

Book Reviews

Richard L. Engstrom, Editor

Jay Hakes. *A Declaration of Energy Independence*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008. iv, 252 pp. (\$27.95 cloth).

The question of “energy independence” has been somewhere on national policy agendas at least since the Arab Oil Embargo and the price shocks of the early to mid 1970s. Indeed, Jay Hakes, in his book *A Declaration of Energy Independence*, acknowledges this problem on page six, where he reproduces a moderately famous Jimmy Marguiles cartoon in which each president, from Nixon to G.W. Bush, utters one word to form a sentence “It’s time we end foreign oil dependence.”

With this dismal history behind oil policy, and energy policy broadly, what new can be said? Complicating Hakes’ task—if one desires short-term fixes—is the rapid pace of change in the economy and in energy markets; in 2008 a gallon of gasoline in the United States cost over four dollars at its peak in some areas, and at a low of \$1.40 in other locations and months. And when Hakes started writing this book, the economy was in much better shape than it is now.

But Hakes’s book is valuable, because he takes the longer view, both historically and into the near future. Hakes melds energy market concerns, environmental problems, and technological advancements into a cogent analysis. Hakes, whose expertise as director of the U.S. Energy Information Administration from 1993 to 2000 serves him well, seeks to connect these threads into a call for action that would reduce American dependence on foreign oil. Such an action would, in turn, give the United States a stronger hand in foreign policy, reduce air pollution and slow global climate change, and would yield greater economic security.

The book is divided into three broad parts. Part One usefully lays out the history of our oil problem. Those who remember the gas lines and price spikes of the 1970s, and those who do not, will learn a great deal about the nature and mechanics of the oil market and how the United States became vulnerable to price increases or oil embargoes. Hakes traces the history of our oil policies since before World War II, and shows how the interplay of British and U.S. energy hegemony, followed by Middle Eastern nationalism, has shaped foreign policy in oil-rich regions, and shaped decision making in other nations, such as Venezuela and Norway. This period also saw import quotas and price controls that kept American production high, and prices low.

In Part Two, Hakes outlines “the problem of America’s energy dependence,” including chapters on our increased dependence on foreign oil despite actual successes in reducing oil imports and consumption in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These successes were a result of actual market forces and regulatory change not, as our former Vice President might say, as a result of personal virtue. This section also discusses the foreign policy, military, and climate implications of increasing oil dependence in the 1990s, and then discusses the need to critically assess market based solutions to declining oil stocks without being saddled by “ideological blinders.”

Part Two outlines “seven economically and politically viable paths to energy independence.” These include increasing the size of emergency oil reserves, building efficient vehicles, developing alternative fuels, electric cars, and energy taxes “liberals and conservatives can like,” making energy conservation “a patriotic duty,” and taking chances on some “Hail Mary’s” through advanced research and development. Part Three is a one chapter exhortation on “what we need from national leaders and voters.”

Overall this volume, particularly Part Two, contains several interesting ideas, but some of the ideas have been made less feasible, at least in the near term, by unforeseen events. The market for ethanol and biodiesel, for example, has been badly hurt by (as of January 2009) \$40 a barrel oil. And American automobile companies’ capacity for major technological improvements that would yield fuel economy improvements is deeply constrained by the Big Three’s serious financial plight.

For political scientists, Hakes’ book provides excellent nuggets of insight and information. It is curious, for example, why the U.S. Department of Transportation figures on a given car model’s fuel efficiency are unrealistically low, and how much oil could be saved if the measurements were simply more realistic and if the letter and spirit of the law were applied. The politics of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and of fuel economy standards are fascinating and are important case studies for any student of American politics and public policy. Hakes is not an ideologue or a partisan, and writes respectfully of the ideas advanced by Democrats and Republicans, and those on the left and right, while pointing out their ideological biases. Hakes, a former political science professor, understands how to assess and write about politics and policy.

However, a significant shortcoming of this book is its overly optimistic tone and its assertion that partisan politics and ideology are major impediments to policy change. These themes are taken up most clearly in chapters 6, 7 and 15. Hakes attributes the failure to make better energy policy to the ideological blinders of both the left and the right, but he does not adequately explain how particular *interests* are major drivers of policy positions, as students of Theodore Lowi or Paul Sabatier have described in explaining “interest group liberalism” and “advocacy coalitions” for policy change.

Hakes' call for action in Chapter 15 may be inspirational, but is also rather simplistic. While starting with an excellent observation that there is a long lag between a policy and its (hopefully positive) effects, Hakes argues that we should "change the politics" by "paying more attention to Congress," "increasing the political involvement of young people," and "finding elected officials who dare to lose." He rightly points to champions of energy independence from significantly different regions or ideological predispositions, but does not focus on what institutional advantages or disadvantages Congress may have compared with the executive branch in shaping energy policy.

Inducing greater youth involvement in politics is laudable, and young people may have participated somewhat more in the 2008 election, but Hakes claims without evidence that young people have a keener sense of long-term effects than do older people. This would be more convincing if we had any evidence of different discounting among different age groups. And "finding politicians who dare to lose" is a tall order if we assume, following David Mayhew and Morris Fiorina, that politicians are at least as concerned with their reelection as they are with making "good" policy. While finding politicians who care about intergenerational equity is a worthy goal, it is hard to imagine, under current institutional arrangements, a large cadre of new politicians joining the Congress to pursue long-term goals over short-term reelectability.

Despite these criticisms, this book is worthwhile reading for students of American politics and public policy. Those searching for a deeply theoretical work on the amazing complexities of energy politics and public policy should look elsewhere. But those looking for a readable and sober analysis about how "Freedom from foreign oil" can improve "national security, our economy, and the environment" would do well to give this book a look. And the style and tone of the book might be just the thing to stir up debates in advanced courses in energy history, politics, and public policy.

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Tamara Cofman Wittes. *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy.* Washington, DC: Bookings Institution Press, 2008. 176 pp. (\$26.95 cloth.)

For eight years, the spreading of American-style democracy and the building of democratic institutions in the Arab world was a pillar of President George W. Bush's foreign policy. The *Freedom Agenda*, as the Bush

administration formally called it, was sold as the sociopolitical face of the United State's counterterrorism agenda. *The Freedom Agenda* managed to make U.S. foreign policy and democracy promotion synonymous with each other. Arguably, in the Arab world the results have been disastrous. The utter failure of the *Freedom Agenda* has resulted in the ideas associated with spreading democracy and the building of democratic institutions highly unpopular. In *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy*, Tamara Cofman Wittes's main argument is that Arab democracy and American involvement in the Arab world is a necessity and fundamental to both Arab and American security. She argues that it is imperative that the U.S. facilitate democratic reform within the region. She shows why the Bush administration was correct to help facilitate democratic movements; however, she argues that they went about it in the wrong way. Witte dissects the Bush Administration's failures and uses them as building-blocks to develop a rational, long-term democracy promotion policy to assist the next presidential administration.

While talking about the Bush Administration and the spreading of democracy Tamara Cofman Wittes writes that "Even where the administration succeeded by its own terms, it failed spectacularly" (p. 1). Witte argues the Bush administration's failures were threefold. First, it pushed for democratic progress in areas least equipped to build democracy. It pushed for elections in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq and each time the results ran counter to what the administration had anticipated. Secondly, it emphasized elections rather than building democratic norms and establishing basic sociopolitical freedoms. Third, she demonstrates that President Bush faltered because of a lack of planning and preconceived notions that did not represent Islamic culture or acknowledge Middle Eastern history. On the other hand, Wittes argues that it is fundamental for the United States to facilitate democracy by supporting grassroots movements and building democratic norms within Arab states. She agrees with President Bush that the development of liberal democracies in the Arab world will help secure the advancement of American interests, if done in the correct way. It also would help stabilize the region and help with its long-term economic growth. Wittes assumes that Arab populations are eager for American-style democratization.

Witte's rational long-term democracy policy consists of two parts. First, a basic typology categorizing Islamist movements, and secondly, advice directed to American foreign policy decision makers when dealing with Islamic movements and Arab democracy promotion. The first category consists of ideologically driven jihadist movements such as al-Qaeda. Groups like these hold a worldview of total opposition to the United States role in the Middle East. Also, they are committed to working outside demo-

cratic institutions and using violence. The second category includes local and/or nationalist militant movements that have a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and their political environments. They use violence as a means to realize their political goals. Groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas are included in this category. The third category of Islamist movements includes movements that aspire to politically participate in the state's political institutions and do not use violence. The most prominent group in this third category is the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Wittes emphasizes that movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood are significantly different from the first and second category. Unlike the first two categories, there is a total rejection of violence and they seek to formally participate in democratic institutions and follow the norms and rules of their respected societies.

