

Book Reviews

Richard L. Engstrom, Editor

David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister. *The Australian Electoral System: Origins, Variations and Consequences.* Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006. ix, 215 pp. (\$49.95 paper.)

This book was written with two audiences in mind. First, the book appeals to comparativists interested in understanding the effects of different election systems. Secondly, the book attempts to explain the logic of the Australian political system by focusing on the development and effects of the Australian election system. Farrell and McAllister endeavor to satisfy both audiences by linking their case study of the Australian election system to the effects of election systems in other national contexts.

What makes the focus of this study worthwhile is the obvious importance of Australia in offering a different and almost unique electoral system. While Ireland and Malta can claim to use their own version of the single transferable vote (STV), Australia has adopted of a system they call preferential voting that involves significant differences for the upper and lower house. The Australian House of Representatives has a single representative elected from each constituency and the Australian Senate has multiple representatives elected from each constituency. Farrell and McAllister differentiate the House Alternative Vote (AV) system from the Senate STV system.

The fundamental difference between Australian preferential voting and most other voting systems in the world is that this system allows voters to rank order candidates rather than just categorically choose their first preference. Most advocates of preferential voting cite the empowerment of voters and enabling them to list their preferences as the greatest virtue of this kind of system. Nevertheless, critics of preferential voting contend that this system fails to treat voter preferences consistently and treats all rank orderings of voters the same even if they are not.

In explaining the origins and evolution of the Australian preferential voting system, Farrell and McAllister build successfully upon previous research and scholarship. They believe that this system was not created as merely a cynical attempt by party elites to develop a system that would favor their partisan interest. Farrell and McAllister are correct to point out that Australia developed and chose their election system based on the utilitarian political culture that emerged in Australia in the late 19th century as it conceived of itself separately from Britain. Intellectuals had already led an effort at implementing preferential voting systems in the Australian states

and cities, so efforts to create a national election system built on preferential voting built upon these previous efforts.

Farrell and McAllister also provide some historical perspective to the differences in preferential voting systems that have been used throughout Australia in different constituencies and time periods. They demonstrate that slight changes in the electoral rules of how preferential voting is implemented significantly alter the logic of electoral competition for parties and candidates. Variation in this type of election system can include district magnitude (number of seats in a constituency), ballot paper design, the process of transferring surplus votes, the number of preferences that need to be listed by the voter to make the vote valid, and the means to fill an empty seat before another general election.

The authors' analysis of the impact of preferential election systems is carefully crafted to build upon previous studies, but they effectively re-examine earlier evidence as well to provide a systematic comparison of these systems to others, primarily the List Proportional Representation (PR) system and the Single Member Plurality (SMP) system. The data from previous studies and the Australian Senate indicate that at least five members need to be elected per constituency to ensure proportionality. Thus, since the Australian House elections only have one seat, AV operates much like a SMP system and is not a system that guarantees that voter's preferences translate into party support.

Beyond looking at proportionality, Farrell and McAllister also examine the impact of the Australian election systems on the fate of individual candidates (i.e., whether the "correct" candidate is elected) and the electorate. The authors depict Australian politicians as torn between the need for support among voters and the need to gain party support. In other contexts, especially Ireland with its STV system, it is assumed that the need for constituency service compels candidates and thus STV is often depicted as a candidate centered system. Nevertheless, Farrell and McAllister demonstrate that those seeking elected office in Australia focus more on party activity because of its central role in nomination and because party success leads to personal success at the polls.

Because of the complexity of ballots associated with STV, there is a concern that voters will not be as fully rational as proponents of this system assume. Therefore, ballots need to be simple and require little effort on the part of voters. Otherwise, they will look for shortcuts rather than take the time to express their true preferences. The authors' emphasize that compulsory voting in Australia has been an important factor in shaping how the voting public views the election system. Perhaps states that do not have compulsory voting requirements or as many elections as are held in Australia would not have the same experience with preferential voting as the

Australians since these are an important part of their election history. Along with their high rates of participation, Australians report a high level of satisfaction with their democracy. Farrell and McAllister credit the election system for much of this support for democracy.

Overall, Farrell and McAllister have provided a thoughtful and thorough review of the causes and consequences of the Australian electoral system. This book will be of great interest to anyone attempting to understand the implications of differing electoral systems as well as the peculiarities of Australia's election history.

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Kevin Olson. *Reflexive Democracy: Political Equality and the Welfare State.* Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006. 249 pp. (\$35.00 cloth.)

In Kevin Olson's *Reflexive Democracy*, the author sets out to salvage the idea and utility of the welfare state. The collapse of communism and the concurrent rise in globalization has caused nations to rethink the middle path of the welfare state that traditionally navigated between purer forms of socialism and capitalism. According to Olson, the welfare state has become problematic and a source of conflict in many western societies. He states that "many of the welfare state's current problems can be attributed to its focus on economic issues. An institution that sells itself as a solution to problems of class, distribution, and market regulation stakes its political fortunes on public uptake of those issues" (p. 3-4). Unfortunately, public consumption of just those issues has become contentious as we enter the 21st Century. Public norms and values no longer attain consensus regarding such economic considerations and indeed much of the discussion focuses on the dysfunctions of existing welfare structures. Olson outlines the contemporary difficulties using the United States and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 to demonstrate that normative understandings that develop out of "a moral critique of the economy" (p. 12) can lead to opposing viewpoints and therefore cannot provide a sufficient theoretical basis for justifying an approach to the welfare state.

