

# *Party Integration in Indiana and Ohio: The 1988 and 1992 Presidential Contests*

Barbara Trish, *Grinnell College*

This article examines the integration between formal party and campaign organizations in Ohio and Indiana during the 1988 and 1992 presidential election seasons. It finds a basic difference in the level of integration across those two states. It also finds variation in the partisan patterns across the two elections. In light of these findings, the article offers an explanation of party integration that considers the structure of the organizations, the nature of the candidacies and campaign personnel, and organizational learning.

To the observer of U.S. political parties and contemporary electoral politics, two observations reign supreme. The first is that electoral politics is candidate-centered. Not only do scholarly works point to this, but even the most basic journalistic examinations of politics show this as well. The second observation is that party organizations are alive and well. By some accounts they are even stronger now than they were in the recent past. Thus, the state party environment is marked both by robust candidate and formal party structures.<sup>1</sup>

On one hand, these observations are paradoxical. If candidates in large part control their own fates, it would seem reasonable that party organizations diminish in importance. Likewise, it is curious that candidate-run campaigns continue to hold their own when party organizations are vital. The solution to the paradox is simple. It lies in the fact that party politics is not a zero-sum game. Candidate and formal party organizations do not each prosper at the expense of each other.

Others have considered the environment just described and have argued that the formal party organizations have adapted by taking on new roles and responsibilities (see, e.g., Frantzich 1989). I, however, suggest a slightly different focus: the relationship between the formal party and the campaign organizations. This focus emphasizes the degree to which formal party and campaign organizations work together—through the process of *party integration*—in the interest of placing individuals connected with the party label into elective offices. This article explores party integration in two states, Ohio and Indiana. In particular, it examines the relationship between formal

---

BARBARA TRISH is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Grinnell College.

party and presidential campaign organizations in two recent elections. It offers possible explanations of integration in light of the patterns uncovered and, finally, considers the impact of integration on political parties.<sup>2</sup>

## An Empirical Focus

### *Party and Campaign Organizations*

At the state level, as well as the national and local, formal party and campaign organizations are structurally and legally independent. But given the practice of politics—electoral politics in particular—there are good reasons to consider *both* the formal party organizations and the campaign organizations as *part of the political party*. Typically they are both present and active in politics. And indeed it is rare for one or the other to monopolize the practice of politics. For this substantive reason, I propose that including both formal party and candidate organizations as part of the party structure is sound. This proposition has a theoretical foundation as well. Joseph Schlesinger (1965, 1984, 1985, 1991) conceptualizes the political party as an office-driven structure that encompasses both the candidate and the formal party organizations.<sup>3</sup> What Schlesinger's conceptualization of the party organization does is direct attention to the various relationships between and among the components of the party.<sup>4</sup> In other words, it underscores the *intra-party* relationships. These are precisely what a focus on party integration entails: the relationships between candidate and formal party structures under the same partisan label.

This article, thus, examines the working relationship between formal party and campaign structures. It does so by examining parties in two states, Ohio and Indiana, and by considering primarily the integration of presidential campaign organizations and county parties.

### *Parties in Ohio and Indiana*

My attention was first directed to Ohio and Indiana because of their legacies of traditional and strong formal party organizations. Having a vital party apparatus in place seemed to be a logical prerequisite for an integrated party. In this sense, Ohio and Indiana are similar cases. But the similarity across the two states goes even beyond the basic quality of party strength. There are striking consistencies that mark many aspects of the party environment of those two states.

First, Ohio and Indiana are both states with competitive political parties. Jewell and Olson (1988) classify Ohio and Indiana as "competitive two-

party" states over the period from 1966 to 1988. This is the ranking that denotes the greatest party competition within states. The general competitiveness of the contemporary parties in Ohio and Indiana is typical of the pattern established historically. Fenton, writing in 1966, remarked that the political parties in these two states were then competitive and attributed this similarity to parallel patterns of population settlement and traditional job-oriented politics in each (1966, 1-5). Beyond providing for similarities across states, these settlement patterns also sustained intra-state continuities over time.

Key and Munger (1959) found longitudinal parallelism in party competition in Indiana, likely structured by sectional and religious origins of the settlers of Indiana. Similarly, Thomas Flinn (1960, 1962) established that settlement patterns prior to the 1850s not only structured the party vote of their own time, but also had an impact on party competition well into the future. Flinn noted that there had been a marked continuity in the structure of party competition in Ohio through 1960, with very few departures from earlier party patterns. Thus the findings of preceding scholars underlay the Jewell and Olson judgment that these states are similar today.

Contemporary research on party organizational strength describes similarity as well. Gibson et al. (1985) emphasize the strength of the Democratic and Republican county parties in both Ohio and Indiana. The local parties are very strong in Ohio and Indiana and rank exceptionally close in terms of the authors' measure of party organizational strength, which averages the strength of county organizations within a state. On the Democratic side, the county parties in Indiana are fifth strongest in the nation; in Ohio they are seventh. The Republican county parties in Indiana rank third and in Ohio they rank, again, seventh. This shows both similarity in general county party strength across the states and similarity between parties within each state.

Mayhew (1986), assessing party organizational strength of the late 1960s, also describes comparable party environments in the two states. Ohio and Indiana were similarly marked by "traditional party organizations (TPO);" they had autonomous and durable parties, instrumental in electoral and nomination politics. Both states had high scores on Mayhew's measure of TPO. In a related vein, Charles Johnson (1976), investigating political culture in the states, found that Ohio and Indiana both had individualistic political cultures. Drawing from Elazar, Johnson highlighted the role of the political parties in the individualistic culture.

