The Causes and Consequences of “Running Scared”

Richard Herrera and Michael Yawn

Despite attention given to the advantage of incumbency and the tireless pursuit of a personal vote by members of Congress, little attention has been directed at the consequences of the ‘running scared’ phenomenon. Specifically, the relationship between congressional behavior and changes in the electorate is as yet unspecified. Did the erosion of partisanship in the electorate facilitate the emergence of a new style of representative? Or did the activities of members of Congress beginning in the years immediately following World War II contribute to a partisan dealignment? Drawing on the work of Fiorina and using some available but heretofore neglected data, we demonstrate that changes in congressional behavior were spurred by an increased sensitivity to electoral fortunes and began prior to the electoral dealignment of the 1960s. Further, we show that the changing behavior of House members was working to weaken partisan ties among the electorate.

In 1950, Senator Walter George of Georgia garnered one hundred percent of the vote for the second consecutive election, and was beginning his fifth full term in the world’s most prestigious deliberative body. As chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he was an architect of the nation’s foreign policy and a key advisor to Presidents. Within the Senate, only Robert Taft had greater prestige and influence. But he was also seventy-two years old, an infrequent visitor to the state that he represented, and ill-attuned to emerging political realities. By 1956, his long decaying in-state political organization was a shadow of a shade, many of his political allies had retired or died, and he faced the strongest electoral challenge of his career. After a brief campaign, he declined the election (Jewell and Patterson 1986, 54).

As Jewell and Patterson (1986) note, there is no contemporary equivalent to George’s political career. Nowadays, long careers are still common—in fact, more common—but they cannot be forged, as George’s was, without sedulous attention to electoral imperatives. Over the past fifty years, members of Congress have responded to these imperatives, and, in the process, have changed the manner in which constituents are represented.

Today, members of Congress are characterized by scholars as “single-minded seekers of reelection” (Mayhew 1974a, 5). Seemingly, they do quite well in this regard, inasmuch as reelection rates hover perpetually in the 90-95 percent range, even in years of scandal, recession, pestilence and plague.

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These data, however, are not persuasive: “No matter how secure their electoral circumstances may seem . . . members of Congress can always find reasons to feel insecure” (Fenno 1978, 14). Incumbents perceive themselves to be “unsafe at any margin” (Mann 1978), subjected to a Hobbesian world of “random terror” (Weisberg 1981) fraught with biennial elections and capricious electorates.

These fears have spurred members to dwell on matters not likely envisioned by Madison. Consider the ruminations of one of Fenno’s congressmen:

Do you know that a man who eats salmon and crackers with you will vote for you? And if a man takes a bite of your chewing tobacco—or better still if he gives you a bite of his chewing tobacco, he’ll not only vote for you, he’ll fight for you (1978, 64).

Of course, most members today eschew tobacco, but their pursuits are no more elevating. Rather than embrace “deliberation and debate,” they engage in “credit claiming and constituency service” (King 1997, 157). The costs of this style of representation “measured in terms of lost time, dignity, and self-respect, are heavy” (Matthews 1960, 226) but not quite so heavy as the costs of electoral loss. According to Fiorina (1977a, 37), today’s congressman is “sufficiently interested in reelection that he would rather be reelected as an errand boy than not be reelected at all.” In less than half a century, the image of an electorally-obsessed member of Congress has emerged (Alford and Brady 1993; Herrera and Yawn 1999).

Scholars devote much attention to these changes in congressional behavior, with most studies focusing on the relationship between representational style and vote returns (Erikson 1972; Mayhew 1974b; Fiorina 1977a; Fiorina 1977b; Born 1979; Krehbiel and Wright 1983; Cain et al. 1987; Alford and Brady 1993; Herrera and Yawn 1999). As partisan loyalties among the electorate declined, voters responded less to partisan and issue messages and relied more heavily on incumbency as a voting cue. Hence, representatives who exploited their incumbency status by pushing casework, advertising personal attributes, and serving as a legislative tribune for their districts were rewarded on election day, while members who persisted in pushing partisan issues and controversial legislation stood in electoral peril. Over the span of three or four decades, the errand-boy representative has come to dominate the House and the legacy of Edmund Burke finds few takers.

While many students of politics were quick to notice these trends, the precise relationship between electoral dealignment and changes in congressional representation remain unclear. Writing in 1977, Albert Cover (540) summarized the state of the literature: “We know incumbents have benefited
from changes in mass electoral behavior. What we do not know is whether incumbents have played an active role in inducing these changes.” This question has since been addressed by many (Ferejohn 1977; Fiorina 1977a; Fiorina 1977b; Born 1979; Parker 1980; Krehbiel and Wright 1983; Garand and Gross 1984; Ansolabehere et al. 2000), but the answer is “still disputed” (Jacobson 1987a, 134). Did members of Congress “accept willy-nilly, a kind of Faustian bargain: greater power over their own electoral fortunes, but at the price of being condemned to unrelenting entrepreneurial effort” (Jacobson 1987b, 40)? As Jacobson further notes,

The bargain has consequences far beyond the electoral arena, for the internal politics of Congress and its performance as an institution are deeply affected by how its members win and hold office. This is why it is important to understand what has happened (1987b, 40).

