# *Book Reviews*

*Conrad P. Waligorski, Editor*

*The Term Limits Debate: Two Views*

**Benjamin, Gerald and Michael J. Malbin**, eds. *Limiting Legislative Terms*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992. 324 pp. ($29.95 cloth, $19.95 paper).

**Will, George F**. *Restoration: Congress, Term Limits and the Recovery of Deliberation Democracy*. New York: The Free Press, 1992. 260 pp. ($19.95 cloth).

The two books reviewed here deal with the proposition that legislators' opportunities for reelection to the legislature ought to be limited. Will's *Restoration* is an extended essay arguing that what ails Congress would be ameliorated by term limits for congressmen. *Limiting Legislative Terms*, by Benjamin and Malbin (eds.), contains a diversity of perspectives, but the focus is on state legislative terms.

I bring to this review a career-long commitment to studying and appreciating the legislature's central role in representational democracy. I am skeptical about the capacity of the chief executive to represent the people or the prudence of the courts in applying justice that goes beyond the plain meaning of the constitution and laws. The legislature is and ought to be the first branch. Its central function is to forge consensus of and for the people about what public policy should be, whether for the state or nation.

David Everson's essay in *Limiting Legislative Terms* reminds us of Robert Merton's warnings a generation ago: reforms do not always have their intended effects and, indeed, often produce unwanted consequences. Advocates for term limits insist that they do not wish to injure or weaken legislative bodies; nevertheless they are committed to depriving those legislatures of their most experienced members.

George Will is an engaging wordsmith who writes from a depth of historical and philosophical insight to explain a conservative perspective. He rejects the "kind of scorched-earth, pillage-and-burn conservatism that loathes government," preferring a conservatism that calls for the "recapturing" of a civic life in which republicanism is practiced and Congress regains both status and competence. "[S]uch restoration requires breaking the dynamic of careerism. Term limits will break it" (180). Will suggests a variety of ills that devolve from careerism, including the following: popular doubt

that Congress can be trusted to do the right thing (3); Republican socialism (28); members' selfish disregard for the national good to obtain benefits for constituents (32); "convenient electorates," gerrymandered as necessary for careerists, sometimes in the name of civil rights (42); the culture of spending in Congress (61); the elimination of strong congressional leadership (91); franked mail (93); the mobilization of massive grassroots pressure on members and committees (112); and the handing over to presidents responsibility for, among other things, the nation's emotional well being (128). The list could be longer, but the reader will recognize that Will has identified many specifics of normative concern to conservatives. He would rail against them with or without the specific curative he has in mind: term limits.

There is more to his argument. He presents data about incumbent reelection, arguments from history, case studies of subsidy such as mohair and public radio, and specification of the essence of republican government. In sum, he argues that Congress is institutionalized to evoke career aspirations by members. In thrall to the legislative life, incumbents prostitute themselves and their judgment to constituency service and cultivation of special interest voters. Disabled by obligations to interests, congressmen ratify bargains, but they do not deliberate with prudence that takes into account national needs to establish authentic policy priorities. They do not limit their attention to national interests, eschewing subnational ones. Instead they log roll with one another about particularistic favors to the extent that any policy idea that could help somebody somewhere has a chance of being congressionally enacted.

Will's conservative critique of Congress is both lucid and engaging. My concern is that his "one-size-fits-all" solution to the many congressional ills he perceives cannot accomplish his purpose. Will wants freer agents in Congress who will restrain the reach of national government while looking past the clamor of particularistic concerns to make wise judgments about general policy matters. While the case against Congress is argued well, Will is not persuasive in explaining why representatives with a six-term limit are going to be able to look past particularistic needs of constituents and interest groups and raise their eyes to the greater good of all people. Assuming for the moment the validity of all Will's charges about "legislative corruption" (72), whereby the legislative body and its members acquire interest of their own, which they advance collectively, there is little reason to believe that legislators limited to six terms will care less about reelection than those with unlimited prospects. No incumbents run harder for reelection than those new to the House. Term limits will increase turnover, and newcomers may well be more malleable on the issues than mossbacks, but the proportion of members and members' time devoted to cultivating the grassroots will increase,

not decline, Will's charming prose not withstanding. There is no reason to believe that legislators limited to 12 years in office will appropriate less money or care more about the long term future (deficits, defense, infrastructure, sustainable economic growth) than those with longer prospects for office. Deserving of credit for cataloging congressional ailments, Will has not found the catholicon in term limits.

Benjamin and Malbin have produced a very valuable work with diverging points of view about what term limits ought to be, how they can be achieved and what their consequences are. Especially valuable to teachers are the documents attendant to actual term limit contests: the texts of several term limit ballot initiatives, briefs filed in relation to congressional term limits and the California Supreme Court decision sustaining voter-imposed term limits there.

The history of why term limits were not incorporated in the American founding is thoroughly explained, not as deliciously, but more systematically, than by Will. The campaign politics for ballot initiatives is scrutinized along with a solid report from the state of Washington accounting for the defeat of term limits there. But the strength of the book is in looking from several perspectives at the likely consequences of term limits on political careers and on the institutions of state governments. There are positive possibilities for government and the political culture from directives that cause shortened, up-and-out political participation. There is a dispassionate analysis of what term limits would do in different states (Illinois, a professionalized legislature; West Virginia, a citizen legislature; and Minnesota, a hybrid), making the valuable point that specific limits will change some states much more than others. Even where career legislators are rare and rotation is frequent, term limits will necessitate turnover among legislative leaders, who nearly universally have several terms of experience before becoming speaker, majority leader, minority leader, or the like.

The term limit debate is of continuing relevance. These two books are very valuable beginning points. *Limiting Legislative Terms* is a prerequisite for anyone treating this subject in the classroom, wanting to do a single state analysis, or seeking to lead an initiative campaign. Will's *Restoration* is a challenging piece of literature from a conservative perspective that raises valuable questions with a singular, but undemonstrated answer.

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**Will, George F**. *Restoration: Congress, Term Limits and the Recovery of Deliberative Democracy*. New York: The Free Press, 1992. 260 pp. ($19.95 cloth).

George Will's new book is a timely and provocative interpretation of the idea of representation and a troubling meditation on the role of Congress in contemporary America. Will concentrates his thoughts on two themes: classical republicanism and deliberative democracy.

Will bases his conception of republicanism on "civic virtue," defined as "a steady predisposition to prefer the public good to private advantage when they conflict" (163). Unfortunately for the definition, Will does not expound on the meaning of "public good." What particular interests are to be sacrificed? What is the public good over and above a particular interest? Will is no Rousseau. In a liberal regime there must be a sphere of private regarding as well as public regarding activity. What is the proper balance between them?

Will leaves the idea of the public interest at the level of common sense. He is entitled to common sense judgements; e.g., whatever the public good is, it is not served by running up huge debts that will have to be paid by our children. Whether or not instilling an ethic of civic virtue is the key to restoring inter-generational responsibility is an open question, however, for which common sense provides no sure guide.

In any event, Will's notion of civic virtue is weakly connected to term limits. How would the reform promote civic virtue? More crucially, whose civic virtue would be promoted? Removing the pressure for re-election could create "distance" from public pressure allowing a member of Congress to promote the public good, but would it create an environment in which zeal for the public interest is fostered? If we assume that professionalism is the only motivating force tending toward promotion of private interests, the reform might transform attitudes among members of Congress, but Will produces compelling evidence that there is a culture of spending in Congress that tends to eliminate resistance to budget deficits. He gives no persuasive reason to believe that the culture would disappear with the professionalism.

Will's conception of republican virtue is tempered by a largely Burkean notion of representation which he labels "deliberative democracy." Will rebukes those who would reform Congress to make it more "responsive" if responsiveness involves representing citizen's desires rather than their common interests. What Americans desire are low taxes along with high levels of spending. To these desires Congress has responded vigorously. What is needed is a Congress capable of reflecting our interests rather than the "cognitive dissonance" of our wishes.

Will depicts well the pathological responsiveness of Congress; his diagnosis of its source is unconvincing. For Will, the pathology results from professionalism. The cure is to make professionalism impossible. No sufficiently complex problem can be reduced to a single variable; the sources of congressional irresponsibility are numerous. In addition to professionalism, Will lists three explanations for congressional irresponsibility that would not respond to his remedy. One has already been mentioned—a culture of spending where members of Congress and interest groups tend not to challenge requests for spending. The culture derives from the necessities for compromise in an undisciplined and decentralized legislative process but seems to have taken on a life of its own. The culture of spending cannot be attributed exclusively to the need to produce pork for re-election.

Will also mentions the problem of delegation (172-173). Congress tends to write laws that are more statements of purpose than detailed plans for addressing problems and needs. Too much of the legislative process has been abdicated to executive agencies. Term limits would not touch this problem—indeed, they could exacerbate it by minimizing the possibility of expert legislation and oversight. (Will's brief discussion of delegation should be compared with the considerably more extensive work of Theodore Lowi who, unfortunately, is not cited by Will.)

Will also notes ascendancy of the presidency during the latter half of the twentieth century. We have come to expect our leadership—our policy and budget initiatives—to come from the President. Will may be right that a citizen legislature would have more respect from the American public. It hardly follows that the legislature would assume a more active role in policy making. As with delegation, the disparity could be worsened.

Even if Will is right that *the* source of our troubles is professionalism, term limits, as he conceives them, may not remedy the condition. Will favors term limits where both Senators and members of the House are limited to twelve years of service. Would this eliminate professionalism? I can envision an enterprising professional who would stay in the State legislature for twelve years and then move on to the House and Senate for another twenty four. If the career track is broken, our professional could move into the Governor's mansion for a few years. For a dynamic careerist, the presidency is not out of reach. If denied an elective position for a few years, there would be strong incentives to travel the revolving door into a high paying political appointment in the bureaucracy or in lobbying. In short, term limits will have to be more radical than Will believes to eliminate professionalism.

Perhaps a more radical proposal to create a citizen legislature would yield a better balance between public and private interests. We could limit

members of Congress to one term and forbid them to hold executive appointments or lobby. I doubt that even a genuine citizen legislature (or the executive agencies to which it would delegate much of its business) could be insulated from well organized, heavily funded and highly articulate interest groups. Somehow civic virtue must be aroused among citizens so they will demand a responsible rather than a responsive legislature. Such a difficult (and dangerous) shift in our political culture cannot be accomplished with an institutional gimmick.

Term limits would not result in significant changes in our way of doing business. Will does an excellent job criticizing arguments against term limits, and its opponents will need to give the final chapter the serious attention it deserves. He is especially effective in raising issues in the sociology of knowledge when he explores the rather intense opposition to term limits among political scientists. In any case, I left the book with the sense that there is not much to be said for or against term limits (unless we go with a more radical version). I also left with the sense that Will has done a great service by bringing the issue of representation to a broader reading public than the standard dry treatise in political science could ever reach.

