

Book Reviews

Richard L. Engstrom, Editor

Barber, Kathleen L., ed. *Proportional Representation and Election Reform in Ohio*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1995. xiii, 383 pp. (\$45.00 cloth; \$16.95 paper).

American political scientists traditionally have defended America's two-party system and in so doing implicitly have defended the election system on which the two-party system rests. Increasingly, however, scholars have begun to break with that tradition, publishing articles and books explaining the merits of proportional representation systems which create new opportunities for minority groups and parties to elect candidates of their choice to legislative bodies. In 1993-1994 alone four books devoted to this subject were published.

Now comes Kathleen Barber's contribution, a volume which describes in careful detail the creation, the working, and finally the demise of PR systems in five cities in Ohio during the period 1915 through 1960. Separate chapters are devoted to each of these cities, written by different scholars from (with one exception) Ohio colleges and universities. The cities are Ashtabula (Ronald Busch); Cleveland (Barber); Cincinnati (Robert Kolesar); Hamilton (Leon Weaver and James Blount); and Toledo (Dennis Anderson). Barber's three introductory chapters provide the background setting and description of the single-transferable-vote system which was used by the five cities. Readers will find her two concluding chapters especially useful. One summarizes the "commonalities and contrasts" from the five case studies, while the final chapter presents a useful history of the Supreme Court's attempts to define "fair and effective representation."

Each of the five city-focused chapters discusses, with supporting statistical tables, outcomes of elections held under the pre-reform election system; outcomes under the PR/STV system; and outcomes of elections held immediately after the repeal of PR. Outcomes are examined in terms of voter turnout; the number of candidates willing to run for council office; the personal characteristics of those elected (party, ethnicity, religion, occupation); and the decision-making patterns on the city councils. Where data were available, the authors assess the significance of transfer votes. One of the most significant findings of the volume is that the leading candidates on first-choice votes were nearly always the ultimate winners, as they would

have been under an at-large plurality system. Only 10 percent of the seats on the city councils were won or lost by virtue of transfer votes.

To those accustomed to think of proportional representation as a "radical" innovation, it will come as a surprise to learn that the state of Ohio was once a leader in introducing PR systems, with the city of Ashtabula being the first American city to do so in 1915. The answer to this apparent paradox constitutes a major theme of the Barber volume. PR was introduced into the five Ohio cities by Progressive reformers determined to rid cities of corruption and "boss rule." More specifically, when the larger cities adopted PR they did so as part of the adoption of a municipal reform charter which included most conspicuously the adoption of a city manager form of government and a change to non-partisan elections. The fact that these elections were to be held under an innovative single-transferable-vote system was the result of some active members of the reform movement being ardent advocates of this innovation. Later, when the PR/STV system was submitted to the voters to be approved or rejected on its own merits, voters chose to reject it, although often only after several campaigns waged by its detractors. Another theme stressed throughout the volume is that the very success of PR, insuring the election of ethnic and racial minorities, helped turn voters against it.

One of the most instructive aspects of the five case studies is that they identify the respective opponents and supporters of PR. Fighting the introduction of PR in these five cities was usually the dominant Republican party machine whose hold on city governments the Progressive reform movement was determined to break. It was also the dominant Republican party which led the successful repeal effort in cities such as Cleveland and Cincinnati. In contrast, the minority Democratic party in these two cities supported PR, at least so long as Democrats remained the minority party. Once they became strong, however, Democrats and their labor union allies also helped to defeat PR.

Less predictable was the stance of the black community. In the three largest cities black voters strongly opposed introduction of PR over the ward system of representation, in part reflecting their Republican loyalties in the 1920s and in part the fact that neighborhood segregation allowed the ward system of election to elect black candidates to the city council. In Cincinnati the black community came to appreciate the advantages of PR and in the end fought its replacement by an at-large plurality system. In contrast, in Cleveland blacks did not oppose repeal of PR since it was to be replaced by the former ward system of representation. Perhaps the most instructive lesson to be derived from Cincinnati's experience was the way blacks benefited from PR before the system was repealed. The analysis presented by the

author of the Cincinnati study demonstrates that blacks benefited from PR not because they were able to secure direct representation through votes cast by black voters, but rather because the two political parties in this nominally non-partisan system—the Republicans and the Charter Committee—saw it to their advantage to include black candidates on their respective slates.

