

Book Reviews

Richard L. Engstrom, Editor

Bell, Lauren Cohen. *Warring Factions: Interest Groups, Money, and the New Politics of Senate Confirmation*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2002. 212 pp. (\$60.00 cloth; \$21.95 paper).

In the summer of 2002 there was a lot of Republican criticism about the slow rate of action by the Senate Judiciary Committee on judicial nominations. The irony of the situation was that the severe clogging of the system in its present form has its origin in the 1st session of the 105th Congress (1997) under the chairmanship of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and the actions of the Republican controlled Senate (pp. 104-105). Yet, the transformation of the confirmation process is much more complex than mere partisan politics, and is the subject of a detailed work by Lauren Cohen Bell.

Warring Factions is a thoroughly comprehensive study of the Senate confirmation process. Bell traces its general evolution from Washington's time to the present. She focuses on internal Senate changes and the influential role interest groups have assumed in confirmation decisions. Her analysis is primarily concerned with judicial nominations, but there is also a chapter devoted to cabinet and ambassadorial confirmations. Bell utilizes an extensive bibliography to present her case, supplemented by quantitative analysis of 1,242 judicial nominations in the 1979-1998 period, plus 88 cabinet-designee and 993 ambassadorial actions between 1977 and 1998, and interviews with interest group leaders, former senators, and Senate staffers. Her documentation of the changes in the process and its current status is very solidly grounded.

After detailing the Framers' discussions about the appointment process at the Constitutional Convention, Bell asserts that they ". . . intended the Senate to be a 'silent' check on the president for the purpose of preventing cronyism, favoritism, and nepotism from blocking the appointment of the best qualified individuals" (p. 25). She then takes the reader through the changes in this relationship between the President and the Senate concerning the confirmation process over the next 200 years.

Bell points to the 1980s as the decade in which the appointment process changed most dramatically. She states that “In 1984, Reagan announced that he would use the appointment process to remake the federal judiciary in a conservative image” (p. 36). His nomination of Robert Bork for the Supreme Court in 1987 was notable not only because it mobilized supporters and opponents, but because of “the realization that the power of the media could be harnessed in the same manner as in an election campaign” (p. 36). This, along with the nomination of Clarence Thomas in 1991 and the increased media exposure of confirmation hearings, allowed the Senate to re-emerge as a prominent influence in the appointment process. From the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s, major presidential nomination rejections increased dramatically, and the length of time to confirm judicial nominees had lengthened to an average of 212 days by 1997 (pp. 37-38).

Bell identifies a number of factors responsible for the present day confirmation situation. First of all, she notes factors that have transformed Congress: changes to chamber rules and norms, increased workload, population increase, changes to the two-party system, increasingly demanding constituents, and the rise of 24 hour news organizations (p. 42). Congress is now “an institution with clearly defined boundaries, professional legislators and staff, and a highly regimented legislative process” (p. 45). Today “blue slips” and holds are utilized to provide delays that not only provide time for consideration of nominees, but also to force them to withdraw from their nominations (p. 46).

In addition, presidents have relied increasingly on staffers and nominating commissions to assist them in selecting nominees. The result is that they have little connection with the nominees, which makes them less willing to expend time and effort on their behalf (p. 53). The Bork nomination—with the activation of liberal partisanship and the conservative counter-reaction with Republican control of the Senate in 1995, marked the beginning of all-out partisan war in the Senate over presidential nominations (p. 57). To this mix is added interest group participation. With the routinization of the Senate confirmation process in the 1970s, more access and “veto” points were created, and interest groups took the opportunity to affect nomination decisions (p. 69).

Interest groups are active in confirmation politics for two main reasons. First, they want to influence public policy outcomes. Second, they want their issue positions on record for maintenance of their organization (p. 70-71).

This demonstrates their prestige and activism, and also is an avenue for fund-raising and generating additional interest in their causes (p. 72).

