# *Book Reviews*

*Richard L. Engstrom, Editor*

**Henry Flores.** *The Evolution of the Liberal Democratic State with a Case Study of Latinos in San Antonio, Texas*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003. xxiv, 208 pp. ($109.95 cloth.)

Indicative of its lengthy title, Flores covers a lot of ground in *The Evolution of the Liberal Democratic State with a Case Study of Latinos in San Antonio, Texas*. He introduces his work by saying, "this book is about the 'Theory of the State,' the liberal democratic state, and how Latinos fare, socially and politically, as subjects of the state" (p. vii). This introductory chapter, "An Essay on the State," appears almost as a separable item, especially since it is paginated using Roman numerals. Flores then discusses briefly the role to be played by his case, the Latino community of San Antonio, Texas. Unlike many books in political science, this one takes a position. Flores argues that educational and economic development policies have worked to "perpetuat[e] the lower social status of Latinos in the United States. At the same time the electoral structures and processes are designed to inhibit the political participation of Latinos," particularly in the city of San Antonio (p. vii). Strong words, indeed!

The book may be divided into roughly three sections, following the schema presented in the title. Flores opens with a careful review and critique of the major theories of the liberal democratic state. (Why wasn't this available when I was preparing for my Ph.D. exams?) The critique continues into Chapter 2, where the author identifies and examines the structural barriers inhibiting out-groups, in this case Latinos, from fully participating in politics and governing. It is here that members of the in-group may find some points to criticize, especially when Flores argues that economic development helps perpetuate inequality. Critics will have to be sharp because the San Antonio data presented to support his arguments are quite convincing.

In the second section of the book (Chapter 3), the author considers the factors that cause the evolution of the liberal democratic state. He advances the proposition that the state is "dynamical," or constantly changing. Flores locates the cause of this constant change in chaos theory. Chaos theory attempts to "understand variations in some physical systems that appear random 'even though their behavior is in fact determined by precise laws'" (p. 77-78). From chaos theory as developed by physicists and mathematicians, Flores posits that "the state is a dynamical system, and consequently, experiences aperiodic structural changes, in varying degrees, due to the unintended effects of variables internal and external to the system" (p. 89). While the discussion is enlightening and quite novel, it is unclear whether the author really needed to delve into chaos theory to derive this proposition. A lot of what a state does is try to fix conditions caused by its previous decisions.

It is the third section of the book that will appeal to a wider readership. In this section, Flores examines the economic development policies and the politics of San Antonio over the last three decades. In an interesting argument, he shows how a number of "reforms" of San Antonio city government have served to hinder greater Latino political participation. Among these reforms are the implementation of single-member districts for the city council and the imposition of term limits on city council members. Flores is able to bring data to bear on his argument that term limits have actually reduced political opportunities for members of a minority group. He argues that this was the real goal of term limit advocates in San Antonio, a charge these advocates likely will deny.

The arguments presented in this volume clearly are open to criticism on ideological grounds, especially the author's claims about economic development serving to perpetuate *de facto* segregation. Flores states:

> In San Antonio, economic development policies create programs that exclude the participation of groups other than those possessing, controlling, or having access to large amounts of investment capital. . . . Additionally, even if either the public or private sectors solicit participation in alternative economic development options, such as the possibility of joining collectives or cooperatives as alternatives to individual participation, the state or market representatives will not identify the options as viable (p. 54).

City-county consolidation, proposed as a method to increase the efficiency of local government, also is criticized as establishing a barrier to Latino political participation. During consolidation discussions in San Antonio in the early 1990s, a subcommittee of voting rights experts determined that consolidation would serve to dilute the voting power of the Hispanic community. The consolidation effort was killed largely through the efforts of a "local Mexican American state senator, Frank Madla" (p. 148). The reader learns that the unintended consequences of local government reform may actually reduce democracy for the Hispanic community, although Flores presents convincing evidence that political segregation may actually be an intended consequence.

