

Book Reviews

Conrad P. Waligorski, Editor

American Politics

Baker, Richard A. and Roger H. Davidson. *First Among Equals, Outstanding Senate Leaders of the Twentieth Century.* Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991. 317 pp. (\$32.95 cloth, \$23.95 paper).

This book features biographical sketches of nine prominent majority or minority leaders of the United States Senate in the twentieth century. The profiles of five Democrats and four Republicans were commissioned as part of the Congressional Leadership Research Project of the Dirksen Congressional Center, Pekin, Illinois. Each chapter, written by either a journalist, political scientist, or historian, focuses on one leader. But the goal was not to present a definitive analysis of each man. Instead, the authors sought to assess each Senator in "the context of the political environment and Senate institutional setting of his era, his personal qualities, performance in office, contributions to the Senate, and place in the nation's history" (p. 5).

The Senate leaders and their chapter's authors are: John Worth Kern, by Walter Oleszek; Henry Cabot Lodge, by William C. Widenor; Joseph Taylor Robinson, by Donald C. Bacon; Charles L. McNary, by Seven Neal; Alben W. Barkley, by Donald A. Ritchie; Robert A. Taft, by Robert W. Merry; Lyndon B. Johnson, by Howard E. Shuman; Everett M. Dirksen, by Burdett Loomis, and Mike Mansfield, by Ross K. Baker. Other leaders were excluded because they either lacked "tenure or distinction" or "served too recently to fall within the scope" of the work" (p. 4).

Taken as a whole, the book provides readers with slices of the history of the evolution of Senate leadership throughout this century. Since each chapter was written from a similar framework of analysis, readers are allowed to trace changes and compare leaders throughout the years. An example of the best of what this book has to offer is Shuman's chapter on Johnson. This brief study provides a solid analysis of both Johnson's leadership and of the nature of the Senate in that era.

Hence, a most striking value of this book is the overall message it conveys to readers to consider the context of the times when assessing the importance, success, quality, etc., of individual Senate leaders. Each chapter thus treats the leader to an analysis immersed in the pressures, opportunities, and obstacles confronting each man during his time in the Senate. However, several of the chapters could be improved by strengthening their conclusions by providing a solid overview analyzing the leadership strengths/weaknesses of the senator. Unfortu-

nately, a few chapters tend to lean toward sacrificing analysis for simply chronicling the highlights of the member's career and ending rather abruptly with a brief account of the death of the senator. In addition, the book could have been strengthened with a concluding chapter reflecting on patterns of leadership issues identified in the preceding chapters. Nonetheless, the volume is an interesting contribution to the literature and is enjoyable to read.

In sum, this effort is a useful addition to the scholarship on Congressional leadership, which to date has been characterized more by empirical studies such as those by Barbara Sinclair or Randall Ripley. Moreover, the volume links to a current research trend toward examining Congress systematically from an historical perspective. Finally, the biographical case study approach of this book is compatible with a current series of Senator volumes on individual members written by Richard Fenno.

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Black, Earl and Merle Black. *The Vital South*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. 366 pp. (\$29.95).

Since 1972, Republican presidential candidates have captured the entire southern electoral vote -- the only exception being the Carter election in 1976. The collapse of the old Democratic solid South and its replacement by an equally strong solid Republican South has put successful presidential elections almost out of reach for Democratic candidates. How and why this has occurred and how long it is likely to remain are questions that Merle and Earl Black attempt to answer in *The Vital South*.

From 1889 to 1944 with minor deviations in 1920 and 1928, the Democrats could count on a steadfast and loyal South in presidential elections. This is illustrated by a remark of Governor George Donaghey of Arkansas who attended the 1912 Democratic convention that nominated Woodrow Wilson. When asked at the convention how Arkansas would vote in the 1912 presidential election, he replied, "We've already voted." This loyalty to the Democratic party came at a price, and the price was no interference with southern racial policies. The informal understanding was broken in 1948, when the Democratic party first endorsed a civil rights bill. The endorsement was the opening wedge that finally delivered the South and half of the votes needed to win in the electoral college to the Republican party. Today, the South is the most Republican part of the country in presidential elections. With this southern advantage, the Republicans only need to win one-third of the electoral votes in the North to capture the White House.