Bell notes that until the mid-1980s most interest group participation was formal: testifying at hearings and submitting positional briefs (p. 74). But in response to the Bork hearings and culminating with Hatch's assumption of the Judiciary Committee's chairmanship in 1995, the Senate has limited interest group participation at formal hearings. Now interest groups have turned to informal participation: affecting who's nominated at the executive branch level, providing Senators with campaign contributions, and trying to sway the senator's constituents by such means as publishing "vote scorecards" (pp. 80-81). In 1997 the conservative Judicial Selection Monitoring Project built an entire fund-raising project around the distribution of a videotape urging contributors to help block President Clinton's judicial nominations (p. 124). Overall, Bell states that this shift from formal to informal confirmation participation makes monitoring for fairness or accuracy much more difficult.

Regarding cabinet-level nominations, interest group activity is present and increasing, although its influence on the outcome is less quantifiable (pp. 137-138). Interest group participation in ambassadorial nominations is much less common, although the very visible conservative Republican opposition to openly gay Democratic Party activist James Hormel's nomination for the top post in the embassy in Luxembourg may signal a harbinger of future interest (pp. 142-145).

No work is perfect, and this one has some minor flaws. The most noticeable one is that there is much repetition of conclusions/findings, not only at the end of the chapters, but also at various points within them. The reviewer suspects that this was done to lengthen the text portion of the book, which excluding Notes, Bibliography, Index, and appendices, runs to barely 145 pages. Of the typographical/factual variety: only 12 states—not 13—sent delegates to the Constitutional Convention—Rhode Island declined (p. 20), the 105th Congress adjourned in October 1998, not 1997 (p. 143), and the near to closing sentence on the last text page—"It is also not unlikely that interest groups will stop pushing senators to reject nominees whom the groups deem to be unfit"—runs counter to the findings presented.

Nevertheless, this is a very important contribution to the body of literature on all three branches of government, parties, and interest groups. Not only does it focus on an important specific process: the politicized, interest

group affected confirmation process that has resulted in “delays in confirmation, difficulty recruiting people to serve as federal judges, increasingly lengthy judicial vacancies, and the inability of the president to craft a legacy through the federal courts” (pp. 126-127), but also that the dynamics of the confirmation process are “a microcosm of the political process” (p. 4). This work should be familiar to all students and scholars of American political institutions, actors, and processes.

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Cox, Gary W., and Jonathan N. Katz. *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. xii, 234 pp. (\$55.00 cloth; \$19.00 paper).

The first thing to say about *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander* is that it has nothing to do with Elbridge Gerry, who died more than 150 years before the events studied in the book. It also has nothing obvious to do with oddly crafted legislative districts, whether they resemble salamanders or any other denizen of the cartographic bestiary, since the book never evaluates the shapes on electoral maps. However, this slim volume does live up to its subtitle—it offers a thorough argument that the American electoral system changed sharply because of a court-led revolution in the apportionment of congressional districts.

The Supreme Court issued a series of “one person, one vote” decisions in the mid-1960s that required most states to redraw their legislative maps. These decisions, which sent the judiciary scurrying into a “political thicket” it had previously avoided, represented an obvious alteration in constitutional doctrine. Cox and Katz note, however, that researchers provide little evidence connecting reapportionment to changes in non-southern electoral politics. Numerous traits of the political system did change simultaneously with the doctrinal change: Republicans lost their congressional advantage, incumbents won more often, Democrats solidified control of the House, and winning candidates compiled wider vote margins. But the literature suggests that these concurrent changes are uncorrelated with whether a state redrew districts.

Cox and Katz contradict those who have dismissed redistricting's practical or political relevance. Reapportionment struck the political system at a time when most states operated under Republican-designed maps. Yet Democrats controlled most federal courts as well as a healthy number of state governments. They were able to leverage the mandate for equalized representation into significant partisan gains, especially because friendly courts were constrained by neither detailed legal precedent nor a clear process for remedying malapportionment. The pro-Republican bias of post-war districts, for example, disappeared most swiftly in Republican states facing a hostile federal court. Indeed, the analysis suggests that each Democratic judge aided party fortunes about as much as did control of a legislative chamber or of the governorship.

