

*The South and the Military:  
Evidence from the House of Representatives*

Donald Beachler, *Ithaca College*

With the enfranchisement of southern Blacks and the development of a two-party system in the region, several well-documented changes have occurred in southern politics. Among the most prominent of these changes is the greater liberalism exhibited by many southern Democratic members of Congress. Several scholars have noted the vastly increased support southern Democrats provide for civil rights measures. Other researchers have noted less conservatism by southern representatives on other issues.

This paper explores roll call voting by southern representatives on national security issues. It demonstrates that despite some increased liberalism by southern Democrats, during the 1980s a wide regional gap existed within the Democratic caucus on foreign policy and military matters. Southern Democratic votes on national security issues were influenced by a representative's overall ideology, by a district's partisan preferences as indicated by presidential election results, the region of the South a representative is from, and by the strength of Republican opposition in a district.

As a result of the growth of a two-party system in the South and the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, some widely noted changes have occurred in the roll call votes cast by southern Democratic members of Congress. For decades, a conservative coalition existed on many issues, as conservative southern Democrats deserted more liberal northern Democrats to join with Republicans (Patterson 1967; Manley 1973; Shelley 1983). By the 1960s most southern Democrats were casting conservative votes on a host of issues including civil rights, national security issues, domestic spending, and other social issues such as crime and gun control (Shannon 1972; Shelley 1983).

By the 1980s, Southern Democrats were nearly as likely as northern Democrats to be supportive of legislative measures favorable to blacks, as measured by representatives' scores on ratings compiled by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (Gilliam And Whitby 1991). Given the importance of black voters in the electoral coalition of many southern Democrats, it is hardly surprising that other studies have found growing southern Democratic support for civil rights measures and other legislation deemed to be in the interests of blacks (Black 1978; Stern 1985; Bullock 1985).

---

DONALD BEACHLER is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at Ithaca College, Ithaca, New York.

*The American Review of Politics*, Vol. 14, Autumn, 1993: 341-354  
©1993 The American Review of Politics

As southern Democrats have become more liberal on some issues, House Democratic party unity scores have increased in recent years. This rise in party line voting indicates that greater southern Democratic liberalism is not confined to racial issues. David Rohde reports that many southern Democrats in the House have begun to vote with northern Democrats on a wide variety of issues (Rohde 1989, 1991).

However, most southern Democratic politicians do not wish to be perceived as undiluted liberals. Because they must construct biracial coalitions to win elections, Democratic candidates in the South combine conservative and liberal stands on issues as they seek to present themselves as moderates (Black and Black 1987). Southern Democrats in Congress should not be expected to be as liberal as their northern colleagues on all issues.

This paper will examine southern representatives' recent roll call voting on foreign policy and military issues. In the 1960s, southern Democrats often opposed northern Democrats on national security issues (Shannon 1972; Rohde 1989). Since national security issues are less obviously of concern to black voters, who are more numerous in the South, it would be surprising if the large gap between northern and southern Democrats in the 1960s has disappeared. However, little scholarly attention has been paid to regional differences in roll call voting on national security issues in the last decade.

This paper presents a thorough examination of regional trends in congressional voting regarding this important area of national policy. Interest group ratings will be used to analyze change in the positions of southern House members between 1969 and 1988. The paper also will explore variations *among* southern Democratic representatives in voting on national security issues: since the increased liberalism of Southern Democrats on domestic matters has been documented, it should be determined whether the trend also pervades behavior in the area of national security policy. Regression analysis will be used to explore variation within the southern Democratic House delegations in the 1980s. (It will be demonstrated that there is so little variation in southern Republican voting on national security matters that no regression is required.)

### **Measuring Conservatism on National Security Issues**

Southern representatives' positions on military and foreign policy issues have been measured using the National Security Index compiled by the conservative American Security Council.<sup>1</sup> The ASC produces a biennial index that rates members' votes on national security issues. The lowest possible score, 0, indicates that a representative cast a liberal vote on every roll call

vote that the ASC included in its index for a particular Congress. The highest possible score on the NSI index, 100, indicates that a member cast a conservative vote on every roll that was included in the index for that particular Congress. In the 1980s the NSI index primarily included roll call votes on Central American policy, specific weapons programs and overall levels of defense spending. Those representatives who voted to support weapons programs favored by the Reagan administration, the administration's policies in Central America, and the highest possible levels of defense spending received high scores on the NSI index. An examination of the roll call votes included in the NSI indexes from 1970 through 1988 indicates that the index is completely homogenous. All roll calls dealt with national security issues.

