

*Stepping Stone to the White House or Tombstone
on Presidential Ambition: Why Senators Usually Fail
When They Run for the White House*

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Studies divide over which offices are the best position from which to seek the presidency. This study looks at how candidates from various backgrounds perform in the competition for resources and votes in presidential nomination campaigns. The study also sheds light on Burden's (2002) "candidate pool" and "candidate investment" hypotheses. As a group, senators are found to be relatively weak fundraisers, receive less campaign news coverage, and attract less public support than presidential candidates from most other backgrounds. Senators as a group are more variable than other groups of office-holders, but not significantly so. Most but not all senators who enter the race appear to invest themselves in their campaign.

What is the best position from which to run for the presidency? The U.S. Senate has long been viewed as a "presidential incubator" and as "the major launching pad for presidential contenders" (Schlesinger 1966; Peabody and Lubalin 1975; Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde 1976; Hess 1986; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987). It is generally believed that nearly all U.S. senators aspire to be president (e.g., Doherty 1999; Berke 2002). More presidential candidates come from the Senate than any other office.¹ Yet senators usually fail when they run (Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde 1976; Burden 2002). One observer refers to the Senate as, "a graveyard of failed White House ambition" (Zuckman 2003, 1). If the Senate is such a strong position to run from, why do senators so often fail when they run?

In portraying the Senate as a strong place to run from, all of these studies assume that senators are advantaged in raising money and attracting media coverage. None actually assesses whether candidates senators gain an advantage in obtaining money and media coverage compared to presidential candidates from other offices. Winning presidential nominations requires appealing for the support of tens of thousands of primary voters since the reforms of the 1970s (e.g., Aldrich 1980; Patterson 1980).² Without the resources need to compete, no candidate can win the nomination—regardless of their ideas, character, and qualifications (Steger 2000, 747; Gurian 1986; Haynes, Gurian, and Nichols 1997; Adkins and Dowdle 2001).³ If senators are less effective in raising money or attracting national media coverage, then they less able to appeal for the support of potential presidential primary

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voters. The first part of the paper assesses whether senators are advantaged in raising money and attracting media coverage compared to other types of candidates.

This study also offers a partial test of Barry Burden's (2002) "candidate pool" and "candidate investment" hypotheses. In the one study to address why senators usually fail, Burden argues that senators lose more often because they are not as strategic about entering the race. Burden hypothesizes that non-strategic behavior leads, first, to a more variable pool of presidential candidates running from the Senate. More strategic behavior by governors results in a stronger pool of candidates running from governorships. Burden also argues that senators invest less in their presidential campaigns compared to other candidates. Low investment by senators could account for their relatively poor rates of success in presidential nomination campaigns. While providing an eloquent theoretical argument, Burden's hypotheses remain untested until now.

Understanding candidates' relative capacities to compete for votes is central to understanding competition and citizen input in the selection of presidents in the post-reform era. Electoral power derives in part from having choices among candidates or parties (Schumpeter 1942, 281-83). Competition among political organizations and leaders provides people with the opportunity to make a meaningful choice in elections (Schattschneider 1960, 140-41; Held 1987, 154-66). Focusing on the relations between candidate backgrounds and the means to compete thus gives us insights about broader questions about political ambition, presidential nominations and ultimately the nature of democracy in the American political system.

I begin with a review of the literature on progressive ambition and the incubator thesis. Then I discuss a number of methodological issues in presidential nomination studies. Next I analyze candidates' media coverage, fundraising and primary vote shares in presidential nomination campaigns. Finally, I analyze the pool of senators running for the presidency to determine whether senators' investment in their campaigns affects their success.

The U.S. Senate as a Stepping Stone to the Presidency

Schlesinger (1966; 1975) argues that the serious presidential candidates are career politicians who exhibit progressive ambition (see also, Aldrich 1980). Progressive ambition refers to the pattern of building career credentials for a bid for higher office (Schlesinger 1966, 10). Offices with more prestige, power, and a larger constituency base are seen as stepping-stones to higher office (Rohde 1979). State legislatures are stepping-stones to the U.S. House (Mezey 1971). The House is a stepping-stone to the Senate (Brace 1984; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993). Governorships and Senate seats are viewed

as the main stepping-stones to the presidency (Schlesinger 1966; Peabody et al. 1976; Abramson et al. 1987; Adkins 2000).

In the progressive ambition framework, the Senate came to be viewed as the premier place from which to run for the presidency. Peabody et al. (1976, 240) attribute this to the nationalization of politics and policy after World War II, which made experience in Washington more valuable in terms of credibility and familiarity on national and international issues. Aldrich (1980, 32-38) and Abramson et al. (1987) attribute it to the decreasing efficacy of state and local party organizations and the growth of presidential primaries.⁴ Senators are seen as advantaged in candidate-centered campaigns of mass appeal because they gain more national visibility through media coverage of their activities in the Senate (Peabody et al. 1976, 247; Robinson and Appel 1979; Hess 1986) and have greater access to money (Peabody et al. 1976, 251). Finally, senators are advantaged because their unlimited, six-year terms and electoral security give them flexibility in deciding when to run and enable them to run with less risk to their current positions (Peabody et al. 1976; Abramson et al. 1987).⁵ Thus the conventional view is that senators are quality presidential candidates who can be selective about when they run, which should make them effective presidential contenders.

Yet few senators have been able to win their party's presidential nomination. The central hypothesis of this paper is that senators are not advantaged in the competition for presidential nominations. All of the preceding ambition studies presume that senators' location in Washington, D.C. provides them with an advantage in raising money and attracting media coverage. This matters because money and media became more important in presidential nomination campaigns with the proliferation of primaries (Patterson 1980; Arterton 1984; Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995; Adkins and Dowdle 2001; Haynes et al. 2004).

The main factors affecting fundraising in presidential nomination campaigns are candidates' initial fundraising base (reflected in constituency size or ties to particular social-identification groups or to national party activists), positions of congressional leadership, position in an ideological spectrum, money spent raising money, and candidates' performance as the campaign progresses (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995, ch. 5; Hinckley and Green 1996; Adkins and Dowdle 2001). Most senators who run for the presidency lack party leadership positions, ties to national organizations aligned with their party; and gain no advantage over other presidential contenders with respect to the other factors affecting fund-raising. This means that few senators are likely to be successful raising funds on the scale needed to compete effectively in presidential nominations. Technology also neutralizes the advantage of a Washington, D.C. location by enabling more candidates to

tap prospective contributors from across the country. Direct mail enabled non-D.C. based candidates to raise large sums of money as early as 1976—witness George Wallace. The emergence of the internet as a fundraising tool further decentralizes fundraising, as Howard Dean’s candidacy in 2004 illustrates. Thus senators are expected to have no fundraising advantage over other types of candidates.