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**Black, Earl and Merle Black**. *The Vital South: How Presidents Are Elected*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. 400 pp. ($29.95 cloth, $14.95 paper).

Once again Earl and Merle Black have made an important contribution to our understanding of both Southern and national politics. As with their earlier (1987) *Politics and Society in the South*, this is that rare political science study which can be equally appreciated by two sets of readers: the academicians, who will recognize and relish the meticulous scholarship, compelling insights, and impressive bibliography; and the politicians and their consultants, who will find great utility in the maps, charts, demographic analyses and nuggets of sound "positioning" advice.

That the Republicanization of the South has been a top-down process, only slowly percolating from presidential choices down through statewide and local contests, is well-known. What the Blacks so capably do in *The*

*Vital South* is to fully explain, utilizing both historical description and voting data, precisely how both the "reformed" primary process (Act I) and the national nominating conventions (Act II) have harmed Democratic and helped Republican electoral chances (Act III) in the South in recent decades. Students of southern politics will appreciate having this tale so well and thoroughly told in one handy and almost entirely reliable volume. (Contrary to the authors' assertion on p. 136, Nixon did not carry Arkansas in 1968.) The intra-party machinations of 1948 and of Kefauver's 1952 and 1956 battles for his party's nomination are recounted with particular color and flourish.

Beyond telling the tale of how the presidential election process contributed to the demise of the solidly Democratic South and to the rise of the Republican South, however, the authors are eager to assert the overall centrality of the South, "for it now shapes the trends and sets the pace of national political outcomes and processes" (366). This is a somewhat more problematic assertion, as the 1992 presidential election demonstrated.

In an occasional aside (for which the authors must now be grateful), the Blacks acknowledge that an unusual juxtaposition of circumstances and candidate could conceivably combine to deprive a Republican presidential nominee of what has become the usual southern sweep into the White House. Indeed, the authors rather specifically define what those circumstances and that candidate could be. For circumstances, "The Democrats are fundamentally dependent upon widespread distress among voters focused upon a Republican White House to give them the opportunity to argue persuasively that 'it's time for a change'" (352); and for nominee, "What the Democrats need are extraordinarily skilled candidates who generate enthusiasm among the party's two essential groups, blacks and core white Democrats, but who are also attractive to the South's swing whites . . . Such candidates would give most emphasis to progressive issues and themes, while hedging their liberalism by making some concessions to more conservative voters. Democratic politicians who are already experienced in devising such a broad-based appeal would have an enormous advantage . . . over Democrats who owe their success mainly to particular narrow segments of the party" (270). The authors now may wonder whether Bill Clinton and his campaign for change had advance access to their manuscript, for certainly in many respects he and his running mate followed their prescribed script for success in recapturing the critically important swing white southern vote: stress economics and demonstrate concern for the working and middle-classes; repudiate quotas; support capital punishment; advocate welfare reform, etc. Somewhat less prescient is the Blacks' assertion that "Democratic strategists have not yet learned how to be truly competitive in

the unfamiliar landscape of modern presidential politics" (24). Furthermore, whereas the Blacks note only three possible options available to Democratic aspirants ("completely write off the South, campaign hard in every southern state, or run in several carefully selected states," [360]), the Clinton-Gore team devised a fourth option: run hard in winnable southern states and hard enough in hopeless southern states to keep the Republicans pinned down, defending (at great expense) their base for fear of losing it. Most seriously, Clinton's victory demonstrated that the South is not monolithic, and therefore is no more or less "vital" on a permanent basis than any other region.

These irresistible quibbles aside, however, the 1992 presidential contest did more to confirm than to challenge the Blacks' larger historical points and assertions, and did nothing to detract from the very real worth of this book, which hopefully will soon be followed by an equally exhaustive account of the South's changing partisan complexion below the presidential level.

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**Brownell, Herbert with John P. Burke.** *Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. ($29.95 cloth).

As befits an Administration populated by successful businessmen, the major Eisenhower cabinet heads have given history little in the way of memoirs, autobiographies or even reflective retrospectives. Herbert Brownell served Eisenhower as an important and able political strategist and later as Attorney General, and he has decided to break through that code of reticence. Brownell relates in a rather straightforward, but still charming way, the early years of his career when he flourished in the respected world of New York and eastern liberal Republicanism.

He grew up in Nebraska, went to Yale, practiced law on Wall Street, served a political apprenticeship in Greenwich Village, moved through the elegance of Gramercy Park and the political strategies often cooked up at the Commodore Hotel. His early historical touchstones were Roscoe Conkling, Elihu Root, Teddy Roosevelt, Charles Evans Hughes. Some he met personally, others were figures of the past, men important to the culture of the New York wing of his party. The major presence in his political career before Eisenhower was Thomas E. Dewey, for whom Brownell worked first

in New York during Dewey's successful governorship and then on the national level in his unsuccessful presidential campaigns in 1944 and 1948.

With the ease and dispassion that comes with age and public regard, he passes summary judgments on some of the giants of that period: Al Smith was a good governor, Herbert Lehman was a plodder, but an honest and hardworking executive, and Franklin Roosevelt was a patrician dilettante who looked down on politicians and who was not highly regarded by many New York State figures before 1933. And Dewey was a true reformer who was impatient and often seemed to lack any sense of humor. Brownell's insights into those Dewey presidential campaigns include the assertion that in 1944 FDR had gone secretly to Bethesda Naval Hospital under a false name for medical treatment 29 times, and that General George C. Marshall may have sought to keep Pearl Harbor from being used by Dewey as an election issue because he feared that evidence of his own culpability in the disaster (his deputies were not fully informed of the break-off of diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese Government) would come to light. Four years later Dewey lost again to Truman: Brownell indicates that Dewey did expect the incumbent to run strongly, and that the result was due to the precipitous dip of agricultural prices just before the election.

The experiences of these campaigns make him an important force in the Eisenhower race in 1952. Brownell establishes the central role of General Lucius Clay in both moving Ike along to the nomination and then in staffing the first administration. The two most important sections, however, are those that deal with the early desegregation struggle and the nasty national security controversies of the early and mid-1950s. Although Brownell is always deferential and loyal to his president, it is clear that Eisenhower had no real desire to further civil rights and was very cautious in putting the prestige of his reputation and the power of his office behind *Brown v. Board of Education*. Brownell indicates at several points that Eisenhower wanted the Justice Department to stay out of the whole controversy, and that the Attorney General had to employ various subtle strategies to get the government to support the Truman Administration's early brief against separate but equal facilities.

Looking back with the perspective of over forty years, the achievements of the Administration (and, by implication, Brownell) in the area of civil rights seem modest, but the author is right in reminding us of the enormous forces then opposing progress in civil rights—including Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy. Brownell also sees the Supreme Court's use of federal courts for enforcement and its doctrine of "deliberate speed" as real obstacles to a more vigorous enforcement of desegregation.

The second controversy was Brownell's role in the national security hysteria of the first term. The nadir of his career was his charge that alleged Communist Harry Dexter White was an active agent of the Soviet Union, and that Truman knew it and kept that fact quiet as he shifted him to the International Monetary fund. Truman denied that accusation later, probably gave incorrect information to the public, and was faced with a Congressional *subpoena* after he left office. Eisenhower opposed the issuance of a *subpoena* to a former president, and Brownell notes in passing that it seemed to some that the President was putting distance between his pristine image and his Attorney General.

The Eisenhower of Brownell's memoirs lends support to Fred Greenstein's landmark work on the president and Steve Ambrose's magisterial biography. Eisenhower is indirect, shrewd, distant, calculating, organized, politically subtle, and above all highly sensitive to the need to keep himself above the fray and away from the controversies that so ripped up lesser and more passionate politicians of his era.

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**Gilbert, Robert E**. *The Mortal Presidency: Illness and Anguish in the White House*. New York: Basic Books, 1992. 314 pp. ($25.00 cloth).

According to the author, "[h]istorians and political scientists often describe the presidency of the United States as a stressful, burdensome, debilitating position" (1). It is that premise which forms the theme of this timely and thought-provoking treatise. Employing interviews with White House personnel, presidential library documents, and medical records, Robert E. Gilbert traces the health—or lack thereof—of five twentieth century presidents, including Calvin Coolidge, Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan. The manner in which personality traits and career background instigated the physical and psychological ailments that beset these presidents is probed, and recommendations for more effectively dealing with disability in office are promulgated.

Chapter 1 analyzes the life expectancy of American presidents in relation to that of all white males. Gilbert finds that the first ten chief executives had the highest positive differential between their age and life expectancy, while the second ten presidents fared worst on this measure. Except for Herbert Hoover and Harry Truman, recent presidents have, due

to the institutionalization of the White House and additional burdens placed on the presidency, suffered poor mortality levels. Utilizing a 1971 rating of presidents, Gilbert reveals that "the presidents who accomplished the most fared better in terms of both reputation and longevity of life than did their less successful counterparts" (11).

Chapters 2 through 6 offer case studies of five modern presidents. We learn in Chapter 2 that President Coolidge lost interest in his job after the sudden death of his son, who developed a fatal infection after playing tennis sockless on the White House grounds. The elaborate and extensive deception exercised to shield the public from Franklin Roosevelt's paralysis is uncovered in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 details Dwight Eisenhower's heart and intestinal ailments and how they influenced the course of his presidency. Chapter 5 illustrates how John Kennedy's boyhood illnesses shaped his personality and political career. Chapter 6 depicts how Ronald Reagan survived an assassin's bullet in 1981 to score overwhelming legislative victories that year, but also how his managerial style and 1985 cancer surgery contributed to the Iran-Contra debacle.

In the concluding chapter, Gilbert reviews the history and effectiveness of the 25th Amendment. Among his suggestions for reducing the stress associated with the presidency are to establish a mental health unit in the White House medical office, to appoint a chief of staff at the outset of each administration, to downsize the White House offices, and to allow delegates at nominating conventions to select a running mate for a presidential candidate from a list of three acceptable choices.

*The Mortal Presidency* may be compared to two other books on the same topic which were likewise published in 1992. In *The President Has Been Shot . . .*, Herbert L. Abrams focuses exclusively on the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan, although he ends the text by identifying conditions that may trigger the 25th Amendment and offers guidelines to clarify the responsibilities of White House physicians. Alternatively, in *Ill Advised: Presidential Health and Public Trust*, Robert H. Ferrell portrays medical coverups that have occurred in the White House since Grover Cleveland's administration, but does not present a comprehensive strategy for rectifying this ongoing dilemma.

