Explaining Change in Communist Successor Parties: Political Environment versus Party Organization?

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The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the transformation of the formerly dominant communist parties has provided an opportunity to test some of the major propositions regarding party change. This article focuses on the relationship between external and internal factors, and evolution of the communist successor parties in seventy-nine countries across the world. The most important factor explaining the electoral success of the communist successor parties is the *degree of organization,* a finding that provides broader support for the literature arguing that communist successor party electoral performance is primarily a result of the organizational features these parties inherited from the past.

Introduction

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the transformation of the formerly dominant communist parties provides an opportunity to test some of the major propositions regarding party change. In the general literature on political parties there has been a considerable amount of interest in party identity change, or the "face" which the party presents to the electorate (Budge et al. 1987; Janda et al. 1995). By and large, this literature suggests that the principal factors that explain party identity change are external to the party. In other words party change "does not 'just happen'" (Harmel and Janda 1994, 261), but results from changes in the political environment or from the electoral failures of the party.

This article focuses on the relationship between external and internal factors, and the evolution of the communist successor parties. The "communist successor" parties are those identified as the organizational descendants of the parties that had been officially recognized by the Soviet Union in 1988 as the principal "communist party." These parties were those that have as "their legacy the former communists" property, membership, political elite or a combination of these, or else are "legal successors" to the communist party (Bozoki 1997, 57; for a more extensive discussion of this definition see Ishiyama 1995).[1]

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What affects whether these parties changed their identities? Although there have been several recent works that have investigated the development of the communist successor parties, these works have tended to either focus on the extent to which the successor parties have been politically successful (Ishiyama 1997; Orenstein 1998) or how they have adapted organizationally since the collapse of communism as a political system (Ishiyama 1999b; 1995; Mahr and Nagle 1995; Bozoki 1997; Urban and Solovei 1997). Some studies have investigated identity change, but these have been conducted mainly at the level of individual parties or using comparative studies involving a small number of cases (Ziblatt 1998; Grzymala-Busse 1999)

Unlike previous comparative studies of the evolution of the communist successor parties (Ishiyama 1997; Orenstein, 1998), this article seeks to test theories of successor party adaptation in a broader way. I investigate the factors affecting identity change in light of the evidence from a sample of seventy-nine communist successor parties. Several criteria were used to construct the sample of successor parties. First, the parties must have been legal and in existence by the time of the first competitive legislative election after January 1, 1990. Second, there must have been at least one free, open and competitive legislative election between the beginning of 1990 and October 1998. Third, the country's political system must have remained consistently and relatively democratic (meaning a consistent score of four or above on the widely used Freedom House Index) between January 1992 (i.e., following the collapse of the USSR) and October 1998. After taking these criteria into account, data were collected on a sample of 79 individual successor parties.[2] The list of communist parties and their corresponding successor parties are identified in the Appendix.

Two questions guide this inquiry. First, what explains the *degree* to which the communist successor parties have changed, particularly in terms of their identity? Second, do changes in the party's identity affect the degree of electoral success a party enjoys following the change in identity? In other words, do parties that changed their identities generally perform better electorally than parties that do not change their identities?

Literature

Environmental Factors Affecting Party Identity Change

What causes party identity change? On the one hand, party identity change can be seen as a result of environmental influences. For instance, Janda (1990), Harmel and Janda (1994), and Janda, et al. (1995), have argued that party identity change occurs as the result of parties reacting to changes in the political environment. From this perspective, parties are

assumed to be conservative organizations that are unlikely to change unless forced (Harmel and Janda 1994). Thus, party change is viewed as a rational and purposeful move by the party in response to specific stimuli.

For Janda one of the most important influences that necessitate party change is extreme competition that results in poor electoral performance (1990). Janda et al. (1995) tested the hypothesis that parties will change only if they do poorly in elections. The authors defined five different kinds of elections as perceived by the party's activists: calamitous, disappointing, tolerable, gratifying and triumphal (Janda et al. 1995). They found that generally calamitous or disappointing elections were associated with the greatest degree of party identity, indicating that parties only try to change their identities when voters reject the policy face they had presented in the previous election.