Members of the House were divided into four sub-groups: southern Democrats, northern Democrats, southern Republicans, and northern Republicans. Mean scores for each of the subgroups have been calculated for the 91st through 100th Congresses (1969 through 1988). These scores are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 indicates that there was some decline in southern Democrats' conservatism between 1970 and 1980. After a substantial rise in the first Congress of the Reagan administration (the scores for this Congress are reported for 1982), the mean NSI score for southern Democrats declined substantially in 1984, 1986, 1988. Southern Republican scores remained uniformly conservative throughout the two decades.

**Table 1. Index of Military and Foreign Policy Conservatism of Representatives, 1970-1988\***

	Southern Democrats	Northern Democrats	Southern Republicans	Northern Republicans
1970	94.1	47.5	99.2	90.7
1972	90.7	33.7	99.5	88.8
1974	76.4	37.5	93.6	81.4
1976	80.9	34.0	96.1	84.1
1978	77.4	35.5	97.1	83.9
1980	65.3	25.9	93.7	82.9
1982	83.6	37.0	95.7	86.4
1984	64.4	16.5	95.5	84.4
1986	55.0	10.4	98.4	84.2
1988	59.0	14.3	99.5	88.2

\*Numbers in each cell are the mean NSI scores for the sub-group.

Southern Democratic mean scores were characterized by large standard deviations, especially in 1984, 1986, and 1988. That the moderation of southern Democratic conservatism on national security issues did not reflect a uniform change in roll call voting by *all* southern Democrats is best illustrated by looking at the frequencies of southern Democratic NSI scores, which are presented in Table 2.

Examination of Table 2 indicates that southern Democrats were spread across the ideological spectrum on national security issues. However, more southern Democrats were concentrated on the conservative side of the NSI index than on the liberal side. In each of the three Congresses examined in Table 2, more than a third of the southern Democrats scored above 80. The number of southern Democrats scoring below 20 never exceeded a sixth of the southern Democratic House delegation.

For illustrative purposes, Table 3 presents the differences in mean scores between southern Democrats and northern Democrats, southern Democrats and southern Republicans, and southern Democrats and northern Republicans. In each column of Table 3, the mean score of one of the other sub-groups has been subtracted from the mean southern Democratic score.

Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from Table 3. First, there has been little convergence between the northern and southern wings of the House Democratic party on national security issues. The drop in the mean NSI scores of southern Democratic representatives has been accompanied by an equally large decline in the mean score of the northern Democratic House

**Table 2. Distribution of Southern Democratic Scores on the NSI Index**

	1984	1986	1988
0-9	2	4	6
10-19	2	6	6
20-29	9	6	4
30-39	3	7	8
40-49	8	7	6
50-59	8	6	6
60-69	1	7	6
70-79	6	4	4
80-89	9	8	5
90-100	24	17	23
Total	80	72	74

delegation. On foreign policy and military issues southern Democrats remain a distinctive group within the Democratic caucus.

As the two-party system has matured in the South, the difference between southern Democratic and southern Republican voting on foreign policy gradually has widened. The difference between the party delegations from the South was not less than ten points after 1972 and exceeded 30 points in each of the last three Congresses of the Reagan administration.

The difference in mean scores between southern Democrats and northern Republicans has grown larger over the past twenty years. In the first two Congresses of the Nixon administration, southern Democrats actually were slightly more conservative than northern Republicans on national security issues. The gap between northern Republicans and southern Democrats resulted from a drop in the mean scores of southern Democrats, while northern Republican scores remained very consistent over time.

The examination of scores in this paper concludes with 1988. However, it is interesting to note that on one of the most important foreign policy votes of recent years, the January, 1991 authorization for President Bush to use military force to compel an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the patterns delineated here held firm. Only three Republican representatives, all from the North, voted against the authorization to use force. Sixty-five percent of the Democratic representatives from the South voted in favor of the president's position. Eighty-two percent of northern Democrats opposed granting the president the power to begin the war on 15 January 1991 (Barone and Ujifusa 1991).

