Senate Delegations and Federalism:  
The Dynamics of State Representation

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The integrity of the individual states as components of the United States' system of federalism depends upon effective representation of the states' interests at the national level. The states' delegations to the U.S. Senate are of prime importance in this capacity, especially when deciding between federal authority and state discretion. We find that the votes of state delegations to the 101st U.S. Senate on issues of federalism can be broken into four conceptual areas, and that the effectiveness of the representation of state federalism interests depends upon the specific federalism concept under consideration.

The maintenance of a federal structure in the United States requires some conception of state sovereignty. The manifestation of this concept historically has been a dynamic, difficult issue, as the national and state governments have struggled to define the proper form that the relationship between the levels of government should take.

While the original conception of federal representation of the states has been altered significantly, the concept of representing state interests in the Congress is well documented and persists. Madison writes that "one branch of the legislature is a representation of . . . the states" (*The Federalist* 58). Marshall commented that "the states themselves are represented in Congress . . . and representatives of the state sovereignties" (*Marbury v. Madison* 5 US 137, 1803). In *Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority* (469 US 528, 1985) the Court recognized the concept of state interests and stated that "state sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by procedural safe-guards inherent in the structure of the federal system." Although earlier Supreme Court decisions had attempted to define broad constitutional constraints on congressional action regarding federalism policy,¹ the *Garcia* decision in effect granted the popularly elected U.S. Congress the authority to determine the nature of the federal relationship. Beer (1978) describes this orientation as "representational federalism." Although some political scientists are quick to dismiss representational

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federalism as a viable orientation or theory, citing, for example, the apparent lack of regard for the intent of the framers (Dye 1990) or the over-reliance on federalism as a policy issue (Peterson, Rabe, and Wong 1986), representational federalism as defined by the court in Garcia does in fact provide the context in which the basic issues of federalism are debated. Yet, given the dynamic nature of American federalism, many have questioned whether and how state interests are in fact represented (Derthick 1986; Elazar 1981). Are state federalism interests represented at the federal level? More specifically, are state governments and/or citizens systemically represented against intrusions from the federal government? If so, how is this representation manifested? The remainder of this article addresses these questions.

The Senate and Federalism

Federalism as a substantive policy issue will continue to be debated and will continue to be meaningful as long as multiple governments share authority and jurisdiction in the United States (Anton 1989). Although many policies with a federalism impact were considered by the 101st Congress (see, e.g., Pagano, Bowman, and Kincaid 1991, Conlan 1991, and Malaby and Webber 1991), the basic federalism issues persist: what level of government should carry out what activity, and what if anything comprises a "national purpose" sufficiently vital to override the rights of the states (Anton 1989)? More importantly, given the recent Garcia decision and the acknowledged ambiguity of the Constitution regarding the federal issue, the responsibility for the maintenance of federalism has fallen to the Congress.

Considerable research has shown that constituents are only dimly aware of their representatives' political activities (e.g., Campbell, et al. 1964; Stokes and Miller 1962), and from that it has been reasoned that a member of Congress has "a very wide range of choices on any given issue, so far as his constituency is concerned" (Dexter 1973). However, several constraints on legislative voting behavior have been identified, including, but not limited to, party, ideology, and constituency (e.g., Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974).

Although the U.S. Congress as a whole generally is seen as a "focal point" for determining federal relations (Wright 1982), Senate delegations have a unique responsibility in this area. As Riker (1955) explains, the Senate originally was seen as a representative of state governments. The constituency of the Senate was changed, of course, with the ratification of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution in 1913, as delegations from that point on unambiguously would represent the people of a state.
Keeping the powerful evidence regarding the tenuous relationship between the electorate and its representatives in mind, we nevertheless would expect that in order to maintain the integrity of the position of states as separate institutions in the federal system, state delegations to the Senate should at least in some elementary sense reflect the preferences of their formal constituencies (electorate) when deciding federalism issues. To realize the "procedural safeguards" necessary to protect state interests in the absence of formalized obligations, we would expect state delegations to the Senate to act in their role as an agent of the state's polity and to serve generally as a catalyst in the transfer of the political orientations of their respective polities to the national level. In other words, we expect senate delegations to support a federal/state relationship consistent with their respective electorates' preferences.