Olson's project therefore turns on identifying a theoretical basis for the welfare state that will support changing and dynamic understandings of what the welfare state means within a given society. One of Olson's first steps is to provide a critique of the labor market paradigm and its understanding of the welfare state. Olson contends that the labor market paradigm focuses too exclusively on economic issues to the exclusion of broader political and

cultural inequities. While progressive distribution mechanisms may benefit the exploited, such distributions typically reinforce the existing system and do not provide for the critical components of exit and voice that presumably would give the exploited expanded capabilities. Olson looks to the feminist paradigm as an example of a critique that attempts to breakdown the replicating structures of society, i.e., those almost innate structures that perpetuate gender differentiation and inequality. Olson identifies cultural agency as “critical, cognitive, and discursive abilities to act as an agent in defining the terms through which oneself and one’s society are understood.” (p. 75). Olson then connects this idea of cultural agency with Amartya Sen’s idea of capability such that possessing cultural agency or capability allows one to achieve input into and, at the very least, the potential to transform the very norms of society to which one is subject. Once a member of society acquires this capability, they possess voice.

Olson then shifts to a discussion of the deliberative-democratic paradigm where he connects his idea of voice with the ideas of citizenship as represented in the work of T.H. Marshall and Jürgen Habermas. The existing social fabric creates the conditions for material inequality. This inequality marginalizes members of society and perpetuates their exploitation. The key to overcoming this dilemma is in a vision of citizenship that entails equal rights to participation in the construction of the social fabric. While democratic governments certainly espouse ideas of equal participation, these are typically formal assurances that, due to existing structural inequalities, rarely translate into true opportunities of participation. It is important to note though that Olson’s vision of participatory equality does not necessarily imply an equality of outcomes but rather an equality of input that allows members the opportunity to redefine social norms such that existing structures of inequality may be disrupted and/or reformulated. As a practical example of how societal members acquire such capability/voice, Olson often refers to job and community skills (opportunities to lead public meetings, public speaking opportunities, etc.) that enhance an individual’s experience and comfort with exercising voice. Regardless of material redistributions, these opportunities help citizens to get closer to realizing equality of voice in the political process. Of course, disparities exist in the distribution of even these voice-building opportunities such that existing inequalities persist. One of the resulting questions though, is how to get from existing inequalities to a society of citizens with equal voice? Olson is clear that the means for achieving this state should not be overly paternalistic in nature. Indeed, using paternalistic hand holding to achieve reflexive democracy would likely establish its own perpetuating structures of inequality and dysfunction. Ultimately, Olson seems to recommend a sort of moderate nudging with a minimal amount of paternalism to help push society from a negative spiral

of cynicism and further dysfunction to a positive spiral of increasing citizen participatory equality.

What then is Olson's idea of reflexive democracy? It is a reconceptualization of the welfare state not as emanating from class divisions or cultural/moral norms, but rather, as a procedural concern. At its most basic then the welfare state is a procedural concern:

Welfare is important here not as an outcome—not as generating the kind of substantive equality to which Weber objected. Rather it is important as a process, as a formal component of the democratic creation of law. Without this component, a system of laws lacks the means to ensure its own legitimacy, just as surely as if it failed to provide people with rights to participation. [Thus,] . . . a system of laws must include a guarantee of agency sufficient to ensure that people will be able to function as equal participants in authoring the laws (p. 203).

Welfare then is no longer a particular set of distributional economic outcomes but rather a method to establish participatory equality through the enhancement of participatory capabilities. Citizens achieve voice with participatory equality and it is this voice that allows them input to the transformative dialogue of society. Society can then establish its own legitimate (truly legitimate due to the equal input stakes) consensus regarding the normative distribution of benefits. Thus citizens become enfranchised with capabilities through the establishment of participatory equality and the practice of reflexive democracy. However, citizens must be aware that the outcomes of their decisions, once participatory equality is attained, are binding and may yet reflect structural inequalities albeit inequalities all have been able to equally debate.

Olson directly acknowledges the continued potential for such structural inequalities; however, due to participatory equality, these no longer appear to be overly problematic. It seems that there is almost a sense that participatory equality will inherently translate to more equal outcomes making a discussion of what happens next (once participatory equality is reached) a non-issue. However, using the United States as an example, if we hypothetically set participation to be equal, the distribution of preferences would still seem to continue to enfranchise the middle class while marginalizing the lower classes. Even if currently marginalized groups attain political voice, the democratic majority decision rule seems to ensure outcomes that would continue existing marginalization structures favoring the middle and upper classes. The acquisition of political voice then does not appear to necessarily translate into preferences or benefits.

To conclude, Olson sets out on a formidable and worthy task, to attempt to rescue the idea of the welfare state from its current malaise and dysfunction. In doing so, he appropriately updates the idea of the welfare

state as more than just an economic concern and in connecting his ideas with those of feminism helps to set the idea of the welfare state on track to address contemporary cross-cutting issues of gender, race and class. Overall, he presents a compelling theoretical argument that demonstrates the logical necessity of the claims he stakes and warrants continued attention in terms of understanding the welfare state as a procedural concern for establishing participatory equality. However, there is a failure, at least within the text, to address the human capacity to exist in a state of cognitive dissonance such that norms of political and social equality and economic differentiation need not be reconciled despite the compelling arguments he advances. Finally, additional attention needs to be devoted to how reflexive democracy will affect distributional outcomes. While establishing equality of political voice for all citizens is a worthy goal, if it does not alter existing distributional inequities, how much have we really accomplished in attaining it?