While Gilbert's work is well-written and especially informative, it contains some notable flaws. For instance, the methodology used to form the longevity chart in Chapter 1 is based on an incomplete population; this shortcoming is acknowledged by the author. Further, the comparison of presidential accomplishments with their life span relies on a dated ratings poll—there are several more recent and reliable polls which could have been tapped. Though the illnesses of several presidents are briefly discussed, one

has to question the inclusion of Calvin Coolidge for expanded treatment. Even with a wealth of evidence showing that he was psychologically impaired in office following the death of his son, Coolidge did not suffer a plethora of physical infirmities like the other chief executives who were examined in depth. Finally, it is not universally accepted that the points delineated by the author are direct catalysts of illness; nor is it certain that his concluding advice would actually relieve stress and the pressures of the modern presidency.

Nevertheless, Gilbert correctly contends that political rather than legal issues are the real barriers to progress in confronting the mortality of our nation's leaders. His research represents an important addition to a heretofore underemphasized area of presidential study.

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**Hertzke, Allen D**. *Echoes of Discontent: Jesse Jackson, Pat Robertson, and the Resurgence of Populism*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993. 293 pp., xvii ($29.95 cloth, $19.95 paper).

What is the significance of the sudden irruption of religious issues and candidates into Presidential politics in the 1980s and 1990s? This is the question underlying Allen D. Hertzke's informative study of Jesse Jackson and Pat Robertson. At first sight, few men would seem to have less in common than the left wing preacher from the Democratic Party whose political base is the Black church, and the popular television evangelist whose supporters are predominantly white conservative Republicans from the suburbs. Hertzke, however, argues that they are best understood as branches of a single root. His thesis is that both Robertson's critique of the secular cultural elite, and Jackson's critique of the global capitalist economy express the profound discontent of a traditional religious morality with the cultural and economic consequences of excessive individualism: each campaign took on a different expression of that individualism, but with a similar motivation. In addition, Hertzke argues, the major theme of each campaign was an important sub-theme in the other. Nor, he suggests, is this overlap surprising, since these themes—traditional morality and suspicion of business elites—usually are found together in American political history, as in the populism of William Jennings Bryan. What is unique about the recent

"religious populism" is not that these ideas are combined, but that there should be *two* candidates advocating both.

The core of the book is a sympathetic and detailed account of the lives, characters, speeches, campaigns, and supporters of both candidates. This account, which tends to emphasize the similarities between the two campaigns, is an important and much needed step toward a more informed and balanced appreciation of the politics of religion in America. For example, it is noteworthy that women were the backbone of both movements, and that Robertson's supporters were remarkably well disposed towards Jackson: such information should help to correct stereotypes about both groups. On the other hand, the weakness of the book is its de-emphasis of the political differences between the two principals. The problem is clearest in the case of Jackson. Can this outspoken advocate of the extreme liberal position on abortion, gay marriage, and related issues really be counted among the defenders of traditional morality? Hertzke raises this question, but leaves it, somewhat unsatisfactorily, as an unresolved "tension." Again, Jackson may use a quasi-religious political rhetoric, and his main political base is unquestionably the Black church, but I was not fully persuaded that his followers were motivated primarily by a religious notion of community rather than by economic concerns or pride in the first serious Black Presidential candidate. Finally, and more generally, one can wonder how much religion explains if it is flexible enough to accommodate both left wing Democrats and right wing Republicans.

Such questions aside, however, *Echoes of Discontent* does establish that both leaders aired legitimate grievances, and that both had a significant impact on their respective parties and on the country. The family, for instance, was crucial for both movements, and perhaps their most enduring legacy will be the growing sense that radical secular individualism has become a serious threat to the well being of families, and especially of children. Not everyone will share Hertzke's evident belief that populism is a good thing, but his broad conclusion—that religious populism is the only discernible voice amidst the chorus of national political discontent with classical liberalism—seems correct. And for this reason, there is much to learn from this study both about the problems of liberalism and about its continuing dominance.

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**Kallina, Edmund F., Jr**. *Claude Kirk and the Politics of Confrontation*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993. 253 pp. ($34.95 cloth, $18.95 paper).

In his new biography of Claude Kirk, the first Republican governor of Florida since Reconstruction, historian Edmund Kallina attempts to shine some scholarly light on a figure who either has been forgotten in the dynamic world of Florida politics or has been dismissed as a comical character whose election and one-term administration was something of a fluke. Kallina believes, quite rightly, that Kirk was a pathbreaking governor who should be taken seriously for his political skills and policy accomplishments.

Using an array of personal interviews, government documents, and newspaper archives, Kallina effectively tells the story of Kirk's rapid rise in politics as a GOP outsider in a Solid South state. After a successful career in insurance and other business concerns, Kirk became active in Florida's small GOP organization. However, he was never an organization man, and his election to the governorship in 1966 had little to do with the power of the Florida Republican Party and much to do with his own political skills, his personal campaign organization, and the weakness of his Democratic opponent, a Dade County official who had ousted a more traditional, conservative Democrat in the primary. As many other Republican candidates have done in other Southern states, Kirk was able to take advantage of divisions among the Democrats by associating his opponent with the more liberal Democrats in the North. Kirk's opponent was also hurt by the poor image that all Miami area politicians had in the rest of the state and by an apparent inability to arrive at his campaign appearances on time, a problem that was present but not crucial in President Clinton's campaign.

Once in office, Kirk practiced what Kallina calls "the politics of confrontation." Kirk was faced with a hostile Democratic legislature, a skeptical press, and an antiquated state constitution which greatly limited the formal powers of the governor's office and which vested substantial authority in the state's cabinet, a collective executive decision-making body unlike that of any other state. Kirk attacked his opponents both personally and publicly, and he did not let the dignity of his office stand in the way of making headlines. Kirk referred to the president of the state senate as "Senator Claghorn," appeared in full baseball uniform to throw out the first ball at "grapefruit league" games, and once ordered champagne and flowers for all the women in a Beverly Hills hotel restaurant, then signed the bill with the name of the chairman of a Florida business group.

Kirk served but one term, and then was replaced by Reuben Askew, one of the new-style, moderate Democratic governors elected in the South during the 1970s. During the short time that he was in office, Kirk did accomplish some significant policy and political goals. A new constitution was drafted and approved, a state police force was created, and state government began to take environmental protection seriously. Kirk survived two serious educational crises, one involving a state-wide teachers' strike, the other a court-ordered desegregation plan. Near the end of his term, Kirk infuriated legislators of both parties when he vetoed a legislative pay raise bill that he apparently had committed himself to sign. During the unsuccessful re-election campaign of 1970, it was the GOP that was divided and the Democratic Party that was united behind a popular candidate.

Kallina's biography touches upon two issues that are of great current interest to political scientists: partisan division of government and partisan change in the South. Unfortunately, Kallina does not offer much theoretical insight into these issues, nor does he try to use Kirk's experience as a case study to test political scientists' hypotheses on these topics. Readers may learn some practical lessons from the book about the limits of confrontational politics. Kirk's rhetoric and flamboyance got the attention of Florida's political establishment and even led to some important reforms. But they did not lead to good long-term working relations with the legislature, nor did they build up a strong GOP organization in Florida.

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**Kaufman, Burton I**. *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. 245 pp. ($29.00 cloth, $14.95 paper).

Presidential reputations change over time, and Jimmy Carter's has been on the upswing in recent years. Whether because of the passage of time, his well-received tenure as ex-president, reaction to his successors, or other reasons, both scholarly and public attitudes toward Carter have generally improved. A common theme in this reinterpretation is that any president facing the circumstances that confronted Carter (including lingering bitterness from Vietnam and Watergate, an increasingly unruly Congress, the rise of political action committees, and the weakening of the party system) would find governing very difficult.

In addition, Carter is frequently lauded for his sterling personal character and good intentions (especially in comparison with other modern presidents), and for his intelligence, sincerity, and other attributes that seem very appealing and apparently have prompted many people to look back on Carter fondly. Furthermore, most agree that President Carter clearly tried to act in what he perceived as the best interests of the American people.

Kaufman, professor of history at Virginia Tech, accepts some of this positive reassessment while still sharply criticizing Carter's handling of the presidency. He acknowledges that serious problems plagued Carter and he appreciates the man's fine personal qualities; yet, Kaufman argues that Carter's was "a mediocre, if not a failed, presidency" (3). Much of the blame for Carter's problems, the author contends, lies with Carter himself.

After analyzing the events of the Carter administration, Kaufman summarizes his case against Jimmy Carter by describing him as

> . . . long on good intentions but short on know-how; a novice in the Oval Office who never reached an accommodation with the institutions and interests in Washington he had run against but whose support he needed; a chief executive who was smart, caring, honest, and informed but who self-righteously believed that what he thought was right should prevail; an administrator who micromanaged but not always well; a leader who worked diligently in support of his policies and programs but failed to educate or influence public opinion; and, most important, a president who never adequately defined a mission for his government, a purpose for his country, and a way to get there (210).

As indicated by the preceding passage, the tone of the book is predominately negative.

The author argues that many of Carter's problems stemmed from his political maladroitness. His disdain for the nitty-gritty of politics undoubtedly contributed to his rocky relationship with Congress and made it harder to achieve his goals. Not only did Carter sometimes fail to cultivate adequate congressional support, he even attacked some of the members' beloved pork barrel projects!

Also, Carter's natural fiscal conservatism coupled with the troubled economy he faced led him to oppose some expensive domestic projects favored by traditional Democratic groups. Minorities, labor, urban dwellers, and others became alienated when Carter did not deliver the desired government programs, thereby sapping his political support.

Further, what Kaufman calls Carter's "trustee" approach to the presidency also encumbered him. Once Carter decided what he thought was best for the country, he did not want to compromise and regarded anyone who disagreed with his position as selfish rather than having a different perspective of the public interest. Neither attitude endeared Carter to the Washington establishment nor made it easy for him to get his proposals enacted.

Kaufman considers Carter's lack of a clear vision one of his biggest failings. Carter sought to achieve many things but never indicated which had priority or how they fit into his overall agenda for the nation; indeed, he never specified what his overall plan was. Among the plethora of bills Carter submitted to Congress were measures to reform welfare policy, tax policy, farm policy, and energy policy. Carter similarly delved into numerous international issues, including the Panama Canal Treaties, relations with the Soviet Union, and the Middle East. In both foreign and domestic policy, Kaufman contends, Carter "proposed a number of bold new measures, angered constituencies that had helped to elect him, and tried to do too much too quickly" (37).