In this paper we offer evidence that helps us understand what happened and resolve the dispute, arguing that incumbents did, in fact, play an active role in inducing changes among the electorate. Drawing on the work of Fiorina and using some available but heretofore neglected data, we demonstrate that changes in congressional behavior were spurred by an increased sensitivity to electoral fortunes and began prior to the electoral dealignment of the 1960s. Further, we show that these activities did not go unnoticed by the electorate, inattentive though that electorate might have been (Campbell et al. 1960; Miller and Stokes 1963). We conclude by discussing the connection between the electorate’s partisan attachments and congressional behavior.

**Generational Replacement in the United States Congress**

As the 79th Congress took its seats in early 1945, a large proportion of the members found the surroundings very familiar. One hundred and two of the members had served at least twelve years consecutively. Throughout the entire 19th century, no single session of Congress could lay claim to more than twenty-three members with twelve years of service, but from 1945 to the present, at least a hundred such members have been present in every session. By this time, the congressional climate had changed, both literally and figuratively. According to Jim Martin, “The installation of air conditioning the 1930s did more, I believe, than cool the Capitol: it prolonged the session. The members were no longer in such a hurry to flee Washington in July” (quoted in Davidson and Oleszek 1994, 35). There was also the presence of a “professional” legislator (Price 1975) who worked in an organization that was institutionalized and whose “apprenticeship period had lengthened” (Polsby 1968, 146). The path to power in the modern Congress
was longer, but the value of the office was greater (Hibbing 1991, 416-420). So while House seats were safe enough in the 19th century, “the desire and incentive to retain one’s seat” had increased by the mid 1940s (Price 1975, 9). Accordingly, as New Deal programs moved into their second and third decades of existence, the workload of the legislator increased: from the 1950s to the present, the number of hours in session, committee meetings, and floor votes have doubled (Davidson and Oleszek 1994). To accommodate these changes, members increased their staffs by more than a factor of four in less than three decades.

These changes positioned Congress as the “cornerstone of the Washington establishment” (Fiorina 1977a), and changed the incentives associated with congressional service. As new members took their seats in “the cockpit of government” (Fiorina 1977a, 39), they found the prospect of a long congressional career more appealing than had previous generations. Consequently, the prospect of electoral defeat loomed larger for these individuals, spurring them to find new ways to maintain their incumbency status. Happily for them, their emergence coincided with the rise of an activist federal government, presenting them with intriguing electoral possibilities. As the federal bureaucracy increased in size to cope with ever-proliferating responsibilities, delays, red tape, and inefficiency increased commensurately. Congressmen were in a position to benefit from this phenomenon, however, by expediting the bureaucratic process for their constituents, and they exploited relentlessly this position in an attempt to curry constituent favor (Fiorina 1977a; Fiorina 1977b; see also, Alford and Brady 1993).

In short, the representative that emerged from the years immediately following World War II was singularly motivated by electoral concerns and uniquely positioned to act on those concerns. As more of this generation was elected, the nature of Congress and the representational relationship was transformed. Dwindling were the Burkean legislators of a previous generation; in their place was a group of representatives who had mastered the art of electioneering (Alford and Brady 1993; Herrera and Yawn 1999).¹

It is important to note that Fiorina’s theory suggests that House members were beginning to change their behavior ten to fifteen years before partisan loyalties began to weaken among the electorate (Converse 1976). Thus, congressmen not only helped create big government, they also worked to create changes among the electorate: “voting behavior did not change by itself. Rather, voting behavior changed in part because congressional behavior changed” (Fiorina 1977a, 50). By the middle of the 1970s, according to Fiorina (1977a; 1977b), almost all House members resembled Representative B, big government was well established, the electorate was splitting tickets like kindling wood, and, paradoxically, incumbents were running scared.
Fiorina’s theory rests on three related propositions: (1) Representatives elected in the years immediately following World War II were more concerned with electoral prospects than their more senior counterparts, (2) the electoral concerns of this generation spurred them to adopt a different style of representation, one revolving around constituency service, the advertisement of positive personal qualities, and service as a tribune for their districts, and (3) this change in congressional behavior spurred their constituents to rely less on partisan cues and more on personal cues when making voting decisions. Taken together, these propositions offer strong theoretical insight into the origins of the change in the behavior of House members and the electorate.

