Strategic Canvassing by Political Parties, 1952-1990

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The activities of political parties, and particularly local party organizations, are geared toward cultivating the relationship between the electorate and those who govern. This paper adds to the theoretical and empirical literature on party activities by focusing on one of the primary mechanisms by which parties attempt to stimulate political participation on behalf of their candidates: the party canvass. Using the 1952-90 National Election Studies, I examine the contacting patterns of the two major U.S. parties, and argue that political parties contact individuals in the electorate not randomly, but strategically, targeting their canvassing efforts to specific individuals and groups within the electorate. This can only be done imperfectly, but with technological increases over the last 40 years, the parties have become somewhat more efficient in their contacting activities and in their ability to target such contacts.

The activities of political parties, and particularly local party organizations, are geared toward cultivating the relationship between the electorate and those who govern, and the traditional theoretical approach to the party emphasizes that role (for discussions and critiques of this literature see Baer and Bositis 1988 and Epstein 1986). For example, Eldersveld (1982, 4) focused on the importance of political parties as linkage institutions between the mass public and the government. "What [emerge] to facilitate government in modern systems . . . are linkage structures, intermediary organizations that help produce positive action and effective decisions in the face of fragmentation, conflict, and mass involvement. These structures are groups that engage in activities and organize initiatives that make cooperative behavior possible. The political party is one major type of a linkage structure; some would say it is the central one." As such, it has been suggested that the party has become an essential element of modern democracy (Schattschneider 1942).

Political parties, however, are in competition for the scarce rewards the political system allocates, and must compete for the capacity to organize influence (Sorauf and Beck 1988). Thus, one of the primary roles ascribed to parties is the mobilization of support for political candidates (Schlesinger 1985). Indeed, Caldeira, Patterson and Markko (1985, 507) argued that mass political behavior can not be understood completely without accounting explicitly for the parties' mobilization role: "Electorates need not merely

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'emerge,' the products of faceless social, economic, and psychological forces. Electorates can be brought into vigorous being where there is an active political life."

Drawing upon the model of political mobilization developed in Wielhouwer and Regens (1993), and based upon neoinstitutional economic literature, this analysis conceives of political participation as a transaction cost problem. Elections are essentially exchanges (or transactions) between citizens and the political system. In a world with no transaction costs, individuals will participate up to the point where the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of participation. There are a variety of costs associated with that participation—especially information and opportunity costs (Downs 1957), and the result is that fewer people vote than would absent these costs. This view of participation has important implications for political parties. Following the formulation of North (1990; see also Coase 1937) political parties are institutions that respond to the high transaction costs associated with political behavior by attempting to alter individuals' perception of the costs and benefits that will accrue when they participate, which has the result of changing the levels of participation in a democratic market. Such activities may take the form of advertising, providing resources to candidates (such as poll data, advice on strategy, or media facilities), and canvassing by party workers.

There is no reason to assume that parties undertake the reduction in transaction costs to increase participation in general—they want to win elections. As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992, 70) noted, "[canvassing] efforts on the part of parties are not unbiased attempts aimed at encouraging diffuse system support; they carry an explicitly partisan message." Therefore, parties should seek to change costs and benefits only as it advantages them. In order to improve their electoral prospects, the parties should be strategic in the use of the canvass as a tool of mobilization, attempting to contact those persons whose participation will increase the parties' candidates' probability of winning. The responsibility for implementing such efforts usually falls to state and local party organizations.

The Role of Party Organizations

State and local party organizations frequently have the responsibility for getting out the vote. Katz and Eldersveld (1961) found that the strength of the local Democratic leadership was negligible in predicting local voting behavior, while local Republican leadership was a significant factor in mobilizing voters in the 1956 presidential election. As an explanation for the party differences, the authors concluded (1961, 10) "that, where strong

forces have been mobilized over time for one party, additional activity at the precinct level does not help it as much as local activity by the rival party may hurt it." Crotty (1971) examined the relationship between party activity indices and election results in 100 North Carolina counties for the 1960 presidential and 1962 elections. Party competition scales accounted for little where the variance explained by demographic variables was already high (i.e., in presidential and gubernatorial races). But in lower level races, where demographics and party competition accounted for less variance, party activities made substantial improvements. Recently, Smith (1990) found that county organizational strength was a potent mobilizing force for turnout during the 1988 presidential elections.

The organizational strength of the parties at sub-national levels is also related to the performance of other campaign activities. The Party Transformation Studies found that one indicator of the strength of local and state party organizations is their programmatic capacities; that is, the extent to which the party organizations cultivate their constituencies through institutional support activities and candidate-directed activities. Gibson et al. (1983) reported that among the programmatic activities highly related to state organizational strength were the provision of services to candidates and voter mobilization campaigns. Gibson et al. (1985) reported that the activities associated with strong local party organizations included coordination with candidate campaign organizations and involvement in several kinds of campaign activities. Over time, state party organizations grew in strength, but this growth was not matched by local party organizations, and regional differences in local strength were different from those observed in the state organizations. Updating the results for the period 1980-1984, Gibson, Frendreis and Vertz (1989) reported that local party organizations continued to be strong, and were consistent in performing their programmatic activities. Frendreis, Gibson and Vertz (1990) found that local Republican organizational strength was unrelated to the percentage of the vote received by a GOP candidate in a county. Local strength, however, was strongly related to the probability that the GOP would field a candidate for the state legislature or U.S. House from the county.

Herrnson (1986) noted the recent expansion of political action committees' influence in congressional elections, and examined the success of party organizations in the "transitional" period of adjusting to this competition. Candidates of both parties evaluated national party organizations (including congressional campaign committees) as important for providing campaign management assistance, issue development, advertising, and gauging public opinion. Local or state parties, on the other hand, were particularly important for registering voters and conducting get-out-the-vote campaigns.

Herrnson concluded (1986, 609) "even though local party organizations no longer play a dominant role in many phases of campaign politics, they continue to make important contributions to those aspects of campaigning that require direct contact with voters."

