

Book Reviews

Richard L. Engstrom, Editor

Cornelius, Wayne A., Tsuda, Takeyuki, Martin, Philip L., and Hollifield, James F., eds. *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, in association with the University of California San Diego Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2004, 2nd ed. 560 pp. (\$70 cloth; \$29.95 paper).

Ten years ago, the first edition of *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* by Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin, and James Hollifield made an immediate impact on the emerging field of immigration studies by identifying a pair of research hypotheses that continue to shape debates within the field. First, the editors observed that immigration is often characterized by gaps between policy goals and outcomes, and hypothesized that such gaps are inevitable when it comes to migration control. Second, the 1994 volume hypothesized that industrialized states were converging around a similar approach to migration control and migrant integration.

In their introduction to the second edition (published in 2004 with Takeyuki Tsuda as an additional co-editor), Cornelius and Tsuda take the gap between migration control policies and outcomes as a given, and focus their attention on four explanations for under-enforcement. They argue that the enforcement gaps reflect poorly designed, short-sighted policies that produce unintended consequences; the “structural embeddedness” of migrant labor and migration networks, which make flows inherently difficult to control; political constraints emerging out of partisan politics, interest-group demands, and liberal courts, which limit enforcement options; and ambiguous intentions on the part of policy-makers.

This discussion provides a potential organizing principle for the eleven case studies that make up the heart of the edited volume. However, many of the country studies fail systematically to explore the scope or causes of under-enforcement. As a result, the book raises a number of unanswered questions. First, are enforcement gaps indeed universal? On one hand, even so-called “reluctant” countries facing immigration (France, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom) actively and successfully recruited migrants in the decades prior to the 1973 oil shocks. And Germany, the UK, the United States, Australia, and Canada continue recruitment of certain migrants in the current period. On the other hand, states have historically demonstrated substantial capacity to control certain kinds of migration, and continue to do so. Australia, the United States, Canada, and the United

Kingdom all have exploited their relative isolation to prevent unwanted labor inflows during earlier periods (as recently as the 1970s in the British case). Japan and Korea continue to do so, and essentially all the countries reviewed here have exhibited some capacity to limit refugee and asylum inflows.

Thus, rather than confirming that immigration is simply and universally “out of control,” the case studies highlight a pair of cross-national trends. First, migration is highly path-dependent, and the unintended consequences of previous guest-worker programs and tolerance of trans-migration certainly have contributed to the subsequent emergence of migrant networks and segmented labor markets that are at the heart of today’s “immigration systems.” Thus, the structural embeddedness of immigrant labor is largely a result of policy choices, and it therefore varies substantially across migrant-receiving states.

Second, while policy-makers retain some inherent capacity to influence the scope and character of immigration flows, the most striking “gap” is that between grassroots demands for stricter limits on inflows (especially low-skilled) and the reluctance of mainstream politicians to take the painful steps associated with effective migration control. Thus, migration control is an expensive proposition in terms of immediate enforcement costs, and especially in terms of the broader economic adjustments that would accompany a move from low-cost labor imports to more efficient production and the redirection of native-born workers to the dirty, dangerous, and difficult jobs now dominated by immigrants. Moreover, the same recessionary concerns that prompted the retreat from active migrant recruitment make it particularly risky for politicians to consider imposing additional levels of bureaucracy and coercive adjustment on migrant-employing industries—often the most vibrant sectors of advanced industrial economies. Political considerations reinforce this economic thinking: While employers and consumers derive important benefits from immigration—including undocumented flows—black markets mainly work to the detriment of migrants themselves, as well as the least skilled (and politically weakest) native workers.

Exploring the uniformity of these trends returns us to the second hypothesis identified above: convergence. While Cornelius and Tsuda’s introduction rejects the idea of a linear or evolutionary trend, the tension between socio-cultural anxiety about immigration and economic benefits of inflows is essentially universal in the current period. Likewise, migrant-receiving states are converging around a discrete menu of policy choices (guest-workers, family- and skills-based permanent admissions, enforcement options at the border and in the interior) and around specific combinations of policy outcomes. Thus, with few exceptions, case studies describe the emergence of “grand bargains” during the 1970s and 1980s, in which

increased border controls and internal enforcement were combined with new integration programs that including limited amnesties, anti-discrimination programs, and the embrace of multiculturalism.

Yet even where internal enforcement showed early signs of success, it has typically been replaced by “symbolic” control efforts, including employer sanctions legislation with built-in loopholes and funding limits that prevent effective enforcement. During the 1990s, most receiving states began rolling back migrants’ civil and political rights, while also imposing new restrictions on asylum applicants and passing streamlined procedures for deporting rejected claimants. Given the importance of early policy mistakes in the stories of contemporary immigration, these questions are especially important for our understanding of emerging patterns in “latecomer” states (Spain, Italy, Japan, and South Korea); and Seol and Skrentny’s chapter on South Korea includes a particularly useful discussion of these issues.

The great strength of *Controlling Immigration* is its case studies of eleven migrant-receiving states. These chapters cover the history, demographics, and economics of migration to (and from) each state, and review the history of policy response focused on migration control and immigrant integration. The information is readily accessible, and the second edition will likely replicate the accomplishment of its predecessor, becoming the standard textbook for courses on immigration, as well as the starting point for researchers interested in one or more of these key migrant-receiving states.