[The] party is held to be important, party regularity is held as an important norm, and gratuitous manipulation of political power is an accepted goal (Johnson 1976, 501).

There has been, according to Johnson, a central role for the political parties in Ohio and Indiana which both have individualistic cultures.<sup>5</sup>

On various dimensions related to the party environment, then, Ohio and Indiana are similar cases. This, in and of itself, is a desirable quality in order to identify more discrete factors associated with party integration: maximizing similarities across cases allows one to approximate a comparative approach. This article's focus on *presidential* campaign structures also works to this end. While a variety of comparable campaign structures (e.g., gubernatorial, U.S. Senate) would be in place across any two states, the state-wide presidential campaigns carry with them one advantage: they are tied into *singular* national campaign organizations.

### Data Collection and Measurement

In order to measure and assess party integration in Ohio and Indiana, I solicited information from individuals who could speak in an authoritative, informed fashion about the relationship between the formal party and the presidential campaign organizations in 1988 and 1992. A mail questionnaire was sent to county party chairpersons in Ohio and Indiana who were in place during the 1988 and 1992 electoral seasons. This article also reports information gathered by means of interviews with 1988 state party and campaign leaders. Appendix 1 details the entire data collection strategy.

Responses to the inquiries made to county parties provided the basis for the measure of integration reported in this analysis. The county chairpersons were asked first to assess the contact between their organization and the local presidential campaign. (The following example shows questions directed to Republican chairpersons in 1988.)<sup>6</sup>

About how much contact would you say your **county party organization** had or will have with the county Bush campaign?

- A Great Deal
- Some
- Little
- None

Respondents then were asked to assess the cooperation between the two organizations.

How would you describe the cooperation between your **county party organization** and the county Bush campaign?

- Excellent
- Good
- So-So
- Not So Good
- Poor
- No Contact

**Figure 1. The Measure of Integration**

		Cooperation					
		Excellent	Good	So-So	Not-So-Good	Poor	No Contact
Contact	Great Deal	<b>High</b>					
	Some	<b>Medium</b>					
	Little				<b>Low</b>		
	None						

The integration measure itself looks at paired responses to the questions. On the basis of these it distinguishes three levels of integration: high, medium and low. The coding scheme for this measure is presented in Figure 1. The formal parties and campaign organizations marked by high integration generally have extensive contact and very cooperative exchanges. Those cases falling into the low category typically have less contact that is not quite as positive. Appendix 2 provides further detail about the creation of the integration measure.

### FINDINGS

The patterns associated with party integration in Ohio and Indiana are pronounced. There is a marked difference across the two states regarding levels of integration, a difference which persists across both election years. This suggests that party integration is not simply a surrogate measure for some other characteristic, such as strength, of local parties. At the same time, there are partisan patterns. However, the direction of these patterns reverses from 1988 to 1992. An examination of the patterns and their dynamic nature suggests a rudimentary explanation of party integration.

#### *State Patterns*

The data show that in both 1988 and 1992 county party and presidential campaign organizations were more highly integrated in Ohio than they were in Indiana. This pattern is depicted in Table 1. In both years one-half or

**Table 1. Party Integration in Ohio and Indiana, 1988 and 1992**

Level of Integration	1988		1992	
	Ohio	Indiana	Ohio	Indiana
High	50%	36%	57%	22%
Medium	28	32	17	37
Low	22	32	26	41
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Integration reported is between the county party and the local presidential campaign organization. Number of cases are as follows for 1988: Ohio—99; Indiana—78. For 1992: Ohio—98; Indiana—85.

1988:  $\gamma = .24$ ;  $p < .20$ . 1992:  $\gamma = .46$ ;  $p < .001$ .

more of the county cases in Ohio rank as highly integrated. In Indiana, however, only one-third in 1988 and fewer than one-fourth in 1992 are highly integrated.

On one hand, this pattern that distinguishes Ohio from Indiana, without attention to partisan distinctions, is a crude indicator of state variation. On the other hand, the basic state difference is critically important. It indicates that party competition and strength, although likely related to integration (as I will argue later), are not the sole determinants of it. Ohio and Indiana are states with strong and competitive political parties; still, Ohio is generally more integrated than Indiana. Two distinctive factors relating to the political culture in Ohio may help account for this difference. These factors also will introduce the reader to the nature of electoral politics across the two states.

While Ohio and Indiana parties are similar in basic respects, the Democrats and Republicans in Ohio today show the lingering effect of unique circumstances. On the Democratic side, of particular importance are the strength and autonomy of the county party organizations in Ohio's many metropolitan areas. In this respect Indiana differs from Ohio. The independent Democratic party bases in Ohio are especially strong in the various counties that subsume most of the Cleveland, Toledo, Akron and Youngstown areas. These, combined with Ohio's other urban areas (Columbus, Cincinnati, Dayton, and Canton), provide for a state much different from Indiana with its epicentral Indianapolis.