According to the Blacks, factors that have contributed to this political sea change included the Republican identification with issues important to southerners such as defense, family values, patriotism, limited government, crime fighting,

and opposition to social change. Another factor was the loss of the southern veto over unacceptable Democratic presidential candidates. This veto at Democratic presidential conventions consisted at one time of the unit rule (all votes of a state are cast for one candidate), the requirement of a two-thirds vote at the convention to select the nominee, and state delegations consisting mostly of conservative white males. The southern veto was completely altered by abolishment of the unit rule and the two-thirds requirement. A final blow was the adoption of delegate selection rules in 1970 that required more women, minorities, and young people.

One of the most thought-provoking chapters in the book is entitled “The New Southern Electorate.” In this chapter, the Blacks divide the southern electorate in 1988 into four major voting groups. The largest group is called the core white Republicans. They are 44 percent of the Southern electorate and are very loyal to the Republican party which they consider to be the party of economic expansion and growth. The second group or bloc is designated the white swing voters. They are made up of conservative Democrats and moderate independents and constitute 18 percent of the southern electorate. Their orientation is basically conservative, although not as strong as that of the core white Republicans. A third group is labeled the core white Democrats. They are liberal to moderate Democrats and liberal independents who compose 24 percent of the southern electorate. The core white Democrats are not as committed as the core white Republicans, and at best, are a soft core of white loyalists to the Democratic party. The fourth group consists of southern blacks. They are 14 percent of the southern electorate and are as cohesive and faithful to the Democratic party as the core white Republicans are to the Republican party. Since core white Republicans are approximately equal to core white Democrats and blacks combined, only minimal additions from the white swing voters are necessary for the Republicans to win in presidential elections. Given the conservative outlook of the white swing voters, this is normally not difficult.

The one exception to this grim diagnosis for the Democrats was the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976. He put together a coalition of whites and blacks and carried every southern state except Virginia. Carter ran as an outsider, balanced skillfully conservative and liberal issues, and capitalized on his southern identity and Watergate. The Carter victory was atypical, however, and the authors think that if the Democrats are to avoid a long string of Republican triumphs stretching into the distant future, they need to rethink presidential strategy. For example, they might consider concentrating on some border southern states (Arkansas, Tennessee, Texas) where biracial coalitions are easier to build, and nominating a candidate, preferably a moderate southerner acceptable to the North, who would concentrate on domestic issues like education, health, and the environment. The Democrats also might examine the success of Democratic candidates in the South at the congressional and state levels to see what lessons can be learned. Even so, barring some economic catastrophe, “denying the Republicans a complete sweep of the South is probably the most realistic outcome that the Democrats can hope

for in the new future” (p. 362).

The Vital South is a stimulating work that can be used not only to explain voting behavior but also to conduct political campaigns. The authors make creative use of charts and graphs, have a sure grasp of the nuances of the South, and write so well that the general public will find this book as interesting as political scientists do. My only reservation is that I wish more time had been devoted to how Democrats still can create overwhelming majorities in the South at the congressional and state levels. This minor quibble should not detract from the fact the Blacks have written another classic of southern politics which everyone needs to read.

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Davis, Richard. *The Press and American Politics: The New Mediator*. New York: Longman (distributed by Addison-Wesley), 1992, 305 pp. (\$26.98 paper).

Growing recognition of the increasing significance of the mass media in American politics and public affairs makes the appearance of Richard Davis' book on the subject especially timely. Despite the importance of and mushrooming interest in the subject, there is relatively little serious, up-to-date, and broad-based work available.

Davis' book is broad-based and thus has both the virtues and limitations inherent in such an approach. The overall treatment is solid, covering the history and content of the media's role, plus some strong chapters on coverage of the three branches of government, public policy, and elections and campaigns. The powerful and controversial role of the media in the 1992 campaign already leaves the latter section somewhat outdated and limited, however.

Davis operates from the premise that “the American political system and the American press share a long history of interdependency” and goes further by referring to the political system's increasing dependence on the press,” a claim certainly borne out by this book. His chapters on the newsgathering and newsmaking processes -- with public figures angling for news coverage -- help make this case. He points out that relations with the press now account for significant portions of the time and efforts of newsmakers -- elected officials, bureaucrats, staff, and interest group representatives who regularly seek to influence news.

Although the book is sound in describing the press' role in the American political system, a chapter on “The News Media in Other Systems” is thin, somewhat outdated in view of major changes in the old Soviet bloc, and adds little to the book. The chapter on covering foreign affairs makes good points but is very limited. Treatment of the importance of technological developments for the media and politics is also sparse.

