The Nominating Process: Factionalism as a Force for Democratization

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In what ways may a one-party system advance democratic development? Democratic development requires an understanding of the process of institutionalization and the ways in which institutionalization may be promotive of nonviolent elite competition, even within one-party systems. This directs our attention to the hierarchy of institutionalized organizations and conflict systems that constitute a party system, namely, government, parties, and factions. Although neglected in research on party politics, factions are capable of creating conditions favorable to democratic development, including nonviolent competition among elites, party pluralism, and popular participation in electoral and other institutions of national politics. The centerpiece of factionalism is the party’s nominating process, another relatively neglected subject of inquiry. Several principles of institutionalization are suggested by the experience with factionalism in the United States and other nations.

In the search for strategies of democratization, a facet of institutional development that is often overlooked is the role of factionalism within political parties. American political scientists, imbued with the values of freedom, pluralism, and political competition, endorse what they perceive to be a strong connection between two-party systems and successful democratic development. American analysts are less comfortable with the multiparty systems prevalent in Europe and elsewhere, systems that appear to lead to ideological rigidity, reduction of the electorate’s direct influence upon government leaders, and unstable governments. As for one-party systems, they are bad, bad, bad. One-party systems are presumed to be the devices of Marxist dictatorships of the proletariat, fascist totalitarians, authoritarian oligarchies, and military despots. According to this view, factional competition within one-party systems is an oxymoron.

While there is plenty of evidence to support these negative assessments, political analysts may be overlooking certain important features of democratic systems, particularly as they relate to elite competition and conflict management. The same may be said of the study of factions within parties and of party nominating processes as critical occasions for factionalism. If competition and conflict management are among the principal functions of democratic institutions, then 1) factions are principal mechanisms of intraparty competition and 2) nominations for public office are their principal objectives.

The Hierarchy of Organizations and Conflict Systems

E. E. Schattschneider (1957), whose views on the relationship between parties and democracy have influenced a generation of political scientists,
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considered conflict as the essential element of politics and conflict management as the central practice of politics. He stated the implications of this proposition succinctly.

If politics is the management of conflict, it is necessary first to get rid of some simplistic concepts of conflict. Political conflict is not primarily or usually a matter of head-on collisions or tests of strength, for a good reason: intelligent people prefer to avoid tests of strength, about matters more serious than sports, unless they are sure to win.

Nor is political conflict like an intercollegiate debate in which the opponents agree in advance on the definition of the issues. The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country because the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power.

Political strategy deals therefore with the exploitation, use, and suppression of conflict. Conflict is so powerful an instrument of government that all regimes are of necessity concerned with its management. The grand strategy of politics deals with public policy concerning conflict. This is the policy of policies, the sovereign policy -- what to do about conflict.

Political elites are the gladiators who struggle for the relevant prizes, that is, incumbency in governmental offices, control of public policies, distribution of society's resources, the psychological gratifications of exercising power, etc. The processes and outcomes of elite conflicts usually reveal whether or not a political system is viable and its practices democratic or authoritarian.

At the heart of modern political systems and their conflict processes are political parties. Certain facets of historical experience tell a tale of the process by which party development enables some nations to make a transition from millennia of internal wars to eras of representative democracy, political pluralism, and civilian control over the military (Goldman 1983, 1990a). In these cases, party systems, under certain conditions, displace armies and warfare as the principal means of conflict among competing political elites. Political party development appears to be an essential antecedent condition for the achievement of an enduring representative democracy.

Party leaders become the negotiators of the major decisions of the representative body and make the major decisions regarding the military establishment. When the party system, regardless of the number of parties, becomes the dominant institution, the military and the methods of elite competition are transformed. The armed forces no longer serve as combatants in internal wars nor as autocratic oppressors of the people, but instead serve as agencies of common security under the direction of the elected civilian authorities. Armies, civil war, and the battlefield are replaced by parties, election campaigns, and the ballot box.

Modern political parties first appeared as parliamentary parties in
England during the seventeenth century. They next emerged in a distinctive way in the American colonies, where they functioned as nominating and electioneering as well as legislative organizations. Nominating systems in the U.S. have since become the most elaborate and complex in the world. Today, political parties of one type or another may be found in nearly every nation of the world.

The prevailing view is that without the competition generated by political parties, the concept of popular sovereignty loses meaning and the development of democracy is hindered. Totalitarian and authoritarian systems, where only one party is permitted, have helped give one-party systems their bad name, becoming, as they have, instruments of oppressive control rather than mobilizers of the people's will and sovereignty. The exceptions are those one-party systems that tolerate a vigorous intraparty factionalism in which the electorate plays a significant role, as in the example of primary elections in the one-party states of the United States.

If we think of political parties as organizations within a hierarchy of organizations, we may also find a concomitant hierarchy of conflict systems associated with each organization. The organizational hierarchy consists of government, party, and faction, each with its own conflict system.1

A government is a complex organization established by leaders of a society in keeping with custom or, as in the case of the founding of the United States, according to specifications in a written constitution. The extent to which ordinary citizens are able to participate in the selection and accountability of government officers and in the decisions that determine public policies is one measure of how democratic the particular community is. From a conflict perspective, a government's primary functions are a) to defend the society and its institutions and b) to coordinate and regulate relations among its institutions, that is, maintain the "rules of the game."