Data and Analysis

This analysis began by reviewing the votes of the 101st Senate and selecting those which contained a federalism component. Although it is difficult to differentiate between federalism concerns and other policy issues, we required the selected votes to contain a substantive federalism component, i.e., a proposed significant change in the distribution of authority in the relationship between the states and the national government. Meeting this standard often required the consideration of votes on amendments to larger bills, as the amendments often addressed federalism issues more specifically than the bills from which they originated. Twenty four votes were finally selected. The votes then were recoded, where necessary, to consistently reflect whether a particular vote was in agreement with the intention to increase state discretion regarding the policy in question. Finally, the votes for each issue were summed by delegation. Each delegation's vote on a particular issue, then, could reflect 0, 1, or 2 votes in favor of increasing state discretion.

Although similar "federalism scales" based on the simple summation of votes have been developed and utilized in previous research (e.g., Hero 1987a, 1987b, 1989), it has been argued that such additive scales do not reflect the multidimensional nature of federalism voting (Webber 1989; Malaby and Webber 1991). Factor analysis is an appropriate procedure for "extracting" the underlying dimensions, or concepts, of roll-call votes and thereby reducing the number of variables by combining them into a number of uncorrelated groups each with a common "theme" (MacRae 1970). The results of this procedure are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Factor Loadings for Senate Delegation Federalism Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Allocative</th>
<th>Preemptive</th>
<th>Distributive</th>
<th>Conjoint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child Care–Mitchell</td>
<td>0.9077</td>
<td>0.1776</td>
<td>0.0834</td>
<td>0.1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education–Teachers</td>
<td>0.8993</td>
<td>0.1912</td>
<td>0.1063</td>
<td>0.0947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education–National Std</td>
<td>0.8803</td>
<td>0.1850</td>
<td>0.1253</td>
<td>0.1567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign $</td>
<td>0.8595</td>
<td>0.0805</td>
<td>0.3617</td>
<td>-0.0798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Care–Dole</td>
<td>0.8527</td>
<td>0.1123</td>
<td>0.3111</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Care–Pmt Rate</td>
<td>0.8144</td>
<td>0.1896</td>
<td>0.2212</td>
<td>0.1320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Care–St Tax</td>
<td>0.7926</td>
<td>-0.0067</td>
<td>0.3479</td>
<td>-0.1267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.7565</td>
<td>0.3208</td>
<td>0.1904</td>
<td>0.3030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title X</td>
<td>0.6959</td>
<td>0.3850</td>
<td>0.1604</td>
<td>0.1688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime–Discrimination</td>
<td>0.6430</td>
<td>0.3359</td>
<td>0.5113</td>
<td>0.0188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime–Habeas Corpus</td>
<td>0.6397</td>
<td>0.2827</td>
<td>0.4344</td>
<td>0.2583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education–Healthy St</td>
<td>0.5226</td>
<td>0.3757</td>
<td>0.4315</td>
<td>-0.1349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime–Race</td>
<td>0.4970</td>
<td>0.2992</td>
<td>0.4844</td>
<td>0.1323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S–Child Care</td>
<td>-0.8235</td>
<td>-0.2117</td>
<td>-0.0859</td>
<td>-0.3093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Air–NRC</td>
<td>0.3840</td>
<td>0.7964</td>
<td>0.0240</td>
<td>0.0797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Air–Permits</td>
<td>0.4650</td>
<td>0.5159</td>
<td>0.3700</td>
<td>0.1858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Air–CFC</td>
<td>0.0665</td>
<td>-0.5877</td>
<td>-0.3903</td>
<td>-0.3779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Air–Smog</td>
<td>-0.1595</td>
<td>-0.7190</td>
<td>-0.0727</td>
<td>-0.0952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Closures</td>
<td>0.1732</td>
<td>0.1468</td>
<td>0.7299</td>
<td>0.1675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic $</td>
<td>-0.2453</td>
<td>-0.0036</td>
<td>-0.6238</td>
<td>-0.1414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLK–Education</td>
<td>0.0806</td>
<td>0.1718</td>
<td>0.1105</td>
<td>0.7827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLK–Lobby</td>
<td>0.4865</td>
<td>0.0331</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>0.6465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Service</td>
<td>-0.5435</td>
<td>0.1321</td>
<td>-0.1192</td>
<td>-0.5553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>0.0952</td>
<td>-0.1955</td>
<td>-0.1754</td>
<td>-0.7715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eigenvalue</strong></td>
<td>12.297</td>
<td>2.301</td>
<td>1.574</td>
<td>1.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variation Explained</strong></td>
<td>51.24</td>
<td>9.59</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>4.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Variation Explained: 71.96%