However, chapters such as those on the presidency, Congress, and the Supreme Court are at the heart of the book and are strengthened by a number of illustrative examples. Davis drives home the point that the president “is the star” and discusses presidential domination of the news. Indeed, he says, “The argument could legitimately be made that virtually all coverage of national government is primarily the drama surrounding the president” Perhaps he oversimplifies when he notes that presidential media coverage is generally positive “primarily because of White House efforts to manage the news,” but he makes telling points about White House involvement in “image-making.” At the same time, Davis correctly notes that while presidents often attempt to shape the policy agenda, they don’t inevitably succeed. No single actor dominates this process, and as Davis indicates, “The press can be particularly effective in placing issues on the agenda in combination with other forces, and the agenda-setting efforts of a single politician or a group . . . can be reinforced by press involvement”

In contrast to the media focus on the presidency, coverage of Congress is often uncomplimentary or negative and is declining in volume. This has made the Congress even more dependent on the press to communicate its activities and gain leverage in policy-making vis-a-vis the president. “As the president increasingly has become the star of national government news, Congress has become more dependent on the media to remain a significant visible force in the public eye.” Davis suggests some of the causes of the problems with Congressional coverage, including the institution’s fragmentation and lack of an ultimate spokesman.

While making these important points about the disparate coverage of the two institutions, Davis does not explicitly address the relationship between this imbalance and the growth in the importance of television, nor does he deal with the consequences of this preoccupation with the presidency for government generally.

On the other hand, Davis gives heavy emphasis to the weakening of political parties as an important factor in enhancing the role of the press. He laments the decline of party importance and favors reducing the political system’s dependence on the media. “If nomination for national office once again becomes the internal business of the major political parties,” writes Davis, “the press would not be a necessary intermediary in the organizing the campaign for voters.” He concludes that in this case candidates would no longer need to appeal to masses of citizens and voters “would not need to reply on the media to make decisions about candidates with whom they are largely unfamiliar.”

While there is much to fault in the current “permanent campaign” style of conducting our political business, including the packaging of candidates and the disproportionate role played by political consultants, Davis’ analysis and prescription seem neither convincing nor realistic. There is little likelihood of significantly diminishing the press’ mediating role, and, in any case, probably not much prospect of seeing the media give greater emphasis to substance over style and policy over personality. He states that the role of parties has fallen “by default”

to the press, which both overstates the case and neglects to give attention to the cause and effect factor resulting from, as well as contributing to, the growing importance of the media.

Although there are weaknesses in the analytical and prescriptive aspects of the book, the descriptive component, which is the nucleus of the volume, is generally strong, well-organized, and constitutes a worthy contribution on a subject of increasing consequence.

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Fenno, Richard F., Jr. *When Incumbency Fails: The Senate Career of Mark Andrews*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1992. 309 pp. (\$29.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper).

In this era when incumbency is frequently a political liability rather than an asset -- as commonly perceived -- this book is especially appropriate. Fenno writes, not in response to the current political climate of anti-incumbency, but as part of the continuing expansion of his 1978 classic *Home Style: House Members in their Districts*. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company), which explores the connection, based on trust and accessibility, between representatives, their constituencies and the reelection process. In this study, Fenno developed and justified his research method of "participant observation," where research is conducted through the perspective of the member of Congress.

One of the numerous studies stemming from the original research conducted for *Home Style*, *When Incumbency Fails* examines "a puzzling case of outstanding political success followed by unexpected political failure. Political scientists know that incumbent members of Congress usually win reelection. This book is about one who did not" (p. ix). The book focuses on former Senator Mark Andrews, a Republican from North Dakota, who was elected to the Senate in 1980 and was defeated in the 1986 election. Before serving in the Senate, Andrews spent 17 years in the House of Representatives. When Andrews lost, Fenno hypothesized: "when an incumbent fails to win reelection, it probably means that something worth looking at has happened between elections" (p. 3). Consequently, Fenno examines this six-years period of Mark Andrews' career to determine what that something was. By tracing the relationship Andrews had with his constituency while in the House of Representatives and comparing it with the relationship he had while a senator, Fenno generated hypotheses to explain this deviation from the norm of incumbency.

After an impressive and thorough explanation of numerous factors impacting these relationships, Fenno concludes there were several elements contributing to Andrews' defeat. The first was political issues that undermined his relationship

with his constituency. Fenno demonstrates throughout the book that that relationship was a highly personal one based on commonalities, a sense of family and community, and a priority of North Dakota first and federal interests second. However, during his reelection campaign, Andrews generated a great deal of unfavorable publicity from: a) a lawsuit he and his wife filed, b) a water project he fought for and disagreed with local officials and the press over, and c) unsubstantiated rumors regarding campaign tactics. Fenno argues that the cumulative effect of these events was to threaten the close constituency relationship Andrews cultivated during his years in office.