In those nations where popular sovereignty is an accepted principle of governance, political parties are the essential instruments for recruiting leaders from among elite competitors, articulating alternative public policies, and facilitating citizen participation. A political party is a distinctive type of social organization whose principal objective is to place its avowed leaders and representatives into the offices of government. Party organization is usually formal, with officers, headquarters, and rules of operation. Parties formally present their nominees to an electorate, campaign for their election, and appeal for support through statements, platforms, manifestos, and propaganda that deal with public policy issues and the merits of their nominees. When they control government offices, party leaders are usually the principal decision makers in the adoption of public policies and the allocation of public resources, such as job patronage, government contracts, taxation, programs for managing the economy, and policies favorable to the goals of particular groups within the community.

In addition to their primary interest in staffing, organizing, and managing the government, political parties perform numerous secondary civic func-
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tions. Parties reiterate and reinforce community political values, usually by claiming that their programs promote these values. Political parties recruit, train, and nominate prospective public leaders. To a degree that may surprise some observers, parties prevent political fraud and corruption by maintaining keen watch over the conduct of the leaders of other parties and organized interests. Parties encourage participation in politics by telling citizens how government is organized, how to use governmental services, how government policies affect their lives, and how to influence the decisions of government officials. When party leaders function as brokers and mediators among competing interests or when they themselves compete for office, they provide a system for channeling conflict along nonviolent and constructive lines; in effect, they provide an institutional alternative to warfare (Goldman 1990a).

At times with hesitation, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and their political heirs have acknowledged that political parties are key institutions of democracy for the reason that they give life to popular sovereignty by systematically compelling party leaders to remain in touch with their constituencies. This accountability to an electorate assures that the views and interests of the people will be heard and attended to. No other political institution seems to achieve this accountability as openly, regularly, and effectively.

The third level of the hierarchy is faction. A faction is a system of cooperation, often short-lived, among a number of recognized leaders within a political party for the purpose of influencing the decisions and conduct of the party organization as a whole. Belloni and Beller define faction as “any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part.” The academic study of factions has been modest, but awareness of factions by practicing politicians is widespread, as suggested by the frequent use of their generic names in many languages, such as *batsu* in Japanese, *siya* in Hebrew, *tendance* in French, *correnti* in Italian, *sub-lema*, sector, and *linea* in Spanish.

A faction is a type of intraparty organization that usually gives free play to competition among a party’s leaders, yet retains for them the opportunity to negotiate, transact, and compromise. Factions are usually informally organized, although in some cases, as in the Italian parties, they are formal to the extent that they have names, officers, headquarters, and journals. Faction decisions most often pertain to such matters as the selection of the party’s officers, nominees for public office, policy postures, or distribution of party resources such as campaign funds and patronage. The constituencies of factions are usually drawn from party rank-and-file workers, core party regulars among the voters, or organized special interests, such as unions, agricultural cooperatives, and ethnic or cultural groupings. In the U.S. context, factions may be referred to as cliques, wings, ideologues (liberals, conservatives, etc.), or the name of their principal leader (“the Reaganites”). A faction may exist as briefly as the balloting of a nominat-
ing convention or for as long as several decades in support of a policy, as in the
case of Medicare.

An entire faction may bolt a party and set itself up as a new, independent party organization. This happened frequently during the first century of the United States party system; it is happening today in the party systems of Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere. More commonly, factional leaders within a stable party organization try to demonstrate their strength, campaign about their differences, or negotiate various trade-offs -- for example, one faction’s support for a particular candidate in exchange for the other’s endorsement of a particular platform plank.

This hierarchy of organizations may promote democracy by also providing a hierarchy of conflict systems that, at the same time, both facilitate and constrain elite competition. Accordingly, factions compete for control of party offices and policy platforms. Parties compete for control of government offices and public policies. Government competes with other institutions, such as the media, organized interest groups, churches, corporations, and military establishments (“the military-industrial complex,” for example) for control of the society. Political conflict thus becomes multilayered. As conflict-resolution occurs at each level, the intensity of the conflicts dissipates. In constitutional democracies, application of the principle of dispersed power reinforces the moderating effects of this hierarchy of conflict systems.

The prevailing view of U.S. political scientists is that two or more parties are necessary to make these conflict systems meaningful. Democracy occurs between parties, not within parties, according to E.E. Schattschneider (1942) and his followers. However, historical experience demonstrates that competition is possible regardless of the number of parties. Even one-party systems can provide for significant political contests in the shape of factionalism.

How does the faction-party-government pyramid of organizations get to be a system of conflict suppression rather than conflict facilitation? In totalitarian systems, a particular leader's faction gains control of a party, a party gains control of the government, and the government, with the preponderance if not monopoly of military force in its hands, may exercise extensive as well as intensive control over all facets of each citizen's life. Examples abound: the rise of Stalin’s faction in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Ferdinand Marcos’s ascendancy in the Liberal party of the Philippines, and others.

The pyramid stands differently in democratic systems. A democratic party system is one in which the leaders of factions openly compete for control of party and government. They do this in ways that are public, nonviolent, and in accordance with constitutional and party rules that provide predictability to the process and physical safety for all leaders as they pursue their roles as conflict managers and representatives of particular constituencies. In a democratic system, party or factional leaders who lose in an open and honest contest peacefully relinquish office, whether in the party or the government, to the
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winners. Such open contests and peaceful transfers of power are possible in some types of one-party system, but hardly possible in totalitarian or authoritarian systems.

