Book Reviews

Richard L. Engstrom, Editor

Swain, Carol M. *The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge to Integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 526 pp. ($30 cloth).

This book does not purport to be "value-free social science"—Dr. Carol Swain interjects with broad license her personal experiences as a child in rural southwestern Virginia, as a college student, and as a professor at prestigious universities, as well as her interpersonal relationships with her mother, siblings, and grown children. To be sure, Swain does present theory-laden hypotheses and, on several occasions, presents empirical tests of these relationships; however, the central assertions of her work remain largely untested. The book is better termed a hybrid, presenting a discourse on current race relations with a heavy dose of "personal anecdotes" and reflections.

The launching point for this work is found in its title, The *New* White Nationalism. The book begins by delineating the differences between the older, more coarse white nationalism and the new, more palatable white nationalism of the present. The old racism called for a devilish mix of race-aggrandizing slogans, terror, white supremacy, and white-on-black retributive violence. The modus operandi of the new white nationalism, however, eschews overt violence, is less inflammatory on its surface, and embraces the style of presenting reasoned assertions girded by empirical data. Rather than the strident barking of slogans associated with the older racist right, the new white nationalists use more subtle forms of persuasion to tap into feelings of resentment and perceived threats among mainstream whites. Swain both identifies and interviews the new generation of white nationalists as well as many of the more traditional white nationalists that had at one time doffed robes and hoods, but now don starched white shirts, Eddie Bauer trousers, and fashionable ties. The new generation is better educated and refined in the delivery of the nationalist message, a message calling for the equal protection of whites and reforms in public policy relating to affirmative action and immigration.

Central to Swain's thesis is that the politics of identity and racial group consciousness, long the strategy of minorities, is also the strategy of the new white nationalists. White nationalists see group-based interests as a zero-sum proposition where gains or advantages of one group are necessarily at the expense of other groups. In efforts to heighten white consciousness and identity, white nationalists sell a sense of white victimhood by arguing that minority advancements facilitated by race-based public policies are at the

expense of whites. Increasingly, mainstream whites are beginning to recognize that, as a group, they have shared legitimate interests and that these interests ought to be both protected from erosion and, in fact, promoted. The new white nationalism, Swain contends, is a reaction to minority identity politics and race-conscious policies.

The author identifies the recent surge in white identity and consciousness as white tribalism and asserts that grappling with the forces that are driving white tribalism is essential to remedying America's racial tensions. According to Swain, the increase in white nationalism is a response to, and is being spurred by, resentment over the perception that affirmative action provides unfair advantages to protected minorities at the expense of white natives, state-sponsored policies that promote minority group identity while barring activities and speech that promote white group identity, black-on-white crime, and demographic trends that project a numeric minority status for whites in several states and many counties in the coming decades. A combination of perceptions and reality concerning these issues has contributed to growing insecurity and anxiety among whites and made attractive white nationalist organizations and venues.

The crux of Swain's work is that white concerns about immigration, crime, and affirmative action are indeed genuine. Unfortunately, she laments, the African American leadership in conjunction with the intellectual left and the mainline media encourages many to discount outright these concerns and label those expressing such concerns as racists. Swain admonishes blacks for these actions saying that they exacerbate racial polarization and contribute to the expansion of nationalist currents among mainstream whites. Rather than allowing white nationalist assertions to go unchecked, Swain recommends that blacks welcome the dialogue and critically counter the nationalists' claims. This willingness to discuss the issues that are of concern to whites will diffuse the appeal of white nationalist organizations, contribute to the depolarization of the races, and allow blacks to more clearly assess the root causes of social ills that plague the black community.

By extension, Swain reasons that a black community unwilling to allow frank discussion of issues such as the high violent crime rate among black males and soaring out-of-wedlock births is in a state of self-imposed dysfunction. The black leadership—including both political and religious officials—and black intellectuals must be willing to take ownership of these ills by first openly and honestly addressing them. The refusals of blacks to address these difficulties are facilitating two major developments: first, the lack of discussion is frustrating the development of solutions and, second, it is allowing white nationalists to present figures and arguments unchecked, essentially allowing white nationalists to frame the debate. Swain states that much of the empirical data presented in white nationalists' arguments concerning crime and immigration are in fact accurate—but these 'facts' are

often skillfully packaged, embedded within a context of racial rhetoric that generates fear among whites and, in turn, contributes to white solidarity.

Swain further chides African Americans for allowing black political and religious figures to focus energy and resources on symbolic issues, such as reparations and the placement of Confederate flags, emphasizing that such concerns either have little substance or are not politically feasible. These agenda choices squander limited political capital, are lightening rod issues that alienate allies, and deflect attention from more pressing issues such as crime and education. Swain cantilevers on sensitive ground when she states that black clergy often are bankrupt for their failure to press African Americans to take personal responsibility for their moral and spiritual lives. The weakness of black leadership, in turn, has provided a vacuum for the hate-filled rhetoric of radical black nationalists.

The author also takes to task the diversity rationale asserted by university administrators when using race as a plus factor in admission decisions. These universities, Swain argues, are inconsistent in the pursuit of diversity in that they often promote segregation on campus through separate housing, student services, student unions, and cultural meeting centers. In addition, efforts to establish parallel arrangements by white students are discouraged. These inconsistent actions within universities, it is contended, are a manifestation of a double standard, one that recognizes group-based interests of minorities while denying white interests.