In addition to the ideological criticism, another challenge faced by the book is its price. At $109.95, Flores' work may not find its way into many academics' private libraries. The Mellon Press brochures that I receive trumpet the fact that Mellen Press books can be found in research libraries around the world and this book certainly is one that should be recommended to a favorite librarian. The volume presents a controversial argument about the nature of democracy, defended with data drawn from an easily accessible and interesting case. The summary and critique of the liberal democratic theories of the state would appeal to large numbers of graduate students. Flores' analysis of San Antonio politics will share shelf space comfortably with Robert Dahl's seminal work *Who Governs?* (1961). In terms of San Antonio, Flores' answer is, "not the Hispanic community!"

Political science unfairly devalues the case study because of a supposed lack of rigor and generalizability. Following Flores' lead, we can now examine the politics and government in other American cities through a new filter to determine if San Antonio is an outlier or the typical case.

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**Donald Green and Alan Gerber.** *Get Out the Vote! How to Increase Voter Turnout*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 2004. ix, 145 pp.

*Get Out the Vote!* is quite a unique book in social science. It manages to combine rigorous scientific research with concrete specific recommendations to practitioners, and all in only 111 pages of text. Essentially the authors conduct a meta-analysis of numerous social science experiments examining the effects of various get-out-the-vote techniques on turnout and draw overall conclusions from the evidence in these studies as to what techniques are most effective. But, unlike other meta-analyses, this book goes beyond the research conclusions and provides very concrete advice to candidates and practitioners as to what is worth doing and when it is worth doing. Before getting into specifics, it is important to say what this book is not about. The research and recommendations are directed at increasing turnout; they have nothing to do with persuasion. They also exclude any study of the mass media. The authors acknowledge these limitations several times, but it is easy to lose sight of these points when reading about the "effectiveness" of techniques.

The book demonstrates the value of field experiments. All of the research used to support the authors' conclusions are field experiments from campaigns at the level of Congress and below. The scope of the research is impressive. These experiments were conducted in eighteen states, over five years, in federal, state and local elections, and with different investigators. Field experiments are the only methodology included because the authors make the valid point that only through this method can we have some confidence that the get out the vote (GOTV) strategy was responsible for the resulting turnout. All of the experiments employ random selection into an experimental group and a control group. Amazingly, many researchers received cooperation from actual campaigns to conduct experiments within their campaign operations. This, of course, involves withholding the GOTV treatment from a randomized portion of the electorate, something many campaigns would be reluctant to do.

Beyond experiments there are two other characteristics that contribute to the academic rigor of the results. First, the authors wisely categorize their conclusions into a hotel-like categorization scheme, represented by stars (*). Three stars means that the finding is based on a large number of cases in various settings. Two stars means that the finding is based on a smaller number of cases over a more narrow set of contexts, and one star means that the finding is suggestive. Second, they use actual voting records to establish whether someone has voted; they do not rely on inflated self-reporting.

The heart of the book is five chapters on door-to-door canvassing, leafleting, direct mail, phone banks, and email**.** Each chapter is divided into three distinct sections. One is a detailed description of how to actually implement the technique, the second is a summary of the experimental results using the star rating system, and the third contains conclusions and advice for practitioners. The sections on how to implement the technique include step-by-step guides written as instruction manuals. Among the details involved are the instructions on door-to-door canvassing which include advice such as get your voter lists in geographic clusters, do not canvass after 7 p.m., prioritize your walking lists, and expect to contact twelve people per hour. Similar instructions are offered for all five techniques.

The effectiveness of the techniques is summarized by two numbers, the number of contacts necessary to generate one vote, and the typical cost of one vote. Of course there is variability with some GOTV methods depending on whether you are targeting your partisan base or other voters—and they estimate separate effectiveness numbers for each targeted group. The bottom line on these five techniques is that *door-to-door canvassing generates the most votes per contact and is the cheapest GOTV method*. The others rank in the following order from most to least effective in terms of contacts needed to generate a vote: volunteer phone banks and commercial phone banks with long scripts, partisan leafleting, partisan direct mail, non-partisan leafleting and non-partisan direct mail, phone banks with no special coaching, and other-partisan direct mail. Email and robo calls have no effect. The cost per vote of each technique ranges from only $19 per vote for door-to-door to $200 per vote for direct mail and commercial phone banks. All of this is summarized in a convenient chart.