The other major competitive factor in appealing to voters in a presidential nomination is media coverage—especially for candidates who cannot raise as much money (Haynes et al. 2004). The conventional view of senatorial advantage in this regard is based largely on studies finding that senators who run for the presidency do receive more coverage from the networks (Robinson and Appel 1979; Weaver and Wilhoit 1980; Hess 1986; Squire 1988).⁶ “Television has made the Senate the mother of presidents. . . . The senators get coverage and stature; the networks get to cover, in self-fulfilling prophecy, the ‘presidential contenders’” (Robinson 1975, 254-55). These studies, however, compare network news coverage of senators running for the presidency, with news coverage received by other senators. While senators running for the presidency receive more network coverage than other senators, they do not necessarily receive more coverage than other presidential candidates—which is the appropriate comparison group in a presidential nomination campaign. In this context there is no reason to view senators as privileged. Studies of news coverage in presidential nominations find that candidates get news coverage roughly in proportion to their standing in the polls, with some deviation owing to the occurrence of scandals, gaffes, and other non-systematic factors (Patterson 1980; Robinson and Sheehan 1983; Brady and Johnston 1987; Haynes and Murray 1998). Coverage of candidates’ activities in government does not relate significantly to performance in presidential nomination campaigns (Robinson and Sheehan 1983; Steger 2002). Thus the hypothesis is that senators do not have an advantage in media coverage compared to other types of presidential candidates.

This study also provides at least partial tests of Burden’s “candidate pool” and “candidate investment” hypotheses. In the first study to focus on why senators typically fail, Burden (2002) argues that senators lose more often because they are not as strategic about entering the race. It is generally accepted that senators have low career risk in running for the presidency, a factor that leads more senators to run (Abramson et al. 1987). Burden (2002, 2005) argues that senators are not as strategic as other kinds of candidates. Other office holders with shorter terms and/or term limits have to spend more time retaining their current positions, so entering the race usually means giving up their present position for a chance at the presidency. Burden argues this makes governors more “careful” in deciding whether to run while senators’ decision is less restricted (p. 101). This leads higher

quality governors entering the race while the pool of senators running varies more in quality (meaning more senators running who are weak candidates, compared to governors). Burden (2002) second argument is that senators lose more often because they invest less in their presidential campaigns compared to other candidates. Burden argues that senators' ability to run without giving up their seat gives them less incentive to "go all out" once they are in the race (p. 87-88). Others like governors and former office-holders "go all out" because they have little to lose once they are in the race. Burden (2002, 87) defined "investment as the extent to which a candidate commits to her or his presidential campaign." Poorer quality candidates and low levels of investment by senators could explain their high rate of failure in these campaigns.

Burden, however, does not assess the variability of the performance of candidates from different offices nor does he assess how much candidates invest in their campaigns. Burden simply reasons that sitting senators' lower nomination success rate reflects "some liability" in running for the presidency (p. 83, 100). The problem, however, is that success rates vary positively with the success of candidates from a position but inversely with the sizes of the candidate pools. For nominations, the numerator in the success ratio is constrained to one nominee per campaign while the denominator increases with the number of candidates running. Since the candidate pools vary in size, positions with more candidates necessarily have lower success rates. The Senate is most affected by this problem since more candidates run from the Senate than from elsewhere. Senators' low success rates thus need not reflect any "inherent liability" of the office—aside from that which encourages more senators to run.

Instead of these effects, Burden's analyses focus on differences in the authority and issues, expectations, structure of the offices that might affect the candidate pools of governors and senators. The three candidate characteristics Burden identifies as being significantly different across offices are age, state size, and region. Senators who run for the presidency are slightly older, tend to come from smaller states, and are less likely to be from the South. Burden does not test whether these factors relate to success in presidential campaigns. Other studies, however, have shown that years of experience in office (which relates to age), state size, and region do not significantly affect candidate's primary vote shares once campaign finances and news coverage are taken into account (Steger, Adkins, and Dowdle 2004). These factors cannot explain why senators are less effective in seeking presidential nominations.

Burden's hypotheses are worth investigating and they can be tested. If Burden's "candidate pool" hypothesis is correct, then senators should vary more than other pools of candidates in their ability to raise funds, attract

network news coverage, and ultimately to gain votes during the primaries. If Burden's "investment" hypothesis is correct, then senators who invest more in their campaigns are able to raise more money, attract more news coverage and gain more votes in presidential primaries.

Note that candidates' investment, fundraising, media coverage are endogenous—they both affect and reflect candidates' chances of winning. Candidates with a good chance of success in the primaries are better able to raise the funds needed to appeal for votes (Hinckley and Green 1996; Adkins and Dowdle 2001), and the media disproportionately cover the candidates likely to win (Patterson 1980; Robinson and Sheehan 1983). Senators facing long odds in the nomination campaign may minimize their investment of time and energy, and effectively reduce their odds of success. Thus candidate investment, fundraising and media coverage are indicators of success as much as they are causes of candidate success. This does not pose a problem for this study since both relate to and largely define the concept of candidate strength in a campaign. If senators as a class are strong presidential candidates, they should attract more money and media coverage and be more successful in these campaigns. That is what strong candidates do, and what for our purposes—determining which backgrounds produce strong presidential candidates.

Data and Methodological Issues

There are several critical methodological issues in presidential nomination studies. The most important are: which races, candidates, and measures of success are most appropriate.

First, the analysis includes only presidential nomination campaigns without an incumbent seeking renomination since the McGovern-Frazer reforms. Incumbents' advantages in media coverage, fundraising, and ability to use government resources deter strong challengers from their own party (Keech and Matthews 1976, ch. 2; Maisel and Stone 1998). No president has lost renomination when seeking it since before the Civil War, so including these races in an analysis of competition would distort the results. Second, the analysis is limited to the post-McGovern-Frazer reform era because the pre- and post-reform nomination systems differ in their operation and selection dynamics (Steger, Hickman, and Yohn 2002).⁷ Third, the analysis is limited to the invisible primary leading up to the Iowa caucuses. Candidate fundraising and news coverage increasingly follow candidate position in the polls once the voting begins (Brady and Johnson 1987; Steger 2002). If senators have media and fundraising advantages over other presidential candidates, that advantage should be greatest prior to the primaries. Analyzing these nomination races over this time frame thus favors finding a

senatorial advantage in presidential nomination campaigns, thereby providing a strong test of the hypotheses.