Swain calls race-based affirmative action the perfect white grievance since it is at odds with our principle of individual equality, is easily framed as reverse discrimination, and may be demonstrated that many of the beneficiaries are not or have not been disadvantaged. Fears grounded in the realities, as well as the misperceptions, of affirmative action policies have fueled white nationalists' claims both that whites are under siege and that whites have reached the status of aggrieved victim. The solution, Swain proffers, is to jettison our race-conscious affirmative action policies in favor of class-based, means-tested preferences, thus embracing the principle of color-blindness and undercutting white grievances. In essence, the presumptive unconstitutionality of race as a criterion in decision-making ought to be strictly followed and race-neutrality ought to be the benchmark of all governmental decisions. There is broad consensus, argues Swain, that class-based remedies are just and, since they are consistent with the principle of equality, will help heal the rift in black-white race relations.

Over the next few decades Swain sees demographic changes linked to age and immigration increasing pressure on the college admissions process as competition expands at America's first and second tier universities. This increased competitiveness for admissions simply means more rejection for members of all groups. Rejected whites may point to the presence of race-based admissions as the sole explanation for their failure, hold suspect the

qualifications of all minority students, and harbor resentment that may manifest in racist attitudes. Essentially, Swain maintains that consideration of race in admissions is pernicious in that it leads to racially charged environments and, as such, any broader societal gains attributable to group-based preferences may be viewed as Pyrrhic Victories.

There is a sense of urgency and direness throughout this work as she portends the future of race relations. The author cautions that America is at the crossroads of an unfettered racial crisis. We can choose to embrace a more honest dialogue relating to race-related concerns of all groups, and especially that of whites. This will orient us towards the goals of true equality and color-blind justice. Or we can choose to continue to follow our current trajectory of heightened group identity and passionate tribal emotions. This path may shortly lead to a violent race war. While armed struggle is far from certain, Swain counsels that there are plenty of historical parallels for violent race struggles and Americans ought not think themselves immune from such tragedy.

Swain believes that Americans would do well to give their hearts to Christ, a recurring theme of her work. A nation of God fearing individuals who accept the teachings and love of Jesus Christ will be blessed with the wisdom and knowledge necessary to mend race-relations. The moral and religious truths that are inherent in the Bible should be the guidepost in our dealings with each other. After all, Swain argues, many of the societal advances made in our country can be ascribed to individuals or groups moved to action by biblical principles. In addition, she notes that African Americans who practice religious principles and pray regularly are most likely to escape the cycle of state dependency and the desperate conditions of drug abuse, out-of-wedlock births, and criminal activity.

The premise of Swain's work is largely dependent upon the purported sizable growth in mainstream white identification with white nationalist organizations, or at least identification with the message proffered by white nationalists. The difficulty is that she provides little empirical evidence of such growth. In a limp attempt to document such a trend, she provides the reader with the change in the raw number of hate groups nationwide over an eight-year period in the 1990s. It is questionable that these data, compiled by the author and the Southern Poverty Law Center using uncertain methods, demonstrate a trend at all. And certainly the number of hate groups is not necessarily a valid measure of the intensity of white preferences. She concedes that absent is an accurate accounting of the number of white Americans who identify, or at least sympathize, with nationalist reasoning, yet this is linchpin to her thesis.

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Green, John C. and Paul Herrnson, eds. *Responsible Partisanship?: The Evolution of American Political Parties Since 1950.* Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2002. 247 pp. ($35.00 cloth; $17.95 paper).

In December of 1946, the Executive Council of the American Political Science Association (APSA) established the Committee on Political Parties, and assigned it the task of studying the organization and operation of national parties and elections with a view towards suggesting potential reforms that would enable the parties and voters to fulfill their responsibilities more effectively. Sixteen political scientists were appointed to serve on the committee, and E.E. Schattschneider was chosen its chair. After several drafts, the committee's report, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System" was accepted by the APSA in 1950, and it was published as a supplement to the September issue of the *American Political Science Review.*

Although the Report was slightly more than 100 pages in length, it had a dramatic impact on the manner in which parties were viewed and evaluated. The Report characterized the two major parties as suffering from weak national party organizations (both inside and outside of government), poorly developed and articulated platforms, and a lack of intra-party democracy. It forcibly argued that the country needed parties that were more democratic, responsible, and effective. The Report concluded with a warning that failure to achieve these goals could result in instability in national policymaking, overextending the presidency, and party disintegration. With the year 2000 marking the 50th anniversary of the publication of "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," the editors of *Responsible Partisanship: The Evolution of American Political Parties Since 1950* focus their attention on how parties have evolved over the past 50 years and whether or not they have come to more closely resemble the type of parties called for in the Report.

After the obligatory introductory chapter which outlines the key elements of the Report and the goals and structure of the edited volume, John White and Jerome Mileur spend Chapter Two describing the political context within which the Report was written and the motivations for writing it. Particular attention is paid to the impact of the Progressive Era and the experiences of the New Deal in shaping the goals and recommendations contained in the Report.