In addition to the historical details, the case studies (and accompanying commentaries) suggest a pair of additional issues for future research. First, what are the key factors shaping immigration policy-making? Answers here range from models of client politics (Seol and Skrentny’s chapter on Korea) to top-down state planning (Reitz’s chapter on Canada), to constructivist arguments about founding myths and subjective perceptions of migration (Castles and Vasta’s chapter on Australia; Hollifield’s chapter on France), to institutional arguments about migration bureaucracies (Tsuda and Cornelius’ chapter on Japan), to two traditional arguments about interest groups and left-right partisanship (Martin’s chapter on Germany; Layton-Henry’s chapter on the United Kingdom). Is it possible to develop a universal model of immigration policymaking, or do the distinct approaches employed here reflect fundamentally different national-level policy dynamics? Most of the case studies here ultimately suggest that multiple dynamics are at play, which is why it seems to be universally difficult to reach national consensus on what Martin (pp. 51-2) rightly describes as “the three major immigration questions: How many? From where? In what status should newcomers arrive?”

A second research question that emerges from the case studies regards the relationship between nationalist political entrepreneurs, political party systems, and popular ambivalence (or outright hostility) to migration. Previous research on anti-immigrant sentiment has tended to draw on models of political behavior, ignoring the institutional determinants of partisan cleavages (discussed here by Muus and Lijphart with respect to the Dutch case). Given the prominence of anti-immigrant politicians and parties in places such as Australia, the Netherlands, France, Germany, the United States, Italy, and Britain, these questions should clearly receive more attention in the future.

Marc R. Rosenblum
University of New Orleans

Swaine, Lucas. *The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious Fundamentalism.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. XIX, 215 pp. (\$35 cloth).

Three years into the Iraq war and five years from the attacks of September 11, it would be difficult to convince an American that the gulf between religious fundamentalist and Western liberal ideals were anything but intractable. Indeed, the evidence seems, at least on the surface, to vindicate a “clash of civilizations” perspective, one in which neither side is capable of comprehending the political and moral commitments of the other. To make matters worse, the issue is not simply one of foreign relations, for immigration has brought to the fore countless domestic cultural and religious conflicts, conflicts that in truth have been with us all along.

It is precisely with such gloom in mind that Lucas Swaine offers *The Liberal Conscience*. Where others might see irreconcilable differences, Swaine sees only missed opportunities—opportunities not just for the sides to come together, but also for each, in so doing, to gain a richer understanding of their own fundamental principles. This well-written and provocative book is well timed.

Swaine’s target audience is liberals, those whom he believes have lacked the resources to handle the domestic tensions surrounding both “ambitious theocrats” (those seeking to impose their way of life on liberals) and “retiring theocrats” (those merely hoping liberals might leave them alone). (Quick clarification, per Swaine: Theocracy: “a mode of governance prioritizing a religious conception of the good that is strict and comprehensive in its range of teachings” (p. 7). Examples of theocrats: ambitious, as in the Nation of Islam; retiring, as in the Amish.) Swaine’s road to improved

relations with either group begins with self-confession: “liberal theory and liberal government each bear some responsibility for the prudential problems (raised by theocracy)” (p.15). In light of that fact, he continues, “it will only be through a sustained treatment of a series of *moral* shortcomings in liberalism that these prudential problems will be stabilized and resolved” (pp. 15-16).

Swaine’s first goal is to demonstrate to liberals that theocrats have good theocratic reasons to accept, indeed, even embrace, freedom of conscience. (Liberals have their own reasons, but as they cannot of necessity motivate theocrats, they serve no purpose here.) His argument is rooted in the theocrat’s own admission that people can and do “live wayward, irreligious lives” and that those lives “will not advance people toward valuable otherworldly ends” (p. 41). Given that fact, Swaine argues (and I am simplifying here) that “the theocrat also is committed rationally to the normative view that conscience *must* be free to reject lesser religious doctrines to accept the good [and] to distinguish between good and bad doctrines” (p. 46). Even if such were not the case—if religious commitment did not require such freedom, but instead was best served by living under a theocracy that affirmed one’s own religious doctrine—Swaine wisely points to the practical difficulties involved in getting to theocracy (from, say, liberalism), in deciding whose understanding of “the truth” is correct, and, having perhaps accomplished that, in avoiding the corrosive affects of corruption, a concern of particular importance to the theocrat (why else push for such strict institutions?).

It is perhaps easy to see where the logic leads from here: “Freedom of conscience . . . requires some measure of liberty in social and political affairs” (p. 52), and in particular “a measure of liberty from government” (pp. 69-70). It requires, in other words, liberalism. By that, Swaine does not mean that theocrats need to grin and bear life in liberal society. To his mind, they don’t—sort of. The road he envisions is a middle ground between autonomous theocracies and liberal tyranny, one in which theocratic communities live with “semi-sovereignty.” The trick of this middle ground is to accommodate from both sides; that is, to give a religious community a wide enough berth such that its practices are respected, while at the same time keeping a watchful eye on the rights of its members. In other words, let theocrats have their community, but make sure that they “meet educational and human rights requirements . . . for their entire cohort, without exceptions for women, children or any vulnerable community members” (p. 95).