As the Supreme Court continues to cast doubt on the constitutionality of majority-minority legislative districts, the need for Americans to learn more about other forms of minority representation becomes increasingly apparent. The Barber volume makes a significant contribution to that effort.

Howard Scarrow

State University of New York at Stony Brook

Cooper, Phillip J. *Battles on the Bench: Conflict Inside the Supreme Court.*

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. 224 pp. (\$24.95 cloth).

Disagreement among Supreme Court justices is of fundamental interest to those who conduct research on, and teach about, the United States Supreme Court. Disagreement among justices, more so than perhaps any other single factor, was responsible for the creation of the field of judicial politics. And media commentary about the Court and its justices often focuses on disagreement rather than agreement between the members of the Court. Thus, I read Phillip Cooper's *Battles on the Bench* with considerable enthusiasm. Precisely because conflict is of such importance I looked forward to Cooper's answers to the four questions he poses early in Chapter 1: "1) Why do the justices fight?, 2) How do they fight?, 3) What difference does it make?, and, 4) Why do they not fight more often?" (p. 3). My excitement increased as Cooper offered the components of an interesting typology for answering some of these questions, but quickly waned when the typology proved rather elusive in the subsequent chapters.

Despite some objections to Cooper's portrayal of conflict and the Court, particularly as it relates to previous research on this topic, the opening chapter presents the foundation for an interesting typology of conflict. The author suggests that we categorize conflict based on its type, whether it is personal or professional, and its locus, whether it is private or public. A typology that gives rise to four categories of conflict: "1) internal personal clashes; 2) internal professional conflicts; 3) external personal disputes; and, 4) external professional challenges." Like all interesting typologies, this one (although never formally recognized by Cooper as the organ-

izing principal for his subsequent chapters), immediately stimulated my creative interests. The empirically testable implications of the typology seem limitless: Which category has a greater impact on the Court's institutional legitimacy?, Do the various forms of conflict result in different rates of compliance with decisions?, etc. Unfortunately, the subsequent chapters do not provide many interesting answers to these questions; rather, they are largely an attempt to demonstrate the existence of the four categories. For example, in Chapter 3, Cooper, after providing illustrations of the existence and changing nature of professional fights within the Court, draws the conclusion that ". . . conflict is different now" (p. 89). While perhaps a valid conclusion, I was left wondering why conflict is different and whether this change in the nature of professional fights has had any implications.

Battles is not, nor was it meant to be, an empirical test of a typology of conflict. The methodology is judicial biography, scholarly analysis based on "papers, biographical studies and interviews with members of the Court" (p. 3). The methodology is not new, but as Cooper correctly points out, it is rarely used. *Battles* is filled with rich accounts of conflict on the Court. Cooper has compiled a large number of narratives that illustrate the varying types and level of conflict among the justices. For example, there are ego clashes, demonstrated by a biographer's account of Justice Frankfurter's disdain for Justice Brennan; "Brennan, Frankfurter decided, simply had an 'ego' problem" (p. 21). And then there are disputes over the internal workings of the Court, illustrated by Thurgood Marshall's displeasure with a decision by Chief Justice Burger to hold a conference in his absence; "I am deeply disturbed as a result of the conference on argued cases being held in my absence" (p. 43). The anecdotes Cooper has compiled are both interesting and useful. *Battles* is a quick read because these stories are so interesting. In much the same way as *The Brethren* revealed information about the internal workings of the Court, *Battles* provides a collection of vignettes that describe conflict. I found many useful quotes and stories that illustrate points I often make while teaching. Yet, the very same characteristic that makes this book such a delight to read raises concerns about how well Cooper answers the four questions he poses in Chapter 1.

Judicial biography is a difficult methodology to perfect. Cooper's attempt is commendable, but the limitations are significant. For example, in discussing personal battles on the Court, Cooper provides a statement by William Brennan to illustrate that justices maintain generally positive feelings toward each other despite the constant conflict; "we're [the justices] working constantly with each other under conditions of a certain amount of agreement, and a very definite amount of disagreement" (p. 103). The difficulty with Brennan's statement is that it does not inform our understanding

of the type or nature of that conflict, it only provides evidence of its existence. Similarly, it is open to discussion whether Marshall's indignation with the breach of Supreme Court etiquette by the Chief Justice in holding a conference in his absence was a sign of personal or professional displeasure. Judicial biography is difficult because choosing examples that demonstrate the presence or absence of particular types of conflict is an inherently subjective enterprise depending on the quality of the scholar and the scholarly accounts upon which he/she relies. There is ambiguity surrounding the meaning of some of the stories and judicial quotes that Cooper uses to illustrate his claims, but that should not detract from the accomplishment of putting a large portion of the judicial biographical evidence relating to conflict together in one place. If one is writing or teaching about conflict, *Battles* is a book that will be of considerable utility.

