Who Has The Body?
Party Institutionalization and Theories of Party Organization¹

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This analysis seeks to codify and elucidate an emerging consensus among party scholars concerning the phenomenon and significance of the institutionalized party. More than the mere bureaucratization of party organizations, by adapting to environmental challenge an evolving “web of party” has sprouted new linkages between elites and non-elites, as well as among national and subnational executives and legislatures. Party scholarship, dominated until recently by non-institutional perspectives such as progressivism, behavioralism, and pluralism, needs to examine party institutionalization in a broader institutional context, i.e., as compared with Congress, the Presidency, and other prime political institutions, for which the advent of the institutionalized party has far-reaching implications.

Since the mid-1980s, a considerable debate has raged over whether parties are in good health or ill health. Since at least 1969, political scientists and observers who focus on voters have proclaimed the end of party politics (Burnham 1969; Broder 1970). Yet, scholars who actually have studied the beast—or at least party organizations—during the 1980s have concluded that this assessment was, to say the least, premature. In the major publication from the Party Transformation Study, Cotter et al. have argued that this “death watch over the American parties” has included conducting “the obsequies without benefit of the corpse” (1984, 168). The issue can be stated even more strongly: whose corpse, whose body are we discussing? Cotter et al.’s observation, echoed since by many scholars who have studied parties at the local (Eldersveld 1986; Marvick 1986), state (ACIR 1986), and national levels (Herrnson 1990) has been widely dismissed by many in the discipline as irrelevant to the basic issue. In an essay written as prelude to a group of essays looking at the transformation of interest groups, Petracca asserts without qualification that “There is no need to belabor the well-documented decline of American political parties.”

As parties have become less relevant to Americans since the 1960s, they have lost the ability to mobilize citizens. Although parties as organizations may be on the rebound, there is little evidence to suggest that parties in the electorate are gaining strength (1992, 26).

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Petracca’s dismissal of the growing body of research on strengthened organizations is common in political science.

Why is it that the views of those who should know best—active party scholars—are ignored? Certainly, one reason is the problem of lag time in the diffusion of the most current research among colleagues who are consumers, not the creators of research findings. This, for example, has been cited in the dominance of the “Textbook Congress” in non-specialist writings about Congress, while the post-reform Congress has operated quite differently for some time (Shepsle 1989). Similarly, Baer and Bositis (1993) now argue that the “Textbook Party” has limited popular understanding of the contemporary party system. Further, the dominance of progressive and pluralist strains in political science have devalued the views of party government theorists. The notion of responsible party government is considered “foreign” (Baer and Bositis 1993). Finally, there is no generally accepted definition or categorization of the post-reform party system even among party scholars. Herrnson, who often has used the term “party institutionalization,” defines it as an enhanced staff bureaucracy involving fiscal solvency, permanent organizations, larger and more diversified staffing, and the “adoption of professional-bureaucratic decisionmaking procedures” (1989, 48). In contrast, other party scholars, notably Cotter and his associates, view the transformation of party as a broader phenomenon based in rules and norms, as well as in an enhanced organizational capacity. To understand the post-reform party system requires a theoretical comparison of competing models of organization.

This paper is an effort to codify and define an emerging consensus among a variety of party scholars concerning the institutionalization of party. I propose that party scholars should understand party institutionalization more broadly, and comparatively with other salient political institutions, such as the Presidency or the Congress. The confusion over what institutionalization means for party stems from the dominance of non-institutional perspectives—namely behavioralism, progressivism, and pluralism—in political science. These theoretical paradigms are contextual, reductionistic, utilitarian, instrumentalist, and functionalist in their scope and aim (March and Olson 1989).

The study of institutions, in contrast, stresses the distinctiveness of political conflict, organizational structures and norms, obligations and duties, the role of symbols, rituals and ceremonies, and looks for organizational change through trends, adaptation and mal-adaptation (March and Olson 1989). The strengthening of party organizations is a more fundamental and significant phenomenon than simply a bureaucratization of party
headquarters. Rather, this phenomenon involves a broadening and democratization of party. To illustrate these points, I will employ over-time data from the Party Elite Study\(^3\) to exemplify my argument. My intent here, however, is to make a theoretical argument, not to test one. Parties are expanding their traditional linkage function, rather than becoming atrophied organizations. This argument encompasses both permanent (i.e., headquarters) and temporary (i.e., caucus, primary, and convention) party organization. Finally, I will argue that the advent of the institutionalized party has far-reaching implications for executive-legislative relations.

**Competing Theories of Party Organization**

Early theorists of party organization all were European: Max Weber (1947), Robert Michels (1915), and Maurice Duverger (1954). Their work has conditioned our scholarly understanding of party. Given the unique nature of American parties, the usefulness of their theories for understanding contemporary American parties is limited. Weber, the classical theorist of bureaucracy, viewed political organizations such as parties as bureaucratic, but nonetheless different from other bureaucracies. In one of his more colorful statements, he asserted that voters would prefer “parvenus of doubtful morals” to the mandarins of bureaucracies. Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” describes organizational tendencies, but does not enable us to differentiate more from less oligarchic party organizations. Finally, Duverger’s concept of the cadre party is based on temporary associations of notables, but contributes little to understanding continuous organizations, issue-oriented activists, and organized social movements. The major American party scholars E.E. Schattschneider and V.O. Key contributed to our understanding of party, faction, and conflict, but spoke little about party organizations.

There are four competing theories of party organization that provide different models of organization and organizational change: (1) the Party-in-the-Electorate model; (2) the Office Nuclei model; (3) the Truncated Party model; and (4) the Party Institutionalization model. The assumptions of each model are presented in Figure 1. Assessments of each model best can be made with reference to the adequacy of their assumptions and hypotheses. The Party-in-the-Electorate model, while certainly pervasive in its undergirding of contemporary pessimism over the health of the party system, is easiest to dismiss on these grounds. A decline in party identification and in the use of material incentives (patronage) is thought to result in a loss of mass attachment to party, an accompanied increase in the amateur style, and the decline of machines (Ladd and Hadley 1975; Kirkpatrick 1976, 1979; Polsby 1983; Shafer 1983). Each of these results in a
Figure 1: Models of Party Transformation

The Party-in-the-Electorate Model

- Decline in Party Identification
- Decline in Material Incentives (Patronage)
- Increase in Amateur Style

Loss of Mass Attachment to Party
Decline of Machines & Professional Style
Weakened Party Organizations

The Office Nuclei Model

- Decline in Voter Party Identification
- Increase in Party Competition
- Increased Party Organization
The Truncated Party Model

Electoral Crisis

Opportunities for Party Entrepreneurs

New Campaign Technologies

Bureaucratic Imperative: Need for Efficiency

Strengthened National Party Organizations

National Party Assistance to State & Local Parties

The Institutionalized Party Model

National Party Elites Establish Permanent National Party Committees

National party Organizations are Stronger: Increased Programmatic and Rule-Making Authority

Increased Organizational Vitality

Increased Organizational Interdependence

Development of Stable Factions

Integrated Party Community

Elite Agenda Setting

Group Elites Initiate Mobilizing Events and Organize Non-Elites on Group Issues

Social Movements of 1950s, 60s and 70s make demands with Increased Interest Group Activity and Mobilization

Party Reform
weakened party organization. The Party Transformation Study⁶ provided the first real empirical test of these assumptions. First, Cotter et al. found that state and local party organizations were stronger, not weaker during the same period that party identification decreased and amateurs were found to be more prevalent in party activities. Further, Cotter et al. found not only that amateurs were not increasing in the ranks of party leadership, but that organizational strength did not vary between party organizations run by chairs of amateur role orientation and those run by chairs having professional role orientations. Cotter et al. suggest that there is an “organizational imperative” that causes “even amateur activists to engage in activities that recognize common organizational needs” (1984, 150).