Since all presidential nomination studies use non-random samples of candidates, another methodological issue is which candidates to analyze. Including or excluding candidates affect results. Burden's (2002) coding rules, for example, exclude Senators Larry Pressler '80, Lowell Weicker '80, Joseph Biden '88, Phil Gramm '96, Arlen Specter '96, and Bob Graham '04, and Governors Douglas Wilder '92 and Pete Wilson '96. Deciding which candidates to include, however, is not straightforward. Dozens of presidential candidates register with the Federal Election Commission (FEC).⁸ Most, however, are never considered serious candidates and only a handful win a significant share of the vote in any caucus or primary. Included in the sample are: 1) all current and former federal and gubernatorial elected officials who officially registered with the FEC—whether or not they remained in the nomination race until the primaries, *and* 2) all candidates who received at least one percent of the primary vote in at least one primary in an election year, including candidates lacking elective office.⁹ These rules enable us to include serious candidates who were winnowed from the race prior to the primaries. These rules exclude notable non-candidates Senator Hubert Humphrey '76 and Governor Mario Cuomo '92 who never formally declared their candidacies or registered with the FEC.¹⁰ The resulting sample includes 30 senators, 6 former senators, 7 governors, 11 former governors, 10 representatives, 2 vice presidents, 2 former vice presidents, 9 former appointed government officials, and 8 with no government experience.¹¹

The third methodological issue is measuring candidate performance. Peabody et al. (1976) measure the number of candidates from an office that win as a percentage of total number of candidates running, i.e., the number of senators running / total number of candidates running. Burden's (2002) measures the number of candidates from an office that win as a percentage of the number of candidates from that office who run, i.e., the number of senators winning / number of senators running. These measures are problematic because success rates vary positively with the success of candidates from a position but inversely with the size of the candidate pool. The numerator in the success ratio is constrained to one nominee per campaign while the denominator increases with the number of candidates running. Since the candidate pools vary in size, positions from which more candidates run necessarily have lower success rates. Testing hypotheses about the relative strengths of candidates requires data with more variation and that reflects the relative competitiveness of candidates.

Candidates' shares of the aggregate primary vote (APV) provides a relational measure for candidates running which has sufficient variance for comparisons between and within candidate pools. The variable also measures the effects of winnowing. Weaker candidates draw less support

and generally drop out of the race sooner; while stronger candidates attract more support and stay in the race longer (Norrander 2000; Haynes et al. 2004). Data on candidates' share of the national primary vote are obtained from Congressional Quarterly's *Guide to U.S. Elections*. Vote share is coded as zero for candidates dropping out before the primaries, to account for the winnowing effect of the invisible primary (e.g., Norrander 2000).¹²

Presidential candidates' money raised and cash reserves are measured from the Federal Election Commission, Quarterly Campaign Expenditure Reports for 1975 to 2004, FEC Form 3P.¹³ These variables, cumulated to January of the election year, measure 1) a candidate's ability to raise money, and 2) cash reserves at the end of the pre-primary season. Candidates with the best chances of winning are those who raise large sums of money and attain high levels of public support without spending much of that money (Adkins and Dowdle 2000; Steger 2000). Because rising costs distort comparisons across elections, each candidate's funds raised and cash reserves are measured as a percentage of all funds raised (cash reserves) of candidates running in each nomination campaign. These measures allow across-time comparisons of the candidates' relative success raising money within each nomination campaign.

The Vanderbilt Television Archives are used to generate an event-count of network news stories that refer to or mention candidates campaigning for the presidential nomination of one or the other major political parties.¹⁴ These event counts are aggregated to obtain a summary count for each candidate. Since a news story may refer to multiple candidates, the sample size exceeds the actual number of network news stories mentioning a candidate in each nomination campaign. The substantive focus of network news stories is coded as "campaign," "governing," "mixed campaign/governing," or "other" categories.¹⁵ Campaign coverage is defined as a news story that mentioned the candidate in the context of any aspect of the campaign. Coverage of candidate's views on a policy matter, in which he or she is not directly involved in the unit of government making decisions, is coded as a campaign story. Governing coverage is defined as a news story that mentioned the candidate in the context of his or her official duties as a government official. Mixed campaign-governing coverage is defined as a news story about the implications of the campaign for events in government or the implications of events in government for the campaign. The other category includes items like Jerry Brown attending the Academy Awards. Since network news coverage of presidential nomination campaigns has declined since 1976, I normalize this variable by scoring each candidate's coverage as a percentage of the coverage received by all candidates in a given nomination campaign. Standardizing coverage as a percentage makes possible valid comparisons across campaigns.

Results and Discussion

I analyze in turn candidates' primary vote shares, news coverage, and fundraising for the full field of candidates from 1975 to 2004. Then I offer a limited analysis of senators running for the presidency to assess the relation between investment and the performance variables.

Candidate Performance in Presidential Primaries

Table 1 presents Burden's NSR and the average share of votes received by sets of candidates in presidential primaries for the 10 "open" nominations between 1976 and 2004. Incumbent vice presidents dominate the primaries when they run. Former vice presidents vary greatly in their success with Mondale winning and Quayle dropping out early. Governors, on average, form the second strongest set of vote getters but they also vary considerably in their primary vote-getting power. Of the seven governors in the sample, three were nominated, one ran well, and three received less than 2 percent of the APV in their nomination campaigns. Two of 11 former governors won their party's nomination while most are not competitive in presidential primaries as indicated by their low median vote share. Though two senators won presidential nominations, senators as a class rank sixth in their APV—just behind political activists lacking governing experience. Senators' median APV of 1.14 percent indicates that most senators were not at all competitive in the presidential primaries. Aside from Dole and Kerry, few senators were even remotely competitive in the primaries. Gary Hart ran strong receiving 95 percent of the vote share won by former Vice President Mondale in 1984. John McCain received almost half as many votes as George W. Bush in 2000. Only three other senators received more than one-tenth of the votes received by the eventual nominee—Al Gore '88, Bob Dole '88, and John Edwards '04. Senators, in short, have been weaker presidential candidates on average than incumbent or former vice presidents and governors.