On the other hand, some scholars have suggested that the greater external challenges a political organization faces, the more likely the followers of that organization will seek to reaffirm its ideological purity (Stewart 1991). As the party faces greater external challenges there is greater pressure to reaffirm the movement's identity, because as Richard Gregg (1971, 74) argues there is a need for followers for "psychological refurbishing and affirmation." This usually involves a greater attempt to identify the members of the movement as being different from others. This is a way, as Gregg (1971, 76) notes, to establish selfhood by "identifying against another" establishing one's identity through contrast. Thus the greater the external competition, the more likely the party will seek to maintain its ideological roots (see also Breuning and Ishiyama 1998; Stewart 1991). Kitschelt (1995, 455) suggests that repressive communist regimes were "able to entrench" themselves, and thus effectively preclude the emergence of the challenge of "an independent structure of intellectuals or middle-class professionals." This implies that a communist successor party is successful not because of the party's organizational characteristics, but because its opponents are only weak and disorganized (Kitschelt 1995, 455).

In addition to the performance of rivals, another feature of the structure of competition is the degree to which the party system as a whole is "fragmented" or "fractionalized." The more fractionalized a party system, the more likely that the successor party might be able to win seats in the legislature. This would especially true where electoral thresholds are low (such as in some proportional representation electoral systems).

Organizational Legacies

Factors internal to the party may also affect the party's ability to change its identity. Epstein (1968) and Panebianco (1988) have noted that different kinds of parties are more likely to adapt then others. From this

perspective parties that are organized along 'mass' (programmatic) lines tend to be less able to change than are parties that are organized primarily to win election (or what Duverger referred to as 'cadre' parties). This is because mass parties place greater internal constraints placed on leaders in their ability to react to incentives generated by a political environment (Ishiyama and Velten 1998). Indeed, one can imagine the situation where external incentives to moderate a party's political position may have little effect on a party leadership whose range of movement is constrained by the presence of a significant number of 'hardliners' in the ranks of the organization.

Several scholars of party organizations have contended that the organizational features of parties impact their ability to new political circumstances. Much of this work is based on the concept of *organizational institutionalization* (Huntington 1965). Huntington proposed to measure the level of institutionalization for a particular organization "by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence" (1965, 394). Although useful, Janda (1980, 19) notes that Huntington's approach to measuring the degree of institutionalization fails to recognize party organizations that are clearly institutionalized. For instance he notes "a party can be highly institutionalized but lack the independence of other groups (Huntington's 'autonomy')—as the Labour Party in Great Britain." Rather, for Janda an institutionalized party is "one that is reified in the public mind so that 'the party' exists apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behavior valued by those who identify with it" (1980, 19).

Design and Methodology

Dependent Variables: Party Name Change and Current Position on Marxism-Leninism

The above literature suggests several variables that will be included in this study. First, turning to the dependent variables, identity change is measured by whether or not the party changed its name after the first election following the collapse of communist systems in Eastern Europe in 1990 and 1991. A change in name would signify the party's attempt at identifying itself with another constituency, and hence is an indicator as to the extent to which the party seeks to accommodate with new political circumstances. The focus here, however, is only on a complete change in the party's name as opposed to only a *minor* change.

In addition to the name change of the party, a second indicator of change in identity (and hence the willingness to adapt to new political circumstances) is the successor party's attitude vis-à-vis Marxism-Leninism. Each party was coded in terms of whether or not the party had explicitly disavowed Marxism-Leninism in its program between 1990 and 1998, where

0 was assigned to "had not rejected Marxism-Leninism" and 1 assigned to "had rejected Marxism- Leninism."

Independent Variables: Party Competition

As mentioned above, the literature suggests that the extent to which parties seek to change their political identities is a function of the degree of competition the party faces. "Competition" was measured in two ways. First, I examine the strength of "left wing competition." Although the strength of left-wing competition has been cited as an important variable affecting the performance of the communist successor parties (Waller 1995; Kopecky 1995; Ishiyama 1995) the concept "left wing," or the entire political spectrum in post-communist politics for that matter, is notoriously difficult to measure. The issue, however, is not to provide indisputable criteria for categorizing a "socialist" from a "non-socialist" party, but to identify those parties which might compete with the communist successor parties for the same constituencies on the ideological spectrum. To address the measurement of the strength of the left wing competition facing the successor parties, two criteria were used. First, a left wing competitor must have won seats in the most recent legislative election. Second, the party must tend to compete for the same constituencies as the communist successor parties. Whether the party competed for the same niche on the ideological spectrum was discerned by identifying the largest parties which won seats and labeled themselves as either communist, socialist or social democratic and determining the average percentage of seats held by the largest leftist competitors in the lower house of parliament from 1990 to 1998.