**Table 3. Southern Democratic NSI Mean Scores  
Relative to Other House Subgroups**

	So. Democrats– No. Democrats	So. Democrats– So. Republicans	So. Democrats– No. Republicans
1970	46.6	-5.1	3.4
1972	47.0	-8.8	1.9
1974	38.9	-17.2	-5.0
1976	46.9	-15.2	-3.2
1978	41.9	-19.7	-6.5
1980	39.4	-28.4	-17.6
1982	46.6	-12.1	-2.8
1984	47.9	-31.1	-20.0
1986	44.6	-33.4	-29.2
1988	45.7	-40.5	-29.2

### **Regression Analysis of Southern Voting on National Security Issues**

To analyze variation within the southern House delegation, regression analysis was performed for the 98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses (1983 through 1988). The dependent variable for each Congress was the representative's score on the NSI index.<sup>2</sup>

Table 1 indicates that there was a widening gap between southern Democrats and Republicans in the 1980s. Examining southern representatives' roll call votes as measured by support for the agenda of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and support or opposition to the Conservative Coalition in Congress, Bullock found that party was an important variable in the roll call votes of southern representatives (Bullock 1985). This partisan difference is consistent with the previously cited work that indicates that the party system in the South increasingly resembles that of the rest of the nation. Party was included as a dummy or dichotomous independent variable (Republican = 0, Democrat = 1).

Examination of representatives' scores on the NSI index indicated that representatives from the Deep South appeared to vote more conservatively than representatives from the Rim South. Region of the South also was included as a dummy variable, with Rim South states (FL, TX, TN, AR, VA, and NC) coded as 0 and Deep South states (SC, GA, AL, LA, and MS) coded as 1.

Much of the previous work on congressional voting on national security issues indicated that a district's economic dependence on the military, whether measured by the presence of military bases or the amount of defense contracts, had little or nothing to do with the positions a representative took on national security matters (Bernstein and Anthony 1974; Ray 1981; Fleisher 1985). Some recent research indicates that the presence of military bases may have greater impact on the roll call voting of a representative than would the amount of military contracts disbursed in the district (Lindsay 1991). The number of military personnel based in a district was entered as an independent variable, coded in thousands. For a district with 10,000 military personnel, a 10 was entered.<sup>3</sup>

Southern Democrats have been viewed as compiling more liberal records on civil rights and government spending issues as a result of the enfranchisement of blacks. The interest of black voters in civil rights and government programs is obvious. The connection between black voters and national security issues is less apparent. However, members of the Congressional Black Caucus, North and South, have compiled extremely liberal records on foreign policy and military issues (Barone and Ujifusa 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991). It can be argued that, especially in times of severe

budget constraints, military spending increases come at the expense of social programs that disproportionately benefit blacks. Thus, a minority variable, which in all states except Texas was the percentage black of the voting age population in each district, was included in the analysis. For Texas the minority variable was constructed by adding the black and Hispanic voting age populations in each district.<sup>4</sup>

Research using a general, heterogeneous ideological index found that southern Democrats tend to be more liberal as support for the national Democratic ticket increases in their districts (Abramowitz 1990; Fleischer 1993). Thus, a variable was included for the percentage of the vote that the Democratic presidential nominee received in each district during the presidential election that preceded each Congress. For 1984, the presidential vote variable is the percentage of the 1980 vote won in each district by Jimmy Carter. For 1986 and 1988, the presidential variable is the percentage of the 1984 vote received in each district by Walter Mondale.

**Table 4. Multiple Regression Analysis of Southern Representatives' Voting on National Security Issues<sup>a</sup>**

	1984	1986	1988
Region	22.035*** (5.64)	18.04*** (4.54)	17.10** (5.14)
Military Personnel	.277 (.159)	.164 (.131)	.166 (.150)
Presidential Vote	-.700 (.378)	-1.37*** (.341)	-1.48*** (.387)
Minority	-.233 (.200)	-.078 (.199)	.000 (.229)
Party	-20.60** (6.14)	-31.52*** (4.82)	-29.86*** (5.45)
Intercept	114.67***	139.43***	139.92***
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.276	.566	.504

\*\* = significant at .01 level

\*\*\* = significant at .001 level

<sup>a</sup>The numbers in each cell are the regression coefficient and the standard error.

Table 4 indicates that party was strongly correlated with conservatism on national security issues. Given the results presented in Tables 1 and 3, it is hardly surprising that even when several district characteristics were included in the analysis, the party variable indicates that a Democratic representative is far more likely to compile a less conservative record on national security issues.