The second half of Wittes's rational long-term democracy policy consists of advice directed to American foreign policy decision makers when dealing with Islamic movements and democracy promotion. Foreign policy decision makers must be willing to deal with Islamist movements that fall into her third category. She uses the mistakes that the Bush administration has made as her starting point. Specifically, she argues that its greatest mistake was its one-size-fits-all approach to building and dealing with Arab democracy. It is imperative that the next administration understand that each Arab state and Islamic movement is different and that they must be more attuned to regional differences. Furthermore, she advises that an Islamist movement's attitude toward violence is a necessary but insufficient indicator of its likely ability to play a constructivist role in building and working within a democratic political system. Other factors that play a critical role are their attitudes toward women and religious and ethnic minorities, their attitude toward political pluralism, and the ideas associated with the separation of church and state and Islamic law. According to Wittes, if the Islamist movement meets the basic criteria of nonviolence, a democratic process, and pluralist ideals, then the United States government must be willing to work with it, even if ideological differences persist.

In the last 8 years we have seen American approval in the Arab world plummet as a result of the Bush Administration's regional policy. As a result of this unpopularity, it is logical to question Wittes's main hypothesis and ask how much of an impact can the next administration really have on spreading Arab democracy. I would think that it is the wrong time to argue that the United States should engage in democracy promotion. Furthermore, the results of past eight years demonstrate the difficulty of meeting this goal. And the result of Arab elections could result in significant negative repercussions for the United States, as demonstrated in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Wittes's assumptions associated with the stability and security of the Arab world being facilitated by the establishment of democratic norms

and values are highly idealistic. It is not the ideas associated with democracy that frighten the Arab world. It is the inherent hypocrisy associated with U.S. foreign policy and the norms associated with capitalism that run counter to the foundations of Islam that frighten the Arab world. Witte barley touches on the fact that U.S. foreign policy makers must understand the underlying factors that are facilitating Islamic extremism, much of which is the indirect effect of U.S. hypocrisy and the socioeconomic inequality inherent in much of the Arab world.

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Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. *Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. xi, 218 pp. (\$65 cloth; \$26.95 paper.)

Punishing the Prince fits in well with the growing trend in emphasizing political leaders as the key actors in international relations. By relaxing the assumption of states as unitary actors, the book crosses levels of analysis and shows how leaders and their domestic institutional environment shape the relations between states. Adopting a multi-method approach, the book combines formal modeling, experimental design, and quantitative data analysis covering a variety of cooperative and conflictual interactions between states.

In developing their theory of *leader-specific punishments*, the authors argue that “the targets of foreign policies are often political leaders rather than the nations they represent” (p. 1). Targeting punishment against individual leaders has two important implications for relations between states. First, leader-specific punishments allow states to “identify an end to sour relations” when targeted leaders are subsequently deposed from office (p. 2). Second, the effectiveness of leader-specific punishments is dependent on the cost of removing the targeted leader, which is a function of the domestic institutional context.

The authors adopt a principal-agent framework in which office-seeking political leaders can be replaced by their principals for failing to cooperate with other states. However, the ability of citizens to replace leaders who cheated their nations depends on the cost of leader removal. Building on earlier work on *selectorate politics*, the authors expect that leaders in regimes with large winning coalitions can be replaced with low cost. When coalition size is large (as in democracies), leaders provide public goods to their supporters, in turn benefiting all members of society and reducing the

incumbency advantage. Yet leaders in small coalition systems (as in authoritarian regimes) retain power by distributing private goods to a small circle of supporters, thus making defection from the winning coalition and challenges to the leadership costly and therefore less likely. The costliness of leader removal also impacts the variability in policies following leader removal. In large coalition systems, leadership change should not result in significant policy changes since new leaders will want to continue providing public goods. Leadership turnover in small coalition systems, on the other hand, will likely result in dramatic policy shifts since coalition membership will differ fundamentally under a new leader.

This theoretical model allows for the development of several empirical predictions. Anticipating citizens' desire to replace cheaters, leaders in large coalition systems are unlikely to cheat and will cooperate with international actors to avoid removal. When the cost of removal is high as in small coalition systems, leaders lack incentives to cooperate since "a leader's survival is relatively detached from her ability to produce successful foreign policy outcomes" (p. 21). In consequence, *leader-specific punishment theory* expects that leaders in large coalition systems are more likely to cooperate with other states than leaders in small-coalition systems. Moreover, because of the greater policy variability induced by leadership change in small-coalition systems, leadership turnover in such systems is more likely to alter interstate relations than leader change in large coalition systems. As a corollary, when relations have been tarnished by noncooperative behavior in the past, leadership change can result in the reemergence of cooperation. Since leaders in large coalition systems are unlikely to cheat in the first place, this effect is observed for small coalition leaders only.

Expectations derived from the model are assessed in a number of empirical tests. The authors first conduct human subject experiments and compare behavior in groups with mechanisms for leader removal to groups where removal is impossible. Results indicate that mutual cooperation is most likely in a representative democracy environment and that high costs makes leader removal less likely. Two subsequent chapters provide quantitative empirical tests and analyze dyadic trade levels and sovereign debt, respectively. In both tests, small coalition leaders are less likely to cooperate, experiencing lower trade levels and higher default rates. Moreover, leadership change in small coalition systems succeeds in restoring cooperative relations in both tests. Following periods of noncooperation, leadership change increases trade levels and the probability of lending in small coalition systems, but has no such effect in large coalition systems.

The most significant contribution of this book is its emphasis on leadership change, but some questions remain unanswered. While the cost of removal means that leaders in small coalition systems are less likely to be

replaced, one of the most interesting empirical predictions arises from the replacement of precisely these leaders. If leader replacement in small coalition systems has the expected benefit of producing renewed cooperation, would we not want to know why and under what circumstances leaders in such systems are removed? Related to this point, the outcome of leadership change seems important. For example, if a leader in a small coalition system is replaced by another dictator, it is unlikely that future relations would be more cooperative since the new leader would cheat again, if only by using a different winning coalition to support her stay in power. Moreover, one could argue that while leader removal is costly in small coalition systems, the consequences of losing office are much more severe for authoritarian leaders, who often experience imprisonment, exile, or death after being removed. Why are these leaders not more cautious in avoiding replacement? Finally, there may also be reason to amend the office-seeking assumption. Term limits in presidential systems or the dependence of prime ministers on their political party in parliamentary systems, for example, suggests that leaders' reasoning for cooperation may be influenced by a commitment to the governing party in addition to fear of replacement.

With regard to the empirical tests, the authors claim that the concept of winning coalition size (W) is distinct from measures of democracy. Yet even though it is known that W strongly correlates with democracy for values at the extremes, substantive predictions are focused primarily on instances where W is at such values. In addition, one may question whether citizens are sufficiently informed on international economic issues such as trade levels or the size of a nation's debt. Empirical tests focusing on more salient foreign policy issues could increase confidence in the authors' results.

To conclude, the book makes a strong contribution to the growing literature on the incentives of international leaders. The focus on leadership change and its potential to restore cooperative relations between states results in novel predictions and empirical findings.

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Catherine E. Wilson. *The Politics of Latino Faith: Religion, Identity, and Urban Community.* New York: New York University Press, 2008. 320 pp. (\$75.00 cloth; \$25.00 paper.)

The study of identity politics can become quickly complicated by the intersectionality of identities. Those who study America's Latino population are all too keenly aware of this. In observing the behavior of Latinos or

Latino organizations in the United States, social scientists must not only pay attention to the heterogeneity of Latinos but also understand how ethnicity may intersect with identities related to class, nation-state, or gender. Catherine Wilson's work problematizes the intersectionality of Latino identity politics even further by introducing us to Latino religious identity. While some could claim that her analysis falls short of perfection, it is no small task that Wilson has taken on in this book. In the end, she provides a necessary contribution to an understudied aspect of ethnic-urban politics. In doing so, she also provides valuable insights for scholars of Latino politics who implicitly acknowledge (conceptualize) the important role of religion to Latino political behavior but have fallen short in operationalizing and conceptualizing beyond.

Wilson provides a rich, ethnographic account of three Latino faith-based organizations (FBOs): Latino Pastoral Action Center (LPAC) based in the Bronx, Neuva Esperanza based in North Philadelphia, and The Resurrection Project (TRP) headquartered in Chicago. Wilson's method of inquiry is heavily informed by the likes of Clifford Geertz and Paulo Freire by which she strives to relate her analysis from the perspective of the agents and organizations she studies. The method of inquiry is not accidental as evidenced by frequent reminders to the reader that while some social scientists may critique her approach, it is essential to view the role of Latino religious identity "from the viewpoint of the believer." (p. 8). It is only by doing so, Wilson argues, that we can come to see the "truth" motivating the actions of religious leaders and their organizations—actions that many social scientists would be quick to dismiss as irrational.

