

*The Second Magellanic Age:
Territory and Political Authority in the 21st Century*

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Territorial states have evolved over several centuries into all-purpose political units, sharing sovereignty only with other states. Non-territorial forms of political, economic, or religious organizations are increasingly performing state functions, leading to "government a la carte" and thereby to a wider sharing of sovereignty than at any time since the medieval period. Nation-states will not disappear, indeed they will continue to increase in number; but they will be forced to share the world stage with supple and adaptable non-territorial, transnational organizations.

The rise of the territorial nation-state to become the universal standard of political organization brought some well-known benefits (including individualism, personal rights, and economic development) and curses (including totalitarian regimes, colonialism, and destruction or assimilation of other political forms). Technological developments, especially in electronics and telecommunications, have shifted the balance away from purely territorial political forms towards a greater role for non-territorial organizations and their associated identities and loyalties. These new forms and forces constitute a new "logic" which opens up possibilities unknown or unimagined or unattainable until now.

Is territory imperative? Must sovereign political units rest necessarily on assumptions about territoriality? At least three assumptions historically underlay institutional experiments with nation-states. Indeed, they have formed a deep and unconscious part of the political culture of the western world and its colonies for up to 300 years. The three assumptions involve exclusive use of territory, continuous territory, and contiguous territory. Territoriality will be used here to mean that all three of these assumptions are assumed as the basis of political authority, especially at the national level. To "relax" assumptions about territoriality, as I will do, means to assume that at most one or two of the assumptions hold. For example, reserves for Indians are not territorial in the way nations are because they do not presume contiguity of reserves with each other even though the reserves may be for the exclusive use of status Indians. All of the assumptions play a role in conceptions of appropriate political units and the exercise of political authority.

Political units based on exclusive, continuous, and contiguous territory came to justify themselves in terms of sovereignty.¹ Sovereignty was

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personified in the early stages in the body of the King, but eventually sovereignty was imbued in the state and institutions such as Parliament. In many nations, nations, of course, it has been presumed to reside in "the people" with different consequences depending on how "the people" gets defined. As territoriality became a plausible basis for sovereignty, the assertion of sovereignty was used as a counter to other political forms, in particular against the Catholic Church and Pope, against the cities and the rights of citizens to free trade and commerce, and against the local, particularistic ties of fealty and homage in the feudal system.²

The nation-state, as we have learned to call this condensation from "the feudal nebula of the Middle Ages" (Clark 1947, 155), won a Darwinian struggle with Church, cities, and feudality. By focusing sovereignty in one institution, the territorial state encompassed a much wider range of functions than any one of the political authorities it subdued. These nation-states mutually recognized each others' sovereignty and all-purpose hegemony over territory, thus bringing into reality a state-system rather than the empires more common elsewhere. (Strayer 1970; Anderson 1974; Gottman 1973; McNeill 1986; Tilly 1992).

The state-system and its assumptions about territoriality and sovereignty have evolved in significant ways. Although most observers see continuity of the Westphalian system, one can question the permanence of the system on several grounds. For one thing, these assumptions about territoriality and concomitant sovereignty are very recent additions to political culture. For the first millennium or so of the Christian era in Europe, politics was carried out with no belief that a territorial base was essential to the state, even though many rulers coveted territory.

But time brings changes. Not only have market systems penetrated all countries—and not just industrialized ones—but international "globalization" of economic relations has placed many economic functions beyond the control of nations, even rich and powerful ones like the United States or Japan. Likewise, political organizations at the local or regional level and at the supra-national level compete with nations for the allegiance of citizens. In these and many other ways, the territoriality of political, economic, and cultural life has been challenged in recent decades. The particular ways in which most aspects of our lives have been bundled or packaged in containers called nation-states have been subtly eroded. The implications of the "unbundling" of nation-states amount to a profound change in political culture as well as in forms of institutional authority and in political behavior.

A Vision of Tectonic Change

An interconnected set of assumptions about appropriate modes of behavior and institutions, and about the range of plausible variations on them, compose what I mean by culture. Not culture in the sense of "high culture" like opera or painting, but culture in the sense of a way of life so taken for granted that it seems natural, "a given," and the premise on which we can base arguments and actions (Elkins and Simeon 1979). Assumptions which so evade most people's notice that they are not even seen as assumptions at all, I will refer to as *tectonic* assumptions. Tectonic changes occur rarely, but they render problematic many aspects of our lives. They call into question the very grounds of our arguments. They are debated and eventually a new assumption or set of assumptions comes to seem natural or even inevitable.