So why do campaigns spend so much on direct mail and so little on door-to-door? Why is so much money routinely wasted on GOTV efforts that don't yield results? The benign explanation is that the so-called experts in campaigning simply do not know what works. They rely on anecdotes and their personal experience, not science. They don't measure effectiveness. They speculate about causes and effects. The less-than-benign explanation is that the professional consultants want centralized control, and have "sold" candidates on direct mail, impersonal phone banks, and mass media because they can make a profit. Door-to-door canvassing, on the other hand, is labor intensive, difficult to set up, relatively cheap, and decentralized.

At the end the authors make what I think is an unwarranted speculation. They predict the demise over time of the inefficient methods of increasing turnout. I doubt if we will see this soon. Insecure candidates with money want to do at least what the opposition is doing. Inefficiency may not be a major consideration if the opposition is using direct mail and conventional phone banks. In campaigns there is always the feeling that something more needs to be done, and that one thing "may make the difference." The authors are correct that most people operate on intuition, and the insecurity of a campaign exacerbates that tendency.

In sum, *Get Out the Vote!* offers an impressive compendium of scientific evidence for and against techniques for increasing turnout. The book is short on theory; the closest theoretical explanation is that personal contact is more effective than impersonal contact. But testing theory is not the purpose of this book. The results of this research will be especially useful for local candidates and managers with limited resources. For students, it offers a non-technical text on experimental research in political behavior.

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**R. Michael Alvarez and Thad E. Hall.** *Point, Click, and Vote: The Future of Internet Voting*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. viii, 204 pp. ($46.95 cloth; $18.95 paper.)

Does the way in which Americans vote have impacts on the voting process in general? Can Internet voting facilitate casting ballots for certain groups, and is it feasible to consider a gradual phasing-in of this technology to the point where it is near universal in the not too distant future? These are the central questions addressed by R. Michael Alvarez and Thad E. Hall in *Point, Click, and Vote*, a thorough analysis of recent Internet voting (quasi) experiments, and a thoughtful guide of how to move to universal Internet voting in the near future.

It is easy to start reading this book with a wary eye, alert to the seemingly prescriptive suggestions that are sure to come from the authors. Alvarez and Hall do an excellent job of anticipating the standard critiques of Internet voting, and, it turns out, are not really trying to dispel them. It is also easy to misinterpret their approach as a nearly unbridled endorsement of Internet voting, which it is not. The authors are advocating a particular perspective; they propose small trials of Internet voting to be scientifically tested and judged on their effectiveness.

Alvarez and Hall begin by reviewing the academic and policy landscape of Internet voting. This is a participant-observer's account of the process and conclusions of the California Internet Voting Task Force and the National Project on Internet Voting. The report of the former has been (incompletely) "interpreted as stating that Internet voting is not feasible for the foreseeable future" (p. 21). Although the authors claim that the task force did not properly conceptualize how Internet voting should develop, they say "the task force report has set the agenda for subsequent academic and policy discussions about Internet voting" (p. 21).

The impact of Internet voting on representation is a major issue. Alvarez and Hall contend that Internet voting will increase participation among younger voters. The digital divide (wealthier voters have more and better access to the Internet than others) is a problem that is inevitably declining. Whether or not the reader buys into either of these arguments, the authors "believe that it is wrong to conclude that experiments with Internet voting cannot be conducted until those problems are addressed" (p. 53).

Alvarez and Hall examine the potential relationship between Internet voting and its impact on American political culture, particularly in terms of the debate about direct democracy. Their conclusion is that debate "should not be conflated with discussions of Internet voting" (p. 75). This chapter of the book is the only one that lacked immediate relevance to their central focus. However, it was probably included because of a natural tendency to link these discussions.