While this approach serves as an admirable strength of the book, it is also, at the same time, one of the weaknesses of the book. At times, it seems as if Wilson is unwittingly uncritical of the organizations and actors she examines. In letting subjects speak for themselves, one does provide a level of "authenticity" to the subject matter, yet this poses the risk of failing to critically assess these organizations. This perhaps might be understandable within a traditional ethnographic perspective. How many of us, after all, enjoy critiquing our own actions and perspectives objectively? However, if the author is grounding her work in Geertz and Freire, who are clearly concerned with the politics of representation and power relations in society, it is curious that Wilson did not spend more time unpacking her own positionality and as well as seeking to understand more fully the power and politics of those organizations.

For example, the origins of the three organizations under study are traced back to periods of government devolution during the 1970s and 1980s when there was a failure by governments to provide adequate services to inner city residents. These religious organizations arose in response to fulfill

needs in the community. Yet, one cannot help but wonder why these Latino FBOs continue to exist today. Have they failed in their mission to provide adequate services and, hence, continue to exist because of continued needs from inner-city residents? Or has government devolved even further, which continues to explain these organizations' existence? A more critical ethnographic approach, or a basic comparative approach—either historically or organizationally to secular community service organizations (e.g., Chicanos por la Causa) could help answer some of these questions. In justifying her methodological approach, Wilson and her subjects argue against the use of performance outcomes in assessing organizations. If we are only to understand Latino religious identity for “its own sake and on its own terms” (p. 37), we then lose any ability to analyze whether such organizations are making barrio residents feel warm in their stomachs and not just in their souls.

This potential weakness of the book should not be confused with another common pitfall in ethnographic research that Wilson cautions against—“going native.” To her credit, Wilson is able to reference relevant scripture without proselytizing about letting Christ into your heart and allowing Him to show you the way. However, there are moments in the book where Wilson risks alienating those who are not all too familiar with religious doctrine and scripture. This, for example, is evidenced in the chapter on “new liberation theology”—perhaps the book’s strongest chapter. This chapter is critical to understanding the motivations of the leaders of the three organizations under review. Brief references are made to “old” (i.e., Latin America) liberation theology, Thomistic philosophy, and Vatican II that can drive the reader to want to have a catechism nearby because the relevance of these references are sometimes too brief. This, however, paints itself as a necessary avenue of future research for Wilson or others to pursue. Expanding on the distinction between old (i.e., Latin America) and new (i.e., U.S. Latino) liberation theology would be interesting. Doing so would also help shed light on how transnational state identities of immigrants intersect with religious identities.

In assuming the viewpoint of the religious leaders as the primary viewpoint, the salience of other non-religious identities becomes lost. To be sure, Wilson’s own subjects place a greater emphasis on religious identities rather than racial, ethnic, or political identities. However, the primacy of religious identities throughout the book makes it seem as if there are not as many meaningful intersections of religious identities with those other identities—something opposite of Wilson’s argument at the outset. Furthermore, the viewpoints of lower level agents and constituents become lost. The most prominently written about are the viewpoints of the leaders of these organizations. As a reader, I was left wondering about the viewpoints of individ-

uals at lower-levels in the organization or, more importantly, the viewpoints of the constituents that these organizations claim to serve.

The primacy of religious identities relative to others may simply be an outcome of the methodological approach used in the book. Perhaps, cognizant of the division between church and state in American politics and also cognizant of the sensitive subject of race in America, the religious leaders discussed in the book strive to make themselves appear as apolitical or color blind as possible and emphasize only their religious identities. But this makes scholars of racial politics ask, “Where is politics? Where is race?” The case study of Nueva Esperanza is, perhaps, the exception to seeing the political connections; but this may simply be due to the fact that its leader, Cortes—a widely recognized religious leader in the country, has made deliberate efforts to make his ministry political. Yet, for the rest of the book, the intersectionality of religious identities with Latino racial and ethnic identities is less than obvious.

An example of where more attention could have been given to the political is on the contrasts of the *political* contexts in which these Latino FBOs exist. Using Census data, Wilson spends some time describing the social and demographic context of South Bronx, North Philadelphia, and the Pilsen district in Chicago because she says this is essential for understanding these organizations. However, political scientists more accustomed to a counterfactual approach to guide their inquiry might question the selection of these three particular contexts versus other urban areas. In conducting case studies, one can always be susceptible to the criticism of case selection. However, in the present case, one unifying political characteristic of all three of these urban environments justifies such a critique—these are urban environments with a strong history of powerful urban machines playing influential roles in electoral outcomes and the distribution of goods, services, and patronage. Did the three Latino FBOs under examination rise to such prominence because of such an environment? Could they have done so in other settings? Would looking to urban environments in the West and Southwest where party machines are non-existent due to Progressive Era reforms (i.e., San Antonio, Dallas, Phoenix, San Diego, Los Angeles) lead to different conclusions about the role of Latino FBOs? Or even at a minimum, providing a direct comparison of the variation of the political environment between New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia might have borne out some ways in which the religious organizations were different. In short, while there are some descriptions of the political environments of each of the urban settings, the readers are left to make more of the direct comparisons themselves.

In the spirit of this book, it is imperative that I, too, relate the lens through which I read Wilson’s study. Due to my own interest in Latino politics, I may not be a conventional political scientist to some. However,

relative to Catherine Wilson, or, at least, what I am able to infer from her work, I most certainly recognize that I am a conventional political scientist. To state my own perspective is inspiration drawn from the spirit of Wilson's work, for any comments or critiques I present owe more to the failings of my own conventional understanding of political science and ethnic identity politics rather than Wilson's work itself. Again, Wilson provides a worthwhile and necessary contribution to the field of identity politics—most especially religious identity politics.

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Corwin E. Smidt, Kevin R. denDulk, James M. Penning, Stephen V. Monsma, and Douglas L. Koopman. *Pews, Prayers & Participation: Religion and Civic Responsibility in America*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008. ix, 280 pp. (\$44.95 cloth; \$26.95 paper.)

The research question that drives this book is: What role does religion play in fostering broad civic responsibility? By “religion” the authors mean more than simple church attendance or affiliation, they mean individual religious *expression*. And by “civic responsibility,” they mean a type of civic engagement that includes active behaviors, capacity building, and civic virtues which are based on caring and respecting others (p. 3). Within the context of civil society, that is the space between the public and private spheres, they maintain that the state provides the space for religious associations to function and develop an ethic of civic responsibility.

This study is significant because it uses a unique research design. While other researchers have traditionally looked at religious expression primarily through the lens of church attendance and affiliation, this study focuses on the fact that religion today is more personalized, eclectic, individualistic and fluid. Indeed, the authors argue that religion is not necessarily disappearing, but changing, and therefore, the relevance of this research design comes from looking at the way one *is* religious today. It leads to the hypothesis that the type of one's religious expression is a factor in fostering broad civic responsibility.

By statistically analyzing “diminished,” “private,” “public” and “integrated” religious expressions as a benchmark, the authors were able to make a statistical breakthrough. Using a different research design than those used by mainstream sociologists and political scientists in the past, the authors showed that the design for their study is more valid than earlier approaches

because it *can apply to all religions because the way of expression is not a function of one's religious affiliation* (p. 62).

Given their new statistical approach, what did the authors find out about the role of religion in fostering broad civic responsibility? While some of the information seems almost intuitive, their survey research finally gives empirical proof to what many academics have only surmised in the past.

With regard to joining civic associations they showed that Church members are more likely than non-church members to join secular voluntary associations; that they play key roles in associations and that their religious tradition and pattern of association are connected. Beyond that, though, they were able to show that the way people express their religion plays a role in their civic involvement. In short, they conclude that “there may be something in religion itself that encourages associational involvement” (p. 94).

In terms of volunteering and philanthropy the authors were able to demonstrate that people who are religious volunteer more than do those who are nonreligious, and that they volunteer more for religious rather than civic or political organizations. These individuals are also more likely to do charitable giving. Of all the religious inspired individuals, however, those who have been described as “integrated,” i.e., those whose private religious activities and active participation in worship life are intertwined, are those most likely to have volunteered and reported charitable contributions (p. 120). Statistically, then, Smidt et al. were able to prove that religious expression is either the most important or among the most important variables in making charitable contributions (p. 127).

As far as civic capacity building, the authors looked at the practice of developing and using civil skills such as giving speeches and running meetings as well as becoming involved in public affairs and gaining political knowledge. They were able to show empirically that Evangelical Protestants, mainstream white Protestants, black Protestants and Catholics, participate in church activities in that order. This is due to tradition and the structure of their denominations. While the authors' findings in this area are important, they must be viewed in the context of their final results which show that education and age are more important indicators of civic involvement than religion. Specifically with regard to attention to public affairs—these variables also trump religion although religion does contribute to the development of civic skills.