Both the Office Nuclei model and the Truncated Party model are predicated on the empirical reality that party organizations are indeed stronger. Yet each provides different explanations of how this occurred. The Office Nuclei model is primarily the work of Joseph Schlesinger (1991, 1984, 1985). Schlesinger’s theory of party organization rests on a combination of two discrete theories: positive economic theory (Downs 1957; Olson 1965) and his own ambition theory (1966), both of which assume individual level rationality.⁵ The major assumption of the Office Nuclei model is to predict an entirely different result for a decline in party identification. In contrast to the Party-in-the-Electorate model, Schlesinger argues that it is precisely the decline in party identification that has resulted in increased party competition, and, in turn, improved party organization. The Truncated Party model is associated with a number of contemporary scholars, including Kayden and Mahe (1985), Herrnson (1986, 1989), Frantzich (1986, 1988), and Arterton (1982). What makes the Truncated Party Model distinctive is that it stresses the critical role of elites. Truncated party theorists identify a bureaucratic imperative based on the efficient use of the new campaign technologies, as well as the role of electoral crises and consequent opportunities for party entrepreneurs as key factors in strengthening party organizations.

The Truncated Party Model

A truncated party is one in which parties are comprised of an elite organization divorced from a mass base (Lawson 1978). As such, it is extremely undemocratic, with the potential of relying on demagoguery and public relations rather than political socialization and face-to-face contacts. Examples of these new models of party include Frantzich’s (1986; 1989) “service vendor” party, Herrnson’s (1986) “party-as-broker,” and Arterton’s (1982) “party as PAC” model. A truncated party is even more removed
from mass support than either the machine or cadre organizational forms. Machine politics incorporated a strong attachment, but it was one based on nonpolitical and indeed crassly materialistic incentives, as well as on fear (Merriam and Gosnell 1940, 175). Cadre parties involve little mass participation in party affairs, consisting as they do of episodic, electorally-oriented organizations of political notables and elected officials, but lacking an enrolled membership. Cadre parties were supported by voters with a psychological and nonrational attachment to the party. The truncated party model takes the cadre concept one step further: truncated parties lack even the symbols of party identification and attachment.

Truncated parties are based on the notion of party strength as discipline enforced by national parties, not as party cohesion developed through the integrative life of an institutionalized party. According to Kayden and Mahe, “If the party recruits and trains candidates and provides the backbone of their campaigns, they are likely to end up as a more homogeneous group and more inclined to be team players” (1985, 196). The party, Herrnson argues, is a “broker” between the variety of resources available. Not only does the party selectively distribute resources, but it also assists candidates and their campaigns in locating resources for themselves (i.e., from interest groups and donors) and in using modern campaign techniques (e.g., consultants, mail houses, voter contact). Beginning in the early 1980s—the same period that the national parties were actively building up their organizational capacity—that the national parties were actively building up their organizational capacity—party cohesion increased in the U.S. Congress to record levels (Davidson 1992).

Can the party organization enforce discipline? This type of campaign assistance, if ever determinative, would be controlling only for freshmen. Incumbents do not need party assistance to fund and manage their campaign. Since the 1970s, we have had some of the highest incumbent re-election rates ever. It is difficult to imagine selective party resources having such an immediate and coterminous effect on party unity. Party discipline should only have an effect on new or marginal members, and should only gradually evince itself over time. Further, this notion does not square with 1970s congressional reforms that reduced leadership control, or with scholarly research that concludes that increasing partisanship in Congress is due to electoral factors, not the enforcement of party discipline (Rohde 1991). To explain enhanced partisanship, we must look further than external disciplinary measures to the internalization of party norms and values—an integrative community life (March and Olson 1989).

Unlike the Institutionalized Party model, which views each party culture as unique, these truncated models are based on a shared ideal of a single “modern” model of party toward which parties must evolve. Kayden
and Mahe, like Frantzich (1986; 1989), argue that the Republicans have pioneered new competitive organizational forms in their use of campaign technology, “with a [typical] lag of eight to twelve years . . . before the Democrats catch up” (1985, 92). This stress on the competitive nature of bureaucratic reforms of the parties is based on the notion that the “Republican model” of reform has been to concentrate on “competitive reforms” resulting in electoral success, while the Democrats have implemented “expressive reforms,” only resulting in the encouragement of internal party participation, not success at the polls (Salmore and Salmore 1985, 212-213).

This notion is based on the assumption that the “Republican Model” is more efficient because it is corporate in form, and is not characterized by the dominant characteristics of “stratarchy” (Eldersveld 1964). Stratarchy, according to Eldersveld, involves a broader set of characteristics than simply organizational decentralization and independence of different party “strata.”

Eldersveld pointed out that in contrast to the bureaucratic hierarchy, American parties are also characterized by rapport as the basis for leadership, high leadership turnover, and diverse motivations among various leadership groups. Hugh Bone notes that the use of an organizational chart (such as is common in the Republican party) or the “physical resemblances to a business office” belies the lack of true bureaucratic organization.

Bone’s observation of the party organizations of the 1950s remains true today. The staff are not bureaucratically organized, nor is party development “technology driven.” Programs begun by one chair are not necessarily continued by the next. For example, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee installed an extensive in-house polling operation during the 1987-88 cycle, under the direction of the DSCC Political Director, Page Gardner. Gardner found the use of the DSCC polls both cost-effective and useful strategically. Yet, when a new chair of the DSCC (Sen. John Breaux) was selected to replace Sen. John Kerry, the entire infrastructure (i.e., carrels, computers, headsets, software) was dismantled and discarded, and staff with the expertise to expand the program were out of a job. On the Republican side, much has been made of the vaunted set of publications, including the semi-scholarly journal, First Monday. This is no longer published. Freeman (1986) stresses that the Democratic and Republican parties have distinct and different political cultures that draw upon their different social group world views that influence their respective organizations. Pannebianco (1988, 62) describes party culture as a “society within a society.” Thus, one “culture” cannot evolve into another. Cotter and his associates in the Party Trans-
formation Study also stress that rules and norms will differ between the parties. In their study, they examined the complexity of rules, not their content. Cotter et al. found no decline in the Democratic Party organizations associated with an emphasis on rules rather than the provision of services.

Many scholars have expected that the service emphasis [in the Republican Party] would strengthen and that the rules reform emphasis [in the Democratic Party] would weaken the state party organizations. The present analysis does not confirm those expectations. The weaker of the two national party organizations, the DNC, with its emphasis on rules and hierarchical relationships, appears to have a measurably greater impact upon the strength of state parties than does the service-oriented and stronger RNC (1984, 69).

The Truncated Party theorists treat the party reform era as an aberration for the Democratic Party. Herrnson (1989) argues that for the Democrats, there were two distinct phases: the first phase was the party reform era associated with party decline, and the second was the party renewal era associated with enhanced institutional and electoral capabilities. Herrnson stresses that the development of national party organizations is recent, based upon electoral crises and the innovations of entrepreneurial leaders. For the Republicans, this was the massive defeat in 1974 following the Watergate scandal, and the selection of William Brock to head the RNC. Frantzich, like Herrnson, argues that party organizations were “shocked into change when traditional techniques fail[ed] to satisfy their goals,” with the lead provided by “change agents” (1988, 91).