In Chapter Three John Green and Paul Herrnson consider how party organizations evolved during the early, mid-, and late 20th century. They conclude that, in reference to the recommendations outlined in the Report, parties have experienced a growth in their institutional capacity as well as in their campaign and electoral activities. Green and Hernnson also conclude that parties have become more internally democratic, allowing for greater

representation and participation within their organizational structures.

Sandy Maisel and John Bibby consider changes in the institutional context in which parties operate in Chapter Four. They conclude that some changes, such as the lowering of legal barriers to voting, have helped move parties closer toward the Report's goal. Other changes, however, particularly those having helped to transform party-centered campaigns into candidate-centered ones, have moved parties farther away from the goals of the Report.

In Chapter Five Frank Sorauf describes the growth in financial resources that party organizations have come to enjoy. Although attempts to regulate campaign finance activities have often restricted the role of parties, they have been able to adapt and creatively make use of "soft money," "issue advocacy," and "independent expenditures," in order to play a larger role in financing campaigns. One consequence of the increased importance of parties in financing campaigns has been that, even though candidates continue to raise most of the money themselves, those elected may be more indebted to their parties and as a result more open to appeals for greater party unity. Sorauf is quick to caution, however, that financially strong parties are not necessarily more responsible ones.

David Magleby, Kelly Patterson, and James Thurber consider the impact of the rise of professional campaign consultants in Chapter Six. Using the theoretical lens of principal-agent theory they analyze data from a national survey of professional campaign consultants. Professional campaign consultants are found to possess different goals than parties, but they are also often more committed to issues and ideological positions than are party organizations.

In Chapter Seven Barbara Sinclair describes the growth in the organizational strength and importance of congressional parties. Focusing primarily on the House of Representatives, she argues that congressional parties have become better organized, more involved in agenda setting, and better able to coordinate legislative activity. The growth in the organizational strength and importance of congressional parties has resulted in an increase in party cohesion on roll-call votes. Sinclair concludes that while the growing importance of congressional parties is a step toward achieving the goals of the Report, the lack of party coordination between the executive and congressional branches continues to be a serious problem.

Charles Jones, in Chapter Eight, draws attention to the fact that the Report is somewhat vague regarding the relationship between parties and the presidency. Drawing attention to the impact of separation of powers on the dynamics of the American political system, he suggests that attention should not continue to be focused on how to make "party government" more viable, but that it should instead be focused on how a "government of parties" could be made to function more effectively.

In Chapter Nine Herbert Weisberg considers the role of voters in help-ing to create more responsible parties. He analyzes trends in party identifica-tion, party balance, and ideology found in National Election Study data from 1952-2000. Based on his findings, Weisberg optimistically concludes that voters can play a significant part in helping parties achieve the Report's goals.

Gerald Pomper and Marc Weiner's analysis of National Election Study data, in Chapter Ten, complements Weisberg's findings. They discover that during the time the Report was written partisanship was based primarily on family and other social attachments. However, by the 1990s, due to clearer differences between party elites, partisanship had become much more issue-oriented and cognitively based. Thus, Pomper and Weiner conclude that more issue-oriented, responsible voters can help contribute to more issue-oriented, responsible parties.

In Chapter Eleven Leon Epstein concludes the volume by examining the legacy of the Report on the study of parties. Clearly, the criticisms and goals of the Report helped to create a responsible parties paradigm around which scholars entering the discipline at that time focused much of their research. However, the new generation of party scholars, according to Ep-stein, would benefit from being less preoccupied with the search for respon-sible parties and should invest their energies in pursuing new theoretical and analytical models.

Two main lessons can be learned from reading *Responsible Partisan-ship*. The first of these lessons is that, in some respects, parties have come to more closely resemble those called for by the authors of the Report. This is particularly true in terms of the increased strength of the national party or-ganizations and the congressional parties. At the same time, however, some of the goals outlined in the Report have yet to be realized, and in some in-stances the parties have moved farther away from them rather than closer to them. One such case in point is how the rise of candidate-centered cam-paigns, brought about by the popularization of direct primaries, has under-mined the goals of the Report. The second lesson learned is that perhaps the most important contribution made by the authors of the Report lay not in any specific goal or recommendation but in the critical questions asked, and how those questions helped shape the research agenda of a generation of party scholars. If our knowledge of the role of political parties in the American political system is to continue to progress, the current generation of party scholars must not simply look for new answers to old questions, but rather they must ask new questions and discover new theoretical and empirical approaches to studying the dynamics of political parties. Thus, Green and Herrnson's book is a must read for anyone interested in understanding the history of party scholarship and for anyone looking to contribute to the

developing body of literature on the role of parties in the American political process.

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Garcia, John A. *Latino Politics in America: Community, Culture, and Interests*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. xix, 289 pp. ($85.00 cloth; $32.95 paper).

Professor John A. Garcia has written a much needed and versatile volume on Latino politics. It is much needed because currently there is no book of such extensive breadth on Latino politics that can be used as a comprehensive textbook on the market. This book is versatile because it is much more than simply a textbook. Garcia's work can also be used as a source to raise basic research questions and launch research efforts in much the same manner as the now classical work by Moore, Guzman, and Gebler, *The Mexican American People* (1970) was utilized by scholars for twenty years. Essentially, Professor Garcia has produced a comprehensive volume that integrates an in depth discussion of racial identity with one concerning the diverse nature of the Latino community generally and the Latino community's politics specifically.