Table 2 shows that Democratic integration in Ohio surpasses that of Indiana in both 1988 and 1992. Granted, the percentages reported are based on relatively few cases; some caution is urged in interpretation. Still, it is possible that the presence of strong Democratic county organizations in many of the large urban areas functionally removes one of the rungs in the

Table 2. Ohio and Indiana Integration by Party, 1988 and 1992

Level of Integration	1988				1992			
	Republican		Democratic		Republican		Democratic	
	Ohio	Indiana	Ohio	Indiana	Ohio	Indiana	Ohio	Indiana
High	36%	27%	62%	43%	78%	26%	39%	20%
Medium	32	29	25	34	11	39	23	35
Low	<u>32</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>46</u>
	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%	101%	101%	101%

Number of cases are as follows for 1988: Ohio Democrats—47; Indiana Democrats—34; Ohio Republicans—52; Indiana Republicans—44. For 1992: Ohio Democrats—46; Indiana Democrats—39; Ohio Republicans—52; Indiana Republicans—46.

ladder of the formal party hierarchy (i.e., the state party). And this special state campaign/county party nexus reinforces the integration between the county campaigns and the county parties. Indeed, a state-level organization in Ohio, like that in a presidential campaign, can cultivate relationships directly with the numerous county party organizations in urban sections of the state. Furthermore, there tends to be a wealth of campaign experience in county organizations in urban areas. Individuals with that experience provide fuel for a well-integrated party.

As seen in Table 2 as well, Ohio surpasses Indiana in Republican integration. An explanation highlighting an individual, namely Ray C. Bliss, may help account for this pattern. Bliss was from Akron and served as chairman of the Ohio Republican Party (ORP) from 1949 to 1965. Later, he would chair the Republican National Committee; he is well known for his party-building efforts in that capacity. But his tenure with the ORP also produced results. In Ohio, Bliss created a strong GOP organization especially well suited for campaign activity. Bliss constantly urged county party leaders to identify and back competent candidates. He oversaw the organization of the state party headquarters into special campaign functions, and notably marshalled the party in 1960, when it helped Richard Nixon carry Ohio despite predictions of a Kennedy win (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 15 January 1965).

The formal Republican apparatus in Ohio shows the legacy of strong state leadership with an emphasis on campaign activity, including activity at the county level. The Democratic party is a locally-driven vital organization. These qualities of the Ohio parties may partially account for generally higher levels of integration in Ohio compared to Indiana. But there also may

be an explanation in the campaigns of 1988 and 1992. There is reason to expect that the importance of Ohio for presidential candidates in 1988 and 1992 helped to inflate integration in that state. In both years the prize status of Ohio, due to its size and presidential competitiveness, proved a great attraction to the presidential contestants. Because of this, visits to the state were frequent.

Estimates show that in 1988, Bush spent one day and Dukakis none in Indiana. At the same time, Bush was in Ohio somewhere between six and ten days; Dukakis spent over ten days there (*New York Times* 9 November 1988). Of particular note in 1992 were the bus trips of Clinton and Gore through Ohio. All of these visits integrated the efforts of the presidential campaigns and the formal party organizations in Ohio. The complicated logistics of an appearance by a presidential candidate create a force that unifies the campaign and formal elements of the party.<sup>7</sup> In this respect, the emphasis placed on Ohio by the presidential nominees of both parties in 1988 and 1992 may have helped Ohio to surpass Indiana in level of party integration.

### *Partisan Patterns*

Partisan patterns also characterize party integration in Ohio and Indiana. However, unlike the longitudinally consistent state patterns, the direction of these varies from 1988 to 1992. While such variability is difficult to explain conclusively, the patterns themselves and complementary interview data suggest a possible dynamic explanation of integration.

Dealing first with the results from 1988, one finds that the Republican party was more highly integrated than the Democratic party. This relationship is shown in Table 3, which summarizes the material that was presented in Table 2. The Democratic and Republican columns for 1988 show the basic partisan pattern. Across the two parties there is a pronounced difference in integration; twenty-one percentage points separate the highly integrated Democratic counties from the Republican ones in 1988. Moreover, over one-half of the counties in the Republican party are highly integrated.

When first considering the basic 1988 pattern, I hypothesized that proclivity towards management and coordination by the Republican formal apparatus facilitated well-integrated formal party and campaign structures (Trish 1992). Indeed, the GOP has established for itself an instrumental role of provider in politics. Huckshorn et al. (1986), for example, have demonstrated the mechanics that bind the state parties to the national. But this orientation also may affect integration between the formal party and campaign units. Two examples will serve to illustrate this point.



**Table 3. Democratic and Republican Integration  
in Ohio/Indiana Combined, 1988 and 1992**

Level of Integration	1988			1992		
	<i>All</i>	Democratic	Republican	<i>All</i>	Democratic	Republican
High	44%	32%	53%	41%	54%	30%
Medium	30	31	29	26	24	29
Low	<u>27</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>42</u>
	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%

Number of cases are as follows for the 1988 data: Democrats—81; Republicans—96. For the 1992 data: Democrats—85; Republicans—98.

1988: gamma = -.391;  $p < .01$ . 1992: gamma = .412;  $p < .01$ .

In presidential politics, the soft-money driven efforts at party-building have seen great success. In 1988, the Ohio GOP's party-building effort was a state-of-the-art operation. It was effectively run out of state Republican headquarters and, although by law separated from the Bush campaign, it was virtually indistinguishable from the campaign organization. In this regard the formal party apparatus, by registering and mobilizing voters, provided an instrumental link between itself and the presidential campaign organization. The campaign and formal party structures were, *de facto*, part and parcel of each other.

In 1988, the Republican apparatus and the campaigns also were closely connected in the area of personnel. Indeed, the GOP is especially good at providing job opportunities for campaign personnel. This point was articulated well by a Democratic campaign consultant with both national and Ohio experience. He commented that the success of the national Republican party lies not only in its capability to provide material benefits to the state parties and campaigns, but also in its ability to employ campaign practitioners in the off-season. He urged the Democratic party to

find bright and talented people and take care of them between elections so that they don't go off and do other things . . . get other kinds of jobs and get out of the political environment. . . . [In this] the Republicans are way ahead of the Democrats. The Republican National Committee basically nurtures and cares for dozens and dozens and dozens of pretty skillful campaign specialists between elections. The Democrats don't do that . . . They sort of say, "Hey, you guys are off on your own." They lose a lot.