This emphasis on internal crises and entrepreneurial leaders ignores ways in which elites can act in advance of crises. Certainly, crises do offer greater opportunities for change. However, Cotter et al. point out that the increase in party organization preceded competitiveness. The “rise of the national party organizations in the 1920s and the rise or rebirth of the state party organizations in the decades following World War II” comprised an effort by elites to act to avert electoral disasters. “[National] party leaders in the 1920s associated professionalized party organizations with presidential election winning” (1984, 163). Anticipation of electoral fortunes enabled party organizations to influence changes in the electoral environment, as well as to react more efficaciously. It was the strengthened national parties that were able to assist state and local parties with the augmenting of their organizational capacity beginning in the 1960s. Elite Agenda Setting also is a component of the stress that Baer and Bositis (1988; 1993) place on social movements as a key factor in the democratization and broadening of the parties. The social movements of the 1950s, 1960s, and the present day have been led by outgroup potential elites who organized and led the movements, yet they also represent a method by which non-elites can force change. Party
reform did not happen in a vacuum. The role of groups and group conflict is key to understanding party reform.

The Truncated Party model points to a number of critical changes in party organizations—their increased organizational strength (especially at the national level), programmatic capacity, and enhanced capacity to diffuse innovations in campaign technology. But the Truncated Party model is incapable of explaining partisan cohesion and party change. Interested groups—party factions, auxiliaries, candidate organizations, and interest groups—may work to recruit candidates and delegates that enable them to “take over” the party if they are successful. Their success, of course, also may mean the success of the party. The work of these groups is critical, but their activity and influence varies from year to year. As Hugh Bone pointed out many years ago, group influence is not institutionalized.

Their relationship to the national committees has for the most part not been committed to paper or an organization chart. Instead of being institutionalized, the relationship between the party and the nonparty groups is worked out, election by election, on the basis of expediency and necessity (Bone 1958, 34).

It is this election-by-election variability that provides a structural source of party permeability, a party characteristic not incorporated in the Truncated Party Model.

The Office Nuclei Model

Schlesinger bases his analysis on the consequences of office-seeking and the “party nucleus” (efforts directed toward a single office). The party, for Schlesinger, consists of not only the formal party organization, but also all activities by candidates for office. Whether different party nuclei cooperate or not depends upon whether the electoral constituencies for each are congruent (facilitating maximum cooperation), disjoint (permitting maximum independence), or enclaved (a smaller constituency located within a larger one that may result in independence or cooperation). Based on changes in competitiveness, Schlesinger (1991) argues that we have a “new American party” which dates from about 1960. The “old” party system he terms a centrifugal multinuclear party, because it was decentralized. “The most striking difference between the old and new party systems is that there are no states in which one party is completely unable to win any office (1985, 1166). The “new” party system, the centripetal multinuclear party, developed because of electoral insecurity. Flexibility in the electorate, and thus increased competition, is a direct result of congressional and party reforms, the increase in primaries, the expansion of the electorate, the
demise of malapportioned districts, the decline of party identification, and the introduction of campaign finance laws. He argues that rules changes at the elite level, such as campaign finance and congressional and party reforms, are neutral in their effect. Schlesinger hypothesizes that rules changes create incentives for linkage, which then result in centripetal multinuclear parties.

The key change, according to Schlesinger, is that electoral volatility creates insecurity among office-seekers, who then combine their resources to compete. In this regard, Schlesinger’s model is similar to the Truncated Party model. A central problem with his analysis is that he never spells out in any detail how insecurity strengthens organization. Schlesinger simply asserts that insecurity increases cooperation, which in turn results in strengthened parties. This is counter-intuitive: the normal human response is to hoard resources when threatened or insecure. Schlesinger does not explain why scarce campaign resources should be shared when the more powerful can monopolize them without sharing.

Related to this theoretical gap is his assumption that rules changes are neutral in effect. This simply is contrary to historical facts. Rules changes, whether to weaken parties in the Progressive era, or to democratize parties in the contemporary era, have been hard-won battles by specific groups with real enemies (Baer and Bositis 1988; 1993). That is, the rules changes were effected to gain group benefit. Rules are never neutral. Schlesinger considers the increased partisanship an indicator of increased organizational strength. The big difference between the machine era and the contemporary era is that cohesion during the former was through enforced discipline. With the contemporary party and congressional reforms of the 1970s, party and congressional leaders have fewer mechanisms with which to enforce party discipline. Further, the heightened partisanship of the machine era was of a vastly different type. Political party machines did not reflect ideological differences—only different constituencies for the dispensing of patronage. The development of high levels of party unity in roll call votes in Congress cannot be explained through discipline. Party cohesion at elite levels requires some notion of party identification among elites, not just among the masses.

The attraction of Schlesinger’s theory is its analytical simplicity and logical consistency. However, on this score, his analysis is self-contradictory. In contrast to the Truncated Party model, which emphasizes recent changes among elites, Schlesinger assumes that elite motivations have not changed. Instead, he points to changes in the electorate to explain increased party cohesion: “Thus, the essential difference between the old and new party systems resides in the altered attitudes and behavior of the
voters” (1985, 1167). Yet, Schlesinger’s earlier work on ambition theory posits the very opposite result: an increasing convergence of candidates and officials, not the increasing divergence that actually has occurred. As he concluded in 1966, “since the state nuclei are competitive, the two parties will tend to converge, as they would in simple party theory” (1966, 132). This logical inconsistency—not acknowledged or explained by Schlesinger in his later work—undermines the most important attraction of positive theory.

Schlesinger’s work has been criticized from a variety of perspectives. The most serious criticism comes from Cotter et al., whose point that strengthened national party organizations of the 1920s preceded the competitiveness of the 1960s is evidence for an alternative causal relationship. Goldman (1991) has stressed that factional conflict is a key and continuing feature of party organizations. Schlesinger’s theory is silent on the distinction between intra-party factional conflict and the presence of inter-party competition. The problem is that even as we have increased inter-party competition, we also find increased intra-party factionalism (Baer and Bositis 1988). Baer and Bositis suggest that “for the first time, we find the development of a true coalition at the elite level as well as at the mass level” (1988, 122). This coalition has also transformed the meaning of mass attachment.

At the mass level, parties are moving from a patchwork quilt—an amalgam—of local interests to a substantive consensus. But this consensus is not one of (mass) cultural uniformity; on the contrary, it is one of partisan cleavage (1988, 122).

These changes in group and factional attachment to the parties developed from the new social and political movements of the 1950s and 1960s.

Baer and Bositis (1988) criticize both Schlesinger and Downs on the notion of rationality. Social and political movements have been key features of American politics since the 1950s, despite the fact that it is irrational (according to positive rational choice theory) to do so. They argue that non-elites have a purposive role to play in the party system. Social movements arose to represent group interests and, in the process, to attack party oligarchy. As Staebler and Ross point out, state party oligarchies were happy to remain in the minority rather than to share power with new groups “whose support might bring them victory at the polls” (1969, 50; also Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1991). Schlesinger errs in assuming that party leaders act rationally, and are free to cooperate when it is in their “rational” interest to do so. According to Baer and Bositis (1988; 1993), the parties became competitive only after party oligarchies were broken down and
permeability was increased. Why the oligarchic party *cadres* disappeared is inexplicable in terms of Schlesinger’s theory.

Finally, Schlesinger ignores any definition of party except as comprised by elected officials, a choice which places his work outside the range of mainstream party research which stresses party as a “social formation” (Chambers 1967). Certainly, in his later work, he nominally includes the party organization in his formal definition. However, he has fused the campaign organization with the party (Cotter et al. 1984, 4). Thus, his measure of party cohesion is solely based on the party unity of elected officials. Schlesinger, like the Truncated Party theorists, ignores the “integrative community” of institutions (March and Olson 1989). Both models of party stress the increasing dominance of the mercantilist style of campaigning over the militarist style (Jensen 1969). The mercantilist style is based on public relations and the liberal use of media techniques to appeal to a broad, undifferentiated electorate. It is conducted without regard for party identification, and in many instances is directed toward independents. In contrast, the militarist style stresses contact with partisans, and mobilization of the already-committed. The militarist style is based on the model of the “political army” of the party machine. Yet, neither model can explain why it is that both techniques remain prominent and complementary in today’s campaigns. Candidates utilize the militarist style with partisan groups, and use the mercantilist style in broad public arenas. Hoefler terms this the “Jekyll/Hyde approach,” in which a candidate delivers an “upbeat, good feeling, rose garden appeal designed for a broadcast audience” for mass consumption in the evening news, and a “hard hitting, negative, targeted delivery tailored to fuel [the] local fires” of specific groups only (1991, 47).