Note: Entries are factor loadings from a principal component analysis with orthogonal rotation.

Four factors were extracted from the delegation votes, which in combination explain 71.96 percent of the variation in the votes. The factor loadings, which represent the correlation of each vote with the underlying factor, enable the votes to be grouped on the basis of the strength of their association with the extracted factor. The boxed entries in Table 1 represent the votes that are similar regarding the four extracted dimensions of federalism voting. The votes that load together on the first factor include the issues of child-care funding, the regulation of out-of-state campaign contributions,
education funding, block grants, and the withholding of the distribution of federal monies to states on the basis of the state's policies regarding South African products. Since these primarily are issues of the allocation of federal resources, the factor is interpreted as an "allocative" dimension.

Loading together on the second factor are votes concerning the regulation of radioactive emissions, the regulation of ozone-depleting chemicals, federal mandates regarding urban smog, and the authority of the states to issue operating permits without the review of the Environmental Protection Agency. While each of the votes has an environmental component, the primary issue captured by this factor is one of federal mandates to the states, and is interpreted as a "preemptive" dimension.

Loading on the third factor are the issues of allowing states and localities to control and profit from closed military bases, and the reallocation of resources from national defense to education, training, and social services. These broad issues are interpreted as a "distributive" dimension.

Finally, the fourth factor includes votes concerning the impact on the states of the Martin Luther King Holiday Commission, the allocation of grants to states to encourage national and community service, and enforcement of state sodomy laws. Since these are issues that often are regulated jointly by state and federal governments, this is interpreted as a "conjoint" dimension. These four dimensions of federalism voting by Senate delegations—allocative, preemptive, distributive, and conjoint—will serve as our dependent variables.

To "explain" the variation in the respective factor scores for each Senate delegation, several variables were selected: the party affiliation and conservatism of the Senate delegation, the party affiliation and conservatism of the state, and the state's political culture. Party affiliation was measured by coding each delegation as consisting of two Republicans, two Democrats, or one Democrat and one Republican. Delegation conservatism was represented by American Conservative Union scores as published in Congressional Quarterly. The initial analysis of these variables revealed them to be highly correlated \(r = .81, p = .0001\). Due to the relative inability of partisanship and the ACU score to differentiate between Senate delegations, and the generally lesser performance of the ACU scores, party identification was chosen to fulfill the function of contrasting the delegations.

Two of the state level variables measuring citizenry characteristics were derived from Wright, Erikson, and McIver’s (1985) large-sample study of state partisanship and ideology. These variables were not significantly related, which is evidence that they do represent different state characteristics. Further, the state-level measures of partisanship and ideology were generally only weakly correlated with the measures of Senate delegation
partisanship and ideology. With the exception of Senate delegation partisanship and ACU scores, we are satisfied that these variables represent considerably different influences on Senate delegation federalism voting.

State political culture is based on Elazar’s (1966) classification. It is important to note here that although Elazar’s labelling of individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic state cultures often has been transformed into an ordinal scale, and even used in analysis as an interval variable, Elazar has maintained that his classifications may not lend themselves to such severe transformations (Elazar 1982).