Party Contact

The influence of party activities has come under some scrutiny. One strain of literature frequently noted the extent to which local party activities provide voting (and other informational) cues to local electorates (Crotty 1971; Cutright 1963; Cutright and Rossi 1958a, 1958b; Katz and Eldersveld 1961; Rossi and Cutright 1961; Wolfinger 1963). Studies that tested for the mobilization effects of party contacting activities generally concluded that such activities increase voter turnout and participation in other political activities (Caldeira, Patterson and Markko 1985; Eldersveld 1956; Eldersveld and Dodge 1954; Kramer 1970; Lupfer and Price 1972; Zipp 1979). Recently, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) showed substantial overall effects of the party canvass as a method of mobilizing mass participation in governmental and electoral participation, based on a pooled, cross-sectional analysis of the National Election Studies (NES) and other data. Wielhouwer and Lockerbie (1994), however, analyzing each year of the NES separately, found that the party contacting effects varied from year to year, from mode of participation to mode of participation, and that there tended to be a differential effect between the two major U.S. parties (see also Eldersveld 1964, chapter 14). Such positive results have not been universal, however. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992) found that party contact had only mild turnout effects on primary voters, and only in gubernatorial and congressional elections. Whiteley and Seyd (1994) analyzed the effects of local party campaigning in Great Britain on the Labour share of the vote in 1987. They found no significant effects on voter turnout, but did see an increase in the Labour share of the vote as a result of those activities. Similarly, other analyses of the preference effects of contacting yielded mixed results. Kramer (1970) found none, while Bochel and Denver (1971) and Blydenburgh (1971) found that party contacts did increase votes cast for the contacting party. The differences between the studies seem to have been a function of the different level of election analyzed; Kramer examined congressional and presidential races, while the latter two studies examined municipal elections. Thus contextual differences between electorates and studies are likely to yield different results (see also Huckfeldt and Sprague 1990; Krassa 1988; Price and Lupfer 1973).

To what extent have the parties been contacting individuals in the electorate? Based on the National Election Studies, Eldersveld (1982) pointed out that the parties contacted an increasing proportion of the electorate from the 1950s through the mid-1970s. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) showed that since the mid-1970s, however, party contacting appears to have leveled off and then gone into a decline. Despite this decline, the parties have been contacting approximately 20 percent or more of the electorate in the last decade. Moreover, Wielhouwer and Lockerbie (1994) reported that the levels of activity of each of the two major U.S. parties paralleled each other, though the Democrats have tended to contact a marginally higher percentage of the electorate than the Republicans.

As strategists, parties and campaigners are keenly aware of the demographic characteristics of the states and districts in which they will be competing. This is a common element of the strategy of winning elections:

> No subject is more intensely discussed in the privacy of any campaign headquarters, either state or national, than the ethnic origins of the American people and their bloc-voting habits. Men have made careers and politicians have won office by being (or claiming to be) experts on the Polish vote, the Jewish vote, the Irish vote, the Negro vote, the Scandinavian vote, the Italian vote, and what the rights, expectations, offices and dignities of each of these blocs are (White 1961, 222-223).

In fact, the Kennedy campaign, using (then) state-of-the-art technology, constructed a "sample" electorate by computer simulation as a tool for devising local and regional election strategies (see Pool, Abelson and Popkin 1965). Price and Lupfer (1973, 424-425) described the canvassing strategies of the 1970 reelection effort of Tennessee Senator Al Gore: "High-Democratic areas were designated as 'priority precincts,' and the experience gleaned from a few pilot efforts . . . was distilled into a comprehensive voter-contact plan. . . . The strategy of concentrating on likely high-yield areas dictated that canvassing in the white community should take place mainly in low income precincts." In a study of local party campaigning, Norrander (1986) found that a local party's canvassing activities were a function of local resources, access to state party resources for joint programs and other services, and the extent to which a local chair perceived his or her role *vis-à-vis* party maintenance.

Kayden and Mahe (1985, 80) noted the extent to which computerization of campaigns allows for the fine-tuning of targeted messages. "Messages can be targeted according to socioeconomic status, pulling the political and census geography together in a method called 'digitizing.' . . . The California Republican party, for example, is able to send out a mailing to all the

residents in precincts that voted over 60 percent for Reagan in 1984, with an average age of over forty-five, in houses costing over $100,000, who have lived there for more than five years."

Finally, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 162-169) found that parties were more likely to contact strong party identifiers, union members, people located within close social networks, and individuals with higher educational levels, incomes and ages. They were less likely to contact African-Americans prior to 1964, and women socialized before 1920. While that study demonstrated that there have been overall effects of some social and economic status variables on the probability of being contacted, the analysis performed only very limited tests for changes in these factors over time.

But politics is a dynamic phenomenon. For example, Sundquist (1983) argued that realignments have occurred periodically in the U.S. since the early 1800s. He and Key (1955, 1959) showed that the issue stands of political parties and the parties' responses to political shifting sands are important for understanding such shifts in voters' loyalties. Carmines and Stimson (1989) noted that by 1964 racial polarization had "evolved" sufficiently to fix black voters' loyalties to the Democratic party. The passage of time has seen the ebb and flow of social movements that affect contemporary politics, such as the ERA movement of the 1970s, and the increased activism in electoral politics of evangelical Christians during the 1980s (see, for example, Baker 1990).

Finally, the efficacy of the parties' contacting activities has also varied over time. Wielhouwer and Lockerbie (1994) showed that the parties have become more effective in mobilizing voter turnout, campaign activity participation, and soliciting campaign contributions since 1952. There were also substantial differences between the two parties: usually, it was the party out of the White House whose contacts obtained significance in any given year.

Data Analysis

Since the parties undertake activities geared toward winning elections, and practitioners contend that they approach contacting in a purposive manner, it seems reasonable to test the targeting capabilities of party canvassing. Do parties have the ability to target their contacts successfully? Or is there simply a random chance of contacting sympathetic citizens? Is there evidence that the parties know who they should contact, and do? Or is there a haphazard quality to contacting that suggests no particular pattern?

A number of prior variables have been identified in the extant literature as related to electoral support and coalitions. The bivariate results obtained by Axelrod (1972, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986) have been augmented by the

multivariate analysis of Erikson, Lancaster and Romero (1989). They found that the group characteristics that contributed to the Democratic (presidential) vote between 1952 and 1984 included blacks, the poor, union members, Catholics, Jews, those with no religion, and Southern whites before 1964. By implication, Republican voters were made up of a "vanilla" coalition of "northern white male Protestants who are not college educated but not poor, over thirty and living outside the largest SMSAs" (1989, 343). According to their analysis, group members on the margins of electoral coalitions included college-educated persons (periodically), those under 30 years of age, women before 1980, and urban residents.

