Race, Redistricting, and Re-Election: The Fate of White Incumbent Democrats in the 1994 Congressional Elections

L. Marvin Overby and Robert D. Brown

Critics of racially-motivated congressional redistricting have argued that the practice has numerous negative consequences. Following the Republican victories in the 1994 midterm elections, many critics concluded that the creation of “majority-minority” districts helped the GOP win control of the House of Representatives. In this article we subject that claim to empirical scrutiny. Using a multivariate regression model we examine the electoral fates of white Democrats who had survived the 1992 election. After controlling for other political and personal factors, changes in the racial composition of their districts had little negative impact on these members’ 1994 electoral margins. Moreover, we find that in the South, white Democrats who lost African-American constituents actually fared better than those who had gained them. These results indicate that the impacts of racially-based redistricting are more complicated than many have supposed.

Racial Redistricting and the 1994 Midterms

In 1982 Congress amended the 1965 Voting Rights Act, significantly expanding the requirements on states to take positive actions to promote minority representation. Under the original language of Section 2, the underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities was subject to judicial remedy only if plaintiffs could establish discriminatory intent. While the act mandated federal pre-approval of changes to election laws in covered areas, as originally written it did not place any positive burden on the states to encourage minority representation. The amended Act relaxed the burden of proof required (allowing for judicial relief on the basis of discriminatory outcome) and placing a positive burden on state and local governments to create racially packed districts designed to encourage the election of black representatives. In the 1986 case of Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court interpreted these revisions to require “the creation of a maximum number of minority districts whenever a geographical area contains a large, politically cohesive minority group” (Swain 1993, 197). In practice, following the logic outlined in Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, Mississippi, the federal courts have favored minority congressional districts containing black or Hispanic populations of at least 65 percent to compensate for lower minority turnout rates and bloc voting by whites (Brace, Grofman, Handley, and Niemi 1988; Grofman and Handley 1989).

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The full impact of the new federal guidelines was seen in the decennial redistricting following the 1990 census. Prior to 1992 black voters constituted a majority in only 15 congressional districts nationwide. In the eleven states of the old Confederacy there were only four “majority-minority” districts (one each in Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee). Following the redistricting cycle, the number of such districts almost doubled nationwide, up to 27. In the South which is home to roughly 60 percent of the nation’s African-American citizens, the increase was even more dramatic, with the number of “majority-minority” districts more than tripling (up to 14) (Where Minorities 1993).

Not surprisingly the use of redistricting to enhance minority representation spawned a storm of controversy. Most African Americans and African-American interest groups endorse the procedure, have undertaken the legal actions and political activities necessary to implement it, and generally laud the results (Swain 1993, 200). However, critics raised a number of concerns about racially motivated redistricting, ranging from normative considerations grounded in liberal political theory (see Wells 1982; Berke 1991), to practical worries over the alleged limitations of the strategy for electing black representatives (Swain 1993, 200-201), to anxieties related to the quality of representation in “packed” and/or “ugly” districts (Swain 1993, 72, 197), to empirical questions regarding the behavior of white representatives who lose black constituents to newly created “majority minority” districts (Overby and Cosgrove 1996).

Potentially the most serious concern raised about racially motivated redistricting, however, has a decidedly partisan edge to it. Packing minority voters into “majority minority” districts, it is alleged, could drain strong Democratic voters from surrounding districts, making these neighboring districts whiter, more conservative, and more likely to elect Republican representatives. According to this argument, African Americans might then find themselves represented by black Members of Congress, but in a congressional environment less sensitive to their policy preferences. The empirical support for this position is growing. Based on a study of state legislative redistricting in South Carolina, Brace, Grofman, and Handley (1987; see also Bullock 1987 and 1993) conclude that under certain minimal conditions redistricting “plans which advantage blacks also can be expected to advantage Republicans” even if the Department of Justice is concerned “exclusively with black voting rights” and is not motivated by partisan political matters. As the authors note,

[the reason that helping blacks gain seats in the South Carolina Senate was likely to help Republicans is that the political and racial geography of the State of South Carolina made such a result virtually inevitable. Thus, state
Republicans could pick a plan drawn by Justice Department experts with the sole aim of helping blacks and adopt it as their own—to help Republicans.¹

The Brace, Grofman, and Handley study is limited to only one round of redistricting for one legislative chamber in one state, yet their conclusions help explain the vigor with which Republicans have allied themselves with African-American interest groups in support of the creation of “majority-minority” seats (see Barnes 1991) and have been supported by recent studies by Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran (1996), Lublin (1997), Lublin and Voss (2000), and Shotts (2001).