To easily accommodate the culture classifications, and allow a more general picture of the impact of state level influences, analysis of variance techniques were chosen as the most appropriate. The state ideology and partisanship measures were recoded as four-point scales and states were classified as either individualistic, moralistic, or traditionalistic based on their dominant culture. ANOVAs were performed for each of the four factors, based on the following model:

$$\text{FACTOR}_i = A + B + C + D + AB + AC + AD$$

where A is delegation party identification, B is political culture, C is state partisanship, D is state ideology, and AB, AC, and AD are terms representing the interaction between the delegation and the state variables. Based on previous research and under the assumption that delegations do effectively represent their states’ interests, the general expectation has been that the independent variables would perform as follows: Republican delegations, and those from Republican, conservative, and traditionalistic states, would support greater state discretion, while Democratic delegations from Democratic, less conservative, and moralistic states would support greater federal authority at the expense of state discretion. Given the four dimensions of federalism voting we have identified, however, we expect that the delegations will respond to different pressures based on their conception of the federal issue under consideration.

The results of the four ANOVAs are presented in Table 2. While previous analysis, relying on additive federalism scales, has suggested that ideology and party are most closely associated with overall federalism voting (Hero 1987a, 1987b), as expected, our data suggest that each factor of federalism is affected by different variables.

For allocative federalism, party affiliation of the Senate delegation appears to be responsible for the greatest proportion of voting variation. As seen in Table 2, party affiliation, state ideology and the interaction of the two all are statistically significant. Yet, the analysis of factor level effects highlights the role of party affiliation. Figure 1 depicts the mean levels of support for state discretion regarding allocative federalism issues. Support
### Table 2. ANOVA Analysis Results

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Allocative factor score**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>F Value</th>
<th>P Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>10.68</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) Delegation Party</td>
<td>58.82</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Political Culture</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.7565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) State Party</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.4787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) State Ideology</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A*B</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.3238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A*C</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>0.1126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A*D</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>0.0023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Distributive factor score**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>F Value</th>
<th>P Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>0.0275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) Delegation Party</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>0.0527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Political Culture</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.3034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) State Party</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.3655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) State Ideology</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.2034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A*B</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A*C</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A*D</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>0.1069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Preemptive factor score**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>F Value</th>
<th>P Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>0.0142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) Delegation Party</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.2291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Political Culture</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.4427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) State Party</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) State Ideology</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>0.0155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A*B</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.2701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A*C</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>0.1552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A*D</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>0.0461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Conjoint factor score**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>F Value</th>
<th>P Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.3259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Senate Delegation Support for State Discretion on Allocative Issues

Note: Plotted values are cell means; the greater Y-axis values represent greater support for state discretion.

for state discretion is highest for Republicans and lowest for Democrats. Further, the role of party across all levels of ideology can be seen. Democratic delegations, regardless of the ideology of the state, are more likely to oppose allocative measures that increase state discretion. Although there appears to be considerable interaction between the Republican delegations and state ideology, this effect is driven by the unique behavior of the delegation from Pennsylvania. This anomaly in voting behavior does not restrict us from concluding that in general, Republican delegations, regardless of the ideology of their constituency, are more likely to vote in favor of state discretion on allocative issues. That delegation party affiliation is the dominant explanatory variable supports previous findings regarding the role of party affiliation (Hero 1989), but only for allocative federalism issues.

Examining preemptive federalism issues, Table 2 indicates that state ideology and the interaction between delegation party affiliation and state ideology are the only significant variables, suggesting that both state ideology and delegation party affiliation may be responsible for a greater part of the voting variation. However, an examination of the factor effects reveals that no significant difference in delegation voting can be discerned on the basis of delegation partisanship. Figure 2 clearly illustrates that
Figure 2. Senate Delegation Support for State Discretion on Preemptive Issues

Note: Plotted values are cell means; the greater Y-axis values represent greater support for state discretion.

Figure 3. Senate Delegation Support for State Discretion on Distributive Issues

Note: Plotted values are cell means; the greater Y-axis values represent greater support for state discretion.
Senate delegation votes on preemptive federalism issues are best explained as a reflection of the state's ideology. Thus, for issues involving federal mandates to the states, states with populations that identify with conservative ideology are more likely to have senators voting not to preempt state authority, while states with a liberal ideology are more likely to have senators voting to preempt state authority. That state ideology is the dominant explanatory variable suggests that Senate delegations do represent the ideology of their constituents on preemptive issues.

For distributive federalism, Table 2 suggests that party affiliation best explains voting variation. Yet, the interaction with political culture indicates the presence of a cultural effect. Figure 3 illustrates the interaction of delegation party affiliation and state political culture. Previous studies have concluded the absence of any cultural effect (Hero 1987a, 1987b, 1989). However, our results suggest that while a party role may be identifiable in moralistic and individualistic states, that role collapses in traditionalist states. This difference in the support for distributive federalism issues given the presence of different political cultures is further evidenced by the low mean support for state discretion in moralistic states. Although the difference in the mean responses of delegations from moralistic and individualistic states is not statistically significant, the differences are in a direction that is consistent with the assumption that moralistic states are more likely to accept federal intrusions. That traditionalistic states respond differently than moralistic and individualistic states and that moralistic states have the lowest mean support for state discretion lends support to Elazar's assertions regarding political culture. Thus, for distributive federalism issues, explaining the votes of Senate delegations involves both an identifiable party affiliation component and a political culture component.

Finally, the independent variables under consideration here failed to produce any significant explanatory information in relation to conjoint federalism. This suggests that voting on conjoint federalism issues is not driven by party, ideology or culture.

Discussion and Conclusions

Previous studies have relied upon additive procedures to measure federalism, resulting in muddled findings in which there were no distinctions among the different federalism concepts. Identifying the individual factors of federalism allowed us to isolate the specific variables responsible for voting variation. This procedure results in a clearer understanding of the dynamics of federalism voting. Thus, this analysis at the same time supports, clarifies and calls into question several previous findings.
First, it has been asserted that federalism issues are a separate and distinct policy area and, given thus, that explanations of voting variation for federalism issues are different from other domestic policies such as social welfare, government management, agricultural assistance, etc. (Hero 1987a). To claim that all federalism issues are/are not a separate policy area distinct from other domestic issues is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, our results suggest that delegation voting on preemptive federalism issues, explained by state ideology, is the only type of federalism issue explained by variables other than those used to explain variation in voting for other domestic policies (Clausen 1973). As such, rather than suggesting that all federalism issues be combined into a unique policy area, our analysis indicates that preemptive federalism issues are unique among domestic policy areas in general, as well as unique among federalism issues in particular, when it comes to explanations of voting variation. Indeed, preemptive issues, apart from all others under consideration here, appear to bring out a willingness on the part of senators to defend state federalism interests *per se*.

Further, conjoint federalism issues offer an entire area of policy issues that are unaffected by delegation party affiliation, state ideology or political culture. This finding is not new and has been addressed in a general way by several scholars. Previous studies suggest that federalism issues are sometimes mediative (Hero 1989), accidental (Riker 1985), or "nonvisible" to constituents (Kozak 1984, 1987) and, as such, play only a limited role in congressional decision making. Our findings clarify this proposition. For conjoint federalism issues, it appears as if both the public and politicians fail to respond as they would for other federalism issues, indicating either a lack of association of those issues with federalism concerns, or an inability to distinguish the federalism component or recognize it as a distinct policy area.

Second, the relationship between ideology, partisanship, and federalism is clarified. Allocative and distributive issues, which together account for 80 percent of the explained variation in Senate delegation voting, are best explained with variables other than state ideology. In most cases, the important variable that best explains variation in delegation voting is delegation party affiliation, not state ideology or partisanship. This finding supports Clausen and Cheney's (1970) suggestion that the national orientation of the senator and the heterogeneous nature of a senator's constituency might lessen the effect of constituency pressure as a factor in voting.