To measure the degree of fractionalization in a party system I employ the commonly used Rae's Index of Fractionalization (Rae 1967). The measure is calculated based upon the share of seats each party receives and is based upon the following formula:

$$FRACTION = 1-\Sigma p_i^2$$

where p_i = fractional share of the I-th component (meaning the seat shares for each party) and Σ = the summation overall squared components. The value ranges from 0 to 1. If all the components have extremely small seat shares the FRACTION tends toward 1; at the other extreme, if one party receives all of the seats then the value tends toward 0.

Organizational Institutionalization

Based upon both Janda and Huntington, I employ four measures of institutionalization: *Name Changes prior to 1989, Average Leadership Duration in Old Party, Degree of Organization, and Occurrence of*

Organizational Splits Prior to 1989. As Janda notes, party name changes are often made to establish new links with the electorate, as well resulting in confusion about the party's identity within the citizenry as a whole. Thus the magnitude and frequency of name changes relates to the degree of institutionalization of the party organization; the greater the frequency and magnitude of changes indicates less institutionalization.

In keeping with Janda's measure, the magnitude of name changes was assessed in terms of minor and major changes. A minor change was defined as one that involves the repetition of one or more terms (not including prepositions) in both the previous name and the changed name. A complete change involved the repetition of no terms. The measure of magnitude was combined with the frequency of name changes to produce the measure *Name changes prior to 1989.* This variable was coded as an ordinal measure ranging from 0 to three where 0 indicated "no name changes," 1 indicated "one minor change," 2 indicated "two or more minor changes or one complete change," and 3 indicated "more than one compete change, including one minor and one complete" (Janda 1980, 22).

Another measure of institutionalization that relates to both Janda and Huntington is the "generational age" of the party organization. This measure assumes that the lack of leadership change leads a party to become closely identified with an individual leader and heightens the propensity for the development of a "cult of personality." Thus, the fewer the number of leadership changes the less adaptable and hence less institutionalized the party is as an organization. To measure generational change, I first determined the number of different chief executive officers the party had up until 1989 (in most cases this was the General or First Secretary, although occasionally it was the party Chairman) and then divided this number by the number of years the party was in existence (dating to its founding). The resulting number measures the average leadership duration in the communist party; the higher the number the longer the tenure of the party leader, and hence the less likely the party was "institutionalized."

An additional measure of the degree to which a party organization is institutionalized relates to the complexity of the organization. As Harmel and Svasand argue (1993) the more organizationally complex the political party the more institutionalized it is. To measure the degree to which a party organization is complex, I borrow from Janda (1980) who noted that organizational complexity involves two dimensions: *intensiveness* and *extensiveness*. Intensiveness refers to the smallest unit in the party structure, while extensiveness denotes the geographical coverage of the party organization (Janda 1980, 101).

To measure intensiveness, I employ a modification of Janda's measure that has six discrete categories and ranges from "no observable organiza-

tion" on one extreme and "cell units" on the other. As Duverger (1964) noted the smallest organizational unit in the party is indicative of the type of party. For instance if the cell is the basis of organization this indicates a profound change in the very concept of the political party. Instead of a body intended for the winning of votes "the political party becomes an instrument of agitation" (Duverger 1964, 35).

To measure intensiveness I reconfigured Janda's measure into four categories where 1 is coded for organizations which either have no institutionalized organs or are only apparent at the national level. The value 2 is assigned to where no institutionalized party organs exist below constituency or municipal level. The value 3 is associated with party organs existing in geographic locations at the precinct level. The value 4 is reserved for party organizations which exist at the cell level (usually involving units of less than 100 party members).[3]

The second dimension indicative of the complexity of the organization (which Janda labeled the *degree of organization*) is the extensiveness of the party organization. Janda conceived of this as involving the geographic coverage of the party, which was determined by whether the party maintained local organizations throughout the country. This measure, however, proved problematic in application to the communist parties. Many of these parties (particularly in the developing world) were clandestine organizations (even those which were officially legal); hence information on the internal organizational structure of these parties was extremely limited. Thus, rather than employ Janda's measure of extensiveness, I employ a measure of *membership density* as a surrogate measure.[4] The assumption here is that the larger the estimated membership the more likely the organization has the wherewithal to maintain local organizations throughout the country. This involves dividing the estimated party membership in 1989 by the population of the country and multiplying by 100.