In the party systems of dictators, the incumbency of the leader and his factional colleagues is usually “legitimized” by control of another type of organization, namely, the military and/or the police. While the dictator’s government may be organized *pro forma* according to a constitution, he is likely to consider the government organization subordinate to his “official” party, which in turn is subject only to his and his faction’s convenience and purposes. In contrast, democratic parties and their factions are institutionally subordinate to the governments they seek to control, subject to the same constitutional rules under which the government itself operates. Often, party rules will imitate constitutional rules in ways that prepare party leaders for the management of governmental affairs, e.g., the majority rule for nomination by U.S. party national conventions imitates the majority rule of the Constitution’s presidential electoral college.

The interactions among factions can tell us much about how the party leadership is chosen, how nominations for government offices are made, and how factional leaders are likely to behave at the head of their party or while in public office. The “deals” that factional leaders are willing to make in a democratic party system are likely to predict how well they will serve as political brokers or negotiators among the many competing interests of their society in general.

As key players, factional leaders also become the rule makers for the institutionalized political game within which they carry on their competition. These are the persons who negotiate the constitutions that organize the structure and procedures of government, the statutes that guide the contest between parties, and the party rules that regulate competition among factions. These are the players who decide when breaches of the political rules of the game, such as a resort to violence or refusal to accept the outcome of an election, become too destructive or too costly to be tolerated.

The Importance of the Nominating Process

Nominating candidates for governmental offices is perhaps the single most distinctive activity of political parties and the most serious decision contested by their factions. Parties in democracies have several ways of nominating candidates. There are mass rallies, party caucuses, party committee or convention votes, and primary elections. Regardless of method, most nominations generate factional tensions that often conclude with negotiations among a party oligarchy or election contests among core party activists. When the method generates certain consequences, as noted below, the nominating process may promote democratic institutional development through a ripple process that
begins with factional competition at its center, interparty competition as the next outer wave, and government competition with other institutions (for example, the media) at the outermost.

**Coalition Formation**

Factions usually emerge as personal cliques and coalitions. In new democracies, it is common for small groups of political activists to create oligarchic parties with tiny or nonexistent constituencies. Their constituencies could be a few members of the national legislature, a clique in the military establishment, a family network, neighbors in a particular local community, a few influential personal friends, or an illegal armed band. In some countries, these so-called parties often resemble the organized lobbying groups found in the older democracies. When outlawed, they may become guerrilla movements. The result is a confusing multiplicity of pseudo-parties, some of which may be inclined to engage in insurgencies, each with few leaders and limited organization.

Separately, no one of these parties is capable of displacing the dictator’s or any other dominant party. The latter are usually well-organized and affiliated with a military establishment. For example, parties by the score appeared in post-Duvalier Haiti, over a dozen parties opposed the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines, seventeen parties belonged to the oppositionist National Accord in Chile, and about nine parties opposed the Sandinista machine in Nicaragua. For all practical purposes, however, these were one-party systems.

In most of these cases, the opposition became effective, even victorious, only when its many parties, as coalition partners, confronted the tasks of a nominating process. A first step was to provide a forum in which the tightly-knit oligarchies of competing groups, parties, and factions could negotiate an anti-regime coalition. A second step was to produce a single slate of nominees to oppose the ruling party’s candidates. Slate-building also foreshadowed the make-up of a government-in-opposition, suggesting which leaders would presumably participate in a new regime if elected. These coalitions of parties were analogous to coalitions of factions, which they would have been if their members belonged to a single umbrella organization, as in the early parties of Great Britain or the United States.

By producing coordinated slates, each coalition reduced the alternatives from which the electorate would have to choose. The fewer the alternatives, the easier it was for voters to participate meaningfully in the elections. This second step reflects a major strength of the two-party system, rooted in the psychology of information theory, namely, that individuals can deal most comfortably when options are limited to two or three at a time. In elections, this comfort factor makes for high turnout, and high turnout is likely to bring out voters who might otherwise be frustrated by too many choices and too little information about any
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of them.

The third step was to achieve a well-coordinated election campaign to which all parties in the coalition could contribute their best efforts. Management of this interparty effort was analogous to management of an intraparty nominating campaign in which disparate factions have to be brought together. The leadership problems and achievements of both types of coalition effort are similar.

Successful coalition efforts may also lead to establishment of a permanent umbrella party within which most former opposition parties may become factions. This transformation may be facilitated by certain institutional arrangements, for example, the establishment of representative nominating conventions at which minor parties may negotiate their way into the framework of the larger organization or contribute to the absolute majority vote required for election by an electoral college. The latter institutional rule in the U.S., for example, not only motivated competing factions to merge into two competing party organizations but also eventually gave rise to a stable two-party system.

Popular Participation

A nominating process raises questions as to who is a party member eligible to participate and how a party organization should support its nominees in the election campaign. A nominating process that provides an opportunity for popular participation can have several democratizing effects. In the U.S. since the turn of the century, for example, primary elections of one kind or another have tended to energize otherwise inactive factional leaders and dormant party rank-and-filers by mobilizing them during the pre-election cycle as they carry on the party’s nominating contests. During these contests, candidates had to demonstrate a capacity (a) to campaign, (b) to attract a following among the party’s activists, and (c) to focus rank-and-file attention on their civic and party roles. After the nominations are made, everyone’s recently heightened awareness tends to increase turnout on election day.

