
The famous 1950 report of APSA’s Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, has cut a strange career path, serving in turn as a high-stature disciplinary statement, a scholarly punching bag, a cautionary tale about academic ventures in real-world prescription, and—in our current polarized age—an ironic invocation by political scientists warning each other to be careful what they wish for. What it has not been, until now, is the subject of a sustained book-length intellectual history that both contextualizes the work’s outlook and unpacks its particulars. Mark Wickham Jones’s exhaustively researched monograph draws from existing historical analyses of the committee while vastly outstripping them in its archival detail and comprehensiveness. In the process of doing this, the book also joins the surprisingly limited ranks (alongside works by Jessica Blatt and Theodore Rosenoff) of sustained historical analyses of the development of American political science writ large.

The major value of the book lies in the granular detail enabled by Wickham-Jones’s herculean research effort in over twenty-five manuscript collections. What his excavation unearths is the early postwar story of a scholarly field in flux, with leading political scientists returning from wartime public service eager to engage prescriptively in major questions of good governance just as an ascendant behavioralism began to promulgate a new skepticism of the discipline’s institutional focus and normative bent. The APSA Committee on Political Parties, led by E.E. Schattschneider and championing the responsible-party doctrine he had helped to revive, did its work during just this transitional period, which is partly what left it so vulnerable. Wickham-Jones engages this key dynamic as well as a kaleidoscopic array of additional questions—so many, indeed, that the book’s thoroughness can sometimes overshadow its arguments. He lays out the book’s inquiry thusly:

> How did the committee come to write such a report, what impact did it have, what theory fashioned its conclusions, what role did the British political system play in its deliberations, and what part did partisan politics have in shaping these activities? Why did party government ostensibly drop off the intellectual agenda surrounding American political science in the early 1950s? (p. 17)

Wickham-Jones addresses each of these subjects in turn with a characteristic care and restraint that can occasionally leave the reader yearning for more definitive and sweeping claims. But the benefit of such analytical caution lies precisely in conveying the multiple, complex motivations driving both the production and reception of a collective work of public scholarship like the APSA report.
He does a particular service in moving the Committee’s work out from under Schattschneider’s shadow. While crediting the Wesleyan University professor both for guiding the committee’s correspondence and meetings over the course of the late 1940s and for ensuring that the animating spirit of responsible party advocacy would inform the group’s output, Wickham-Jones emphasizes the more central role played by three members employed full-time in the federal government: Paul David, Bertram Gross, and Fritz Morstein Marx. As Senate and executive branch staffers, these three worked intensively on the 1946 Full Employment Act; an article by Schattschneider about the necessity of party cohesion for making the legislation’s provisions on national economic planning work inspired David and Marx to propose to APSA a committee to study American party organizations. Formally emulating the APSA committee on Congress chaired by George Galloway (which had directly influenced reform legislation in 1946), the Committee on Political Parties reflected more broadly the discipline’s confidently prescriptive postwar mandate, well captured in an APSA pamphlet in 1946: “The purpose of the study of political science is the maximum of good government for the people” (213).

A political motivation more ideologically pointed than mere “good government” drove the key committee members’ work, however. Wickham-Jones effectively situates the midcentury revival of responsible party doctrine within the context of liberal Democratic frustration at the obstructionism of dissenting southern conservatives in the congressional party during the Roosevelt and Truman years. Remaking the American party system into a contest of two centralized, disciplined, and programmatically distinct national parties would, so the thinking among the liberal scholars who advocated it went, eliminate such obstructionism and facilitate more active federal planning, regulation, and social provision. As Schattschneider put it in an unpublished manuscript, “The idea of party government is a Democratic idea” (232).

It continued to be even after the scholarly debate over the committee’s report died down. On this subject, I think, Wickham-Jones gives the report’s influence short shrift by remaining too focused on the immediate, committee-centered discussion (or lack thereof) in the broader public. He emphasizes APSA’s botched rollout, which generated little publicity for the report, and the rapid decline of literal references to it in journalism and politics. But the language and outlook of party responsibility and issue-driven partisanship survived for years after, informing the work of liberal advocacy groups, Democratic club organizations, and the belated push for reforms aimed at congressional seniority and the committee system. No doubt the absence of sustained discussion of race and civil rights in the book reflects the same absence in Wickham-Jones’s archival sources, moreover. But the importance of civil rights to the party realignment that responsible-party advocates envisioned—epitomized by the career-making 1948 convention speech by the doctrine’s great political champion, Hubert Humphrey, on behalf of a robust civil rights platform plank—makes the omission regrettable.

The robust critical response that the report engendered has long colored its reputation. Wickham-Jones identifies two key dimensions of critique, distinguishing those who disagreed normatively with the reports’ prescriptions from those who considered its analysis fundamentally
crude and unscientific. Along the first dimension, the report inspired champions of traditionally decentralized and non-ideological American parties to mount a defense of its virtues. American parties are “big and clumsy, and loosely hung together,” wrote one such critic, Ruth Silva, “largely because the United States is big and clumsy, and loosely hung together” (121). Along the second dimension, Wickham-Jones uses a nuanced account of the scholarly relationship between Schattschneider and V.O. Key to shed light on how behavioralism’s rise impacted political science’s public role. He rightly points to recent evidence for a revived interest by political scientists in “wider engagement outside of the immediate scholarly community” (17). This mammoth, essential history of a particularly notable past effort at such engagement richly conveys both its perils and its promise.

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