Similarly, Cox and Katz argue that reapportionment largely explains the 1960s changes in incumbent performance noted by other scholars. Their evidence relies on a simple insight: that the incumbency advantage, reelection rates, and "vanishing marginals" all should vary by party affiliation. Redistricting hurt Republicans by concentrating their partisans, cracking apart other Republican districts in order to do so. Map makers helped the Democratic party, meanwhile, by skimming excess supporters from districts they already held—redistributing these voters to other districts where they could improve the party's chances. Cox and Katz do not test the propositions directly, but the indirect observable implications are that (1) Republicans should receive a greater average share of the vote after reapportionment, because of their concentration and because of skimming from the Democrats, but (2) Republicans should lose more elections as their variance in support increases. The data confirm both hypotheses.

Perhaps the most explosive claim in the book is that the "incumbency advantage" may be nonexistent. Other measures of pro-incumbent voting suffer from selection bias because officeholders who expect to perform poorly drop out of a race, biasing the vote average upward for those who remain. David Lublin and I have been emphasizing the endogenous nature of post-redistricting vote totals for a while, most recently in this journal ["Boll-Weevil Blues," Winter 2000, pp. 427-450], but Cox and Katz provide a solid empirical test for such claims and so are able to state the case more strongly than previously. Their main evidence that incumbents make endogenous entry decisions is that involuntary retirements, caused by death or lost primaries, do not precede decreases in party support in the same way voluntary (and therefore potentially strategic) retirements do—even though the loss in incumbent resources would be equivalent. It is also suggestive

that the estimated incumbency advantage is greater among minority parties than among those for whom congressional resources should be greatest. Although their attack on a core disciplinary concept comes a little too matter-of-factly, in a model focused on a different question with inadequate justification and insufficient probing, Cox and Katz nevertheless seem to be tracking big game with this one.

I should mention a few weaknesses. Part II on partisan bias and responsiveness was dissatisfying. It bogs down in a confusing typology of “reversion” plans—setting up a strained distinction between “divided” and “mixed” governments, meanwhile conflating two unrelated forms of “radical reversion.” Two theoretical chapters erect serious entry costs (e.g., assuming knowledge of game theory jargon), ultimately to establish rather uncontroversial claims at a level of formality the analysis never quite exploited. The authors speculate about the impact of Democratic vote gains and of redistricting changes on partisan bias, but leave the relative contributions unexplored. Of course, grappling with “what ifs” can be dicey—as illustrated by my own humble attempt with Lublin [“Racial Redistricting and Realignment in Southern State Legislatures,” *American Journal of Political Science* 44:792-810 (2000)]—but some kind of formalized counterfactual would have helped the comparisons. And I wanted to know how their story of partisan judges fit with the 1990s case, in which Republican justices and activists revealed *opposing* preferences.

Part III, on the incumbency advantage, was much more tightly reasoned; even the footnotes seemed useful reading. It could have profited from more discussion of model specification, since I found myself doubting whether a control for candidate quality or lagged incumbency status still allowed the estimates required by theory. (Sub)headings were used peculiarly, sometimes introducing single paragraphs, or breaking the flow of discussion with a “technical note” or partial conclusion. Perhaps the most unsettling is where the authors seem to promise a simultaneous equation model but then do not deliver (pp. 143-144)! Finally, one cannot help but suppose that generalizations about House elections would have profited from comparisons with primaries and/or with Senate contests. These miscellaneous drawbacks do not detract from the significance of *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander*, however. It is a complex and clever book that future students of redistricting and Congress will have to take seriously.