Senators as a group vary in their vote getting performance as Burden's candidate pool hypothesis predicts. However all of the candidate pools—except vice presidents, exhibit substantial variation around the mean share of votes received by candidates (see Table 1, column 3). With the exception of incumbent vice presidents, none of the category means differ significantly from zero. Senators as a group are only somewhat more variable than the other pools of candidates, with incumbent vice presidents standing out in this regard. The variability of senators' primary performances supports Burden's argument that senators are not strategic about entering the race, but only to a degree since the other sets of candidates exhibit similar variance. Excepting vice presidents, the difference is not significant.

Table 1. Aggregate Primary Votes by Candidate Position, 1976 to 2004

Candidate Position	N	NSR*	Aggregate Primary Vote Share (%)		
			Mean	Median	St. Dev.
Vice President	2	100%	71.76	71.76	5.52
Governor	7	42.9%	24.79	15.26	27.19
Former VP	2	50.0%	18.91	18.91	26.74
Former governor	11	18.2%	12.96	3.48	19.89
Senator	30	6.7%	8.95	1.14	16.65
No government / activist	8	—	8.91	5.67	10.25
Former senator	6	—	7.27	1.78	9.11
Other government	9	—	6.51	3.16	9.13
Representative	10	—	3.70	1.75	4.44
All candidates	85	11.7%	11.49	1.90	18.58

*NSR = Nomination Success Rate, calculated as the number of nominees from each pool of candidates (e.g., Burden 2002).

While senators may not be strategic about race entry, they do appear to be strategic about exiting the race. Senators are consistently among the first to withdraw from the nomination race when it becomes apparent they are unlikely to win. Others, like former office holders and political activists, have nothing to lose from staying in the race even when they are unlikely to win (e.g., Norrander 2000). That senators typically withdraw sooner than other candidates indicates a likely concern about the impact of a continued campaign might on their careers or their standing in the Senate or their political party as Keech and Matthews (1976) argue. This suggests that senators are strategic about exiting a presidential campaign consistent with the arguments of Norrander (2000) and Haynes et al. (2004).

Fundraising

Senator's access to fundraising networks has been over-hyped as a factor in presidential nomination. Senators ranked 7th among the nine types of candidates in average percentage of funds-raised (see Table 2, column 1). Senators on average were surpassed by all but U.S. representatives and other government officials. The only senator to lead the pre-primary competition for money was Bob Dole when he was the front-runner in 1995. Senators' relative weakness as fundraisers is a serious liability in presidential nomination campaigns. Funds-raised before the primaries correlates significantly with the primary vote, $r = .63$, $p < .01$ (see also, Adkins and Dowdle 2000; Mayer 1996).

Table 2. Average Percent of Cumulative Receipts and Cash Reserves at the End of the Preprimary Year, by Candidate Position, from 1976 to 2004

Candidate Position	Average Percentage of Cumulative Funds Raised*	Average Percentage of Cash Reserves*
Vice President n = 2	38.37 (18.25)	46.91 (0.75)
Former VP n = 2	22.29 (26.31)	39.71 (55.50)
Governor n = 7	16.33 (16.57)	31.70 (35.84)
Former Governor n = 11	14.18 (10.63)	11.13 (14.63)
Former Senator n = 6	12.13 (18.56)	10.12 (21.05)
No govt. / activist n = 8	10.98 (11.16)	5.92 (9.02)
Senator n = 30	10.43 (8.08)	9.97 (16.15)
Representative n = 10	7.80 (5.67)	5.17 (7.00)
Other government n = 9	6.31 (5.41)	2.63 (3.24)
All candidates	11.76 (11.52)	11.76 (19.58)

*Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Note: Figures are the group average percentage of funds raised (cash reserves) by the end of January of the election year, with each candidates' funds scaled as a percentage of the total within each nomination cycle.

Senators also tend to fail to conserve funds for the intense competition of the presidential primary season. Candidates who raise funds without spending much of those funds are in the best position going into the primaries (Adkins and Dowdle 2000). Senators as a class ranked 6th among the nine types of candidates—ahead of activists, U.S. representatives, and other government officials. Senators typically have high burn-rates—spending nearly all of their money as they raise it. Senators struggle for traction in the invisible primary and most are unprepared financially for the competition of the primaries. Even Bob Dole was perilously low on funds when the primaries began in 1996. John Kerry's campaign would have been in trouble in

early 2004 had he not made a personal loan of over \$6 million to his campaign. That senators typically fail to build cash reserves is important since cash reserves at the end of the primary season correlates significantly with candidates' shares of the primary vote, $r = .64$, $p < .01$. Adkins and Dowdle (2000) and Steger (2000) find this to be one of the two variables that accurately forecast the presidential primary vote shares.

Senators perform poorly in the competition for money because, one, few of them possess the national fundraising networks needed to run effectively in a presidential nomination; and two, many senators jump into the race without building up their war chest prior to entry. Aside from party leaders and those holding a formal position in national party organizations, senators have no fundraising advantage compared to other presidential candidates.

The most successful candidates running from the Senate were chamber or national party organization leaders or those who transferred substantial funds from their Senate or other PAC accounts upon entering the race. Henry Jackson had been Democratic National Committee chair in 1960 and had run for the presidency in '72. Jackson's campaign had more money on hand than any other candidate at the beginning of 1975.¹⁶ Howard Baker was Senate minority leader in 1979-80 and began his presidential campaign with a substantial campaign fund (Cook 1979, 307). Bob Dole developed substantial fundraising networks through his days as Republican National Committee chair in 1971-72, his successive presidential nomination bids, and through networks built as Senate majority and minority leader (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995, 86). Bob Dole transferred substantial funds to his presidential campaign committee in 1979, 1987, and again in 1995 (Hucker 1979; Alexander and Bauer 1991). Alan Cranston began raising funds in 1981 when he was the Senate minority party whip, and began his presidential campaign with the second largest war chest in 1983. Phil Gramm was the Republican National Senate Committee chair from 1991 to '95, which enabled him to develop a major network of campaign contributors and enabled him to transfer \$4.7 million to his presidential campaign fund.¹⁷ Of the senators who held a formal party position, only Richard Lugar (RNSC chair from 1983-1985) failed to begin his campaign with substantial funds transferred from other accounts.