Online security, "the 500-pound gorilla of Internet voting" (p.13), is dealt with in an interesting manner. While acknowledging that online security is an issue that still needs to be dealt with, the authors speculate that inevitable improvements in Internet security will likely make Internet voting more secure than present voting systems. They carefully spell out the critiques of three prominent computer scientists specializing in this area. One takes the least restrictive position, saying that "Internet voting can and should be used for small-scale, private elections now but be put on hold until cryptographic advances make its widespread use in public elections possible" (p. 25). The second argues "that widespread Internet voting should await the development and implementation of new computer hardware protocols that will make stronger network security possible" (p. 25), and the third asserts "that Internet voting should not be used for public elections" (p. 25). They claim that "the critiques are problematic in [that] they cannot be tested, or they are framed in such a way that they are very difficult to test" (p. 25). If these assertions are not tested, the debates remain philosophical. A middle ground between an absolute ban on Internet voting and universal implementation would provide the data needed to evaluate these arguments. Alvarez and Hall clearly distinguish between Internet voting and "touch-screen" type systems, but problems with the 2002 Florida Democratic primary and other potential problems of "touch-screen" systems enhance their argument here.

Analogous voting reforms, most specifically Oregon's vote-by-mail system, are analyzed in the context of their impact on representation and whether similar potential benefits may accrue due to Internet voting. Together with absentee voting and early voting, the apparent lesson is that "voters are seeking to participate in ways that do not involve voting at a polling place on election day" (p. 122). Along the same lines, an examination of actual recent examples of Internet voting in Alaska, Arizona, and the Federal Voting Assistance Program, constitute a major justification for the authors' prescriptions. Alaska's trial in a January 2000 Republican straw poll could not even deal with basic questions concerning technical aspects and access "because there was no scientific plan for a meaningful evaluation of the Alaska straw poll" (p. 126). If small-scale Internet voting experiments are already underway, why not conduct them with scientific rigor so that we can learn from them? The examples above were undertaken in a haphazard manner (from a scientific perspective), and therefore were useless in terms of what sort of lessons may be learned from them. Even if the objections, both from a political representation and computer science standpoint, have not been adequately dealt with in this book, by the time that the reality of Internet voting already arriving is acknowledged, the argument to be more careful in its "pilot testing" is a strong one.

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**David Lublin.** *The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change.* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004. xxi, 245 pp.

In *The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change*, David Lublin accomplishes what political scientists do best. He systematically analyzes a complex contemporary phenomenon—the rise of the two-party south—in a clear, parsimonious study that both synthesizes established scholarship and adds new insights. It is a superb book and one that can effectively be used in upper-level and graduate political science courses on political parties and on Southern politics. The book is well-written, flows easily and is packed with information. The author accomplishes this without getting distracted by the temptation to recount stories of particular elections or individual politicians. Rather, Lublin allows the reader to fill in those blanks with their own knowledge of current political events. As such, the book would be a terrific core reading in a class on Southern politics. The instructor could enjoy filling in the flamboyant details in a lecture or assigning additional works on particularly intriguing and illustrative politicians or elections.

Chapter One is a thorough compilation of the major conclusions in the political science literature on the reasons for the rise of the Republican Party in the American South. Race, and economic and social forces provide the framework in almost all of these analyses, and Lublin is smart in continuing to use this familiar framework as he surveys what we have learned about why the American South changed from Democratic dominance to a Republican advantage. This chapter alone is a good bet for assignment in graduate seminars on American politics or political parties.

Chapter Two surveys the evidence. Lublin's strength in providing a clear picture of this complex phenomenon is highlighted in this chapter. He differentiates the pace of Republican gains in federal, state and local elections, summarizes those gains well and explains the differences among them. His emphasis is on the "top-down" nature of the gains, but he also recounts gradual gains in state and local offices and gives credit to the alternative "bottom-up" realignment theories.