To calculate a composite measure of organizational complexity, I multiply the intensiveness score by the membership density score and divide the product by 100 to render a value which estimates the *degree of organization* of the communist party before the collapse of communism in 1989.

Finally, I consider the extent to which the previous communist party organization was "coherent" defined in terms of basic consensus among the leadership of the party (Huntington 1965, 403-405; Janda 1980, 118). As a basic measure of leadership coherence, I employ a simple dichotomous measure which scores as 1 the situation where the party experiences a major factional struggle which resulted in an organizational split in the party (and the foundation of an alternative party organization) between 1969 (which marked the height of the Sino-Soviet split) to 1989. No split was coded as 0 as was the situation when factionalism did not result in an organizational

split. The reason for coding the latter as 0 was that even under conditions of rampant factionalism, as long as the party remained organizationally whole, then it was reasonable to assume that there was some basic consensus among the party leadership which held the party leaders together.

Analysis

Table 1 deals with the factors that affect the probability that the successor party would change its name following the collapse of communism. Two models are reported. The first model (Model 1) includes variables which relate to the external political environment (*Challenger Success* and *Party System Fractionalization*) and internal to the party organization (*Degree of Organization* and *Name Changes Prior to 1989*). The table reports the results of the logistic regression procedure, regressing the environmental political variables against the dichotomous dependent variable of whether or the successor party changed its name.[5] In addition to reporting coefficients and goodness of fit measures, the tables also report the results of several collinearity diagnostic tests. Dummy variables are included to test if there are any significant differences between the successor parties in post-communist countries and the remainder of the sample (reported in Model 1) and the successor parties in developed countries and the rest of the sample (reported in Model 2).

As indicated in Model 1, the two environmental variables had little to do whether or not the party changed its name. Further, the coefficients associated with *Average Challenger Success* and *Party System Fractionalization* suggests that the greater the challengers' electoral success the more likely the party would change its name, a finding that contradicts some of the literature (e.g., Gregg 1971) which holds that external challenges would make the party less likely to change its name. However, these results *do* not necessarily support the arguments made by Janda and others that challenges make it more likely the party will change its identity, given that these relationships are not statistically significant. The one significant relationship is between the composite measure of organizational complexity (*Degree of Organization*) and the likelihood the party changed its name. However, contrary to the literature that suggested that parties with more mass-like characteristics were less likely to change their names, the sign of the coefficients associated with the organizational complexity is positive, indicating that the more organizationally complex the party *the more likely that party changed its name.*

Although this finding is contrary to some literature, it supports the notion that communist successor parties that emerged from organizationally complex parties are more willing to adapt to new political circumstances

Table 1. Coefficient Estimates and Collinearity Diagnostics, Logistic Regression for Communist Successor Party Name Change

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Challenger Success	.01	-.01
Party System Fractionalization	-.47	-.27
Degree of Organization	1.88**	3.34***
Name Changes Prior to 1989	.08	.05
Dummy Variable for Post-Communist Countries	.61	
Dummy Variable for Developed Countries		.27
N =	79	79
Model Chi-square	50.38***	48.28***
Percent Correctly Predicted	85.17	75.18

*p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ 01.

than are parties which are not organizationally complex (Huntington 1965; Harmel and Janda 1994). Importantly, as indicated in Table 1, whether or not the party changed its name was unrelated to whether or not the communist successor party was from the post-communist countries. Table 1 results indicate that whether or not the party changed its name was unrelated to whether or not the party was from a developed country. Thus, these relationships are *not a function of whether the successor parties were from post-communist countries, developed countries or developing countries*.

Table 2 examines another aspect of party identity change, in this case whether or not the successor party explicitly rejected Marxism-Leninism. Unlike in Table 1 the measure of organizational complexity had little to do with whether or not the successor party explicitly rejected Marxism-Leninism (although the sign of the coefficient would suggest that more organizationally complex parties were more likely to reject Marxism-Leninism). In both tables none of the independent variables exhibit a statistically significant relationship with whether or not the party rejected Marxism-Leninism. Interestingly, the degree to which the party system was fractionalized was unrelated to whether or not the party rejected Marxism. This contradicts the notion that competition drives ideological change contrary to the argument put forward by Harmel and Janda. Again, as with the results reported in Table 2, whether or not the party rejected Marxism-Leninism was unrelated

Table 2. Coefficient Estimates and Collinearity Diagnostics, Logistic Regression for Communist Successor Party Position Regarding Marxism-Leninism

Variable	Model 3	Model 4
Challenger Success	.00	.00
Party System Fractionalization	-.64	-.64
Degree of Organization	.69	.32
Name Changes Prior to 1989	.05	.04
Dummy Variable for Post-Communist Countries	-20	
Dummy Variable for Developed Countries		.08
N =	79	79
Model Chi-square	6.60	5.60
Percent Correctly Predicted	68.12	58.11

*p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ 01.

to whether or not the party was from a post-communist country or a developed country. Thus, these relationships are not a function of whether the successor parties were from post-communist countries, developed countries or developing countries.

Tables 3 and 4 report the effect changing the party's identity had on its electoral performance. In Table 3 the variables *name change prior to the first election* and *whether or not the party had rejected Marxism-Leninism prior to the first election* are combined into a single measure of party identity change, which is comprised of three categories—"no change" (where neither name was changed nor did the party reject Marxism-Leninism) "partial change" (where the party either changed its name or rejected Marxism-Leninism) and "complete change" (where the party both changed its name and rejected Marxism-Leninism). The resulting variable is then cross tabulated with the degree of electoral success the party enjoyed in the first legislative election. As Table 5 indicates, there is a statistically significant (p = .00) and fairly strong relationship (gamma = .56) between the degree of party identity change and performance in the first legislative election. Thirteen of the 21 parties (62%) that changed their identity prior to the first election won at least five percent of the legislative seats.[5] The 13 parties that both changed their names and rejected Marxism-Leninism officially and

Table 3. Crosstabulation, Electoral Performance in First Election by Whether the Party Had Changed Name and/or Rejected Marxism-Leninism

	Had not rejected Marxism-Leninism and had not changed name prior to first election (column percent)	Had rejected Marxism-Leninism and had not changed name / Had not rejected Marxism-Leninism and had changed name prior to first election	Had rejected Marxism-Leninism and had changed name prior to first election (column percent)	Row Total
Won no seats	17 (70.8)	12 (36.4)	5 (23.8)	34
Won from .01 to 4.99%	4 (16.7)	9 (27.3)	3 (14.3)	16
Won 5% or more	3 (12.5)	12 (36.4)	13 (61.9)	28
Column Total	24	33	21	78

N = 78
Pearson Chi-square = 15.29
Gamma = .56
Significance = .00

won at least five percent of the legislative seats were Western or post-communist parties. They included Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia.

Only five parties that changed their names prior to the first election after the collapse of communism did not win seats in the legislature. These included not only three parties from "developed countries" (Great Britain, Belgium and Australia), but also from the post-communist countries of Slovenia and Estonia. By contrast, overall 71 percent (17 of 24) of the parties that had not changed their identity prior to the first legislative election won no seats in the first legislative elections. Of these parties, twelve were from western or post-communist countries, including Armenia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. In other words, even when comparing only Western and post-communist cases, communist successor parties that changed their identity prior to the first elections performed better than parties that either did not change their identities or only changed after the first elections.

Table 4. Crosstabulation, Change in Electoral Performance from First to Second Elections by Whether the Party Had Changed Name and/or Rejected Marxism-Leninism

	Had not rejected Marxism-Leninism and had not changed name prior to first election (column percent)	Had rejected Marxism-Leninism and had not changed name / Had not rejected Marxism-Leninism and had changed name prior to first election	Had rejected Marxism-Leninism and had changed name prior to first election (column percent)	Row Total
No change or lost seats from first to second election	17 (89.5)	17 (56.6)	10 (50.0)	44
Increased share of seats from first to second election	2 (10.5)	12 (41.4)	10 (50.0)	24
Column Total	19	29	20	68*

N = 78
Pearson Chi-square = 7.47
Gamma = .52
Significance = .02
*Eleven countries had yet to have had second free election by 1998.