The Party Institutionalization Model

Consistent with the complementary work of a variety of party scholars, the *institutionalization* of party is defined here as consisting of four interrelated phenomena: organizational vitality, organizational interdependence, stable factions that augment partisan linkage between elites and non-elites, and an integrative community life.

Increased Organizational Vitality

The minimum requirement for the institutionalized party is to develop an enhanced organizational capacity (as measured by organizational permanence, an identifiable headquarters, regularized funding and stable staffing, a relatively clear authority structure and division of labor). Party
organizational vitality consists of the ability to use this capacity to alter the party’s environment in a more favorable direction. This has occurred in several regards:

- National parties have acted to strengthen state and local parties.
- Party organizations have acted to control PAC and Consultant behavior.
- Party organizations have sought to change their legal environment.
- Party organizations have sought to change their relationship with the electorate.

National parties act to strengthen state and local parties. National party committees have been instrumental since the 1960s in working to strengthen the state parties. What is remarkable is that their efforts are directed at strengthening the party organizations, not just a surgical effort to come in and win a particular campaign. Also vital is the effort of state parties to assist their local party committees. In the Republican party, this was accomplished under the tenure of Chairman Bill Brock (1977-81), and continued by successive RNC Chairs. These efforts include grants, provision of staff, data processing and consulting services. In 1986, under Frank Fahrenkopf, the RNC began a local party-building drive. In the Democratic party, DNC Chair Paul Kirk (1985-89) has been the most ambitious in his party-building efforts. Kirk provided trained staff to 16 state parties to assist with fundraising. Utilizing a “consortium,” the DNC has coordinated party-building efforts with the Hill Committees, state parties, and non-party Democratic groups such as Democrats for the 80s (Pamela Harriman’s PAC), the National Committee for an Effective Congress, and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (Bibby 1990, 34-36).

Party organizations act to control the behavior of PACs and Consultants. With adoption of the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, political action committees (PACs) became major players in the political process. While early interpretations of the rise of PACs viewed them as responsible for a candidate-centered politics of incumbency, parties have adapted and reasserted control over the process. This is not surprising given the fact that PACs and their contributions represent a form of narrow lobbying by interests in an era when “going public” is an increasingly important weapon in the arsenal of political interests (Schlozman and Tierney 1983). As Samuel Kernell points out,
organizations are neither well designed for nor much interested in brokering the diverse interests brought into play by policy proposals (1986, 35).

Only political parties have the potential to broker collective interests; the institutional party as integrative community provides greater hope for fulfillment of this distinctive role than ever before.

Critical to this has been the growing strength of the legislative campaign committees both at the national and the state level (Herrnson 1990; Loftus 1985; Patterson 1989). Instead of PACs developing individual and independent relationships with key incumbents, the legislative campaign committees are raising funds from these PACs, as well as funneling them to candidates they recruit and endorse. Political directors of PACs depend on party committees to identify, and provide updates on, those candidates that have a significant chance to win. Increasingly, the parties sponsor “PAC Briefings” to showcase their preferred candidates. Instead of PACs operating outside of the party system, at least as early as 1980 they began to receive their intelligence from the party committees (Adamany 1984). While at the beginning of the 1980s the PACs were “not yet aligned along party lines” (Adamany 1984, 104), the fact of “open and protracted [interest group] conflict with other lobbies in their policy area” (Berry 1989, 244) had resulted in the alignment of PACs with one party by the early 1980s (Sabato 1984; Wekkin n.d.). In an increasingly partisan era, PACs are more often allies than competitors of the parties, as the latter have encouraged the formation of PACs among supportive interests, and former party staffers are found “in key positions in the PAC community” (Sabato 1984, 146).

Consultants have been brought into the party system, as well. It has not yet been sufficiently acknowledged that consultants commonly get their start in politics by working in campaigns and in the party committees. Because of the irregularity of party employment, the most skilled consultants will form their own firms and begin to contract independently. However, this does not mean that consultants necessarily further candidate-centered campaigns. While it is true candidates essentially can obtain “hired guns” to run their campaigns, the party committees still play a key, and in some cases central, role.

First, consultants still require party intelligence to assist their clients. For example, no poll can be put together without considerable candidate and opposition research. This is commonly supplied to the candidates and their consultants by the party. Moreover, one major goal of consultant polls is to convince the party committees not only to fund the candidate, but to endorse them in their efforts to gain PAC donations. Therefore, consultants regularly give copies of their polls to the appropriate Political Director of the relevant
party committee. The purpose of such polls is not to circumvent or operate independently of the party organization; rather, they are presented to the party in the role of supplicant.

Second, consultants as a group regularly are brought in to brief party leaders and committee staff. During his tenure as DCCC Chair (1981-86), former Rep. Tony Coelho (D-CA) regularly brought Democratic consultants in as a group to offer suggestions on strategy to the DCCC in the presence of their competitors. Such regular exchanges of information provide a social and a political network that is mutually beneficial. Third, the party committees increasingly are establishing in-house operations to enable them to have information as good as that provided by the consultants. As a top RNC staffer commented about Richard Wirthlin, when asked about the in-house polling operation at the RNC: “Well, he’s a nice guy, but he’s doing it for a profit”!

*Party organizations aggressively act to change the legal environment.* In recent years, the Democratic and Republican parties have regained some of the power to control their own internal processes that had been lost at the turn of the century. During the Progressive Era (1890-1920), the states began to regulate the parties. This regulation began with the adoption of the secret or Australian ballot, followed by stipulations of who could participate in elections, specification of the powers and composition of the state central committees and state conventions, and finally, adoption of the primary for state nominations.11 Ironically, the resurgence of party organizations in campaign finance has been catalyzed by the public regulation of campaign finance effected in the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), a law routinely criticized for weakening parties by capping total receipts from parties, but not from PACs. The effect of FECA has been to stimulate the improvisation of sophisticated fundraising strategies as well as new fundraising technologies—a knowledge and personnel base that can only be maintained over time by the parties.12 More importantly, only parties (and associated political committees)—not candidates—can raise “soft money” and transfer funds between local, state and federal levels, a process that requires expert accounting and legal assistance as well as an “extensive national, state, and local structure” so as to permit “maneuver[ing] within the interstices of American federalism” (Sorauf and Wilson 1990, 197).

In addition to what might be called a pliant, albeit fruitful adaptation to unfriendly legislation, party organizations also have actively sought to change their legal environment. Legislators in general have not been responsive to party organizations’ preference for greater freedom to act, since incumbents prefer weak party organizations affording them greater latitude. In response, the parties have turned to judicial activism in recent years. This has been successful, as the courts have been more sensitive to issues of
freedom of speech and association. Early litigation focused on the national parties and their rights to regulate the state parties. Two of the most important Supreme Court cases in this area were *Cousins v. Wigoda* (1975) and *Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette* (1981), in which the power of national party delegate selection rules was upheld even when in conflict with state statutes. The Supreme Court declared a constitutionally protected party right of association, in which the national party alone could determine who could participate in its presidential selection process. Recently, other efforts, assisted by party scholars and organizations such as the *Committee for Party Renewal*, have addressed state regulation of state parties regarding internal party matters. In *Tashjian v. Republican Party* (1986), the Connecticut Republican Party was permitted to decide whether to include unaffiliated voters in its party primary, Connecticut’s closed primary statute to the contrary; and in *Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Committee* (1989), the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated statutes prohibiting party endorsements in party primaries, limiting the state chair’s term to two years, and requiring rotation of the chairmanship between Northern and Southern California. The *Eu* case is especially interesting, in that the Supreme Court declared that the right of states to regulate the internal structure of parties was unconstitutional, barring a compelling interest “to ensure that elections are fair and honest.” The *Eu* case has far-reaching national implications: if state parties wish to challenge state laws, then the burden of proof is on the states to prove a compelling state interest.