Under some circumstances in one-party systems, even when there are vigorous nominating contests, low voter turnout and ballots left blank may be politically significant as indicators of popular dissatisfaction with or fear of the dominant party or its dominant faction. For example, in the 1989 elections of representatives to the Soviet Union’s Congress of People’s Deputies, approximately 200 unopposed Communist party candidates failed to receive the 50 per cent vote necessary for election. These individuals were candidates in constituencies deeply alienated from the Communist party.

In sum, regardless of number of parties, voter participation in factional contests, primary elections, and related nominating activities is likely to prove electorally significant as well as provide civic training for the exercise of greater influence in internal party affairs, not to mention for participation in some
possible future new party. Participation and secessionist possibilities are thus able to promote political competition and democratic development.

First Elections

A primary election that nominates is essentially a first election in a set of two. A primary is an intraparty event; the general election is an interparty event. However, in some multiparty countries and in the open primary states of the U.S., the two events are often treated as a sequence of two general elections.

In the first election, whether multiparty or open primary, the voter may cast his or her ballot for any party’s or faction’s offerings, rather than solely for a factional candidate within his or her own party. The mathematical and political consequence of this system is to reveal the true size of each candidate’s support, eliminate those with the least support, enable the leaders of different factions or parties to negotiate coalitions on behalf of the candidates remaining in the race, and reduce the number of alternatives from which the voter may choose at the second and final election. Participation in first elections of this type is open to all voters rather than exclusively to enrolled party members. This type of first election enhances the influence of party officials who select the candidates for the first election and negotiate the interparty endorsements of the survivors for the second election. This process differs from the closed primary elections employed in most of the United States.

In closed primaries, only enrolled party members may participate; other registered voters are excluded. The candidates on the primary ballot get there through nomination by a party committee or convention, by petition of enrolled party members, or by self-nomination procedures that require official applications and fees. The party electorate and the general electorate, although including most of the same individuals, remain distinct collectivities and influence party leaders on two separate occasions in different ways.

U.S. primary elections make it possible for occasional grassroots insurgencies to occur, encourage factional contests, and activate popular interest in the entire election season. Even in one-party states, so well described in V. O. Key’s Southern Politics, primary elections, when honestly administered, keep factional competition alive. As a consequence, popular influence on the conduct of party leaders is sustained throughout the two-election sequence, coalition formation must take place within rather than between the parties, and advantage in the general election lies with those candidates and nominees most skillful in the tactics of compromise and moderation.

In comparing the American-type primary and general election sequence with the set of two general elections of the European type, perhaps the most important institutional difference is the separation of the nominating from the electing phase of the government leadership selection process. American practice makes the most of factional competition and at the same time structures
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general election choices in ways that reduce the probability that doctrinaire nominees will gain public office.

Moderate Leaders

Extremist nominees are likely to be either losers in closely competitive elections or winners with questionable mandates if supported by a low turnout or a minority vote. As argued above, two of the principal effects of factionalism and a competitive nominating process are coalition formation and the nomination of political moderates or centrists. Both factional and party competition make it necessary to negotiate, build alliances, and agree to compromises. These are actions that facilitate moderation. Party moderates in public office are probably the best assurance that political conflict will be managed positively and that democratic solidarity will increase over the long term.

Illustrative Experiences: The American Case

The United States enjoys what is perhaps the most complex, most competitive, and least understood nominating system in the world. The nation’s experience may be divided into three phases: the convention system that prevailed until 1900; the mixed convention-primary system operating from 1900 to about 1972, and the primary and open caucus system of the period after 1972 (Kamarck 1990). Today, two thirds of the states employ presidential primaries. There is also strong popular support for the establishment of a national presidential nominating primary, according to most opinion polls.

In their initial stages of development, political parties tend to be relatively accidental and transitional organizations, established and operating extraconstitutionally, usually under a charismatic leader seeking to control a government. This is typical of new nations: the United States two hundred years ago and many of the more than one hundred new nations that have emerged since World War II. In almost every case, the new nation copes with a need for political unity, problems of untested institutions, and, if inclined toward democracy, the implementation of the many requirements of pluralism: free speech, association, religion, ideology, etc. Weary of domestic oppression and violence, many citizens of new nations are likely to hope that dissent will be vigorous but gracious and that the new institutions will quickly become strong enough to cope with conflicts nonviolently and democratically.

Despite these aspirations, founding leaders tend to be wary of political parties, uncertain about the loyalty of opposition groups, and inclined to manage national affairs with a tight rein or iron fist. They tend to prefer one-party systems and to rely on their military colleagues to maintain order. This leads to questions about how soon the nation’s “official” party or military leadership is likely to become corrupted by the concentration of power.
Recall that in 1789 the only other functioning party system in the world was the British. Colonial political experience was derived from England, where the previous century’s parliamentary factionalism was contentious and roundly criticized in the writings of Lord Bolingbroke. Nevertheless, informal Court and Country parties formed in several of the colonial legislatures, democratic clubs and societies were established in several cities, Sam Adams’ Boston Caucus inspired imitators elsewhere, and the committees of correspondence served as the Party of the Revolution. The political groupings in the Continental Congresses of the Revolution and the Confederation were as contentious as the factions in the British Parliament. Given their century-long association with dissent, controversy, and revolution, little wonder that factions had a bad name among the Founding Fathers.