To flesh this vision out, Swaine discusses, among other things, the educational standards to which theocratic communities must conform and the areas of legal sovereignty that they should be granted. It all sounds eminently reasonable: The education standards, for example, include

“literacy, mathematical competence, and civic knowledge,” a knowledge of liberal rights, and an appreciation for “the values of toleration and respect for people outside their territories” (p. 96). Who could argue with that?

If that sounds like a veiled criticism, it is. The problem here is that in cashing out semi-sovereignty, Swaine fails to leave his readers with a clear sense of its overriding philosophy. Most of what he says makes good pragmatic sense, but, as with anything that makes good pragmatic sense, it is not clear just why any of the conclusions he draws map out a new and/or distinct theoretical terrain.

The discussion of legal sovereignty offers an example. Swaine argues here that semi-sovereignty would, on civil matters, “allow communities to decide internal laws and regulations for adherents, including conditions of membership, regulation regarding property, rules pertaining to marriage and the inclusion and exclusion of outsiders, and other civil matters affecting their community” (p. 99). Again, sounds good. The problem, however, is that while this passage comes nearly 100 pages into the book, none of these 100 pages lay out the reasons why drawing the line with these issues makes more sense than drawing it with others. The throwaway phrase, “and other civil matters,” suggests that, to Swaine, the principled position has been staked out, and that readers will surely know what those other matters might be. Yet when he presses further to argue that “it would be wrong to allow authorities in theocratic communities to inflict serious corporal or capital punishments” (p. 99), those same readers may just as assuredly find themselves groping, as I was, to see how all of these positions are held together by a distinct principle.

In the final chapter, “Inspiring Public Reason,” Swaine seemingly deserts philosophic discourse altogether, relying instead upon a steady stream of publicly reasonable, but frustratingly uncontentious, arguments. Here, for instance, Swaine entreats liberals to fight against the tendency to behave in “unacceptable and at times openly despicable ways when characterizing and treating minority practices,” noting that “these groups could grow to exist in harmony with liberalism and liberal institutions, and I dare say the world would be better off if they did so” (p. 130). Later, he warns that “governments will also have to be vigilant in watching for outbreaks of physical violence,” and that “while governments should be chary in attributing violent or abusive behavior to religious communities, actual negligence and abuse must not be tolerated” (p. 132-33). Throughout much of the chapter, I kept wondering, “What would the opposite view be?” Would anyone, for instance, really think that liberals should *not* “engage members of ambitious theocratic groups in constructive dialogue” (p. 141), or that liberal critical actions should *not* “be performed in good faith” (p. 155)? Is it even logically possible to refute the notion that “liberals should only censure

other parties where they have adequate reason to think that the condemnation is deserved” (p. 155)?

Perhaps this is a gratuitous—even mean-spirited—cherry picking of passages, but my frustrations stem from a nagging sense of unfulfilled promise. Swaine has addressed an issue of pressing political importance, has done so with concern and intelligence, and, with his argument that theocrats, qua theocrats, must necessarily uphold freedom of conscience, offered an original and helpful contribution to our thinking on these matters. What he has not done, however, is to provide anything but the beginning of a conceptual framework for clarifying liberalism’s encounter with theocracy. It is a good beginning, but as he is not yet able even to sustain the political conclusions he draws, Swaine perhaps needs to spend more time on the framework and less on the politics.

Peter Lindsay
Georgia State University

Galderisi, Peter F., ed. *Redistricting in the New Millennium*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005. 344 pp. (\$90 cloth).

The proliferation of scholarly research examining redistricting and representation has continued to increase since the last round of redistricting following the 2000 census. *Redistricting in the New Millennium* is yet another well-edited contribution to this area of research. Galderisi has successfully coalesced contributors from around the country in this compilation of manuscripts that address legal and political issues that impact the redistricting process and the larger issue of representation.

The book is divided into four parts that contain fourteen chapters written by exceptionally well-known and respected scholars in the field. Part one of the book serves as an introduction, as well as an historical guide to reapportionment and redistricting. Part two examines the broader issue of race and redistricting, and part three is a collection of case studies that address redistricting in individual states and groups of states. Part four offers a glimpse into the future of redistricting in the United States.

The opening chapter by Galderisi and Cain lays the foundation for the book by summarizing the tough questions that the chapters address as a whole. In addition, they point to the six major topics that have shaped the redistricting debate since 1965: political professionalization, incumbency advantage, rising partisanship, term limits, court intrusion, and the role of reform groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational

Fund. These items, as well as others, shape the context in which the chapters are written.

In chapter two, Gary Cox begins by reviewing “the systemic effects of redistricting in the United States since the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in *Baker v. Carr* and *Wesberry v. Sanders*” (p. 17). He finds that the Court’s decision in both of these cases did not substantially change the redistricting process in the 1960s. However, he does note that the actions of the Court brought about three major changes that directly conflict with popular sentiment. First, the Republican bias in the conversion of votes into congressional seats vanished. Second, incumbency advantage increased precipitously (Desposato and Petrocik, in chapter three, find, using 1990s data, that the incumbency advantage does diminish to some extent when congressional districts are redrawn and new voters are brought into the picture). And last, increases in suburban and urban voters led to a change in policy toward those geographical regions.