As might be expected, some of these findings changed over time. For example, the college-educated contributed to the Democratic coalition in 1972 and 1984, the Republican coalition in 1964, 1968, and 1976, and were on the margins in 1952, 1956, and 1980. The poor were on the margins in 1952, 1960, and 1968, and went Democratic in the remaining years. Southern whites went Democratic in 1952, 1956, 1960, and 1976, Republican in 1972, and were on the margins in the other years.[1]

Other research has shown that evangelical Christians made important inroads into the political sphere during the 1980s. For example, Smidt (1987) showed that, among evangelicals, substantial changes in political attitudes and behavior took place between the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections. One of the most important shifts took place among young evangelicals, who became relatively politicized and particularly Republican in their partisanship. In general, evangelical voters shifted to the GOP during the 1980s, white evangelicals became more politicized, and the political similarities between white evangelicals and nonevangelicals were attenuated during the decade as well (Smidt and Kellstedt 1992).

The indicator of party efforts on behalf of candidates is based on a question that ascertains whether an individual was contacted. The text of the question is,[2]

> The political parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidates. Did anyone from one of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the campaign this year? Which party was that?

I make four assumptions about the information contained in responses to this question. First, the question is clear and explicit in its reference to the activities of the political parties for the sake of candidates, so I assume that effects of interest group activities are not being tapped here. It should be noted, however, that Herrnson (1986) found that unions do canvassing work for the parties. In such cases, the members of the union (or any other

interest group for that matter) are acting as agents for the parties. They are, therefore, party workers.

Second, I assume that respondents accurately recall the nature of the contacts they report; Teixeira (1992, 52, note 62) is skeptical of the validity of this assumption, while I do not believe that it is very restrictive. If the report of contact is inaccurate (within the normal bounds of survey research), it might be expected that reported levels of contacting should track with levels of party identification and with public perceptions of the parties in the U.S. electorate over the period of the studies. On neither count is this the case (see, for example, Flanigan and Zingale 1994, 62-63; Wattenberg 1990). It might also be expected that individuals with stronger party identification would report contacts more frequently than persons with weaker (or no) party identification. As I show later, party ID is not a particularly good predictor of reported contacts.

A third assumption is that the persons doing the contacting accurately represent themselves and their candidate. This assumption is also not very strong. If a party worker contacts a potential voter *on behalf of* a particular candidate, the purpose of that contact is still to increase support for that candidate, even if the contacter misrepresents his or her own identity.

Finally, what respondents recall as a "party" contact may include candidates' campaign organizations. For two main reasons, this is not very problematic. First, Schlesinger (1985, 1153) suggested that "[t]he basic unit of the party is the nucleus, which consists of the collective efforts to capture a single office." Proceeding from this definition, anyone who is part of such a collective effort (for example, a candidate campaign organization), is a party worker. Second, Gibson et al. (1985) observed that it is a common practice for local party organizations to coordinate activities with candidate campaign organizations for most offices. In sum, with a few relatively weak assumptions, I believe this question is a valid indicator of individuals' contacts with the parties and their workers, and is useful for testing the relationships hypothesized.

I make use of a number of independent variables (in three broad categories) that are likely to be related to citizens' being contacted by the parties. Since my purpose is to gauge the targeting of contacts, the independent variables include only those characteristics that the parties might reasonably be able to assess prior to making the actual contact. Thus, variables such as interest in campaigns and other political attitudes and opinions are not included in the equations.

Political orientation and experience variables include a respondent's party identification, whether the respondent reported voting in the previous presidential election, whether the respondent was registered to vote in the

current election (or reported being registered as a Democrat or Republican), and whether the respondent reported voting in the most recent primary (or a particular party's primary) in their state.[3] Prior voting experience is appropriate to include in these equations, because voting records (who voted, who is registered, in which party's primary a person voted) are a matter of public record, available for use by party organizations, and highly correlated to turnout. As might be expected, party identification and party registration were frequently related. When in the course of multicollinearity diagnostics these variables were found to be collinear, party ID was dropped because it seemed more likely that parties would have accurate knowledge of party registration than of party identification.

State or district characteristics include whether the area is rural, and region of the country (this is a series of dummy variables, in which solid southern states are the excluded category).[4] *Demographic characteristics* include family income, educational level, race (black), gender (male), age, union membership, and religion (Catholic or Jewish). Due to space consideration and for ease of exposition, truncated tables are presented here. Readers who care to see the full equations may write to the author.[5]

Based on this discussion, some general hypotheses (and their corresponding nulls) can be developed and tested.

H1: If the parties use personal contacts as a method of mobilizing individuals who belong to their electoral coalitions, then members of those groups will be contacted at higher rates by their respective parties than nonmembers.

H2: If the parties wish to mobilize undecided voters, we should see higher levels of contacting among members of the marginal groups discussed above.

H3: If the parties use the contact as a demobilization tactic for members of the other party's coalition, then each party will contact members of the opposite party's constituent groups at higher rates.

Because the dependent variable in each case is dichotomous (contacted or not contacted), logit is used for the analysis (Hanushek and Jackson 1977; Aldrich and Cnudde 1975).[6]

Results

Table 1 shows the effect of each variable on the probability of being contacted by the Democrats (cell entries are logit coefficients with standard

Table 1. Results of Logit Equations Estimating the Effects of Variables on the Probability of Being Contacted by Democratic Party Workers