Chapter Three balances the emphasis on federal elections by focusing exclusively on state legislative and county elections. Lublin argues effectively that the solidity or fluidity of the Republican gains in the south is best understood by an examination of these elections. The chapter titled "Strategic Elites and Partisan Change" is his explanation of how party leaders recruit candidates as they maneuver their way through the maze of popular local incumbents, party switching and open seats.

Chapter Four examines the impact of institutions. Redistricting and election rules take center stage in this chapter. Just as political science teachers are often surprised to learn that their lectures on election rules are often the most engaging in class, readers might be surprised to learn that this topic is far from bland. The liveliness of the reading may be as much a result of the necessary emphasis on the effects of Louisiana's odd election rules as the remainder of his discussion of the subject.

Chapters Five and Six are the reasons this book will be used not just as a core teaching tool, but will likely be quoted in the literature. Lublin's work on "The Impact of Racial Context" in Chapter Five and the "Issues and White Partisanship" in Chapter Six makes important contributions to the literature on race and southern politics. In Chapter Six, he explains the impact of racial threat, black party loyalty and "submerged" white backlash in federal and state elections. He makes particularly effective use of several county-by-county maps of the entire region.

The appeal of Chapter Six can be found in this teaser on page 177: "Contrary to much past scholarship, racial issues do not appear to do a satisfactory job of explaining partisan change in the South. This failure is all the more shocking as one might expect theories that focus on the role of race in American politics to fit more closely in the South than other regions of the country." Is this an artifact of contemporary Southern sensitivity in answering attitudinal questions about racial issues? Lublin argues otherwise. He argues that the racial realignment theory is incomplete and "underestimates the continuing power of economic issues" (p. 181). Lublin also examines social issues like abortion and presents a comprehensive explanation. His conclusions are reflected in the final subtitles of this chapter: "Economic Issues Remain Paramount" (p. 207) and "Race and Social Issues Have Grown in Importance" (p. 210). He states: "The focus of much past scholarship on racial issues may be seen not so much as incorrect as overstated and ahead of its time" (p. 215). The chapter is provocative, thoughtful and well-documented and researched. It is the highlight of this very good book.

Finally, in Chapter Seven, Lublin writes on the obligatory subject, "The Future of Southern Politics. Solid Republican South? Democratic Resurgence?" Lublin does present some intriguing possible scenarios and addresses important demographic and legal trends. However, the conclusion is ambivalent: "The discussion in this chapter indicates that southern politics is likely to remain interesting" (p. 231).

*The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change* certainly deserves a prominent place in the growing bookshelf of attempts to explain the transformation of party politics in the American South. It is concise and clearly written, synthesizes the more prominent works in the field and adds some thoughtful insights of its own.

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**Lynn Musslewhite and Suzanne Jones Crawford.** *One Woman's Political Journey: Kate Barnard and Social Reform 1875-1930.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.xxi, 231 pp. ($35.95 cloth.)

Kate Barnard is not known outside Oklahoma and, besides a vague name familiarity, little known in Oklahoma. The one known fact, "In 1907 Kate Barnard was elected Oklahoma Commissioner of Charities and Corrections, the first woman in the United States elected to a major political office" (p 5) is wrong. Laura Eisenhuth was elected North Dakota Superintendent of Public Instruction in 1892. Barnard was not even the first woman elected in Oklahoma. Many held county positions in the Territorial period.