The other senators to raise money effectively began their efforts well in advance of the primary season and transferred substantial sums to their presidential campaign when they declared their organizations with the FEC. Like Henry Jackson, Lloyd Bentsen, took advantage of the loophole that enabled them to raise contributions of unlimited size prior to January 1, 1975 (Freed 1975a, 403-7; Freed 1975b). Gary Hart transferred more money to his presidential campaign than all of the other democratic aspirants combined in

1983. John McCain transferred \$2 million to his presidential account. John Kerry started his campaign with over \$3 million transferred to his presidential account. Senators who began their race with money raised prior to formally entering the presidential race generally performed well in the competition for money in their nomination campaigns.

Most senators who ran lacked a party leadership position, failed to prepare financially, and were weak fundraisers once in the race. Twenty-two of the 30 senators who ran for the presidency lacked a party leadership position.¹⁸ Sixteen of these began their campaigns with virtually no funds transferred from other accounts.¹⁹ Senators who failed to transfer funds also tended to raise little money during the first and second quarters of the pre-primary year, when presidential candidates usually tap their fundraising bases to build their organizational and fundraising efforts. Senators who failed to prepare financially, but who came from large states, were able to reach a middle level of fundraising success (i.e., John Glenn '84 and Paul Simon '88). That so many senators ran despite failing to build a war chest in advance suggests that they did not plan strategically for their run for the presidency. Instead they appear to have jumped into the race expecting to generate attention and quickly raise funds.

Senators lack a fundraising advantage in part because other kinds of candidates can develop national fundraising networks. Though small by today's standards, Carter built a national network with a mixture of activists and candidates who lost elections in 1974 (Kaufman 1993, 11; Stroud 1977). Reagan developed a national fundraising network through his nomination campaigns in 1968 and 1976 and his leadership PAC, Citizens for the Republic (Cook 1979, 307). John Connally's Citizens Forum and George H.W. Bush's Fund for Limited Government were major sources of funds for their campaigns (Buchanan 1979, 2529). Bush, in particular, benefited from his connections to contributors who were regular donors to Republican National Committee organizations (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995, 83-85). Pat Robertson raised larger sums of money than Senator minority leader Dole in 1988, largely through direct mail solicitations of a donor base built through his years as a televangelist (Runkel 1989, 87-88). Michael Dukakis and Jesse Jackson out-fundraised other Democrats in '88 in part because of support from the ethnic, racial, and religious communities (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995). Clinton developed remarkable networks through the Democratic Leadership Council, the Renaissance Weekend, and now famous FOBs (Friends of Bill) (Walker 1996, 106-109). George W. Bush's fundraising network built on his own network in Texas, his father's substantial organization as well as a powerful band-wagon movement among Republican Party elites (Corrado 2001, 98-99). Gary Bauer's Campaign for Working Families was the second largest PAC by the late '90s—providing him with a substan-

tial network of contributors. Finally, Howard Dean's use of the internet to develop a national network of repeat contributors illustrates how other kinds of candidates can raise funds nationally (Von Drehle and Faler 2003).

In short, candidates inside or outside of Washington, D.C. can build fundraising networks of sufficient scope to finance a presidential nomination bid. Senators can be successful fundraisers, but they need to build their networks and raise money before they run—just like other presidential candidates who become financially competitive. I reject the hypothesis that senators have a fundraising advantage in presidential nomination campaigns. The evidence on fund-raising supports Burden's argument that many senators are not strategic about entering the race. The evidence does not support Burden's candidate pool argument since senators are not more variable than other sets of candidates in this respect. Building financial networks prior to entering the race may be one of the main differentiators between strong and weak candidates.

Media Coverage

Table 3 presents the average share of each set of candidates' network news coverage, as a percentage of all candidate mentions in each nomination campaign. The vice presidency is the strongest position from which to run for a presidential nomination in terms of network news coverage. Vice Presidents Bush '88 and Gore '00 dominated network news coverage before their primaries, receiving similar proportions of exposure in campaign stories but differing in their exposure in governing stories. Bush received mention in five times more governing stories (108) in 1987 than Gore (21 stories) in 1999. Bush's strategy of associating with the Reagan Administration earned him more media coverage while Gore's strategy of distancing himself from Clinton cost him network news exposure. Incumbent senators and governors and former senators, governors and vice presidents received similar shares of news coverage on average (Table 3, column 1). The network news programs paid less attention to political activists, U.S. representatives, and other government officials running for the presidency. Senators do not vary more than other groups of candidates in terms of total network news coverage.

The sets of candidates do differ in their exposure in campaign and governing stories. Senators derive a substantial portion of their total exposure from governing news stories as earlier studies suggest (Table 3, column 2).²⁰ Senators, on average, receive less governing coverage than vice presidents but more than governors and U.S. Representatives. Senators, however, do not benefit from such "bonus coverage" of their activities in government. If vice presidents are dropped from the analysis, the relation between news coverage of candidates in governing stories and the candidates' share of the

Table 3. Average Percent of Total, Governing and Campaign News Stories on Network News Programs, by Candidate Position, 1975 to 2004

Candidate Position	Average Percentage of Candidate Mentions on Network News*	Governing Stories*	Campaign Stories*
Vice President n = 2	49.46 (17.98)	69.62 (42.97)	42.56 (12.76)
Former Senator n = 6	14.56 (11.06)	0	17.18 (15.74)
Former VP n = 2	14.25 (16.03)	0	15.24 (21.55)
Governor n = 7	13.95 (12.11)	7.75 (7.87)	14.86 (18.87)
Senator n = 30	13.39 (11.15)	24.64 (21.67)	10.19 (8.01)
Former Governor n = 11	10.18 (7.83)	0	13.05 (8.45)
No govt./activist n = 8	7.0 (5.76)	0	10.87 (9.67)
Representative n = 10	6.34 (5.71)	6.09 (7.05)	7.47 (5.99)
Other government n = 9	6.05 (4.18)	0	7.78 (6.64)
All candidates	11.76 (11.44)	11.77 (19.89)	11.96 (11.73)

*Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Note: Figures are the groups' average percentage share of network news mentions cumulated to the end of January of the election year, with each candidates' news mentions scaled relative to the total within each nomination cycle.

primary vote is not significant, $r = .10$, $p = .40$.²¹ Eleven of the 30 senators running for president, including John Kerry in 2004, received mention in eight or fewer governing stories prior to the primaries. This is roughly the same as for senators not running for the presidency in these years.