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1966	1968
Intercept	-3.64 (.86)**	-3.96 (.77)**	-3.79 (.61)**	-3.44 (.60)**	-4.50 (.69)**	-4.36 (.70)**
Reg. Democrat						
Registered	.54 (.36)	.59 (.33)	.37 (.26)	.60 (.21)**		.18 (.30)
Dem. Primary				.07 (.17)	.57 (.20)**	.06 (.21)
Dem. Party ID	.07 (.29)	.30 (.22)	.41 (.20)*		.19 (.23)	.42 (.25)
Independent	.11 (.32)	.52 (.23)*	.12 (.22)	-.21 (.20)	-.02 (.24)	.43 (.25)
Voted Last Election	.69 (.31)*	.55 (.32)	.11 (.23)	.40 (.23)	.22 (.23)	.17 (.24)
Income	-.02 (.07)	-.02 (.05)	.00 (.04)	.04 (.04)	.13 (.05)**	.04 (.03)
Education	.03 (.04)	.05 (.03)	.08 (.03)**	.08 (.03)**	.10 (.03)**	.08 (.03)*
Black	-.04 (.48)	.18 (.40)	.18 (.30)	.34 (.30)	-.62 (.34)	.57 (.29)*
Male	.45 (.22)*	.05 (.18)	-.05 (.16)	.11 (.16)	.11 (.16)	-.03 (.18)
Age	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)
Union	.56 (.24)*	-.07 (.21)	.38 (.18)*	.34 (.19)	.13 (.19)	-.33 (.21)
Catholic	.87 (.28)**	.08 (.24)	-.57 (.23)**	.05 (.21)	.12 (.21)	.07 (.22)
Jewish	1.60 (.48)**	-.20 (.51)	-1.73 (.74)*	.01 (.50)	.42 (.40)	-.85 (.65)
Rural	-.14 (.37)	-.05 (.20)	-.09 (.23)	-.49 (.24)*	-.38 (.23)	-.69 (.24)**
New England	-.43 (.50)	-.85 (.50)	.51 (.39)	-.18 (.40)	.16 (.39)	.13 (.44)
Mid. Atlantic	-.73 (.43)	.02 (.31)	.25 (.28)	-.47 (.30)	-.05 (.29)	.13 (.29)
MidWest East	-.24 (.38)	-.06 (.30)	.94 (.26)**	.01 (.26)	.08 (.27)	.22 (.28)
MidWest West	-.90 (.46)*	.55 (.29)*	-.06 (.32)	-.28 (.31)	.35 (.31)	.56 (.28)*
Border South	-1.27 (.78)	.54 (.42)	-.02 (.34)	-.15 (.33)	-.36 (.36)	-.45 (.42)
Mountain	.66 (.51)	.27 (.45)	.02 (.51)	.57 (.42)	.67 (.43)	1.04 (.46)*
Pacific	-.42 (.47)	.03 (.35)	1.05 (.26)**	-.39 (.31)	-.52 (.32)	.33 (.32)
R^2	.13	.06	.11	.11	.15	.12
N	1521	1323	1721	1323	1219	1140

Table 1 (continued)

	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980
Intercept	-2.97 (.69)**	-4.96 (.52)**	-4.00 (.44)**	-4.47 (.53)**	-4.28 (.79)**
Reg. Democrat	.50 (.21)*		.46 (.13)**	.35 (.17)*	-.04 (.28)
Registered Dem. Primary	.66 (.25)**		.10 (.05)		.68 (.27)**
Dem. Party ID		1.23 (.20)**		.20 (.20)	-.00 (.29)
Independent	-.16 (.19)	.98 (.19)**	.01 (.13)	-.11 (.19)	-.02 (.27)
Voted Last Election	.31 (.22)		.30 (.12)**		.75 (.29)**
Income	.01 (.03)	-.01 (.02)	-.00 (.01)	.02 (.02)	.01 (.02)
Education	.05 (.04)	.09 (.03)**	.08 (.02)**	.11 (.03)**	.06 (.04)
Black	-.08 (.35)	-.07 (.25)	-.04 (.23)	.25 (.24)	-.01 (.35)
Male	.01 (.17)	.21 (.13)	.17 (.12)	.07 (.14)	-.25 (.20)
Age	.00 (.01)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.00)**	-.00 (.01)
Union	.09 (.20)	-.08 (.15)	.25 (.14)	.23 (.16)	.19 (.22)
Catholic	.24 (.22)	-.16 (.16)	-.16 (.15)	.08 (.17)	-.11 (.25)
Jewish	.86 (.58)	-.15 (.37)	.82 (.32)**	.85 (.35)*	.33 (.53)
Rural	-.23 (.20)	-.68 (.15)**	-.53 (.14)**	-.36 (.17)*	-.46 (.26)
New England	.00 (.42)	.56 (.31)	.35 (.26)	.62 (.30)*	.60 (.42)
Mid. Atlantic	.12 (.32)	1.20 (.24)**	.04 (.22)	-.33 (.27)	-.38 (.35)
MidWest East	.90 (.28)**	.96 (.23)**	-.22 (.21)	.10 (.21)	.50 (.30)
MidWest West	1.56 (.29)**	1.87 (.24)**	.88 (.20)**	.30 (.33)	.91 (.44)*
Border South	-.28 (.44)	1.14 (.26)**	-.15 (.26)	.44 (.24)	.19 (.43)
Mountain	.77 (.46)	1.70 (.31)**	.42 (.31)	.92 (.31)**	.57 (.52)
Pacific	.62 (.32)	.94 (.24)**	.06 (.21)	-.39 (.26)	-.09 (.41)
R^2	.18	.17	.14	.14	.17
N	997	2239	2478	1711	1106

continued . . .

Table 1 (concluded)

	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990
Intercept	-4.49 (.67)**	-4.61 (.59)**	-5.08 (.52)**	-6.62 (.69)**	6.59 (.76)**
Reg. Democrat	.65 (.17)**	.45 (.20)*	.81 (.15)**		
Registered				1.03 (.34)**	1.42 (.38)**
Dem. Primary				.80 (.19)**	
Dem. Party ID		.33 (.21)		.85 (.24)**	.81 (.24)**
Independent	.08 (.18)	-.12 (.20)	.17 (.15)	.72 (.23)**	.13 (.27)
Voted Last Election	.85 (.24)**				.34 (.27)
Income	.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.01 (.02)	-.00 (.02)
Education	.12 (.03)**	.12 (.03)**	.13 (.03)**	.09 (.03)**	.14 (.04)**
Black	.42 (.28)	.05 (.29)	.24 (.22)	.28 (.27)	-.10 (.28)
Male	.12 (.16)	.19 (.15)	-.03 (.14)	-.02 (.17)	-.05 (.17)
Age	-.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.00)**	.02 (.01)**	.02 (.01)**
Union	-.02 (.20)	.25 (.18)	.19 (.17)	-.01 (.20)	.20 (.22)
Catholic	.33 (.20)	.07 (.19)	.39 (.17)*	.39 (.20)	.11 (.22)
Jewish	.25 (.54)	.12 (.43)	.50 (.50)	-1.39 (1.05)	.43 (.50)
Rural	-.31 (.19)	-.36 (.19)	-.12 (.17)	-.01 (.21)	-.10 (.23)
New England	.04 (.35)	.36 (.35)	-.35 (.34)	.53 (.38)	-.60 (.50)
Mid. Atlantic	-.38 (.29)	-.07 (.31)	-.46 (.27)	-.05 (.31)	-1.02 (.39)**
MidWest East	-.65 (.26)**	.09 (.28)	-.23 (.23)	-.18 (.28)	-.17 (.28)
MidWest West	.94 (.28)**	1.20 (.32)**	.68 (.24)**	.69 (.32)*	-.39 (.35)
Border South	-1.14 (.38)**	-.48 (.37)	-.26 (.30)	-1.00 (.38)**	-1.02 (.46)*
Mountain	.31 (.44)	1.66 (.40)**	.97 (.32)**	.96 (.45)*	.37 (.55)
Pacific	-.47 (.34)	.03 (.29)	-.64 (.27)*	.73 (.31)*	-.43 (.31)
R^2	.22	.15	.19	.23	.22
N	1139	1669	1910	1574	1767