Deep South representatives were more conservative than representatives from the Rim South. The conservatism of Deep South representatives is discussed below, in the section on the regression analysis of southern Democratic representatives.

Presidential voting also was an important variable in explaining NSI scores. As the percentage of the vote for the Democratic presidential candidate increased, the NSI scores decreased. This result is consistent with literature indicating that representatives who stray too far from the ideological leanings of their districts may face electoral difficulties (Fenno 1978; Johannes and McAdams 1981; Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985).

The economic influence of the military was not an important variable in explaining conservatism on national security issues. This finding for the South is consistent with previously cited research on the entire nation conducted in the 1970s. It would appear that too few of the major roll call votes on foreign policy and military issues have a significant enough impact on particular districts to greatly influence representatives' overall ideological position-taking on national security matters.

Variation within the southern Democratic delegation was explored by running the regression with only Democratic representatives included. (There was little point in conducting a companion analysis of southern Republican voting on issues included in the NSI index, because there was almost no variation to be found: as with virtually all other issues, southern Republicans were uniformly conservative on national security matters.)

Some additional variables were added for the analysis of southern Democratic voting on national security issues. Some previous research has indicated that the presence of serious Republican challengers induces increased liberalism from southern Democratic representatives (Bullock 1981; Fleischer 1993). The greater liberalism of southern Democratic representatives is attributed to the fact that in districts with a substantial Republican presence, Republican candidates, who inevitably are positioned to the right, attract conservative voters. Southern Democrats are then forced to rely on the support of more liberal and moderate constituents. The independent variable for Republican strength in a district's congressional politics was the percentage of the two-party vote received by the Republican candidate in the preceding election.



Since the Democratic House caucus adopted reforms designed to encourage greater adherence to the generally liberal policy views of a majority of that caucus, party loyalty has been regarded as being of increased importance for those seeking appointments to the prestige committees—Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means—and those seeking to be an elected party leader in the House (Smith and Deering 1990). Those serving on prestige committees and in the leadership would be expected to compile more liberal records than would other southern Democrats. Some evidence for this hypothesis can be found in the fact that in 1984 several members of the leadership, including majority leader Jim Wright of Texas, changed their positions to oppose the MX missile system favored by Reagan administration after there were complaints from liberal members of the caucus that leaders should not oppose major policy views held by a majority of Democrats in the House (Lindsay 1991). The prestige committee/leadership variable was coded as 1 for members of prestige committees or the leadership, and 0 for other southern Democrats.<sup>5</sup>

Most previous studies of congressional voting on military and foreign policy issues have indicated that the ideology of a representative is the most important predictor of liberalism or conservatism on national security issues (Clotfelter 1973; Bernstein and Anthony 1974; Ray 1981; McCormick and Black 1983; Fleischer 1985; McCormick 1985). As an indicator of southern Democrats' overall ideology, the representatives' ratings by the liberal Americans for Democratic Action were included as an independent variable.

When the ADA score is included as an independent variable, ideology is a statistically significant predictor of voting on national security issues. No other variable is significant in any of three Congresses analyzed, and for two of the three Congresses a great deal of the variance was explained, as is indicated by the high  $R^2$ s. A truncated version of the regression analysis with the ideology variable included is presented in Table 5. Only the results for the ADA variable are reported in Table 5.

However, simply stating that general ideology determines voting on a particular issue may not explain other sources of the ideological disposition of southern Democrats on national security issues. Thus, the regression was run again with the ideological liberalism variable excluded. The results of the regression for southern Democrats are presented in Table 6.

The results of the analysis of southern Democrats indicate that region and the strength of the party's presidential nominee in a district were the most important variables in explaining southern Democratic voting on national security issues.

**Table 5. Regression of Southern Democratic Representatives Voting on National Security Issues with the Ideological Variable Included<sup>a</sup>**

	1984	1986	1988
Ideological Liberalism	-.883*** (.149)	-1.23*** (.136)	-1.33*** (.143)
Intercept	98.06***	113.85***	149.72***
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.425	.733	.723

\*\*\* = significant at .001 level  
<sup>a</sup>The numbers in each cell are the regression coefficient and the standard error.