Data and Methodology

We examine congressional behavior in the 1950s using data from the Miller-Stokes American Representation Study, conducted in 1958. These data are uniquely placed to capture the views of these political actors in the time frame of interest. All of the respondents were either candidates for, or members of, the House of Representatives during the 1958 congressional elections. A total of 285 candidates from 151 congressional districts were sampled, with 251 individuals taking part in the survey. We analyze the data from the 129 incumbents responding to the survey.

The timing of this survey is crucial. Approximately a third of the sample was elected before 1946, while two-thirds were elected in 1946 or later, providing us with a mix of both types of representatives. Moreover, the data were collected when party identification was an especially strong voting cue for much of the electorate, a half decade before the weakening of party loyalties in the 1960s (Converse 1976). This latter point is especially important insofar as it allows us to test whether incumbents initiated these behavioral changes or whether they were merely reacting to changes in the partisan makeup of the electorate that began in the middle 1960s.

While these data may prove sufficient for detecting trends in congressional behavior, they tell us little about how the electorate was reacting to these changes. Therefore, we add data from the American National Election Study conducted in 1958. By matching constituent and incumbent data, we are positioned to determine whether emerging congressional strategies were having their desired effect on the electorate. Finally, we added election data from Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to Voting Scores, America Votes, and from The United States Congressional District Data Books.

Central to the analyses presented below is the postulate that in the 1950s members differed with regard to electoral concerns and that these concerns had important consequences on the behavior of incumbents. To examine these processes, and some of the assumptions upon which they are
predicated, we begin by providing a descriptive analysis of Congress and its members’ electoral outlook in 1958. If Fiorina’s theory is correct, we would expect much more variance on measurements of insecurity in the 1950s than scholars depicted in the 1970s and beyond. Second, we extend these analyses by testing for differences in the electoral outlook between representatives elected after the Second World War and representatives elected during or before the war—holding objective measures of safety constant. As a measure of perceived safety we use the question, “How about the relative strength of the parties in your district? Over the years has the district been a safe district, a fairly close district, or what?” Responses ranged from very safe (?) to very unsafe (1). Following Fiorina’s theory, these electoral perceptions should be driven, at least in part, by generational differences in career objectives and representational styles. If newly elected members are more career-oriented than their more senior counterparts, then they should be more concerned with electoral security, even after controlling for objective measures of safety. Otherwise, we should find no differences in subjective electoral concern between these two groups of legislators. To test this, we include measures for generation and objective measures of electoral safety. The generational measure is binary, coded 1 if the member was elected in 1946 or later and coded 0 if elected before 1946. The objective measures of safety tap both individual electoral performance and district partisanship. The measure of individual electoral performance was derived by subtracting the candidate’s share of the vote in 1956 from his share in 1958. District partisanship was measured by averaging the district vote for the presidential candidate of the House candidate’s party in 1952 and 1956.

In addition, we want to identify the behavioral consequences of perceived electoral insecurity. We hypothesize that members who are electorally fearful will govern differently, campaign differently and campaign harder than their more secure counterparts. Generally, they will undertake campaign and governing activities designed to win votes; in particular, they will seek to cultivate a personal vote: “that portion of a candidate’s electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain et al. 1987, 9).

Included in our analyses are measures tapping these various activities. As a broad measure of vote-seeking behavior, we include an item gauging the extensiveness of the candidate’s campaign: “How extensive a campaign did you conduct this year?” Responses ranged from one to five, with five indicating “very extensive” and one reflecting “no campaign.” We expect members who are electorally fearful to mount a more extensive campaign than their more secure counterparts, again, after controlling for objective electoral risk.
As measures of members’ pursuit of the “personal vote,” we include four additional items. First, we measure the members’ attitudes towards constituency service: “How important a part of your job do you think constituent services should be?” Responses ranged from five (most important) to one (not important at all). Constituency service cuts across party lines, thus providing personal voting cues as opposed to partisan cues. The insecure representative should place great emphasis on constituent service in an effort to win votes, while the opposite should hold true for secure members.

Second, we include a measure of the primary voting cue of the legislator: “If you felt that a majority of the people in your district were opposed to important bills in your party’s legislative program, how would you probably vote on these bills?” Responses ranged from five (“would follow opinion of district” without qualification) to one (“would vote for party’s program” without qualification). This item measures the member’s pursuit of a “policy-based personal vote” by serving “as a tribune of the district and [advocating] policies favorable to it in the legislature” (Cain et al. 1987, 153). Representatives seeking to enlarge their personal vote are likely to push policies favorable to their district and avoid party line voting, which will almost certainly prove unpopular with those who identify with opposing parties. As a related measure, we include members’ party support scores. This measure reflects the percentage of 37 House party-unity roll calls in 1958 on which the member voted in agreement with a majority of his own party. We expect that insecure members will have lower party scores than their more secure counterparts.