Latino Politics begins with an analysis of the variables that both divide and unify Latinos in the United States. Professor Garcia finds that issues of identity and language can prove to be both unifying and divisive simultaneously. Some of the divisiveness, described by Garcia, is caused by the agendas of the political leadership of various Latino national origin groups while some of the divisiveness is caused by the diverse nature of the Latino community itself. The diverseness of the Latino community is vividly brought out by Garcia in the first half of *Latino Politics* where he paints demographic portraits of the many national origin groups that comprise the national Latino community. It quickly becomes evident that this rapidly growing community is unified by language and some socio-historical-cultural similarities while at the same time the Latino community is divided by socio-historical-cultural differences that have arisen for the different histories of the native countries from which Latinos have descended. In the end, it is the differences that make political unity difficult for the Latino community to achieve.

Although the first half of this volume is dedicated to a thorough discussion of the social characteristics of Latinos focusing on issues of cultural identification and demographic trends, the discussion begins to center on the

all important task of defining Latinos as a "community of interest." Most importantly, Professor Garcia defines "community of interests" in such a way as to make this concept useful in the public policy arena. On one level, "communities of interest" is a term that must be operationalized for the legislative redistricting processes in every state of the union because this legally defines the basis for representation. On another level, a definition for "communities of interest" lays the foundation for baseline data that underscore the rationale for budgetary decisions in various public policy realms.

Although the author does not create two distinct sections of this text, separating the descriptive information from the policy study areas, they are set apart in specific chapters. The early part of Professor Garcia's work, the first eight chapters, provides the reader with a wealth of data concerning the Latino community. Information is provided that includes demographics on every Latino subgroup together with a discussion of the difficulties involved in grouping some of the subnational groups together. For instance, grouping Argentines and Brazilians in the simplistic category of "South Americans" makes no sense from a linguistic and historical perspective yet one is forced to do so by the fact that in the United States they represent very small percentages of the overall Latino community. Garcia points out that the distinctiveness of many Latino subgroups has simply been ignored or overlooked by earlier scholars. As a matter of fact the last attempt at developing a comprehensive understanding of the national Latino community, the Latino National Political Survey (1993), excluded all Latino groups with the exception of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans.

Other chapters include information on the attitudes and opinions of Latinos on various political, social and economic issues and the political participation and partisan preferences of Latinos. After Professor Garcia presents his "profile" of the Latino community he sets forth four chapters focusing on various public policy areas important to the Latino community. These chapters cover topics such as Immigration Reform and Rights, Education, Voting Rights, and the "Building of Political Alliances." Garcia concludes his book with a chapter entitled "The Latino Community: Beyond Recognition Politics," in which he speaks to the political implications of the growing Latino community, issues of pan-ethnicity, and presents various scenarios as to how the Latino community may develop politically in the future. An interesting and attractive feature of this volume is the biographical sketches of Latino leaders strategically placed throughout the body of the work.

Professor Garcia's discussion of pan-ethnicity is particularly timely in that one of the "burning issues" among Latino academics is whether there really is a national Latino community? Garcia does not shy away from this sensitive issue and answers emphatically in the affirmative. He also makes it

quite clear, however, that although he feels that a "pan-Latino" identity exists, the practical implications of this identity presents difficulties for organizing politically. The principle reason is that each Latino national origin group possesses a unique ideology that appears to change or evolve from one generation to another. For instance, it is clear that each newer generation of Cubans appears to be changing from being staunchly conservative ideologically to being more moderate. As a result, the political differences the older generation of Cubans may have had with other Latino groups may be disappearing slowly. What this means for the fusion of the Cubans with the other Latino national origin groups can only be answered by what happens in the future political world. Nevertheless, Professor Garcia concludes that Latino Politics will evolve into a matrix of activism that at times will include the development of alliances with ideologically compatible ethnic, racial, or interest groups, or Latinos may "go-it-alone" on some issues and in some electoral arenas, or they may simply rely on age-old pressure or interest group tactics, or their participation may prove to be a combination of all three of these techniques. Whatever, the political future will be for Latinos two things are abundantly clear in Garcia's work. First, Latinos have become and will continue to be the most important racial or ethnic group in American politics, and second, this cannot be accomplished without the achievement of a sense of community among all Latino groups.

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Shapiro, Ian. *The Moral Foundations of Politics*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. xii, 289 pp. ($25.00 cloth).

In this, Ian Shapiro's most recent book, the Yale political theorist and author of *Democratic Justice* (2001), grapples with an enduring question of political thought: "When do governments merit our allegiance, and when should they be denied it?" (p. 1). In an attempt to answer this question an analysis of the utilitarian, Marxist, social contract, anti-Enlightenment, and democratic traditions of political thought is conducted, and constitutes the core of this book. Happily, Shapiro's mastery of the canonical texts of western political theory enables him to render succinct yet comprehensive accounts of each tradition. His admittedly tenuous solution to the problem of political legitimacy, however, may leave some readers dissatisfied.

In chapter one Shapiro frames later chapters by describing the main tenants of Enlightenment thought, namely "faith in the power of human reason to understand the true nature of our circumstances and ourselves" and "human improvement measured by the yardstick of individual rights . . ."