Fenno also finds that Andrews' more traditional governing style became outmoded and was subsequently replaced by the more individualistic styles of later challengers. Fenno states that Andrews essentially maintained his governing style from the House of Representatives which "emphasized the maximization of his influence inside the legislature in order to serve his constituents at home" (p. 119), a focus on pork. However, while Andrews had a reputation in Washington of bringing the pork home, it was never clearly communicated in North Dakota. Fenno argues that this was due to the low priority that Andrews' staff placed on press releases. When new candidates emerged in North Dakota, they had governing and campaigning styles that clashed with Andrews, and offered the constituency an alternative in governing approaches -- although the differences in these approaches are not clearly articulated by the author. This new approach emphasized a focus on publicity and visuals, while Andrews emphasized legislative skill and pork. The former animated the voters, but Fenno never discusses why.

Fenno concludes that if Andrews had been running for reelection to the House instead of the Senate, he would have been reelected, despite the specific contested issues. His credibility would have remained higher; his governing style would not have come under serious challenge locally; and he would not have had time to get out of touch to the degree that he had (p. 295). This argument warranted further explanation and support.

While Fenno details the great distance Andrews placed between himself and the Republican party during the popular Reagan years, he does not believe this was a major factor in Andrews' loss despite the use of this issue by the challenger.

As always, Fenno provides a detailed and fascinating look at the relationship and daily operation of the campaigning and legislative processes. While this methodology of participant-observer has some basic limitations, Fenno is clearly aware of them. This research will likely inspire replication that will examine other anomalies of the incumbency rule -- and therein lies its primary value. When Fenno's hypotheses are tested against the experience of other Senators the true contribution of this research will be realized. While this book is interesting, its ability to generalize to other constituencies and campaigns is limited; therefore *When Incumbency Fails* remains an examination of a microcosm of American politics.

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Hargrove, Erwin C. and John C. Glidewell (eds). *Impossible Jobs in Public Management*. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1990. 213 pp. (\$29.95 cloth, \$14.95 paper).

Hargrove and Glidewell, both of the Institute for Public Policy Studies at Vanderbilt University, offer an interesting and original construct that challenges much of the existing literature in public management. The University Press of Kansas should receive high marks for the sponsorship of this volume under their Studies in Government and Public Policy Series. The format of this work is also a departure from the norm for most edited texts encountered in the scholarly literature due to the quality of the case studies contained therein and the general discussion of the "impossible jobs" thesis by the editors in the first three chapters of the manuscript.

The central thesis of the work revolves around the notion that some jobs in the public sector are impossible. Commissioners, as these managers are titled in the volume, face severe challenges at almost every juncture, particularly with respect to: meeting the goals and expectations of the public; staying within the legislated guidelines of the general assembly, and the regulations of the bureaucracy; fulfilling the "myth" of office which they hold; and providing adequate services to their clients while facing limitations of all resources, human, or nonhuman.

Invigorating Case Studies

Numerous positions in the public sector are defined as impossible, or nearly so, by the contributors to this work, those being: a corrections commissioner, chief of police for major cities, a mental health commissioner, an executive of a social welfare agency, a public health executive and a special master of a corrections facility. The case studies are provocative and timely, particularly the case presented by Mark H. Moore concerning the management of large, urban police departments where he highlights the professionalism of Darryl Gates as Chief of Police for the City of Los Angeles.

Moore details the outstanding job done by Gates in the face of ongoing financial cutbacks due to the passage of Proposition 13 in the state of California. In spite of Gates considerable administrative ability, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has drawn nationwide criticism for the very public and brutal assault of a motorist by several members of the LAPD which was captured on videotape and broadcast across the country in 1991. One incident, though tragic and lamentable, has called into question the competency of Gates and the entire department. Moore's prophetic case study exemplifies the editor's contention that decades of superlative effort are obliterated by a single, thoughtless act.

Many of the other case studies offer similar prophecies of pending disaster due to such uncontrollable factors as prison overcrowding; redefined social services

goals; federal and state budget cuts; public health epidemics, such as the AIDS virus; and cost inflation in a declining economy. Overall, the case studies provide significant insights into the functioning of administrative offices in high risk public service jobs. Beyond merely describing the difficulties encountered in these positions, the case studies depict various coping strategies and innovative tactics which aid the officeholders in overcoming the aforementioned challenges.