Many areas of the world are now in the midst of a tectonic change in several dimensions of political, economic, and social life. One in particular will receive most of my attention, but its ramifications require that a few words be recorded about other tectonic changes. Territoriality is thus the keystone among many changes. Questioning territoriality will lead to ramifications in the meaning of individuality, personal identity, types of community, mass society, democracy, and citizenship.

To highlight the taken-for-granted nature of territoriality, I offer a vision of another world premised on the relaxation of our assumptions about territoriality. This vision may or may not turn out to be accurate as a detailed prediction about the world in the 21st or later centuries. Prediction is not my goal. Instead I want to corrode the presumptiveness of the set of assumptions about territoriality which have served as the unspoken framework of European political thought for about three centuries and the framework for every part of the inhabited areas of this planet for most of this century. Prediction occurs implicitly whenever we use familiar concepts, because they imply that their underlying assumptions will continue to be applicable.

Most people feel no unease at the concept of "creating" a nation by revolution (as is alleged to have happened in the United States in 1776 and France in 1789) or by writing a constitution, as Canadians did in the 1860's or Australians in the 1890's or so many Third World countries after World War II. But there are deeper levels of creation and construction: before one can write a constitution, you must have the idea that a constitution is a willed act of human agency and not just tradition or the revealed word of a deity; before one can argue for or unify a nation, you must have the idea of a nation.

Words serve many helpful purposes, but they—like tables—often seem hard and definite. From time to time, we need to see them as cages from which our thoughts should be freed. Is Canada one nation or two? Are aboriginal peoples really nations, and if so, how many nations are there "in" Canada? And how many angels can dance on the head of a pin? The answers to these questions—to the extent anyone can give an answer—are less significant than recognizing that the concept of nation (and angel) has changed a great deal over time, and it is undergoing, I argue, a fundamental transformation now.

For present purposes, I intend to use "nation-state" in several related ways because that will remind us that an institution was created, evolved, feels familiar, but continues to evolve in ways that make us wonder if it is still the beast we feel so comfortable with. Some readers will prefer to use new terms or to add explanatory adjectives, and I understand the urge. But I have chosen to stick with "nation" or "nation-state" for the reasons given.

To question assumptions about territoriality requires that one also question the reliance on one all-purpose or at least multi-purpose political organization. Such all-purpose organizations historically grew out of the increasingly territorial nature of the state. They arose solely in what we now call western Europe over many centuries, and only later were they spread to every part of this planet by imperialism, exploration, conquest, settlement, and conversion.

Some areas of the world are still endeavoring to "bundle" into sovereign nation-states, and thereby they give the impression that nationalism is growing rather than diminishing in strength. In areas where nations and nationalism have deeper roots, we are now witnessing the transition away from the assumptions that a nation-state must have territory and that the territory should be contiguous, continuous, and exclusive. I believe firmly that the transition is in progress and will be completed in a matter of decades. Thus, it is timely to relax the components of territoriality and speculate about some directions in which political organization may proceed.³

Globalization: Process and Product

Thinking about the implications of moving beyond the territorial nation-state may be facilitated by a distinction between the process of globalization and the likely products of that process. For most people, globalization means larger political units and more extensive economic interdependence. For them, the classic products of globalization include the European Community and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Note, however, that this way of thinking about globalization assumes, along with national units

of analysis, that political and economic organizations will have territorial bases. Even if globalization in this sense were to encompass a world government and worldwide free trade, it would be a less radical change in that respect than what I have suggested is underway—the demise of territory as the sole basis of political units and the consequent decline of sovereignty for all-purpose political units, especially nations.

I envision globalization, on the other hand, as a process rather than equating it with these larger or more integrated political and economic units. Let us call these "products" globalism to distinguish them from "nationalism." Of course, I do not deny that these events are happening or that new and larger communities are forming. What I propose, however, is to view "globalism" as part of the evolution of the Westphalian system and the economic interdependencies it has spawned.

Globalization, by contrast, I conceive as the process by which ever larger proportions of the world's population become aware of differences in culture, style of life, affluence, and other matters. This increasing awareness has been underway for millennia, if not forever, but it achieved an especially high pitch in the era of European exploration, imperialism, and settlement in the sixteenth and subsequent centuries. With the spread of independence of colonies from their empires in this century, the process has become multilateral: instead of the British learning about India or Australia, and vice-versa, we now witness almost all nations of the world learning about almost all other nations. This results from greater travel, more extensive trade in consumer goods, and massive diffusion of media of telecommunications. If the circumnavigation of the globe by Magellan marked the beginning of an era, the circling of our globe by electronic means might be called the Second Magellanic Age.