The Federalists, who won nearly every seat in the first two sessions of Congress, refused to refer to themselves as a political party, never admitted that George Washington’s and John Adams’ were essentially one-party presidencies, and ignored Alexander Hamilton’s urgent proposals for building a national party organization that he wanted to call “The Christian Constitutional Society.” President Washington, a thinly disguised Federalist, went out of his way to warn his fellow-citizens against parties. Federalist self-deception led to their gradual disappearance from public offices during the first decade of the nineteenth century. Their legacy, however, was carried on in President John Quincy Adams’ tirades against all political parties and his refusal to acknowledge that the National Republican party was the infrastructure of his own election and administration (Goldman 1990b, ch. 3).

To be fair, even the most populist of the aristocratic Founding Fathers, namely, Madison and Jefferson, were frequently uneasy about parties and factions. Madison’s Federalist 10 worried about dealing with the inevitable and perhaps necessary mischiefs of faction. Jefferson’s inaugural address predictably called for national unity, proclaiming that “we are all federalists, we are all republicans.” Both men thought of partisanship as electoral, local, and legislative, and their respective low-profile presidencies (1801-1817) encouraged this perception.

Following a brief period of unpleasant partisanship at the national level from 1795 to 1801, the nation’s politics moved into a one-party era that lasted until 1824. Historians refer to the period euphemistically as the Era of Good Feeling. More accurately, it was a period of intensifying personal and regional factionalism within the Jeffersonian following. Although most political leaders referred to themselves as Jeffersonians (a.k.a. Republicans or Democratic-Republicans), an intense presidential nominating competition unfolded in Congress. With large majorities in both houses, it was the Democratic-Republican Congressional caucus that became the principal presidential nominating agency. In this one-party era, nomination by “King Caucus” was tantamount to election to the presidency. The contestants were leaders of personal and regional factions. Comparable factions arose in state legislatures, where United States
senators and, at first, slates of presidential electors were chosen.

With the arrival in 1828 of the Jacksonian era, factionalism and nominating contests transformed national politics from a one-party to a two-party system. The transformation was institutionalized in 1831-1832 by the invention of presidential nominating conventions. As King Caucus lay moribund, the leaders of the Antimasonic, National Republican, and Democratic-Republican parties recognized the need to establish a national nominating procedure that could respond to two institutional conditions: the states as single-member presidential electoral districts and the electoral college rule of election by absolute majority.

The Founding Fathers had invented the electoral college as a means for identifying the "best" men in the nation for the offices of president and vice president. Such persons would be known to the most knowledgeable and representative political leaders in each state, presumably the state's legislators. The requirement of an absolute majority in the electoral college was intended to encourage consultation nationwide and to reduce the number of nominees to two or three. What the Founding Fathers failed to anticipate was the way in which partisan politicians would compete in a system of states behaving as single-member districts.

The presidential electors of each state were originally chosen by state legislators. State legislators were themselves elected in single-member districts in which locally organized parties were active. Since single-member districts produce all-or-none outcomes, majority parties in state legislatures acquired unearned increments of seats, that is, overrepresentation in the number of seats won when compared to the proportion of popular votes received. Unsurprisingly, the dominant party in the state legislatures proceeded to make the most of their disproportionate voting power, particularly when it came to the important choice of presidential electors. Almost from the outset, the dominant state legislative parties filled their allotted representation in the electoral college by choosing entire slates of fellow-partisans as presidential electors. In time, electors were chosen by popular vote, but as members of a party slate rather than as individuals. The slates were nominated by the state parties and elected on an all-or-none basis; popular pluralities as well as majorities gave entire slates of electors to only one of the presidential candidates. As the practice spread, states took on the character of single-member districts in the electoral college.

By the mid-1820s, two thirds of the states had one-party systems. Party slates were submitted to popular vote, but the outcomes were nearly always predictable. Meanwhile, state party leaders were beginning to form regional coalitions in support of particular national leaders. The extension of the suffrage was also enlarging the national electorate. One result of these trends was the removal of presidential selection from control of the Congressional establishment, that is, from King Caucus.

To further complicate matters, candidates for the presidency were being
nominated in many ways: by themselves, mass rallies, state legislatures, state party committees, Congressional cliques, and partisan newspapers. It was difficult to distinguish factions from parties and regional candidacies from self-declared ones. However, pressing down on everyone was the institutional requirement of an absolute majority in the electoral college. Success, therefore, could come only to those national politicians who could form factional coalitions. Whereas Congress had been the negotiating marketplace well into the 1820s, a new marketplace had to be created by the early 1830s. Thus was born the national nominating convention, first employed by the Antimasonic party in 1831 and imitated in 1832 by the National Republicans and the Democratic-Republicans.

The national nominating conventions have had a long and often turbulent factional history. In the century-and-a-quarter between 1832 and 1960, there appeared five basic patterns of factional conflict and presidential nomination. Of the 65 major-party nominations made during this period, 22 were renominations (confirmations of the factional leader incumbent in the presidency or at the head of the out-party), seven involved nomination of an heir apparent from within the dominant faction’s leadership, and 10 were nominees chosen by an inner-group coalition of factional leaders. These 39 cases reflected the clear ascendancy of a particular faction in the relevant party.

Another seven nominations were compromises in factional stalemates at the national convention. As many as 19 nominations were victories of insurgent factions over previously dominant factions. These 26 cases, that is, 40 per cent of the total, reflected vigorous factional competition, that is, contrary to the Schattschneider thesis, the possibility of pluralism within parties (David et al. 1984, ch. 7, Goldman 1990b).