Miller and Iscoe, in their study of state mental health commissioners, describe several coping strategies which may extend the careers of some mental health managers: having a sense of humor, building internal and external constituencies, practicing participatory management techniques, being a creative opportunist, enhancing leadership skills and realizing that there are jobs outside this profession. The job prospects for ex-mental health commissioners appear to be substantially better than their peers who hold similar jobs in other fields.

Overview

Edited volumes, as a rule, are a mixed bag of materials that do not fit harmoniously into an all encompassing theme. This book did not fall into that trap; instead, this work fits together in a nice mosaic of interdependent parts. This text has a substantive theoretical underpinning with numerous descriptive and supportive case studies highlighting the thesis of the editors. The various contributors to this volume offer clear and consistent arguments in support of the “impossible jobs” concept without jeopardizing the quality of the case study methodology or the integrity of the authors.

Charles Goodsell’s *In Defense of Bureaucracy* makes many of the same or similar arguments. Goodsell describes the difficulty of many jobs in the public sector, stating that impossible demands are made on bureaucrats in this era of cutback management. Hargrove and Glidewell suggest that the impossibility of the positions described in the text is based upon the unreasonableness of the myths surrounding public demands regarding service delivery. The increasing demand for public services is growing at an exponential rate while Proposition 13- type tax revolts are draining public coffers. The editors restate Thompson and Gouldner’s “problems of the client thesis,” from an earlier era, which deserves further investigation.

Conclusion

As Richard Elmore suggests, the thesis of *Impossible Jobs* is controversial. The editors exhibit contradictions in the volume by suggesting numerous improvements that have been made by commissioners in each of the cases cited. Are these jobs impossible, or are the contributors to this work simply “building their own prisons” ideationally? Goodsell’s book describes the successes of public managers in spite of the overwhelming challenges they face on a routine basis. The

“problems of the client,” as well as the problems of the bureaucrat, are well known to the individuals who fill these impossible jobs. To paraphrase Truman, “if you can’t stand the heat. . .”

Hargrove and Glidewell’s book is a fascinating contribution to a scholarly literature which is decidedly lacking on this topic. This volume is recommended for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses and libraries. A *must* read for students of public management.

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Hinckley, Ronald. *People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security.* New York: Lexington Books, 1992. 157 pp. (\$22.95).

This is a refreshingly concise and neatly arranged analysis of American public opinion on national security and its relationship with policymaking. In Part I the author pinpoints some common myths about security, delineates relevant problems of polling, and addresses a number of conceptual issues. It is in this last area that Hinckley is quite impressive, neatly cutting through the debates about public rationality and providing the reader with an accessible and understandable overview of these arguments. He also analyzes the main groups which make up the national security issue public.

In Part II many salient polls are reviewed and grouped into sections on attitudes about 1) the Soviet Union, 2) arms control and SDI, 3) Central America, 4) terrorism, and 5) the Middle East.

There are two main problems with this book. The first is relatively innocuous but nonetheless disquieting: the way media are treated throughout the text. The other problem is related to the first but more substantive: Hinckley’s conclusions in Part III about the fundamental nature of the public’s security opinions and their impact on policymaking. These problems arise from Hinckley’s discussion and can be catalysts for stimulating thought, yet they remain vexing.

I do not understand the manner in which the author brings media into the mass attitude/elite policy equation. Sometimes the media appear as convenient scapegoats, almost as loose cannons which distort an otherwise orderly relationship between opinion and policy (pp. 62, 65, 80, 121-124, 133-134). At other points in the analysis the place, impact, and significance of media are indiscernible or jumbled (pp. 71, 100-102). Yet in other sections Hinckley does succinctly and objectively focus on how the public uses media to gratify wants (p. 7) and on the agenda-setting function of media (p. 92).

It certainly is true that such a multifaceted element as media can have a difficult impact in different situations. But this means only that its influence is

conditional, not that its effects are uncontrollable, negative, or unknown.

There are basically two kinds of people who attend to television news, the form of media most often mentioned in this book. One type, the majority, uses few other forms of media (does not read papers carefully), has little knowledge and interest in most world affairs, and attends to the news to be entertained (by happy, personable reporters or stimulating visuals) and uses TV news to provide themselves with a minimal sense of keeping abreast with events. These people can be swayed rather easily because they previously knew little or nothing about the names and places mentioned on the news. There is no deep cognitive structure supporting their opinions. So any consequent opinion change is short term and ephemeral. The other type, the minority, are much more well informed and use TV news to supplement their knowledge and to update their attitude base with current information. They are selective in their attention and process the news further through discussion. Their attitudes (more developed and enduring than opinions) are difficult to change. In the book, a summarization of these limited and conditional mass media effects would have been helpful.