Globalization and globalism have been conceptualized in economic terms more often than in political terms. This can be accounted for, I believe, because economic relations can more easily be abstracted from assumptions about territory, whereas we have rarely questioned the territorial basis of politics. Indeed, many increasingly important economic organizations lack a territorial base: GATT, the World Bank, IATA, OPEC, and many other obvious examples.

But think about another view of the organizations just mentioned. Although economic in an overt sense, they are governments or at least "police." We rarely think of them as governmental institutions because they are neither sovereign nor occupy territory in an exclusive way. Yet they perform functions which are political or governmental, such as interest articulation and aggregation, rule-making, rule adjudication, and enforcement of sanctions in a few specific areas of jurisdiction. Their essential


purpose derives from the increasing need to regulate economic activities which coincide less and less closely with national or territorial boundaries. Which does not prove that nations or territorial units will eventually serve no useful purposes, but it may demonstrate that they will serve *fewer* purposes than they once did. If so, nations may be in the process of sharing sovereignty with other institutions or authorities.

Another consequence of distinguishing between globalism and globalization brings into focus a crucial question about the 21st century. Globalism in my definition involves supranational communities with multiple functions, as is most evident in the European Community which may eventually come to look quite like a nation. The ostensibly economic organizations just mentioned, however, are quite different; they are not multi-functional but have a very restricted set of functions. They are *de facto* governments, albeit with highly focused jurisdictions. They also share another important feature—they were created by nation-states to serve national interests. A large question for the next century concerns whether these or similar organizations will continue to serve national interests or will become more autonomous.

Regulation of specialized but transnational markets follows a "logic" clearly different from the "logic" of territorial police, the nation-state, and the state system. Unless these supra-national agencies achieve a degree of autonomy, they cannot effectively achieve their intended purposes; to the degree they become autonomous, however, their unintended consequence will be to circumvent, to undermine, and to replace some of the functions of the nations which created them. Likewise the international cooperation so evident in technologies of communication and travel foster the specialized and voluntary communities which I will describe in a later section. Neither these modes of travel and communication, nor these specialized "police," were designed to create trans-national communities; and few or none of these communities were set up for the explicit purpose of making nations less relevant. Unintentionally, that is exactly what they seem to be doing.

Intentional versus unintentional consequences may be clarified by a final example of the usefulness of my distinction between globalization and globalism. As I argue below, there are many actors which are challenging nations or serving to move us "beyond the territorial nation-state," but here I will use transnational corporations as a convenient surrogate for the others.

Consider the oversimplified diagram below. It summarizes a vast amount of detail in a way which highlights the processes of most interest here. In brief, the historically specific state structure is taken as "given" at any one time (nation-state now), and that sets severe constraints on types of government. Each type of government—and each "regime" whether elected



or self-chosen—creates somewhat different policy environments which constrain or offer opportunities to particular transnational corporations (and environmental groups, religions, and other entities ignored here).

Transnationals know what is going on in lots of places around the world, which is a good part of what I mean by "globalization." When they come across forms of government and/or policy environments which they believe favor their enterprise, they try to reinforce those forms and to modify the governments and policies elsewhere. That is shown as feedback loop "A," which amounts to conscious, deliberate, and intended efforts to evoke responses in government which improve the policy environment. In trying to get one government to implement policy learned in another political system, the result may be different even if everyone conscientiously works to implement the policy. This follows from the obvious fact that circumstances differ in small and large ways, and our knowledge is insufficient to compensate for the differences. These complexities alone are enough to suggest that emulation on a global scale, as a result of globalization of information, need not lead inexorably to globalism as world-wide homogeneity. Universal standards make more obvious the unique, the local, and the particular.

Let us turn now to feedback loop "B." Occasionally there are politicians or other actors who consciously try to think through the likely consequences for the state system and state structure of the lobbying efforts of transnationals and of the policy environment and government structural adaptations. Such conscious reflection on state structure seems to be quite rare, and thus "B" may be conceptualized as a largely unconscious, inadvertent, or unintended set of consequences for the state structure when the participants thought their "target" was the government or the policy environment. Much of what I describe below as lying beyond territorial nations consists of unanticipated effects on state structure. Of course, the picture is enormously richer and more complicated than this diagram can convey because transnationals are only one type of organization which generates feedbacks like "A" or "B."