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Walter F. Baber and Robert. V. Bartlett. *Deliberative Environmental Politics: Democracy and Ecological Rationality*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005. x, 288 pp. (\$60.00 cloth; \$24.00 paper.)

Baber and Bartlett argue that political theory and public policy, although rarely in dialogue, have a lot to say to each other about environmentalism. The authors make four main points. First, they argue that environmentalism depends on deliberative democracy. Second, they highlight differences among theories of deliberative democracy and propose a position somewhere between Habermas and Bohman. In doing so, they suggest that environmentalism may circumvent some problems in theories of deliberative democracy. Third, in contrast to its exclusion in other approaches, Baber and Bartlett argue that the use of rhetoric in public discourse is not only unavoidable but also normatively desirable. Fourth, they attempt to demonstrate that deliberative democracy is not utopian. This review briefly presents the argument for the necessity of deliberative democracy and then focuses on the comparison of various approaches and their practical value.

Deliberative Environmental Politics consists of twelve chapters, implicitly organized in two halves. The first and more theoretical half deals with the importance and feasibility of reconciling rationality and reasonableness and the value of deliberative democracy. Chapters three through six delineate, compare, critique, and—to some extent—synthesize three varieties of deliberative democracy: the classical liberalism associated with John

Rawls, the ideal discourse of Jürgen Habermas, and the approaches of James Bohman, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson, alternatively labeled full or interest group liberalism. The second half of the volume elaborates on the roles of experts, collective identities, and social movements in deliberative democracy, offers examples of existing and proposed institutions that reflect ideals of one or another version of deliberative democracy, and defends the viability of deliberative democracy.

Under existing forms of democracy, diffuse popular support for the environment often rallies against proposals for environmentally destructive policies but fails to produce proactive reforms with concentrated costs. The complexity of many environmental problems threatens to overwhelm the cognitive capacity of ordinary citizens, suggesting a choice between outcomes that are technocratic but environmentally sound or democratic but unsustainable. Deliberation provides a mechanism for changing individual preferences and societal priorities through a process of social learning. Theories of deliberative democracy reconcile the rationality associated with interest group politics and experts with a reasonableness that involves respect for others and recognizes social, economic, and *ecological* interconnections. Through reasonable deliberation, awareness and understanding of environmental threats may be raised so that a commitment to environmental sustainability becomes politically possible. Rhetoric allows holders of specialized knowledge to communicate with others who cannot share their expertise. An openness to learning, and thus to expertise couched in layman's terms, increases prospects for sustainable policy responses.

Whatever its merits in theory, many doubt the feasibility of deliberative democracy. Baber and Bartlett counter this critique in two ways. First, they link each approach to a broad category of policy problems and, second, they identify examples of particular institutions or procedures with deliberative features. Baber and Bartlett draw parallels between the Rawlsian search for principles of justice and the development of binding pre-commitments, whether in the form of constitutional choice (formal or informal) or the adoption of procedural rules (e.g., for listing endangered species). The sort of truth-seeking discourse described by Habermas appears in many regulatory procedures, including those associated with environmental impact assessments and adjudication. The compromises accepted and expected in interest group liberalism can be found in many policies.

Despite examples of binding social pre-commitments consistent with Rawlsian goals, his requirements of unanimous decisions based on the reference to public reasons by actors situated behind a veil of ignorance are unrealistic. At the other extreme, proponents of full liberalism argue that plurality rule and divergent reasons for supporting policies are unavoidable but acceptable if political equality is achieved. Baber and Bartlett sharply

criticize Bohman for abandoning consensus decision-making and the requirement—shared by Habermas and Rawls—that actors reach conclusions for the same reasons. Possibilities for social and individual learning depend on a commitment to consensus decision-making in which people are open to persuasion and strive for unanimity. Giving up on unanimity is, according to Baber and Bartlett, tantamount to giving up on efforts to change the views of those who hold marginal positions, thereby relegating these people to a position of permanent exclusion. If the value of deliberative democracy lies in part in the potential for raising consciousness of environmental problems, as Baber and Bartlett contend, this issue is central. Nonetheless, the practical problems are unavoidable. Consensus making creates possibilities for minorities to veto decisions out of self-interest and may be time-consuming even when all parties deliberate in good faith. Baber and Bartlett follow Habermas in attempting to square the circle by allowing non-unanimous decisions when there is pressure to decide (e.g., deadlines, immediate need), on the condition that such decisions are provisional and reversible. These non-unanimous decisions require minority consent and so do not address the problem of self-interested minority vetoes. Baber and Bartlett deny Bohman's assumption that social pluralism creates unbridgeable divisions that make consensus impossible; ecological survival is a foundational social goal that overrides social and cultural divisions, thus making consensus possible. This claim is difficult to square with Baber and Bartlett's acknowledgment of weak and diffuse support for environmentalism.

In addition to linking each theorist to a broad category of realistic situations, Baber and Bartlett identify a number of specific actual practices with deliberative features and describe proposals for reforms to enhance the deliberative quality of existing arrangements. These counter-examples establish the *possibility* of approximating deliberative democracy, but are unlikely to satisfy skeptics, in part because the authors are inadequately critical whenever they discuss policies, institutions, or procedures. The strategy of linking examples to all three approaches suggests that particular theories fit with particular types of policy problems. While consistent with the characterization of each theorist as concerned with specific types of public decision-making in the first half, the idea is not developed fully. The authors provide very little critical comparison of alternative institutional arrangements for achieving the same or similar goals. Is an approach consistent with Rawls better or worse than a strategy that is more in the spirit of Habermas or Bohman? Is it simply a matter of matching policy situations to the most relevant theorist? Or does one theoretical approach—perhaps the synthesis of Habermas and Bohman developed in this volume—have greater practical applicability than the others? The authors deny that each approach is right

when applied appropriately, but do not provide the sort of critical policy analysis required to support any other position.