Finally, we include an item about the nature of the candidate’s campaign: “What were the main things you tried to get across in your campaign?” In particular, we are interested in whether the candidate emphasized personal or nonpersonal information. Candidates mentioning qualities such as experience (inside or outside of Washington), seniority, or incumbency status were coded as having run a personal campaign (coded one). Candidates giving primary emphasis to other themes were coded as having run a nonpersonal campaign (coded as zero). Taking a strong position on issues may prove divisive, while stressing experience, incumbency status, or seniority may appeal to voters across party lines, thereby increasing a candidate’s personal vote.3

Measures of party, heterogeneity of district, urbanization of district, and region were included as controls for political and demographic differences among the candidates and their districts. There are strong theoretical reasons for including each of these control variables. The two parties differ with regard to ideology and base support. These differences are likely to influence legislators’ perspectives on representation. Moreover, the electoral
vulnerability of the candidates in 1958 was determined largely by party, with Republicans losing forty-eight seats. The heterogeneity of a district may also influence a representative’s perspective. Heterogeneous districts may have greater potential for division, thereby creating greater incentives for legislators to emphasize personal qualities rather than issues. Urbanization has been noted in the literature on state politics to influence the relative importance of various issues (Dye 1986). The geographic region of the district may have an important influence on representatives’ perspectives. In particular, the South is likely to differ—especially during the 1950s—from the rest of the country. The differences in cultures between the South and the rest of the nation are likely to lead to differences in the attitudes that representatives hold, as well as the strategies they use to garner votes.

Results

We begin with a breakdown of members’ perceptions of electoral security, comparing those from “safe seats” with those from “marginal seats.” By the 1970s, scholars could reasonably argue that members of Congress “always find reasons to feel insecure” (Fenno 1978, 14) or that incumbents perceive themselves to be “unsafe at any margin” (Mann 1978). But was this true in the 1950s?

To test this, we compared members’ perceptions of security (using the seven-point scale described above) with two objective measures of electoral safety: (1) percentage of vote received in previous election and (2) whether that percentage had risen or fallen over the previous two elections. Congressmen were coded as perceiving their districts as safe if they characterized their districts as “safe district” or “fairly safe district.” Congressmen were coded as perceiving their districts as unsafe if they described their districts as “unsafe,” “fairly close district, leaning against member’s party,” “fairly close district, goes back and forth,” or “fairly close district, leans to member’s party.” The results are presented in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congressmen who won more than 55% in last election</th>
<th>Perceived Seat as “Safe”</th>
<th>Perceived Seat as “Unsafe”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congressmen whose vote share increased last election</th>
<th>Perceived Seat as “Safe”</th>
<th>Perceived Seat as “Unsafe”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results show that a significant minority of members felt insecure about the safety of their districts despite reassuring electoral returns. Some members apparently felt “unsafe at any margin,” but this outlook remained in the minority—and was certainly not the pervasive phenomenon identified in the 1970s. Ironically, representatives appear to have felt more secure about their electoral prospects before the “marginals vanished.”

While the variance among congressmen in the 1950s is consistent with Fiorina’s theory, it does not tell us which members of Congress were describing their “safe” districts as “unsafe.” To that analysis, we turn next.

In our second analysis, we examine the impact of generation on members’ perceptions of electoral safety. We suspect that as Congress gained institutional strength, the prospect of a congressional career became more attractive. As noted in one popular textbook, the growth of the federal government “enhanced the excitement and glamour of the national political scene” (Davidson and Oleszek 1994, 35). It was on this scene that this new generation of representatives burst in the late 1940s and 1950s (Herrera and Yawn 1999). Therefore, we hypothesize that the new generation of House members were more protective of their congressional careers and, hence, more threatened by signs of electoral risk.

To test this, we use the following model, and the results are presented in Table 2.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>β (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party (Dem = 1/Rep = 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban = 1/ Rural = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (South = 1/non South = 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Partisanship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous vote shares (1958-1956)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (B = 1/A = 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordinary Least Squares regression was used to produce estimates. Sources: 1958 Miller-Stokes American Representation Study, 1956 and 1958 Congressional election returns, and United States Congressional District Data Books. The cases were weighted in accordance with codebook instructions to ensure a representative sample.

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Perceived Safety = a + β₁ heterogeneity + β₂ party + β₃ urbanization +
β₄ region + β₅ district partisanship + β₆ prior electoral performance + β₇ generation + e.

As the results in Table 2 indicate, the generation variable behaves as expected. Representatives elected after World War II scored, on average, almost one half of a point lower on the seven-point perceived safety scale than did their more senior counterparts: The post war generation appears to have hit the ground running scared. Moreover, this fear exists independent of electoral circumstances. Both the partisanship of the district and prior electoral performance had an impact on perceived safety, but the generation variable is significant even with these controls in place.