My book examines many inadvertent consequences of the actions of non-territorial groups and organizations. The consequences of most interest

to me concern the ways in which nation-states have come to share the world stage with political entities previously eclipsed in their shadow but now becoming more visible, more salient, and more influential. In the space available, I cannot cover all the major changes discussed in the book, but I will summarize briefly the direction of my argument in regard to a couple of key lines of evolution.

Multiple Identities

As the idea of the nation-state as a territorial, all-purpose political organization achieved its hegemony, it affected aspects of identity. Out of the myriad ways in which each person can be characterized, one's territorial location in a nation has come to assume overwhelming importance. One is not just a car manufacturer but a Japanese car manufacturer. One is no longer just a Catholic but a Polish Catholic. Thus, slowly and incrementally, the idea of the territorial nation-state has changed the relative importance of identities, creating a hierarchy which is arbitrary but has felt natural to most of us for generations. This hierarchy of identities coincides with nationalism, but its implications reach beyond nationalism.

I refer to this occlusion of identities as "bundling." The territorial nation has been the bundle or basket into which other facets of our lives are fit. It is similar to the economic concept of a "basket" of goods: one cannot easily get items individually but must take them collectively. In a restaurant, one can order *à la carte*; but as far as our identities are concerned we must take what nations have bundled together, which amounts to *table d'hôte*.

These observations must be qualified. In the core areas where these processes of territorial bundling began, the hierarchy of identities seems most advanced (Elkins 1980). In areas touched later by explorers from Europe and even later by imperialism and nationalism, some countries have been more "resistant" to the virus of territoriality while others have had their own reasons for embracing these assumptions (Jackson 1990). To give two examples from Asia, one may instance India as a territorial agglomeration which has probably not bundled the identities into as tight a hierarchy as has Japan. Caste, language, and religion contest quite successfully with nationalism for pride of place in the hierarchy of identities of many Indians. For most Japanese, however, homogeneity of a remarkable order on dimensions of language, race, and religion makes it difficult to say whether "nation" as a set of islands is the pinnacle of Japanese identities or whether it may simply summarize (or thus bundle in another way) these other dimensions. Unbundling, as discussed below, seems in any event much less likely in Japan (or France or Germany) than in India (or Switzerland or Canada).

The United States, Australia, and a few other countries derived from European settlement provide another kind of evidence about bundling of identities. The United States showcases its tolerance for immigrants from the rest of the world, even if its welcome sometimes includes discrimination. But the melting pot is aptly named, because there is a clear hierarchy of identities at least as a goal: one is an American first and foremost, to such an extent that the concept "unAmerican" has real resonance. Not that every American will have the same hierarchy, but it is usually believed that in time every group will put "American" ahead of race, class, religion, or place of origin. The "bundle" or hierarchy of identities will never be exactly the same, but open borders, tolerance, and multicultural immigration are not usually seen as a threat to the United States and some other "settler" countries because of the assumption that *place* and territoriality will win out over non-territorial identities and loyalties.

It takes an act of imagination to realize that our European ancestors made no such assumptions. One's pre-eminent identity was religious for many centuries, no matter where one lived or how often one moved. In feudal times, serfs and lords were tied to particular pieces of land, but their identities rested on the specific status and privileges of rank and mutual obligation and hardly at all on geographic place in the current sense of German or Italian or Dutch. The transformation of identities has thus been two-fold: creation of powerful territorial loyalties, and the occlusion or bundling of many other identities and loyalties as subordinate to those of territorial nations. Citizenship took on new meanings as the bundling of identities progressed, and I will suggest below that it will mean something new in the 21st century when unbundling opens new "spaces" in our minds and spirits.

A reverse process has been underway for some time, which can be called "unbundling."⁴ When communists try to appeal to the working class across national boundaries, they represent a form of unbundling. When business leaders argue for free trade and deregulation, they unknowingly further the unbundling of national-territorial hegemony. When women make common cause between the First World and the Third World, their actions serve to make gender relatively more salient and nation or territory relatively less so.

