The Paradox of Multiple Elections and Divided Government

Authors

  • Diane Lowenthal

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2005-2006.26.0.369-383

Abstract

In this paper, I identify a relationship between the paradox of multiple elections (PME) (Brams, Kilgour, and Zwicker 1997, 1998) and divided government. PME occurs when voters who face several elections may not know the results of one election before they vote in another. Often the winning combination (the set of winners of each individual election) is not a combination that most voters prefer. ANES data shows that when elections result in divided government PME emerges; when elections result in one party rule, PME is not present. While the 2000 elections break a pattern found in the 12 previous presidential elections, a new definition explains the anomaly. This study concludes that elections reflect majority preferences when they exist, but otherwise tend to be some-hat arbitrary.

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Published

2006-01-01

Issue

Vol. 26: Winter 2005-2006

Section

Articles

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