Note: Entries are logit coefficients (standard error). * = $p \leq .05$ ** = $p \leq .01$ (two tailed test)

errors in parentheses). People who were registered and registered Democrats were more likely to be contacted in eight of the last nine elections in which this question was asked; Democratic primary voters were more likely to be contacted in four out of seven years. Democratic identifiers and independents were more likely than GOP identifiers to be contacted in five years. Rural areas were canvassed less than urban areas in the 1960s and 1970s. Looking at the regional patterns, there is an anti-southern tendency, with other regions contacted significantly less than the solid south six times, more so 23 times. Since 1968, Democrats seem to have been more active in the Midwest compared with the South. Looking at the demographic characteristics, higher educational levels are significantly related to contact in 11 of 16 years, and older people were contacted at higher levels beginning in 1986.

To what extent have the Democrats been contacting members of their coalition, as defined by Erikson, Lancaster, and Romero (1989)? Blacks have not been contacted at higher rates than whites; the poor have not been contacted at a rate higher than the nonpoor; union members were contacted at higher levels only twice, and not since 1960; Catholics have been contacted more than Protestants twice, and once less; Jewish people have been contacted more than Protestants three times, and once less. One intriguing result is that in 1960, when Kennedy's religion was an important campaign issue, Catholic and Jewish people were significantly less likely than Protestants to be contacted by the Democrats. This is interesting, in that one could argue logically that the Democrats should have contacted Jews and Catholics at a greater rate than Protestants in order to ensure the turnout of these groups. Instead, they were contacted at *lower* rates. This suggests that the Democrats knew for whom Catholics and Jews were likely to vote, and did not expend precious resources attempting to mobilize them. In fact, in voter turnout equations (not shown here), Catholic Democrats voted at significantly higher rates than Protestants in 1960, even given the significantly lower contacting rates. In sum, the Democrats have *not* been contacting members of their electoral coalition very persistently.

Table 2 presents the results of equations in which the dependent variable is contact by a Republican party worker. The GOP demonstrates a general tendency to contact registered citizens and registered Republicans (they were contacted at higher rates in six of the last 12 years), but this tendency is not as consistent as the Democratic pattern. Previous voters were contacted more than nonvoters in 1952, 1960, 1972, 1976 and 1982. Republican identifiers were more likely than Democratic identifiers to be contacted in three years, and there were no differences between independents and Democrats. People living in rural areas have been contacted significantly less than urban residents in ten of the last 13 elections.

Table 2. Results of Logit Equations Estimating the Effects of Variables on the Probability of Being Contacted by Republican Party Workers

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1966	1968
Intercept	-3.86 (.76)**	-4.26 (.74)**	-3.54 (.56)**	3.79 (.58)**	-4.57 (.68)**	-4.18 (.64)**
Reg. Repub.						
Registered	.64 (.36)	.59 (.34)	.98 (.28)**	.64 (.20)**		.45 (.31)
Rep. Primary				.16 (.22)	.29 (.27)	.30 (.24)
Rep. Party ID	-.08 (.26)	.17 (.22)	.86 (.19)**	.28 (.22)	.13 (.24)	-.01 (.24)
Independent	-.07 (.26)	.28 (.22)	.32 (.21)	-.09 (.20)	-.02 (.21)	-.01 (.20)
Voted Last Election	.63 (.29)*	.58 (.34)	-.39 (.21)	.52 (.22)*	.19 (.23)	.02 (.23)
Income	.05 (.07)	.07 (.05)	.10 (.04)**	.09 (.04)*	.13 (.05)*	.06 (.03)*
Education	.02 (.03)	.04 (.03)	.09 (.03)**	.08 (.03)**	.08 (.04)*	.09 (.03)**
Black	-.57 (.55)	.48 (.41)	-.32 (.36)	-.72 (.36)*	-.33 (.35)	-.14 (.34)
Male	.06 (.20)	.10 (.17)	.08 (.16)	.18 (.15)	.17 (.17)	-.01 (.17)
Age	-.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
Union	.00 (.24)	-.30 (.22)	-.09 (.20)	.10 (.18)	-.25 (.21)	-.13 (.20)
Catholic	.23 (.27)	.02 (.24)	-.37 (.24)	-.35 (.20)	-.06 (.23)	.20 (.22)
Jewish	1.06 (.49)*	-.22 (.51)	-1.54 (.75)*	.35 (.45)	-.28 (.49)	-.56 (.59)
Rural	.06 (.31)	-.03 (.20)	-.23 (.22)	-.58 (.22)**	-.50 (.24)*	-.69 (.23)**
New England	.38 (.48)	.25 (.38)	.08 (.34)	-.20 (.38)	.21 (.42)	-.15 (.42)
Mid. Atlantic	-.19 (.42)	-.44 (.33)	-.94 (.28)**	-.63 (.28)	.19 (.31)	-.17 (.28)
MidWest East	.09 (.37)	-.06 (.30)	-.13 (.24)	-.10 (.25)	.24 (.28)	-.00 (.27)
MidWest West	-.24 (.41)	.60 (.29)*	-.25 (.28)	-.32 (.29)	.71 (.32)*	.04 (.28)
Border South	.18 (.55)	-.05 (.49)	-.28 (.31)	.27 (.29)	-.72 (.45)	-.09 (.36)
Mountain	1.32 (.50)**	.32 (.44)	.16 (.42)	-.30 (.46)	.91 (.44)*	.58 (.48)
Pacific	.84 (.40)*	-.11 (.36)	-.00 (.27)	.16 (.27)	.24 (.32)	.17 (.30)
R^2	.10	.07	.18	.19	.14	.14
N	1527	1323	1721	1323	1219	1140

Table 2 (continued)