Note that bundling or packaging never eliminated sub-national or non-territorial identities. What resulted was a hierarchy of identities. Unbundling may weaken the hierarchy and may change the *relative* significance of particular identities, but it need not eliminate any of them. More crucial is this: unbundling will create spaces in which the hierarchy of identities is replaced by multiple hierarchies, that is, different hierarchies for different people.

For some people, territorial identities like nation or province will still predominate, but for other people those identities will be closer to the bottom of their personal hierarchy.

Whether bundling will be eclipsed by unbundling everywhere, and at the same pace, we must not lose sight of an even more profound transformation of how one conceives of identities: change of identities need not involve *choosing* among identities but *adding* new dimensions (or raising the salience) of our selves. Immigrants to Canada or the United States add a new dimension to their identity. Moving from one occupation to another need not entail changing one's religion or dress. And yet in earlier times and places, one sort of change (to the extent it was allowed at all) entailed many related choices: moving to another territory may have required conversion to a different religion or denomination; entering a particular profession entitled one to wear distinctive clothing or live in a special type of housing; and the fealty and protection from one Lord rather than another could affect whether or whom one married.

Many people have come by stages to believe that most identities are open to choice, and recently to believe that choice may involve adding identities without discarding others. In short, historical instances of bundling and unbundling reveal that at least some people have learned to be comfortable with the concept and reality of *multiple identities*. This entails—for some people at least—the coexistence of *multiple loyalties*. Multiple loyalties is a neutral label for what social scientists used to call "cross-pressures." Contrary to that earlier view, I envision a future in which multiple loyalties and multiple identities increase one's freedom by addition rather than forced choice.⁵ If there are two primary motives or principles in politics—loyalty and revenge—then we may ask how multiple loyalties could make it less clear on whom vengeance should be wreaked.

Mass society has meant the elimination or downplaying or atrophy of primary and secondary group affiliations which mediated between individuals and the nation-state. As nation-states provide fewer functions and as other groups, communities, and identities gain in significance and visibility, society becomes less "mass" and much more complex. As groups, identities, and loyalties more often cross national borders, the stature of the nation-state should become only one context for individuals, even if it remains the single most powerful political authority.

Lest the issue of identity seem a private matter of little consequence for high politics, let me offer one example of how reconceptualization of identities might lead us to examine how we measure national trade and wealth. The largest exporter of microchips from Japan to the United States in recent years has been Texas Instruments, a company founded and having its

headquarters in Dallas. Is it a Japanese company? Regardless of label, those microchips show up as Japanese exports and American imports in the balance of payments. They are counted in Japan's GDP rather than American GDP.

However challenging it may be to debate the real identity of Texas Instruments, it is more interesting to question whether one should catalog companies in terms of where headquarters is physically located. Of course, some companies are locally owned and serve a purely local market, but transnational corporations do not. The majority of dollar value of world trade in manufactured goods now involves movement of semi-finished goods between countries *but within the same company*. This is one reason why trade in goods and trade in financial instruments have been completely decoupled or unbundled. It also suggests that the way we measure trade may not reflect the same activity which occasioned the original attempt to measure this economic exchange. In short, transnational economic activities should henceforth be classified in their own right rather than remaining bundled in containers called nation-states which no longer control them or contain them (Ohmae 1991; Reich 1991).

Community and Citizenship

The array of identities made more visible or salient by the weakening of national hegemony—at least for some parts of the world—should lead to a greater sense of community among groups or categories of people who do not share national boundaries. I mentioned above several such transnational identities, including class, business sector, and gender. To the extent these identities are "just" ideas or feelings or hopes, they may have some potency but not much institutional autonomy, and thus they would seem to pose minimal threat to the nation-state and the state system. Communities of direct personal contact and of transnational organizations should eventually pose more potent threats. As they do so, concepts of citizenship may evolve in quite different forms than we now take for granted.

Globalization defined as wider awareness of conditions in other parts of the globe should heighten the sense of differences in culture and life-chances. But it should also encourage and underwrite the awareness of "people like me" who happen to live in other places. Furthermore, opportunities to travel and visit such "people like me" in their homes or in conferences can only strengthen the multiple identities which challenge national loyalties. In the final section of this paper, I will outline which identities and communities seem to me most likely to ascend in the hierarchy of identities and thus most likely to share sovereignty with nation-states. At this point,

however, I want to mention the crucial technological change which will transform personal identities into actual communities, and then to speculate on the implications for citizenship.