The findings presented in Table 2 suggest that congressional candidates elected after the second World War were more concerned with electoral prospects than their more senior peers. Although many factors may account for this concern with electoral security, we suggest that the institutionalization of Congress as the cornerstone of the Washington establishment following the New Deal is of prime importance. Whether these concerns influenced the behavior of these members is a question we turn to in our next analysis.

In our third set of analyses, we test the hypothesis that perceptions of electoral safety have behavioral consequences independent of objective electoral risk. We suspect that those members who fear for their electoral safety (disproportionately appearing amidst the ranks of the newly elected) will be more likely to pursue vigorously vote-seeking activities. Further, we suspect that these members will not be satisfied with attracting support from traditional quarters, such as their partisan base. Their desire to maintain or advance their careers will move them to seek new bases of support. We test the hypothesis that those members who perceive a greater electoral threat will: (1) campaign more extensively, (2) place greater emphasis on constituency service, (3) vote as a tribune for their district, (4) support their party less when voting on legislation, and (5) be more likely to run personal campaigns. We use the following OLS regression model:

Y = a + β₁ heterogeneity + β₂ party + β₃ urbanization + β₄ region +
β₅ district partisanship + β₆ prior electoral performance +
β₇ perceived safety + e.

Where Y is the five activities mentioned above.

As the results in Table 3 show, the data offer strong evidence that perceptions of electoral security have important behavioral consequences similar to those theorized about by Fiorina. The subjective measure of
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Table 3. Effects of Perceived Safety on Members’ Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency Service</th>
<th>Party Support</th>
<th>Voting Style</th>
<th>Campaign Extensiveness</th>
<th>Personal Campaign*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.26 (.36)***</td>
<td>46.89 (4.97)***</td>
<td>5.44 (.52)***</td>
<td>6.44 (.49)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
<td>.27 (.06)***</td>
<td>4.76 (.88)***</td>
<td>.19 (.09)**</td>
<td>.1 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party (Dem/Rep)</td>
<td>.27 (.14)*</td>
<td>12.31 (1.9)***</td>
<td>-.38 (.19)**</td>
<td>-1.63 (.2)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>.28 (.12)**</td>
<td>-8.05 (1.57)***</td>
<td>-.27 (.17)</td>
<td>.62 (.15)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (S/NonS)</td>
<td>1.14 (.19)***</td>
<td>-21.71 (2.5)***</td>
<td>.38 (.28)</td>
<td>.88 (.28)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Partisanship</td>
<td>.01 (.006)</td>
<td>.12 (.09)</td>
<td>-.014 (.01)*</td>
<td>-.02 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous vote shares</td>
<td>.01 (.004)**</td>
<td>.07 (.05)</td>
<td>.02 (.01)***</td>
<td>.03 (.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Safety</td>
<td>-.32 (.04)***</td>
<td>.93 (.54)*</td>
<td>-.1 (.05)*</td>
<td>-.18 (.05)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N        | 360 | 374 | 215 | 334 | 334 |
| Adj. R²  | .21 | .30 | .12 | .274| .274 |

Ordinary Least Squares regression was used to produce estimates for the first four models. LOGIT was used to produce estimates in the personal campaign model.

Sources: 1958 Miller-Stokes American Representation Study, 1956 and 1958 Congressional election returns, and United States Congressional District Data Books. The cases were weighted in accordance with codebook instructions to ensure a representative sample.

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

*76.35% of the cases were predicted correctly. The null prediction is 73.4%, meaning the LOGIT model reduces the predicted errors by 11.2%.

Ordinary Least Squares regression was used to produce estimates for the first four models. LOGIT was used to produce estimates in the personal campaign model. Perceived safety is statistically significant across all five of the models—in the hypothesized direction. Indeed, it is one of only two variables in the equation that are statistically significant across all models. Curiously, district partisanship and prior electoral performance are significant in only two and three of the models, respectively. Perceived safety is a more consistent predictor of vote-seeking activities than the two objective measures included in the model. These results suggest that it is not that “incumbents in marginal districts work especially hard to establish a personal vote” (Ansolabehere et al. 2000, 30), but rather that incumbents who believe themselves to be vulnerable,
regardless of their actual electoral safety, pursue vigorously a personal vote. More importantly, we measure “subjective marginality,” a suggestion made by Cover (1980, 131), and find that it exerts a strong independent influence, even when various objective measures of safety are included.

Nor does it appear that these vote-seeking activities are chosen randomly. Rather, members appear to engage in activities that emphasize incumbency cues rather than party cues: they stress the importance of constituency service, they have lower party voting scores, they are guided by the wishes of their district rather than party platforms when casting roll-call votes, and they are more likely to run personal campaigns than those who feel electorally secure. These data indicate that members’ perceptions have important effects on the set of activities in which they engage.

