Burning the Midnight Oil: Clandestine Behavior, Hard Work, or Strategic Rush in Congressional Voting?

Authors

  • Phillip J. Ardoin

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2009.30.0.229-250

Abstract

While the vast of majority voting in Congress occurs during regular working hours, two percent of the recorded votes and eleven percent of Key Votes each session over the last 15 years have occurred late into the evening. The purpose of this research is to examine this unique set of votes that members of Congress cast while burning the midnight oil. Although these late night votes represent only a small percentage of roll-call votes, they are clearly important to members of Congress, or at least their leaders, who are extremely busy. Roll-call votes scheduled late in the evening undoubtedly interfere with members’ regular schedules, and no member wants to spend their night on the hill after a long day of Washington work. The results of our analyses indicate the majority of late night voting can be explained by the strategic rush hypothesis which suggests members burn the midnight oil prior to long recesses and also later in the week in order to return to their constituents. We also find late night voting may be the result of an over burdened legislature. Finally, our results confirm the growing power of Congressional leaders, particularly in the House, to utilize and even abuse the legislative schedule to meet their policy and reelection goals.

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Published

2009-11-01

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Articles