The Senate is a soapbox for those few senators involved in the hot issues that attract media attention. Seven senators account for almost 77 percent of the governing stories mentioning a senator running for the presidency from 1975 to 2004. Of these only Dole proved to be a competitive candidate in the primaries (and Kerry won a nomination despite being one of the least

visible senators to run in a presidential race). Senate Party leaders like Baker and Dole get on the nightly network news more often because they are more consistently involved in the hot issues of the day. The only other senators to receive much governing news coverage were those involved in issues that attracted substantial media attention in a given year. Frank Church received extraordinary exposure during 1975 through his role as chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence Oversight, which held high-profile televised hearings on CIA activities. Henry Jackson received frequent coverage in stories on his committee and subcommittee hearings on oil prices, arms control, and conflicts in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. Phil Gramm was involved in stories on the Medicare debate, the budget deadlock and the government shut-down of '95-'96. Joe Lieberman received coverage in stories on the War on Terror and the Iraq War. While these senators' governing coverage relates to their committee activities, there is no systematic relationship between committees and network news attention for the set of senators running for the presidency.²² The issues within the jurisdiction of any given committee only sporadically become the hot issues covered by the network news. Few if any senators control the issue agenda covered by the media. Rather, senators get coverage when they are involved in the hot issues of the day.

Senators received relatively less campaign coverage in the pre-primary period than other sets of presidential candidates (Table 3, column 3). Only representatives and other government officials averaged less campaign coverage than senators prior to the primaries. Senators also do not vary more than other types of candidates with respect to campaign news coverage. The reason is that campaign coverage closely tracks candidates' position in the polls. Few senators have stood out in the polls. Only 11 of the 30 senators in the sample received more frequent campaign coverage than the average presidential candidate between 1975 and 2004. Only Dole and Kerry in 1995 and 2004, respectively, received more than one standard deviation above the mean presidential candidate' campaign coverage. Candidates' coverage in campaign stories before the primaries correlates significantly and substantially with their shares of the primary vote, $r = .72, p < .01$.

The evidence does not support the conventional view that senators are advantaged by news coverage of their activities in government. Some senators gain media coverage of their activities in Washington but this "bonus" coverage does not help them in presidential nomination campaigns. Few senators running for the presidency are more newsworthy than the average presidential candidate during the campaign. The evidence also does not support Burden's candidate pool hypothesis since senators are not substantially different from other types of candidates in their ability to gain exposure in network news coverage of the campaign.

Senatorial Investment

Burden (2002) argues that senators fare poorly compared to other candidates because they invest less heavily in their presidential campaigns. While we cannot evaluate this claim for the full field of candidates, we can assess its validity among U.S. Senators for whom we have data on attendance on roll call votes. Absenteeism on roll call votes is an imperfect indicator of investment in the presidential campaign, but the measure may not be too far off the mark. Legislators who campaign hard for the presidency typically are away from the Senate floor raising money or campaigning (Ehrenhalt 1983; May 1987; Doherty 1999).

Table 4a presents absentee rates of senators from three years prior to the primaries through two years after the elections. For many senators there is a “ramp up” pattern absentee rates leading up to the primaries and a “return to normalcy” after the primaries. For these “investing” senators, the pattern is one of gearing up for the nomination campaign, devoting time and energy to it, and then practicing a proverbial *mea culpa* after the campaign. Ten of 29 senators increase their absenteeism from the third year to the second year prior to the primaries. Sixteen of 29 senators increased their absenteeism from the second year out to the preprimary year. Twelve of the 24 senators entering primaries increased their absenteeism from the pre-primary to the primary season. These senators missed an average of 60 percent of the roll call votes from January 1 to the date they dropped out of the race or the end of the primary season. Nearly all senators revert to low absenteeism in subsequent years—indicating that absenteeism during the campaigns are deviations from their normal rates of attendance. Only seven of the 30 senators remained constant in their absenteeism before, during, and after their presidential campaign.²³ The differences in absenteeism across years are significant in difference of means tests. Most senators, then do invest in their nomination campaigns though the level of investment varies considerably.

Table 4b shows the difference between the absentee rate of senators in the race and the senatorial average for that year. Positive numbers reflect greater absenteeism while negative numbers reflect lower absenteeism. Most senators either campaigned around their senate schedule or did not campaign during the 3rd and 2nd years before the primaries. The senators running for the presidency have a lower average absentee rate than the average senator in the third year before the primaries. Senators in the race had a negligibly higher rate of absenteeism during the 2nd year prior to the primaries. These results are consistent with earlier observation that most senators fail to prepare for the presidential nomination campaign. Few senators seem to be working hard on their presidential campaigns more than a year before the primaries.

Table 4a. Absentee Rates for U.S. Senators Running for President, 1973 to 2004

Candidate	3 Years Before Primaries*	2 Years Before Primaries*	Year Before Primaries*	While Active in Primaries*	Year After Election*	2 Years After Election
Bayh	14	31	44	63	6	9
Bentsen	11	26	17	19	11	8
Byrd	1	0	0	2	2	1
Church	15	29	19	47	10	9
Jackson H. Baker	1 21	19 21	5 38	30 52	2 3	1 5
Dole	5	5	7	3	2	2
Pressler	—	—	20	—	11	10
Weiker	13	13	13	—	11	14
Cranston	12	11	64	90	4	6
Glenn	6	18	36	88	3	5
Hart	8	6	37	82	3	5
Hollings	6	8	50	81	0	0
Biden	8	6	38	—	2	2
Dole	1	1	5	85	1	0
Gore	1	1	58	97	11	1
Simon	1	1	58	84	2	1
Harkin	2	0	25	83	2	5
Kerrey	0	1	0	70	2	1
Dole	2	1	1	27	—	—
Gramm	7	10	11	95	0	0
Lugar	1	0	4	9	0	0
Specter	4	3	2	—	1	1
Hatch	1	1	2	0	2	4
McCain	2	6	36	100	4	8
Smith	0	1	0	—	2	2
Edwards	1	0	39	81	—	—
Graham	1	0	32	—	—	—
Kerry	2	4	64	88	Na	Na
Lieberman	2	2	54	100	Na	Na
Average	5.1	7.8	30.0	61.5	3.9	4
St. Dev.	5.5	9.4	21.6	34.2	3.7	3.9
n	29	29	30	24	25	25

*Votes counted for the entire year, since candidates formal declaration dates are strategically calculated to maximize media attention and candidates may actively campaign prior to that date.