In the early 1900s, the introduction of primary elections opened another arena for the conduct of factional conflicts. Hitherto, party leaders who met in conventions, committees, “smoke-filled rooms,” or the living room of a party boss usually chose party officers, party committees, delegates to party conventions (including the national conventions), and nominees for public offices. The primary election brought the rank-and-file enrolled party voter, that is, the party-in-the-electorate, into the selection process.

The primaries were initially declared to be reforms for overcoming bossism, but they very soon became a tool with which a minority faction in collusion with a faction of the opposition party could overthrow or circumvent a majority party’s dominant faction. Although primaries democratized the nominating process in many respects, they also brought to the fore institutional questions of their own. One question raised anew by this method of nomination was whether popular sovereignty (by way of primaries) or peer-evaluation (by way of conventions of party leaders) is more likely to recruit better talent for the party’s pursuit of public office. The Founding Fathers would definitely have preferred peer-evaluation, the essence of their electoral college system. Two
centuries later, however, factionalism had extended the competition to all levels of the government-party-faction hierarchy so as to better include the citizenry.

**Factions and Nominations in Other Nations**

What has been the experience with factions and nominating processes in other nations, particularly in one-party states? Does that experience support an expectation that factional competition can advance a nation’s democratic development?

*Mexico.* Most would be reluctant to classify Mexico as a democracy, yet it is hardly a dictatorship. Perhaps “factional democracy” would apply.

From its independence in 1820 to the end of its revolutionary decade of 1910-1920, Mexico was subject to recurrent internal wars and governed by fickle coalitions of *caudillos* (generals with private or local armies). After the Mexican Revolution, Presidents Alvaro Obregon (1921-1924) and Plutarco Calles (1925-1928) dedicated themselves to increasing the political clout of emergent labor unions and agrarian associations. At the same time, they sought to reduce the size and influence of the military. This delicate task had to be accomplished without destroying the national unity promised by the new Constitution of 1917. Their chosen institutional instrument was the political party.

During the Obregon and Calles presidencies, political parties emerged, merged, and faded away: the Liberal party, the Mexican Labor party, the National Cooperative party, the National Agrarian party, etc. At the end of Calles’s term in 1928, Obregon was elected a second time, only to be assassinated two weeks later. To deal with the succession crisis, President Calles pursued an unconventional “nominating” procedure. He invited all the active political generals to come up with a candidate of their own for provisional president. This had to be someone upon whom the dominant party coalition in the Mexican Congress could agree in advance of the formal election. Egocentric and factionalized, the generals failed to agree on any one of their number. The compromise provisional president chosen was Calles’ own first choice, Emilio Portes Gil.

Before leaving office, President Calles and a number of other prominent political figures founded an “official” National Revolutionary party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, or PNR). The PNR created a powerful seven-member National Executive Committee which promptly embarked upon an intensive organizing effort. The new party adopted a comprehensive system of representation that extended to every state, territory, and the Federal District. The PNR immediately intruded itself into state and local election affairs by endorsing candidates for governorships and state legislatures regardless of their method of nomination and by participating aggressively in their campaigns. Absent a systematic nominating process, the PNR endorsement served as a substitute and became a practical prerequisite for winning public office.
PNR’s first national convention to nominate (in effect, elect) a president took place in 1929. Labor, peasant, and military delegations held relatively equal voting strength. The military were the best organized and amenable to Calles’ wishes. A Calles choice, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, was nominated for president. It was a Mexican version of King Caucus. In the Mexican case, with Plutarco Calles as boss of the PNR, the callista faction became the directive force in three successive presidencies: Portes Gil (1928-1930), Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932) and Abelardo Rodriguez (1932-1934).

In 1938, President Lazaro Cardenas (1935-1940), another of Calles’ hand-picked successors, called a special convention to reorganize PNR into a more representative institution: the Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana, or PRM). The new principle of representation was syndicalist (then in vogue in Mussolini’s Italy). The party established four sections, reflecting the factionalism that had persisted over the preceding decade: military, labor, agrarian, and popular (the party’s state and local officials) sections. The four sections were given equal votes in the selection of presidential nominees. In practice, the military were invariably outvoted, three to one. Their influence in presidential politics declined accordingly. In 1946, PRM was renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI). Over the next four decades, PRI experienced a lively factional life, with the labor unions becoming the dominant faction in recent years.

Although PRI still holds the presidency and more than four-fifths of the seats in the Mexican Congress, the 1988 elections witnessed a significant factional bolt: the National Democratic Front (Frente Democratica Nacional, or FDN), led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the son of the late president. In addition, the hitherto miniscule opposition party, the conservative National Action party (Partido de Accion Nacional, or PAN), began to win offices in major cities. It may be too early to declare Mexico’s conversion from a one-party system to multiparty pluralism. However, the signs are there: an institutionalized factionalism; a significant factional bolt (FDN); rising electoral fortunes for a long-established minor party (PAN); a more deeply involved electorate. Comparisons with the one-party Era of Good Feelings seem reasonable. Mexican party development continues, as manifest in the changes in the party balance, in the parties’ nominating processes, and in the factional competition of the dominant party.