The fourth chapter, by Richard N. Engstrom, integrates measures of recent boundaries into models of voter participation to create a test of the relationship between electoral district characteristics and citizens. He posits three hypotheses: “More compact districts will be associated with higher voter turnout,” “districts with a higher degree of conformity to preexisting political boundaries will be associated with higher voter turnout,” and “districts with a higher degree of conformity to media market boundaries will be associated with higher voter turnout” (p. 67-68). Using digital maps of the electoral districts in 1994, 1996, and 1998, he finds that district compactness is not necessarily associated with higher levels of voter turnout. Further, he finds no evidence to support his second hypothesis that district conformity to county boundaries is related to voter turnout. Specifically, “people who live in districts with a greater degree of conformity to county boundaries are not more likely to turnout than those in districts with a lesser degree of conformity to county boundaries” (p. 74-75). Lastly, he shows that district conformity to media market boundaries is systematically related to voter turnout. Using a voting tendency model to predict the relationships, only the media-market congruity variable is significant and in the correct direction.

Part two of the text covers the sub-theme, “Race and Redistricting in the Old and New Millennia.” David Canon, Anthony A. Peacock, and Florence P. Adams contribute to this section respectively. Canon provides a summary of the historical and legal background on race redistricting through an examination of the Constitution, Jim Crow laws, significant pieces of legislation (Voting Rights Acts (VRA) of 1965 and 1982), and substantive court cases that have significant impact on the election of racial minorities. He argues that the courts should exercise restraint because recent decisions have left the “status of majority-minority districts in doubt” (p. 109). In my opinion, one of the most important statements in this text is found in his

conclusions: “If white politicians and black politicians were completely interchangeable in terms of representation, the fairness of the process would be much less important. Most white representatives from black-influence districts do not spend much time representing their black constituents, while most black members of Congress spend a substantial proportion of their time representing white constituents” (p. 111). While these statements do not nullify research by Swain (1995) and Endersby and Menifield (2000), they do raise other questions with respect to the desire and ability of white and black members of Congress to effectively represent all of their constituents.

Peacock follows the same course that Cannon set up by arguing that the VRA should not be renewed in 2007. He argues that translating and enforcing the pre-clearance requirements of the Act are challenging both logistically and constitutionally because it contradicts the provision of the Equal Protection Clause in the 14th Amendment. Adams, in chapter 7, compares the redistricting plans used in Arizona, Florida, and California with respect to the treatment of minority groups in lieu of court decisions and U.S. Department of Justice regulations. Specifically, she discusses the importance of the Hispanic vote as legislators, the courts, and other parties try to navigate the redistricting question, while attempting to satisfy the needs of the party.

Part three of the book is a collection of case studies that examine redistricting. Grofman and Brunell, in chapter 8, examine a term they call a “dummymander.” A dummymander is a gerrymander by the party in control of the redistricting process that, over the course of the decade, benefits the other party. They address this term by examining election data based upon the district lines drawn in 1992 and 2000 in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Chamberlain, in chapter 9, examines the impact of the first legislatively drawn districts in Michigan since the mid 1920s. Despite geographical evidence that shows that county, city and township borders were respected, Republicans were able to draw the lines in such a way as to increase the likelihood of their electoral success.

Jacobson, in chapter 10, discusses how the often divisive partisan redistricting process in California prior to the 2002 elections turned into a relative protection plan for both parties. Despite having the majority, Democrats chose not to aggressively pursue a plan that would potentially reign in the five new House seats for the party. The political consequences of pursuing such a plan led to a decline in competition for House seats and a polarization of the parties.

From a broad perspective, Burden, in chapter 11 focuses on the ramifications of having one party dominate the legislature. His study examines the redistricting process in the state of Massachusetts, where Democrats have an overwhelming majority. Despite the majority, interparty conflicts

and cleavages nearly compromised the electoral fortunes of one long-term incumbent in 2001.

Squire completes part 3 of the book with a study of redistricting in Iowa. Unlike most states, Iowa has a state law that authorizes a nonpartisan body to draw legislative districts. As a result of the law, the state had the dubious distinction of having the most competitive congressional elections in the country in 2002.

The last section of the book examines the future of redistricting, given the dynamics of the court and the continued partisan battles. In offering solutions to the dilemma, McKee and Shaw discuss the concept of “reredistricting.” They focus their study on the state of Texas, where Republicans sought to undo the gains made by Democrats when they controlled the process. They examine racial and incumbent gerrymandering, the role of congressional leadership, the legal ramifications of redrawing legislative districts twice in the same decade, and partisan ploys.

Richard L. Engstrom concludes the book by recommending the removal of the courts from the redistricting process. His argument is based on the “fair and effective representation” premise of the Court’s decisions in *Baker v. Carr* and *Wesberry v. Sanders* (p. 313). He proposes an election system that utilizes multimember or other alternative voting systems: for example, limited, cumulative and preference voting. He says “these systems would take the emphasis off of party and group majorities within a legislative district and replace it with a system that would provide prospects for groups that receive sizeable but less than majority support within a district” (p. 334). Further, it would provide a chance for other groups that share common interests and values that are not based on geographical boundaries to elect someone who shares their interests and values.

Overall, this book is an excellent contribution to the growing body of literature that encompasses redistricting and representation, as well as to the field of political science in general. It is very likely to stimulate a plethora of research as the decade draws to a close. I would highly recommend this book as a primary text in courses that address redistricting, representation and elections, as well as make it a prerequisite reader for those who are involved in the redistricting saga at all levels of government.