Note: Votes counted only for dates in which candidate remains in the race. Missing values are for candidates who dropped out prior to the primaries.

Source: Data are derived from Congressional Quarterly Almanac voting participation reports, counting only roll call votes on which a senator voted yea or nay.

Table 4b. Difference between Absentee Rates of Senators Running for President and Average Senate Absentee Rates, 1973 to 2004

Candidate	3 Years Before Primaries	2 Years Before Primaries	Year Before Primaries	Year After Election	2 Years After Election
Bayh	1	17	33	-6	-4
Bentsen	-2	12	6	-1	-5
Byrd	-12	-14	-11	-10	-12
Church	2	15	8	-2	-4
Jackson H.	-12	5	-6	-10	-12
Baker	7	8	28	-4	-1
Dole	-7	-8	-3	-5	-4
Pressler	—	—	10	4	4
Weiker	1	0	3	4	8
Cranston	5	5	57	-1	1
Glenn	-1	12	29	-2	0
Hart	1	0	30	-2	0
Hollings	-1	2	43	-5	-5
Biden	3	1	32	0	-1
Dole	-4	-4	-1	-1	-3
Gore	-4	-4	52	9	-2
Simon	-4	-4	52	0	-2
Harkin	0	-3	22	0	0
Kerrey	-2	-2	-3	0	-4
Dole	0	-4	-2	—	—
Gramm	5	5	8	-1	-3
Lugar	-1	-5	1	-1	-3
Specter	2	-2	-1	0	-2
Hatch	0	-2	0	0	0
McCain	1	3	34	2	4
Smith	-1	-2	-2	0	-2
Edwards	-1	-4	36	—	—
Graham	-1	-4	29	—	—
Kerry	0	0	71	—	—
Lieberman	0	-2	51	—	—
Average	-0.8	0.7	20	-1.3	-2.1
St. Dev.	4.2	6.9	22.6	4.1	4.3
n	29	29	30	25	25

Note: Positive figures indicate greater absenteeism. Negative figures indicate less absenteeism.
 Source: Data are derived from Congressional Quarterly Almanac voting participation reports, counting only roll call votes on which a senator voted yea or nay.

Senators running for the presidency miss roll call votes more frequently than senators not running for the presidency in the year before the primaries. Senators in the race missed an average of 20 percent more votes than the average senator in the year prior to the primaries. Ten of the senators in the race, however, missed less or no more than the average senator not running. These are low-investment presidential candidates and they fit the profile of Burden's hypothesis.

There is substantial difference in absenteeism for senators of the two parties. Democratic senators seeking a nomination have relatively high rates of absenteeism during the year before the primaries. Democrats running missed an average of 36 percent of the votes in the year prior to the primaries, compared to an average of only 11.6 percent for Republicans. This is interesting because Republican and Democratic senators differ in their risk-taking behavior in entering the race (Adkins, Dowdle, and Steger 2006). Democrats who run for the presidency are significantly more likely to be risk-takers compared to Republicans who run for the presidency. Risk-takers may invest in their nomination campaigns more than non-risk takers. This suggests that investment in the campaign may be more a function of risk-taking than as a characteristic of candidates who run from the U.S. Senate.

There is mixed support for the investment hypothesis. Over half of the senators appear to invest heavily in the race *after* they declare their candidacy—inconsistent with Burden's investment hypothesis. About one-third of the senators invest relatively little—consistent with Burden's investment hypothesis. The results also speak to whether senators are strategic about deciding to enter the race. Most senators do not appear to invest heavily *prior* to declaring their candidacies consistent with our earlier observations that many senators do not prepare in advance of their entry into the race. Most senators do invest substantially once they are in the race. Absenteeism during the year before the primaries does not relate significantly with senators' funds raised, campaign coverage, or primary vote shares—indicating that—for senators in a presidential race, investment of time does not affect their success gaining resources during the invisible primary.

It is also worth noting that incumbent vice presidents, governors, and senators run stronger in the primaries, on average, than their retired peers. This result has important implications for the investment hypothesis. Former office holders have much more time available to invest in the nomination campaign compared to incumbents who are tied down to varying degrees by their official duties. Having more time has generally not helped make former office holders more competitive in the primaries compared to their incumbent peers.²⁴ In short, a lack of investment of time, then does not appear to explain why so many senators fail. The inability of most senators to raise substantial sums of money or gain network news coverage probably does.

Conclusions

The Senate can be a valuable stepping-stone to the presidency, but only for a few senators—those using their position to raise substantial funds prior to entering a presidential nomination campaign. Though a few senators received substantial media exposure of their governing activities, such coverage does not significantly relate to their performance in the presidential nomination campaign. Senators have not had an advantage relative to other kinds of presidential candidates on the dimensions that matter for competing in presidential nomination campaigns—raising money and gaining campaign news coverage. Senators' investment of time does not affect their performance in presidential nomination campaign. Most senators invest (higher absenteeism) while they are in the nomination race—whether they are doing well or not.

While senators have flexibility in deciding when to run (Abramson et al. 1987), this does not mean that they can do so whenever they want and still have a good chance to gain the resources needed to succeed. Senators as a class have run poorly in presidential nomination campaigns in part because so many have not laid the groundwork for a presidential campaign. This inference is consistent with Burden's (2002) argument that senators are not be as strategic about entering a presidential nomination race as other types of candidates. The low risks of race entry enable a relatively larger number of senators to "test the waters." Perhaps as many as a third of the senators to enter a presidential nomination race have been this kind of "testing the waters" campaign—entering the race without preparing and not investing much once in the race. Another third of the senators entering the race may be testing the waters, but they invest time and energy in the race. Nearly all senators appear to be strategic with respect to when they exit the race consistent with Norrander (2000) and Haynes et al. (2004). The pattern for most senators is one in which they throw their hat into the ring without much preparation, and then they withdraw if their campaigns do not take off. Only about a third of senators entering a nomination campaign appear to have been serious—preparing for entry by raising money in advance of their entry and investing heavily while in the race. These candidates generally performed well and two became their party's nominee. The success rate of this set of serious senators rivals that of governors.