(p. 8). Understanding Enlightenment thought is necessary, Shapiro suggests, because the history of "Enlightenment politics" is one of potential "*tension* between science and individual rights" (p. 16, emphasis added). Science is deterministic. Human freedom—the protection of which is the point of individual rights—often appears to be constrained by the "laws" that science discovers and governments employ. Which takes priority? To what extent may people "reject what science reveals on the basis of their own convictions . . . ?" (p. 17). How effectively various traditions of political thought have mitigated this tension is the focus of the chapters that follow.

Chapters two and three describe utilitarian thought. In classical utilitarian thought political legitimacy is equated with the government's ability to maximize the pleasures and minimize the pains of the governed. Thus, Jeremy Bentham argued that there "was a robust role for government in computing people's utilitarian interest and enacting policies to further them" (p. 23). Ironically, the "scientific" character of the utilitarian calculus presents a potential conflict with individual freedom and rights. According to Shapiro, "Bentham affirms the Enlightenment aspiration to achieve freedom, even as he embeds it in a thoroughly determinist science" (p. 36). Later "mature" utilitarian thinkers attempted to "synthesize rights and utility." But they are unable to reconcile science and individual rights, and provide no solid basis for political legitimacy.

In chapter four Shapiro asserts that Marx was essentially an advocate for individual rights. Shapiro presents evidence for this, citing Marx's critique of the state's underwriting of the capitalist system's exploitation of the worker, and transgression of individual rights. A state that sanctions such injustice cannot be legitimate. Yet Marx's "scientific" solution—communism—is not a sufficient solution to contemporary questions of political legitimacy.

Chapter five deals with the social contract tradition, specifically Rawls. Shapiro argues that the social contract tradition *is* useful because it offers "hypothetical thought experiments" which are "exactly what we are seeking in this book: a yardstick for assessing the legitimacy of actual political regimes" (p. 115). Yet social contract theorists like Rawls ultimately fall short because they depend upon an "overlapping consensus" on those Rawlsian principles of fairness—an assumption that may be overly presumptuous.

Chapter six is an account of anti-Enlightenment thought. What characterizes this mindset is a lack of faith in science to engender progress. Instead, these thinkers affirm "preexisting limits and embrace political arrangements and patterns of conduct that have been inherited over generations, even centuries" (p. 151). On one side of the anti-Enlightenment spectrum is Edmund Burke, who is critical of the "early Enlightenment" and its faith is scientific progress. On the other are more recent postmodernists, Richard

Rorty for example, who, criticizing the "mature Enlightenment," "conflates the abandonment of the search for foundational certainty with the abandonment of the scientific outlook *tout court*" (p. 157). The problem of anti-Enlightenment thought, according to Shapiro, is that "without a commitment to some version of the possibility of genuine knowledge about politics, there is no chance of developing satisfying criteria for assessing political legitimacy" (p. 169). Furthermore, this tradition of the protection of individual rights is often deemed subordinate to the collective good of the community. Again, lacking the Enlightenment emphasis on science and individual rights, the possibility of political legitimacy is dubious.

In chapter seven Shapiro makes his argument for democracy. He claims that democracy most successfully relaxes—but does not resolve—the tension inherent in Enlightenment thought between science and individual rights. He states, "Appropriately construed and institutionalized, democracy offers the best hope that the truth will prevail in the political arena over time, that human rights will be respected, and that those elements of traditions and constitutive cultures meriting preservation will be preserved" (p. 192). Against the Platonic assertion that democracy is a threat to "Truth," Shapiro agrees with Dewey that "truth" is not metaphysical, and is compatible with, not inimical to, democracy. Democracy creates the context in which "truth-telling" and "mechanisms to expose corruption and dishonesty" are possible, and are "integral to political legitimacy" (p. 201-02). Shapiro also counters arguments made by Tocqueville, Mill, Madison, and modern social choice theorists "that democracy is hostile to individual rights" (p. 207). Despite the claims of social choice theorists, Shapiro argues that while democracy is susceptible to these threats, history demonstrates that a democratic regime will accommodate the malleable nature of truth, while protecting individual rights in ways other traditions do not. Democracy is not perfect, yet it may be the best we can hope for.

Shapiro's account of Enlightenment philosophy may be deconstructed, undermining his defense of democracy. Marx valuing "bourgeois" individual rights is questionable. While Shapiro's theoretical defense of democracy is sound, it may not be enough to persuade empirically minded skeptics.

The Moral Foundations of Politics will be of special interest to scholars of democratic theory—especially those seeking to defend democracy against postmodern critics. It would serve as a fine introductory text in a course addressing questions of political legitimacy, democracy, and related topics. Yet, Shapiro's account of the virtues of the democratic tradition and the failings of the other traditions are provocative enough to prompt seasoned scholars to debate the merits of the books' thesis.

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Suri, Jeremi. *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2003. 355 pp. ($29.95, cloth).