What is the connection between religion and civic virtues then? While there is ample room to argue that religion brings a moral dimension to the exercise of civil responsibility, the authors report mixed results and can only show that “. . . religion matters . . . in subtle ways” (p. 205). But, the civic virtues that they affect are interesting: *trust* and *acceptance* of institutions and their political efficacy, *tolerance*, and support for the *work ethic*.

Thus, the authors are able to make several empirical claims about the role of religion in fostering broad civic responsibility. First, they are able to prove that the most civically and politically engaged among those surveyed were those whose religious life is “integrated.” Their fused private and public religious expressions play a role in generating and maintaining the behaviors, capacities, and dispositions that the authors identify as component parts of civic responsibility. Second, they show that variables such as education, age and income rank are significant in developing civil responsibilities. Third, they demonstrate that religiously “integrated” individuals are more involved in civic rather than political activities. And fourth, they show that religion helps to aid in an individual’s involvement in political life through encouraging participation in it, and by providing another voice in the public arena.

What the authors do not do, however, is discuss in detail the political and policy implications of their findings. What is the significance of their study? Specifically, what do these statistics mean with regard to the role of religious groups in the political arena and the policy process? What are their national and state ramifications? Although such a discussion would have made the study more valuable from a campaign and strategic legislative perspective, their new research design is enough to expect from a limited study. This book is worthwhile for what it finally proves statistically about one’s religious expression and its role in fostering civic responsibility.

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Bruce E. Cain, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert, eds. *Democracy in the States: Experiments in Election Reform*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. vii, 238 pp. (\$62.95 cloth, \$26.95 paper.)

State governments in the U.S. have wide discretion over the rules that govern elections within their borders and this has resulted in large interstate differences in election laws. The authors of this book utilize this natural laboratory setting to determine the effects of various election reforms that have been instituted in recent years. The analysis begins with an overview by the editors who contend that several forces drive contemporary election reform: cynicism about election competitiveness, concern over the role of money in politics, and low confidence in the integrity of election administration. The chapters that follow are divided into three main sections dealing with issues of election integrity, efforts aimed at increasing political partici-

pation, and changes intended to increase responsiveness. Each chapter considers a specific element of what the editors refer to as an “intended” or “unintended” reform to determine its impact relative to competing explanatory conditions. While some chapters are primarily reviews of existing literature, others provide new empirical findings that often challenge convention wisdom concerning a particular aspect of election reform.

The collective finding to emerge from these chapters is that the effects of election reforms vary. Some reforms bring about changes in a manner consistent with their proponents intentions. For example, liberalization of felony voting rights and same day registration have increased voter turnout (Tolbert, Donovan, King, and Bowler). More liberal ballot access laws lead to more minor party candidacies, although this does little to harm the major parties’ voting strength (Burden). Competitive voter initiative campaigns do increase voter interest in elections and engage less sophisticated voters (Tolbert and Bowen). However, the adoption of other reforms such as early voting has only increased turnout by a modest amount and had little, if any, effect on energizing less political active members of the electorate (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller). Still, other reforms have had few intended effects and have actually resulted in negative consequences. A chapter by Kousser indicates that term limits have done little to increase competition in state legislative elections or to change the types of people who run for and win these offices. However, in states where term limits have been imposed partisanship has increased, power has shifted more to the executive branch, legislators have lower levels of knowledge, and policies adopted are less innovative (Kousser).

A major strength of the book is the varied types of laws and regulations that are analyzed. For example, the chapter by Cooper points to the different styles of representation exhibited by legislators in multi-member and single-member districts regarding their constituency service activities and policy voting. A chapter by McDonald examines factors that impinge upon the redistricting process that occurs within the states every decade. While many of these reforms deal with fundamental issues of the electoral terrain, others involve features of election administration that have not been the focus of widespread attention by political scientists. A chapter by Atkeson and Saunders shows that voting mechanisms can affect the degree of confidence that citizens have in the election system. Interestingly, they find that the presence of early voting and absentee voting appears to make voters have less confidence. Another chapter, by Hall, Monson, and Patterson, points to the importance of poll worker training as a factor contributing to greater voter confidence in the election process. These findings demonstrate that while issues of election administration have been off the beaten path to a

large segment of the political science community, they can have significant consequences that deserve greater scrutiny.

The book ends with a chapter summarizing the major points that can be taken away and suggest what “lessons” can be learned and applied to the next generation of reforms. Overall, the book will make an excellent addition to an undergraduate or graduate course on state politics or elections. It does an exceptional job of stressing the great variability across the states in reform efforts and how these differences can be utilized in empirical analyses to further our understanding of elections.

Robert E. Hogan
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Gregory Allen Smith. *Politics in the Parish: The Political Influence of Catholic Priests.* Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008. 272 pp. (\$29.95 paper.)

Like everyone else, political scientists are coming to terms with the demise of secularization theory. While scholars now accept the fact that religion continues to command attention in American social and political life, there are plenty of understudied research areas in the growing subfield of religion and politics. The influence of clergy on their congregants’ political views remains dramatically understudied—Corwin Smidt’s 2004 *Pulpit and Politics* is a rare exception—and Gregory Allen Smith’s book is a welcome addition to the literature.

Smith concerns himself with Catholic priests, in part due to their prominence in American politics; 25% of Americans self-identify as Catholic, and over half of these are regular churchgoers. Drawing from the literature on political communication and voting behavior, Smith hopes to show that priests in the pulpit have a similar effect on parishioners’ political views as does the media. While this claim might seem obvious at face value, Smith reminds readers that in the past, “the potential for a high degree of clergy influence has been assumed rather than demonstrated” (p. 25). To move from assumption to demonstration, Smith uses a variety of methods and data sources. One chapter analyzes the (admittedly old) Notre Dame Study of Catholic Parish Life; in addition, the author conducted his own study in the Washington, DC, area, utilizing pastor interviews, separate surveys of priests and parishioners, and a quantitative content analysis of church bulletins.

Smith discovers a variety of political messages emanating from different parishes. While the Catholic hierarchy constrains the positions priests may take on any number of issues, from abortion to the war on terror,

particular clergymen emphasize certain issues over others. Smith helpfully suggests three categories for the priests he surveys: “personal morality” priests who emphasize conservative positions on abortion and homosexuality; “social justice” priests who focus more on traditional Church positions on poverty and war; and “mixed-emphasis” priests who, unsurprisingly, fall in the middle of the other two categories. Based on a convincing portrait of these different types, Smith rightly concludes that scholars who want to understand the role of the Church in American politics need to pay particular attention to local context.

But the study is less clear on the actual influence of Catholic priests on individuals’ political attitudes. Smith finds no evidence that priests influence the party affiliation, voting choices, or even ideology of their parishioners. There is some evidence that the more liberal, “social justice” priests may steer their parishioners towards more liberal positions on public policy issues overall, but even this is not definitive. Instead, Smith suggests that priests have more of an indirect influence, possibly inculcating a stronger sense of religious particularism (the view that Church policy positions are core tenets of Catholicism), which itself affects political attitudes. Priests also seem to influence how strongly congregants are willing to accept church guidance on public policy issues, which similarly affects a person’s politics. But Smith offers no clear account of how this priestly influence might actually work on congregants. Could the *quality* of homilies as perceived by parishioners (one of Smith’s admittedly imperfect gauges of influence) really affect the willingness of Catholics to accept the Church’s teachings? Certainly these chief measures—religious particularism and willingness to follow the Church—conclusively show that religious attitudes affect political attitudes. But Smith does not do enough to show how clergy affect these religious attitudes in the first place.

The elusiveness of this influence points to another, more significant problem with Smith’s study. Since Catholic parishioners do not have a role in selecting their pastor and priests, Smith hopes to establish causality; for example, similarities in political views are not the result of parishioners selecting priests who are politically compatible. But it is entirely possible, as Smith only occasionally admits, that priests are assigned to parishes based on their ideological compatibility with parishioners. Moreover, priests could, as he suggests in an endnote, “tailor their public messages based on their perceptions of the attitudes and beliefs of their congregants” (p. 113). So while Smith certainly shows that there is some correlation between the political views of priests and their parishioners, this is only an important first step towards causation.