**Table 6. Multiple Regression Analysis of Southern Democratic Representatives' Voting on National Security Issues<sup>a</sup>**

	1984	1986	1988
Region	15.74* (7.58)	21.26** (6.77)	18.50* (7.19)
Military Personnel	3.42 (2.33)	1.01 (2.06)	1.68 (2.02)
Minority	-.203 (.238)	.116 (.287)	.245 (.307)
Presidential Vote	-.383* (.185)	-1.86*** (.576)	-2.463*** (.526)
Republican Opposition	-.421 (.221)	-.204 (.161)	-.491* (.194)
Prestige Committee Leadership	-9.14 (7.05)	-9.58 (6.25)	-4.31 (6.25)
Intercept	89.41***	128.56***	157.39***
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.159	.404	.374

\* = significant at .05 level  
\*\* = significant at .01 level  
\*\*\* = significant at .001 level  
<sup>a</sup>The numbers in each cell are the regression coefficient and the standard error.

Democrats from the Deep South were more conservative than those from the Rim South. The increased conservatism of Deep South Democratic representatives is not easily explained. In presidential elections, whites in Deep South states provide less support for Democratic presidential nominees (Ladd 1985, 1989; Lamis 1988). Few Deep South Democrats represent districts that have black majorities.<sup>6</sup> Thus, Deep South representatives simply may be responding to the fact that whites in their districts are more conservative than whites in the Rim South. At this point, this supposition must be regarded as speculative.

Increasing support for the Democratic party's presidential candidate was accompanied by increasing liberalism on national security issues. That Democratic representatives adjust their ideology to conform to their districts is not surprising, given the propensity of representatives to attempt to keep their voting records in close conformity with the preferences of their districts (Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1981). However, on civil rights issues, virtually all southern Democrats are supportive of legislation favored by civil rights organizations. On national security issues, Democrats seem to respond to the overall ideological compositions of their districts.

The Republican opposition variable always was negatively correlated with NSI scores. Although it was significant at the .05 level only in 1988, the significance level for the Republican opposition variable in 1984 was .06. The results presented in Table 6 lend further support to those who hypothesize that significant Republican opposition leads to increased liberalism on the part of southern Democrats.

It is interesting that, while the prestige committee/leadership variable always correlated negatively with the NSI scores, it never approached statistical significance. Given the need of southern Democrats to appear conservative on some issues, national security may not be the policy area where they choose to placate either liberal constituents or Democratic representatives from outside the South.

### **Conclusion**

A wide gap remains between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic party in the House on national security issues. This gap exists despite the moderation in southern Democratic scores in the 98th through 100th Congresses. The decline in southern Democratic conservatism was accompanied by an equally large drop in the mean NSI scores of northern Democrats. On defense and foreign policy, regionalism remains alive within the Democratic party in the House of Representatives.

As a two-party system has developed within the South, the region's party delegations in the House of Representatives have developed substantially different records on national security issues. The wide gap between northern and southern Democrats should not obscure the large gap between southern Democrats and southern Republicans.

Within the southern Democratic House delegation, liberalism on national security issues is correlated with the strength of the Democratic presidential candidate in a representative's district and the strength of Republican opposition. Rather than voting uniformly for the conservative position, southern democrats are responding to the electoral imperatives they face in a two-party region.

Because southern Democrats have a need to avoid the appearance of being liberals, they are likely to continue to compile more conservative records on military matters than are northern Democrats. Unlike civil rights and certain social welfare issues, conservatism on national security issues is unlikely to alienate black voters.

Southern Democratic conservatism on national security policy also means that conservative positions are likely to prevail in the House. Ronald Reagan lost his working majority of Republicans and conservative Democrats on economic issues after his first two years in office. George Bush never had such a majority. However, as was true during the period of the Reagan military build-up and during the January, 1991 Gulf War vote, southern Democrats likely will continue to play a crucial role in providing Republican presidents with national security majorities in the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives. And, when a Democrat occupies the White House, southern Democrats may join with Republicans to limit defense cutbacks favored by many northern liberals.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>The South is defined as the eleven states that once constituted the Confederate States of America.

<sup>2</sup>The skew among southern Democratic representatives' NSI scores could not be removed by logarithmic transformation (Shelley 1992).

<sup>3</sup>The military personnel figures were calculated from data in Gottron (1983).

<sup>4</sup>Figures on district racial composition are from the various editions of the *Almanac of American Politics* cited in the references below.

<sup>5</sup>In addition to members of the three prestige committees, those holding the elected party positions of majority leader and majority whip were coded as 1. Because the Speaker normally does not vote on roll calls, he was not rated by the American Security Council.