On 25 May 1961 President John F. Kennedy pledged to set a man on the moon within the decade. This public promise embodied the hopes of a generation that science and technology would liberate human societies from the constraints of geography, poverty, and ignorance. At the same time, however, enormous political changes in the international system threatened to destabilize and possibly destroy all that had been rebuilt following World War II. Not only did the U.S. and the Soviet Union square off over nuclear missiles in Cuba, but wars in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa, coupled with colonial independence movements, all contributed to a growing sense of global disruption. It is this tumultuous environment of the 1960s that provides the setting for Jeremi Suri's fresh and compelling book exploring the emergence of détente. While orthodox explanations of détente point towards the escalating costs of military rivalry, Suri insists that domestic political unrest in the United States, Europe, China, and the Soviet Union propelled leaders to seek mutual compromise to preserve the political status quo. That is, in order to quell internal disorder, political elites accepted an international political order that was far from ideal. With major power restraint now institutionalized, elites were free to turn their attention to their own societies and avert radical political transformation.

For Suri, nuclear competition provided the impetus for domestic unrest. The rivalry not only transferred resources away from social welfare, but the growing destructiveness of these weapons meant that any confrontation between the superpowers might result in a global catastrophe. As the enmity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union intensified, frustration with the structure and direction of international politics began to grow. Leaders in West Germany and France increasingly distrusted American hegemony, and Beijing sought independence from Moscow's control. Moreover, the strategic settlement negotiated during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Suri maintains, only deepened dissatisfaction with superpower management of the international system. Stability, non-aggression, and status quo preservation now characterized superpower relations. The promises of Kennedy, Khrushchev, De Gaulle, and Mao went largely unfulfilled as political, military, and ideological divisions among these major states necessitated restraint and compromise, rather than revolutionary change.

As political rhetoric collided with superpower rivalry, youthful disenchantment reached the boiling point. Suri maintains that the confluence of a postwar baby boom, increased access to higher education, and a language of dissent, offered by men such as Martin Luther King, Herbert Marcuse, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and John Kenneth Galbraith, helped propel the

dissident and revolutionary movements of the 1960s. Student groups increasingly revolted, violently at times, against the political systems and political leaders that had promised much and delivered little. In Washington, D.C., West Berlin, Paris, Prague, and elsewhere police and military units battled with student protesters who sought to tear down the edifices of political power. According to Suri, domestic unrest that erupted in many countries during the 1960s produced the détente policy of the Nixon Administration in the early 1970s. While protesters may have welcomed détente if accompanied with progressive societal change, ultimately the policy merely preserved international stability so that elites could thwart political and social change domestically. Suri concludes that cynicism reflected in public views towards politics and policymakers today stems in part from elite failure to enact real political and social reforms during détente.

Suri clearly opts for breadth over depth in detailing the rise of superpower accommodation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Chapter 3, for example, illustrates the emergence of dissident voices in the U.S., Soviet Union, and China during the 1960s. But events such as the civil rights movement in the United States, the gulag system in Russia, and the Cultural Revolution in China are addressed only briefly, and accompanied with a discussion of literary works by Michael Harrington, William F. Buckley, Jr., Ivan Turgenev, and Wu Han. Clearly a single chapter cannot do justice to these important events nor the reflective arguments of these authors. However, despite the extensive historical, cultural, and literary ground covered in this chapter, Suri does skillfully illustrate the global nature of frustration, disillusionment, and political stagnation that pervaded the U.S., U.S.S.R., and the P.R.C. at this time.

Suri is less skillful, however, connecting U.S. intervention in S.E. Asia to a broader theoretical model of liberal foreign policy decision-making. While the "liberal peace" constitutes only the first three paragraphs of a chapter devoted to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the domestic opposition that emerged as a result, greater nuance than Suri acknowledges clearly characterizes democratic decision-making. Not only do democratic norms of non-violent dispute settlement fail to explain fully the lack of violent conflict between democratic polities as Suri maintains, but mounting empirical evidence indicates that democratic states do not "seek conflict with illiberal adversaries," but in fact are frequently targeted by non-democratic states. While President Johnson may have expressed a desire to democratize and develop South Vietnam, concerns over power, influence, and reputation were much more critical to the U.S. intervention.

As with any far-reaching work, Suri's manuscript is not without its omissions. Scholars of U.S. political history will question the relative importance of student protest groups compared with opposition that emerged in

elite circles. Suri ignores important membership changes within Congress that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s that increased the number of liberal northern Democrats in both the House and Senate. Elite consensus on U.S. containment policy was to a great extent a consequence of institutional rules that shielded presidents from congressional opposition and norms of deference that empowered committee chairmen. Since these features of the congressional environment inhibited new members from affecting real change, new rules and norms were drafted so Congress could more easily and effectively challenge presidential policies. In 1970, for example, Congress forced the Nixon Administration to remove any and all ground forces in Cambodia and repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Further, in 1973 Congress passed over Nixon's veto the War Powers Resolution. While scholars disagree on whether the presidency has been significantly weakened as a result, its passage clearly put the president on notice that Congress was watching. Arguably, elite opposition was more critical to superpower accommodation that student protests.