The knowledgeable reader may note a gap between the data and Part III, the conclusions. I did. Simply put, the conclusions clashed with my sense of public opinion. America as portrayed in *People, Polls, and Policymakers* is an appealing place; its citizens are rather well informed about national security and foreign affairs, and have fairly definite opinions regarding a wide array of important international matters. Americans are connected to the rest of the world, and even isolationists have pretty clear ideas about the global role of the United States. Not only is the entire public quite rational, but it also cares about these issues. I would love this to be the case. Unfortunately, it is not.

What most Americans do care about is closer to home, namely the domestic economy. Hinckley chooses a narrow interpretation of national security which does not include the economy. This is surprising since our prime security threat, the USSR, has virtually ceased to exist due to a deteriorating economy. What could be more threatening to a nation's existence than lack of economic viability?

Similarly, I also wish that policymakers were guided, at times constrained and at times emboldened, by a rational, caring, public's opinion. I agree with Ronald Hinckley that better communication among the public, pollsters and policymakers can make a positive contribution to democracy. But Hinckley implies that pollsters may serve as a clarifying and useful link between the public and policy. I do not see an additional expert link in the chain as bridging elite/mass differences.

Recently, in speaking to European researchers of mass, post-modern opinions, I tried to contrast unstable, fleeting, opinion change with long term attitude change. As soon as I had described "lightweight," short term change, my colleagues said I was accurately depicting post-modern public opinion! Such may be the case, but this does not transform passing fancies into either core values, attitudinal bases, or even guiding opinions. If the public has no knowledge or opinion of a country and its officials, and then suddenly holds an opinion when provided with

information and names, what is the value of such opinions? Certainly not as a safeguard preventing World War III. We need to accept that the public does not think like elites, rather than redefine rationality until the public meets minimal requirements.

Overall, this is a focused and largely unbiased analysis of American public opinion on national security and its relationship with policymaking. The first two parts (the majority of the book) make this work one which may well be considered for use in teaching courses on public opinion and public policy, and it would be a stimulating supplement in a national security class. Aside from the problems noted above (which the reader may not deem as important as I), the professional can and should find this book well written and refreshing, and a valuable collection of poll findings.

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Lewis-Beck, Michael and Tom W. Rice. *Forecasting Elections*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992. 163 pp. (\$18.95 paper).

Shafer, Byron E. *The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991. 187 pp. (\$35.00 cloth, \$12.95 paper).

These books illustrate two approaches to modern political analysis. Each asks different questions about what we know about American elections, i.e., what can we *explain*, and more importantly, how should one proceed in doing political analysis. The volume by Lewis-Beck and Rice is firmly grounded in mathematical modeling and indeed is a model of this paradigm. The volume edited by Byron Shafer takes an historical/theoretical perspective on the usefulness of the concept of electoral realignment. It is a model of scholarship and of the nature of theoretical discourse on political things.

Lewis-Beck and Rice have written a succinct and accessible book on predicting elections. They take readers through the flawed models of those who might be termed “enlightened amateurs” from the perspective of political scientists. The “Prognosticators, Politicos, Pundits and Pollsters” ultimately fail because the first three are essentially impressionistic while the last group, in spite of sophisticated survey techniques, fails to explain elections. They do not ask *why* voters do what they do. Lewis-Beck and Rice also make the customary arguments about the practical and statistical limits of modern commercial pollsters.

The authors then take readers through a simple model focusing on presidential popularity as an indicator of how voters feel about congeries of economic and other issues. Their strength here lies not in the unsurprising fact that popularity correlates strongly with electoral success but with their common-sensical grounding of the logic of this approach. In subsequent chapters, the authors develop this

logic through rudimentary regression analysis and a model that accounts for ten of eleven presidential contests with reasonable estimates for the actual vote share. Their final presidential regression model takes into account presidential popularity, party strength in the House, growth in GNP and candidate strength in the primaries. The same approach is then taken with House, Senate, gubernatorial and state legislative elections, and most interestingly for a work of this kind, with French Presidential and National Assembly elections. In each case their model is confirmed.