Kaufman does admit, however, that Carter suffered politically from some serious problems he did not cause, including inflation, the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the antics of his brother Billy. It is Carter's reaction to these events that the author criticizes: there was no coherent and effective anti-inflation plan, the hostage rescue attempt was a fiasco, Carter overreacted to the invasion of Afghanistan, and failed to control his brother.

Kaufman makes a compelling case against Carter. His interpretation of events is usually convincing, and he does a good job of linking the administration's failures to Carter's political weakness. Occasionally, however, Kaufman seems overly determined to portray Carter as a failure. For example, while the author does give Carter some credit for successes, including the Camp David Accords, the energy bill, and the Alaska lands legislation, he seems to give that credit grudgingly and still finds some fault with these achievements.

The author provides a very helpful bibliographical essay. The book is highly recommended for political scientists and others interested in the presidency and the Carter era.

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**Pohlman, Marcus D**. *Governing the Postindustrial City*. White Plains, NY: Longman, 1993. 399 pp. ($20.00 paper).

In *Governing the Postindustrial City*, Pohlman has written a text for urban politics courses that attempts to analyze "power" in city politics in the

postindustrial era. In doing so, he offers a strong theoretical foundation that is often lacking in city politics texts.

Pohlman contends that governing the city of the late 20th Century is a nearly impossible task. Urban mayors (often African-Americans, who have come to political power as a result of the continuing white middle-class and corporate exodus) find themselves torn between their electoral (poor African-Americans) and corporate constituencies. Their electoral supporters, victims of discrimination and unable to attain the social mobility of the 19th Century white-ethnics who populated the industrial city's ghetto, expect local governments to provide the social services and jobs required to help them escape poverty. On the other hand, the business community demands lower taxes and financial assistance from the city so that they may remain "competitive" in a postindustrial world where the mobility of capital has accelerated the corporate exodus that had begun in the 1960s. Technological advancements, which had made the city the center of the American economy in the 19th Century, have made cities obsolete to the postindustrial economy. Pohlman quotes Mayor Coleman Young of Detroit:

> We have a number of laws on the books which give a tax preference to businesses located in the city, encourage them to stay rather than leave . . . . Some say this is subsidizing business. I say it's the name of the game. As long as we live in a society which pits workers in Mississippi against workers in Michigan, we have to make concessions (327).

Coleman made this statement in 1980. Today, he would have to amend it by including workers from Mexico (especially if the North American Free Trade Agreement is ratified).

According to Pohlman, big city governments usually resolve this dilemma by encouraging economic growth, rationalizing their decision by stating that the jobs saved and added to the local economy will provide opportunities for their electoral constituency.

However, such assertions are questionable. Postindustrial economic growth, built on service industries, is fragile. As Arian, Goldberg, Mollenkopf, and Rogowsky (*Changing New York City Politics*, 1991) observe, the Wall Street crash of October, 1987 caused a new round of local budget cuts as "the tax base shrank, financial houses laid off workers, and employment and earnings leveled off" (80). Also, postindustrial economic growth does not create balanced economic opportunity. At one extreme are highly paid professional positions, often held by suburban commuters. At the other extreme are low-skill, low-pay, no advancement jobs. These are the jobs that often go to Mayor Young's (and so many other mayors') constituents. As a result, we have seen the emergence of what Mollenkopf and Castells

(1991) called the "dual city," where massive wealth (symbolized by downtown office towers and luxury condominiums) and poverty (homelessness and ghettos) co-exist, with periodic incidents of urban violence (Pohlman chronicles these incidents in his final chapter). Such incidents usually lead to "rebuilding efforts" (for example, the effort led by Peter Ueberroth in the wake of the south central Los Angeles riot), that in turn lead to minimal improvements in social service delivery without altering the *status quo*.

Pohlman ably discusses the evolution of the American city (picking up a theme presented by Dennis Judd in *The Politics of American Cities*, 1988), describing economic, social, and political relationships in an historical context. There are a number of chapters dealing with the institutions of local government, which are enhanced by "case studies" that will be helpful to undergraduates. The chapter on the mass media, while well written, is not focused on the media in cities. While it is a fine treatment of the media in American politics (that would work well in an introductory text), it fails to deal with either the inability of the major media to cover the news in the ghetto (a weakness that the *Los Angeles Times* has attempted to redress since the riots) or the role of the ethnic press in urban communities.

The final chapter, "Alternative Futures," suggests possible scenarios for urban America. Will middle-class Americans, fed up with crime and rising taxes, accept a friendly form of fascism (as first suggested by Bertram M. Gross, 1980) where law and order take precedence over the Bill of Rights? Pohlman suggests that the supranationalism of the Gulf War, the ever-increasing proportion of our population that is incarcerated (especially the African-American population), and the growing presence of book burners and hate groups are evidence that we may be moving in this direction (as may the recent election in Los Angeles, where pro-business, "law-and-order" candidate Richard Riordan was elected mayor). But Pohlman also cites evidence that we also may be moving toward a democratic socialist solution for the cities. Of course, we also may not be moving at all—as cities lose jobs and become the warehouses where America stores those who have been left behind.

The book offers timely perspective on urban politics that undergraduates rarely are exposed to. On that basis alone, it is a strong contribution to both scholarship and teaching in this field.

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**Pomper, Gerald M**. *Passions and Interests: Political Party Concepts and American Democracy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992. 178 pp. ($27.50 cloth, $12.95 paper).

A number of democratic theorists have argued that political parties are essential to the functioning of democracy. In *Passions and Interests* Gerald Pomper offers a cogent and convincing defense of this perspective, as well as a sophisticated analysis of the relationship between party concepts and American democracy.

Pomper's analysis revolves around eight conceptual models of parties: the *governing caucus*, *cause advocate*, *ideological community*, *social movement*, *bureaucratic organization*, *rational team*, *urban machine*, and *personal faction* models. These conceptual models are based on three analytic dimensions: the party's focus (the active elite versus a mass clientele), goals (collective versus coalitional objectives), and modes (instrumental to other objectives versus expressive of affective sentiments). Pomper's central purpose is to determine how well American parties fit the eight conceptual models, and how well the models serve democratic interests.

The governing caucus model, one traditionally favored by many political scientists, is characterized by an elite group of professional politicians who are controlled by an electorate whose participation is limited to judgement of collective programs. Pomper sees little empirical evidence of this model's presence in American politics, and is critical of its overemphasis on "cold reasoning" and the role of elites. The governing caucus's mass-based counterpart is the cause advocate party (e.g. U.S. splinter parties such as the Dixiecrats), which emphasizes enlisting popular support for its policies. Their central problem, he contends, is the limited range of their policy concerns, which makes it difficult to build majority coalitions.

Similar to the governing caucus and cause advocate parties, the ideological community and social movement parties have collective goals, but their modes are expressive rather than instrumental. For both models, politics "is a crusade for justice rather then a mean chase for personal advantage" (53). The ideological community (e.g. Leninist parties) has an elite focus; a disciplined cadre of party elites works toward the party's collective goals. Conversely, social movements (e.g. the Populist and Progressive parties) are built on a mass, rather than elite, base. Ideology, Pomper contends, is an important incentive for party activism and allows for a public discussion of various conceptions of the "common good." However, ideological parties also are based on faith in the truth, which is not

compatible with the tolerance and open discussion of a liberal democratic community.

The party as a bureaucratic organization and a rational team has coalitional goals and material, rather than expressive, incentives. The bureaucratic organization, however, emphasizes elite leadership, professional expertise, and specialization of labor. Pomper argues that while American parties (particularly the national organizations) have become more bureaucratized in recent years, there are still many limitations (e.g. primaries, a diffuse electoral system) on bureaucratic party organizations. He further contends that while bureaucratic organizations mobilize voters and facilitate collective mass action, they are too inaccessible to the rank-and-file and potentially too manipulative of the public to be fully democratic. The rational team of office seekers has more of a mass base; voters are seen as consumers and parties as entrepreneurs in a utilitarian pursuit of self interest. Pomper sees this model as lacking a proper emphasis on communitarian values.

Contrary to many conceptions of party machines that emphasize material rewards as a source of cohesion, Pomper contends that expressive, emotion-laden factors tend to account for the survival of such organizations. The affective appeal of ethnicity, he contends, was much more crucial to the survival of the party machine than patronage. Machines, argues Pomper, were weakened by their internal contradictions: an elite focus versus a mass base, coalitional goals versus the collective needs of their constituents, and ethnic particularism versus class needs. The personal faction has the coalitional goals and affective appeal of the party machine, but puts more emphasis on its mass base. According to Pomper, the emotional loyalty to a leader (e.g. Mussolini, Peron) based on personal factors limits the influence of the electorate over the public policy.

After an insightful analysis of the eight concepts, their relevance to the empirical realities of American politics, and their relationships to democratic theory, Pomper concludes by evaluating the contributions of American parties to democracy, and presents a number of proposals to strengthen the role of parties in American democracy. "No perfect party exists," he contends, "either in reality or even as a prescriptive model" (140). He does, however, argue that present trends are moving American parties too close to the cause advocate, office-seeking teams, bureaucratic, and personal faction models. Pomper recommends not making American parties fit any particular model, but to move toward "fuller participation, a greater concern for collective goals, and more autonomous leadership" (146).

*Passions and Interests* is a superb book. It insightfully links American politics research with normative democratic theory. As such, Pomper's work

will likely influence empirical analyses and normative discussions of American parties for a long time.

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**Bauzon, Kenneth E., ed**. *Development and Democratization in the Third World: Myths, Hopes and Realities*. Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, Inc., 1992. 344 pp. ($54.50 cloth, $24.50 paper).
**Vanhanen, Tatu, ed**. *Strategies of Democratization*. Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, Inc., 1992. 178 pp. ($45.00 cloth, $24.50 paper).

The investigation of democratization is something of a growth industry within political science. The two works reviewed here seek to contribute to this field, though in very different respects. Unfortunately, aside from their general concerns with democratization, the main thing these two edited volumes share is inconsistency and lack of focus that is too frequently the hallmark of such collections. Of the two, Bauzon's *Development and Democratization in the Third World* suffers most from these problems.

The disjointed nature of the volume is apparent from the outset. The first two chapters, both written by Bauzon, demonstrate the intellectual confusion of the work as a whole. In the first—"Democratization in the Third World—Myth or Reality?"—Bauzon engages in "straw-manning" of the worst sort. His oversimplification, and even misrepresentation of "mainstream" democratization literature contributes neither to his specific argument nor to the debate more generally.

In a characterization that is tantamount to ideological name-calling, he suggests that ". . . the proponents of democratization as represented in the mainstream literature . . . are really nothing more than current versions of the Social Darwinists of the late nineteenth century" (7).