	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980
Intercept	-3.37 (.76)**	-4.55 (.51)**	-5.50 (.48)**	-4.98 (.56)**	-5.82 (.76)**
Reg. Repub.	.58 (.24)*		.23 (.18)	.23 (.23)	.20 (.30)
Registered					
Rep. Primary	-.17 (.31)		.12 (.06)*		.24 (.28)
Rep. Party ID		-.09 (.18)	.38 (.21)	.34 (.22)	.24 (.27)
Independent	-.34 (.21)	-.22 (.16)	.11 (.16)	.11 (.17)	.13 (.24)
Voted Last Election	.51 (.26)*		.48 (.15)**		.02 (.26)
Income	.07 (.03)*	.03 (.02)	.02 (.01)	.05 (.02)**	.07 (.02)**
Education	.03 (.04)	.05 (.03)	.14 (.03)**	.13 (.03)**	.16 (.04)**
Black	-.59 (.44)	-.52 (.33)	-.53 (.32)	-.48 (.33)	-1.23 (.55)*
Male	.00 (.19)	-.32 (.14)*	-.13 (.13)	-.16 (.15)	-.14 (.19)
Age	.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.02 (.00)**	.01 (.01)	.02 (.01)**
Union	.07 (.23)	-.44 (.17)**	.24 (.15)	-.10 (.18)	.04 (.22)
Catholic	.14 (.24)	-.24 (.17)	-.08 (.16)	-.28 (.19)	-.08 (.24)
Jewish	.38 (.69)	-1.09 (.54)*	.01 (.39)	.46 (.37)	-.17 (.61)
Rural	-.53 (.23)*	-.42 (.16)**	-.39 (.15)**	-.41 (.19)*	-.07 (.23)
New England	-.52 (.51)	1.08 (.34)**	-.42 (.31)	.06 (.35)	-.50 (.45)
Mid. Atlantic	-.04 (.35)	1.54 (.27)**	.07 (.23)	-.42 (.25)	-.73 (.34)*
MidWest East	.11 (.32)	1.44 (.25)**	-.13 (.21)	-.33 (.23)	-.47 (.29)
MidWest West	1.04 (.32)**	1.92 (.27)**	.13 (.22)	.35 (.34)	-.03 (.41)
Border South	.58 (.39)	.81 (.32)**	-.74 (.32)*	.01 (.29)	-.61 (.43)
Mountain	-1.20 (.78)	2.29 (.32)**	.73 (.29)**	.91 (.31)**	.04 (.38)
Pacific	.25 (.36)	1.08 (.28)**	-.21 (.23)	-.65 (.28)*	-.87 (.40)*
R^2	.17	.18	.17	.20	.19
N	997	2239	3051	1711	1106

continued . . .

Table 2 (concluded)

	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990
Intercept	-5.97 (.74)**	-5.40 (.66)**	-6.46 (.59)**	-5.69 (.68)**	-6.34 (.75)**
Reg. Repub.	.44 (.20)*	.11 (.26)	.37 (.21)		
Registered				.78 (.32)**	.83 (.36)*
Rep. Primary				.11 (.22)	
Rep. Party ID		.28 (.22)	.35 (.23)	.70 (.23)**	.54 (.23)*
Independent	-.10 (.19)	-.11 (.20)	-.24 (.20)	.37 (.22)	.35 (.23)
Voted Last Election	.62 (.26)*				.45 (.30)
Income	.03 (.02)	.04 (.02)*	.02 (.02)	.05 (.02)**	.03 (.02)
Education	.16 (.04)**	.09 (.04)**	.16 (.03)**	.04 (.03)	.10 (.04)*
Black	-.69 (.39)	-.50 (.39)	-.09 (.28)	.28 (.33)	-.43 (.36)
Male	.23 (.17)	.21 (.16)	.18 (.15)	-.18 (.17)	.07 (.18)
Age	.02 (.01)**	.02 (.01)**	.02 (.01)**	.01 (.01)*	.02 (.01)*
Union	-.27 (.22)	.38 (.19)*	.07 (.18)	-.08 (.21)	-.22 (.24)
Catholic	-.28 (.22)	.19 (.20)	.18 (.19)	.11 (.21)	.02 (.23)
Jewish	-1.74 (.80)*	.59 (.44)	-.24 (.58)	-.56 (.78)	.25 (.55)
Rural	-.51 (.20)**	-.79 (.22)**	-.56 (.19)**	-.44 (.23)	.01 (.25)
New England	-.40 (.38)	.16 (.36)	-.60 (.40)	-.28 (.44)	-1.10 (.61)
Mid. Atlantic	-.37 (.29)	-.32 (.34)	-.64 (.29)*	-.06 (.34)	-.56 (.35)
MidWest East	-.59 (.28)*	-.11 (.29)	-.68 (.26)**	.15 (.28)	-.17 (.30)
MidWest West	.41 (.28)	.07 (.37)	.20 (.26)	.70 (.35)*	-.50 (.40)
Border South	-.61 (.364	-.73 (.40)	-.52 (.32)	-.76 (.41)	-.22 (.42)
Mountain	-.69 (.50)	1.15 (.41)**	1.01 (.33)**	1.37 (.44)**	-.12 (.57)
Pacific	-.60 (.35)	-.53 (.33)	-.63 (.34)	.69 (.31)*	-.16 (.32)
R^2	.25	.18	.25	.19	.21
N	1139	1674	1910	1574	1767

Note: Entries are logit coefficients (standard error). * = p ≤ .05 ** = p ≤ .01 (two tailed test)

Regionally there is an anti-southern tendency, but it is not as pronounced as was seen in the Democratic equations. Non-southern states were less likely to be contacted eight times, and more likely to be contacted 20 times, but this pattern is attenuated late in the series: since 1974, seven regions have been contacted less, and seven regions have been contacted more than states in the solid South. Looking at individual characteristics, persons with higher educational levels were significantly more likely to be contacted, and the higher one's income, the higher the likelihood of being contacted by the GOP since 1960. These findings are not surprising, given the attractiveness of Republican economic policies to the wealthy, and given the greater propensity to vote among persons with higher educational levels and socioeconomic status. Since 1976, older Americans have been contacted at higher rates than the young (seven out of the last eight years), possibly a function of the growing political importance and higher turnout rate of this group.

Is the GOP contacting members of its coalition? Republicans have not been contacting whites significantly more than blacks (except in 1964 and 1980); they have not been contacting men more than women; they have not contacted Protestants more than Jews or Catholics. They have come to contact older citizens at higher rates since 1976; higher income people are more likely to have been contacted than lower income people; individuals living in rural areas are less likely to have been contacted than those in metropolitan areas. The evidence is mixed: the GOP *does* contact older, richer people, but not members of the other groups in their coalition.