Nevertheless Kate Barnard merits investigation. Those familiar with Oklahoma political history know Kate Barnard as a visible and active political force when politics was a man's game. They also know her as an effective social reformer and a tireless advocate for Oklahoma's 'progressive' Constitution. I write 'progressive' with reservations. Almost a century of Oklahoma writing characterizes the Constitution to be 'progressive.' This claim is justified by its having an elected Commissioner of Charities and Corrections, initiative and petition, mandatory primary elections, prohibition on the Governor succeeding to a second term and numerous limitations on business. The 'progressive' claim was carved into rock when Nebraska's William Jennings Bryan called it the most progressive ever written. But Oklahoma's Constitution was not progressive and did much harm. It required segregated schools, defined races, and created the basis for Jim Crow legislation. It did not give women the vote and prohibited women from serving in a number of executive offices. It broke up and diffused executive authority through fifteen elected officials and innumerable independent boards and commissions. It required extraordinary majorities to amend. The 1940 referendum to allow a woman to run for Governor, for example, failed because over eighty percent voting on the measure would have had to vote 'yes.' The Constitution delayed or prevented progress. Responsible politics remain impossible.

The Commissioner of Charities and Corrections, designed by Barnard, was allowed to investigate and report but not hire, fire or compel. Being elected gave the commissioner independence, but it separated her from the legislature, Attorney General, Governor and boards and commissions on whom she depended for funding, staff and compliance. She could not compel anyone to do anything except allow her to inspect. When abuses were discovered she could report to the governor, but there her formal powers ended. Anyone could write the Governor. If they (or she) had influence, there might be remediation. If not, the report would be shelved. When she lost influence with the legislature there would not be funds for staff to investigate or print the report.

Within these constraints Kate Barnard found some initial success but ultimate political failure. Let me balance her strengths and weaknesses. She was a steadfast Democrat. In 1906, 1907, 1908 and 1910, during highly partisan electoral contests dominated by Democrats, she was an asset and given deference. After her re-election in 1912, however, Democrats became conservative, business-oriented, and stressed less government. The new people owed her no debt from earlier battles and her influence waned. She was thirty-two when elected in 1907. She was a woman. She had little formal education or money. She could expect success in supporting roles, and politeness, but she could not command. After 1910 she had health problems requiring extensive out-of-state recuperation. What these problems were remain unclear. "She had developed . . . type-one herpes simplex . . . by 1916 blisters had spread to larger areas of her face . . . these burning, itching sores on her face and hands tormented her, and so disfigured her that she shunned public scrutiny. . . . Barnard was convinced that this infection was the underlying cause of her poor health when just the reverse was probably the case" (p. 180-181). Musslewhite and Crawford do not tell us what she suffered from but imply mental as well as physical maladies. She could not stay on top of politics.

Her assets, stacked against her liabilities, would not mark her for political success. And yet there it was. Why? The answer is Oklahoma. No other place presented such opportunity. Oklahoma Territory was quickly settled in a series of land runs. People came in from here and there and everywhere. No positions were taken, there were no established families, no big landowners, no industrial magnates, no venerable colonels, no old school ties, no deference, no history. Everyone had a vote and a voice.

Kate Barnard entered Oklahoma Territory at sixteen. She was an undistinguished student who never went to college. It took her several tries to pass a simple teaching examination. She taught a few years, then quit to learn shorthand and typing. By twenty-seven she was working as a clerk for the Territorial Legislature. This led to her going with the Territorial exhibition at the Saint Louis Exhibition. She was twenty-nine. In Saint Louis she became familiar with poverty and social welfare ideas. She decided she would be a charity worker. Back in Oklahoma she published some of the ideas she picked up in the *Daily Oklahoman*, a Democratic newspaper, and joined the staff of a ministerial charity. She forged ties with Oklahoma's labor movement. As a Democrat and a charity worker she became the voice of children, workers and the poor in the politics leading up to the Constitutional Convention.

Her successes include ending Kansas's inhumane treatment of Oklahoma prisoners, Oklahoma having no prison of its own, a child labor law and compulsory school attendance. Her last cause, protection of Indian orphans from abuse and the massive looting of their property, was not fulfilled. She retired to private life in 1916.

Musslewhite and Crawford place Barnard's politics within the progressive movement and Oklahoma history. They do a good job explaining Barnard's problems with woman suffrage and women's groups. Unexplained are Barnard's support for racism and Jim Crow. Was she a bigot? If so why? Was she just using race for political advantage? A glimpse into Barnard's race motives would help us understand that despicable half century of Oklahoma politics.