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Ellis, Richard J. *Democratic Delusions: The Initiative Process in America*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. xi, 244 pp. (\$35.00 cloth; \$17.95 paper).

This book focuses primarily upon the use of the general initiative-referendum process at the state level in western states, and contains only brief references to the use of the device in several other states and Switzerland. The book's subtitle is "The Initiative Process in America," yet there is no examination of the use of the initiative by local government voters or its use to place a statutorily authorized specific proposition on the referendum ballot. The author is upfront in acknowledging he follows "one basic decision rule: I vote no. No matter what the measure, no matter what the issue, I just say no" (p. 3).

The book opens with a description of political neophyte Helen Hill's initiation of and campaign for Oregon Initiative Measure 98, approved by voters in 1998, opening adoption records to adults who were adopted as children. Ellis concludes the initiative would be "a valuable supplement to the political process" (p. 16) if her campaign was a typical one. In his judgment, however, most initiative campaigns tend to be similar to Oregon's Initiative Measure 8 of 1994 that would require public employees to contribute six percent of their salary to help finance a state pension plan. The measure was approved by a close margin, but was invalidated by a 4 to 3 vote of the Oregon Supreme Court on the ground the measure abridged a contract.

Chapter 2 contains a brief history of the adoption of the initiative by various state governments and highlights "The Initiative's Radical Past" by examining its origin in South Dakota and the prominent role played by "radicals in the labor movement and agrarian protest movements" (p. 30). Chapter 7, "The Myth of a Golden Age," describes the early use of the popular device in Oregon and California, and would fit better as part of Chapter 2. Ellis admits the myth contains "some basis in fact," but nevertheless contends the myth "exaggerates the corruption of state legislatures" (p. 177). No evidence, however, is supplied to support this statement.

The third chapter is devoted to signature gathering, increased use of paid signature gatherers, the high cost of ballot access, required financial disclosures, and the role of the judiciary. Briefly noted are several reform possibilities—replacement of the signature requirement with a high filing fee, counting signatures collected by volunteers more heavily than ones

collected by paid gatherers in conjunction with a higher signature threshold requirement, and signing of petitions only in city or county voter registrars' offices or in public facilities such as fire stations and libraries.

Initiative campaigns examined in Chapter 4 include union-sponsored campaigns in Oregon and Washington, an Indian tribe-sponsored initiative to terminate state regulation of tribal gambling in Washington, and George Soros' sponsorship of legalization of marijuana for medical purposes in Arizona and California. Use of the device by elected officers and candidates to promote their reelection or election is illustrated by California Governor Pete Wilson's promotion of initiated measures such as the "Three strikes and You're Out" proposition and a proposition that would deny state services to illegal immigrants. Referring to poorly drafted propositions, the author explains the legislative process "is designed to discover and correct mistakes, both political and technical" (p. 88). Subsequently, he admits state legislatures have enacted bills "at the end of session with little or with only perfunctory hearings" (p. 144).

Chapter 5 notes a supermajority affirmative vote is required for a proposition to be adopted in a few states. The Idaho approval requirement for a statutory initiative is an affirmative majority vote on the proposition that includes a majority of the votes cast for governor. Wyoming has a similar double majority requirement except the second majority is based upon the total number of individuals who cast ballots in the general election. Table 5.1 (p. 129) contains data on the impact of three such requirements, had they been in effect, on voter-endorsed propositions in Arizona, California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington in the period 1980-2000. The Nevada requirement for approval by a majority of the voters in two successive referenda before a constitutional amendment initiative proposition becomes effective is described briefly. In addition, a short section is devoted to the Massachusetts indirect constitutional initiative provisions that encourage voters to utilize the statutory form; only one of thirty two initiatives on the ballot in the period 1978-2000 was a proposed constitutional amendment.