A review of the career paths of Republican campaign personnel in Ohio and Indiana shows that the party apparatus did provide a sturdy (employment) safety net.

On a related staffing matter, the Indiana Republican chairman reported that he assisted the various national campaigns in the selection of their nomination personnel in Indiana. He said that he had input in the selection of "each and every one" of the chairpersons and campaign directors. The chairman believed that party involvement of this nature would foster a positive climate within the party.

We try to make sure in Indiana that the leaders of the presidential campaigns are party people first, whose first responsibility is to the Indiana Republican Party. The reason for that is so that we don't get into conflicts. In other states you still have people referring to the 'Reagan people' and the 'party people.' That's never happened here.

Because the candidates recognize what the party does as a provider, the party in theory can have a greater say in the operation of a campaign.<sup>8</sup>

The bond between the formal parties and campaigns created by the GOP's provider orientation is not absent among the Democratic apparatus. However, the data from 1988 suggest that the source of the bond was more rule-oriented. This is consistent with the noted regulatory nature of the Democratic Party (see, e.g., Wekkin 1984, 1985; Epstein 1986). In the general election, this was shown in what amounts to almost a Democratic preoccupation with rules. Consider contrasting examples of Republican and Democratic campaign coordination.

During the fall of 1988, the Ohio Republican chairman met in his office on a weekly basis with representatives of the Bush/Quayle campaign and the campaign of GOP Senate challenger George Voinovich, then mayor of Cleveland. These meetings, which also were attended by representatives from various local campaigns, were for the stated purpose of coordinating the efforts within the party. This was in an effort to expend resources efficiently. The Democrats also engaged in coordinated efforts. But the purpose stated was one that emphasized compliance with federal financing regulations. Certainly, the difference is subtle, yet the stated Democratic rationale betrays the party's emphasis on rules.

Given this array of qualities that marked the formal parties in Ohio and Indiana, the pattern of 1988 Republican dominance in integration seemed reasonable. The standard operating procedures of the GOP, which emphasized coordination and management, appeared to provide the basis of the partisan difference in levels of integration. The data from 1992, however, call this explanation into question. As summarized in Table 3, the 1992 partisan pattern departs significantly from that of 1988.

The parties essentially reversed their positions on integration across the two elections. As a comparison of 1988 and 1992 shows, the Republican dominance in party integration in the former year is matched by the Democratic dominance in the latter. This result prompts one to reconsider the explanation offered for 1988. At the same time, it points to a more comprehensive explanation of party integration. First, however, I offer a *caveat* about the relevance of these findings.

Clearly, two data points cannot illuminate party integration in the way that a protracted longitudinal study could. Indeed, with the divergent integration scores from only two elections, random variation cannot be dismissed as the source. Still, contextual data—especially from the interviews in 1988—do provide insight. And, as I will demonstrate, integration scores from 1988 and 1992, taken in conjunction with each other and these contextual data, point to a refined explanation of party integration. It is one that suggests that there is a minimal organizational threshold for integration, but party integration is also affected by qualities of unique candidates and their campaigns and by a process of organizational learning.

## Toward an Explanation of Party Integration

### *Organizational Threshold*

A necessary condition for a well-integrated relationship between the party apparatus and the campaign structure is the presence of both components. While in one sense obvious, it is worth noting that especially the structures of campaigns—and to some extent state-wide party organizations as well—do not always satisfy this basic condition.

The 1988 Dukakis campaign was particularly ill-suited for integration with the formal party. The formal structure of the Dukakis campaign organization departed from the usual structure of state-wide campaigns. Typically presidential campaigns, U.S. Senate campaigns, and gubernatorial campaigns display a structure that is built around county-level campaign organizations. The Dukakis organizational structure, in contrast, was built around a mix of units that corresponded to major metropolitan areas and congressional districts. In 1988 there were eight such divisions in Ohio and ten in Indiana. While there clearly was some semblance of a county-level structure to the Dukakis presidential campaign, it was secondary to the organization that mixed metropolitan and congressional district units.

On one hand, the Dukakis structure, with its muscle in the urban counties, would appear to play to the strength of the Democratic party apparatus. At the same time, however, the Dukakis structure did not provide

a ready partner for the county parties in rural areas. These areas are critically important in state-wide elections. The vote of the major metropolitan areas tends to balance out with, for example, Cleveland (Cuyahoga County) being consistently Democratic and Cincinnati (Hamilton County) being consistently Republican. Rural areas of the state frequently will tip the balance.

The Dukakis structure also slighted parts of the urban areas not encompassed by the dominant county organization. In the urban areas, there tends to be at least a second important county party structure. It is likely that these second-tier counties were slighted without a corresponding county unit in the Dukakis campaign structure. This peculiar framework imposed by the national Dukakis organization may have made integration with the county parties structurally difficult.

I believe that there is a structural threshold that must be met in order for campaigns and formal parties to be integrated. At minimum, the *presence* of the campaign and the formal party are requisite. The situation is better still when there are important and active structures in place that also match geographically. Structurally, the formal Democratic and Republican organizations were constant over the years examined by this article. But there was variation in the campaign organizations, with the Dukakis campaign structure being the major anomaly. In 1992, both presidential campaigns were structured along county lines; the Republican campaign, however, was not as developed as the Democratic. This was not likely due to any conscious decision by the Bush/Quayle organization. Rather, as I will argue shortly, the electoral environment may have made it difficult for the presidential campaign to organize thoroughly.

Beyond this general structural concern, there is the important issue of candidates and personnel who staff the structures. Here also Democratic presidential integration in 1988 was impaired. The Dukakis personnel in both states and the inclusion of Dan Quayle on the presidential ticket in Indiana may have had an overt influence on integration.

### *Unique Candidacies and Campaigns*

In addition to its organizational structure, a second factor set the Dukakis organization apart from the other presidential campaigns of 1988 and 1992: the unique quality of its campaign personnel. The Dukakis campaign staffed its statewide structure, to a greater degree than the other campaigns, with young individuals from outside of the state—mostly young people from the Boston area. Members of the Democratic establishment in both Ohio and Indiana perceived a distance between themselves and the

Dukakis personnel. One operative pointed to the handicap of the Dukakis campaign manager. This person had worked Ohio for Mondale in 1984 so "it wasn't so much that she was unfamiliar with Ohio, as that she *wasn't considered an Ohioan.*"

The impression of a strained relationship between the Democratic Party and the Dukakis campaign, both within and beyond Indiana and Ohio, was dominant in the media and general political discourse in 1988. The data that were reported in Table 2 suggest that to a large extent it was warranted. In 1988 in Ohio, there were clearly more cases (eighteen percentage points) of low integration for the Democrats than for the Republicans. In Indiana the difference was in the magnitude of twenty-one percentage points. The tension is illustrated by the comments of some of the county chairpersons. A respondent from Indiana who had been active in the party organization as well as the Dukakis nomination effort included a type-written note with his completed questionnaire. "I was more than willing to become involved in the general election effort but I never heard from the Dukakis people again after [the Indiana primary]."

In addition to unique factors associated with the Dukakis presidential campaign, the presence of Dan Quayle on the presidential ticket must be examined regarding integration in Indiana. On one hand, there is reason to expect that the addition of Quayle to the 1988 Republican ticket would have enhanced integration within presidential ties in Indiana by providing a unifying force for Republicans. This was true to some extent. Informal comments accompanying the mail questionnaires suggest that Quayle's candidacy was an integrating force for Indiana Republicans. But at the same time, a dynamic may have worked in the opposite direction. The change in the Bush campaign organization due to Quayle's vice-presidential candidacy is one of the important factors in this reverse dynamic. Quayle activists, by precluding a unified presidential campaign front, may have weakened party integration in Indiana.

When Dan Quayle was placed on the presidential ticket, the county chairpersons from his 1986 Senate campaign were added to the pre-existing Bush structure. The coordinator of the presidential campaign noted that there were some small conflicts between the Quayle additions and the regular Bush organization. While not specifying the nature of these, he attributed them to the fact that the Quayle people had a very large personal investment in the race, but a role that was diminished from their typical role in Quayle's senate campaigns. Dealing with this reality may have been difficult for the senator's activists: "The people who helped lay the foundation didn't get to decorate the house."

Indeed there is a difference in integration between the Bush/Quayle Indiana campaign and its Ohio counterpart. While there are too few cases to make strong claims, Republican presidential integration appears to be more pronounced in Ohio than Indiana. Again Table 2 shows that thirty-two (62 percent) of the 52 Republican counties in Ohio were characterized by high integration while 19 (43 percent) of 44 Republican counties in Indiana fell into the same category.

Quayle as a vice-presidential candidate also had a profound impact on the electoral environment in Indiana. In fact, the presence of Quayle on the ticket also may have depressed integration due to his effect on the competitive situation in the state. Always a Republican stronghold, the promise of Indiana support for a Republican presidential ticket was even stronger in 1988. Bush's choice of Quayle as a running-mate all but guaranteed an Indiana victory for the GOP. As evidence of Bush's strength, the Republican National Committee (RNC) withdrew funds earmarked for Indiana immediately upon Quayle's selection as the vice-presidential running mate. This was a sure sign that the competitive situation in the state overwhelmingly favored the Republican ticket; the resources that still were important elsewhere would have been wasted in Indiana. The confidence of the RNC may have filtered down to the state and local party organizations, making an intense and combined effort for the presidential ticket less critical than it might have been under other conditions.

While the impact of Dan Quayle on integration in Indiana probably was mixed, Republican integration was higher in Ohio than in Indiana, and remarkably consistent at that. This likely reflected the fact that the Ohio Bush organization was tied intrinsically to the formal party. When the 1988 Bush nomination chairman pulled together the initial organization in Ohio, he turned first to the formal party apparatus. The result of this strategy was a state-wide campaign organization that was well suited to integration with, if not part of, the formal apparatus. But beyond this state-wide structure, the leadership of the Bush general election campaign had deep ties to the Ohio Republican Party. The national field director, the regional director and the executive director of the Ohio campaign all had hands-on experience with Ohio. The national campaign wanted to have key states like Ohio "run by people who knew the local organizations." (This, of course, is in stark contrast to the Dukakis experience of 1988.) Again, the prominence of Ohio compared to Indiana in presidential politics likely affects integration. While I already have argued that this can be explained partially by the candidate's appearances in the state, it also may reflect the personnel decisions of the campaign.

Still, 1992 remains a puzzle. Arguably, Ohio was as important to the Bush effort in 1992 as it had been in 1988. However, it is possible that the national political environment detracted from Ohio Republican integration in the latter year.

During the general election campaign of 1988, Bush led consistently in the national polls. But given the electoral strength of Ohio, it was well known that he would need to maintain control of Ohio in order to preserve his national lead. The situation in 1992 was different. The presidential environment in Ohio still was competitive. But, importantly, Bush's prospects nationwide looked dismal over most of the fall. Although Ohio remained important for GOP success, the loss of Ohio unlikely would affect the general outcome of the election. With or without Ross Perot in the race, Clinton seemed to have the national support necessary to win.

Nationally, the competitive environment in 1992, despite what was transpiring in Ohio or Indiana, produced incentives that did not encourage Republican party integration. The message coming from the state environment was the same. The dramatic plunge in Republican integration in Ohio from 1988 to 1992 might well have been catalyzed by the congressional campaigns of 1992, which were marked by a great deal of uncertainty. Redistricting had significantly changed the political map of Ohio. Key incumbents had opted to retire, and Glenn's senate candidacy had been tainted by the Keating Five scandal. In other words, Ohio politics provide many diversions for the Republican apparatus in 1992. With finite resources and Bush's discouraging national prospects, integration at the presidential level likely suffered.

### *Organizational Learning*

I have argued that both the structural qualities and those associated with unique candidacies and campaign personnel contribute to an infrastructure that either does or does not facilitate integration. But beyond this infrastructure, I believe that organizational learning, to some extent, affects levels of integration. This would account for the marked Democratic improvement in integration in 1992.

The Democrats were well poised in 1992 to correct the flaws of the 1988 campaign. With a strong candidate who had a particularly vulnerable opponent, both the campaign and formal apparatus in Ohio made a conscious effort to avoid the missteps of 1988. The conventional wisdom during and after the 1988 race emphasized the inexperience and ineptitude of the Dukakis operatives as factors that contributed substantially to his loss. But in 1992, the Clinton/Gore campaign showed signs of superb savvy. The

grassroots Clinton-Gore organization in Ohio delighted the party regulars. A local journalist "[recalled] seeing Clinton-Gore workers in [an] affluent Columbus suburb . . . passing out literature at arts festivals and outside the library. 'They were in areas' [said the journalist] that 'I'm not used to seeing Democratic people campaign in a presidential or gubernatorial race" (Cook 28 November 1992). While not using the same techniques, the Democrats in 1992 emulated the well-integrated GOP structures.

If 1988 taught the Ohio Democrats to *integrate*, then the Indiana Democrats are likely to have received the same message. Still, as Table 3 shows, there is little change over time in Democratic integration Indiana. This is despite the fact that the competitive situation in Indiana was much closer in 1992 than it had been four years earlier. In fact, by October poll results were indicating a "statistical dead-heat" in a two-way presidential contest (Schneider 11 October 1992). This was a noteworthy situation, given the recent dominance of Indiana presidential politics by the GOP. Still, Indiana did not receive the attention from the Clinton/Gore campaign that Ohio did, likely because of the relative importance of the states. This also may help explain the difference in integration between Indiana Democrats and Ohio Democrats in 1992.

If, again, the general message of the 1988 Democratic experience was to integrate, the message for Republicans was to *stay integrated*. But Republican integration in both Ohio and Indiana dropped. While I suspect that the lesson was not lost on the Republicans, they could not overcome the perceived national weakness of the Bush/Quayle ticket. Investment in other races was likely more attractive in both Ohio and Indiana.

Clearly further study is necessary to definitively identify the factors associated with party integration. The conclusion of this article will address yet another related concern: whether integration is a functional quality of a political party. First, however, I will briefly consider the generalizability of the analysis already reported.

### Beyond Ohio and Indiana

To this point, this article has considered party integration as seen in only two states. But one should question the national relevance of data from Ohio and Indiana. In this regard, the similarity and unique qualities of Indiana and Ohio (e.g., the competitiveness and strength of their parties), originally viewed as a plus in the study of party integration, can be viewed as detrimental to the significance of the findings.

This section will consider the relevance of the findings from Ohio and Indiana. To do this, I report the results taken from a 1988 national data set



that provides complementary information to the Indiana/Ohio data set. These national data are from a survey of county chairs during the 1988 general election campaign. The study was directed by John H. Kessel and William G. Jacoby.<sup>9</sup> A comparison of findings at the national level and in Indiana and Ohio reinforces some of the explanations already offered for party integration.

First, focusing on integration between presidential campaign organizations and county parties, one finds that the national pattern in 1988 was similar, although not identical, to that of Ohio and Indiana. Table 4 shows the pattern of integration displayed by the national data. The basic distribution in Table 4—38 percent High, 36 percent Medium, and 26 percent Low—is roughly comparable to that for Ohio and Indiana. As Table 3 had reported, the Ohio/Indiana distribution was 44 percent High, 30 percent Medium and 27 percent Low. The similarity of the distributions for 1988 is a basic, yet encouraging sign for the national significance of the two-state findings. (Again, caution is urged in interpreting the table.) Had they differed considerably, one immediately would have to question the inferential value of the two cases. However, a like distribution is not a sufficient condition for generalizing the results. Furthermore, the basic levels of integration tell only the partial picture. They do not speak to those patterns associated with integration, already discussed in this article.

A comparison of the 1988 Ohio/Indiana data to the 1988 national data, shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively, shows that the basic partisan pattern of Republican dominance in integration in 1988 persists across the two samples. However, there is a rather large difference in the magnitude of the relationship between party and integration. While approximately six

**Table 4. Democratic and Republican Integration Nationally, 1988**

Level of Integration	1988 National		
	<i>All</i>	Democratic	Republican
High	38%	35%	42%
Medium	36	35	36
Low	<u>26</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>23</u>
	100%	99%	101%

Number of cases are as follows for the 1988 national data: Democrats—68; Republicans—53.

percentage points separate the parties both in the categories of high and low integration in the national data, the difference is closer to 20 percent in the 1988 Ohio/Indiana data. Indeed, this difference is substantial.

In one respect, this threatens the national relevance of explanations generated from the two cases. At the same time, these findings are consistent with an explanation that posits the unique quality of the campaigns and the electoral environment in Indiana and Ohio in 1988. In particular, the impact of Dan Quayle on politics in Indiana and the unusually strong ties between the Ohio Republican party and the Bush campaign organization help account for the difference between integration in the two states and integration nationally.

While there is no comparable test for 1992, the comparison of the national data to the Indiana/Ohio data suggests that the applicability of some of the findings and explanations highlighted by this article might extend beyond just two states.

### Conclusion

Many questions remain about the reasons for party integration, but one question has yet to be addressed: functionality. Is it in the interest of the political parties—both the formal apparatus and the campaign structures—to integrate?

While the data do not speak directly to this question, impressionistically there appears to be a relationship between party integration and electoral success. Indeed, the aggregate patterns addressed show that well-integrated structures also tend to be the successful ones. The presidential data demonstrate this in the scores for Republican integration in 1988 and for Democratic integration in 1992. Although not reported in this article, the same is true of integration between formal party structures and U.S. Senate campaigns in Ohio in both 1988 and 1992. An important causal issue, however, remains: does integration lead to success, or does success facilitate integration? Clearly, the analysis of this article would tend to support the latter. Competitive promise within a state, especially in the context of a favorable national environment, appears to encourage integration. Organizational learning as well suggests that success—all things being equal—may lead to future integration. All things were not equal for the Bush/Quayle campaign in 1992.

There is another dimension to the question of functionality. This one moves beyond success and the relevance of integration for the parties themselves; it considers the importance of party integration for the entire political system. Indeed, integrated political parties may be a way to approximate

some semblance of party responsibility in a system that takes candidate-centered politics as a given. In this context, one would do well to remember that county party and campaign structures constitute just one layer of a more comprehensive party organization. To some extent the massive formal party apparatus is the only constant in politics; entrepreneurial presidential candidates regularly move onto and out of the political setting. But voters may be able to hold elected officials accountable by means of their own authority over political parties.

Thus, party integration might be the critical bond between the formal party apparatus and the candidates. While it would not resemble the traditional model of responsibility in which formal parties *control* their candidates and elected officials, it would be one that comes as close as possible, given the realities of contemporary politics. This bond between the formal party and the candidates' campaigns might provide the link, albeit delicate, that connects the electorate to the governmental officials who are largely responsible for their own electoral success.

## APPENDIX 1

The data reported in this article are from 1988 and 1992. In late 1988, a questionnaire was mailed to all Democratic and Republican county party chairpersons in Ohio and Indiana. This instrument asked about the county party's involvement during the 1988 nomination and general election seasons. It also asked a series of questions about the chairperson's own personal involvement in politics. A follow-up mailing was sent in early 1989 and, as a result, the return rate for the usable responses in the 1988 wave of the study was 49 percent.

This 1988 study of county parties was actually part of a larger one that collected information not only from the formal party, but also from representatives of local campaign organizations. Thus, the same questionnaire that was mailed to county party chairpersons was sent to the local directors of presidential nomination, presidential general election, and U.S. Senate general election campaigns in Ohio and Indiana. The return rate for the entire study was 55 percent.

The 1992 wave of the study focused exclusively on the county party structures. In 1993, I sent questionnaires to those chairpersons who had been in place in 1992. After two mailings, the return rate for usable responses was 51 percent.

The county level data sets for 1988 and 1992 are complemented by information from personal interviews with state party and state campaign leaders in Ohio and Indiana. I interviewed leaders from the presidential nomination, presidential general election, and U.S. senate campaigns in 1988. The format of these interviews was semi-structured and they ranged in length from 45 minutes to two and one-half hours. A total of 28 interviews were conducted. In addition to providing background information, these interviews generated data about party integration at the state level and integration among national, state and local levels.

## APPENDIX 2

The process of creating a measure of integration begins with the proposition that a fully integrated party would include party and campaign units that work together closely and well. Accordingly, I established a rudimentary rank order of the individual cells shown in Figure 1, which was based on my own images and expectations of a well integrated party. I then refined the measure based on empirical patterns in the 1988 data.

The empirical refinement employs techniques presented by Lazarsfeld and Barton (1951) and by Rudermacher and Smith (1955). These techniques allow one to combine categories of a topology into larger classes based on both logic and patterns in the data. While one might well have arrived at the measure displayed in Figure 1 following the dictates of common sense, the creation of the measure followed a systematic process.

The results reported in this article reflect integration as measured from the perspective of the formal party organization. The original measure uses data from this same perspective. But the nature of the 1988 data set provided the opportunity to test the measure in a number of ways. One of these tests showed that integration as measured from the perspective of the formal party was largely consistent with that measured from the perspective of the campaign organizations.

See Trish (1992) for yet further detail on the construction and tests of the measure of integration.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>That candidates are instrumental in engineering electoral outcomes is a common assertion in the study of U.S. parties. Salmore and Salmore (1989) trace the structural separation of campaigns and the formal party apparatus to the 1934 gubernatorial contest in California. Presently, we recognize candidate-centered campaigns as typical of U.S. politics. (See, for example, Bibby 1990 on this quality of state politics.) The vitality of formal party organizations is illustrated well in Gibson et al. 1983 and 1985.