References

- Swain, Carol 1995. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress*. 2d. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Endersby, James W. and Charles E. Menifield. 2000. “Representation, Ethnicity, and Congress: Black and Hispanic Representatives and Constituencies.” In Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh and Lawrence J. Hanks *Black and Multiracial Politics in America*.

Charles E. Menifield
University of Memphis

Rosenblum, Marc R. *The Transnational Politics of U.S. Immigration Policy*. La Jolla, CA: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego, CCIS Monograph 3, 2004. 128 pp. (\$14.95 paper).

Through a monograph series on transnational migration, the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California, San Diego, presents work by emerging scholars based largely on master's theses and dissertations. The slender volumes in the series tackle large theoretical issues at the forefront of studies of migration between Latin America (especially Mexico) and the United States.

Accordingly, Marc Rosenblum, a political scientist from the University of New Orleans, offers an original study that aims big—to build analytical bridges between the fields of international relations and American politics in order to construct a comprehensive theory of American policymaking on migration. He focuses on migration policy in an era of national prominence—the 1980s and 1990s—to build an “intermestic” model of decision-making among key political and institutional actors, domestic and foreign.

Rosenblum questions the adequacy of scholarship in accounting for competing or contradictory tensions in American policymaking on immigration. On the one hand, American policymakers produce restrictionist policies that include stricter border enforcement and the curtailing of immigrant rights. On the other hand, a number of “pro-immigrant,” or liberal, immigration policies are adopted as well, such as increases in immigrant and refugee admissions. Rosenblum faults the lack of good models produced by political scientists and immigration analysts to explain these contradictory trends in policy outcomes. He argues that “one-level models” typically focus on domestic group competition or on international aspects of migration, but not both.

The author argues that migration policymaking can best be understood as a “two-stage, two-level game” involving three principal actors: Congress, the president, and migrant-sending states. Whereas Congress and other domestic actors are accountable primarily to U.S. constituents, they will reflect those interests in negotiations on migration policy. At the same time, while Congress must be attentive to public opinion and other domestic political considerations, presidents are primarily concerned with the U.S. position on the broader international stage. As Rosenblum puts it, “when domestic veto players and international partners disagree, presidents may exploit the reluctance of one side to extract concessions from the other” (p. 17).

Key to Rosenblum's model of immigration policymaking is the “strategic environment,” defined by the salience of immigration in domestic

politics and its foreign policy value. Domestic salience refers to the level of popular attention given to immigration issues. Foreign policy value is “the importance of migration to U.S. bilateral relations with particular states and the importance of those states for the overall U.S. foreign policy agenda” (p. 41). Rosenblum hypothesizes that under conditions of low salience, domestic interest groups and their congressional agents will dominate migration policy, whereas high salience produces popular demands for restrictionism that will constrain Congress. As the foreign policy value of migration increases, presidents and migrant-sending states exert more influence in policymaking, and thus migration policy likely becomes a tool of foreign policy. Four policymaking modes result from varying conditions in the strategic environment: client politics, popular restrictionism, migration as foreign policy, and interbranch conflict outside the legislative process.

Rosenblum characterizes the strategic environment during specific time periods by analyzing official documents, such as congressional reports, studies of presidential commissions, public and private agency position papers, public statements of key actors, and secondary sources. He constructs useful empirical measures of public opinion and media attention to immigration to bolster his analysis of the qualitative data. He also draws from 120 interviews, conducted between 1998 and 2001, with government officials and political elites from the United States, Mexico, and Central America.

In the end, he finds that his model of the strategic environment explains the passage of specific pieces of congressional legislation: the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), the Immigration Act of 1990, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. In the fourth case, spanning the years 1997-2000, U.S. foreign policy toward Central America is the outcome.

This work makes several noteworthy contributions toward understanding American policymaking on immigration. Rosenblum puts the presidency back into immigration policymaking, noting presidential attentiveness to both domestic and foreign policy concerns. His work also places migrant-sending states into the policymaking mix as central rather than marginal actors, suggesting that Latin American nations exercise more influence than in the past in their relations with the United States. The author’s intermestic approach thus moves analysis beyond the more common scholarly focus on congressional and domestic interest group behavior to account for American immigration policy.

Shortcomings of the work include the lack of conceptual clarity in some concepts and definitions. For example, Rosenblum’s dependent variable is somewhat fuzzy. It is not clear whether his primary purpose is to explain policymaking modes or to account for the inclusive versus restrictive

nature of migration policy outcomes. Similarly, he does not grapple with the fact that policy outcomes may contain both restrictionist *and* expansionist features. The 1986 IRCA is a case in point as it contained employer sanctions, border enforcement, and legalization provisions all in one legislative package.

While this reviewer is not wedded to disciplinary boundaries and sub-field demarcations, some of the author's interpretations, omissions, and mistakes (his reference to the Secretary of Justice instead of the U.S. Attorney General) raise questions regarding his understanding of American politics. In particular, the book's treatment—and dismissal—of domestic interest groups in immigration policymaking is problematic.

In his review of the interest-group literature, the author summarizes interest group advocacy as largely “pro-migration,” understating the influence of organized forces for immigration restriction, especially during the time frame of his study. Moreover, the diversity of interest-group networks on migration policy in the contemporary period is not sufficiently acknowledged.