The key role of state courts in the initiative process in Oregon, California, Florida, Washington, and Arkansas is the subject of Chapter 6. Challenges to the ballot title and ballot wording are common and courts have rewritten titles. Ellis calls special attention to the Florida Supreme Court narrow interpretation of the single-subject and clear ballot title requirements, and the post 1993 invalidation by the Arkansas Supreme Court of more than two-thirds of the initiative petitions that met the signature threshold. He

concludes “direct democracy has ironically contributed to our increasing reliance on the least accountable branch of government” (p. 176); i.e., the judiciary. Citizens, of course, also rely upon this branch for protection against certain statutes enacted by state legislatures.

A short epilogue adds new information; e.g., attempts by state legislatures to amend statutory requirements and changes produced by administrative bodies including a 1998 U.S. Postal Service regulation prohibiting the collection of signatures in front of a post office. Slightly more than a page is devoted to Internet signature gathering, access to financial records, and other information. Ellis reports initiative mistakes “are generally more difficult to correct” than legislative mistakes and there is a need “to teach citizens to appreciate the enduring value of representative institutions” (p. 202).

This book merits reading by students of the general initiative-referendum process and citizens with an interest in public affairs. Although the author does not examine systematically the evidence supporting, modifying, or refuting the various pro and con arguments found in the literature on the initiative in all states where it is authorized on the state and/or local levels, he presents a strong case against the direct initiative and expresses great faith in state legislatures. A chapter tying together findings presented in earlier chapters and addressing their theoretical implications, and inclusion of a bibliography, would improve the book. This reviewer discovered only one minor factual error: “No state requires ordinary laws to be submitted to the people . . .” (p. 131). Several state constitutions require statutes pledging the full faith and credit of the state to be submitted to the voters for their approval or rejection.

A need remains for a book comparing law making in non-initiative states with law making in initiative states. The initiative can be utilized by aroused voters to break a deadlock between the state legislature controlled by one political party and the governor who belongs to a different political party, as Ellis notes with respect to Governor Wilson, and to break the deadlock on important bills when control of the two houses is divided between the two major parties in a highly partisan state.

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Hart, Roderick P. *Campaign Talk: Why Elections Are Good for Us*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. xvii, 307 pp. (\$39.50 cloth; \$17.95 paper).

Roderick P. Hart has produced a work which befits his position as Allan Shivers Chair in Communication and Distinguished Teaching Professor at the University of Texas-Austin. He promotes his central premise, which is clearly stated by the book's title, through comparative content analysis over time (1948-1996). This analysis focuses on the words used by the campaign participants captured by the categories of the presidential candidates, the public and the press. Hart's strong theoretical framework, bolstered by extensive coverage of pertinent literature, provides a valuable new tool for research on political communication. As such it should most definitely be considered for use in graduate seminars on elections and/or communications.

Problems are arising with the use of surveys, notably there has been a decline in response rates due at least in part to an increase in the use of polls by those with proprietary interests. There always has been the problem of a lack of richness with traditional close-ended survey instruments. Helpfully, Hart has created DICTION, which is a computer program that complements survey research tools.

He wrote the program over twenty years ago for mainframe computers, but it is now available from SAGE Software <<http://www.scolari.com>> for use on Pentium-based personal computers that use windows. DICTION looks at the usage of words and classifies them in terms of concepts, including self-referential language and INTENSITY. The former would include use of words such as *me*, *myself*, and *I*. The latter classification would measure the frequency with which a particular word was used, for example, in the case of presidential candidates in acceptance speeches, stump speeches and debates. Hart notes that, "DICTION . . . uses a series of dictionaries to search a passage for five semantic features—Activity, Optimism, Certainty, Realism, and Commonality—as well as thirty-five subfeatures" (p. 245). He lays out in detail how he operationalized these features in Appendix 1. DICTION also allows each user to create her or his own dictionaries. In Appendix 2 Hart provides statistical analysis of each text which is presented in the volume. While his source of data for presidential candidate words is traditional, his data source for the words of the people is likely to be more controversial.