Third, the discounting of Elazar's theory of political culture as it applies to federalism might be premature. When used as Elazar intended, this analysis finds modest support for his assertions regarding differences in
state political culture, particularly the unique characteristics regarding traditionalistic states and, depending on the partisan makeup of the Senate delegation, the lower resistance to federal preemption in moralistic states.

Fourth, while the Senate may be an institution capable of representing the interests of the citizenry (Riker 1955; Sinclair 1989) and through which the states may fight federal intrusions and support state discretion, (Wechsler 1954; Chopper 1980), the overall effectiveness of the Senate as a representative of state federalism interests in our federal system is called into question. Variation in votes on both allocative and distributive federalism issues are explained largely through the party affiliation of the Senate delegation, not the ideology of the citizenry. While there is some general support for cultural explanations for distributive issues, the role of party affiliation also is obvious. Thus, only for preemptive federalism issues are state characteristics the most important variable for explaining voting variation.

The conclusions of the analysis are four-fold. First, the strong association of the federalism factors with separate variables reinforces previous conclusions that federalism is not a unidimensional concept. As such, to understand the relationship between state representation and federalism issues, one must take into account the dimensions of federalism. Second, the variation in Senate voting on federalism issues is dependent upon the type of federalism issue under consideration. Allocative issues are best explained by the partisan affiliation of the delegation, preemptive issues are best explained by the state's ideology, distributive issues are best explained by delegation party affiliation and state political culture, and conjoint issues are not necessarily viewed as federalism issues at all. Third, given these results, the claimed differences between federalism issues and other policy areas, based on voting variations, are called into question except in the case of issues of preemptive federalism. Fourth, given the explanatory power of delegation party affiliation, state ideology and state culture, Senate delegations appear to represent state federalism interests only in such cases of preemption.

NOTES

2See the appendix for the list of senate votes utilized in this analysis.
3When the ANOVAs presented here were performed using ACU scores in lieu of party identification, the results obtained were essentially the same. However, the ACU scores generally were less powerful predictors of the dependent variable in question.
State ideology was coded high conservatism, mid-high conservatism, mid-low conservatism, or low conservatism. State partisanship was coded high Democratic, mid-high Democratic, mid-low Democratic, or low Democratic.

Tests for significant differences in mean responses were conducted using Tukey's procedure with alpha = .10.

These results suggest party unity as a variable. Working under the assumption that the members of the Pennsylvania delegation may deviate from the rest of their party, party unity scores (as developed by Congressional Quarterly) were utilized. When ANOVAs presented here were performed using party unity scores, the results obtained failed to produce explanatory information.

APPENDIX

101st Senate Votes Used to Construct Federalism Scores

1. S 5: CHILD CARE/ MITCHELL SUBSTITUTE
   Substitute authorizes child-care subsidies and requires states to set standards for child care.

2. S 695: EDUCATION PROGRAMS/ TEACHER COMPETENCY
   Motion to table an amendment to divert funds from Title X to the states to use in establishing minimum competency standards for teachers.

3. S 695: EDUCATION PROGRAMS/ NATIONAL STANDARDS
   Amendment to delete funding for the National Board of Teaching Standards.

4. S 137: CAMPAIGN FINANCE OVERHAUL/ REPUBLICAN SUBSTITUTE
   Amendment to establish aggregate fundraising limits on PACs and out-of-state contributions.

5. S 5: CHILD CARE/ DOLE SUBSTITUTE
   Amendment to increase existing block grants to states to increase the availability of child care.

6. S 5: CHILD CARE/ PAYMENT RATES
   Motion to table an amendment to strike language that would require states to pay providers of ABC (Act for Better Child Care Services) funded services at the same rate charged by other providers of comparable services.

7. S 5: CHILD CARE/ STATE TAX CREDITS
   Motion to table an amendment to permit states to use ABC funds to provide child-care tax credits to low income working families with children.