In the final analysis, Rosenblum excludes interest groups from his policymaking model by noting that “legislation and policy enforcement are executed by agents with formal institutional standing,” and interest groups as non-state actors are “ultimately endogenous to an institutionalized policymaker approach” (p. 22). Such a position, while defensible, understates the interrelationships across formal and informal policymaking arenas. Further, through interviews with legislators and their staff, Rosenblum finds that migration policy is “overwhelmingly constituent-driven” (p. 10), with interest groups ultimately taking a back seat to constituent opinion. What the author fails to consider are the political incentives for members of Congress to downplay the role of “special interests” in their decision-making and to highlight their responsiveness to constituent demands.

Despite its shortcomings, Rosenblum's work offers an important intermestic analysis of American policymaking on migration. This concise but informative work holds its own among an increasing number of studies on transnational politics as practiced in the United States.

Christine Marie Sierra
University of New Mexico

Ceaser, James W. and Busch, Andrew E. *Red Over Blue: The 2004 Elections and American Politics*. Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. 208 pp. (\$55 cloth; \$19.95 paper).

What explains the victory of George W. Bush and the Republican Party over John F. Kerry and the Democrat Party in November 2004? James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch address the question incisively in their fourth book examining American elections. This is a valuable book for understanding the reasons for Americans' choice of red over blue in 2004, but there are limitations to the analysis.

This book is more than just a journalistic account of the election; nor is it intended for what Ceaser and Busch refer to as "the more formal-minded among political scientists" (p. 77). In fact, the more "formal-minded" political scientists might be the group that finds this book has the least to offer. Still, it is useful in that it gives a detailed analysis of contemporary politics. However, there is little that grounds it in terms of current political science research.

That is not to say that the book is void of material of interest to political scientists, or that it is completely out of touch with current political science. There is a strong attempt to understand current American politics through the lens of American electoral politics theory, as well as an effort to enhance that theory through the authors' own understanding of contemporary electoral politics. For example, a primer on Walter Dean Burnham's realignment theory, as well as a brief discussion of David Mayhew's recent work debunking critical realignment theory, are provided in an attempt to place the 2004 election in historical perspective, particularly one that would be of interest to political scientists, formal-minded or not. The authors do this by trying:

to combine the best of Burnham and the best of Mayhew...by setting forth a minimal definition of a realignment that, in the spirit of Mayhew's critique, divorces the concept from the grand theoretical claims made on its behalf [and] by drawing on Burnham . . . treating the imaginative claims linked to realignment theory as questions or hypotheses, which can be analyzed to see what light, if any, they shed on the current situation (p. 22).

In addition, all of the segments dealing with changes or reforms in the nomination process are aided by the fact that Ceaser is well recognized as one of the foremost authorities (if not *the* authority) on the topic, and has been so for quite some time.

The book is well organized and a very interesting read. It opens with an introductory chapter describing the landscape of contemporary American

electoral politics and a clear description of what the rest of the book will be about. There is a chapter on the Bush presidency, followed by an examination of the Democratic Party's nomination process. After a thorough assessment of the general election campaign, Ceaser and Busch present an extensive review of congressional and state elections. Finally, they conclude with a chapter discussing electoral reform and the issues facing both the Democratic and Republican Parties in the near term.

One of the more noticeable problems with the book is the appearance of a lack of objectivity. I am not sure what motivates the authors to do this, but there is a clear slant toward viewing the Republican Party favorably and the Democratic Party unfavorably. Perhaps the authors were over-sensitized to accusations that academics tend to be liberal Democrats and they bent over backwards to avoid that charge, or maybe they are just partisan Republicans themselves. Neither explanation matters because a book such as this should strive to achieve neutrality, lest its utility be questioned.

Examples abound here of prose favoring Republicans. For instance, in discussing the midterm elections of 2002 and Karl Rove's suggestion that Republican candidates "run on the war," the authors write, "Republicans started from a position of strength, and then cleverly trapped Democrats who had sought to gain ground on this issue" (p.50). Their description of the invasion of Iraq drips with admiration as well: "Yet, by historical standards, the Iraq campaign has to be considered a marvel of military planning and execution" (p. 59). The authors' reduction of Bush critics is another example detracting from the overall value of the book: "It was not a coincidence that many of Bush's most vehement critics were European intellectuals, who had long imbibed the moral skepticism of the age, and those Americans who hoped to make their country as much like Europe as possible" (p. 65). A comparison of the Democratic and Republican conventions would be difficult to verify empirically as well: "Although the Democrats had the rest of Hollywood, the Republicans had the Terminator, and it was no match" (p. 121). In a similar manner, their descriptions and comparisons of the "new" and "old" media show distinct preference for the "new." Sentences such as these are often enough to make me abandon reading a book, which in this case would have been unfortunate, given that much of the rest of it is a worthwhile read.

Despite these shortcomings, the analyses presented in the book are interesting and informative. The weaknesses sprinkled through earlier portions are long forgotten by the final chapter, the strongest chapter of the book. Here the prospects for electoral reform and the political realities both parties presently face are offered in a sobering, thoughtful tone.

This volume should be utilized extensively in undergraduate electoral politics courses. It is an excellent choice for scholars wanting a concise description of contemporary American electoral politics.