Radio and television have already played a large role in globalization of identities and communities, but interactive television and other features of the electronic superhighway offer almost limitless opportunities. This follows from the transition away from mass media—and away from mass society—because of the active and interactive possibilities of hypermedia. One measure of the scale of possibilities concerns the 800,000,000 households worldwide which possess both telephone and television. Once the regulatory regimes which keep these technologies separate have been erased or merged, all those homes will eventually have access to interactive visual, auditory, and eventually data transmission. Add to these powers those of cellular telephones, fax machines, electronic networks and bulletin boards (E-mail), and deathstar satellites broadcasting 500 channels of specialized (not mass) television, and the 21st century could be as different from the 20th century as our century has been from the 16th century.

One can envision in a decade or so that hundreds of communities could develop which allow and encourage vast transnational networks based on focused interests and voluntary choice. One can foresee a community linked by a worldwide broadcast of Australian rules football (or tennis or stamp collecting or Shia Muslim poetry or feminist political commentary) and an E-mail network of interested participants. Indeed, individuals would not be limited to one such network; they could participate in as many as they had the time and energy to join. The specificity of focus and voluntary nature might seem at first glance to offer less satisfaction and less authority to such communities, but these might well turn out to be their greatest strengths. The participants in such communities would likely be less parochial, less chauvinistic, and more aware of global interdependence than most people today. Of course, not everyone will have equal access to these communities, but the numbers should be very large and growing as the technology is perfected and becomes cheaper.⁶

Besides purely "private" or voluntary communities such as these, the information superhighway also allows and encourages existing groups and organizations to expand their horizons and become transnationals. Obviously, some have already started down this road—academic researchers, medical practitioners, aboriginal organizations, transnational corporations, financial dealers, terrorists, drug cartels, and the supranational regulatory bodies discussed above. What requires emphasis, I believe, is that large organizations or "the elite" or nations cannot and will not monopolize these opportunities for community-building. That does not preclude nasty surprises

as outlined in William Gibson's novels of cyberspace, but I believe that no central authority (and certainly no territorial authority) can monitor and control all of the networks (Gibson 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1993).

If interactive hypermedia have even part of the stature I have posited, they will engender identities and loyalties which challenge territorial boundaries and thus existing political authority. They will serve purposes and support activities which could be extremely meaningful and deeply emotional for many people. If words like "meaningful" and "emotional" make this process sound like committed relationships, that intent seems plausible. In a post-modern world in which multiple identities are sustained and created by multiple and overlapping communities, "the self is redefined as no longer an essence in itself, but relational" (Gergen 1991, 146). Such relationships will thereby accelerate the evolving concept of citizenship. These new types of relationships will also force us to ask *where* people may reside and still be part of our *community*. To put it more pointedly, *where* can people live and still be *citizens of here*? Why choose? Why not multiply identities, loyalties, and citizenships? For many citizens today, the concept of citizenship should be limited to nations or territorial states. By granting that wish, one severely restricts what citizenship will come to mean in the Second Magellanic Age.

If we wish to restrict the word citizenship to national entities, then consider other words, such as member or participant or holder of an entitlement to services (perhaps "titler" for short). The buzzword recently has been "stakeholders," which includes clients, citizens, private organizations, businesses, and many other categories which might be equivalent to "titlers." Then the concept of "citizen" or "citizenship" will carry a very much more restricted significance as nation-states (and territoriality) yield some of their functions and loyalties to other organizations. The central issue for me has nothing to do with nomenclature, but whether we can relax or eliminate assumptions about exclusivity, continuity, and contiguity of territory in regard to political organizations. I believe these assumptions have already been undermined and attenuated; and I believe that we are passing into a new historical epoch in which non-territorial citizenship may seem as "natural" or "given" as the territorial nation-state did for the past century or more. Whether I am right in these respects, my book and this paper offer a vision of the world I foresee. There is room for many visions, but if one grants that this particular vision *could* come true, then I have accomplished all that I really want to demonstrate: We have taken an awful lot for granted, and these tectonic assumptions may have blinded us to the world in which we live.

Beyond Nations? Beyond Sovereignty?

If many forces and processes have the effect of unbundling territorial nation-states, are these precursors of other bundles or even of a single hegemonic bundle? As with identities, one may not be required to choose among bundles but may add bundles to the repertoire of political authorities. The rise of the nation-state did not eliminate empires or cities, and one may hypothesize that unbundling need not eliminate or replace nation-states. Unbundling will, however, result in a world in which nations perform fewer functions than heretofore, because they will find that non-territorial forms of political organization have taken over functions hitherto assumed to be "naturally" the preserve of territorial states.

Nation-states will almost certainly continue to exist and to perform some extremely important functions, most of all security functions. Although terrorists, drug cartels, and separatist movements have access to formidable firepower, it is a good bet that nations will continue to have more—collectively and in many cases severally. My vision of the future does not, therefore, rule out many of the gloomy predictions made by other observers. With varying degrees of probability, one may look ahead to: nuclear accidents, regional nuclear wars, ecological degradation, wars of redistribution, population explosion, and many other unpleasant possibilities. These eventualities, like wealth and the information highway and like unbundling itself, will probably be found more in some places and less in others. But they are—alas—very likely to occur even if nations unbundle and transnational loyalties multiply (Kennedy 1993).

Having granted that much of the 21st century may look dismayingly like this century, what else lies "beyond nations" and "beyond sovereignty"? The first candidate "beyond nations" is more nations. This may seem to contradict the analysis up to this point, but there are at least two reasons why "more nations" represents a challenge to the hegemony of the existing state system. For one, existing nations must give way to successor states, as has already happened in the former Soviet Union. Why not Quebec, Catalonia, Zululand, and many others? And if Quebec, why not a nation for the James Bay Cree? Such partitions call in question the viability of nations as we know them and lead us to question whether a United Nations with 200, 300, or 1000 nations would be comprised of entities worthy of the same label as in 1950 when there were only 60 members of the U.N.

More significant perhaps would be the creation of nations which were decoupled from states, or more precisely non-territorial nation-states alongside territorial states which did not pretend to be "nations" in the sense of religious, ethnic, linguistic, or cultural states (Armstrong 1982). One thinks

of Kurds, Maya, Cree, Navaho, Basque, and Bantu, among many other candidates. "More nations" does not automatically equal greater security for the recently hegemonic concept of nation-state.

"Beyond nations" lie religious revivals and perhaps new religions. Obvious candidates include Islamic movements, and Christian fundamentalists and evangelicals. One might also witness a rebirth and spread of aboriginal spirituality. Independent of aboriginal concerns but perhaps in alliance with them could arise a new religion based on holistic environmental movements. Religious communities might find expression in cyberspace as well as in more traditional settings. Either way, one can envision situations in which conduct was governed less often by national legislation and more often by religious piety, or in which environmental regulation and rehabilitation flowed from a form of spirituality as much as from territorial governments.

I have already addressed the cases of supranational communities like the EC and supranational agencies like the World Bank and IATA. One may add their sub-national counterparts: greater attention to local and regional governments or special districts "closer" to the populations concerned than a national government can be except in very small, homogenous nation-states.

The previous section anticipated a proliferation of voluntary communities, as well as transnational corporations and the many transnational advocacy and charitable organizations like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and the World Council of Churches. Thus, "beyond nations" may lie the age of corporations or the age of organizations.⁷ Whatever the label, "beyond nations" lies a world full of organizations, networks, and communities which lie somewhere between the purely public and purely private domains.⁸ Each group should "usurp" to some degree the functions of sovereign governments in a limited territory.

Finally, I hypothesize that the next century will witness migrations and attempted migrations on a scale unknown since the founding of the settler societies in the 17th-19th centuries. At first glance, this may seem like business as usual, since nations have dealt with migrants since at least 1648. The novelty of the migrations envisioned here comes from several sources. If we are "connected" in meaningful communities with people elsewhere, can we so easily deny them entry here? If our identities consist in part of shared non-territorial communities, will we wish to prevent people "there" from moving "here"? If citizenship "means less" because nations serve fewer purposes, why would we want to insist on the inviolability of national borders? In short, how do we say "no" to the people who wish to immigrate to the affluent, underpopulated settler societies?

The justifications usually take two forms—national sovereignty and national ways of life (Carens 1987, 1992). The arguments based on sovereignty are essentially circular: we can keep you out because we have the power to keep you out. As sovereignty comes to be shared—and thus loses some of its allure if not its meaning—power to stop immigration will be less easily equated with the right to do so.

That leaves the defense of a coherent national culture as the bulwark against immigration. The first problem with this defense concerns the evident fact that coherence of a culture is a variable; some cultures seem homogeneous and coherent while others may be less so. Of the large nations today, which has a coherent national culture? Korea? Japan? China? France? One could not grant that India, Nigeria, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, or Great Britain exhibited the degree of coherence found in France, let alone Japan. In other countries the ideal of a coherent national culture consists of multiculturalism (Switzerland, Belgium) or of relative openness to immigrants from all cultures (the United States, Canada, Australia). Thus, defense of national cultures, while carrying more weight than sovereignty as a justification, cannot in most cases account for how tightly borders are sealed.