The results of the 1994 House elections further fueled the debate over racially motivated redistricting. Pundits and scholars alike have declared the election a watershed event, with Republicans picking up 52 House seats—the largest partisan swing in seats since 1948. Many observers—either directly or obliquely—blame the creation of “majority minority” districts for this outcome. In a preliminary post-mortem on the election, Jacobson (1994) notes that the “effects of reapportionment were muted in 1992, because George Bush was a drag on the whole Republican ticket,” but concludes that they were a significant factor in 1994: “minority majority districts . . . strengthened Republicans by packing African-American (that is, Democratic) votes in minority districts.” Miller (1995) is more direct, claiming that

[r]acial gerrymandering . . . doomed at least seven white Democrats to defeat in November, mainly in Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina. . . . What enabled record numbers of blacks to win election to the House in 1992 also planted the seeds for their political disenfranchisement in 1994.

In an innovative simulation undertaken before the midterm elections, Hill (1995) draws similar conclusions, finding that as a result of racial redistricting, Republicans were likely to pick up three southern congressional seats in 1994 and perhaps even more in future election cycles.

Others have drawn different conclusions. After surveying the 54 formerly Democratic seats lost to the Republicans in 1994, the National Association for the Advancement of Color People’s Legal Defense Fund (LDF) concluded that only one could be attributed to the creation of majority-minority districts: the second district of North Carolina (Edsall 1994; Holmes 1994). Even some observers who are usually suspicious of racial redistricting came to similar conclusions. For example, Mark Gersh, Executive Director of the National Committee for an Effective Congress and a critic of racial redistricting, concluded that “[even though racial redistricting was] more of a minus than a plus, . . . it’s not fair to say we got killed because of it” (quoted in Edsall 1994). As one LDF lawyer put it, the 1994 midterms
involved a 30-foot tidal Republican tidal wave, in comparison to which racial redistricting amounted to the removal of one or two sandbags (Holmes 1994).

While both of these perspectives have some intuitive appeal, neither has as yet been subjected to sophisticated, multivariate, empirical scrutiny. In fact, a glance at the 1994 election results indicates that the impacts of racially motivated redistricting might be considerably more complicated than previous accounts have suggested. Table 1 provides a first glimpse at this. Here those white Democrats who had survived redistricting in 1992 and subsequently ran for re-election in 1994 are categorized by whether they gained or lost black constituents, and the mean change in their percentage of the two-party vote (between 1992 and 1994) is reported. Although as the top two rows of the table demonstrate, Democratic vote totals were down all across the nation, outside of the South those Democrats who had gained black constituents fared relatively better—experiencing a modest 1.24 percent average vote loss, compared to an average 4.47 percent loss among those who had lost black constituents. In the South, however, where the bite of majority-minority redistricting was supposed to be the sharpest for white Democrats, the results are reversed. In fact, exactly contrary to the expectations noted above, southern white Democrats—who are supposed to rely most heavily on African-American support for election (Lamis 1990)—did worse in 1994 if they had gained black constituents in 1992. This article explores this empirical finding in greater detail. Since bivariate relationships often evaporate after accounting for other relevant factors, we develop a multivariate model to test more accurately the electoral implications of racial redistricting within the context of several competing explanations for the 1994 midterm results. Even after controlling for the other variables suggested by the congressional elections literature, the percentage change in the black constituency size of a district had a significant negative effect on the vote totals of white southern incumbent members of the House of Representatives. In a closing section we discuss the implications of this conclusion.

The Model

To examine the impact of racial redistricting on incumbent white Democratic House members, we construct a multivariate regression model in which our dependent variable is the log-odds of the Democratic candidate’s percentage of the two-party vote. Following conventional practice we discarded those Louisiana representatives whose at-large elections complicate the analysis and those incumbents who faced no serious opposition (garnering at least 90% of the vote), leaving us with 119 white Democratic
Table 1. Change in Percentage of the Two-Party Vote, 1992-1994, White, Incumbent House Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gained African-American Constituents</th>
<th>Lost African-American Constituents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All White, Incumbent House Members</td>
<td>-3.86</td>
<td>-4.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Southern White, Incumbent House Members</td>
<td>-1.24</td>
<td>-4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern White, Incumbent House Members</td>
<td>-8.15</td>
<td>-5.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cell entries represent changes in percentage of the two-party vote between 1992 and 1994 for various categories of white incumbent members of the U.S. House of Representatives.

incumbents who had served during the 102nd and 103rd Congresses and who stood for reelection in the 1994 general elections.6

Our independent variables of primary interest are designed to tap the impact of racially-motivated redistricting in the context of other factors believed to be associated with the 1994 midterm results. The direct effect of racially-motivated redistricting is operationalized as a measure of change in racial composition of the district—the post-redistricting percentage of African Americans in the district minus the pre-redistricting percentage. In keeping with conventional expectations we hypothesize a positive relationship between this variable and the incumbent Democrats’ two-party vote percentages, with those who lost black constituents faring more poorly in the 1994 midterm.

Following recent literature (Hill 1995) we expect this effect to be greatest in the South. That is, as the percentage of African Americans increase (decrease) in the district, it is southern Democrats who will benefit (suffer) the most. To specify this potential effect, we include a regional dummy variable (coded 1 for representatives from the 11 states of the Old Confederacy, 0 otherwise) and an interaction term defined as the percent change in African-American constituency multiplied by the regional dummy.

To ensure proper model specification and to control for other factors described in the literature, we include several independent variables expected to influence the vote percentages of incumbent Democrats. Naturally, we should expect overall partisan support in the district to translate into votes. As a surrogate for the partisan leaning of these newly redrawn districts, we include Clinton’s percentage of the two-party presidential vote in 1992. We also include two measures designed to tap constituents’ and representatives’ political ideologies. Following Segal, Cameron, and Cover
(1992, 103-105), we disaggregate each member’s 1993 Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score to create both constituency and personal ideology scores. Constituency ideological scores are derived by regressing each member’s raw 1994 ADA score on the median household income and the percentage of college educated adults in each district. The predicted values from this equation estimate a median value for constituents’ ideology within the district. Representatives’ personal ideologies are estimated as the residuals remaining when the estimated constituents’ ideological scores are subtracted from the raw ADA scores.

Along with representative ideology we include two additional variables designed to tap the impact of incumbents’ personal characteristics on their performance in 1994. First, we include a seniority variable in order to account for the effect of length of incumbency on vote percentages. Coded as the year incumbents were first elected to Congress, this variable should generate a positive coefficient if, as expected, more senior members fared worse in the much-touted, “throw the bums out” environment of the 1994 campaigns. Second, we expect that the representatives’ previous vote percentages will be positively correlated with their performance in 1994, and thus include a variable for their percentage of the two-party vote in 1992.

We also include three measures designed to control for the strength of the challengers faced by Democratic incumbents in 1994. First, we operationalize challenger quality using a three point scale. Challengers were coded 0 if they had no recorded political experience, 1 if they had served in an appointed office, and 2 if they had previously been elected to public office. Following Green and Krasno (1988) and Jacobson (1992), we expect experienced challengers to have higher initial name recognition, run more efficient campaigns, and garner higher percentages of the congressional vote. Second, to control for the relative ability of challengers to run visible, professional campaigns, we include a variable for challenger campaign spending, calculated as the natural log of total challenger expenditures recorded in thousands of dollars. Third, to control for the fact that higher quality challengers might make more efficient use of available campaign funds, we created an interactive term by multiplying the challenger quality variable by the spending variable. If this term produces a significant coefficient, it indicates that experienced challengers make better use of the funds available to them.

We also include a measure of incumbents’ spending. Some argue that incumbents’ spending is either unrelated to their success or even inversely related to vote totals, and the modeling of its effect is complicated by serious endogeneity concerns (e.g., Jacobson 1980; 1990). Yet, a growing body of evidence suggests that incumbents can benefit significantly from their own campaign expenditures (see Green and Krasno 1988; Ansolabehere and
Gerber 1994; Goidel and Gross 1996). Following the recent literature, we include a measure of incumbents’ campaign spending calculated as the log of their 1992 fundraising total. The totals are logged to take account of the diminishing marginal utility of campaign funds; the use of 1992 figures avoid the endogeneity problem and can be interpreted as an incumbent’s propensity to raise and spend money (Green and Krasno 1988).11

Finally, to be certain that our analysis focuses on the electoral effects of changes in the African-American percentage of district populations, we include two additional control variables. Since overall levels of black population have been shown to affect electoral results, the first of these is the post-redistricting percentage of each district’s total population that is African American. Second, since the presence of large Hispanic communities is also often associated with Democratic electoral success, we also include a variable measuring the post-redistricting Hispanic percentage of each incumbent’s constituency.

Since several of our variables in our equation have heteroskedastic error terms, we model our equation using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust (Huber) standard errors. This conservative approach allows us to derive a least squares estimate of regression coefficients and also produces robust, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

Analysis

The results of our regression model are summarized in Table 2. With several minor and one major exception, these results are consonant with our expectations. As expected we find strong positive relationships between the performance of these white Democratic incumbents in 1994 and both their and Clinton’s vote totals in the district in 1992. In contrast several factors hurt Democratic incumbents in 1994. Consonant with the literature and our expectations in a year in which Republicans set new campaign spending records, challenger spending exerted a very strong negative effect on incumbent electoral margins. On the other hand, neither challenger quality nor the interactive quality/spending term comes close to statistical significance, and the negative sign on the challenger quality coefficient is unexpected. The incumbent spending variable, though not significant, does carry the anticipated positive sign.

The coefficients generated by the ideology variables indicate that constituents’ ideology did not significantly affect the electoral fortunes of Democratic incumbents, but that these incumbents did substantially worse if they were more liberal than their constituents. This finding supports those pundits who suggested the Republican rout reflected an ideological backlash, with voters responding to a president and Congress out of touch with
Table 2. Log-Odds Estimates of White, Incumbent Democrats’ Percentages of the Two-Party Congressional Vote, 1994 (OLS with Huber Standard Errors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinton’s % of District’s Two-Party Presidential Vote</td>
<td>1.919***</td>
<td>(0.360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent’s Expenditures</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger’s Expenditures</td>
<td>-0.0004***</td>
<td>(0.00008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Quality</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive Term 1 (Challenger Expenditures x Quality)</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent’s % of Two-Party Vote in 1992</td>
<td>0.014***</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituents’ Ideology</td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
<td>(0.0023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent’s Ideology</td>
<td>-0.004***</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Incumbent First Elected to Congress</td>
<td>0.005**</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Change in District Racial Composition</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (South/Non-South)</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Redistricting Black % of District Population</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Redistricting Hispanic % of District Population</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive Term 2 (District Racial Change*Region)</td>
<td>-0.028***</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-12.585</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01

Figures are unstandardized regression coefficients; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

their own more moderate views. Finally, tenure in office, rather than its usual buoying effect, exerted a significant drag on Democratic fortunes in 1994; those with longer congressional records fared worse at the polls. This result is consistent with popular observations of the 1994 elections as a vote against the status quo and in favor of change.

While the control variables generally behave as anticipated, the same is not true for the variables related to racial redistricting. Contrary to our expectations, neither the variable measuring the African-American percentage of the district population nor the variable measuring the Hispanic percentage of the population generates a significant regression coefficient. The same is true for the variable tapping the change in district racial composition. While its sign is positive, it is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Despite the considerable ballyhoo raised by various observers, decreases in African-American constituency composition did not harm incumbent Democrats in 1994, nor did increases help them.
These results are even more intriguing when we consider the case of the South. While Democratic vote percentages were prone to be lower in the South anyway (as shown by the negative coefficient on the southern regional dummy variable), this effect was exacerbated substantially by changes in the percentage of African Americans in these districts. In fact, the racial change/regional interactive term, which captures the electoral impact of change in district racial composition for southern Democrats, is significant, negatively signed, and robustly significant (p = .012), with the change in the slope (.006 – .028 = -.022) indicating that relative to non-southern Democrats, the effect of an increased African-American presence in the districts of southern Democratic incumbents actually resulted in a net disadvantage at the polls.12

Figure 1 illustrates these regional differences in the effect of change in racial composition on vote percentages, and it does so in dramatic fashion. In the top half of the figure we plot change in district racial composition on vote margins in all states. This clearly shows the reason for the non-significant direct effect found in Table 2. Indeed, this portion of the figure is interesting precisely because of the complete lack of relationship between the two variables. As the change in the percentage of African Americans in the districts increases, the vote received by white incumbent Democrats remains remarkably unaffected.

In the bottom half of Figure 1 we see the reason for the significant interaction effect based on region. Here we plot the same two variables (change in racial composition by vote percentage) only for districts in the South. The difference between the two portions of the figure is striking. In southern states we see a persistent and steady decline in the vote received by white Democratic incumbents as the African American portion of their constituency increases.13 Examining the nation as a whole masks important differences in the effect of changes in district racial composition on the 1994 Democratic vote. Across all states the effect is clearly insignificant, offering little reason to believe that race-based redistricting had any systematic effect on the 1994 elections. Examining regional variations, however, illustrates just as clearly that the South is a special case. In the South increases in the size of the African American district constituency exerted a negative effect on Democratic vote percentages in 1994, even in the face of variables that tap those factors that have emerged as important explanations for the sweeping Republican victory, such as support for Clinton, improved challenger quality, ideological dissonance between incumbent and constituency, or seniority.

While this result is unexpected and even counterintuitive, there are several plausible explanations. The first is often lost in the hyperbole surrounding racial redistricting. Many white southern Democratic incumbents actually gained black constituents in the 1992 round of redistricting (Overby
Figure 1. Electoral Outcomes by Change in Racial Composition
and Cosgrove 1996). Of the 36 white southern Democrats in our data set, 20 (56%) represented a larger percentage of African Americans after redistricting. This suggests the possibility that in redrawing congressional district lines in the early 1980s, some Democratically-controlled state legislators strategically added black constituents to districts they perceived to be “at risk,” or at least tried not to “bleach” them in any substantial way. If this was the case the acquisition of more African-American constituents would be a sign of perceived electoral weakness rather than an indication of increased political strength, and the sign on the variable’s coefficient would not appear so odd. While our data do not address this issue directly, the fact that neither the redistricting variable nor the interactive term were related to the emergence of quality challengers provides some evidence that the unexpected relationship is not driven by expectations of electoral vulnerability.

A more plausible explanation may lie in Key’s venerable notion of the “black belt” effect. Examining southern politics at mid-century, Key (1949) found that the region’s politics were most reactionary in areas with the greatest concentration of black inhabitants, where fear of African-American political solidarity was keenest. Updating this notion for the 1990s, Glaser (1994, 35) recently concluded that racial environment still has a significant effect on the behavior of southern whites since those who “live in areas with greater proportions of blacks . . . perceive a stronger connection between black political gains and white political losses” (see also Giles and Buckner 1993). Our unexpected findings suggest that this “black belt” effect might have played a role in the 1994 midterms. If these studies are correct, the presence of relatively large percentages of black constituents might have caused white constituents to perceive a greater threat to their “group interest” and contributed to a decision to mobilize and support a Republican challenger. While there were certainly other factors at play in 1994, our findings are consistent with this group conflict hypothesis—as their proportion of black constituents increased, white incumbent southern Democrats experienced lower vote tallies because (everything else being equal) they lost support among whites.

Discussion and Conclusions

The 1994 midterm congressional elections was a watershed for the Republican party, as the GOP took control of both chambers of Congress for the first time in four decades. The election results were even more dramatic in the South, where the Republicans won a majority of congressional districts for the first time since Reconstruction. Widely respected scholars such as Walter Dean Burnham have even suggested that the 1994 elections were “critical” in nature, “. . .one of these rare elections from which bearings will
have to be taken for a long time to come” (Burnham 1995, 363). A variety of explanations for this “earthquake” have been put forward, including changes in voter mobilization among key Democratic and Republican constituencies, short-term rebellion against Bill Clinton, a conservative backlash against liberal voting by Democratic incumbents, and a more general “throw the bums out” anti-incumbent sentiment. Along with these potential explanations, the role of racial redistricting in this outcome has been hotly contested, with some pundits arguing that the “bleaching” of districts around majority-minority districts made a significant contribution to the Republicans’ electoral success, while others concluding that race-based redistricting did little to help the GOP.

With a more sophisticated empirical analysis we constructed a multivariate regression model to examine the effect of racial redistricting on white Democratic incumbents. In general we find some support for several of the explanations put forth to explain the 1994 midterms. District-level support for Clinton in 1992 translated into support for Democratic incumbents in 1994. At the same time Republican challengers had an easier time raising money from PACs and other committees than in previous years, and this translated into lower vote percentages for their Democratic opponents. Democratic incumbents fared less well if their voting records were more liberal than their generally more moderate constituents, supporting the theory of an ideological backlash against Democrats. Long-serving incumbents did less well, with Democrats being hurt by the electorate’s anti-incumbent mood.

The effect of changes in the racial composition of district constituencies is more complex than originally anticipated. The impact of racial redistricting was virtually null at the national level and unanticipated in the southern region. Counter-intuitively, we find that white southern Democrats actually lost electoral support as the African-American proportion of their constituencies increased. This is an important conclusion, the significance of which goes far beyond who won and who lost in 1994. In the South at least, racially-conscious redistricting significantly affected the marginality of white incumbent Democrats. To the extent that marginal incumbents behave differently than electorally secure members, this finding is consequential regardless of win-loss rates. Since the addition of minority constituents has traditionally been assumed to help white Democratic incumbents win reelection, it is a commonly used device to help shore up their electoral fortunes. Finding an unanticipated negative electoral effect cautions that many of the arguments in this area need to be re-examined. These findings are consonant with some version of a “black belt” hypothesis and indicate that white backlash may have played an important role in the 1994 outcomes.
What is clear is that neither of the popular accounts completely captures the impact of racial redistricting on 1994 midterm results. Indeed, the effects of racially-conscious districting are complicated and subtle. It is important to bear this in mind because in the highly charged political debate that surrounds this divisive issue, the rhetoric of both sides can become unhitched from reality and the intuitive mistaken for the actual. Before any final conclusions are reached or normative judgments drawn, more empirical work is needed to illuminate this important and politically volatile topic.

NOTES

1Thernstrom (1987, 234) provides additional empirical support for this point. Following the redistricting of the South Carolina Senate, in which the state increased the percentage of black voters in two senatorial districts, four incumbent liberal Democrats who lost black constituents to the redrawn districts lost to conservative Republican challengers. Thernstrom also notes that following the settlement of the Gingles case in North Carolina (Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 [E.D.N.C. 1984]), Republicans doubled the number of seats they held in the General Assembly.

2For several reasons we concentrate on this sub-group of members of Congress. First, we agree with Overby and Cosgrove (1996) that white members of Congress who survived redistricting constitute the most theoretically interesting category of Democrats for examination. Usually portrayed as the likely losers in racial redistricting struggles and since they are alleged to have dodged a political bullet by winning in 1992, many observers viewed them as highly vulnerable to Republican challengers in 1994 (see, e.g., Miller 1995, 23). Second, the multivariate model we develop below cannot be estimated for members first elected in 1992, because the surrogate variable we use to capture incumbents’ spending proclivities in 1994 is based on their 1992 fundraising totals. Since incumbents typically far outspend challengers, it is impossible using this method to model incumbent spending accurately for a member’s first re-election bid (Green and Krasno 1988). More importantly, members first elected in 1992 never represented pre-redistricting constituencies. It is impossible to calculate a racial composition change variable for members who served only after redistricting.

3Data used in the paper come from various issues of Politics in America and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.

4More formally, our dependent variable is calculated as ln(Pit/1-Pit), where Pit is the two party percentage of the vote received by the ith member of Congress in 1994. While a linear model with the members’ simple percentages of the two-party vote yields very similar results, using a log-odds ratio as the dependent variable results in a better overall model specification, and we are grateful to one of the Quarterly’s anonymous reviewers for bringing this to our attention.

5A potential criticism of this dependent variable stems from the disruptive influence of Ross Perot in the 1992 presidential election. In 1992 and 1994 Perot voters leaned somewhat Republican in congressional contexts, perhaps confounding our results. We offer two pieces of information that lead us to conclude the “Perot factor” is a relative inconsequential problem in this specific instance. First, we ran all regression analyses using Clinton’s percentage of the three-candidate vote as an independent variable to tap into possible Perot effects, and found the results to be stronger for the interaction effect of
change in racial composition in the South. In addition, the average vote percentage for Perot in the southern districts examined in our sample was 18.34, almost identical to the approximately 19 percent he received nation-wide.

An alternative strategy would have been to examine the electoral fates of only those members from states that created new black majority districts in the 1992 redistricting cycle. We prefer to include all states because substantial racially-motivated redrawing of district lines is possible even when no new majority-minority districts are created. For instance, in 1992 Mississippi did not create a new majority minority district, but did increase the percentage of African Americans in the black-majority Second District from 58 to 63 percent, resulting in a “bleaching” of the surrounding districts all of which were represented by white Democrats.

The results of the regression are:

\[ \text{Constituent ideology} = 13.45 + .0011 \times \text{Median Income} + 52.53 \times \% \text{College Educated} + e. \quad \text{AdjR}^2 = .245. \]

Jackson and Kingdon (1992) criticize the conclusion that such residuals should be considered the unmeasured effect of members’ personal ideologies, since they could also reflect any number of other unmeasured factors. Here we are agnostic regarding this debate but simply note that however they are labeled, these residuals measure how closely members’ voting behavior comports with what would be expected given their constituencies. How liberal a member was relative to his or her constituents is potentially an important factor in understanding the ideological backlash explanation for the 1994 results. Alternatively, it would be ideal to have direct, district-level, constituency ideology measures. Unfortunately, no such scores exist. The closest approximations are disaggregated only as far as the state level (see Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993).

We opted for a three-point scale rather than one of the more complicated seven- or eight-point scales proposed by some authorities both because it is parsimonious and obviates reliance on judgment calls regarding which challengers are “famous” (see Jacobson 1990b, 50-51).

In preliminary analysis (not reported here) we constructed a logistic regression model to examine what factors were associated with the emergence of quality challengers. Change in district racial composition was not a significant predictor; our model (which included many of the normal predictors, including partisan lean of the district, incumbent’s previous election margin and spending, and seniority) only poorly accounted for the emergence of such challengers. This indicates that quality challengers are motivated by idiosyncratic personal and local factors that are difficult to model in multivariate analyses (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Kazee 1994).

Green and Krasno (1988) use two-stage least squares regression to estimate the effects of incumbent spending, including lagged incumbent spending in the first equation along with other variables such as challenger expenditures and challenger quality. Since lagged incumbent expenditures is the only variable to emerge as consistently significant in their models (see Green and Krasno, 1988, Appendix B), we opt to employ incumbents’ previous spending as a straight proxy measure, simplifying the analysis.

The formula prescribed in Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990, 27) to calculate the standard error associated with this slope change was statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test). Our model, of course, calculates only the direct effects of our independent variables on electoral outcomes and does not measure indirect effects that might work their way through the 1992 vote totals. Since the correlation between our racial change x region interactive term and 1992 vote totals is very small (\( R = .01 \)), we suspect any indirect effects are slight. Our model does not permit us to consider open
seats, even though there is evidence that redistricting effects were felt in open seats in the South in both 1992 and 1994 (Gaddie 1995a; 1995b; Gaddie and Bullock 2000).

To test if the two districts in the lower left quadrant represent potential statistical outliers, we performed all regression analyses with these two districts excluded. Rather than being outliers that may bias the findings on our interaction term toward significance, removing these two districts actually strengthened the effect for district racial change x region variable.

The average was relatively small (1.23%) with gains ranging up to four percent.

There is a modest negative correlation between change in district racial composition and the incumbent’s percentage of the two-party vote in 1990 (R = -.14).

Since incumbents act strategically in response to changes in their electoral environment (Fowler and McClure 1989; Fowler 1993), it is possible that many white Democratic incumbents who felt themselves to be at risk in the wake of redistricting took a variety of steps ranging from more aggressive campaigning to more solicitous constituent service, thereby mitigating the effects of constituency change; this possibility complicates attempts to measure a redistricting effect.

This interpretation is bolstered by the image that the Republican party is now perceived as the “white people’s party” in the South (Black and Black 1987) and that southern white incumbent Democrats who represented relatively large numbers of African Americans in the early 1990s were sympathetic to black policy preferences on roll call votes (Overby and Cosgrove 1996).

REFERENCES