Roy Dawes
Gettysburg College

Busch, Andrew E. *Reagan's Victory: The Presidential Election of 1980 and the Rise of the Right*. Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2005. 237 pp. (\$35 cloth; \$16.95 paper).

One Friday evening I sat down with my wife and children to watch *Miracle*, Disney's retelling of the United States' hockey victory over the Soviet Union in the 1980 Olympics. I paused the movie frequently (to my family's chagrin) to explain to my children the significance of that victory and the reasons for that significance, and to embellish on the filmmaker's laudable attempts to show why the nation's morale was so low. The next morning, June 5, 2004, Ronald Reagan died. The proximity of those two events struck me, for while the hockey victory preceded his presidency, a good measure of Reagan's importance as president was tied to those feelings unleashed when we were told to believe in miracles. As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said at his funeral, Reagan dedicated himself to "the great cause of cheering us all up."

Andrew Busch, in *Reagan's Victory*, may not directly discuss the ways in which Reagan "restore[d] America's spirit," but he demonstrates convincingly the social and economic conditions that produced "malaise" and asserts that Reagan's genius as president was his unwillingness to accept decline as America's destiny. Part of the significance of the election of 1980, according to Busch, is that it occurred at a time of profound national crisis in economic, social, international conditions, and in public confidence. The election was thus a referendum on this crisis itself, and by extension the possibilities in America's future. Voting for the incumbent would further the crisis, while taking a chance on the challenger would perhaps renew America's promise. The starkness of this choice, according to Busch, helped make the election of 1980 one of the "truly pivotal" ones in American history (p. 188).

Busch has a genuine feel and sympathy for the essence of Reagan's America—one characterized by hope, idealism, prosperity, peace through strength, and liberty—as well as an apparent antipathy for then President Jimmy Carter's America—characterized by high interest rates, high unemployment, high inflation, high taxation, high deficits, a feckless foreign

policy, strategic failure, and an inability to articulate American purpose. This contrast is well developed in the third chapter, which describes in wonderful detail the battles for the parties' nominations. Quoting at length from Reagan's acceptance speech at the Republican convention, Busch notes that the central issue of the election was Democratic culpability for the nation's decline and their unwillingness to admit it was their fault, not the nation's. "They say that the United States has had its day in the sun, that our nation has passed its zenith" Reagan told the delegates. "My fellow citizens, I utterly reject that view. . . . I will not stand by and watch this great country destroy itself under mediocre leadership that drifts from one crisis to the next, eroding our national will and purpose" (p. 84).

This demarcation of the battle lines provides the narrative framework of Busch's text, one which pits "the incipient bankruptcy of American liberalism" (p. 137) against Reagan's "compelling vision of a free, dynamic, prosperous, and strong United States" (p. 139). Critics of Reagan will likely find the book too hagiographical and tendentious; supporters of Reagan will relish the memories the book evokes with its storyteller sense, as well as find copious data demonstrating the failure of political liberalism that paved the way for conservatism as America's new public philosophy. Even Reagan's failures—large deficits, scandals in the administration, the recession of 1981-1982, growing inequity—are argued not to be failures, or at least not Reagan's fault. The one failure Busch does note is that Reagan did not see the hostage crisis of 1979 as the opening salvo in the Islamo-fascist war against the West, and thus did nothing to forestall it. But then again, Reagan was too busy ending the Cold War.

The strength of Busch's book is its ability to see the election as a series of paradigm shifts: from Keynesian economics to theories of unlimited growth; from the New Deal coalition in party politics to a fracturing and resetting of the party system with the religious right as an ascendant player; from accepting Soviet gains as inevitable to believing that victory over the Soviet Union was possible; from expansion of the welfare state to its contraction; from Democratic majorities to Republican ones, and the attendant southern captivity of the Republican Party; and from the centralization of bureaucratic politics to a renewal of federalism and private innovation. Many of these shifts would not become entrenched in policy until the Clinton years, for Clinton's politics were built upon the new paradigm Reagan had created. Furthermore, 1980 marked the turning point of how our electoral system itself works. Changes in campaign financing that erode the authority of parties, the nationalization of congressional campaigns, front-loaded primaries, the end of political conventions as a nominating phenomenon, and the emergent Republican majority all trace back to the 1980 campaign.

In Busch's estimation, Reagan's communication skills and use of the media mattered less than the many connections he made, the ability of his campaign to understand and use the changing rules to its advantage, and the simple clarity of the content of Reagan's message.

Busch's ambitious agenda is to show that in many ways Reagan successfully responded to the economic, foreign policy, and social crises he inherited. The author quite successfully demonstrates with extensive data that these crises existed; he is only slightly less successful in demonstrating that Reagan was up to the task. Indeed, part of Busch's argument is that Reagan demonstrated once again that the presidency itself was manageable and that it was capable of responding to the nation's problems, even if events such as Iran-Contra might have subsequently cast suspicion on this conclusion. By providing the right sort of leadership, the president could lead the nation's citizens to draw upon their own creative reserves to solve any problem put before them.

Still, I could not help but feel that, even in retrospect, the order was too tall for any person to fill—or at least ought to be. While it is cheering to know the presidency still matters, it is a little unnerving to think that it matters that much.

Jeffrey Polet
Hope College

Burns, Peter. *Electoral Politics Is Not Enough: Racial and Ethnic Minorities and Urban Politics.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006. 192 pp. (\$60 cloth).