Scholars of international relations also would disagree on the extent of real change in superpower relations that resulted from détente. While the Nixon Administration eventually pulled troops out of South Vietnam, this occurred only after escalation into Laos and Cambodia failed to break the back of North Vietnamese resistance. Only congressional opposition and presidential weakness due to Watergate ultimately forced a real change in Vietnam policy. Further, the 1973 Yom Kippur War nearly set off a superpower confrontation as the Soviets contemplated placing troops on the ground in the Middle East. One might also quibble with Suri's contention that the development of nuclear weapons by the major powers stabilized international politics. By themselves, nuclear weapons did not even stabilize the U.S.-U.S.S.R rivalry. In fact, the development of these weapons probably increased superpower apprehension until secure second-strike systems were built. Although second-strike capabilities may have reduced fears in Moscow and Washington of nuclear preemption, competition between the superpowers continued unabated in many different forms and in many different places. Indeed, for many countries the Cold War did not represent a long peace.

Despite these oversights, Suri offers a novel and compelling account of great power relations during a turbulent period of history. His work clearly is an important supplement to the burgeoning literature in international relations on two-level games and the impact domestic political processes and public opinion have on foreign policy decision-making.

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Harris, Michael and Rhonda Kinney, eds. *Innovation and Entrepreneur-*
ship in State and Local Governments. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2003. 212 pp. ($70.00 cloth).

Today most students of public policy observe that policy making is
incremental. Decision-makers at various governmental levels are more likely
to add a marginal change to the level of an ongoing program, rather than
consider all possible alternatives to maximize policy impact. However,
Michael Harris and Rhonda Kinney, the editors of *Innovation and Entrepre-*
neurship in State and Local Governments, contend that governments often
seek and achieve a policy change under particular circumstances. Harris and
Kinney propose hypotheses about when policy changes occur, and the con-
tributors of six chapters in the book provide case studies that examine the
editors' hypotheses.

As for policy change, Harris and Kinney use the term "policy innova-
tion." In the book, therefore, "innovation" does not mean any improvement
in policy output or efficiency. Rather, the term implies policy change or
difference which "requires the perception of newness by the adopter" (7).
The editors propose a model that suggests that economic, demographic,
partisan, institutional, public opinion, and interest group factors create
"policy entrepreneurs." Policy entrepreneurs are the individuals who influ-
ence government to initiate a dynamic policy change.

In Chapter 2 Michael K. McLendon examines policy changes in higher
education in Hawaii and Illinois during the 1990s. McLendon finds that eco-
nomic stagnation and high levels of inter-party competition increase office
holders' "electoral insecurity" (52), which causes a decentralization of the
higher education system. As for policy entrepreneurs, McLendon observes
that university presidents, governors, and lieutenant governors are influential
in defining the issue and mobilizing interest.

In Chapter 3 Richard E. Chard examines various influences on state
adoptions of managed care for Medicaid by using a cross-sectional time
series analysis covering from 1982 to 1996. Chard finds that the variables of
the number of Medicaid recipients, the level of Medicaid expenses, and the
presence of neighboring states with a managed care system, are significant.
The first two variables suggest that the budgetary pressure causes a policy
change while the latter implies an influence of regional policy diffusion.

In Chapter 4 Lawrence J. Grossback studies the activity of the Board of
Government Innovation and Cooperation (BGIC) in Minnesota. The BGIC
was created with a recommendation by the Citizen's League, a prominent
policy organization. The BGIC has the authority to grant waivers and
exemptions from various state mandates when local governments have a
plan to achieve a policy program with a better outcome. Grossback observes

that a frequent lack of agreement on problem definition between the state legislature and local governments has produced less comprehensive policies. Also, Grossback finds that the strong economy in the 1990s reduced fiscal stress on local governments, and hence fewer requests for waivers from state mandates.

In Chapter 5 Robert Stoker examines the administration of empowerment zones in Baltimore, Maryland, by Empowerment Baltimore Management Corporation (EBMC), a quasi-public corporation. While the EBMC was to attract new businesses and develop the workforce, Stoker finds that community capacity constrained the EBMC's initiative. He observes that the limited financial resources of the program obstructed policy implementation.

Chapter 6 by Marilyn Klotz examines various cases of public-private collaboration in the programs of poverty alleviation at the local level in a Midwestern state. In Chapter 7 Douglas Ihrke and Richard Proctor focus on policy evaluation. Ihrke and Proctor study the influence of municipal leadership and local administrative board behavior on the "perception" of policy reforms by municipal department heads in Wisconsin municipalities. They observe substantial influence of municipal leadership credibility and some impact of policy board conflict and board-administration relations.

Most chapters in the book are case study oriented and a few chapters provide mere descriptions and historical developments of policy programs without a theoretical articulation. Although the editors propose hypothetical influences of numerous factors on policy innovation, the variables of demographics, partisanship, and public opinion are not fully examined by the contributors. Next, the definition of policy innovation as policy change becomes unclear in a few chapters. Chapter 5 focuses on effectiveness of the economic development program, and Chapter 7 studies the perceived policy success. Also, this definition of policy innovation as policy change is incompatible with the editors' assertion that policy innovation could occur at various stages of the policy process model. Ironically, the book demonstrates that policy changes most often occur at the agenda-setting stage when several actors seek a change in policy. A few chapters in this book examine the implementation stage. However, they study the "administrative success" of policy programs as policy innovation.