So what? Is it our fault that Nigerians are poor, that Somalia suffers from drought and civil war? This is the wrong question, or at least not the only relevant question. My perspective points to the fact that place of birth is now the last remaining ascriptive category to which liberals yield. We who claim to honor human rights no longer accept the idea that people should be judged on ascriptive criteria (race, gender, wealthy parents) and insist that achievement and merit should count for more, if not for everything. Yet most people accept uncritically the idea that our birth (or our ancestors') in a benign and affluent place entitles us to exclude those who did not so wisely choose where their parents would live when they were born.

Concepts and Actions

Can we choose our concepts? Do we live in Alice's Wonderland where words will mean what we stipulate, or must they lag behind the world as we construct and deconstruct it? I doubt if any of the lords, nobles, or kings in the 17th century sat around asking about the best terminology or the appropriate definition of "the state" or "sovereignty." Instead they acted, and the (largely unintentional) by-products of those actions were the rise to dominance of the absolutist monarchy with its incipient bureaucratic state and eventually the territorial nation state (Rosenau 1990). Our concepts constitute implicit predictions. When we use words like "nation" or "state" or

"corporation" or "federalism," we implicitly assume that the way those terms captured reality has some continuing relevance. If so, they aid our understanding. At some point, we find ourselves devising more explicit definitions, or sub-dividing categories, or using other definitional strategies, and for good reason. Those are signs that the world has been changing faster than our ways of describing it. If there is one message more than any which I hope this paper will demonstrate—and I do hope more than one message comes through—it is that the time has come to question our assumption that "nation," "state," "political authority," and ancillary terms necessarily involve territoriality. That was a good working assumption for two or three centuries, but it serves us ill as we enter the 21st century.

NOTES

This article is a partial summary of a book entitled *Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-first Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). It was also delivered at a conference on "Redesigning the State: The Politics of Mega Constitutional Change" at the Australian National University, July 27-29, 1994.

¹"State sovereignty may be regarded as the counterpart in doctrine to the modern territorial division of the world into legally separate jurisdictions. . . . The twin attributes of sovereignty became a monopoly of force and a monopoly of the coinage" (Brewin 1982, 34, 40)

²The contrast between religious and territorial assumptions has been nicely put by Joseph R. Strayer: "A man can lead a reasonably full life without a family, a fixed local address, or a religious affiliation, but if he is stateless he is nothing. . . . This was not always so. . . . In those times it was the man without a family or a lord, without membership in a local community or a dominant religious group, who had no security and no opportunity" (Strayer 1970, 3).

³Although no author has approached this issue in precisely the way I have in this book, I should mention several suggestive and forceful presentations of relevant information and interpretations, including Kratochwil 1986; Ruggie 1993; Herz 1957, 1969; and Falk 1985.

⁴While writing this book on which this article is based I was startled to discover two other scholars (Kratochwil 1986 and Ruggie 1993) who have used the concept of "unbundling" in ways very similar to my usage.

⁵Multiple identities may also be conceptualized as a "post-modern" phenomenon of multiple perspectives and "embedded selves" (Gergen 1991). Whatever one calls the phenomenon, people seem to handle identities differently than they did a few centuries ago.

⁶Computer aficionados tell me that it is only a matter of a decade or so until we will have access to inexpensive portable computers which can translate among spoken languages in real time. If so, one would be able to step outside one's language communities and deal directly with anyone else so equipped. Beam me up, Scottie!

⁷The most consistent proponent of "the age of organizations" has been Peter Drucker. Particularly insightful has been his focus on "third force," organizations which are neither governmental nor "for profit" (Drucker 1989, Drucker 1993).

⁸One should perhaps distinguish between "private" and "personal." "Private" has in recent decades come to bear a particular meaning in political theory because of the efforts of many scholars to resurrect the tradition of "civic republicanism." Thus, private refers to what might more commonly be called "civil society." "Personal" has been given a special cast by feminist theorists, particularly in the slogan, "The personal is political." I offer these examples to show that there is less certainty about where to draw the line between public and private, or indeed for what purposes one would draw the line in a particular way.

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