<sup>6</sup>In 1990, there were only three black majority districts in the Deep South.

## REFERENCES

- Abramowitz, Alan I. 1980. Stalled Realignment: Southern Congressional Elections in the 1980s. Paper presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association.
- Barone, Michael and Grant Ujifusa. 1981. *The Almanac of American Politics, 1982*. Washington, DC: Barone and Company.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Almanac of American Politics, 1984*. 1983. Washington, DC: The National Journal.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Almanac of American Politics, 1986*. 1985. Washington, DC: The National Journal.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Almanac of American Politics, 1988*. 1987. Washington, DC: The National Journal.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Almanac of American Politics, 1990*. 1989. Washington, DC: The National Journal.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Almanac of American Politics, 1992*. 1991. Washington, DC: The National Journal.
- Bernstein, Robert and William W. Anthony. 1974. The ABM Issue in the Senate 1968-1970: The Importance of Ideology. *American Political Science Review* 68: 1198-1206.
- Black, Earl and Merle Black. 1987. *Politics and Society in the South*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Black, Merle. 1978. Racial Composition of Congressional Districts and Support for Voting Rights in the American South. *Social Science Quarterly* 59: 435-450.
- Bond, Jon, Cary Covington, and Richard Fleisher. 1985. Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections. *Journal of Politics* 47: 510-529.
- Bullock, Charles S., III. 1981. Congressional Voting and the Mobilization of a Black Electorate in the South. *Journal of Politics* 43: 662-682.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1985. Congressional Roll Call Voting in a Two Party South. *Social Science Quarterly* 66: 789-804.
- Clotfelter, James. 1970. Senate Voting and Constituency Stake in Defense Spending. *Journal of Politics* 32: 979-983.
- Fleisher, Richard. Economic Benefit, Ideology, and Senate Voting on the B-1 Bomber. *American Politics Quarterly* 13: 200-211.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1993. Explaining Change in the Roll Call Behavior of Southern Democrats. *Journal of Politics* 55: 327-341.
- Fenno, Richard. 1978. *Homestyle: House Members in Their Districts*. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co.
- Gottron, Martha V., ed. 1983. *Congressional Districts in the 1980s*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Johannes, John R. and John C. McAdams. 1981. The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is it Case-work, Policy Compatibility or Something Else. *American Journal of Political Science* 25: 512-541.
- Kingdon, John W. 1981. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, second edition. New York: Harper and Row.
- Ladd, Everett Carl. 1985. On Mandates, Realignments, and the 1984 Presidential Election. *Political Science Quarterly* 100: 1-25.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1989. The 1988 Elections: Continuation of the Post-New Deal Systems. *Political Science Quarterly* 104: 1-18.
- Lamis, Alexander P. 1988. *The Two Party South*, second edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lindsay, James M. 1991. *Congress and Nuclear Weapons*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Manley, John. 1973. The Conservative Coalition in Congress. *American Behavioral Scientist* 17: 223-247.
- McCormick, James M. 1985. Congressional Voting on the Nuclear Freeze Resolutions. *American Politics Quarterly* 13: 122-136.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and M. Black. 1983. Ideology and Senate Voting on the Panama Canal Treaties. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 8: 45-63.
- Patterson, James. 1967. *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Ray, Bruce. 1981. Defense Department Spending and Hawkish Voting in the House of Representatives. *Western Political Quarterly* 34: 438-446.
- Rohde, David. 1989. Something's Happening Here and What it is Ain't Exactly Clear: Southern Democrats in the House of Representatives. In Morris Fiorina and David Rohde, editors, *Homestyle and Washington Work: Studies in Congressional Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Shannon, Wayne. 1972. Revolt in Washington. In William C. Havard, editor. *The Changing Politics of the South*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Shelley, Mack. *The Permanent Majority: The Conservative Coalition in Congress*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Conservative Policy Success in the United States Congress: A Longitudinal Analysis of Alternative Measures. Paper presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association.
- Smith, Steven and Christopher Deering. 1990. *Committees in Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Stern, Mark. 1985. Legislative Responsiveness and the New Southern Politics. In Lorn S. Foster, ed., *The Voting Rights Act: Consequences and Implications*. New York: Praeger.
- Whitby, Kenny J. and Franklin D. Gilliam. 1991. A Longitudinal Analysis of Competing Explanations For the Transformation of Southern Congressional Politics. *Journal of Politics* 53: 504-518.