Most crucially, the book lacks a full study of the activities by policy entrepreneurs. In some chapters it is unclear who the policy entrepreneurs are, what they do, and their impact. The editors' model does not fully distinguish policy entrepreneurship from adoption of a differential policy. In other words, the model assumes that entrepreneurs, who appear because of various factors, always result in policy changes. Nonetheless, entrepreneurs' efforts to influence government to change policy may not always succeed. The book does not examine political dynamics when entrepreneurs are

successful, how they interact with government, and whether they are governmental officials or interest groups, on the policy adoption stage.

However, the major contribution of this book is its exhibition of the robustness of the influence of the economic and financial factors on policy change. Several chapters witness that economic downturns and governmental financial problems force the government to adopt a decentralized structure in policy programs. During the implementation stage, in contrast, sufficient administrative financial resources are important to carry the innovative programs. Thus, the book shows a dilemma of policy innovation at times of economic downturn. Economic difficulty motivates policy change, but it obstructs a swift implementation of innovative programs.

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Holmes, Jennifer S., ed. *New Approaches to Comparative Politics: Insights from Political Theory.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. 173 pp. ($55.00 cloth).

Taken as a whole this collection of essays is a self-conscious effort to fulfill the call of American political science's own Perestroika movement for "problem-driven research with a substantive focus, methodological pluralism, and an interdisciplinary approach" (Jennifer S. Holmes, p. 142). In addition to the theoretical-empirical divide in the discipline, the book highlights the divisions between quantitative and qualitative work, and work with a broad (large *n*) scope and area-specific (small *n*) work. No individual essay can do much to address all of these concerns, but this book's eclecticism offers a model response to this situation. All the essays have both explicitly theoretical and empirical aspects. There are three essays focusing on a single case, while three use multiple cases to make comparative points. Four of the essays offer qualitative analysis of their subjects, while two make use of quantitative methods. The argument for the reconciliation of political theory and comparative politics (and political science at large) is clinched in the end by the way the essays demonstrate how to use political theory to enhance the scientific study of politics.

In the first essay of the book, "The Reconciliation of Political Theory and Comparative Politics," Michaelle Browers asks whether the traditional division of labor between empirical political analysts and political theorists is still serving the needs of the discipline. She suggests that some responsibility for overcoming the alienation of political theory from the rest of political science rests with political theorists who have shown less interest in the

problems with which comparativists are engaged. Browers offers the common interest of students of politics of all sorts in democracy and democratization as an occasion for the necessary reconciliation.

The following three essays begin with the observation that political theories, in the forms of normative commitments and conceptual frameworks, inform the practice of politics. For this reason, if political science is to gain a proper understanding of political phenomena, it must also understand theory in its practical role. Ann Davies, in "Modernity and the State: Enlightenment, Liberalism, and Political Development in the United States," argues that Enlightenment thought influenced the American Founding, particularly in the justification of a powerful state. Zeric Kay Smith, in "Relationships Between Poverty Reduction Approaches and Donor Support for Democracy: The Case of Mali," argues that the efforts in the international development community have been aimed at either improving the situation of the poor, or structural and institutional reform, depending on whether an aid agency adopts a substantive or proceduralist conception of democracy. John Peeler, in "Citizenship and Difference in Latin American Indigenous Politics: Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics," argues that indigenous popular movements in Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Peru are focused on class issues or cultural identity because of their commitments to conceptions of economic equality and the recognition of difference. Peeler goes on to suggest that a shift in ideals will be necessary to turn these movements towards effective electoral mobilization and the attainment of real political power. In all of these cases theoretical debates are seen to affect political processes and outcomes.

The last three essays take a traditional form of the political science essay, in which a novel theory is presented, operationalized, and tested empirically, to see what new illumination it may bring. In these cases, however, the sources of these novel theories are explicitly found in works of traditional and contemporary political theory, which are not themselves empirical in nature. In "Plan Columbia, Violence, and Citizen Support in Columbia," Jennifer S. Holmes adopts a theory of the necessary functions of the state from Aristotle, and uses it to measure the effects of drug violence and the war on drugs on citizens' confidence in the state's ability to provide security and integration. This Aristotelian theory illuminates the causes of the democratic instability observable in Columbia. In "The Kantian Peace Through a Radical Theoretical Lens," Kirk Bowman and Seán Patrick Eudaily question the findings of the democratic peace scholarship using the contemporary theories of Richard K. Ashley, Michel Foucault, and Karl Kautsky. They offer alternatives to the democratic peace hypothesis—first, that it is advanced capitalist nations that do not fight each other, and second, that Latin American countries do not fight each other because of the dynamics of their

domestic conflicts between democracy and militarization. Robert A. Kahn, in "Imagining Legal Fairness: A Comparative Perspective," uses competing political theories of the law to develop a range of competing conceptions of legal fairness. By examining the relationship between norms of free speech and criminal procedures, he is able to identify various conceptions of legal fairness at work in Germany, France, Canada, and the United States.

The effect of this book is to encourage political theorists to be more empirically engaged, and to encourage political scientists (comparativists and others) to be more theoretically engaged. The hope of these authors, justified by the work presented in this volume, is that methodological pluralism will lead to real innovations in the understanding of politics. The hope that political theory will once again find a real home in political science is also justified by the truth of the general dictum that while theories without data are empty, observations without theories are blind. Thus, we should expect that the light of science will shine brightest in those places where rich and profuse theory meets an abundance of data.

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