The study is limited for an additional three reasons. First, most of the data are either old (the Notre Dame study is from the 1980s) or limited to the

2004 election. Smith wonders if mitigating factors for that particular election may have limited the effect of priestly influence on political views. If the 2004 election was centered on 9/11 and fighting terror, for example, than clergy may have had little effect in budging voters beyond their hopeful calls for world peace. Second, the choice of political communication/voting behavior as a theoretical basis for the study might be too reductive. Clergy are more than just communicators; they interact with parishioners in a variety of ways. A more sociological approach might tell us more than a focus on just their communicative function. Finally, there is a drawback to studying only Catholics; as Smith admits, Catholic teachings do not map well onto American politics. The Catholic Church is conservative on abortion and gays, but liberal on poverty and peace issues. The political influence of priests thus may be constrained by their inability to choose sides. A study of evangelical pastors or megachurch leaders, many of whom adopt more entrepreneurial and free-market views of poverty and economics, might show more clerical influence in a clearly conservative direction.

This book appears to be adapted from Smith's award-winning dissertation, and sometimes hews too close to the earlier project; for example, there is a rather long literature review chapter that does not seem to contribute as much to this study as Smith thinks. Similarly, the prose style is sometimes redundant, although exceedingly clear and cogent. Despite some significant flaws, however, this is an important study, and a good starting point for future research into the role of clergy in American politics. It is recommended for all students of religion and politics, particularly those interested in American Catholics.

Richard J. Meagher
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Brad Lockerbie. *Do Voters Look to the Future: Economics and Elections.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008. xiv, 155 pp. (\$65.00 cloth.)

In Cable News Network's 2008 exit poll, of those respondents who said that in the past year their family's financial situation had been the same or improved, 56 percent voted for Sen. John McCain of the party that holds the White House, but of those who said it had gotten worse, 71 percent voted for Sen. Barack Obama. Yet of those who saw a future worse economy, 54 percent voted for the candidate of the party in power while of those who saw it better 61 percent voted for his opponent. Is this just another textbook

example of the power of retrospective economic voting, and lack of prospective evaluations making a difference, in determining elections?

Not according to political scientist Brad Lockerbie's exploration of the influence of prospective economic issues on voting behavior, which provides a thought-provoking argument that comprehensively surveys the theory and literature regarding the degree to which voters look to the past and future in making their decisions. Making the case that prospective voting is far more important than generally is conceded, his conclusions are tempered only by the limitations that his data and models force upon him.

Lockerbie makes an intuitively appealing argument that voters, even if a large portion of them have the barest surface knowledge about issues, are not fools to the point that they cannot form expectations about what candidates will do on the economic front if elected and thereby vote accordingly. The role of economics as an issue in the discipline's literature mostly has favored the notion that voters choose simplistically here, punishing candidates of parties seen as non-performers and rewarding them if they have come through. Not only does this seem to equate past with future, but it discounts any impact that candidates of the challenging party (because evaluations of them matter only prospectively) might have in shaping votes.

The approach taken by Lockerbie is more nuanced and theoretically compelling. He observes that both retrospective and prospective evaluations should matter, where the former informs the latter as voters draw upon past experiences to make reckoning of the future, but "[w]hile there is some relationship" between the two, he demonstrates that "they are by no means synonymous" (p. 33). Nor does partisanship definitively influence these evaluations. Further, they have distinct effects nonrecursively on party identification and (obviously) recursively on vote choice with the prospective components actually being more powerful.

Based on a model of presidential vote choice using American National Election Studies 1956-2000 data, with partisanship affecting issues and the vote, retrospective issues affecting the prospective and both affecting the vote, and with ideological identification affecting the vote, he shows prospective evaluations typically are second only to party identification in influence. Using a similar approach with both U.S. House and Senate contests, he comes to the same conclusion. For good measure, he also weighs on the definitional argument of egocentric vs. sociotropic retrospective evaluations (they are conceptually distinct and, in a model with prospective evaluation, partisanship, and ideology weakly predict the vote) and on forecasting elections using economic evaluations (which works fairly well for presidential contests, somewhat less well for seat change predictions in the House, and not really at all for Senate seat distributions).

However, the effort is not without shortcomings. The most glaring weakness comes in the actual modeling and testing in assessing effects of components. Arguing simultaneous relationships between issues and partisanship, and positing direct and indirect effects of partisanship and retrospective evaluations on voting, Lockerbie's analysis demands more sophisticated techniques than he employs to minimize the possibility of biased estimators. He does seem aware of this in at least one situation where he constructs an instrumental variable to minimize autocorrelation concerns while testing for the impact of previous partisanship on present partisanship, yet in trying to determine effects of a much more complex causal model he eschews techniques such as computing linear structurally related equation sets that could reduce bias in estimation.

One issue here is that, given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, the author sensibly prefers logistic kinds of regression techniques. However, ordinary least squares as a method is fairly robust and the distribution that characterizes voting for a national office violates insignificantly the normal curve assumption. But, inescapably, for more complex modeling the author would find for his interests too few issue variables in the data, leaving too many paths to be estimated. Dumping more variables into the equation set would bring potential multicollinearity difficulties and/or misspecification problems, so one must sympathize with the author and realize he did what he could with what he had. Still, reliance solely on path modeling with assumed additive effects does make his conclusions more cautionary.

Minor things also hamper the effort. For example, the work appears to cover economic evaluations, yet in some analyses proceeds to pull in non-economic evaluations, making a little unclear the conceptual thrust of the effort. His analysis of the sociotropic distinctiveness question relies for confirmation on several dependent variables that are of questionable comparability (behavior vs. attitude). The text sometimes does not comport to the tables and typographical errors in them appear. The tome also demands familiarity with statistical techniques not often encountered by many who are the likely readers, so some further explanation of the reported results and their substantive meanings would have been helpful.

Regardless, Lockerbie's work takes up a neglected subject and shows why it deserves more attention. If making a compelling case is held back for methodological reasons, it certainly makes a good case for more research concerning voters' utilizing prospective economic evaluations.

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Jane Junn and Kerry L. Haynie, eds. *New Race Politics in America: Understanding Minority and Immigrant Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. xi, 195 pp. (\$25.99 paper.)

Those who study racial and ethnic politics in the United States are often frustrated by research that, by focusing on the black-white divide, fails to recognize and assess the increasing diversity in the country as a result of immigration. In this book, Jane Junn and Kerry Haynie have put together an excellent collection of essays that richly explore the consequences and significance of this diversity for electoral politics. Cautiously arguing that “the imposition of racial identities by the state has the political effect of instituting a racial hierarchy” (Junn and Matto, p. 6), the book chapters focus on three minority racial group categories: Asians, Latinos, and African Americans. This volume has a clear normative perspective that recent demographic change throughout the United States will in some way alter our understanding and practice of race and ethnic politics. In their effort to fully investigate the implications of significant growth in Latino and Asian populations, the book provides new and much needed insights about the complex and uncharted relationship between race and ethnicity and electoral politics.

The book is structured into nine chapters, including introductory and summary chapters by the editors. Given the diversity of scholarship within the field of racial and ethnic politics and the reality that race and ethnicity affect political life in multiple ways, it is no surprise that the chapters in the book are distinct in purpose. At first glance, it might be difficult to perceive how this collection of essays fits together to form a coherent volume. The opening chapter successfully solves this dilemma by pointing out that there are several themes in the book, all stimulated in some way by the changing diversity of the country. While one chapter focuses on the role that political and civic organizations play in mobilizing immigrants (Chapter 2), several chapters examine the significance of racial and ethnic consciousness for political mobilization and participation (Chapters 3 and 4). Chapters 5, 6, and 7 reexamine traditional models of voting behavior to assess the role that race and ethnicity play in Latino and African American participation. The remaining chapter raises interesting questions about the prospects for multi-racial political coalitions by analyzing African American elite response to changing Latino immigration.

Of these chapters, I found of particular interest Chong’s and Kim’s research which finds that differences between African Americans and other minority groups in their economic status affects their willingness to embrace racial and ethnic group interests. In particular, they find that affluent African Americans tend to be more race-conscious whereas affluent Latinos and Asian Americans tend to “place less emphasis on racial or ethnic considera-

tions in their political attitudes and policy preferences” (Chong and Kim, p. 63). The authors suggest that one reason why group interest may be more robust among African Americans is because of African Americans’ sustained belief in the power of collective mobilization due in large part to the success of the Civil Rights Movement. The authors fail, however, to recognize that persistent patterns of residential segregation may also help explain this outcome. Despite the increasing diversity of the country and the migration of Latinos and Asian Americans to nontraditional cities and towns, it remains clear that the daily events and experiences that define most Americans’ lives occur in homogeneous settings. Interestingly, even economic class does not change this reality, as studies show that middle-class African Americans live in neighborhoods, on average, with considerably more poverty than those inhabited by middle-class whites. Thus, for the most part, racial and ethnic groups remain residentially separated in U.S. metropolitan areas (see R.M. Adelman, 2004. “Neighborhood Opportunities, Race, and Class: The Black Middle Class and Residential Segregation” *City and Community* 3:43-63).