Japan. For all practical purposes, Japan has had a one-party system since the end of World War II. The Liberal Democratic party (LDP) has controlled the government since the mid-1950s. The only sizable opposition has been the Japan Socialist party, never a serious threat. What has kept pluralism alive in the Japanese party system is the intense factionalism of the LDP (Fukui 1978, ch. 3)

LDP was formed by the merging of two conservative parties in 1955. It
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has since been the dominant majority in both houses of the Diet and in the administration of the government. Most LDP factions (batsu) form around particular leaders, rather than around ideologies or programs. However, over the past quarter century, LDP factions have become increasingly institutionalized, with headquarters, a specific membership, formal organization, regular meetings, and strong discipline. “The cycle of intra-party faction politics begins and ends with the elections of the party president. Because whoever wins the support of a majority in the nation’s legislature (or its lower house) is virtually assured of election to the premiership.. . .” (Fukui 1978, 50).

A candidate for party president must have the support of his faction. His election depends upon the outcome of a coalition process among the factions. Only three or four of the largest factions can expect to win party presidential nomination for their own leader by building a factional coalition. In Japan, factionalism and the nominating process in the one-party system appear to be the antecedents of pluralism.

Turkey. The recent history of Turkish party politics provides an interesting contrast to the usual in factional politics. In this case, an authoritarian regime initiated and supervised the transition to a multiparty competitive politics, a top-down process. The ideology of the Kemalist revolution explicitly calls for a pluralist democracy. Unlike their counterparts in other developing countries, the Turkish military have traditionally been the principal advocates of democratization in the country and the most readily frustrated when civil violence and economic crises occur.

The transition to democracy began in 1945 when the authoritarian Republican People’s party (RPP) allowed the formation of an opposition party, the Democratic party (DP). The DP was initially a coalition of opposition parties but, by 1957, had itself adopted authoritarian ways. This led in 1960 to the first of three military coups; the others occurred in 1971 and 1980. Each coup left the armed forces in control for short periods, during which constitutions were amended or rewritten. These were earnest attempts by the military to provide a constitutional framework in which pluralism and a multiparty system could thrive without giving rise to domestic violence. The military sought to impose multipartyism. The unanticipated result was extreme multipartyism. As parties and ideologies proliferated, the recruitment of new party leaderships stagnated. Elections produced unrepresentative results. Turkish politics continued on the precipice of crisis (Yeshilada 1988, Ozbudun 1989).

What have been lacking are a competitive nominating process and opportunities for elite coalitions within the parties. Instead, Turkish politics is burdened by an excessive number of parties, an anti-coalition orientation, ideological rigidities, Old Guard civilian leaders, prohibitions against party and interest group alliances, isolation of extremist groups from the moderating influences of the broader party process, and institutional arrangements conducive to violence rather than negotiation. Turkey needs fewer parties, more
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factions, new nominating institutions, and a better understanding of the conflict processes appropriate to a party system.

Other Cases

Limited space permits only mention of other illustrations. The Belloni-Beller volume (1978) cites the experiences of the Christian Democrats and Socialists in Italy, where, as noted earlier, factions (frazioni) have distinct names, headquarters, and even journals. They also describe factional conditions in the Israeli Labor party, the Indian National Congress party, and several others.

Mention should also be made of the dramatic transitions from totalitarian one-party systems to competitive systems in Eastern Europe and Africa since 1989. However, these two regions appear to be following different developmental paths. The East Europeans, by and large, have previous experience with multiparty politics as well as models in nearby Western Europe. Theirs is a grassroots-up change process. In contrast, after imposing one-party despotisms for several decades, many regimes in Africa -- Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Benin, Ivory Coast, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, etc. -- are gradually acquiescing to calls for party pluralism, free elections, and honest government. However, as in Turkey, the authoritarian leaderships are cautiously, sometimes deceptively, trying to control a top-down process of democratization, to the point of creating, as in Nigeria, two or more artificial parties and inadvertently setting loose a number of familiar political pathologies.8

Taiwan offers an excellent example of the impact of generational factionalism in a one-party system. Defeated by the Communists in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang party and millions of its adherents retreated to Taiwan where they ruled under martial law for four decades. During the 1980s the leadership of the Kuomintang was dominated mainly by octogenarians who still spoke of reconquering the mainland. However, a younger, better educated, and more affluent generation of party leaders pressed for an end to martial law and a more open society, even to the point of openly tolerating the formation of an illegal opposition (Democratic Progressive) party by their age cohorts. Political reforms were cautiously initiated just prior to President Chiang Ching-kuo’s death in 1988 and continue under President Lee Teng-hui. Meanwhile, factional debate within the Kuomintang grows in intensity and openness and popular support of the new Democratic Progressive opposition increases. It is reasonable to expect that the younger Kuomintang leaders will eventually gain ascendancy in their party or bolt to form their own or join the Democratic Progressives. Thus, through a process of factional development, this one-party military dictatorship will have become a multiparty democratic polity nonviolently.
institutionalized behavior through custom, tradition, law, and similar consensual and regulatory means. When functioning successfully, institutions are thought to be *sufficient* to their task, that is, effective in guiding human conduct predictably along the lines prescribed by the community. Institutional *insufficiency* describes those situations in which institutions fail to maintain established patterns of behavior and practice or fall short of achieving valued collective goals.

One of the most important positive outcomes of institutional sufficiency is the reinforcement of attitudes fundamental to the preservation of political communities, namely, attitudes of trust, or *institutionalized trust*. A simple and familiar economic example of institutionalized trust is the mortgage loan activity of banks wherein the borrower’s credit history enables the bank to entrust him or her with a substantial interest-earning loan to buy a residence. Both profit happily from the institutional roles of lender and borrower.