The relative lack of critical assessment of examples or proposals contributes to a sense of continued utopianism and political naïveté. The authors evidence an unjustified confidence in the ability to achieve reform through institutional arrangements. Likewise, although Baber and Bartlett acknowledge that entrenched interests would oppose reforms to increase political equality, they seem not to accept the implication: political equality is required to achieve deliberative democracy, and yet reforms to create political equality are unlikely in the absence of the public-oriented reasonableness associated with deliberative democracy. Maybe procedures used in judicial settings could be adapted to increase deliberation in other spheres of decision-making. Similarly, it may be true, as Baber and Bartlett claim, that public support for the organization and representation of poorly or not yet organized interest groups is essential for deliberative democracy. But would beneficiaries of existing arrangements accept such reforms? Unfortunately, the political feasibility of new support for interests that are either marginalized or diffuse seems dubious. Even if new institutions or procedures were introduced, their performance would be influenced by the character of the people operating within them. A commitment to reasonable discourse would seem at least as important as procedures that facilitate discourse.

The central puzzle, then, is one of how to achieve broad change in individual and societal orientations. Commitment to ecological survival as a shared value could overcome social pluralism. Avoidance of intellectual shortcuts that violate rationality would raise the quality of public discourse. A fraternal orientation toward other citizens would inculcate reasonableness. Baber and Bartlett argue that deliberative democracy provides a mechanism for reconciling rationality and reasonableness and increasing awareness of ecological risks that require immediate action. And yet, their analysis suggests that deliberative democracy depends upon the existence of a shared goal and a commitment to reasonable and rational discourse. The authors are trapped in a chicken-egg problem.

The volume could benefit from tighter editing. There is significant overlap across chapters, especially across chapters 8 through 10. A more focused presentation would sharpen the arguments. Similarly, an explicit structuring of the two halves of the book would force the authors to address the translation of theory into practice directly. The less structured approach is unfortunate. Baber and Bartlett's effort to reach across sub-disciplinary divides raises interesting theoretical puzzles with important practical implications. With polarized politics and their negative consequences seemingly omnipresent, suggestions for practical strategies to reverse the divisiveness

of public discourse are very welcome. A more critical discussion would be even more valuable.

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Joseph F. Zimmerman. *Interstate Disputes: The Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006). xi, 231 pp. (\$65.00 cloth.)

Although the governors of New Jersey and Pennsylvania are Democrats, the governors are at loggerheads over dredging the Delaware River. Pennsylvania wants to deepen 100 miles of the river in order to revitalize the port of Philadelphia. New Jersey fears that dredging will churn up environmental hazards and that Pennsylvania will fail to harbor the waste scraped from the river's bottom. This dispute is one example of the many disputes that have arisen between states since the founding of the federal union. This quarrel between the Keystone State and the Garden State is unlikely to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court is one constitutionally authorized institution available to resolve interstate controversies.

For the past decade, Joseph Zimmerman has focused attention on interstate relations, a subject, he notes, that has been neglected by students of federalism for several decades. The rise of coercive federalism since the mid-1960s has overshadowed interstate relations, rendering the concept of "federalism without Washington" rather anachronistic because the presence of the federal government is now so ubiquitous. Nevertheless, Zimmerman has sought to revive interest in interstate relations by publishing *Interstate Relations: The Neglected Dimension of Federalism* (1996), *Interstate Cooperation: Compacts and Administrative Agreements* (2002), *Interstate Economic Relations* (2004), and now *Interstate Disputes*.

In this latest book, Zimmerman discusses the original jurisdiction granted to the U.S. Supreme Court by Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution over "controversies between two or more States." Previously, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had jurisdiction over interstate disputes. In the *Judiciary Act of 1789*, the new federal Congress made the Court's original jurisdiction exclusive, such that federal law now accords the Supreme Court "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States." The Court, however, exercises this jurisdiction with extraordinary discretion. The Constitution does not mandate that the Court hear all controversies between states. This is an important point treated only slightly in the book. If the Court had been required to hear all

interstate controversies, it would have been overwhelmed by such cases and never become powerful. Mandatory jurisdiction might also have weakened the federal union by encouraging states to litigate numerous disputes instead of pursuing alternate means of conflict resolution.

Consequently, the Supreme Court exercises its original jurisdiction over interstate controversies only in cases of “serious magnitude” and “absolute necessity” (p. 30) entailing justiciable matters appropriate for adjudication by the Court as opposed to alternate forums. Most interstate disputes, therefore, are settled or addressed non-judicially, and the Supreme Court issued only 189 original-jurisdiction decisions from 1789 to 2004. The author does not say how many of these 189 cases involved interstate disputes, but given that even the total of 189 decisions account for only about 0.76 percent of all the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1789-2004 decisions and that scholars pay little attention to these rulings, one yearns for justification of their importance. Although Zimmerman asserts that many of these “controversies have been of great importance to the federal union” (p. x), it is hard to find in these cases rulings that significantly affected the course of American federalism, federalism jurisprudence, or public policy. Many of the cases are interesting, and all were important to the contesting states, but nearly all the cases resolved disputes between specific states with little or no spillover impacts on other states or federalism.