What is more important than initial electoral performance is whether changing identities was associated with *improved* electoral performance. Table 4 reports the relationship between early party identity change and *change in performance from the first to the second legislative election* for 68 of the 79 parties (11 countries had not yet had their second free election by October 1998). This allows for assessment of the longer-term effects of party identity change on electoral performance. In Table 4 the dependent variable is reconfigured into two categories. The first includes either the situation where the party lost seats in the second election or there was no change. The second includes parties that experienced an increase in its share of legislative seats when comparing the first and second elections. Again there appears to be a relationship between the degree of party identity change and the party's electoral success over time ($p = .02$), and this relationship is fairly strong (gamma = .52). The ten countries that changed names and identities, and had improved electoral performance, included Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Nether-

lands, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Early change in a successor party's identity thus translates into improved electoral performance over time.

As with Table 3, these cases also ranked high in terms of the degree of organization. This finding is consistent with the findings in Table 1—the greater the degree of organization, the more likely the party would change its identity, and the more likely those changes led to dividends in terms of improved electoral performance later.

Discussion

The most important factor explaining the electoral success of the communist successor parties is the *degree of organization.* This finding provides broader support for the literature based on the Eastern European and FSU cases that argues that communist successor party electoral performance is primarily a result of the organizational features the parties inherited from the past (Ishiyama 1997). Further, the degree of organization was related to the adaptability of the successor party, which lend support to the notion that adaptable parties are those which are organizationally complex. In turn this adaptability paid dividends for the successor parties. More adaptable parties have been far more electorally successful than less adaptable parties, and the key to adaptability lies in the party organization's internal features.

The development of the communist successor parties across has important ramifications for the furtherance of democratic consolidation of new democracies. Although not all of the communist successor parties have promoted democratic consolidation, at least some have assisted democratic development by promoting the acceptance of democracy among their supporters in occupational groups most hurt by the political and economic transition. However, the extent to which the successor parties play this role may depend much less on the political environment, but much more on organizational kinds of parties they become.

APPENDIX
Communist Parties and Their Successors

Country	Communist Party	Successor Party
Albania	Albanian Party of Labor	Socialist Party of Albania
Argentina	Communist Party of Argentina	United Left
Armenia	Communist Party of Armenia	Armenian Communist Party
Australia	Communist Party of Australia	New Left Party
Austria	Communist Party of Austria	Communist Party of Austria
Azerbaijan	Communist Party of Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan United Communist Party

Appendix (continued)

Country	Communist Party	Successor Party
Bahamas	Vanguard Socialist Party	Vanguard Socialist Party
Bangladesh	Communist Party of Bangladesh	Communist Party of Bangladesh
Belarus	Communist Party of Belarus	Communist Party of Belarus
Belgium	Belgian Communist Party	Belgian Communist Union
Benin	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin	None
Bolivia	Communist Party of Bolivia	Communist Party of Bolivia
Brazil	Brazilian Communist Party	Popular Socialist Party
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Communist Party	Bulgarian Socialist Party
Canada	Communist Party of Canada	Communist Party of Canada
Chile	Communist Party of Chile	Communist Party of Chile
Columbia	Communist Party of Columbia	Communist Party of Columbia
Congo	Congolese Party of labor	Congolese Party of Labour
Costa Rica	Popular Vanguard Party	Popular Vanguard Party
Croatia	League of Communists of Croatia	Social Democratic Party of Croatia-Party of Democratic Reform
Cyprus	Progressive Party of the Working People	Progressive Party of the Working People
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
Denmark	Communist Party of Denmark	Communist Party of Denmark
Dominican Republic	Dominican Communist Party	Dominican Communist Party
Ecuador	Communist Party of Ecuador	Communist Party of Ecuador
El Salvador	Communist Party of El Salvador	Merged into Farabundo Marti Movement for National Liberation (1997)
Estonia	Communist Party of Estonia	Estonian Democratic Labor Party
Finland	Communist Party of Finland	Left Wing Alliance
France	French Communist Party	French Communist Party
Georgia	Georgian Communist Party	United Communist Party of Georgia
Germany	Socialist Unity Party	Party or Democratic Socialism
Great Britain	Communist Party of Great Britain	Democratic Left
Greece	Communist Party of Greece	Communist Party of Greece
Grenada	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement
Guyana	Peoples' Progressive Party	Peoples' Progressive Party
Honduras	Communist Party of Honduras	Communist Party of Honduras
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party
Iceland	People's Alliance	People's Alliance
India	Communist Party of India	Communist Party of India
Ireland	Communist Party of Ireland	Communist Party of Ireland
Israel	Communist Party of Israel	Communist Party of Israel
Italy	Italian Communist Party	Democratic Party of the Left
Jamaica	Workers' Party of Jamaica	Workers' Party of Jamaica
Japan	Japanese Communist Party	Japan Communist Party
Jordan	Communist Party of Jordan	Communist Party of Jordan