The most disappointing aspect of *Battles* is Cooper's treatment of the third, and arguably the most important, of his four questions: what difference does it [conflict] make? Chapter 5 is devoted to answering this question. As a result, I expected a lengthy discussion of the potential impact of the various forms of conflict on the operation or the environment of the Court, perhaps as they relate to such important considerations as legitimacy, compliance, institutional prestige and effectiveness. Instead of addressing any of these issues, Cooper concludes that the increased conflict on the Court is affecting such factors as collegiality, the ability to compromise, and alienation on the Court. The author does focus on the impact of conflict on several cases and the external view of the Court. However, these discussions are extremely limited, with just three examples of the influence of conflict on decisions, and a only brief description of its effect on the external views of the Court.

In the end, *Battles* is worth reading. Teachers will find it a bountiful source of anecdotes about the justices and their personalities. And while many scholars are likely to be as skeptical of *Battles'* claims as I was, the book did stimulate my interest in a number of research questions and should provide interesting avenues for future research, two characteristics that earn it my recommendation.

Stephen S. Meinhold

University of North Carolina at Wilmington

Gertzog, Irwin N. *Congressional Women: Their Recruitment, Integration, and Behavior*, 2d ed. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. xvi, 310 pp. (\$19.95 paper; \$59.95 cloth).

This book is dated; dated because it is a second edition of a 1984 book which began as some articles published in 1979 and 1980; dated because the author is an old-style political scientist, the sort that wrote books before the behavioral revolution. Today we have variables and hypotheses and coefficients and significance tests. Those words do not appear in this book, or if they do, they are casually used as ordinary English words without any technical meaning.

With Gertzog we have a reliable and trustworthy guide to the House of Representatives—he calls that chamber ‘Congress’ like some call the House of Commons ‘Parliament,’ as if the upper chamber has diminished into an afterthought or a technicality. We have our suspicions concerning our guide as the tour begins with the obscure “Matrimonial Connection,” a discussion, now very dated, of how earlier women members of Congress tended to be the widows of former representatives. But we follow along—and it is interesting, or at least it was interesting when we first read it back in 1980. We proceed on to “Changing Patterns of Recruitment,” again interesting to revisit after seventeen or so years.

Where Gertzog got my attention and respect was when he got into the center of the workings of the House of Representatives. He viewed the institution and its workings from the days of Nicholas Longworth through Tom Foley. He seemed to know the institution itself as it stretched over time, not through the literature on the subject but directly and without mediation. Certainly he does cite literature here and there and it is obvious he knows it, but it is also obvious he knows the House of Representatives itself as well. He knows its rules, its members, its stories and its lessons. He has talked with its members across two decades and he has looked deeply into published materials. He is a reliable and knowing guide. The book shares what he has learned with us.

Today political scientists insist on inviting the reader into the laboratory. We ask them to sit down and watch us code the variables, analyze the data, and share with us the reaching of a conclusion. Gertzog does not write that way. He reaches his conclusions in his own way. We do not know how. We do not even know the questions he has asked himself and the ideas he has tested and discarded. We only know what conclusions he has eventually arrived at. His argument flows in like a tide along a long, shallow beach. Slowly it moves up, never hesitating or stopping. It passes

on, ignoring all obstacles until it reaches a certain point known only to itself.

Thus, Gertzog begins and ends at points selected by himself for no obvious reason. Gertzog asserts rather than tests. He is not really interested in what causes what or why things have changed or failed to change. There is no underlying model or structure to identify and mathematically describe. To him the dynamic element is personality and politics. People come and people go and, as people they have value and as people they have an impact. The book is a terrific lesson for one who wants to know Bella Abzug a little better—pages 169 through 180 are devoted to that individual's behavior and style. Edith Green comes through as does Elizabeth Holtzman and Margaret Heckler. We come to know them as individuals, not as subjects. There is no attempt to apply or develop a 'character' psychology and there is no attempt to explain why they are the way they are. Only the consequences of what they do, their strengths and weaknesses, are explored. It is all well worth reading and well worth thinking about.