In the volume, Zimmerman presents extended descriptions of 21 boundary-dispute cases, ending with the *New Jersey v. New York* (1999) conflict over Ellis Island. Three cases are then presented on escheats, nine on taxation, five on interstate water-apportionment, seven on water diversion, five on water pollution, and six concerning miscellaneous interstate issues.

The author also discusses the role of special masters. Prior to 1908, the Supreme Court often appointed a commission to investigate and report to the justices, but for reasons unexplained by the author, the Court began to appoint special masters in 1908 when exercising its original jurisdiction over interstate disputes. The special master assembles and examines evidence, determines questions of fact and law, and reports to the Court. The special master’s report and recommendations, if any, are usually adopted by the Court. There has, however, been some criticism of special masters. In 1981, for example, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that “justice is far better served by trials in lower courts, with appropriate review, than by trials before a Special Master whose rulings this Court simply cannot consider with the care and attention it should” (p. 59).

In the final chapter, the author discusses other ways to resolve interstate disputes. One would be for Congress to grant concurrent original-jurisdiction to the federal district courts or to a specialized court. Another would be to increase the number of Supreme Court justices. Neither of these alterna-

tives, acknowledges Zimmerman, is probable or necessarily desirable. Federal preemption of matters that give rise to interstate conflicts is more desirable, according to the author; however, given the small number of original-jurisdiction cases and the large number of such cases that involve boundary disputes, preemption is of limited utility. The author is enthusiastic about having Congress apportion the waters of the nation's major rivers so as to foreclose interstate disputes, but no argument is presented as to why it is desirable for a polarized pork-barreling Congress to wade into such muddy and highly politicized waters. Zimmerman also is enthusiastic about forging interstate compacts; however, as he acknowledges, interstate water compacts have not foreclosed original-jurisdiction lawsuits. Although compacts are an alternative in some cases, the very issues that give rise to interstate-dispute litigation make compact negotiations arduous or impossible. States more easily enter compacts that involve mutual aid and service cooperation.

In summary, this book provides information about a little-noticed facet of American federalism and jurisprudence, as well as a rich data source for students and scholars interested in analyzing interstate relations.

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Robert P. Steed and Laurence W. Moreland, eds. *Writing Southern Politics: Contemporary Interpretations and Future Directions*. Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 2006. xiv, 314 pp. (\$45.00 cloth.)

Writing Southern Politics is the fourteenth book co-edited by Robert P. Steed and Laurence W. Moreland, political science professors at The Citadel and, since 1978, co-directors of the biennial Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. While the editors state that the work was inspired by James M. McPherson and William J. Cooper Jr.'s *Writing the Civil War* (1998), there is actually a long history of such volumes. In the related field of Southern history, for instance, Arthur S. Link and Rembert W. Patrick's groundbreaking *Writing Southern History* (1965) has been supplemented not only by *Interpreting Southern History* (1987), but also by state-specific studies such as *Writing North Carolina History* (1979). What all of these works have in common is that, after dividing the subject into various topical areas, they bring together leading scholars to write chapter-length essays discussing the most important literature in each of the areas, in addition to suggesting topics ripe for future research. The essayists in the present volume were asked to identify "key works, major themes, main conclusions, points for

debate, continuing knowledge gaps, and future research questions or directions in their topical areas” (p. 7).

That Southern politics is an exceptionally appropriate subject for such a volume is without question. For the first six decades of the Twentieth Century, the Southern states’ racially-motivated limitations on voting, and the resultant domination of the Democratic party, made the area unique in American politics. Since then, the region has witnessed the transformative Civil Rights revolution, including the enfranchisement of millions of African Americans, as well as an unprecedented, five-decades-long, political realignment—whereby the area has gone from one of complete Democratic dominance to one that now routinely elects Republicans to a majority of its major offices. As demonstrated by the recent works of Earl and Merle Black, among many others, this gradual, lengthy, and top-down realignment can, in many ways, explain most of the major changes in American voting since the 1960s.

Southern politics, thus, has been an area perfectly suited to study by political scientists, not to mention journalists, historians, sociologists, geographers, and others. The seminal work in the field is V.O. Key Jr.’s magisterial *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (1949), and following Key, there have been hundreds of books, not to mention other writings, touching on the politics of the eleven former Confederate states. Until now, however, no work has attempted to discuss systematically all of the major writings in the field, with suggestions for future research.

To accomplish this goal, the editors recruited some of the leading scholars on topics associated with Southern politics, such as David Breaux, John Clark, Patrick Cotter, Richard Engstrom, Ted Jelen, John McGlennon, Charles Prysby, Richard Scher, Stephen Shaffer, and Harold Stanley. The topics chosen for the essays are also most appropriate: changes in partisanship; party activists; civil rights; congressional districting; the role of women; religion; population shifts; ideology; presidential elections, the South in Congress; and governors and state legislatures.

The result is a work that is both interesting and informative, and will prove an important resource for those studying the politics of the South. This is especially true in those areas that are usually not covered in as much depth as the civil rights movement or the partisan realignment. Chapters on the nature of party activists in the South, the role of religion in southern politics, the issue opinions held by southern voters, the role of southerners in Congress, and the changing nature of southern governors and state legislatures will likely be the most valuable to scholars.