Much of the mainstream literature has attracted criticism for emphasizing gradualism, procedural democracy over substantive democracy, and general acceptance of the prevailing global capitalist framework. Yet, typing these "mainstream" authors—many of whom have been victims of authoritarianism in their home countries—as "Social Darwinists" or imperialist lackeys seems unjustified.

Bauzon follows this introductory diatribe with a thoughtful and well-written overview of contending approaches (modernization, developmental ethicist, dependency theory, and Neo-Marxist) to development, suggesting that the rancor of the first chapter is unnecessary.

Subsequent chapters are uneven and range from fairly concrete explications of conceptual, ethical, and empirical issues relating to development and democracy to more abstract exhortations of the "What Is To Be Done" variety. In pieces on "people-centered development" (David C. Korten), "civilization and modernization" (Remigio E. Agpalo), and liberation theology (Enrique Dussel), there are cogent arguments delineating "alternative" conceptualizations of development and democracy from their more "mainstream" counterparts.

Curiously, the chapters with an empirical or policy bent seem to undermine the consistent demonizing of the capitalist system so prevalent elsewhere in the volume. Gerald E. Scott's piece on the impact of IMF stabilization programs in Africa suggests that the principle obstacles to further development in that region are endogenous (corruption, lack of democracy), rather than exogenous. William L. Ascher convincingly debunks the notion that pursuit of equitable development and economic growth are mutually exclusive, and goes on to suggest concrete reforms designed to generate both in Central America. Perhaps not surprisingly, in a caustic Afterword, E. San Juan, Jr. reserves particular vitriol for both of these pieces.

There is, of course, great virtue in bringing together diverse viewpoints and cross-disciplinary approaches when dealing with such large-scale topics. Yet there also seems to be a point of diminishing returns which the Bauzon volume rather clearly crosses. The work offers neither a sustained and coherent radical critique of current "paradigms" of development and democratization, nor a solid empirical investigation of the assumptions implicit in those frameworks. This is particularly unfortunate, given that the democratization literature is in need of a well-grounded and constructively critical reappraisal from a radical perspective.

A number of important and interesting points are made in this book, perhaps none more significant than the implausibility of conceptually separating development and democratization, and the concomitant need to integrate research in these two areas. Ultimately, inconsistency and lack of a unifying thematic focus render the volume more ineffectual than need be.

Vanhanen's *Strategies of Democratization* begins with an interesting, if not altogether novel, premise: democratization processes are driven by the interplay of structural constraints and strategic choices. Thus, the structural characteristics of a political system define certain parameters within which a range of possible outcomes may occur, and the strategic choices made by

politically relevant actors within the system interact to determine which specific trajectory the transition ultimately will take.

Vanhanen focuses on strategy, suggesting three means by which conscious political action can effect democratization: "(a) by transforming social structures affecting the distribution of economic and intellectual power resources; (b) by establishing political institutions that make it possible to share power democratically among competing groups; and (c) by devising effective political action strategies to overcome various obstacles to democratization" (10-11). He further suggests that while the first is more or less "universal" in its applicability, the latter is most "particular and unique" to the specific circumstances of a given transition.

Here he differs from much of the mainstream literature in assuming that optimal strategies exist and can be delineated. Much of the important work in this field (e.g., O'Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead's *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*) suggests that transition processes are marked by such enormous uncertainty that both academics and participants alike may be unable to postulate *a priori* which strategies are most or least likely to yield a democratic outcome. Vanhanen does not adequately address this dilemma, and his empirical model and investigation seem to focus on democratic preconditions rather than on strategic interaction. The model suffers from subjective operationalization of some variables, and conclusions drawn from it are unremarkable (e.g., that the establishment and maintenance of democracy is likely to be easier in countries where "power resources" are evenly distributed).

Subsequent chapters focus on democratization processes in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, South Korea, and China, some offering valuable insights into the unfolding of transitions in these areas.

One piece in particular, "Polyarchical or Consociational Democracy?" by Vucina Vasovic, stands out as prescient and thought-provoking. Vasovic succeeds both in highlighting the possible consequences of consociational engineering in Central and Eastern Europe and in effectively predicting the current state of affairs in the Balkans. He clearly describes the encouragement of hegemonic aspirations among ethno-nationalist elites inherent in confederative arrangements, presaging the appearance of "ethnic cleansing" pogroms. He notes that while mass participation in segmented societies may be problematic, the alternative is likely to be worse: "It is likely . . . that the lack of participation in societies with incompetent, intolerant, and excessively ambitious elites could increase the impact of their irresponsible and harmful actions" (96).

Other interesting pieces include Erik N. Komarov's examination of emerging new political groupings in the wake of the disintegration of

Communist hegemony in the Soviet Union; Miguel Berland's use of opinion data in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to assess mass support for democratic structures and principles in those societies; and Samuel Decalo's mixed assessment of the potential for democratic consolidation in much of Africa.

The weakness of the Vanhanen volume does not lie in individual contributions, though overall there seems to be more emphasis on description than explanation. Rather, like the Bauzon work, it suffers from a lack of focus and consistency. This is unfortunate, because the areas these two books concentrate on—a radical critique, and a systematic examination of the role of strategy—are ones from which the field could benefit.

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**Billington, James H**. *Russia Transformed: Breakthrough to Hope*. New York: The Free Press, 1992. 202 pp. ($17.95).

For three tense days during August, 1991, many of us watched the developments in Moscow in amazement. We wondered what the fate of Soviets would be in the mysterious absence of Mikhail Gorbachev and under the familiar threat of terror by hard line Communists determined to squelch the avalanche of reforms that threatened their own way of life.

James Billington provides those of us who could not be there a uniquely perceptive firsthand account of events during the attempted *coup*. Reading *Russia Transformed* is in some ways better than being in-country during the *coup* attempt. Billington is exceptionally qualified to report the views of the common Moscovite as well as to offer a perceptive account of activities within the White House and among other government officials.

Billington witnessed these events by virtue of his position as a Librarian of Congress attending meetings of the International Federation of Library Associations and the Congress of Compatriots. Both of these groups were, as Billington states, "particularly concerned with the cause of freedom." Having previously been nominated for two National Book Awards for his work focusing on the tumultuous Russian past and the nation's constant yearning for spiritual-cultural independence in the face of political and economic disaster as well as state sponsored terror, Billington is particularly concerned with the spiritual and intellectual impact of the *coup* attempt.

While there have been many accounts of the August *coup* attempt by the press and other participants, all contain a great deal of ambiguity concerning what these events really meant to the Soviet people and the political system itself. Was this the continuation of a democratic process already spurred by Gorbachev himself? Was it the beginning of true democracy itself? Would the victory over the *coup* plotters give the people the motivation they so badly needed to endure the hardships ahead? Billington's highly inspirational and personal account would have us believe that those days were the beginning of a national transformation—the birth of what he calls "an altogether new mentality among the Russian people . . . a politics of hope." These events were a historical breakthrough for the Russian people equivalent to or greater than the Bolshevik revolution. Billington labels these events as more than a political breakthrough; rather, it was a spiritual breakthrough for the culture and people themselves. Billington believes that the spiritual effect will allow people to break out of their long captivity caused by fear and terror and express their spirituality and creative culture.

Billington provides an account that spans society from high-level officials inside the (Russian) White House to the common man who demonstrated in the streets of Moscow hoping to dissuade soldiers from committing violence against their fellow citizens. Portraying those who spoke to the crowds demonstrating outside the White House as the force that held the resistance together, he painted Yeltsin as a particular hero of the hour. Yet, despite the temptation to focus on the leaders, he also noted the effects of the *coup* and the successful attempt to defeat it on the spirit of the common citizens.

Despite these strengths, Billington's work leaves us wondering what to say about the significance of the events of August, 1991 for the process of democratization. Does the inspiration of such events help to institutionalize and stabilize the democratic process? Or does it unrealistically inflate public hopes for more rapid and meaningful change? Billington's analysis, while offering useful insight, does not confront this larger theoretical issue. Despite his understanding of the reactions and motivations of leaders and common citizens alike, the author avoids any broader discussion of what democratization is all about. It therefore is difficult to place this work within the context of the broader literature on democratization, especially now that the *process* of this phenomenon is the subject of extensive debate among scholars. Some believe that for democratization to be successful there must be preconditions of wealth and stable institutions. There are others, such as Di Palma, who now argue that there need not be any preconditions for the emergence of democracy, which can be "crafted" by leaders under many

different circumstances. The problem is that the Russian experience does not seem to fit either of these models, and Billington's efforts do not help us to resolve the dilemma. Yeltsin, who once was the popular hero defending democracy in the streets of Moscow, now is in danger of losing his power to the survivors of the old *nomenklatura*, who successfully play not only to the interests of the still-entrenched establishment but also to the impatience of those who see the failure of democracy expressed in growing political disorder and increasing poverty of body and spirit. What Billington has offered is a useful, enlightening, and frequently emotional snapshot of an important and perhaps even crucial moment in time. But what that moment means for the future is beyond Billington's (and our) grasp at this time.

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**Elkins, David J**. *Manipulation and Consent: How Voters and Leaders Manage Complexity*. Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1993. 256 pp., viii. ($65.00 [Can.] cloth).

David J. Elkins, a noted student of Canadian politics at the University of British Columbia, sets out an ambitious research agenda in his new book, *Manipulation and Consent*. First, in the tradition of V.O. Key, Jr., he sets out to show that voters are not fools. People don't follow all issues; they take the rational course of specializing and forming "issue publics." Aggregate public opinion is also more stable than individual-level attitudes. Second, he seeks to show that political leaders attempt to manipulate the public but are constrained by the attentive issue publics.

These are bold claims and Elkins admits that the project has taken a long time to complete. How long he does not say, but the data base is from a 1979 sample of British Columbia voters. Had Elkins completed the project earlier, this work might have had a greater impact. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro have forcefully made and supported Elkins's first thesis in *The Rational Public* (University of Chicago Press, 1990). They also take a swipe at the second argument, though the major effort in this area is John Zaller's *Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge University Press, 1992). Elkins cites some earlier work by Page and Shapiro, but nothing by Zaller. This is a shame because he deals extensively—sometimes too extensively—with the literature on public opinion.

*Manipulation and Consent* is a diffuse book. Perhaps it was too long in coming. The various chapters don't clearly relate to one another. What we have is a series of essays rather than a single argument. There is no data analysis at all on how some (or all) voters might be manipulated—although the theoretical discussion in the concluding chapter is well worth reading. There is almost no multivariate analysis. Yet, there is much to be gained from this book. Elkins makes some important points—and often has data that support his thesis.