The progressive ambition theory lays out the logic of a pattern of career building for higher office. The vice presidency, rather than senate seats or governorships, is now the best position from which to seek a presidential nomination. This reflects a notable change in presidential nominations by the major political parties. Neither major party selected a current vice president as its presidential nominee between 1836 and 1960. Since then, Richard

Nixon, Hubert H. Humphrey, Walter Mondale, George Bush, and Al Gore became their party's presidential nominee. Vice presidents are able to secure the resources needed to compete in presidential nomination campaigns—they can raise large sums of money and they get substantial campaign coverage. Candidates from other offices vary in their effectiveness raising money and gaining news coverage. Governors, former vice presidents, former governors and even former senators have been stronger candidates on average than senators have been, but these candidates also vary in their effectiveness raising money and attracting media coverage. The presidency may be qualitatively different from other kinds of offices analyzed in the progressive ambition framework. Being an incumbent with a constituency is not enough. Presidential aspirants have to prepare actively in advance if they are going to compete in nomination campaigns.

NOTES

¹For nominations without an incumbent president seeking renomination since 1976.

²Though primaries mattered prior to 1972 (Reiter 1985), gaining the nomination required the support of party bosses who controlled blocs of delegates (Keech and Matthews 1976).

³Resources are necessary, but not sufficient, to win a presidential nomination (Gurian 1986; Norrander 2000).

⁴Studies making this argument view governors as advantaged in the pre-reform conventions (Peabody et al. 1976).

⁵Eight of the 30 senators were up for reelection when they sought a presidential nomination between 1976 and 2004. Two declared their intentions not to seek reelection to the Senate. Two came from states that allowed senators to run concurrently for the Senate and the presidency. The others dropped out of the presidential race in advance of their state's Senate primary.

⁶Only presidential candidacy, leadership positions, and state size significantly affect network news coverage of senators (Squire 1988). Personal characteristics (seniority, age, gender, minority status) and political variables (years since the last election, majority party membership, bills sponsored, committee position, ideology, and deviation from party positions) are not significant once these variables are controlled for.

⁷1972 differs from subsequent nominations (Barilleux and Adkins 1993).

⁸Filing papers is a non-trivial step for office-holders. It commits the candidate's reputation to the race. Less serious candidates may test the waters without filing. It is also a necessary step for legally raising and spending money for the purpose of a presidential campaign.

⁹I exclude perennial candidates Lyndon LaRouche and Harold Stassen. LaRouche received several percent of the primary vote in six Democratic nomination campaigns, but is an American Labor Party candidate who runs in Democratic primaries to qualify for federal matching funds. Former Governor Stassen ran in 9 Republican campaigns between 1944 and 1996 but never received more than 2 percent of the primary vote after 1948.

¹⁰See Steger, Hickman, and Yohn (2003) for a discussion of Humphrey's "non-campaign" in 1976. Cuomo was considered to be the front-runner for the '92 Democratic nomination until he officially declared he would not run in November 1991.

¹¹Each candidate is coded in the category for which he/she is most commonly referred to in the Vanderbilt TV news abstracts and the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*. Typically, these were the individual's most recent position, but the descriptions are more accurately recognized as referring to the candidate's most prestigious government related position. Lamar Alexander usually was referred to as the former Tennessee Governor and infrequently as a former Secretary of Education—his most recent position. John Connally usually was referred to as former Texas Governor and less often as former Secretary of the Treasury—his most recent position. George H. W. Bush '80 was usually referred to as former CIA director rather than as a former U.S. Representative. Carol Mosley Braun was referred to as a former senator as often as ambassador; she is coded as a former senator. The candidates and offices are: **Governors:** Brown '76, Bush G.W., Clinton, Dukakis, Shapp, Wilder, Wilson; **Former Governors:** Alexander '96 and 2000, Askew, Babbitt, Brown '92, Carter, Connally, Dean, Reagan, Sanford, Wallace; **Senators:** Baker, Bayh, Bentsen, Biden, Byrd, Church, Cranston, Dole '80, '88, and '96, Edwards, Glenn, Gore '88, Graham, Gramm, Harkin, Hart, Hatch, Hollings, Jackson H., Kerrey, Kerry, Lieberman, Lugar, McCain, Pressler, Simon, Smith, Specter, Weiker; **Former Senators:** Bradley, Harris, Hart '88, McGovern, Mosley-Braun, Tsongas; **U.S. Representatives:** Anderson, Crane, Dornan, DuPont, Gephardt '88 and 2000, Kasich, Kemp, Kucinich, Udall; **Vice Presidents:** Bush '88, Gore 2000; **Former Vice Presidents:** Mondale, Quayle; **Other Government:** Buchanan '96 and 2000, Bush '80, Clark, Dole E., Haig, Keyes '96 and 2000, Shriver; **Activist:** Bauer, Forbes '96 and 2000, Jackson '84 and '88, McCormack, Robertson, and Sharpton.

¹²Candidates receive primary votes after they withdraw since they usually remain on the ballot.

¹³Thanks to Randall Adkins and Andrew Dowdle for this data. Any errors are ours.

¹⁴The network news abstracts can be obtained at <http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu>.

¹⁵I only present figures for campaign and governing coverage for presentational clarity.

¹⁶*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, February 22, 1975, p. 405.

¹⁷*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, May 11, 1991, p. 1219.

¹⁸There is a party difference. Six of the 12 Republican senators who ran for the presidency held a leadership position, compared to only 2 of the 18 Democratic senators.

¹⁹Freed (1975b), Hucker (1979); Salant (1995), *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review*, February 8, 1992. p 326; www.opensecrets.com for the most recent nomination races.

²⁰I do not analyze appearances on Sunday morning talk shows. Squire (1988, 151) found that presidential candidates do not get extra attention from these programs, which focus on Washington politics. This suggests that network news coverage of government is similar to the Sunday morning talk shows—focusing on Senate leaders and senators involved in "hot" issues.

²¹Including vice president's governing stories makes the correlation significant, $r = .30$, $p < .01$.

²²Every senator running for the presidency sat on a prestige committee—Budget, Finance, Appropriations, Commerce, or Foreign Relations (see Davidson and Oleszek 2004).

²³Byrd, Weiker, Specter, Hatch, and Smith evidence no deviation in their long-term voting patterns. Dole '80 and Lugar '96 deviate only marginally during the primaries.

²⁴Burden (2002) found that former senators were more successful in the primaries than incumbent senators, but he included in the category of former senators those who went on to become a vice president prior to running for the presidency.

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