Did the authors succeed in explaining elections better than their alliterative list of rivals? If by explain one means did they successfully construct an empirically verifiable theory that accounts for past data, the answer is a resounding yes. To this point, the authors have a practical final chapter inviting readers to apply their work in cookbook fashion to 1992. While they acknowledge their prediction is tentative since the model requires mid-summer data, they venture to predict a best case scenario of a Bush landslide or a worse case Bush defeat in a pretty close election. To oversimplify quite a bit, if the economy is strong and the President is popular, the model predicts he will win. On the other hand, if one understands explanation to mean adding something new beyond refinement of their equations, the book is less than successful. By relying heavily on presidential approval, it provides numerical rigor but ultimately fails to deal with how events, perceptions, campaigns, the media, personalities, etc., contribute to shaping this key variable. In short, the model packs too much into too little. The answer to the why question posed to pollsters is numerically precise but ultimately unsatisfying. Still, this book is very well written and clear enough for undergraduates to follow and should be read by political scientists who need to keep abreast of developments within this approach to political analysis.

The book edited by Byron Shafer deals with one of the most important questions confronting students of American politics. Has there been dealignment or is the concept of critical elections and realignment first proposed by V.O. Key still viable? The present volume is the result of panel discussion on this topic at the APSA in 1989. Three chapters were part of this original symposium and two additional ones, along with a first rate "Reader's Guide" were added for this volume.

Joel Silbey's "Beyond Realignment and Realignment Theory: American Political Eras, 1789-1989" states the controversy bluntly. As his title suggests, Silbey argues that the record is richer than a simple critical election model allows. The cycles of change are not all about the same things, and the term "realignment" is simply not applicable to structurally diverse electoral eras. Everett Carl Ladd continues this attack on the concept "realignment" and extends his own work on this topic over the years in an essay "Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of 'Realignment' for Understanding Change in Contemporary American Politics." Like Silbey, Ladd argues that the term is too simple for a complex and subtle political reality. Ladd states that reliance on the concept of realignment by

political science has led it to ask outmoded and confining questions. Shafer, while admitting he is in the skeptics camp on this issue, attempts to move the debate forward by developing the notion of an “Electoral Order.” This is an attempt to make sense of the American regime by focusing on overlapping and cross-cutting majorities and divisions on welfare, foreign affairs and cultural themes. The institutional expression of these values in parties, Congress, the presidency and so on leads one to see a pattern, as diverse as it may be, beneath the current scene. Samuel T. McSeveney in his essay argues that the first three authors overstate their case. While the first three authors in various ways complain about the straitjacket effect of relying on a single concept like realignment, focusing on non-alignment or dealignment may have the same effect. Walter Dean Burnham’s contribution “Critical Realignment: Dead or Alive?” strenuously takes the second position. He argues that not only are Silbey, Ladd and Shafer wrong as to their assumptions and conclusions, but that there is a general theoretical failure to come to grips with grand conceptualizations and their imprecise fit with empirical reality. Harold Bass finishes this volume with an excellent, though brief, bibliographic essay on the realignment controversy along with a thirty-one page bibliography.

This collection merits consideration by all political scientists because of the quality of individual contributions and because it exemplifies academic debate about basic questions at its finest. Each essay is clearly written and argued forcibly without ideological or methodological rancor. Furthermore, this book is a rarity among anthologies. Essays reflect common themes and have been criticized before inclusion. The only criticism one can make is that one wishes that a brief restatement or commentary by each author could have been appended at the end.

In a sense, the question mark in the title says it all. The realignment controversy remains a controversy. This book both explains the issues and advances the discussion. It should be read by all political scientists who are interested in understanding contemporary American politics as well as the discipline itself.

Taken together, both books offer in their own ways cautionary tales about excessive reliance on single theoretical concepts or methodologies to adequately explain the political.

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Nelson, Albert J. *Emerging Influentials in State Legislatures: Women, Blacks, and Hispanics*. New York: Praeger, 1991. 157 pp. (\$39.95 cloth).

Nelson uses the concept of minority incorporation as “Getting elected, representing constituents in committees and party conferences, and staying in a legislative chamber long enough to fully develop one’s influence . . .” (p. 1). This work attempts to assess minority incorporation in 45 of 50 states, excluding Nebraska (unicameral legislature) and Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, and Mis-

Mississippi (each of these four states have 4 year terms).

The approach used in this study looks at the mean percent of Democratic and Republican females, Blacks, and Hispanics represented in chambers following elections in 1982, 1984, and 1986 as dependent variables. Nelson states that he “will assess the mean percent of turnover for each group in chambers, as well as indices of influence based on their party and committee chair positions” (p. 11). As indices of influence for each group, the author examines positions of leadership in the respective parties and chairs held within the structure of the committee system. Three policy variables are examined with regard to expenditures, in which the dependent variables or measures of incorporation become independent variables. Nelson uses a total of 24 other independent variables related to opportunity/incentive, party, and demographic factors.