Elkins's most important argument focuses on how people think about issues. Instead of asking respondents to articulate views on issues that might not be of interest to them, his survey asks them to list their three most important issues. Questions about how much people know and their levels of political sophistication all relate to voters' self-selected issues. When we ask the questions this way citizens appear much more sophisticated than they do in either American or Canadian national election studies. Agreement with candidates strongly affects vote choice. Accord on one's most important issue matters more than on second or third choices. Elkins also shows that voters can make sense out of the complex political system of British Columbia, which is marked by different party systems at the federal and provincial levels. Voters claim that they sometimes vote sophisticatedly and their patterns of likes and dislikes of parties and leaders reflects the context of the party system rather well.

These are the high points in *Manipulation and Consent*. They are important. I wish that the rest of the analysis was as much to the point as these analyses are. There are interesting discussions of British Columbian political culture and of the ideas that people employ when they conceptualize issues. Yet, I didn't see how they connected to the larger thesis of the book. Greater emphasis on a common theme—and a focus on just one theme—would have made an impressive book an essential one.

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**Murphy, Kenneth**. *Retreat From the Finland Station: Moral Odysseys in the Breakdown of Communism*. New York: The Free Press, 1992. 415 pp. ($24.95 cloth).

Kenneth Murphy provides us with an interesting volume relevant to the current dissection and discussion of the collapse of Soviet Communism.

Murphy envisages his particular study of the collapse of Soviet Communism, as a system and as an ideal, as a retrospective companion to Edmund Wilson's *To the Finland Station*. Murphy examines the power of ideas and the socialist ideal through the experiences of the "true believers." Ranging from the practitioners, such as Bukharin, to the believers, such as Koestler and the reformers, such as Gorbachev, all of these "believers," much like Icarus before them, suffer as the heat of Communist praxis melts the wax of their faith in theory.

Indeed, all of the individuals Murphy examines suffer from the sudden confrontation of Realpolitik in the praxis with their faith in theory as a liberating force. The first troubled soul in the study is that of Bukharin. Relying heavily on Stephen Cohen's well-written documentary, we see the believer struggling to come to terms with the transition from revolutionary to ruling class, and how best to proselytize the masses with the new faith. Extragovernmental threats led to extraordinary means, and the Soviet "Leviathan" was born. Leviathan rapidly assumes a "mortal" name, Joseph Stalin, and the believer is consumed. Despite the loss of many of the original revolutionaries, the international appeal of the Soviet model remains high. In a world ravaged by depression and war, Soviet Communism offers hope to the weary.

In the next section, Murphy reflects upon the experiences and fates of three European believers, who, upon closer contact with the worker's paradise, lose faith in the movement and the idea. These three men searching for hope—Andre Gide, Arthur Koestler, and Iganzio Silone—are attracted by the promise of a socialist future, one that seems better than their contemporary Europe. Independent of each other, they are in turn confronted by the Soviet Leviathan, and retreat with their faith destroyed. The ideal has gone, cold praxis has replaced the promise of an earthly paradise. To acknowledge the gap between theory and praxis was to forsake the ideal: no road led to a Soviet Canossa, excommunication was final—until the death of the Soviet deity, Stalin.

The death of "God" led to a rebirth of faith, the cause was been taken up by the reformers. Part three of Murphy's book examines the main actors of reform, the challenges they face, and the penalty of their dissidence. Starting with Milovan Djilas, Murphy traces the experiences of various reformers who, in attempting to end the alienation between praxis and theory, eventually move towards the abandonment of socialism. In each case, the system reacts to protect its interests: Djilas is jailed, Imre Nagy is executed, and Khrushchev and Dubcek are "exiled" into retirement. The only non-political figure included in part three is that of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. While his inclusion in the volume is important, Solzhenitsyn seems

out of place among these practitioners of reform. They are trying to save the faith; Solzhenitsyn is bent on its destruction. His role, while germinating under the Khrushchev thaw, blossoms in the Brezhnev frost and is significant enough to warrant a separate discussion. Indeed, following all of these abortive attempts at reform, the frost of orthodoxy returns with a vengeance. Systemic change, however, is an integral part of nature and can be delayed, but not prevented. It is the combination of the moral and ineluctable economic collapse of the system that allows Luther to become Pope.

In the final section, Murphy examines the role of Gorbachev, the reformer-*cum*-reformationist who, in his attempt to restore faith, destroys the Church. Most of the section provides us with details and some insight into Gorbachev's biography and Party career, leading up to his ascendance as General Secretary. As with earlier discussions of reform efforts, little time is dedicated to actual reforms or measures. While one must consider that the main theme of the book is centered on individual experiences within the Soviet model rather than a political system analysis, one nonetheless would like to see a greater discussion of concrete reform steps taken—particularly with regard to Gorbachev, the main actor in the events leading to the decline of the Soviet system. How does the believer move to the position of destroyer?

*Retreat From Finland Station* is an interesting, readable book tracing the seventy-five year evolution and death of the Soviet model of Communism. It must be remembered that the book is not, nor does the author consider it, a scholarly political analysis. Kenneth Murphy seeks to outline the demise of the socialist ideal, as it corresponded with the Soviet version. Though his conclusion would suggest otherwise, history has not yet ended: socialism in its many other variants is still alive and well. Soviet statism was but one (per)version of socialism. In his zealousness to portray the inherent problem of creating the socialist state, Murphy tends to cast many elements of revolution and revolutionary politics as specific Bolshevik or Leninist tactics, rather than understanding them as a holistic part of revolutionary anatomy, per Crane Brinton.

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*International Politics*

**Khong, Yuen Foong**. *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 286 pp. ($39.50 cloth, $16.95 paper).

**Anderson, David L**. *Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. 226 pp. ($35.00 cloth, $14.95 paper).

The Khong and Anderson volumes both take the United States' decision making regarding Vietnam as their subject matter, but beyond that the volumes are very different. Khong endeavors to show how the decisions of 1965 were arrived at and therefore focuses on Lyndon B. Johnson's administration. The Anderson volume paints with a much broader brush and covers six presidents —starting with Truman and ending with Ford. In the final analysis, Khong is more successful at achieving his stated purpose than Anderson. The latter is an edited volume with contributions by seven different authors. This makes it more difficult to achieve coherence, but the book's lack of a well-developed theme appears to be its more important problem. Although the editor in the introduction refers to the presidential role in foreign policy decision making, the Anderson volume does not present a framework for the substantive chapters to follow. Khong, on the other hand, reserves an entire chapter to present the framework that guides his study. Although the conceptualization of his Analogical Explanation (AE) framework is problematic in certain aspects, his study presents an interesting and thought-provoking argument.

Khong's distinction between the public and private use of analogies is an interesting approach to the question of whether analogies are utilized only as justification or whether they do indeed play a role in the decision making process, but this distinction does not convincingly settle the question of the extent to which decision makers reason by analogy. The distinction allows Khong to sidestep the question of the extent to which decision makers in their *private* discussions use analogies in justifying or explaining their positions to each other rather than truly using them in decision making.

However, Khong is rather persuasive in his argument that the Korean analogy does a better job of explaining the Vietnam decisions of 1965 than the other alternatives he discusses. The crucial issue Khong does not touch on very much is why this analogy has more explanatory power than others. Almost as an aside, Khong mentions that the national self-image of American leaders prevented them from taking the Dien Bien Phu analogy advanced by Ball more seriously (149). This points at one possible answer as to why

some analogies are more palatable to groups of leaders than others: their image of what their state is like defines the set of analogies they will regard as applicable to situations they face. Certainly, as utilized in the book, this is far from a theoretical framework that helps explain why certain analogies come to be referenced so often in particular decision making situations. Nevertheless, the power of such national self-images in predisposing decision makers to accept certain analogies and reject others should not be underestimated.

An aspect of Khong's framework that is difficult to accept is his equation of analogies and the schema concept from the psychological literature. A schema is an abstract concept, while an analogy is more readily interpreted as a separate instance of the same abstraction—e.g., Korea and Vietnam both may be perceived as instances of communist aggression. In other words, to equate analogies and schemas is a misinterpretation of the concept to the extent that it leaves out a step in how certain situations come to be understood as being alike in some way. Furthermore, the author repeatedly refers to analogies as if they *process* information. Reference to another instance of a situation that one judges to be similar to the one at hand may help resolve ambiguities in the current situation, but this is not equivalent to processing information.

The Anderson volume is a collection of essays that, according to its editor, is held together by the assumption that each president placed his personal stamp on the Vietnam issue. This assumption is not worked into a framework with a set of questions that are addressed in the subsequent chapters. The result is a collection of chapters that is not very focused on the presidential role in decision making regarding this particular issue. Instead, the book reads more as a general history of America's involvement in Vietnam than as an examination of the role of subsequent presidents with regard to this conflict. To be sure, there are assertions regarding the attitudes and involvements of the various presidents, but these are too few and far between to warrant the claim that this book is about the role of the subsequent post World War II presidents in decisions regarding Vietnam.

In addition, claims are made that are not sufficiently supported. For instance, McMahon claims that the roots of the Vietnam conflict can be found in the Truman administration's desire to contain communism, together with a linkage of Indochina with the postwar recovery of Western Europe and Japan. However, that leaves unexplained why the continued French presence in Indochina or Vietnam was desirable, while the Dutch presence in Indonesia was not. The leaders of both these European states perceived their economic recovery to be linked to retaining power over their colonies.

Why did the United States accept this perception in one case and challenge it in the other? McMahon's failure to deal with this issue considerably weakens his argument.

Taylor's chapter tries to show that Johnson was paternalist at best and racist at worst. Her final sentence asserts that Johnson "did not call the Vietnamese gooks and slopes to their faces, but one can only speculate that he shared much of the mind-set of those who did" (126). The reader is left with the impression that this statement was a foregone conclusion, not one earned by a careful examination of statements made, either publicly or privately, by the subject of investigation. She furthermore claims that the decision makers surrounding Johnson focused on European analogies in their decision making (119). Khong focuses on this same time period and comes to the conclusion that the Korean analogy was most frequently referenced, providing figures to support this (60-61).

Anderson concludes the volume with the statement that the "Vietnam War was part of the rise and decline, but not fall, of executive power in foreign affairs" (211). While presidents may have become more aware of the need to rally public opinion to their cause, and while there may be a greater degree of congressional oversight, whether executive power in foreign affairs has declined remains very much open to debate.

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**Hayes, Michael T**. *Incrementalism and Public Policy*. New York: Longman, 1992. 222 pp. ($16.00 paper).

In the preface, the author suggests that this book might just as well be titled, "Great Theories of American Politics." The book is really about how public policy is made by American government, and how incrementalism is not only a policy making theory, but is also a theory that explains the American political process.