*Party organizations act to change their relationship with the electorate.* Institutionalized parties act to try to control the political environment in order to maintain their existence and their influence. Prior to the development of the institutionalized parties, the two-party system was unstable and often threatened by third parties, as well as by realignment of the respective coalitions of support. It is well known that the major parties protect their privileged position through control of ballot access, and by making the third party option a difficult one (Feigenbaum and Palmer 1990). Thus, Cotter et al. hypothesize that institutionalized parties may have “a counter-realigning and a counter-dealigning capacity” (1984, 168). This capacity is a function of their role in campaigning, and their appeals to groups. Parties seek to maintain support among their constituent groups. This has been evident at the national level in a formalized way since the 1920s, when women were brought into the governing apparatus of the parties. Since then, many other groups have been granted a formal role in the parties. Just as Keynesians moderate the business cycle to maintain capitalism, institutionalized parties moderate the realignment cycle to maintain the established parties.
Increased Organizational Interdependence

Institutionalized parties are characterized by a new type of relationship between different levels of the party: interdependence. Interdependence is defined as “commonality and reciprocity” (Cotter et al. 1984). Bureaucratic organizations are defined in hierarchical terms, in which one organization is supreme to the others. In contrast, American parties have been understood as stratarchies—autonomous units characterized by decentralization and independence—in which power inheres at the base and authority flows upwards. Interdependence is a qualitatively different concept. Instead of the one-way interaction of the bureaucracy, or the “reciprocal deference” of the stratarchy, institutionalized parties are characterized by a “two-way pattern of interaction” (Huckshorn et al. 1986, 978). In recent years, as Gary Wekkin concludes in his analysis of the federal structure of American parties, “the traditional flow of power upward through the party structure has been complemented by a downward flow that has transformed the course of power into a two-way street” (1985, 24; see also Epstein 1982). However, this new interdependence has not weakened the state and local parties. Cotter and his associates studied intraparty organizational activities among the state and local parties and found that through joint activity toward common goals, or reciprocity in assisting each other to achieve respective goals, national, state and local party levels all are strengthened. Their power is consonant, not zero-sum.

Cotter and Bibby (1986) argue that integration is a much broader phenomenon than simply the provision of services emphasized in the Party Transformation Study. Structural integration is evident through ex officio representation of party officials, party auxiliaries, public office holders, and party and leadership organized associations on party committees at other levels, and through career patterns. For example, more than one-third of county chairs serve concurrently on state executive committees—a relatively high number considering that most of the 3,300 counties are rural and have small populations. State party chairs now serve on the national committees of both parties (the Republicans since 1968 and the Democrats since 1972). Campaign staff, consultants, and party chairs exhibit career paths of serial and concurrent officeholding, according to Cotter and Bibby, that reflect an integration of the permanent and temporary party organizations, as well as different levels of the party. Wekkin (1985) concludes that contemporary parties bear remarkable similarities to intergovernmental relations in their shared authority over a central function. Mutual cooperation is the hallmark of the institutionalized party.
Development of Formal and Stable Factions

The notion of an institution is based in stability and formality. In many institutions, the concept of role—a regularized pattern of interaction—is central (Deutsch 1980; Truman 1955). In political parties, the roles that structure conflict and consensus-building are defined by a special type of group: the party faction (Goldman 1991). Like parties, “factions usually emerge as personal cliques and coalitions.” Unlike parties, however, factions are organized informally because, despite their emphasis on competition with other party factions, they also must retain “the opportunity to negotiate, transact, and compromise.” Factions arise in the nomination process, which is most highly developed in the United States. Like political parties, factions also have constituencies, including the party’s “rank and file workers, core party regulars among the voters . . . [and] organized special interests, such as unions, agricultural cooperatives, and ethnic or cultural groupings” (Goldman 1991, 48, 45). Factions provide a form of linkage within parties.

The key issue is how factions have changed. V.O. Key (1949), for example, is cited widely for his critique of factions based on shifting cliques of personality. This type of faction does not provide for linkage. Baer and Bositis (1988) argue that the social movements of the 1950s and 1960s, particularly the civil rights and women’s rights movements, resulted in a special type of change in party factionalism. They argue that with the decline of the third party alternative, these social movements acted within the Democratic and Republican parties. Social movements comprise an antidote to party oligarchy.

The reform critique [of the restorationists] has also faulted reform for merely creating another elite. This misses the mark: of course it did. This charge ignores the essential role of elites in all groups and the fact that the very function of social movements is to develop new elites. Therefore, one cannot criticize party reform just because the “new” elites are just as different from the “masses” as the old elites. Party reform did not create the stratum of political elites, it merely allowed the representation of “elites sprung from the masses” (1988, 106).

The restorationists, according to Baer and Bositis (1988), have viewed the new groups active in the party as “artificial.” Using women delegates to the 1984 nominating conventions as a test case, Baer and Bositis examined this assumption. Contrary to the restorationist view, they found that women delegates who represent women’s groups were present in both parties, and not just among the “reformed” Democrats. Among Republican male delegates, the modal group represented was professional associations (e.g., the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association), while Democratic male delegates most commonly represented labor.
A major issue in factional conflicts is the staffing of the government—should one’s nominee win—and the development of new leaders, in particular from one’s group. Goldman notes that “Nominating systems in the U.S. have . . . become the most elaborate and complex in the world” (1991, 44). This means that American parties are extremely permeable, particularly in terms of factional influence through staffing. Previously excluded outgroups believe that to achieve proper representation, they must have group members at elite levels.

The process by which this has occurred is through elite agenda-setting. Outgroup leaders are quasi-privileged: they possess political and economic resources, but still are excluded from influence commensurate with their achieved status (i.e., what is due their education and accomplishments) because of discrimination. This discrepancy between achieved status and ascribed status (i.e., black, woman) gives rise to what are called “relative deprivation” and “marginality.” The role of leaders is essential in creating the communications network, and the organizational base and structure, that must be in place prior to the development of a social movement. Social movements also require a critical mobilizing event, and a widespread sense of group consciousness and a felt need for a common solution (Baer and Bositis 1988; 1993). New factions have developed in the parties as a consequence of party reform, which opened up the elite oligarchies to new groups, especially at the national level. However, these organized factions were present in nascent form prior to the reform era.

Elite agenda-setting occurred primarily at the national level, as national elites began strengthening the national party organizations and laying the groundwork for the organized party factions and the social movements that flowered in the 1960s. Many organizations within parties were established prior to the development of mass movements—for example, establishment of the Women’s Divisions at the DNC and RNC (1919), the National Federation of Republican Women (1938), the Young Republicans (1931) and the Young Democrats (1932). Other organizations comprise leadership groups, such as the Association of Republican State Chairs (1962), Association of Democratic State Chairs (1969), and Democratic Governors Association (1983); and still others are ideological organizations, such as the Young Americans for Freedom (1960), Ripon Society (1962), Rainbow Coalition (1984), Democratic Leadership Council (1985), Republican Mainstream Committee (1988), and Coalition for Democratic Values (1990).