Also of interest was the chapter by McClain and colleagues which gave a rare look at African American elite attitudes about Latino immigration. While the chapter is primarily a case study set in Durham, North Carolina, the use of both elite interviews and mass survey data is an appealing approach to examine the potential for creating and sustaining multiracial coalitions in American cities. I was surprised however at the small number of African American elites in the sample pool given the broad manner in which the authors defined who in the city was an “elite.” Interestingly, the African American elites interviewed expressed great concern about the growing tension between the African American and Latino populations due to scarce resources, yet these elites describe themselves as making efforts to improve the relationship. It is unfortunate that the authors provide no description of these efforts. This information could prove useful to future scholars who wish to assess whether political relations among racial and ethnic minorities in other cities and towns across American can be enhanced.

In summary, *New Race Politics in America* provides a timely and provocative overview of current research on racial and ethnic issues in American politics. The chapters are theoretically grounded and most are empirically informed, making this path-breaking volume invaluable for understanding racial and ethnic politics in this new millennium. My only concern, or wish, is that the next edition of this volume will include more essays so that it can be more clearly organized into three sections on institutions, political psychology, and political behavior to reflect three major areas of empirical study in American politics. Doing so would make the volume parallel (to differing degrees) the organization of most U.S. politics courses.

New Race Politics in America is an excellent resource to help all American politics students explore the future of the racial dimension in American politics. Increasing the size of and reorganizing the volume can only enhance the perceived utility of the book, opening the door for the book to be used not only for race courses but for general American politics courses as well.

Atiya Kai Stokes-Brown
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Lina Newton. *Illegal, Alien, or Immigrant: The Politics of Immigration Reform.* New York: NYU Press, 2008. 240 pp. (\$65.00 cloth, \$22.00 paper.)

In this important book, Lina Newton uses discourse analysis to probe the rhetoric of policy debates that surrounded the passage of two key immigration bills: the 1986 Immigration and Reform Act (IRCA) and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Focusing on the years 1981-1986 and 1994-1996, Newton examines policy narratives and social constructions that dominated legislators' communications during the debates. She concludes that legislators strategically use stories, images, and symbols to divide immigrant populations into more manageable groups. These groups are then targeted and labeled as "deserving" or "undeserving," as in the case of the Mexican population which has become the stigmatized "other."

Well written and well organized, the book provides readers with contextual information about the political and economic milieu surrounding the debates. She notes how IRCA deviated from previous immigration policies and imposed strict penalties on employers found guilty of encouraging illegal immigration and how for the first time the United States offered amnesty to illegal aliens. By 1996, however, control of the Congress had changed and so had the mood of the country. Congress passed IIRIRA which was a far more restrictive policy towards immigrants and it eased the compliance regulations governing employers. Newton's book provides typologies which make it easy for the reader to follow the narratives, target groups, and policy proposals.

Chapter One provides a literature review and introduces many of the tropes she explores later in the book. In Chapter Two, she examines the conditions that spurred congressional action, the problems that legislators sought to address, and the interest groups that would gain or lose from the various proposals. This chapter offers a discussion of the 1978 Select Com-

mission on Immigration and Refugee Policy and the Reagan Administration's reactions to the report. Newton notes how the Commission headed by Notre Dame's Father Theodore Hesburgh held 12 hearings and listened to over 700 witnesses before issuing its 1981 report. The report, she notes, added an ethical dimension to the discussion of immigration reform because of the attention given to the potential for human rights violations given the vulnerability of the undocumented population. Chapter Two also provides an in depth look at California politics and the impact of Speaker Newt Gingrich's Contract with America on immigration reform.

Newton devotes Chapter Three to a detailed discussion of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). It is in this chapter that she identifies narratives and social constructions of targeted groups. The four major groups are (1) the "government-off-our backs narrative," (2) the "family farmer narrative," (3) "the corrupt agriculturalist counter-narrative," and (4) the "anti-discrimination narrative." Minor narratives include (1) the "undeserving illegal narrative," and (2) the "deserving illegal counter-narrative." Chapter Four covers the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). After addressing public opinion data, Newton provides a brief discussion of Proposition 187 and the Contract with America. In this chapter, she identifies five additional policy narratives: (1) the "zero-sum narrative," (2) the "pathologies of federalism narrative," (3) the "criminal alien narrative," (4) the "lawless border narrative," and (5) the "government-off-our-backs narrative."

Chapter Five is titled "Problem Mexicans: Race, Nationalism, and Their Limits in Immigration Policymaking." Here Newton links some of the narratives and social constructions developed in previous chapters to negative characterizations of Mexican immigrants. Much of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of race and the stigmatization of Mexican nationals. Newton argues that both race and national origin have dominated immigration policy and American citizenship debates. Her evidence includes questions raised about birthright citizenship, criminal aliens, and Mexicans depicted as freeloaders. In the concluding Chapter Six, Newton argues that American citizenship is an identity that lies "at the nexus of different axes of in-group and out-group construction. . . ." She argues that legislators use their power relationships to stigmatize and label vulnerable groups. She notes that during the 1996 debates, legislators abandoned the negative social construction of employers and demonized immigrants instead.

Newton's book offers an original contribution to an increasingly contentious policy area. Instructors and students will find her application of discourse analysis to the study of immigration both creative and useful for stimulating debate. Like most studies, the book has shortcomings. In particular, Newton fails to critically assess a possible relationship between

demographic changes caused by the sheer volume of illegal immigration, increased social and economic costs imposed on cities and communities, and the changed narratives and social constructions of legislators who were most certainly hearing from their constituents. A changed situation on the ground and the 1994 partisan switch from Democrat to Republican majorities presumably led legislators to reevaluate the immigration situation and IRCA's failure to address the problems. Less support for amnesty may exist today because conservative interests groups who cut deals in 1986 with pro-immigration groups felt they had been betrayed when Congress gutted the employer sanctions provision given in exchange for their support of amnesty. Newton also fails to take adequate account of other circumstances that led to heightened negative perceptions of illegal immigrants, for example increased gang activity and other high profile violent crimes. A more nuanced analysis would acknowledge that politicians use narratives all the time. In the case of members of Congress, they are elected to represent particular constituencies and protect the American interests. For more than two decades, a majority of Americans have desired enforcement of current immigration laws and more restrictive immigration policies. It seems perfectly reasonable that legislators' narratives would reflect their own experiences and what they hear from their constituents. Attaching value judgments to negative characterizations of undocumented immigrants or to a legislator's use of personal immigration stories as prefaces to their position-taking take away from Newton's primary contribution, discourse analysis of legislative debates surrounding immigration policy. Readers should be able to use Newton's scholarship and come to their own conclusions regarding the motivations behind political rhetoric and judge the actors for themselves.

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Anthony A. Peacock. *Deconstructing the Republic: Voting Rights, The Supreme Court, and The Founders' Republicanism Reconsidered.* Washington, DC: The AEI Press, Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute. 2008. 207 pp. (\$25.00 paper.)

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been perverted, according to Anthony Peacock. It has been subordinated to multicultural purposes. If that process of warping the Act can be said to have a beginning it is in 1969, with *Allen v. Virginia*. But the subordination of voting rights law to multiculturalism has deeper roots in "judicial rationalism"—"a judicial form of Friedrich Hayek's 'constructivist rationalism'" (p. 2). Judicial rationalism is like

judicial activism, but it is also a belief in the comprehensive capacities of courts to regulate the democratic political process. Thus *Allen* sharply expanded the range and kinds of governmental decisions subject to “pre-clearance” under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. In doing that *Allen* changed the Voting Rights Act from an emergency statute meant to secure African-Americans’ right to vote for a temporary period, until the turmoil in the ex-Confederacy cooled, into a far more ambitious and permanent regulatory framework that would demand yet more “judicial rationalism.”

The federal government consequently got into the business of telling state legislatures and local representative bodies to carve out majority minority districts—which was nothing more than an “ersatz multiculturalism” based on “racial bean-counting” (p. 153). The statute was used to guarantee the political careers of black (and since 1975) Latino politicians. One result was a quota system, in effect, both for the United States House of Representatives and for state and local representative bodies in jurisdictions which are covered by the Voting Rights Act.

A more serious impact was—to use Peacock’s term—“racial class-warfare” (pp. 63-69). The administration of the Voting Rights Act effectively taught people that there are victims and oppressors—and that the victims must be compensated. This is a “racial class-warfare vision . . . in which racial groups were being deconstructed into the simple binary categories of victimizer and victimized, oppressor and oppressed, Hegemon and Other” (p. 68). It is no accident, for example, that Section 203 of the Act now protects some linguistically identified minorities—Native Americans for instance—but not others, such as speakers of Polish.

Such “racial class-warfare” fundamentally subverts the Founders’ intentions for America. They established a limited government and they envisioned the protection of individual rights. But the Founders did not want government to guarantee representation for any group.