These findings indicate that electoral concerns increased among congressional incumbents in the years immediately following World War II—ten to fifteen years before the weakening of party loyalties among the electorate. And, as a result, incumbents began avoiding partisan cues and emphasizing incumbency cues when governing, interacting with constituents, and campaigning. At the very least, this confirms our suspicion that changes in congressional behavior were not a response to the partisan dealignment of the 1960s. We suggest something more than this: it is our contention that incumbents’ electoral insecurity and electoral strategies contributed to the electorate’s weakening party loyalties.

There is little reason to expect, however, that massive changes among the electorate had already taken place by the late 1950s. Representative B types were just emerging and their electoral strategies were still green, an unlikely scenario for radical changes in constituent voting behavior. Certainly there is little evidence of a large increase in defections to incumbents during this decade (Jacobson 1997, 93; Bartels 2000, 46-49).

Given the strong influence of party identification, it is not likely that voters of the 1950s would quickly abandon their short way with members of opposing parties. But, we suspect that the seeds of dealignment were being sown during the 1950s and that traces of congressional influence may have been evident among the electorate as early as 1958. We expect, then, that the activities of Type B representatives were not going unnoticed by their constituents. By matching constituent data from the 1958 American National Election Study with data from the 1958 Miller-Stokes American Representation Study we test this proposition.

We predict that incumbents who perceive themselves to be unsafe, campaign extensively, campaign on personal issues, have low party support scores, push constituency service, and vote with the district will be better known among constituents, and will be more likely to induce constituents to defect. Crucial to this investigation is the selection of appropriate measures.
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tapping constituents’ knowledge of candidates and constituents’ likelihood of defecting to candidates. First, we measure constituents’ knowledge of the incumbent with the following question: “Of course, the names aren’t too important, but there were two major candidates, Mr. (NAME OF DEMOCRAT) who ran on the Democratic ticket and Mr. (NAME OF REPUBLICAN) who ran on the Republican ticket. Do you happen to know (IF EITHER OF THESE CANDIDATES) is already in Congress?” Constituents who correctly identified the incumbent were coded as 1; constituents who incorrectly identified the incumbent (or indicated ignorance) were coded as 0.

Second, we measured constituents’ knowledge of incumbents’ activities with the following question: “Do you happen to remember anything special that (THE INCUMBENT) has done for this district or for the people in this district while he has been a congressman? If yes, What was that?” Responses to this question were coded in such a manner so that they ranged from 4 (high level of personal, constituent, or district-related activities) to 0 (low level of personal, constituent, or district-related activities).

Third, we examined whether constituents defected to the incumbent congressman (coded 1), or whether they voted with their party—against the incumbent (coded 0). Again, the historical record suggests that defections were not common during the 1950s, so we expect the correlations between personal vote-getting strategies and defection to be weak.

While not comprehensive, these measures give us a sense of (1) whether the candidate was known, (2) what the candidate was known for, and (3) whether constituents defected from the opposing party to vote for the incumbent. We hypothesize that Representative B type characteristics will be correlated with constituents’ knowledge and likelihood of defecting.

Ideally, we would like more measures of constituents’ knowledge of incumbents and more measures of incumbent behavior. No doubt incumbents engage in myriad activities designed to win favor with constituents. Unfortunately, we are limited by available measures. For this reason, the measure of perceived safety is an especially important part of this analysis. We know that perceived safety is strongly related to the personal vote-seeking activities tested in Table 3; presumably, it is also related to vote-seeking activities for which we lack measures. Thus, the perceived safety measure is included as proxy measure for vote-seeking activities for which we lack data.

We present our findings in Table 4.

The coefficients are generally weak, although many are statistically significant. Moreover, all of the coefficients that are significant are in the hypothesized direction. Campaign extensiveness, emphasizing personal issues while campaigning and pushing constituent service are all positively
related to constituents’ ability to recall the incumbent’s name. The congressman’s perceived safety is also related to constituent recall: incumbents who perceive themselves as most safe are the least likely to be identified correctly by constituents. Only the incumbents’ voting behavior is unrelated to constituents’ ability to recall the incumbents.

These data also support our hypothesis relating to the kinds of things that constituents are able to recall about incumbents. Constituents are more likely to remember personal information about incumbents and district-related activities engaged in by incumbents if the incumbent emphasized personal issues while campaigning, voted with constituent opinion rather than party platforms, and pushed constituent services. Further, perceived safety was also related to constituent recall in the expected direction: incumbents who perceived themselves as safe were least likely to have constituents remember them for personal or district-related activities. The extensiveness of the incumbents’ campaign and the party support of the incumbent are not related to constituent recall.

Finally, there is moderate support for the hypothesis that these incumbent-driven activities caused constituents to defect in the late 1950s. Perceived safety is related to defections: Incumbents who perceive themselves as safe are least likely to induce voters to defect to them. This finding is counterintuitive, because it suggests that those who feel they are in the most electoral danger, Fiorina’s Representative B, are the incumbents who are most successful at winning votes of members of opposing parties.