8. HR 2072: FISCAL 1989 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS/ SOUTH AFRICA POLICY
   Motion to table an amendment to strike a provision in the bill prohibiting the Transportation Department from withholding funds from state and local governments that have policies prohibiting procurement of South African Products.

9. S 110: TITLE X FAMILY PLANNING AMENDMENTS/ EXCLUSIONS
   Amendment to make Title X of the Public Health Service Act of 1970 a state block grant.

10. S 1970: OMNIBUS CRIME PACKAGE/ DISCRIMINATION
    Amendment to limit studies on the role of race in state criminal justice systems to review of whether the constitutional rights of criminal defendants have been violated.

11. S 1970: OMNIBUS CRIME PACKAGE/ HABEAS CORPUS
    Amendment to allow states to adopt expedited procedures for reviewing death penalty appeals, and to require federal courts to complete review of habeas corpus petitions within a year of a state court death penalty order.
APPENDIX (continued)

12. **S 695: EDUCATION PROGRAMS/ HEALTHY START**  
   Motion to table an amendment to authorize funds for the establishment of a Healthy Start program that would allow local school districts to coordinate with other social service programs for public school children.

13. **S 1970: OMNIBUS CRIME PACKAGE/ RACIAL DISCRIMINATION**  
   Amendment to prohibit the death sentence in state and federal cases if a defendant could prove with statistical or other evidence that race played a role in the sentencing.

14. **HR 2990: FISCAL 1990 LABOR, HHS, AND EDUCATION APPROPRIATIONS/ CHILD CARE FUNDING**  
   Motion to table an amendment to delete funding for a program of child-care grants to states.

15. **S 1630: CLEAN AIR ACT REAUTHORIZATION/ NRC AUTHORITY**  
   Motion to table an amendment to strike a provision that would remove the authority of the EPA and the states to regulate radioactive emissions at facilities regulated by the NRC, such as nuclear power plants, making the NRC the sole regulator under the Atomic Energy Act.

16. **S 1630: CLEAN AIR ACT/ PERMITS AND ENFORCEMENT**  
   Motion to allow the states to issue operating permits to facilitate enforcement of the act without full review by the Environmental Protection Agency.

17. **S 1630: CLEAN AIR ACT/ CFCs**  
   Amendment to phase out the use of hydrochlorofluorocarbons and to strike provisions to pre-empt states’ efforts to control ozone-depleting chemicals.

18. **S 1630: CLEAN AIR ACT/ URBAN SMOG**  
   Motion to table an amendment to restore the current ability of the federal government to mandate Federal Implementation Plans (FIPs) when areas fail to meet pollution targets.

19. **S 2884: FISCAL 1991 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION/ BASE CLOSURES**  
   Motion to table an amendment to change existing regulations dealing with the disposal of property resulting from the closure of military bases, to allow affected communities to voluntarily engage in a program that would allow them to decide the best use of the property without federal interference.

20. **S CON RES 30: DOMESTIC SPENDING**  
   Motion to table an amendment to reallocate funds from national defense to education, training and social services.

21. **S 431: MARTIN LUTHER KING FEDERAL HOLIDAY COMMISSION/ EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES**  
   Amendment to prohibit the commission from "direction, supervision, or control" over the curriculum of any school or the educational materials schools choose for their libraries.

22. **S 431: MARTIN LUTHER KING FEDERAL HOLIDAY COMMISSION/ LOBBYING**  
   Amendment to prohibit the commission from lobbying state and local governments to encourage or influence enactment of legislation.

23. **S 1430: NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE ACT/ CONFERENCE REPORT**  
   Adoption of the conference report on the bill to authorize grants to states and localities to encourage community service and foster volunteerism.

24. **S 419: HATE CRIME STATISTICS/ HOMOSEXUALS**  
   Amendment saying that "the homosexual movement threatens the strength and survival of the American family" and that state sodomy laws should be enforced.
REFERENCES