For me, Gertzog is his strongest discussing the early years of the Congresswoman's Caucus. He is at his weakest when he tries to update from the 1970s to the 1990s. The Congress of Newt Gingrich is something Gertzog has not quite digested yet. And in that he is not alone.

R. Darcy

Oklahoma State University

Green, Michael J. *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. xii, 206 pp. (\$40.00 cloth).

Arguably America's most important post-World War II bilateral relationship, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been described as the linchpin for Washington's presence in the Asia-Pacific. For Japan, the American tie has provided security "on the cheap," while for the United States, it has meant the availability of "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" for U.S. forces on the western Pacific rim. Nevertheless, the relationship has had its share of frictions. Michael J. Green explores some of the most important of these in *Arming Japan*, a detailed, analytical history of how varying Japanese and American defense production interests have impacted the alliance over the past 45 years.

Because the alliance has always been asymmetrical, Japan has had to be concerned about the "entrapment/abandonment" dilemma as the weaker partner. That is, Japanese governments from Prime Minister Yoshida (early 1950s) onward have been concerned about the incorporation of their country's future into the specific foreign policy goals of the United States, regardless of Japan's particular interests (entrapment) or the opposite (abandonment) should the United States decide to exit the western Pacific, thus leaving a "weak" Japan to fend for itself. Tokyo has partly coped with the dilemma by combining a growing emphasis on indigenous defense production (*kokusanka*) with the increased sharing of defense technology with the United States. The goals here are twofold: to be able to produce sufficient weaponry for self-defense if abandoned but, simultaneously to insure that Japan's defense technology is so up-to-date that the United States cannot get along without it—in short, making the alliance indispensable to the Americans.

Japanese civilian bureaucrats, particularly in the important Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), were generally not enthusiastic supporters of *kokusanka*. They feared that excessive indigenous development could isolate Japanese firms from global partnerships and impede the country's technological advancement. Similarly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and sometimes even the powerful Finance Ministry urged Japanese defense industries to collaborate with their American counterparts. For the former, cooperative defense production and direct purchases from U.S. companies were necessary to cement the alliance. For the latter, buying U.S. products helped alleviate Washington's balance of payments deficit with Japan which began to balloon in the 1970s.

Within these broad trends, however, there was room for variation. For example, during the Vietnam War, U.S. weapons priorities for Southeast Asia meant that Japan's Self Defense Forces (JSDF) "often received equipment that was 'late, over cost, and below expected quality standards,'" (p. 51). Thus, MITI was more prepared to push a *kokusanka* agenda. This trend was reinforced after the Vietnam War when it appeared for a time that the United States might withdraw from the Pacific. Moreover, by the late 1970s, Japan's technological base had sufficiently matured that some of its commercial technology could be spun-on for defense applications. This dual-use technology gave Tokyo new leverage within the alliance because Japan had achieved engineering breakthroughs in composite materials and phased array radar that the Americans needed for their own new weapons. Advocates of defense technology sharing in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and MOFA saw defense collaboration as a useful mechanism for promoting mutual trust. Within the JSDF, joint development was also supported be-

cause it provided an opportunity for close contact with top U.S. firms which operated at technology's cutting edge. Moreover, joint development from the uniformed services' perspective would help to insure continued interoperability with U.S. forces. This capability was crucial for both the joint defense of Japan and the JSDF's growing responsibility for the surveillance of the sea and air lanes within 1,000 miles of the home islands.

The litmus test for this new defense production relationship emerged through the FSX controversy in the 1980s. Green presents an excellent up-to-date case study of this important defense technology sharing issue. Although initially planning for a *kokusanka* new combat aircraft, Japan reluctantly agreed to a co-production arrangement with General Dynamics [now Lockheed-Martin] to sustain the alliance, defuse American trade complaints, and enhance the two-way exchange of technology which had become important to industries in both countries. The F-16 was chosen as the base model not because it was the best aircraft—the F-18 exceeded F-16 performance—but because it was cheaper and "left the most room for adding on indigenous technologies developed by . . . Japanese industry" (p. 102). Although the FSX has yet to enter serial production and came to prototype way over budget, the experience convinced both the JDA and Japanese defense industries that high tech defense technology could never be completely self-sufficient. In effect, a kind of component specialization developed for the aircraft in which parts were assigned to each country based on their cost-effectiveness and comparative technological sophistication. Thus, the FSX engine was given to General Electric, while composite materials, phased array radar, the mission computer, electronic warfare suite, and computer hardware were produced in Japan (p. 127). By the time the FSX was completed in the 1990s, it was part *kokusanka*, part licensed production, and part joint development, including the exchange of some technologies between the two countries. The FSX experience demonstrated, among other things, that no single country, by itself, could create a complex, high tech weapons system. Collaboration—even for the United States—had become essential.