These organizations are augmented by a host of nominally nonpartisan groups that maintain continued communication with their members, and actively participate in party affairs. This is reflected in the substantial group associations found in party leadership groups (see Figure 2). Not only do
many party elites identify themselves as representing particular groups, but the types of groups represented vary by party. Few Republicans are drawn from the ranks of civil rights, education, feminist (e.g., National Organization for Women, National Women’s Political Caucus) or labor groups. Among Democrats, the least represented groups were right-to-life organizations. Both parties are similarly based in community service, veterans, and traditional women’s organizations (e.g., Business and Professional Women, League of Women Voters).

Groups within the parties develop stable factions that are in regular conflict with other party factions. These factions perform a linkage function, and are based on group identification, not on leader-personalities or office-holder patronage.

Development of an Integrative Community Life

The notion that parties are organizations “having an internal life of [their] own” (Sorauf 1975, 37) is not a new one. However, the dominance of behavioralism has led to an emphasis on the individuals who make up the party, rather than the organization. A party becomes institutionalized when it develops what March and Olson term an integrative community life. As integrative institutions, party organizations forge a common identity among
those who participate and act as “agents in the construction of political interests and beliefs . . . . [They can be] a source of vitality in political life and coherence in political identity” (1989, 165). The institutional party provides ongoing interpersonal networks of action for its members—networks that educate as well as provide private information and social friendships. Eldersveld’s study of precinct leaders in Detroit provides fascinating evidence of the party as a “rewarding ‘social group’” (1986, 107). Only a small proportion of party workers began their party service with “solidary” incentives, but after working for the party, this became the most important satisfaction for party work.

These social networks result in regular patterns of interaction based on roles that give rise to a distinct political culture (Freeman 1986). While parties do comprise social groups, this does not mean that they are alike. On the contrary, each of these particular social groups exhibits a distinct political culture—elite cultures that are increasingly evident since the 1960s. In the 1950s, there was little differentiation between the backgrounds of party leaders. Party leaders in both parties were cut of the same cloth: older white males, college educated and professional employment (usually attorneys), protestant, and middle to upper income (David, Goldman and Bain 1960; Cotter and Hennessey 1964; Crotty and Jackson 1985). Indeed, until the reform era, Democratic and Republican party leaders had more in common with each other than they did with the constituent groups of their respective parties. Freeman (1986) has identified the political culture of each of the parties based on her participant observation of the temporary party of the Democratic and Republican nominating conventions from the 1960s to the present. This differentiation of political culture also is present in the permanent party of the national committees (Bibby 1987).

The basic difference between the two parties, Freeman notes, has been remarked by many observers: the Democratic party is pluralistic and polycentric, while the Republican party is unitary and organic, with considerable deference to its leaders. The implications and significance of these basic differences had not been studied prior to Freeman’s insightful analysis. The Democratic party is comprised of many groups and competing power centers, while the Republican party is homogeneous, with the identity “Republican” having primacy over any other identity (male, female, white, black, etc.). In contrast, the different groups comprising the Democratic party are the primary reference group. They are the basis for making demands on party leaders. In the Republican party, the component groups are used as channels for leadership communication to the activists. Even the major influential groups differ: Republican influence groups tend to be ideological and geographic (e.g., state delegations), while Democratic
groups consist of a wide array of demographic, as well as geographic and ideological, factions.

These two political cultures structure a wide variety of aspects of party activities and norms: convention activities, career paths of activists, concepts of representation, organization style, world view, and notions of legitimacy. When not in official sessions, the Democratic party conventions are dominated by group-based caucuses open to all, while Republican conventions are characterized by private receptions by invitation only. At these events, Democrats engage in public speech and debate while the Republicans engage in private speech and one-on-one networking. Legitimacy is determined by who you know and who you are (personal connections) in the Republican party, and by who you represent (group connections) in the Democratic party. Career paths in the party are advanced by the success of the group you represent in the Democratic party, while advancement in the Republican party is determined by sponsorship and the success of the leader(s) you are associated with.

Differences in organizational style result in different strategies for influence. While conflict is quite open and accepted in the more permeable Democratic party, it is highly disapproved of in the more “corporate” Republican party. Indeed, Freeman stresses that the “corporate” structure of the Republican party is part and parcel of its culture, not a bureaucratic organizational “form” toward which the Democratic party necessarily must evolve. Conflict and factional disputes in the Democratic party are used to positive benefit—even just to gain notice. Among Democrats, “successfully picking fights is the primary way by which groups acquire clout within the party . . . [they demonstrate] political skills and [establish] territory” (1986, 340-41). For Republicans, consensus building with deference paid to leaders is key: “maneuvering is acceptable. Challenging is not” (1986, 339). The organic structure of the Republican party is linked to a trustee concept of representation. Republicans stress individual success, while Democrats stress fairness—a balance among groups. The Democrats emphasize a delegate concept of representation. The world view of the two parties reflect their different bases—Democrats view themselves as on the periphery of society, even when they are in power; while Republicans view themselves as at the center of society, even when they are out of power.

An integrative community is normative—the views of individuals are shaped consistent with those of the organization. The party is able to shape values and norms of party members and activists. If an integrative community has developed, then one should be able to locate an increased cohesion among the permanent and temporary party organizations over time—and not simply in roll call votes of elected officials. To examine this, I have
Comparisons are based upon deviations from inter-group means on item indicated. Items measured on 7-Likert scale.

Source: The Party Elite Study.
Comparisons are based upon deviations from inter-group means on item indicated. Items measured on 7-Likert scale.

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Source: The Party Elite Study.
compared Democratic and Republican national committee members, county chairs, and convention delegates over time (1980, 1984 and 1988) in four areas: defense, detente, provision of government services and spending, and affirmative action. Each group’s deviation from the inter-group mean is graphically displayed (see Figures 3 through 10). Evident is both intraparty homogeneity and inter-party diversity. In general, the county chairs are the most conservative group in both parties. Yet, over time, the cohesion is greater on most issues, except for attitudes toward for Government Services among GOP leadership groups where cohesion is unchanged from 1980-88. On this issue, the Republican County Chairs are markedly more conservative in 1988 than they were in previous election years. The most striking increase in cohesion is among the Democratic party leadership groups.

As exemplified by the development of internal cohesion, and the growth of internal rules and norms of behavior, an identifiable political culture, and the development of a leadership structure distinct from that of elected officials, this dimension of party institutionalization appears well-established.

The Significance of Party Institutionalization

As we have seen, institutionalized parties are characterized by an integrative party community, the development of stable factions, increased organizational inter-dependence, and an increased organizational vitality. It is these characteristics that together comprise a continued role in linkage and result in the institutionalized party remaining a social formation, not a truncated party. This concept of institutionalization does not mean that local parties, the least institutionalized, are ineffective in waging campaigns. Rather, as Patterson points out, the “nonbureaucratic organization [of state parties] belies their effectiveness” (1989, 171). Yet, the extent to which the institutionalized party resembles or is differentiated from a bureaucracy remains at issue.

Institutionalized Parties: A Bureaucracy, No Bureaucracy

Institutionalized parties inevitably develop some characteristics of bureaucracies—a permanent organization, a staff with some division of labor, as well as rules and established operating procedures. However, it is important to recognize that, like other institutions, institutionalized parties are not defined solely by their organizational strength, such as staff size, the degree to which they have adopted modern communication technologies, or by their budgets and organizational resources. This point is emphasized by Italian political scientist Angelo Pannebianco, whose recent work is a
significant advance on Weber’s classic analysis of bureaucracy. As Pannebianco (1988, 224) notes, parties are a “hybrid” organization combining a system of interests and a solidary system, as well as the common bureaucratic facets of hierarchy and administration. Unlike bureaucracies, the staff in party organizations not only respond to their superiors for actions and decisions, but also are judged periodically by the party rank-and-file.