Table 4. The Effect of Incumbent Behavior on Constituent Recall and Likelihood of Defecting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name Recognition</th>
<th></th>
<th>Recall of Services</th>
<th></th>
<th>Defection</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Support</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate Orientation</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency Service</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td>1403</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>1403</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Extensiveness</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Campaigning</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>1142</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>1142</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Electoral Safety</td>
<td>-.14***</td>
<td>1368</td>
<td>-.08***</td>
<td>1368</td>
<td>-.14***</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 1958 American National Election Study; 1958 Miller-Stokes American Representation Study. The cases were weighted in accordance with codebook instructions to ensure a representative sample.

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Conclusions

Using data collected by Warren Miller and Donald Stokes in the 1950s, as well as data on congressional elections, we address three unresolved (or partially resolved) issues in the literature. First, did a new type of representative, one more concerned with electoral prospects, emerge in the 1950s? We theorize that, following World War II and the New Deal, the role of Congress in the political process (and, by extension, the role of the congressman) grew more important—making a career in Congress look more attractive to the ambitious politician (Fiorina 1977a; Fiorina 1977b). For these new career-minded members, concern over electoral fortunes was paramount. The findings in the first section of this paper are consistent with this theory: Newly elected representatives were more likely to perceive electoral danger—even when controlling for electoral circumstances—than were their more senior counterparts.

The implications of this finding extend beyond the psychological condition of representatives. Extending our theory, we hypothesized that representatives who were consumed with electoral prospects would engage in activities that they believed would attenuate the threat of electoral defeat. In the second section of the paper, we tested this hypothesis, finding that perceptions of electoral insecurity are related to an increase in the importance of constituency service, a greater likelihood of voting with district sentiments as opposed to party platforms, more extensive campaigning, and an increased likelihood of emphasizing personal characteristics when campaigning. The rise in these activities since the 1950s is well documented (Fiorina 1977a; Fiorina 1977b; Davidson and Oleszek 1994; Jacobson 1997; Herrera and Yawn 1999), suggesting that the results presented here reflect a long-term change in the nature of the representative relationship.

Further, the timing of these changes suggests that representatives were not simply responding to changes in partisanship of the electorate—changes that did not begin until the middle of the 1960s. Our findings demonstrate that congressional incumbents began avoiding partisan cues and emphasizing incumbency cues when party voting was strongest among the electorate. The evidence supports strongly Fiorina’s (1977a, 50) assertion that the electorate’s “voting behavior did not change by itself. Rather, voting behavior changed in part because congressional behavior changed.” Of course, temporal precedence does not necessarily indicate causality, leading us to test this hypothesis directly. Combining constituent data with data from the Miller-Stokes Representation study, we found that these activities were having an effect on the electorate: Constituents represented by electorally obsessed members who pushed personal cues were more likely to recognize the name of their representative, more likely to remember personal things
about him, more likely to remember things that he did for the district, and
more likely to defect to the incumbent than constituents represented by
trustee-type representatives.

Taken together, the findings presented above indicate that the behavior
of the contemporary congressman and of the contemporary congressional
voter can be traced to the 1950s—originating with ambitious politicians who
came of age in the Post World War II era. On the surface, the consequences
of these changes appear to have benefited incumbents mightily, insofar as
these strategies have increased incumbent victory margins over the past four
decades (Herrera and Yawn 1999).

This trend, however, is tinged with irony. As Jacobson has noted
(1987a), the increase in vote shares won by incumbents has not produced
increases in the proportion of incumbents winning reelection to the House.
In short, incumbents win by more votes when they do win, but they do not
emerge victorious more often than they did in the 1950s. By emphasizing
personal and incumbency cues, representatives have pushed voters away
from their partisan anchor. While such a strategy is likely to produce more
votes for the incumbent in a given election, it also produces a more volatile
electorate. In the old days, incumbents were the flotsam of fate at election
time; as went partisan tides nationally, so went party members locally.
Today, House incumbents have managed to carve out impressive personal
political franchises—but in so doing they have also contributed to the
erosion of partisan loyalties among the electorate, which has, in turn, led to
unpredictable election outcomes. Since the late 1950s, House members have
been running harder to maintain their political place.

In this light, House members really are “unsafe at any margin,” living
in a world of random terror. But it is a world created, at least in part, by
themselves. Driven by career ambitions, House members created a
Molochian electorate, to whom sacrifices must be made in the form of votes,
favors, and errand-running—at the cost of deliberation and statesmanship.