One implication of Peacock’s argument is the failure of Madisonian safeguards. The Founders constructed our national institutions to prevent the capture of the national government by a “faction.” The Voting Rights Act’s perversion, however, permits just that, the capture of voting rights policy by a faction—in this case, multiculturalists (here Peacock mentions, among others, Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice William Brennan, and the “voting rights bar”). The multiculturalists seek nothing less than to entrench their regulatory power and to foment deep distrust between blacks and whites. They have swept from one success to another—most recently with the 2006 renewal of the Voting Rights Act, which threatens “more intensified racial antagonism” (p. 153). Their success creates a crisis of the regime. Americans now have a fateful choice “between maintaining their longstanding Madisonian regime of equality and representation or continuing to under-

mine that regime” by following the precepts of a “brazen multiculturalism . . . calculated to fragment the nation into racial constituencies, inviting the very race factionalism that the original Constitution and the Civil War amendments were designed to avoid” (pp. 153, 110).

Peacock is not, of course, the first political scientist to dislike how the law of the Voting Rights Act has evolved. But this book certainly offers one of the most rhetorically vivid attacks to date. When Abigail Thernstrom mounted the first serious critique of the Voting Rights Act she argued far more cautiously. Recall, for example, her treatment of Section 2 of the Act, as amended in 1982. She suggested that it would deprive black politicians of the salutary discipline of learning how to appeal broadly to white as well as black voters. (This was a subtle criticism, it is worth noting, but now seems mooted by the election of Barack Obama to the presidency.) By contrast, Peacock ends his book with the proposal that the courts completely withdraw from the judicial rationalism through which multiculturalists have generated “racial antagonism.” Indeed, Peacock tells us that his clear thinking about the matter of what is to be done is akin to that of John Yoo with respect to executive power (p. 162). Yoo says that executive power cannot be regulated; likewise, voting rights cannot be regulated. They are appropriately left to “state legislatures . . . because resolving questions at this level would facilitate greater local control, accountability, and freedom” (p. 163). Going back to letting the state legislatures do their work without federal involvement would be consistent with the Founders’ intentions.

All of this raises the obvious question: who besides Peacock himself fully grasps the crisis of the republic? Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas does—more, in fact, than several of his colleagues who might be expected to see the danger, such as Justices Alito, Roberts, and Scalia. In *Holder v. Hall* Justice Thomas incisively captured the tendency of the Voting Rights Act’s administration to “exacerbate racial tensions, ‘segregating the races into political homelands’” (p. 12). Peacock points as well toward the apprehensions that many others have shown toward judicial rationalism and multiculturalism, ranging from Justices Felix Frankfurter and Potter Stewart to Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), and a variety of academic commentators.

But Peacock is perhaps in a class by himself. He raises the stakes of Voting Rights Act criticism far more than anyone else has. This probably has to do with his evident training in Straussian political thought. Straussians—which is the name for those political scientists who (properly) take seriously the work and teaching of the great émigré philosopher Leo Strauss—are, for better or worse, unabashedly normative about policy analysis. Policies are not just for solving problems. They also can reinforce—or undermine—the basic values of the American regime.

Very large questions about the regime come into Peacock's picture right away. In the first chapter of the book, Peacock portrays (if this reviewer reads him correctly) a United States challenged, from abroad, by the corrosive thought of Marx and Weber, and from within by Progressive political thought—Charles Beard and Woodrow Wilson, for example, who were hostile to the natural rights teaching of the Declaration of Independence. In short, unlike those critics of the Voting Rights Act who rest their case against it on the putative color-blindness of the 14th Amendment, Peacock is far more ambitious, bringing in 1776, a reading of the Founding, the historicist relativism of European social thought, Friedrich Hayek, the falsely rationalist, anti-Hayekian development of American political science—and, just for good measure, John Yoo.

Is there any actual election law in the book? There is—quite a bit of election law, in fact. Before becoming a political scientist Peacock practiced law in Toronto and he is quite at ease with judicial decisions. He knows the relevant case law extremely well. This book tours—often instructively—over large parts of what elections lawyers now call “the law of democracy.”

Peacock's readings come across, however, as selective—at least to this reviewer. Peacock arrays the case law to reveal the widening gyre of judicial rationalism, and thus the deepening crisis of the regime. He also highlights what he considers warnings and misgivings—dissents, for example, or partial retreats from multiculturalist judicial rationalism, such as *Shaw v. Reno*, *Holder v. Hall*, and *Miller v. Johnson*, among others.

Also the factual details of the Article III “cases and controversies” treated by Peacock are slighted. Because Peacock invites his readers to consider the intentions of the Founders, this reviewer found himself noticing a contradiction between the paucity of detail concerning the actual facts of the cases, on the one hand, and (on the other) the Founders' intentions for the federal courts. By restricting the Court's remit to “cases and controversies,” the Founders signaled that they wanted a Supreme Court which was empirical, casuistic, and focused on the facts. But because Peacock prefers to offer a short, very forceful jeremiad concerning an emerging crisis of the American regime he disregards the histories of the jurisdictions that have come before the Court. At best he offers two or three sentences on who the plaintiffs and defendants were and on the significant details that prompted judicial review in the first place.

In summary, Peacock offers a very lively and daring polemic against the Voting Rights Act. It is well worth reading for the intellectual stimulus it provides. The introduction to election law is brisk and useful. Whether one comes away persuaded is another matter altogether.

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Joseph F. Zimmerman. *Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power*, 2d ed. New York: State University of New York Press, 2008. 254 pp. (\$75.00 cloth, \$25.95 paper.)

One of the great challenges of teaching is communicating to students the relevance of course material to their lives beyond the classroom door. This is particularly difficult when the concepts presented are more abstract in nature. To be sure, even students who have no experience voting can understand the connection between tangible political participation and an electoral outcome. Furthermore, many students either have had personal experience with the judicial system or know someone who has interacted with some level of the judiciary. Elections and court cases are concrete, discrete political events and can be discussed and digested as such. However, American federalism is a fluid concept, with the balance of power between the states and the national government often in flux. Explaining federalism typically requires a discussion of American political history, replete with court cases, legislation, and institutional decisions that have altered the power relationship between national and subnational units. The resulting deluge of constitutional interpretation and political events that have changed the nature of American federalism can often overwhelm students who may have difficulty understanding how the decision in *Gibbons v. Ogden* (1824) impacts the United States in 2009. Joseph F. Zimmerman's *Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power* (2009) successfully demonstrates the relevance of historical events in the development of American federalism by illustrating how they collectively contributed to the expansion of the size and scope of the national government.

Contemporary American Federalism is the second edition of a book first published in 1992. Although there are significant changes in some of the text passages of the second edition and many contemporary court cases have been added, the books are virtually identical. The premise of both books is stated most succinctly in the preface of 1992 edition: "The central theme of this book is the accretion of political power in the United States at the national level" (Zimmerman 1992, p. xi). Like most federalism books, Zimmerman begins with a discussion of the constitutional foundation and historical development of the federal system. Zimmerman's first three chapters are exceptionally good at breathing life into material that can often be dull. Chapter 1 contains a brisk overview of the principal issues of American federalism with tidy definitions of major terms. In Chapters 2 and 3, Zimmerman provides an excellent summary of the constitutional foundations and resulting development of federalism, emphasizing historical import without getting mired in minutia. In fact, one of the great strengths of the book lies in Zimmerman's clarification of the core terms and concepts of

federalism. The first chapter further develops Zimmerman's argument regarding the growth of national government power, introducing the notion of increased national preemption of subnational authority, which the author suggests is not fully explained by either dual or cooperative federalism.

With the exception of Chapter 7, which explores conflict and cooperation between states, the balance of the book dissects the issue of control of a higher level of government over a lower level of government. Chapters 4 through 6 examine national control of states: congressional preemption, preemption initiated by the judiciary, and control based on fiscal aid programs. State preemption of local authority is the subject of Chapter 8. The most profound contribution of the book lies in its treatment of national government preemption of state authority. Zimmerman reports that congressional preemption statutes increased from a mere 14 passed between 1900 and 1909 to 106 passed since 2000. The author's argument is blunt:

The sharp increase in the number of and variety of preemption statutes, particularly in the period 1964-1980, reduced substantially the discretionary authority of states and their political subdivisions; promoted additional interest group lobbying in Congress and national regulatory agencies; and affected the power relationships between the governor and the state legislature in each state (p. 56).