The last three decades have seen a growth in the literature of urban politics concerning minority representation in local governments. Two main research paradigms have dominated the analyses on the effectiveness of different strategies for minority representation. The first paradigm suggests that in order to empower minority groups, minorities must first gain power in the electoral arena. The second paradigm, in contrast, emphasizes regime building and downplays the role of electoral offices in minority substantive representation. Peter Burns's new book clearly belongs to the second paradigm, as the title of his book reflects.

The book is an admirable effort to explain the political history of minority interests in four Northeastern cities. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the literature of minority representation at the local level. Burns intentionally divided the scholarship on minority representation along the dimensions of electoral politics, which he calls the "conventional channel,"

and community politics (such as neighborhood groups), which he calls “unconventional resources.” Using Browning, Marshall and Tabb’s 1984 classic study of electoral politics, *Protest is Not Enough*, as the main target of his criticism, Burns argues that unconventional resources are more important for the unreformed cities in the Northeast to represent black and Latino interests.

Burns nicely compares the similarities and differences between reformed and unreformed cities. Nevertheless, one sees a clear dilemma in the relationship between the geographic pattern of cities and Burns’s assertion about the limitation of electoral politics for minority representation. To be more specific, the current literature on urban politics suggests that the single-member-district (SMD) system provides better opportunities for minorities to win local elections. SMD, as Burns indicates in his literature review, is more likely to be used in the unreformed Northeast and Midwest. Based on this logic, blacks and Latinos should have greater opportunities to use electoral politics in the Northeast and Midwest. Yet Burns argues that electoral politics may be effective only in the South and West, where at-large elections are more common.

Burns’ emphasis on the importance of unconventional channels is theoretically based on the urban regime theory developed by Clarence Stone. Surprisingly, Chapter 1 does not mention urban regime theory at all. This avoidance of regime theory in Chapter 1 is likely due to the author’s plan to criticize the literature of urban minority representation, especially to attack electoral political analysis. But without setting up his own theory and hypotheses, Chapter 1 can only serve as a literature review, and one cannot develop a clear sense about how to test, not to mention how to falsify, Burns’ own arguments.

Chapter 2 summarizes the characteristics of four Connecticut cities—Bridgeport, Waterbury, Stamford, and Hartford—based upon political, economic, and demographic variables. While Burns cited Rodney Hero’s critique of Browning et al.’s study of Northern California, because of the lack of variation in their main variables (p. 6), the same criticism can be applied to Burns’ own study because all of his four cities are from one state, Connecticut.

Chapter 3 reports the survey procedures and results. Though the appendices are used to provide more information about the interviews, the book is vague on the sampling process. For instance, there is no discussion of the procedures used to minimize selection bias (e.g., gender effect, timing and frequency of interviews), and no discussion on the reliability and validity of the measurement of the dependent variable—the awareness index. Arguing against the individual-level interview data, Burns chooses to use a measurement that relies on both white and minority leaders’ collective identification

of important issues facing minorities. Furthermore, there is no explanation of why his measure “trades some statistical reliability to more fully examine which socioeconomic, political, and unconventional factors influence city leaders’ tendencies to represent minority interests” (p. 43). Consequently, with the dependent variable constructed as an aggregate measure, the main empirical analysis is only based on bivariate relationships, and there is no controlled-comparison method used for examining the explanatory power of his independent variables.

Chapters 4 and 5 are case studies. Chapter 4 analyzes education and public safety policy areas in the four cities. Chapter 5 is a case study of Bridgeport neighborhood organizations, which are the key to success in the author’s measure of responsible government. Two stories concerning minority gerrymandering and environmental protection are used to suggest that by establishing and using neighborhood organizations in the late 1990s, the city finally responded to the minority interests. However, Burns does not link this finding with the current literature very closely. For example, previous studies suggest that very few local minority groups can win voting-rights lawsuits against the government without help from national interest groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Interestingly, Burns mentions Jesse Jackson’s participation in Bridgeport’s campaign for a better environment in the minority neighborhoods—an indication of national involvement in the local issue. Burns, however, does not address whether the responsiveness of Bridgeport government to minority interests in the late 1990s was indeed a result of national minority interest groups involvement in Bridgeport’s local fights.

Chapter 6 serves as both a theory-building and a concluding chapter. The author once again turns his criticism to the incompetence of electoral politics in unreformed Northeastern cities. Contrary to his belief in neighborhood organizations, Burns may give his readers the impression that electoral politics does matter. One may, for instance, speculate, based on Burns’ own report, that it was the winning of a voting-rights lawsuit that secured the majority-minority districts in Bridgeport and finally empowered the minorities in city hall. Burns attempts in this last chapter to integrate regime politics into his theory building. But he fails to discuss whether it takes electoral politics in the first place to build a regime.

Burns’ book could be greatly improved by linking his findings to another important work dealing with the Northeastern urban area—*City: Urbanism and its End*, by Douglas Rae (2003), which argues that the failure of black political succession can be explained by the long-term trend of urbanism. Many factors may jointly work together to limit minority representation in the government. These factors at least include the decline and delocalization of business, the shift of labor politics from private to public

and nonprofit institutions, the rise of nonprofits such as hospitals, the declining significance of political parties, and the rising power of state governments in the federal government structure.

Baodong Liu
University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh