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**Tevi Troy.** *Intellectuals and the American Presidency: Philosophers, Jesters, or Technicians?* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. viii, 254 pp. ($18.95 paper.)

The evolution and value of professional intellectuals who have served in the White House is the topic of this study. The author, Tevi Troy, is a Ph.D. with experience in journalism and government. Tapping presidential library archival sources, newspaper accounts, and scholarly books, Troy assesses the role of university and think-tank-based experts on administrations from John Kennedy to George W. Bush.

In the initial chapter, the confluence of the development of the professional intellectual and the demands of the modern presidency are examined. On the one hand, the growing affluence of the United States which the industrial revolution fostered led to the creation of professions. These job areas required education, which precipitated the need for experts. These individuals—who for the most part gravitated to the university system—have always sought both remuneration and recognition, for which government service became a natural outlet, according to the author. On the other hand, the view that experts can contribute to the solving of policy problems, growth of presidential staff, greater sensitivity of contemporary executives to various constituencies within the public, and the seemingly ever-present concern among presidents about their legacy expedited the hiring of professional intellectuals by the White House.

Troy asserts that the job of the resident "egg-head" is to be a repository for new policy ideas, to assist the president in reaching out to the intellectual community, and to help mold the thinking of the elite class who will be most likely to document the record of the administration for posterity. However, the ensuing chapters make evident that presidents regarded and utilized professional scholars in different ways, if at all.

For instance, Troy depicts the manner by which Harvard scholar Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. made his way from a Kennedy campaign supporter to a member of the youthful president's staff. Without a formal title or clearly identified role, Schlesinger assumed a multitude of tasks. He "worked on the arts, gave general political advice, helped create the White House library, provided a liaison with the mainstream intellectual community, and, most unofficially, served as a liberal lightening rod, giving cover to the rest of the staff' (p. 29).

If JFK was comfortable in the company of intellectuals, Lyndon Johnson's humble upbringing, distrust of people who did not take risks, and disdain for a purely objective approach to policy making produced ambivalent feelings about them. Still, LBJ craved information. Though Princeton historian Eric Goldman was furnished with a clear job description upon his hiring, he was sternly reminded that he was not Arthur Schlesinger's successor and that the Johnson administration would do things differently than President Kennedy. Goldman composed speeches for the First Lady and the president's daughters, offered commentary linking historical anniversaries to contemporary events, and promoted projects to build support within the intellectual community for the administration. Unfortunately for him and LBJ, political fallout from Vietnam divided scholars and adversely affected a major White House function that Goldman had planned.

The selection of Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan as a White House idea person by President Richard Nixon ostensibly meant that Nixon was willing to compromise with the liberal community. Actually, Moynihan's criticism of the intellectual community and conservative-leaning views on issues such as race and welfare policy helped to drive a wedge in the Democrat Party, something Nixon had accomplished in the 1968 presidential campaign. Nixon's abrupt departure following his resignation made it difficult for Gerald Ford to get a running start as chief executive, as he not only had to appoint his own staff but rid his administration of Nixon holdovers. Former University of Chicago Professor Robert Goldwin's appointment as White House intellectual advisor began swimmingly, but ended amid confusion about his role and responsibilities, a casualty of Ford's uncertain status and managerial style.

Jimmy Carter ran as an outsider in the 1976 presidential race, and once in office continued his anti-Washington stance. Troy notes that for "good and ill, and more than any other modern president, Carter was his own man. He lacked political and intellectual debts, but he also lacked the experiences and unifying insights such debts would have purchased" (p. 129). Carter, a Southerner, cared little for the northeastern liberal establishment and less for an ideological approach to government. Ultimately, Carter broke the tradition of having an intellectual advisor. His parochial-based staff and aversion to conceptual ideas combined to delay consideration of alternatives. The result was that Carter became the first incumbent president defeated for reelection since Herbert Hoover.

Next to Carter, Ronald Reagan was viewed as a true visionary. In truth, Reagan was a strong conservative ideologue whose acting background imbued him with outstanding communication skills. Aided by an astute, Washington-savvy staff, President Reagan became the second consecutive chief executive to forego an intellectual representative. That is because Reagan himself was regarded as the administration's best transmitter of ideas. The strategy was strikingly effective due to Reagan's ability to simplify complex problems, to be consistent in his views, to constantly reinforce his position, and to assume an unwaveringly positive demeanor which made Americans feel good about themselves. What external policy advice the Reagan team did accept came primarily from conservative think tanks rather than from universities.

President George H.W. Bush chose Roger Porter, a Harvard professor who had stints with the Ford and Reagan administrations, to serve as assistant to the president for economic and domestic policy. In this post, he was a de facto ideas generator and intellectual advisor. However, Porter had to contend with the perception among the media and the public alike that Bush lacked a vision for America. That charge was probably unfair, but nonetheless strengthened by Bush's effort to separate himself from Reagan, by the opposition-party-controlled Congress he faced, and by the 1990 budget agreement which broke Bush's no-tax-increase campaign promise. Additionally, Porter was hamstrung by White House chief of staff John Sununu and budget director Richard Darman, who routinely dominated discussion of policy.

During his first two years in office, Bill Clinton adopted the tactic of the Reagan White House. That is, Clinton's educational background, leadership of the Democratic Leadership Council, and reputation as an innovative governor prior to his election as president made him the natural intellectual leader of his own administration. But the moderate-liberal schism which highlighted the initial few years of his presidency and the disastrous 1994 midterm election—in which the Democrats lost control of both chambers of Congress—steered Clinton toward a more consistently centrist course. In 1997, Clinton added journalist Sidney Blumenthal to his administration. Blumenthal, who successfully coordinated a series of White House dinners for intellectuals, became invaluable in his role as a Clinton defender during the Lewinsky scandal and subsequent impeachment hearings.

Troy observes that George W. Bush ironically utilized academics and intellectuals more effectively than Democrat Al Gore during the 2000 presidential campaign, relied on advice from think tanks in the transition phase, and did not select a formal intellectual advisor after a year in office.

This book is unique in the manner by which it surveys presidents' utilization of intellectual advice over an extended period of contemporary American history. It may be contrasted with several studies focusing on single advisors, such as Robert Katzman's 1998 edited book, *Daniel Patrick Moynihan: The Intellectual in Public Life*, or Walter Isaacson's 1993 book, *Kissinger.*

Troy should be commended for his extensive use of White House correspondence, including letters and memoranda. Further, he synthesizes his findings into an Appendix entitled, "Guidebook for Presidents: The Dos and Don'ts of Employing Intellectuals in the White House." Finally, he includes photographs of most of the intellectuals covered in the book.

Still, there are a few shortcomings evident in the text. First, Troy actually offers a better definition and conceptualization of intellectuals in the last chapter of the book than in its initial chapter. Second, the categorization of certain presidential advisors as intellectuals leaves one wondering why others do not meet the criteria. If—as Troy depicts—some of the identified intellectuals were involved in policy making, what separates them from non-selected personnel such as Henry Kissinger (Nixon) and Zbigniew Brzezinski (Carter), who clearly possessed past academic credentials? Relatedly, Troy seems to have difficulty deciding whether others such as Sidney Blumenthal (Carter) fit the mold. Third, Troy's characterization of intellectuals as publicity-seeking, temptation-succumbing, financially-driven individuals is rather insulting. The scholarly community may have its small share of such members, but for most "opportunities for punditry" (p. 207) means performing community service and expressing one's views freely in a democracy.

The subtitle of the book emanates from a question posed by historian Theodore White as to how intellectual advisors have been used by the White House. It seems appropriate that the presidents who have served America over the last forty years could themselves be alternately described as philosophers, jesters or technicians.

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