This lesson has been taken to heart in current negotiations over Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Emerging from Saddam Hussein's use of Scud missiles in the Persian Gulf War and North Korea's capability to send these same projectiles toward Japan, Washington approached Tokyo to participate in a new venture: the creation of an *effective* TMD which could protect Japan and other countries facing regional missile threats. According to Green's analysis, however, TMD, in fact, required Japan to place a huge portion of its defense industrial base in the hands of the Pentagon. Japan's own shrinking defense budget could not possibly undertake a project of this

scope by itself. Nevertheless, Japan's defense planners and industrialists remain concerned about America's long term commitment to Asian security. Hence, the continued viability of *kokusanka*. If the U.S. should choose to exit, according to the prestigious 1994 Higuchi Panel report, Japan must be able to provide C3I, midair refueling, long range transport aircraft, and independent procurement on its own (p. 147). In short, the possibility of self-reliance becomes a new hedge against abandonment.

Arming Japan ends, then, in a series of unknowns. Japan's fledgling efforts in the post-Cold War to carve out a new international role through UN peacekeeping and multilateral security discussions could lead toward greater *kokusanka*; but the reality of limited defense budgets and decreasing contracts for Japan's defense industries means that the only way the JSDF can maintain its technological lead over its Korean and Chinese neighbors is through co-production and shared research with the United States. The entrapment/abandonment conundrum continues.

Sheldon W. Simon
Arizona State University

McWilliams, Wilson Carey. *The Politics of Disappointment: American Elections 1976-94*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1995. x, 211 pp. (\$17.95 paper).

This collection of essays analyzing presidential election contests from Carter through Clinton (and including the 1994 congressional elections) provides an interesting and continuous narrative that will contribute to the literature on contemporary American political history and thought. The articles on the presidential elections were originally published in a series edited by Gerald M. Pomper; the final chapter on the 1994 election appeared in *Commonweal*. McWilliams adds an introductory chapter and a few footnotes to the original tracts.

The opening chapter provides the context for two decades worth of inquiry. Besides providing a chronicle of deteriorating citizens' hopes into the politics of disappointment, McWilliams introduces readers to his basic framework for examination: that the emergence of the social issue is "a debate over the shape and future of American culture rivaling class and economic policy as the preeminent basis of political conflict" (p. 7). Combined with discontent with the two major parties, the separation of cultural and economic issues portends a new era for American party politics.

In Chapter 2, McWilliams contends that although the traditional New Deal coalition appears to have elected Jimmy Carter in 1976, new cracks not far below the surface have appeared that suggest an ambiguous future for party politics. He bases this claim on "(1) the role of the South in the 1976 election, (2) Carter's relative weakness in northern industrial states, and (3) the increased salience of the 'social issue' in electoral politics" (p. 15). Although the South is becoming more like the rest of the country, it was Carter's southern qualities that made him appealing to African American and white southerners alike. McWilliams says that Carter's weakness in the economically depressed Frostbelt made the election closer than it should have been, without acknowledging the votes that accrued to Ford due to it being his home region. Also, Carter's relative social conservatism took away some advantage that Republicans enjoyed in recent years on the "social issue."

The election of 1980 is discussed in terms of three central themes. First, by displacing deliberation, primary-dominated nomination systems produce mediocre presidential candidates. This is because "the primaries give special weight to initial support for candidates who enter early, they advantage ideological followings, and they emphasize media images" (p. 43). Second, not only did Democrats reject Carter's moving away from the party, but the core coalition of the party is changing from the old Roosevelt coalition to a Kennedy coalition that needs "to give unmistakable evidence . . . of their concern for white workers and ethnic Americans" (p. 51). Third, conservative Republicans "may find victory more painful than defeat" (p. 38). This is because although Reagan's support among social conservatives was substantial, his commitment to socially conservative policies is superficial at best and damaging at worst. "Reagan will give social conservatives the symbols, but he will leave the substance to the forces that are making for privatism and social disintegration" (p. 60).