Hart makes a compelling case for the use of letters to the editor. He rebuts criticisms that they frequently contain “plants”; for example while in the employ of the White House Patrick J. Buchanan reportedly wrote letters to the editor on behalf of Richard M. Nixon; and that letter writers are disproportionately conservative. Hart conducted original survey research to study the latter matter and found no evidence for the proposition that letter writers differ from the general public in terms of political orientation or outlook. In this way they differ from people who call in to radio talk shows where there is evidence that they are much more conservative than the general public. Among the three groups of political participants studied, letter writers changed the least over time if they changed at all.

Two major changes are the increased usage of self-referential language and the decreased level of CERTAINTY among presidential candidates. This was uniformly true of Democratic, Republican and significant non-major party candidates including George C. Wallace and Ross Perot. Party-references are used less in recent years even in candidate nomination acceptance speeches. Still the candidates are distinguishable in terms of word usage.

In 1996 President Bill Clinton made heavy usage of words connoting COMMONALITY and Bob Dole, notwithstanding his declaration that he was “the most optimistic man in America,” used relatively few words which connoted OPTIMISM. Dole stands out as the most ineffective speaker. Governors, who have dominated major party presidential nominations over the years studied, rank particularly high in REALISM.

To the extent that vocabulary and the distinctive use of language contribute to presidential greatness, in the manner of Lord Bryce over a century ago, we should not expect great people to become president. The only two men to be elected twice with over fifty percent of the popular vote, Ronald Reagan and Dwight Eisenhower, used the most “common parlance” (pp. 96-97). There will be no twenty-first century Abraham Lincoln giving an updated version of the Gettysburg Address. One legacy of Lincoln which encouragingly does endure is the political debate. Hart finds the presidential debates, which began in 1960 with U.S. Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon and which have been institutionalized since the Jimmy Carter-President Gerald R. Ford debate in 1976, to be worthwhile and reasonable exchanges of information that add to citizen knowledge.

One assumption of Hart which is difficult to accept, although in fairness to him he is agnostic about it and a number of other of his assumptions,

is that the media have not changed over the period studied. While his work is virtually exhaustive, some discussion of the implications of the advent of the journalist as celebrity and the markedly greater commercialization of the news and all media would have been worthwhile.

One quibble is that the proof-reading of the manuscript could have been better. On page 75 the Iran hostage crisis is placed in 1976 rather than in 1980 and in another passage Ronald Reagan is referred to as Ronald Regan [sic]. Notwithstanding the latter undergraduate type of error, *Campaign Talk* is a valuable asset for graduate students and professors of communication and the presidency.

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Tichenor, Daniel J. *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. xii, 378 pp. (\$65.00 cloth; \$22.95 paper).

At its core, *Dividing Lines* is a lucid, compelling and comprehensive “historical-institutionalist” analysis of U.S. immigration policies and politics covering the period from 1776 through the late 1990s. Tichenor focuses on “the powerful interactions between political institutions, ideological traditions, and organized social interests” (p. 5). This book’s “central puzzle . . . is how and why these decidedly expansive and restrictive policy regimes have emerged from American immigration politics over time” (p. 2). Six of the ten chapters cover successive historical periods each characterized by a general pattern of immigration policy. Two analyze apparent exceptions that confirm the generalizations that can be found in the theoretical chapter.

The first 120 years of U.S. immigration policy were characterized by massive migration from Europe subject only to very loose regulation. For most of this period, immigration policy was determined by states with major ports of entry. This fact, along with universal suffrage for free white men and easy, expedited naturalization, explain why the anti-immigrant nativism that did exist throughout the period was not translated into restrictive policies—immigrants, their supporters and their parties had the votes to permit the further migration of those who would soon be like-minded voters.

Chinese immigrants were not able to follow the same model of pro-immigrant political action because as non-whites they were barred *de jure* from participation in American legal and political institutions. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the result.