One possible reason that the parties do not appear to be consistently contacting their constituents is that these demographic factors would be significant only if the parties contacted these groups at rates exceeding these groups' identification with the party. For example, the Democratic party might be doing an adequate job at contacting Catholics, but only at the rate at which Catholics identify (or register) as Democrats. In order to test for this possibility, a second set of equations was run, dropping the party ID and party registration variables. Among those contacted by the Democrats, dropping these variables caused some minor changes: voting in the previous election became significant four times, and twice during the 1980s were blacks and Catholics each contacted at higher rates. Among those contacted by the GOP, Catholics were contacted significantly more in 1960 and significantly less in 1964; blacks were contacted significantly less in 1976 and 1982. In sum, dropping the party identification and registration measures induced no consistent changes over the series of equations.

Another possible explanation for the results obtained here might be that the parties were targeting more narrow groups than the measures used in this analysis. To test for this possibility, a third set of equations was

generated that controlled for the targeting of young males (aged 30 and under), white southerners, and ideologically conservative Christians. Only white southerners were contacted at rates that were different from others, all things being equal: in four of the six presidential elections since 1968, white southerners were significantly less likely to be contacted. In these cases, the Republican party did not simply make gains in the South by dint of more activities (there was only one year when the GOP contacted white southerners at a higher rate), but more due to a virtual abdication of the region by the Democrats (five out of 11 years the Democrats were less active among these voters). Interestingly, Christian conservatives were only contacted at higher rates by either party in one year (1982), and then by *both* parties.

Have the Parties Improved Over Time?

I suggested earlier that the parties may have taken advantage of technological innovations in their targeting efforts. If, over time, there is an increase in the number of individual characteristics that obtain significance in the parties' contacting equations, we could infer that the parties are doing a better job at targeting their contacts based on these characteristics. For the Democrats, there is an average of 4.3 significant variables in each equation prior to 1974; beginning in 1974, the average is 8.1 (removing the competitive structure variables that began in 1978, the average is 7.3). The averages for the Republicans are 4.8 and 8.2, respectively (removing the competitive structure variables brings these averages to 4.7 and 7.2, respectively). On this basis, the parties are somewhat more efficient at targeting their contacts based on these variables, assuming they use these characteristics and are not just getting luckier over time.

A second indicator of changes in the parties' targeting capabilities can be obtained by regressing the proportion of variance explained by the models in each year on time. Table 3 shows the bivariate regression of each year's Pseudo-R^2 on a time counter. Both counters coefficients are significant at the $p \leq .01$ level; the Democratic equation explains 66 percent of the variance, and the Republican equation explains 60 percent. Solving for the equations yields a 12 percent increase in the pseudo-R^2 over the last 40 years. We can thus conclude that the passage of time has seen a substantial improvement in the ability of this model to explain the variance associated with the parties' contacts. In summary, the parties have become somewhat more successful in their ability to target their contacting toward individuals with the specific characteristics used in this model.[7]

Table 3. Regression of Contact Equation Pseudo R^2s on Time

Dependent Variable	Constant	Counter	R^2
Democratic Pseudo-R^2	8.62 (1.49)**	0.32 (0.06)**	.66
Republican Pseudo-R^2	5.45 (5.08)	0.31 (0.07)**	.60

Note: The dependent variable is the percentage of variance explained by the models in each year (see Tables 1 and 2). The "counter" independent variable takes account of the passage of time on the ability of the parties to successfully target their contacts based upon the variables in the model. This variable takes the value of 0 for 1952, 4 for 1956, 8 for 1960, 12 for 1964, 14 for 1966, and so on.

Discussion and Conclusions

We can compare the results of this analysis with those in Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) important and useful contribution to the mobilization literature. Many of the characteristics that they found to be highly significant made little contribution to these equations. I can think of two possible reasons why my results were substantially less robust than those obtained by these scholars. First, the differences may hinge upon different coding of some variables. The second, and more important reason for the differences in the two analyses probably lies with the time-oriented nature of the methodologies. While Rosenstone and Hansen used the NES Cumulative Data File, 1952-1988, and did not indicate controls for changes in the nature of contacting efforts over time, I assumed that canvassing activities may have changed over time. Therefore, variables that were significant in some years were allowed to be insignificant in others. Moreover, Rosenstone and Hansen did not separately analyze Democratic and Republican contacts.

The results of this analysis show that people who are registered or who are previous voters are significantly more likely to be contacted by both parties than non-voters. Party identification is itself a poor predictor of canvassing, but each party can be successful at targeting their adherents among the population. Overall, these patterns suggest that the parties use lists of previous voters as guides for future contacting efforts. This is an intuitive result, in that one of the best predictors of whether one will vote in the future is whether one has voted in the past.

Other results suggest that canvassing efforts vary according to the organizational strength of the local or state parties and candidate-centered organizations, rather than based on an organized program of contacting

directed from the national party hierarchy. This can be inferred by comparing regional patterns of contacting efforts with the changes in the strength of state party organizations reported by Gibson et al. (1983, 1989). Democrats showed higher levels of contacting in the Midwest (compared to the South) between 1966 and 1972, and between 1980 and 1988, matching the relative strength of their organizations between the two regions in those time periods. Interestingly, however, the pattern does not emerge with regard to the electorally rich industrialized midwestern states such as Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio. The strength of Democratic organizations in the Northeast and Midwest declined between 1970 and 1980, and contacting was not significantly higher in those regions during that decade. In the West, Democratic party organizations grew in strength after 1980, that growth being matched by significantly higher rates of contacting there after 1974.

For the GOP, canvassing took place to a greater extent in the deep South after 1974, matching the substantial growth of the party's organizations in that region. The Republicans had strong organizations in the Midwest prior to 1970, and contacting was substantially higher there at that time. Declines in midwestern party strength after 1975 were matched by weaker contacting efforts. Throughout the time covered by this study, the GOP has had strong party organizations in the West, and their contacting patterns have matched that strength.

In the context of the transaction cost model and its hypotheses that the parties will selectively seek to target their campaign activities, how can these results be interpreted? First, the parties appear to have taken advantage of technological changes and are now able to contact groups with more specificity than early in the NES series. As described in Godwin (1988), the extent to which party organizations are able to fine-tune their direct mail campaigns is remarkable. And Kayden and Mahe (1985) described how the computerization of politics has improved the ability of the parties to reach voters with direct mail appeals and with direct campaign activities, including the use of comprehensive campaign lists based on voting behavior. By the same token, conservative Christians were not any more likely to be contacted by the parties. It seems likely that the reason for this lies in the well-established communication networks used to reach these citizens: churches.[8]

Second, comparing Erikson, Lancaster and Romero's results with those presented here, it seems that the parties (1) do not expend resources for contacting groups that are very likely to vote for their candidates, and (2) do not expend resources for contacting groups that are very unlikely to vote for their candidates. That is, Democrats do not target blacks, union families, Catholics or Jews, who will vote Democratic anyway. Neither do Republi-

cans target their efforts toward these groups, because they will not vote Republican.

Who, then, are the parties targeting? Three answers emerge from this analysis. First, marginal voters from Erikson, Lancaster and Romero (1989): individuals with more education and living in urban areas (where door-to-door canvassing is more efficient). Second, members of groups with the highest turnout rates: those who are better educated, have higher incomes, and who are older. It should be noted that contacting members of these groups is likely to yield a higher payoff, because they are more responsive to direct appeals than to information-sparse television commercials (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Kayden and Mahe 1985; Krassa 1988). Third, older Americans, whose electoral clout has grown substantially in the last two decades.

The transaction cost model also suggests that the efforts of the parties will change the participation rates for the people with whom they come into contact. While this question is not addressed here, the discussion in the introductory sections notes that the parties are quite effective in their mobilization efforts. The parties' contacts vary over time, but are important for increasing voter turnout and encouraging involvement in other political activities. The results of those analyses and that presented here suggest that the parties are increasingly efficient at targeting their mobilization efforts to groups whose participation will increase the organizations' probability of winning elections.

The targeting strategies of the parties differ, however. Eldersveld (1982, 273) wrote, "A major element of campaign strategy is the need to put together a coalition of interest groups that, if appealed to properly, will constitute the winning margin. Parties are . . . appealing for group support in an election campaign, both by activating and reinforcing the support among their own interest subgroups and by expanding the appeal to other interests in the community needed for victory." Using the patterns of contacting observed here, and working under the assumption that parties are purposive and strategic in their allocation of human resources, what can be inferred about the parties' intentions in using the canvass?

The Democrats target groups on the margins, perhaps in an appeal for support or in a conversion effort. Perhaps they do not focus on "traditional" Democrats, because of a belief that the GOP holds little appeal for these voters, and therefore their only option in this two-party system is the Democratic party. The Republicans contact older richer citizens, perhaps in an effort to activate or reinforce their support. They make personal appeals to the well-educated in a conversion effort toward this high-turnout group. In conclusion, it appears that Eldersveld's statement is not equally appropriate

to the two major U.S. political parties. The results obtained in this research imply that the efforts being made by the parties are efforts of both conversion and limited activation, once registered and likely voters have been contacted. The parties *are* strategic in their citizen contacting activities, although not exactly as the literature would lead us to believe.

NOTES

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[1]Implicit in this discussion of electoral coalitions is the notion that individuals are components of a larger group, and that the behavior of a member of a group is probabalistically related to the behavior of that group (see, for example, Grafstein 1991). In the current context, parties may contact individuals in the hope that they will serve as intermediaries between the party and other individuals who share characteristics. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992, 70) called this effect "cascading consequences," arguing that "[s]uccessful efforts at voter mobilization . . . depend upon a process of social diffusion and informal persuasion."

[2]This text is taken from the 1988 survey; minor changes have occurred in the question wording.

[3]It was preferable to use each respondent's party identification prior to contact by a party worker. Unfortunately, only presidential election year surveys included a pre-election party identification item. Post-election party identification was substituted in the remaining years, but this does not seem to have biased the results in favor of this variable's influence. Party identification is coded as a set of three dummy variables. In the Democratic contact equations Republican identifiers are in the excluded category, while Democratic identifiers are excluded from the Republican contact equations. Many states do not have registration by party. Respondents from those states are coded zero, since the parties can not use that criterion for targeting contacts.

[4]The equations also included measures indicating the kind of race being run where the respondent lives (open House seat, open Senate seat, incumbent and challenger party labels). The NES has only tracked the types of congressional races in 1966 and since 1978. Results for these variables were inconsistent over time, and so were not reported in the tables.

[5]Demographic variables included in the equations but not reported were employment status and experience (economic adversity), frequency of church attendance, home ownership, ethnicity (hispanic), residential mobility, and marital status. As an example of the results, here is the logit equation for Democratic contacts in 1988 (* indicates p $\leq$ .05; ** indicates p $\leq$ .01; two tailed tests):

Democratic Contact = -6.59(Intercept)** +1.42(Registered Voter)** +.81(Dem. Party ID)** +.13(Independent) +.34(Voted Last Election) -.45(HR Dem. Challenger) +.68(Sen. Dem. Challenger) +.67(HR Open Seat) -.76(Sen. Open Seat) -.10(Rural) -.60(New England) -1.02(Middle

Atlantic)-.17(Midwest East)-.39(Midwest West)-1.02(Border South)* +.37(Mountain)-.43(Pacific) -.04(Economic Adversity) -.02(Frequency of Church Attendance) -.21(Home Owner) -.00(Income) +.14(Education)** +.05(Residential Mobility) -.10(Black) -.62(Hispanic) -.05(Male) +.02(Age) +.10(Married) +.20(Union) +.11(Catholic) +.43(Jewish)

[6]All equations were tested for collinearity by running parallel OLS equations, and examining the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each independent variable in each equation. In only a few cases does this score rise above 2.25, indicating that multicollinearity does not pose a severe problem for this analysis (Fox 1991). In most of those cases high VIFs were observed among the sets of regional variables, which are categorical, but Fox and Monette (1993) have shown that high VIFs among sets of dummy variables do not seriously degrade the estimation of equation coefficients. The R^2 reported in these equations is derived from a formula in Aldrich and Nelson (1984, 57), and corrected according to recommendations in Hagel and Mitchell (1992, 776). The formula is

$$Pseudo\ R^2 = [\chi^2/(N+\chi^2)]M$$

where χ^2 is the model chi-square statistic for the equation, N is the number of observations in the equation, and M is the Hagel and Mitchell multiplier, which is chosen based upon the distribution of the dependent variable.

[7]It should be noted that even though these models improve in their explanatory ability over time, the proportion of variance explained by them is rather modest, suggesting either the omission of important independent variables or the presence of a large random component to canvassing activities. Including a variable that controlled for on- versus off-year elections did not obtain significance for either party's equations, indicating that the parties have not been doing an appreciably better job in either type of year.

[8]It should be noted, however, that frequency of church attendance was generally unrelated to the contacting patterns of either party. Perhaps the parties proceeded through the authority structure of local churches, rather than using church membership rolls as targeting mechanisms. If they did use membership lists, frequency of church attendance might not be expected to have an effect. For example, the Roman Catholic church *never* purges its rolls, regardless of the attendance record (or lack thereof) of its members.

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