How may political leaders institutionalize one-party systems in ways most likely to advance democratization? What does the historical experience suggest? *A priori*, we must assume a culture or a constitution that assures some degree of free speech, freedom of association, dedication to popular sovereignty, personal security, and free elections. These are not easily achieved conditions, but without them, only “phantom democracy” (sham pluralism and democracy), as Africans call it, is likely to result.

Goal specifications for a party system must include institutional roles and practices that a) encourage nonviolent competition among political elites, b) legitimize the organization of factions, c) promote coalition formation among factions, d) assure that the dominant party is comprehensively representative of most if not all constituencies in the nation, e) legally protect the proprietary character of party names and nominations, f) incorporate a nominating process that assures the participation of all factions and facilitates the involvement of all enrolled party members, and g) allow unaffiliated citizens easy access to party membership.

Experience with factionalism and nominating processes suggests several institutional rules of the game that seem best able to meet most of the above requirements, at the same time allowing for vigorous elite competition, coalition formation, nonviolent conflict, and comprehensive popular participation -- that is, the patterns of role behavior and institutional practice that seem best suited to promote democratization. The rules are few and certainly subject to debate and adaptation.

1. Maintain a clear distinction between general elections in which all registered voters may participate and primary elections in which only enrolled party members may vote. This closed primary rule distinguishes between election to public office and selection as a party nominee, between interparty and intraparty competition, between governmental and party leadership, and between representation of citizens and representation of party members. The rule compels factional coalition formation at a critical time *before* candidates become party nominees, that is, before they are presented to the electorate. The
rule helps clarify who is responsible for what: the party members for their nominees, the electorate for its government.

2. The rule of absolute majority, that is, 50 per cent plus 1, should prevail in all elections, general and primary. The rule compels mobilization of voters (maximizing participation) and coalition formation among factions (requiring negotiation and compromise). The rule also prevents obstruction by a small minority (as in U.S. Senate filibusters) or victories by dubious pluralities or minorities.

3. Apportion units of representation among the citizenry and within the parties so as to assure widely dispersed influence flowing up from all constituencies. Historically, units based on geography appear to respond most conveniently and effectively to changing demographic conditions despite elaborate gerrymanders, intense reapportionment battles, and the propensity to establish group quotas. Nonparty organized interests seeking to influence parties are thus compelled to do so through factional support or affiliation, which should be readily available to them. A party’s committee structure should be particularly sensitive to the need for comprehensive factional, group, and constituency representation.

4. Conduct factional disputes in a public manner in order to encourage a dignified process, give legitimacy to the outcomes, and keep the public informed and involved in all levels of competition.

Perhaps there is a “natural history” of political parties during which evolution occurs in stages: at whose birth factions are essentially personal followings; during whose adolescence a one-faction, one-party system brings national unity; and in whose maturity strong factions may emerge to support a multiplicity of issues and leaders. If the study of factionalism and nominating processes confirms such a progression, we may acquire a better knowledge base for designing and managing one-party systems in ways that can more reliably promote democratic institutional development.

NOTES

1So general is the neglect of the subjects of faction and nominating process that they receive no mention, for example, in the indexes of an impressive four-volume survey of democratic development in twenty-six countries (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1988-1989). Even in a significant volume devoted entirely to factionalism, there is no index reference to the nominating process (Belloni and Beller 1978).

2Probably the most thorough survey of faction and factionalism is Belloni and Beller (1978). Their definition is at page 419. Their survey of the literature is in chapter 1. For other definitions and typologies of factionalism, see Hagopian (1978) and Sartori (1976). Belloni, Beller, and the contributors to their volume make the case that “factional politics is a neglected subject of study.” They point out that Harold D. Lasswell offered the first modern political science definition of faction in “Factions,” Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences and that Key (1949) was one of the first students of parties to give serious attention to factions in his inquiry into the one-party states of the U.S. South. Key found bifactionalism and multifactionalism as the typical patterns. In his study of Louisiana politics, Sindler (1955) concluded that its one-party system approximated a two-party system.

Schattschneider’s Rational-Efficient model of party systems influenced a generation of students of parties. An alternative is the Party Democracy model, in which member participation and internal democracy prevail. The debate between supporters of the two models is described by Wright (1971). Typically, Wright’s survey never alludes to factions or the nominating process.

In the field of psychology, experiments inspired by information theory have demonstrated that a person’s decision-making costs increase significantly as the number of options from which to choose increases. Psychological comfort is at a maximum when there are two or three options. Stress and error enter when the number reaches beyond seven (Miller 1953; Reza 1961).

The history of the national convention system is comprehensively analyzed in David, Goldman, and Bain (1960 and 1984).

For the role of factions in the selection of national committee chairmen, Goldman (1990b).

A similar democratization-from-the-top-down was initiated in Taiwan by the late President Chiang Ching-kuo in 1986. Responding to a new generation of educated middle-class political leaders within the authoritarian Kuomintang party, Chiang urged his elderly colleagues in the party leadership to begin discussions with leaders both within and outside the KMT. A responsible opposition party soon emerged and won elections.


Key (1956, ch. 6) argued but did not prove that the direct primary led to the atrophy of local party organization. Andrew D. McNitt (1980, 257-66) took a different view.

REFERENCES

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