Zimmerman balances this claim against a statement by Alexander Hamilton in *Federalist #17*, who suggests states are more likely to intrude in the national sphere than the reverse (p. 57). The increased use of preemption has created a "confused responsibility problem," in which the lines of accountability are so blurred as to make it nearly impossible to assign blame or praise to the responsible level of government (p. 72). Illustrating the impact of preemption on state institutions, Zimmerman outlines thirteen acts of Congress and one executive order that empower governors, albeit in limited degree, in ways not enumerated by state constitutions (p. 75). For example, as a result of the *Highway Safety Act of 1966*, the U.S. Department of Transportation, as opposed to a state's legislature, designates the governor to be responsible for directing safety programs. This insight is often overlooked in comparable federalism books. Furthermore, Zimmerman's discussion of preemption, partial preemption, cross-over sanctions, and cross-cutting requirements is outstanding, providing readers with clear distinctions between terms that can be confusing (p. 133).

In a book so well organized and carefully written, it is surprising to discover vague or redundant language. For example, in his discussion of fiscal federalism, Zimmerman maintains that "the federal mandate is the principal irritant in national-subnational relations today" (p. 131). Later, the author states: "Today, federal mandates, restraints, cross-cutting sanctions,

cross-over sanctions, and tax sanctions are the principal irritants in national-subnational governmental relations” (p. 135). Editing oversights such as this are rare in this book, but nevertheless detract from the impact of the boldness of such statements. As the title of the book is *Contemporary American Federalism*, one might question the extent to which the book treats contemporary policy issues in the federal system. There is no mention of states’ responses to the *No Child Left Behind* (2001) law or the expected increased role of states in addressing the homeland security threat. The decision in *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003) reexamined the privacy issue and, in the process, invalidated fourteen states’ anti-sodomy laws. Furthermore, the consequences of Hurricane Katrina raised questions about the appropriate roles of the different levels of government in dealing with a natural disaster. Each of these cases illustrates the relevance of federalism in a contemporary context and none are included in the book. However, this is perhaps an unfair criticism, as this is not a policy book. Standard federalism books tend to focus on the constitutional basis and historical development of the federal system. In the process of accomplishing this objective, Zimmerman directs his historical narrative toward the increased national power in the federal system. As an expose on the vast increase of national authority at the expense of state power and autonomy, the book is quite successful.

Reference

Zimmerman, Joseph F. 1992. *Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power*. New York: Praeger.

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Kristin E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael A. Genovese, eds. *Catholics and Politics: The Dynamic Tension between Faith and Power*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008. v, 239 pp. (\$44.96 cloth; \$29.95 paper.)

Paradoxically, there has been a decline of a “Catholic vote,” but there has also been a persistent pursuit of Catholic voters by elected representatives, including presidential candidates. Why? Perhaps because Catholics are the largest single denomination in the United States, representing nearly a quarter of the U.S. electorate, and 80 percent of Catholic voters live in fewer than a dozen important industrial states which also double as states with large Electoral College votes. Perhaps, Catholics are seen as swing voters. On one hand, Catholics are closer to Republicans on issues of abortion and

the like. On the other hand, Catholics are closer to Democrats on issues of justice and social welfare. As Mark M. Gray and Mary E. Bendyna note, “If a Catholic wishes to cast a ballot that is entirely consistent with Church teachings, there is nearly always no valid choice” (p. 76). This edited volume provides interdisciplinary analyses of the dynamic tension between religion and politics in the Catholic community.

The book is divided into four sections. The first four chapters analyze the role of Catholic leaders in U.S. politics. Margaret Sammon, in Chapter 1, provides a brief history describing how Catholic leaders shifted from being sporadically involved in local politics to becoming prominent players in national politics as well as how abortion became “the” issue on which many Catholic voters began to base their electoral decisions. Sammon argues that *Roe v. Wade* triggered the intense and strategic involvement of bishops in national politics, explaining that bishops chose abortion “not only because of its moral implications but also because it epitomized all Catholic concerns.” The author provides a thorough analysis of a shift toward one-issue salience among Catholic leaders, but I wanted Sammon to also discuss the implications of single-issue voting for Catholic voters here.

Chapter 2 provides an analysis comparing the opinions of conservative Catholic and evangelical Protestant Republican convention delegates in efforts to gauge the potential of an alliance between the two groups. Many evangelical Protestants are found in the GOP, which has a tendency toward anti-abortion policies while at the same time supporting the death penalty and weak social welfare policies. There has been cooperation between the two groups, providing evidence that “politics makes for strange bedfellows.” Mark J. Rozell ultimately posits, however, that there can only exist fragile and temporary alliances between the two because while they agree on moral policies, they very much disagree on most other salient issues.

Gregory A. Smith, in the next chapter, provides evidence that Catholic parishioners are likely to hear considerably different political messages from parish to parish. Smith interviewed 9 pastors, developing three politico-religious categories. On one end of the spectrum, there are “Social Justice” pastors who steer away from topics like abortion but emphasize the responsibility of the government as well as individual Catholics to help the needy. Second, he classifies “Mixed Emphasis” pastors. Finally, he describes “Personal Morality” pastors; this group of pastors tend emphasize anti-abortion messages but argue that individual citizens, rather than the government, should help the needy. I would have liked the author to discuss the extent to which parishioners might be affected by these messages as well as whether parishioners are likely to attend churches were the pastors’ homilies are in-line with their own beliefs.

Perhaps, Kristin Heyer's own essay is the gem of the entire collection. Heyer not only discusses the implications of either taking a "Cuomo doctrine" stance ("I'm personally opposed but") or basing one's vote on a single-issue, but also provides a normative argument as to what Catholics should do in the current polarized political context (p. 61). She tasks Catholics to broaden their perspective of "issues of life" (p. 64). Further, she argues that while it is not legitimate for Catholics to disagree with the teachings of the Church, they can disagree on how to solve problems that challenge the sanctity of life.

The next section of the book includes three essays on the Catholic public. Gray and Bendyna use a unique data set to gauge Catholics' opinions in 2002 and 2006. They find that many Catholics are either walking contradictions (i.e., among Republican Catholics who stated that Church teachings were more important than their conscious, 58 percent believed that the death penalty is an appropriate punishment) or Catholic voters are driven more by partisanship rather than religion. Gray and Bendyna ultimately find that Catholics' policy opinions "show much greater consistency with their party affiliation than with their religious affiliation" (p. 88). Matthew J. Streb and Brian Frederick provide a broader perspective of a decline in the Catholic vote by analyzing ANES data between 1952 and 2004, and similarly show that while Catholics were solidly Democrats in the 1950s and 1960s, there has been a decline of a Catholic vote bloc since then. Instead of making a purely sociodemographic argument to explain the increased diversity among Catholic voters, Streb and Frederick also seriously consider the role of cultural conservatism and cultural issue salience in shifting some Catholics from the Democratic Party to the GOP. Despite the general decline of a Catholic vote, Adrian Pantoja, Matthew Barreto, and Richard Anderson conclude that the Christian Right may be able to garner Latino voters, noting 70 percent of Latinos are practicing Catholics and showing that many Latino survey respondents believe that the Church should provide guidance in the political realm.

Part Three of *Catholics and Politics* focuses on the how the American legislative, judicial and executive branches of government interact with Catholics. William V. D'Antonio's, Stephen A. Tuch's and John Kenneth White's chapter would serve as an excellent stand alone in a course on Congress, as party polarization is their main topic of discussion. The authors center abortion as "the" source of persistent polarization in Congress; while I would argue that abortion cannot stand alone in the explanation for party polarization, the authors' argument serves as an alternative to theories of conflict extension and issue evolution. Barbara A. Perry (Chapter 9) and Thomas J. Carty (Chapter 10) provide exceptional historical analysis of how pandering to Catholics has affected the make up of the Supreme Court and

the politics of the White House, respectively. Both authors show that in the past Catholicism was a factor in gaining support through symbolic and descriptive representation while today Catholicism is employed to signal to conservative Christians notions of traditional and conservative cultural values. That is to say, there has been a shift from electoral considerations to ideological ones (Perry, p. 70).

The book closes with two very short essays. The first, by Paul Christopher Manuel, briefly describes the notion that while both the U.S. and the Vatican are global powers (of different sorts) that maintain “parallel endeavors for peace,” they are also in dynamic conflict because they have “competing visions of justice” (i.e., rugged individualism and capitalism versus compassionate communitarianism). Thomas J. Reese closes the book by making suggestion for reforms to the Vatican in efforts to make it more collegial.

The essays in the book present social scientific and historical evidence as well as ethical and philosophical arguments, all driving home several themes: Catholic voters are at odds with both parties because each party presents different perspectives on how to preserve life. What is more, Catholic leaders find themselves making fragile alliances and marriages of convenience by concentrating on one issue, abortion. Further, it remains to be seen whether sociodemographic diversity among Catholics will continue to erode a once solid voting bloc. Each of the essays provides nuance to a very complex topic, such that after reading the text, any reader can begin to make their own insightful contributions to this conversation.

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