<sup>2</sup>While the term "party integration" has been employed by many who study parties, its significance has not been advanced to the fullest. I will emphasize that it is through integration that the party of old, as seen in the formal apparatus, comes to terms with the party of the present, that which is dominated by the candidates. This focus on party integration is relevant not only for the political scientist who tries to understand contemporary politics, but also for the political practitioner who has to reconcile two consequential forces in the political environment.

<sup>3</sup>Schlesinger's early works (1965, 1984, 1985) emphasize the idea that the party organization is candidate-centered. His recent work (1991) expands on this, stating in definitive terms that *both* the formal party and candidate organizations are part of this candidate-centered structure.

<sup>4</sup>Adopting Schlesinger's (1985) terminology, this is a concern with the *multinuclear* party and, in particular, the *linkages* that connect the nuclei.

<sup>5</sup>For Indiana and Ohio, Johnson's classification, which uses discriminant analysis, arrives at the same results as does Elazar's original classification of state political culture.

<sup>6</sup>These questions replicate ones developed by Kessel and Jacoby for their 1988 national study of parties and campaigns.

<sup>7</sup>It is likely that the unifying nature of an appearance by a presidential candidate filters down through the entire party structure. Ohio Senator Metzenbaum's 1988 campaign manager remarked that the circumstance under which the Metzenbaum senate campaign had the most contact with the formal apparatus in Ohio was when there was a national event—like an appearance by Dukakis—in the state.

<sup>8</sup>Mildred Schwartz's (1990) analysis of the Republican party in Illinois provides insight into the connection between the roles of provider and manager. In the course of her network analysis of the Illinois Republican Party, Schwartz cites Howard Aldrich's concept of *critical uncertainties*.

The power advantage . . . rests with those who have control over 'critical uncertainties' . . . [those who] engage in activities and decisions that prevent what would otherwise be serious problems for the organization (1990, 122).

The control over critical uncertainties by the formal apparatus (e.g., securing personnel and votes) likely fosters a positive relationship between the formal party and the campaigns.

<sup>9</sup>Additional information about the study and the results can be found in Clark et al. (1991) and Bruce, Clark and Kessel (1991).

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bibby, John F. 1990. Party Organization at the State Level. In L. Sandy Maisel, ed., *The Party Responds*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Bruce, John M., John A. Clark and John H. Kessel. 1991. Advocacy Politics in Presidential Parties. *American Political Science Review* 85: 1089-1105.
- Clark, John A., John M. Bruce, John H. Kessel and William G. Jacoby. 1991. I'd Rather Switch than Fight: Lifelong Democrats and Converts to Republicanism among Campaign Activists. *American Journal of Political Science* 35: 577-597.
- Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*. 15 January 1965. Raymond C. Bliss—New Republican Chairman.
- Cook, Rhodes. 28 November 1992. America in Miniature: The Ohio Vote. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*.
- Epstein, Leon. 1986. *Political Parties in the American Mold*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Fenton, John H. 1966. *Midwest Politics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Flinn, Thomas. 1960. The Outline of Ohio Politics. *Western Political Quarterly* 18: 702-721.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1962. Continuity and Change in Ohio Politics. *Journal of Politics* 24: 521-544.
- Frantzich, Stephen E. 1989. *Political Parties in the Technological Age*. New York: Longman.
- Gibson, James L., Cornelius P. Cotter, John F. Bibby and Robert J. Huckshorn. 1983. Assessing Party Organizational Strength. *American Journal of Political Science* 27: 193-222.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1985. Whither the Local Parties?: A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis of the Strength of Party Organizations. *American Journal of Political Science* 29: 139-160.
- Huckshorn, Robert J., James L. Gibson, Cornelius P. Cotter and John F. Bibby. 1986. Party Integration and Party Organizational Strength. *Journal of Politics* 48: 976-991.
- Jewell, Malcolm and David M. Olson. 1988. *Political Parties and Elections in American States*, third edition. Chicago: Dorsey.
- Johnson, Charles A. 1976. Political Culture in American States. *American Journal of Political Science* 20: 491-509.
- Key, V.O., Jr. and Frank Munger. 1959. Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana. In Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Allen H. Barton. 1951. Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences: Classification, Typologies, and Indices. In Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Mayhew, David R. 1986. *Placing Parties in American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- New York Times*. 9 November 1988.

- Rudermacher, Lotte and Elias Smith. 1955. The Affinity of Occupation and Subject Matter Among Adult Education Students. In Paul Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, eds., *The Language of Social Research*. New York: The Free Press.
- Salmore, Barbara G. and Stephen A. Salmore. 1989. *Candidates, Parties and Campaigns*, second edition. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1965. Political Party Organization. In James G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1984. On the Theory of Party Organization. *Journal of Politics* 46: 369-400.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1985. The New American Political Party. *American Political Science Review* 79: 1152-1169.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1991. *Political Parties and the Winning of Office*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Schneider, Mary Beth. 11 October 1992. Clinton Gains on Bush; Race Now a Deadheat. *Indianapolis Star*.
- Schwartz, Mildred A. 1990. *The Party Network*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Trish, Barbara. 1992. Party Integration: Toward a Theory of U.S. Political Parties. Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH.
- Wekkin, Gary D. 1984. National-State Party Relations: The Democrats' New Federal Structure. *Political Science Quarterly* 99: 45-73.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1985. Political Parties and Intergovernmental Relations in 1984: The Consequences of Party Renewal for Territorial Constituencies. *Publius* 15: 19-37.