The federal control of immigration policy, congressional rules giving the Speaker of the House extraordinary powers, the shift in the source of the European immigrant stream to southern and eastern Europe, and World War I all helped bring about the era of the national immigration origins quota system which in 1924 allocated 84 percent of a severely curtailed number of visas to immigrants from northern and western Europe. Also important were the racist and anti-Semitic eugenicist viewpoints of the influential academics and intellectuals who authored the Dillingham Commission reports that can be typified as using pseudo-science to justify immigration restrictions. This kind of privileged expertise was an important element in the major changes in immigration law and an important element of the theory Tichenor presents to explain policy swings.

Many Jews who tried to escape Nazi oppression during the 1930s were not admitted to the U.S. but not only because of these quotas. There was a great reluctance to admit any refugees or immigrants during the Great Depression when up to one-third of the nation confronted unemployment, hunger and homeless. This helped mask the overt anti-Semitism among key State Department administrators and other high-ranking officials, but their implementation minimized the migration of Jewish refugees. Even though the quotas limited the number of immigrants or refugees who could be admitted from Germany to about 20,000 per year, in some years the State Department issued as few as one-tenth that number of visas. The animus against Jews can be clearly seen in the fact that emergency legislation to admit British children after the bombing of Britain had begun sailed through Congress the year after a similar proposal to admit German children had been stalled in committee.

In this instance and many others throughout the period of federal control over immigration starting in 1875 various actors, typically the chairs of congressional committees, had control over legislative “veto-points.” This aspect of American government and the particular preferences of those holding these offices have had a great impact on immigration and is the second of four elements of Tichenor’s theory. The third element of the theory is the

importance of broad-based political coalitions and the fourth element is the role of episodic international crises or threats that serve as important catalysts for major immigration reform.

The end of the national origin quota system and the start of the contemporary immigration regime illustrate the working of all four theoretical elements. Beginning after WWII, disturbed by the similarities between the reports of the Dillingham Commission and the Nazi world view, the Truman administration issued a new set of reports refuting the racism of Dillingham. Communism and the Cold War was the compelling external threat, and the gap between the American ideals of equality and the racist reality of the national origin quota system made the U.S. vulnerable to Soviet criticism. The merger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955 resulted in unified labor support. Finally, the ability of congressional committee chairs to control this veto-point was temporarily neutralized. In the mid-1960s, U.S. immigration policy was free of any structured racism and of any special provisions for the migration of Mexican agricultural workers.

Tichenor points out that these reforms resulted in the start of the contemporary period of large-scale illegal migration from Mexico that has continued to grow to this day. He cites statistics showing that in 1996 there were five million undocumented aliens in the U.S. More than half of these were from Mexico and two-thirds of the total were from Latin America. (p. 264). The Census Bureau has recently estimated that there were more than eight million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. in 2000 with the same proportions of Mexicans and Latin Americans. The magnitude of this population makes this an issue that demands attention.

My main criticism of this book is that it did not focus the same thorough analysis on the topic of Mexican and Latino immigration that characterizes the rest of work. For example, Tichenor discusses the ease with which administrative discretion permitted the entry of Mexican contract laborers starting in WW I in contrast to the discretion that blocked entry of Jewish refugees. Yet he glosses over the fact that in response to the massive unemployment and sky-rocketing relief costs caused by the Great Depression half a million Mexican legal and illegal immigrants as well U.S. citizens were coerced, forced, tricked and encouraged to return to Mexico. To be clear, he notes the numeric decrease, but does not mention the cause or the circumstances of this decrease (pp. 172-175). The same can be said of his other mentions of Latino immigration. His text notes the important pieces

of this puzzle, but unlike the rest of the work, he does not put them together in a coherent manner. Perhaps this is too much to ask of one book. However, now more than ever, we as a nation do need to have this puzzle solved or resolved. Who ever takes on this task will be well advised to have easy access to Tichenor's book.

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