Pannebianco distinguishes between executive bureaucracies (the classic Weberian bureaucracy) and political parties, which he terms representative bureaucracies. The executive bureaucracies are characterized by a “vertical integration of elites” in which “people enter the organization at low levels and rise to the top, they are born and raised in the organization” (1990, 62). Classic or executive bureaucracies become closed organizations; entirely the opposite of institutionalized parties.

Bureaucrats can only make their careers within an organization; this explains their conformity, their subordination to their leaders’ decisions, and by consequence, the highly centralized authority which always accompanies high levels of bureaucratization, and the centripetal character of the ‘opportunity structures’ (Pannebianco 1990, 227).

In contrast, institutionalized parties or representative bureaucracies incorporate a “horizontal integration of elites” wherein elites gain power in parties through their influence in extra-party organizations; “people enter the party at high levels from the outside environments in which they already occupy elite positions” (1990, 62). Representative bureaucracies are characterized by factions, horizontal integration, and rank-and-file participation in, and review of, party administration.

These characteristics are evident in American institutionalized parties. In the early years, the role of the chair was to serve as a fundraiser, and a leader of the winning faction. If this continued, then the party might have become a national machine. Now the chair is a mediator of factions (witness Robert Strauss, Paul Kirk, and Ron Brown). It is a mistake to focus, as some have done, on the Democratic emphasis on “expressive” reforms (nationalization through rules) and the Republican emphasis on “competitive” reforms (nationalization through provision of services). It is the job of parties to be competitive by appealing to groups. In fact, the development of stable factions has increased, not decreased, party cohesion. It is ironic that the scholars who criticize Democratic reforms for weakening the party as an intermediary applaud the Republican model as one to be emulated. What has not been recognized is that the Republican party has indeed faced many of the same pressures, and has responded in parallel fashion—although differently than did the Democratic party. Republican women, underrepresented on the RNC and in the unreformed Republican Party, have been
guaranteed half of the seats on RNC committees since 1940 and on all convention committees since 1960, and the NFRW was granted a vote on the RNC Chairman’s 28 member Executive Council (the major governing body of the RNC) in 1988—the only party affiliate to gain this privilege.

Institutional parties differ from classic bureaucracies in other ways as well. The development of a staff does not mean the closing of the party. Instead, factionalism is apparent even in the staff. Staff do not obtain their positions through the establishment of official credentials, but through sponsorship and recommendation by major party leaders. It is interesting to note that one of the oldest graduate programs in campaign management, Kent State University, has just closed its doors. A major component of all university degree programs in campaign management is an internship or a fellowship. This alone (and not the “expertise” taught in books and in lecture halls) gives experience to the novice. Degrees alone do not open doors. Even some aspiring political leaders, such as former Ohio governor Richard Celeste (1982-90), frequently mentioned as a possible presidential candidate, in 1988, have established internship programs unconnected with any university.16 Political party staff represent different factions in the party, and are allocated among the states. They not only lack similarity to career civil servants in terms of initial recruitment, but they also do not attain power through any system of tenure of civil service. Instead, they suffer tremendous job insecurity—the expansion and contraction of staff before and after elections occurs at the state and national levels (Cotter et al. 1984, 17). Even among those with staff experience at the national party level, there is a lack of continuity, and resultant waste of training and experience. The same point can be made about party leadership. The eight year terms of James A. Farley as DNC Chair (1932-40) and of Mark Hanna (1896-1904) as RNC Chair are unusual. Turnover of the national party chairs has been and remains high. In addition, during the twentieth century—the period of increasing national party strength—the chairs usually have been recruited from outside the committee. All of these characteristics of institutionalized American parties are consistent with Pannebianco’s concept of representative, as opposed to executive, bureaucracies.

Groups in the guise of organized factions are increasingly institutionalized in party politics. But their influence and power from one election cycle to the next is not similarly institutionalized. Many have expressed the fear that strong interests mean weak parties (Broder 1979; Phillips 1978). This ignores the key observation of E.E. Schattschneider (1942), a prominent critic of pluralism, that interests are the “raw material” of politics. It is not “strong” interests per se that result in weak parties; rather, it is when strong interests are not diversified that parties are threatened (Morehouse
Increased and more diverse interest group activity results in stronger parties.

**Political Institutions in an Era of Institutionalized Parties**

The concept of institutionalization developed here draws upon a distinctive literature base that distinguishes political parties from bureaucracies. This particular conceptual framework has not been incorporated by students of the institutionalization of the congress and of the presidency, who have emphasized (1) events unique to each institution, and (2) the inexorable adaptation of institutions to modern society. Scholars of congress commonly have stressed the similarity of congress to bureaucracies, with the growth of bureaucratic structures (complexity and boundedness) and the use of automatic and universalistic criteria for apportioning influence and decision-making (Huntington 1965; Polsby 1968). The institutionalization of Congress refers, then, not to its staff or its budget or its support in public opinion polls, but rather to the way the members themselves are organized to make policy. Thus, the increasing tenure in office of members, the increasing role of seniority in allocating influential committee positions, and the practice of ranking committee members by their years of consecutive service on congressional committees comprise congressional institutionalization (Polsby 1968). In contrast, institutionalization of the Presidency refers to the increasing reliance of the president upon a growing, appointive executive establishment of an insular, centripetal character. Presidential scholars traditionally have focused on institutionalization of the presidency—the growth of the White House staff and of the agencies of the Executive Office of the President—as an outgrowth of the distinctive nature of presidential roles and functions, consistent with sociological theories of role and structural/functionalism (Wayne 1984). In a major study of the institutionalized presidency, John Burke (1992, 35, 43) argues that the presidency has several institutional “traits” that transcend different administrations: “centralization of control over the policy-making process by the White House staff”; “centralization of power within the staff”; and bureaucratization of the staff, including “complexity, fragmentation, competition, and self-serving advocacy.” Unlike our concept of the institutionalized party, presidential and congressional studies thus far have not incorporated the salient distinction between classical bureaucracies and political institutions that involve representation and periodic review by the rank-and-file.

It is ironic, but no accident, that the phenomenon of the institutionalized party occurred well after the institutionalization of the presidency and the congress were delineated by scholars, because it is party which
organizes both institutions. In V.O. Key’s felicitous phrase, parties are likely to act as a “solvent of separation of powers” and are expected to encourage joint executive-legislative responsibility. Unlike the contemporary stalemate of divided government, the institutional conflict that previously characterized executive-legislative relations occurred in the absence of strong partisan conflict. Instead of party government, we had coalition government, dominated by what variously has been called “interest group liberalism” (Lowi 1969) and “institutionalized pluralism” (Kernell 1986). As James Sundquist (1980, 199) put it, “the party position in Congress” was “either the president’s program or none at all.” Similarly, Huntington (1973, 34) argues that strengthening congressional party organizations necessarily would weaken presidential leadership. Dependent on “iron triangles” and insulated political communities, Kernell describes the advantaged position of the president in the bipartisan bargaining process as follows:

Constructing coalitions across the broad institutional landscape of Congress, the bureaucracy, interest groups, courts, and state governments required a politician who possesses a panoramic view and commands the resources necessary to engage the disparate parochial interests of Washington’s political elites. Only the president enjoys such vantage and resources (1992, 14).