The author writes from the perspective of the policy process model best advanced by Charles O. Jones. Chapter one discusses the process model and explains how incrementalism can explain policy change within the policy process, laying a foundation for the rest of the book. After this first chapter,

the first part of the book, composed of chapters two through eight, discusses the sources of incrementalism.

Charles Lindblom's theory of disjointed incrementalism is presented in chapter two and illustrates how the need for bargaining and compromise among differing interests prohibits major policy change. Another major source of incrementalism is the very structure of American constitutional government, and chapter three presents an excellent discussion of the structural determinants of incrementalism. The concept of federalism is reviewed, with attention paid to the problem of factions identified by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. In this context, the author discusses the concepts of multiple veto points and concurrent majorities, which are so important to an understanding of the American political process. How policy evolves from group struggle is next discussed, and chapter four examines the influence of corporate power on agenda setting and policy change.

Hayes next critiques a common solution to incrementalism: the call for strengthening the political party system. He reviews the proposed results of a stronger party system: clearer agendas; improved policy formation and implementation; and, of course, significant policy change. Hayes then examines the strengthened party argument in light of inherent sources of incrementalism: the Constitution, and the pluralist anti-majoritarian system of government that it supports. He concludes that it would be more realistic to improve policy coherence by ending the divided party control of Congress and the White House, which amounts to a type of coalition government. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act is next presented as a case study of the factors leading to incremental change.

In the second part of the book, the author addresses policy change. Hayes includes a chapter on non-incremental policy making, and illustrates its obstacles with a case study of welfare policy reform.

The final chapter presents the constraints and possibilities of policy change, and is weak: the chapter at which the author should have ended is chapter 8, which makes numerous generalizations about policy making and American government. Hayes probably feels compelled to suggest how policy making can be improved by going beyond incrementalism. This is why the concluding chapter is so weak: there are few possibilities of anything but incremental change, as the constraints on anything more than incrementalism are considerable. Again, the strongest chapter generalizes about incrementalism, which is an accurate description of policy making in the U.S.

I already have used this text in a graduate-level class, and have found it to provide an excellent orientation to incrementalism, the most descriptive theory of policy making. The author's writing style is sophisticated, yet understandable for students: it is a very well written book, and much work

and care obviously went into its preparation. This text has my strong recommendation for use in both undergraduate and graduate policy classes.

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*Political Theory*

**Frohnen, Bruce**. *Virtue and the Promise of Conservatism: The Legacy of Burke and Tocqueville*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. 251 pp. ($25.00 cloth).

A timely and thoughtful examination of conservative thought, *Virtue and the Promise of Conservatism* is an ambitious attempt to meld two sizable objectives: it endeavors to find a principled, conservative, definition of virtue, and it challenges conservatives to form a defense of a conservative view of the good life based on virtue. As if such objectives were not a tall enough order, Frohnen also examines many conservative thinkers, including not only Burke and Tocqueville but also Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, Michael Oakeshott, Irving Kristol, Russell Kirk, and Michael Novak.

Central to his purpose is Frohnen's conversation that, while conservatives attack liberalism, conservatives have not developed a single, clear alternative of their own. He turns to the two most well known critics of modernity who have a philosophic bent: Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin. He dismisses both for not being true conservatives, a critique that begs to be developed more fully. For example, the author does not deal with Strauss's interpretation of natural right or Strauss's accusation that Burke paved the way for modern historicism.

He continues by noting his central goal, "to describe the elements of the conservative good life and to examine attempts to find and defend this life of accepting virtue in contemporary Western society" (8). This leads him to two of the great thinkers on conservatism: Burke and Tocqueville. Burke is commonly associated with conservatism and Tocqueville is not. Yet, Frohnen makes a good argument for the consideration of Tocqueville as a conservative thinker.

The author focuses on Burke and Tocqueville in order "to show that the conservative good life has been expounded in coherent form and can (and should) be so expounded again" (9). Choosing these particular writers allowed him to make the broader point that the conservative good life

remained consistent when it was applied to different countries at different times. So, the conservative good life is tied to a vision of natural law as transcendent through all time, and the common universal standard is, paradoxically, the hostility toward universal theories. For Frohnen the problem is that universal philosophies (non-time-tested attempts to provide universal solutions) have led modern Western societies to embrace "egalitarian materialism": He believes that Western societies have lost any direction except the desire for material gain.

He next calls conservatism to action. The basis for the call is a return to the defense of virtue. But which virtue? Frohnen states that there are five virtues for conservatives: acceptingness, public service, independence, prudence, and local affection. He develops his understanding of these virtues by examining the writings of Burke and Tocqueville. Simplifying Frohnen's points: Acceptingness means that societies must accept that there are God-given limits to society. Public service means that we have a duty to give back something to our communities. Independence means that we must refocus society on the individual and then build society from there. Frohnen then redefines prudence. Conventional thought defines prudence as practical wisdom. Frohnen redefines it as the "moral virtue—entailing the (truly rational) determination of the requirements for moral action in the given circumstances" (40). Finally, Frohnen emphasizes local governments in what seems to be a call to redefine federalism—where local communities are the focus of greater society.

Oddly, instead of trying to find a modern politician who believed in Frohnen's view of the good life, he evaluates three writers who have little or no political experience but who do have some claim to conservative credentials as writers. He begins by analyzing Michael Oakeshott, who he believes is a conservative who tries to establish a conservative good life through myth but without God. For Frohnen this godlessness is problematic because it means that Oakeshott does not hold out the promise of a conservative good life based on all the virtues but only a partial good life based on local affection and independent action.

Frohnen's second case study involves Irving Kristol. For the author, Kristol's neo-conservatism is the most problematic of all the conservative thinkers he examines, because Kristol baselessly defends modern capitalism and ultimately accepts the welfare state while waiting for some future savior. The author's criticism of Kristol is muted when Frohnen partially redeems Kristol by bringing in Michael Novak. Frohnen's Novak is an example of a conservative writer on the right track, because his writings provide a moral argument for the goodness of capitalism: Novak is on the right path because he is trying to find the good life in a society as it currently exists.

Therefore, one of Frohnen's major tenants for conservatives is that one begins with the existing society, not with some speculative untried theory.

Frohnen's last case is Russell Kirk. Kirk is the most traditional of the three modern writers and Frohnen finds him the closest to the virtues he revealed in Burke and Tocqueville. Yet, Kirk is more concerned with the "reinvigoration of the institutions and beliefs necessary for virtuous acceptance of and service to our given way of life" (197) instead of developing a conservative view of the good life.

This book is an important attempt to define a principled basis for conservatism. Because that attempt is interesting, this book is worth the reader's time. The problems are mainly a result of the dual intents of trying to find a principled basis for conservatism and trying to challenge conservatives to action, tasks that are too ambitious for one relatively short work. Yet, the principles developed from Burke and Tocqueville are worth considering for anyone interested in conservatism or for anyone seeking broader solutions to the problems of our times.

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**Gebhardt, Jurgen**. *Americanism: Revolutionary Order of Societal Self-Interpretation in the American Republic*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993. 359 pp. ($45.00 cloth).

Ruth Hein's translation of Gebhardt's original German work offers English audiences an excellent book describing the central values of American political thought as articulated during the founding and adapted throughout American history. The book's thesis is that the values labeled Americanism can be located during the founding era of American history. However, Gebhardt offers several critical nuances to this, distinguishing his work from either Pocock or other scholars. First, Gebhardt argues that critical to the American founding is its self-understanding character (ix-x, 224). The Founders, especially John Adams, were self-aware of their creation of a sense of order for a new nation and this self-awareness was crucial to defining values and assumptions about the American political world.

Though Pocock makes similar arguments about the founders' self-understanding of America's role within political time and space, Gebhardt looks not to republican ideology but to Puritan religious values. What

Gebhardt calls a Puritan cosmology was the basis of Americanism and the founders' self-understanding of their project. This Puritan cosmology, best articulated and seen in John Adam's *Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America*, linked the individual, the polity, and the world. It did that by one's calling that defined a particular place for each person in the world, and by indicating how private virtues would be manifested in the creation of public virtues and a republic. Finally, the Puritan cosmology situated the founding and creation of a particular country within a specific plan or divine logos.

For Gebhardt, New England Puritanism defined an American political ideology and order, connecting man, God, and society to a set of values that would become Americanism. These values self-reflectively drew the personal character of the founders together with the fate of the nation to create a set of unifying values or common life that would unite Americans.

What or where exactly does Americanism as a unique set of values emerge out of the Founding? Gebhardt's book is at its best in arguing two crucial claims. First, he rejects assertions that Americanism is either a set of beliefs or a political culture in the Pye and Verba mode. In drawing upon Alfred Schultz and Eric Voegelin, among others, the founding is viewed as a civil theology that "fused the cult of the hero and monumental history, Christian spirituality, philosophical and political doctrines of the Enlightenment with concrete behavior patterns, institutional arrangements and social practices into a whole encompassing all of man's existence in society and history" (206). Americanism is not simply a set of political or religious values, but draws upon both and upon the character of the founders, establishing a set of values and institutions that would be the basis of a set of common experiences and shared values that would define the American experience.

Hence, and this is the second exciting point made here, the self-understanding of the founders in creating this fusion was a constitutive process to creating Americanism (221). The founders consciously created Americanism and understood their role in this process and how it would become important to establishing a set of instances, symbols, and practices that would be the basis for future references in American history.

Beyond defining Americanism, the rest of the book offers an appraisal of how the founding, the founders, and Americanism would subsequently be viewed and interpreted in American history and thought. The Civil War is described as a breakdown in the cosmic order that held America together, necessitating Lincoln to rethink a new order or sense of what Americanism would mean. Similarly, Gebhardt describes the Progressive and Post World War II eras as facing similar crises where our civil theology and the status

of the founders came into conflict with other institutional concerns including the rise of big business and an internationalist role for the United States. Throughout these crises, a lost America, searching for its identity or way, has sought to return to the myth of the founders and the founding values as a way to relocate God, truth, and the core values that define Americanism.

There is much to praise and little to criticize in this rich book. The conceptual analysis of the founding, Americanism, and American political thought as bridging beliefs and institutional practices surely is richer than other conceptional claims that approach the subject from an either/or perspective. Similarly, offering an interpretation of Americanism from this perspective as well as from that of German scholarship is refreshing. As far as criticisms, Gebhardt overstates the importance of John Adams and ignores the role of liberal ideas, the Hartz thesis, and the Declaration of Independence in his discussion of Americanism. These are minor quibbles and do not distract from a book sure to contribute to continuing investigations into American political thought.