Still, it must be said that *Writing Southern Politics* is not the definitive volume that it could have been. As is the case with many edited works, there is a certain unevenness among the various essays, likely stemming from both

the “relatively broad” guidelines given the authors (p. 7), as well as the fact that the true target audience for this volume is never clearly identified. The editors’ stated goal was “to produce a book that will be valuable to those seeking a basic understanding of southern politics as well as to those advanced students and scholars doing research on southern politics” (p. 8), yet it may be that these target audiences are necessarily mutually exclusive. Thus, while some chapters truly focus on detailing the literature in the topical area, and will be quite valuable to scholars, others seem more suited to undergraduates and general readers first learning about the subject—and two essays are primarily concerned with making arguments for or against certain points of view, and thus might have been more valuable as journal articles rather than essays here. In addition, several of the essayists do the valuable service of citing not only books but also important articles on their topics, while others rely solely on the former, and the extent to which the essays suggest topics for future consideration also differs greatly. As with most edited works, there is some repetition, and the attempt to tie the chapters together has led to one noticeable contradiction: in writing about the literature concerning women in southern politics, the chapter’s authors state that “[i]nformation concerning the impact that women had on the civil rights movement in the South is abundant,” yet on the following page, they imply that the opposite may be true, for, as was noted in an earlier chapter, “more attention to the contemporary role of women in the civil rights movement is desirable” (Miller and Remington, pp. 133, 134).

While some topical areas are discussed in detail, others do not receive the amount of attention they deserve. The best example of the latter is civil rights, for despite there being an “enormous quantity of literature available about the movement” (Scher, p. 82), these writings are little discussed; a volume one or two hundred pages longer that intensely discussed the role of race in southern politics would have made a major contribution to the field. Likewise, while V.O. Key spent the first half of his masterpiece detailing the political differences between the eleven southern states, there is no mention of the many studies describing the politics of the individual states. Thus, a chapter discussing the most important of these state-specific studies would have been most welcome, as would one detailing the many good biographies of major southern politicians that have been penned over the past five decades. To give but one example, to truly understand the Little Rock Central High integration crisis of 1957, and how it was both influenced by, and then greatly impacted, Arkansas politics, the best source is Roy Reed’s superb *Faubus* (1997), yet this is a work that does not receive a mention in the current volume.

Writing Southern Politics is not the volume that it could have been, but this is true for the vast majority of books published. What this work does

provide, however, is a very good, general overview of those areas currently under investigation by scholars studying southern politics, and for this, it deserves a place on the shelves of all those interested in this most important subject.

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Tyson King Meadows and Thomas F. Schaller. *Devolution and Black State Legislators: Challenges and Choices in the Twenty-first Century.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. vii, 302 pp. (\$85.00 cloth.)

In 1981, when Ronald Reagan took office as president of the United States, one of the first initiatives under his administration was to reduce the size and influence of the federal government. The Reagan Administration scaled back the federal government's role in protecting the rights of minorities, especially African-Americans, in the name of the "New Federalism." Subsequently, the devolving of power from Washington to the states paralleled the growth in black state legislators. Meadows and Schaller present a timely and needed book examining the "*irony of devolution*" that began during the Reagan Administration and inadvertently "empowered minority communities and their leaders" (p. 4), providing black state legislators with greater influence in the legislature to define policies and shape programs important to their constituents.

Meadows and Schaller's work expands on recent books on black state legislators (see Haynie, *African American Legislators in the American States*, 2001, and Menifield and Shaffer, eds., *Politics in the New South: Representation of African-Americans in Southern State Legislatures*, 2005) to offer a detailed and comprehensive study of black state legislators. Their work is filled with an abundance of political scenarios, accounts of legislative behavior while in session, and elite interviews that provide tremendous insight into the "constituency-institutional tension" (p. 28) and institutional barriers faced by these legislators. Like previous studies that have examined black state legislators, they ask the following questions: "How are African-American interests represented by black state legislators? How well? And finally, what factors affect how successful black legislators represent those interests?" (p. 3). Their approach to answering these questions is more thorough, however, collecting demographic, institutional, electoral, and policy data in an attempt to accurately assess black representation.

A major theme in the book is whether there have been "qualitative gains in black representation afforded by the increased quantitative presence

of black state legislators” (p. 15). To explore this, Meadows and Schaller employ a typology of legislative contexts examining legislative black caucuses to “fully describe the relationship between caucus size, coalition building, and institutionalized state power” (p. 35) as predictors of influence for black legislators as a collective group.

In chapter one, Figure 1.4 outlines a theoretical pattern of legislative black caucus activity and influence to show how the size of the caucus “might either facilitate or impede the exercise of black state legislative power” (p. 35). Meadows and Schaller suggest that Small/Medium caucuses, those in legislatures in which blacks hold less than 10% of the seats, should employ a “protective-reactionary” (p. 36) strategy that blocks, amends, and tables policies that are adverse to black interests. On the other hand, Large caucuses, those in legislatures in which blacks hold above 10% of seats, are theorized as “protective-proactive” (p. 36), which suggests that despite their limitations in the legislature, black legislators are able to pursue multiple external allies to have more influence in the policy-making process. Thus, these legislators move beyond mere “protest-oriented politics” to a politics of bargaining (p. 37). This typology is central to the book because Meadows and Schaller contend that “caucus influence is found at the intersection of black incorporation and the legislative environment” (p. 37).