Appendix (continued)

Country	Communist Party	Successor Party
Latvia	Communist Party of Latvia	Latvian Socialist Party
Lithuania	Communist Party of Lithuania	Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party
Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg
Macedonia	League of Communists of Macedonia	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
Malta	Communist Party of Malta	Communist Party of Malta
Mexico	Mexican Socialist Party	Party of the Democratic Revolution
Moldova	Communist Party of Moldova	Socialist Party of Moldova and Party of Moldovan Communists
Mongolia	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
Morocco	Party of Renewal and Progress	Party of Renewal and Progress
Nepal	Nepal Communist Party	United Communist Party of Nepal
Netherlands	Communist Party of the Netherlands	Green Left
New Zealand	Communist Party of New Zealand	Socialist Workers' Organization
Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Socialist Party	Nicaraguan Socialist Party
Norway	Norwegian Communist Party	Norwegian Communist Party
Panama	People's Party	People's Party
Paraguay	Paraguayan Communist Party	Paraguayan Communist Party
Philippines	Philippine Communist Party	Philippine Communist Party
Poland	Polish Socialist Workers Party	Social Democracy of the Polish Republic
Portugal	Portuguese Communist Party	Portuguese Communist Party
Romania	Romanian Communist Party	Party of Social Democracy of Romania
Russia	Communist Party of the Soviet Union	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
San Marino	Communist Party of San Marino	Progressive Democratic Party
Senegal	Independence and Labor Party	Independence and Labour Party
Slovakia	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia/ Communist Party of Slovakia	Party of the Democratic Left
Slovenia	League of Communist of Slovenia	Party of Democratic Reform
South Africa	South African Communist Party	South African Communist Party
Spain	Spanish Communist party	Spanish Communist Party
Sweden	Left Party Communists	Left Party
Switzerland	Swiss Labor Party	Swiss Labor Party
Ukraine	Communist Party of Ukraine	Communist Party of Ukraine
United States	CPUSA	CPUSA
Uruguay	Communist Party of Uruguay	Communist Party of Uruguay
Venezuela	Communist Party or Venezuela	Communist Party of Venezuela
Yugoslavia	League of Communists	Socialist Party of Serbia/ Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro

NOTES

[1]In all cases in this research, if a party claimed to be the legal successor then it was labeled the successor party. If there were two legal successors, then we judged which of the parties received the bulk of the organizational resources and personnel. Thus we could distinguish between the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, or the KPRF and other minor communist formations in Russia—such as Viktor Anpilov's Working Russia Blok.

[2]In two cases two successor parties were identified. For instance in Moldova the Socialist Party/Yedinstvo was the primary successor party in 1992. This party was primarily made up of ethnic Russians. However by the time of the 1998 election another successor party emerged among Romanian speakers, the Party of Moldovan Communists which absorbed a large chunk of the membership and resources of the Socialist Party. In the case of rump Yugoslavia, the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro ran separately for the Federal Assembly. In both these cases, the seat share of the two parties was combined as an indicator of communist successor party electoral performance.

[3]The data for this measure came from the in depth descriptions of parties available in the *Yearbook of International Communist Affairs* (YICA), 1966-1991.

[4]Membership density data for the parties was derived from the *Yearbook of International Communist* Affairs, 1966-1991. The coding of the extensiveness variable was derived from this source as well which has descriptions of party organizational structure.

[5]I use the cutoff of five percent because in most legislative elections (particular proportional representation systems) a five percent electoral threshold is used in order to award seats.

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