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**Lutz, Donald S**. *A Preface to American Political Theory*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992. 188 pp. ($27.50 cloth, $12.95 paper).

Professor Lutz presents the political science "profession" with a highly idealistic challenge. In his *Preface to American Political Theory* he offers the argument that it is not only desirable but imperative that we "rescue" American political theory from its status as a sub-field of political theory, in order to elevate our "profession" into a full blown, dignified and unified **discipline**. He sees the importance of developing a rigorous, structured, logical study of the particular and peculiar American political experience as the key to unifying the intellectual and methodological rivalries and differences within academic departments and, indeed, the profession itself. By addressing American political theory in all its philosophical aspects, we may have the means to reconcile the empiricist, the behaviouralist, the historian as they work together to recognize the value of normative structures in order to guide the active body politic toward *eudaemonia* or at least an approximation of the "common good."

To say the least, this is an ambitious work, written for the cognoscenti. Although Lutz states that he would avoid elitism in favor of an appeal to the "broader active political class," encompassing "anyone who is interested in

pursuing the study of American political theory," including academics, students, even "amateurs" or "anyone outside the academy," this is definitely a book for dedicated insiders of academe. This is an intense work, not easily accessible, but certainly worth the intellectual effort. The problem may lie in the fact that Professor Lutz is "preaching to the choir," and only those who are already converted will have the interest and tenacity to follow his argument.

The principle difficulty with the work is the composite structure of the book itself. Divided into six chapters, with an appendix, it begins with a clear call to action to aid the "birthing" of a viable discipline of American political theory. The arguments here are strong, and one is certainly motivated to sign on as scrub nurse, if not the delivering midwife. But we soon find that this will be a long labour. Carefully, Lutz takes us through the various meanings implicit in each word of the phrase—*American*, *Political*, and *Theory*. This is a provocative and rewarding analysis, though it tends to become tedious from time to time.

The second through the fifth chapters address (variously) political texts, a complete text on the Bill of Rights, use of American history in political theory, and intellectual history and the American founding. Each of these chapters is interesting in its own right, but, in the aggregate they tend to divert attention from the principle message of the work. The final chapter, somewhat pedantically titled "Prolegomenon," has the most relevant relationship to the stated end of presenting "an introduction to the mental discipline required of students of American political theory who will set the standards for inquiry in the future."

The theorist is by nature an existentialist, always becoming, never quite there. The discomfort of uncertainty and ambiguity may be lessened by good old fashioned American pragmatism. It is in this mode that I approached this work, asking what good will it do, who will read and benefit from this? I believe that Prof. Lutz gives those of us who have a great affection for and dedication to his cause much to ponder and to discuss, but I fear that it will be only among ourselves. I cannot visualize one of my empiricist colleagues who "does it by the numbers" having the patience to follow Lutz's argument through to the end. I should like to be wrong, and hope to see this work reviewed by another who comes from the other side of the department.

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**McCartney, John T**. *Black Power Ideologies: An Essay in African-American Political Thought*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992. 264 pp. ($39.95 cloth).

Calls for "Black Power" in the 1960s excited and energized many Blacks, and dismayed, confused or scared many Whites. The term has been and continues to be more often used than understood. Those who utter it often fail to articulate what they mean; those who hear it often infer a meaning, whether or not that definition has any relation to what the user intends. Furthermore, an unfortunate number of both users and listeners saw the ideology as something totally new. John McCartney, an assistant professor of political science at Lafayette College, presents an effort to rectify these situations.

The bulk of this volume is devoted to detailing black political thought from the eighteenth century through the 1960s. Descriptions of the (1) profile, (2) ideology, and (3) tactics of various schools of thought are provided in separate chapters on the (1) eighteenth and nineteenth century colonization movement, (2) abolitionist movement, (3) accommodationists, (4) Garvey Movement, and (5) moralists. Even readers with only a skeletal knowledge of "Black Power" will immediately recognize parallels between the ideas espoused in these earlier eras and those of the 1960s.

In the rest of the volume McCartney attempts to define "black power," not by summary definition, but by identifying common characteristics of its various manifestations. Rejecting Charles Hamilton's four-part typology of "black powerites," McCartney proffers a three-part categorization which he alleges is more precise and more useful in analyzing variance within the black power movement. He lumps Hamilton's "political bargainer," "moral crusader," and "alienated reformer" under an umbrella he labels "Pluralist." Hamilton's "alienated revolutionary" category is then subdivided into "Separatists" and "Counter Communalists," depending on the proposed solution to the nation's racial problems. Those in the Separatist camp "see permanent black-white separation as the best way" to deal with racial problems. "Counter Communalists, exemplified by the Black Panthers, seek to replace the values, interests, institutions, and beliefs of the present system with different ones" (118-119). Subsequent chapters are devoted to each of the categories and include considerations of the tactics implicit in each approach and of how each approach compares with the others.

McCartney's method deserves comment because it determines what the volume is and is not. Most important, each ideology is characterized by focusing on the thoughts of one person. McCartney argues in the "Preface" that such an approach enlivens and clarifies the discussion. While this

biographical methodology is certainly defensible, it changes the unit of analysis from the concept to the individual, and people can always (and will) quibble about one's choice of a representative of a particular school of thought. Thus, this volume is more accurately characterized and makes its contribution as a history of political ideas rather than as a work of political theory.

The work is weakest where McCartney proposes his alternative to Hamilton's schema. McCartney's critique of Hamilton's categorization is overdrawn, and his initial presentation of his groupings is underdeveloped. All of this is attempted in the space of nine pages (111-119), at the end of which it is *not* "clear that the new terms . . . are not only more precise than Hamilton's categories, but they are excellent tools with which to explore the variety and depth of the Black Power Movement as a whole." The subsequent chapters help bolster the case for the utility of McCartney's schema, but the overall effort would have been improved if more time, care, and space had been devoted to this part of the text.

In sum, McCartney has produced a valuable volume. It is important because the lack of a sense of history causes people to waste time rehashing what are really old arguments, thus impoverishing current policy debates. McCartney clearly outlines connections between the ideas of the 1960s and those of earlier eras, and adds perspective to our understanding of the variety of black political ideas. This volume should be a useful source of materials to integrate into courses in black politics, history, or political thought.

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**Phelps, Glenn A.** *George Washington and American Constitutionalism*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. 272 pp. ($27.50 cloth).

The importance of this interesting book stems from its examination and elevation of a key participant in the formation of the American constitutional order. Without detailing the socioeconomic (see Charles Beard and Jackson Turner Main) and republican idealistic (See Bernard Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood) scholarly explanations of American constitutionalism, Phelps' book discloses the personification of both in the public career of George Washington. This does not imply that Washington typifies all of the founders, which includes an eclectic collection of Federalists, Antifederalists, and others at

the national and state conventions who defy partisan classification. Nevertheless, he exemplifies those prevailing nationalistic Federalists who struggled with the practical problem of establishing a viable commercial empire within the context of an animated federal system.

As delineated by Phelps, Washington's public career has several dimensions with the most significant being (1) Washington the general, (2) Washington the land speculator, (3) Washington the framer, and (4) Washington the President.

1. Washington's tenure as commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces had the most profound impact on the development of his nationalism. The pitfalls of commanding a national force within the context of a confederation of states are well known. They include an irregular command structure, the lack of revenue, inadequate war *materiel*, etc. Washington's responsibilities as general for eight and one half years moved the Virginian solidly into the theoretical camp of nationalism. Lessons learned from his attempts to field the most effective fighting force against the British made him a nationalist vis-a-vis the states. For example, his attempts to circumvent the problematical confederal command structure of the Continental Army increasingly made administrative centralization his *modus operandi*.

2. The influences of Washington's land speculation, support for nationally funded internal improvements, and nationalism upon his "constitutionalism" are ripe for analysis. Unfortunately, Phelps does not conclusively analyze these influences. Nevertheless, the evidence he presents makes plausible the opinion that Washington and his co-Federalists were sponsoring phase one of what later became known as Henry Clay's American system. Washington rationalized his support for nationally funded internal improvements on strategic grounds, maintaining that such development was in the national interest. He maintained that commercially tying frontier settlers to the commercial centers in Virginia and New York was preferable to them being drawn into the economic grids of France, Spain, and especially Britain: "Unless a central government with more expansive powers to regulate national commerce emerged Britain would probably regain by the purse what it has surrendered on the battlefield—American dependence" (78). Such public-spirited disclaimers notwithstanding, Phelps indicates that Washington had a personal stake in the nationally funded development of western lands. Left begging is the important question regarding the influence of Washington's personal financial interests on his support for nationalism. This is important because additional light could have been shed on the economic interpretations of American constitutional development. (Even if the evidence were found to be inconclusive, and stated as such, Washington's stature as a founder would have been enhanced).

3. Significantly, Phelps restores Washington as an influential framer. Washington's contributions were threefold. First, he was the undisputed leading national figure. As presiding officer he provided the Philadelphia Convention with legitimacy and a cohesion that no other American could have provided, especially by portraying the Convention "as a genuine legacy of the Revolution" (99). Second, he was a voting member of the Virginia delegation. His voting preferences were undoubtedly known to other delegates thereby occasionally swaying their votes to his side by the mere weight of his heroic status. And third, he was actively involved in securing ratification, particularly in a closely divided Virginia.

4. Washington the president structured the executive branch according to "his long-held notions of administrative centralism" (146). The constitutional arrangements between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches were vague enough for Washington to institutionalize certain practices of his presidency. In his own words, "Many things which appear of little importance in themselves and in the beginning, may have great and durable consequences from their having been established at the commencement of a new General government" (122). Some of those "many things" include the commitment to constitutionalism and the rule of law, national supremacy, and an institutionally strong presidency. But one significant aspiration Washington had for the nation went unfulfilled. According to Phelps, due to his unique personal experiences (revolutionary general, national hero, and first president), Washington became "engaged in a politics of nostalgia, seeking in many respects unsuccessfully, to hold back the tide of liberal republicanism in favor of a classical vision of politics that was already on the wane" (157).

Washington's disdain for the states, on the grounds that they are factious and irredeemably partisan, was exacerbated by his "quixotic view" that classical republicanism could only survive at the national level (186). Failing to recognize his own federalist agenda as factious, Washington equated Federalist policy objectives with national interests to such an extent that the Jeffersonians viewed Washington and Hamilton as key players in a monocratic conspiracy that was taking hold of the presidency. By inciting and tolerating the political combat that ensued between the Federalist and Jeffersonians, one of Washington's most significant contributions to American constitutionalism was (perhaps unknowingly) the nurturing of the development of a symbiotic relationship between the republican constitutional order and partisan politics, a relationship that subsequently coalesced into the American two party system.

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