The contemporary era is dominated instead by the institutionalization of party: broad, open, increasingly public conflict between organized interests disagreed on collective and ideological grounds, brokered by the parties—a systematic and important qualitative change, with important implications for divided government. Historically, divided government has been unremarkable not because it was uncommon, but because there were not significant differences between the parties. For this reason, the institutionalized party should have critical ramifications for the institutionalization of the presidency and the congress, and strong implications for how scholars frame the concept. However, the advent of the institutionalized party has had little impact on congressional and presidential scholars, as many still cite the (non-existent) decline of party even as they note narrow institutional changes. For example, Thomas Cavanagh (1978) has critiqued Polsby’s (1968) concept of institutionalization as dated because the phenomenon it described “peaked” around the time the article appeared. Cavanagh rightly argues that Polsby’s reliance on classic bureaucratic norms of automatic and universal criteria for apportioning influence is misplaced. While the U.S. House did become more organizationally complex over time, the 1970s was a watershed period in which adoption of new and more partisan criteria in apportioning influence resulted in a “major realignment of power among the competing functional units” (1978, 637). Kernell (1986) argues that in an
increasingly complex policy environment, presidents use a “public” strategy by appealing to public opinion. Recently, congressional scholars (Davidson 1992; Patterson and Little 1992) have stressed the resurgence of congressional partisanship, but few (e.g., Rohde 1991) have considered how partisan resurgence may have its roots in electoral forces or changes outside of congressional reform and narrow membership turnover—and none have considered the influence of party organizations external to the institutions themselves.

Conclusion

I have sought here to codify and elucidate an emerging consensus among party scholars concerning the phenomenon and significance of the institutionalized party. To the extent that American parties are institutionalized, many of our established “truths” bear reconsideration. The Weberian unidimensional concept of bureaucracies is much too limited to take account of critical differences between representative and executive bureaucracies. In party institutions (or representative bureaucracies), factional conflict is reflective of increased community within parties, not its opposite. Party cohesion, which has increased dramatically, derives from the increasingly homogeneous political culture within parties, not from enforced and centralized party discipline. Continuous party organizations with increased democracy and rank-and-file participation, no longer the episodic cadre parties controlled by local notables, are something quite different than is explicable via bureaucratic traits. Yet, an elite leadership role remains critical in setting the agenda—even as elite oligarchies decline. To ignore the institutionalization of party risks serious error. Specifically, congressional scholars are wrong to view congressional partisanship as due only to electoral constituencies; presidential scholars err in viewing public strategies of the president as only public relations, rather than reflective of the representative nature of political institutions; and party scholars are wrong in viewing party reform as an aberration that weakened parties rather than contributing to the integration of party officials, elected officeholders, and party rank-and-file. Scholars must go beyond narrow subfield specialities to consider how the changing “web of party” has linked elites and non-elites as well as national and subnational executives and legislatures.

NOTES

1 The author gratefully acknowledges useful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript from Cornelius P. Cotter, John S. Jackson III, Gary D. Wekkin, and an anonymous reviewer. David
A. Bositis also provided helpful commentary, as well as invaluable assistance in preparing the graphic presentations.

2 Herrnson uses the term “institutionalization” to signify these changes. Certainly these are part of institutionalization—as I shall argue—but these changes are devoid of the notion of an integrative community. Without the latter, Herrnson essentially is discussing a “truncated party.”

3 The Party Elite Study is a study of party elites in the two major parties, conducted at Southern Illinois University since 1974 under the direction of John S. Jackson III, joined in 1984 by David A. Bositis and Denise L. Baer as co-investigators. The sample populations from 1980-1988 include all those holding official party office. The study includes samples of nominating convention delegates, county chairs, national committee members, and the universe of state party chairs. Questionnaires were mailed to all respondents immediately after the respective party conventions.

4 In discussions here of the Party Transformation Study, I rely not only on published work, but also on unpublished papers provided by Cornelius P. Cotter that provide a better understanding of the underlying theoretical approach.

5 Schlesinger (1984, 1985, 1991) incorporates both theories in his analysis of parties and party organizations. Drawing upon Downs’ definition of a party as a “team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (1957, 25), Schlesinger argues that the ambition and “drive of individual office seekers” is the “motive force of party organization” (1991, 33). The fusion of individual-level behavior with the concept of organization is distinctive to Schlesinger, and differs from the approaches adopted by other writers. For example, in sharp contrast to such major theorists of organizations and institutions as Pannebianco (1988) and March and Olsen (1989), who emphasize the nonrational and cultural component of organizations, Schlesinger asserts that “rational choice theory . . . is really a revival of the institutional approach in politics” (1984, 375).

6 Based on the author’s observations of staff at the national and some state parties. Some may disagree; however, the onus of proof is on those who assert (without investigation) change from earlier eras. If, somehow, a professionalized party bureaucracy is developing, then this must be proven with hard evidence (e.g., the use of degrees and expertise rather than rapport and sponsorship to obtain and maintain position), not by mere assertion.


8 This is not an insignificant fusion. In campaigns, consultants play a driving role through their control of message development, polling, and media. In party organizations, this is not the case.

9 The Republican success at strengthening state and local parties is well known. This, of course, does not mean that the RNC State and Local Division does not occasionally irritate local parties. One local Republican leader complained loudly at a 1989 RNC/NFRW training workshop about “those boys in their BMWs who came down” to Florida to assist in the special election after the death of Rep. Claude Pepper, but who knew nothing about the local situation. Not satisfied with the answer of Jayne Victor, head of the State and Local Division, the plaintiff elaborated that “the rumor is that their fathers gave big donations to the RNC and said, ‘here, take my son!’” (author’s observation-notes).

10 Interview with author, November 1990.

11 Adoption of the primary as a widespread technique for presidential nomination/delegate selection did not occur until 1972.

12 One consequence, as Sorauf and Wilson (1990, 200) emphasize, is the “reemergence of the financial elite.” However, the financial elite has changed: “the ‘new fat cats’ . . . are no longer the big contributors but the organizers of the big contribution total. They no longer can give $1 million under federal law, but they can mobilize 1,000 people to give $1,000 each.” While this experience and technological base is potentially available to any organization, it is the parties that maintain it over time.

13 An additional “hard” measure would be the codification of party rules (Cotter et al. 1984). However, I do not use this measure because it is too easily misinterpreted as simply a bureaucratization of party, rather than indicating an integrative community.
14 With apologies to Robert Graves, in whose I Claudius the protagonist quotes a Sybilian prophecy in which the recurring opposition of “his wife, no wife” and of “his son, no son” prophesies death and succession.

15 Pannebianco does, however, include some communist parties (whose leaders serve a long apprenticeship and are recruited through youth federations and communist party schools) in this category.

16 Celeste’s program is called Participation 2000 (Part2), and in 1990 placed 39 students in full-time salaried positions in state legislative to senatorial and gubernatorial campaigns in 20 states. Part 2 also includes a ten-day training session with experienced campaign professionals.

17 Presidential scholars, for example, usually cite the Brownlow Report and its model for presidential reorganization, while congressional scholars cite the “revolts” against Speaker Cannon and by the class of 1974.

18 The concept of the institutionalization of the presidency was discussed as early as the Eisenhower era (Seligman 1956), while the concept of the institutionalized Congress dates from the early 1960s (Huntington 1965, Polsby 1968, Haeberle 1978, Cavanagh 1982-1983).

19 Unified government has been present in only about one of every two years since 1875 (Cox and Kernell 1991, 3).

20 Weber’s classic model rarely is invoked in its entirety; yet, the full model is essential to understand why it is that parties (and other political institutions) are not classic bureaucracies. Weber’s model of bureaucracy includes permanence, fixed authority within official jurisdictions (authority attaches to the office, not the person), hierarchy of offices, written formal rules, impersonality and objective criteria, career civil service, and secrecy of the trained expert (Gerth and Mills 1946; Pannebianco 1988; Baer and Bositis 1993).

REFERENCES