In 1984, Reagan's landslide victory ushered in the new politics of the electronic age. Far from suggesting a critical realignment, the election of 1984 suggests that because of an unsettling of all political allegiances, the theory of critical elections "may have become obsolete" (p. 65). For Democrats, success in future presidential elections lies in their ability to rebuild their old coalition.

By 1988, the ability of Dukakis to restore elements of the old Democratic coalition was not enough to produce a victory. Both candidates had the credentials, but lacked necessary flair; in the end, Bush's "handlers" did better than Dukakis's. Most troubling for American democracy was the negative campaigning that enhanced the continued "demobilization" of the electorate. "The affective distance between citizens and public life is great and growing" (p. 105). McWilliams is less critical of the nomination pri-

maries this time around, though he claims that they especially disadvantage Democrats. Because a candidate who is in the center of his or her party is to the left or right of national opinion, contested primaries hurt Democrats. His argument about why this doesn't apply as much to Republicans is unconvincing. Still, the primaries produced candidates who "reflected the fears and hesitations of the contemporary public mind, but not the ability to lead or elevate it, and in the end, they confirmed the electorate's disenchantment" (p. 119).

McWilliams says that the election of 1992 was a dream come true for Democrats: an election fought out on pure economic terms. Simultaneously voting for change and a return to the past, over three-fifths of the voters endorsed the activist proposals of Clinton and Perot. Social issues also tilted in favor of the Democrats. Clinton could distance himself from Sister Souljah and Jesse Jackson, winning support from "Reagan Democrats" without a concomitant loss of support among African Americans. The late Ron Brown's visibility as national chair served as an important symbol that "blacks are no longer outsiders pressuring Democrats, but the new regulars, the heart of the party" (p. 165). The simmering divisions in the Republican Party erupted with the religious right's capturing the party beginning with the convention. Clinton responded by putting together an excellent campaign, taking advantage of defections to Perot and Republican disunity. However, McWilliams perceptively predicted that Clinton would be sorely tested in his attempts to maintain the sensible middle ground that he campaigned upon.

The format of the concluding chapter departs significantly from the rest of the book in that it was written at three different points of time—August, October, and December, of 1994. The piece in August details the summer of discontent and emphasizes the problems Clinton faces in dealing with the Democratic Congress: "Democrats are always at their worst when talking to each other" (p. 189). By October, McWilliams suggests that along with the World Series, perhaps we should cancel the November elections. Voters may be ready to show their discontent with Clinton, but they do not appear eager to embrace Republicans. In the December essay, McWilliams asserts that the voters' inarticulate or incoherent message was to choose "divided government as a remedy for unproductive government and effectively [ask] for more ideological posturing, although that is probably the last thing they had in mind" (p. 196).

McWilliams's unique style of providing insightful election analysis beyond the numbers makes this collection of essays well worth reading. He does not hide his clear favoritism for the Democratic party, which may repel staunch Republicans. Despite that, this book is most appropriate for ad-

vanced undergraduate courses and any other students of American politics interested in a useful chronicle of recent presidential elections.

Roy Dawes
Gettysburg College

Spring Issue

Effects of Districting Systems on Republican Representation in Southern State Legislatures
Malcolm E. Jewell and David A. Bruns 1

Southern Republican Subnational Advancement: The Redistricting Explanation
Joseph A. Alstrup 17

Comment: The Gift that Keeps on Giving? Consequences of Affirmative Action Gerrymandering
Charles S. Bullock III 28

Comment: Conceptualization, Measurement, and the Analysis of Representation in Electoral Systems Undergoing Structural and Social Change
Michael A. Krause and Bryan Garba 41

Rejoinder
Joseph A. Alstrup 49

Rejoinder
Malcolm E. Jewell and David A. Bruns 59

Political Action Committees in State Elections
James D. King and Helene S. Rosen 61

Economic Interests and the Framing of the 1988 and 1992 Democratic and Republican Party Platforms
Terri Susan Fine 79

Book Reviews 89

Summer Issue

Lobbyists as Interest Group Entrepreneurs: The Mobilization of Union Veterans
Scott Alinsworth 107

The Second Magellanic Age: Territory and Political Authority in the 21st Century
David J. Elkins 127