Committee Power and Amendment Rights in the U.S. House

Authors

  • Charles J. Finocchiaro
  • Bryan W. Marshall

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2004.25.0.265-284

Abstract

Much of the extant literature on legislative organization treats Congress’ jurisdictional framework as an exogenous facet of the political landscape. While bill referral and statutory rules are key institutional determinants shaping the politics of committee jurisdiction, we argue that important choices affecting committee power occur at post-referral stages of the legislative process, including actions taken by the Rules Committee. The analysis suggests that variation in amendment challenges to committee bills resulting from special rule decisions is systematically affected by key factors related to organizational theories of Congress. The findings have at least two important implications for committee power in the U.S. House. Special rule decisions can shape committee power by closing or opening access to committee products bill by bill. This result diminishes the significance of prior referral decisions granting committees the prerogative to exercise uninhibited discretion over policies within their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that patterns in amendment rights conferred by special rules respond systematically to majority party interests.

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Published

2004-11-01

Issue

Vol. 25: Fall 2004

Section

Articles

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