APPENDIX

VARIABLE CODING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance of Constituency Service*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“How important a part of your job do you think constituent services should be?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = No part at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = Not very important part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = Fairly important part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = Quite important part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 = Most important; very important part</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

continues . . .
APPENDIX (continued)

Voting Style*
“If you felt that a majority of the people in your district were opposed to important bills in your party’s legislative program, how would you probably vote on these bills?
1 = Would vote for party’s program
2 = Would vote for party’s program; with qualification
3 = Pro-con; depends
4 = Would not vote for party’s program; with qualification
5 = Would not vote for party’s program; would follow opinion of district.

Major Emphasis of Campaign*
“What were the main things you tried to get across in your Campaign?”
1 = Personal Campaign. For example, experience, incumbency status, seniority, important committee assignments, or record and experience outside of Congress. In ICPSR Study #7226, we included codes 50-69—those which have the broad subject headings: “(1) R’s Record and Experience and (2) R’s Personal Attributes.”
0 = Other. For example, Support for President, Voting Rights, and Labor policy.

Campaign Extensiveness*
How extensive a campaign did you conduct this year?
1 = Didn’t campaign at all
2 = Not very extensive; didn’t campaign very hard
3 = Fairly extensive
4 = Quite extensive, campaigned a good deal
5 = Very extensive, couldn’t have worked harder

Perceived Safety*
How about the relative strength of the parties in your district. Over the years has the district been a safe district, a fairly close district, or what?
1 = Unsafe District
2 = Fairly unsafe district, usually goes for other party
3 = Fairly close district, other party usually has edge
4 = Fairly close district, goes back and forth
5 = Fairly close district, r’s party usually has edge
6 = Fairly safe district, usually goes to r’s party
7 = Safe district

Party Support Score*
This variable codes the percentage of 37 House Party Unity Roll Calls in 1958 on which the representative voted in agreement with a majority of his party. A party-unity roll call is one on which a majority of voting Republicans oppose a majority of voting Democrats.

Era Elected*
1946 or later = 1
Pre 1946 = 0

Heterogeneity of District*
Representatives’ view of district diversity in response to question “Of course, districts differ a good deal in terms of their economic, racial, ethnic, occupational, religious and social characteristics. From this point of view, what are the important features of your district?”

continues . . .
APPENDIX (continued)

Heterogeneity of District* (continued)
1 = District all of same distinctive national group; district has no particular national 
gruppen; all Native Americans.
2 = District has one or two important national groups, minorities.
3 = District heterogeneous, diversified; has all kinds; has many different national 
gruppen, minorities.

Party*
Democrat=1
Republican=0

Region*
South=1
Non-South=0

Urbanization of District*
Rural=0
Urban=1

District Partisanship+
The average of district vote for the presidential candidate of the candidate’s party in 1952 
and 1956.

Previous vote shares#
The percentage of the vote received in 1956 subtracted from the percentage received in 
1958.

*Data are from the Miller-Stokes American Representation Study.
+Data are from the United States Congressional District Data Books.
#Data are from Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to Voting Scores and America Votes.

NOTES

1Following Fiorina, we refer to representatives elected before 1946 as representa-
tive A types and representatives elected in 1946 or later as representative B types.

2Though some scholars have used the data from the Miller-Stokes American Repre-
sentation study (Cain et al. 1987), their analysis has been limited largely to the constitu-
ency sample.

3These items are not meant to reflect an exhaustive list of the personal vote seeking 
activities undertaken by electorally insecure House members. Rather, they are items from 
the Miller-Stokes data set that best allow us to test for differences in the activities of 
members who consider themselves to face electoral risks and those members who believe 
themselves to be relatively removed from electoral threats. Thus, positive findings would 
suggest that members engage in many other activities—possibly more important activi-
ties—that we lack the data to measure.

4The results of this analysis probably understate the difference between the two 
generations of congressmen. Congressmen elected prior to 1946 and still serving at the 
time of the survey (1958) are probably more electorally concerned than the congressmen 
who lost their elections or retired during the previous twelve years.
Following the findings of Herrera and Yawn (1999, 142, fn. 2) and the theory of Fiorina (1977) we group representatives into the categories of “elected before 1946” and “elected in 1946 or thereafter.”

See Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) for a study of other behavioral consequences of electoral marginality consistent with Fiorina’s theory.

Given the cross-sectional nature of these data, it is difficult to determine whether these differences are a function of generational or career-cycle forces, although previous research lends support to the generational explanation. Hibbing (1991) shows that by the 1970s the differences between senior and junior members with regard to constituent service measures were small. In the modern Congress, “constituency service operations hum along from the start to the end of the congressional career” (Hibbing 1991, 426). The fact that no significant career-cycle differences were evident in the 1970s suggests that a generational change took place sometime prior to the 1970s. Moreover, Herrera and Yawn (1999, 144-146) provide evidence that such a change was indeed generational in nature and was well underway by the 1950s. See also, Fenno (1978, 43).

REFERENCES