An initial criticism of the book concerns the legislative black caucuses chosen for the study. Meadows and Schaller examine four caucuses, those in the states of Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Grounding their theory of influence on the percentage of black legislative seats held among these caucuses, they do not provide an equal comparison of Small/Medium and Large caucuses. Three states, Maryland (19%), North Carolina (14%), and Tennessee (12%) have Large caucuses and Pennsylvania (7%) a Small/Medium caucus.

Meadows and Schaller begin their analysis examining the voting patterns of these legislative black caucuses. Relying primarily on roll-call voting indices, the disparity in caucus size was evident in their findings. Caucuses in Maryland and North Carolina acted as a voting bloc and were on the winning side of roll-call votes on legislation important to black constituents (i.e., social welfare, economic issues, and citizen policies). Conversely, in Tennessee vote cohesion within the caucus was virtually non-existent, and there was no report on Pennsylvania prompting the authors to speculate that there could be a lack of “solidarity” (p. 103) in these caucuses.

Meadows and Schaller continue by examining the incorporation of black state legislators. Critical of previous studies (e.g., Nelson, *Emerging Influentials in State Legislatures: Women, Blacks, and Hispanics*, 1991, and Haynie, 2001) that employed “indices” to measure incorporation, they argue that previous measures do not account for coalition building nor do they

capture the institutional or partisan dilemmas meet by legislative black caucuses. They assess the degree of black incorporation in 28 states with formalized legislative black caucuses using a number of indicators, but they are not clear on the methodology used to derive their findings. Meadows and Schaller's findings are suggestive, but they leave the reader uncertain of whether these caucuses have an influence on the assignment of black legislators to key committees or the obtainment of primary leadership positions in their legislatures.

Further, Meadows and Schaller run rigorous tests using multiple models to examine black state legislators influence on state expenditures. Relying on a pooled data set of 84 cases across three legislative sessions (1997, 1999, and 2001), they found that in legislatures with larger caucuses, which were also states with higher black populations, welfare expenditures tended to be lower. Models that measured the affect of incorporation on welfare expenditures rendered the same results. On the other hand, regardless of legislative context, education expenditures tended to be higher, which was congruent with the greater number of black legislators assigned to education committees. Black incorporation did not have a substantial influence on state expenditures leading the authors to conclude that the "demonstrable effects of black state legislative incorporation remain elusive" (p. 188).

In conclusion, Meadows and Schaller's findings in *Devolution and Black State Legislators* are elaborate and the timeliest to date. Their approach to the study of black state legislators is impressive. The data sources used to gather findings are noteworthy and required for a comprehensive study. This book has taken a major step in revealing that there have been qualitative gains in black representation.

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Wendy Brown. *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. xi, 268 pp.

Wendy Brown has produced a richly textured and timely analysis of some of the darker elements lurking beneath the tolerance discourse of western liberalism. As the instructive historical analysis of the second chapter demonstrates, tolerance, today one of the cardinal virtues of liberalism, began its political life as an exhausted compromise, when, in the seventeenth century, the forces of the European Reformation and Counter-Reformation fought each other to a standstill, neither able to deliver the killer blow. To tolerate was not a synonym for respect, but simply an admission that the

still-despised other could not be permanently removed this side of eternity. Brown further develops this explanation by working through the various uses of the term tolerance in medical, scientific and mathematical vocabularies, where toleration is about coping with that which is potentially harmful, be it toxins or statistical error. Power and otherness were thus there at the very birth of toleration, and Brown, in the rest of the text, seeks to show that this continued to be the case in the process which saw the apotheosis of toleration in the liberal tradition.

Brown however doesn't want to be construed as totally rejecting toleration as a virtue. She acknowledges that a "personal ethic of tolerance" (p. 13) can in many instances be "an inarguable good" (*ibid.*), allowing us, for example, to get along with individuals, some of whose little personal foibles we do not appreciate, though even here "tolerance is never innocent of power or normativity" (p. 14). Her main concern, however, is with demonstrating the dangers of toleration as "a political discourse, regime, or governmentality" (p. 13). Above all she wishes to show that toleration as political discourse is a vital aspect of the process of "depoliticization" in liberal democracy. Depoliticization in Brown's usage denotes the ways in which politically determined and politically understandable phenomena are denuded of their political content, and redefined in ways that repel effective political solutions—"as personal and individual on the one hand, or as natural, religious, or cultural on the other" (p. 15). Tolerance is then deemed to be the appropriate mechanism for coping with these inherent and intractable givens of group or personality—it thus becomes a negative alternative to a positive political working through of these political realities.

Much of the book is made up of illustrative case studies. Chapter three asks the striking question of why, historically, the language of toleration was used in respect of Jews but not of women. In her elegant answer, too multifaceted to be summarised here, Brown argues that the emancipation of women was couched in terms of an abstract equality with men, who themselves, in liberal discourse, possessed abstract rights as citizens; as public subjects women were to leave behind their private sexed personalities, hence equality and not tolerance was the appropriate discourse. In the case of the Jews, particularly with the emergence of racialised conceptions of identity in the nineteenth century, the perceived pervasive difference of Jewish identity summoned the discourse of toleration. There is also a fascinating discussion of same-sex marriage which locates the cultural struggle taking place in the USA over this issue in opposing reactions to the modern liberal secular state. And, in many ways the most compelling chapter in the book, there is a bravura analysis of the Los Angeles Museum of Tolerance which takes the form of a trip through the exhibits, identifying the political agendas promoted and denied through the overarching concept of tolerance, and the

whole panoply of technological, spatial, and organisational devices used to bring this about (even down to the absence of bathrooms!).

The contemporary political bite in the text, and the sometimes spoken, often unspoken, context of the whole book is the deployment of toleration language by the US state in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Brown cites the language of Bush and his administration with its contrast between countries characterised by tolerant liberal culture, and those deemed to be mired in intolerant religious and cultural practices, who pose a threat to the tolerant civilisation of the former. In the face of intolerance, tolerance has to be suspended—the intolerable cannot be tolerated—and action up to and including armed invasion becomes not merely necessary but positively moral. This perspective Brown terms “the rhetorical Manicheism” of “the Bush regime: ‘You’re either with the civilized world, or you’re with the terrorists’” (p. 204).

Essentially the book is a critique of a particular type of discourse. There is relatively little detail on the way forward. This may partly flow from Brown’s sensitivity to the double-edged nature of political discourse, the unseen, unstated negativities involved in the seemingly unproblematic positive discourse of political advocacy. All the great liberal writers from Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill to the present day are shown to embody important weaknesses in their analysis and vision. Brown’s strategy is to enjoin people to develop “nourishing counterdiscourses that would feature power and justice where anti-political tolerance talk has displaced them. . . . In short... we can contest the depoliticizing, regulatory, and imperial aims of contemporary deployments of tolerance with alternative speech and practices” (p. 205). The possible forms of these counterdiscourses, beyond the element of analysis and critique, are not discussed. This is a plea for more, not a critique of what the author has provided. Brown has produced a thought-provoking, and to many, one assumes, a controversial book. It is a fine piece of work.

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Carolyn Wong. *Lobbying For Inclusion: Rights Politics and the Making of Immigration Policy.* Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. xiii, 225 pp. (\$50 cloth.)

Immigration is a multi-dimensional issue that extends into a number of highly contested policy domains. First, and most profound, immigration involves questions of identity that are central to the American experience. From the colonial period onwards immigration has raised questions about

core values, assimilation, and what it means to be American. Recent concerns include debates about whether English should be adopted as an official language, heated exchanges about the literary canon taught in schools and universities, and arguments about whether the United States is a Christian country. Second, immigration has an economic aspect. Immigrants bring economic benefits to the United States in the form of cheap labor or needed skills, but not all Americans benefit economically from immigration. Competition for jobs from immigrants may lead to lower wages or unemployment, and funding the public services often needed by new immigrants may require higher taxes. Finally, immigration has a national security dimension. Previous wars witnessed the internment of immigrants considered to pose a threat to security, and the present “war on terror” has re-kindled a fear of strangers.

In *Lobbying for Inclusion*, Carolyn Wong examines how the multi-dimensional nature of immigration informs law making. She argues that immigration law is a consequence of the interplay between identity politics and economic politics. This explains the range of interest groups involved in legislative battles over immigration policy, accounts for coalitions between some unusual bedfellows, determines the use of rhetorical strategies, and shapes roll-call outcomes. Four case studies provide the meat of the book. Wong begins with an examination of the landmark Hart-Cellar Act of 1965. She shows how the replacement of national-origin quotas with a family-based policy removed race from future immigration debates, but had the unintended consequence of increasing the number of migrants entering the United States from Asia and Africa through a process of “chain immigration.” Representative Cellar had assured colleagues during floor debate on the law that he did not expect a large growth in immigration from these areas “since the people of Africa and Asia have very few relatives” (p. 56).

Studies of the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and the Immigration Act of 1990 constitute the next two case studies. Wong shows how an alliance of business groups anxious to maintain a supply of labor, and ethnic rights groups committed to preserving a family-based policy, managed to defeat efforts to impose a more restrictive immigration policy. The final case study is an examination of the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Wong reveals how ethnic rights groups successfully framed the debate in universal terms of family stability to defeat proposals to cut family immigration and safeguard the rights of immigrants. Her analysis reveals that the multi-dimensional nature of immigration in the 1990s resulted in shifting voting coalitions in the House of Representatives. A conclusion touches upon immigration policy post-9/11, but does not fully explore the interplay of national security imperatives and immigration.

Lobbying for Inclusion makes an important contribution to the literature on immigration policy. The discussion on the role and tactics of ethnic rights groups is particularly illuminating. Wong shows how groups representing Latinos and Asian Americans played an important part in legislative battles before such populations gained power in the voting booth. Rhetorical strategies that stressed civil rights and family enabled these groups to form coalitions of convenience with more powerful groups in the policy domain. Wong takes pains to dispel the idea that this meant that ethnic groups always sided with those advocating increased immigration. She views this idea as “simplistic” (p. 43). Inclusive policies that enable immigrant populations to assimilate politically and economically within America have been central to the purpose of ethnic rights groups, and coalitions have been abandoned when this ideal has been threatened. Ethnic rights groups have not supported the sort of guest worker programs demanded by the agricultural industry because of this reason. The idea that interest coalitions vary along the different dimensions of immigration policy is a key finding.

Lobbying for Inclusion makes less of a contribution to the literature on legislative politics. The book provides an analysis of a set of roll calls in the House of Representative but fails to offer a fully developed account of law making. There is little explanation of why specific legislators decide to take the lead on immigration issues, how committees structure outcomes, or the role of parties. The roll call analysis is methodologically sophisticated and technically adept, but produces no counter-intuitive results that would force a re-think of congressional behavior.

In short, *Lobbying for Inclusion* has much to offer scholars and students of immigration politics and policy. It is clearly written, if formulaically structured, and provides fresh insights into the development of immigration policy.

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