With regard to minority representation, the author finds that women were fairly stable, though they tended to fare somewhat better among Democrats (7.8%) than Republicans (7.2%) in the latter part of the eighties. Both Black (4.3%) as well as Hispanic (2.0%) representation was also fairly stable in the eighties, with both groups showing slight increases over the early part of the decade. Representation for these groups is also revealed by region. One of the conclusions drawn is that religion may have the greatest implications for female, Black, and Hispanic representation. Because of issues such as abortion and an elusive biblical bias against women among Roman Catholics and Southerners, these factors may impact minority incorporation as well.

An examination of longitudinal data and analysis of minority representation within political parties is compared (by gender) with the following significant findings: 1) the rigidity of conservative Protestant and Roman Catholic voting groups within the Democratic Party, 2) the dislike conservative Protestants have for liberals and feminists, 3) males are more successful among conservative Protestants and Roman Catholics, and 4) the rate of employment among females in states has a positive relationship with political interest, efficacy, and participation.

Nelson addresses turnover by utilizing descriptive statistics in each chamber during each of the election years in question, comparing party and majority group turnover and the extent (percent) of each of these groups that changes with each election season. This is broken down by region (North and South). Utilizing regression analysis and independent variables, the author explains turnover among legislators. Differentiation must be made by party membership and the sundry groups which represent political parties in legislators. Nelson cautions that while such an analysis is fruitful, some amorphous findings may still remain involving correlation analyses utilizing state data bases.

In evaluating the influence of minority influence on policy effects, Nelson constructs an index of “potential influence” based upon various party and committee leadership positions as found in the Council of State Governments’ publications. The author notes that the most important factor associated with

minority incorporation, i.e., representation along with total chamber influence, is “whether it predicts policy per capita expenditures in education, social services, and mental health and hospitals” (p. 122). Among Democratic women, influence means increased expenditures in educational and social services programs while the opposite holds true for Republican females. The conclusion drawn here is that women can no longer be analyzed as one cohesive group with liberal proclivities. The same finding holds true for Blacks and Hispanics, though to a lesser extent.

By examining longitudinal data over a period of time related to the notion of incorporation among minority groups on the lower chamber, Nelson destroys some of the pejorative notions related to the political behavior and political attitudes of females, Blacks and Hispanics. Partisan preferences and values, along with political ambition, affect policy preferences. This work adds an important dimension to the literature on minority politics and the complex interplay of factors that influence the concept of incorporation among females, Blacks, and Hispanics. Surely, after reading this work, it is clear that while these groups are all minorities in the political arena, their concerns, priorities and level of incorporation are going to be affected by different, and sometimes conflicting, mechanisms and functions.

In a concluding note with reference to future directions for research, the author suggests other strategies and levels of analysis which may add to our epistemological concerns related to minority politics. While the work is only 157 pages, including index, this study can serve as an important supplemental text in courses on the legislature, minority politics, public policy, and political parties.

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Ornstein, Norman J., Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin. *Vital Statistics on Congress, 1991-1992*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1992. 275 pp. (\$29.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper).

Vital Statistics is hardly a volume to which most scholars need to be introduced. The current edition is the sixth biennial presentation of much fundamental data regarding the Congress, its activities, and its membership. Most teachers and researchers in the field are familiar with previous editions and recognize their obvious strengths:

- the data are nicely presented by topic with a brief introduction to each chapter;
- the authors adeptly handle the task of taking complicated data questions and making reasonable judgments on the balance between specificity with corollary complexity and generally classifying but masking significant variation;
- similarly, the authors avoid footnoting *ad infinitum* to explain the irregularities that are inherent in the data, but provide adequate documen-

tation regarding both source material and coding criteria;

- it is well-indexed; and

- it is comprehensive.

Most Americanists already consider this book essential to their work. But also, most of us fail to take full advantage of what it has to offer. It seems that most of us (based on a sample of one--me) put it on our shelves and regularly use it for research, lectures, or to answer a question raised by a student, a reporter or a probing in-law. That niche is adequate for a work of this nature, but in this case it leaves it under-utilized. Here, I will offer ways to improve the way the work is used since most, if not all, readers of this review already are familiar with the book and have their own opinion of it.

First, the book could be better utilized in the classroom. This collection of information gets substantial use when drafting lectures as we seek to find that last datum point to complete our presentation, but it tends to be under utilized for pedagogical exercises or as foundation for research. Tables or generalizations in the introductory comments to each chapter can serve as a basis to investigate a number of topics related to the Congress or to explore methodological issues related to the analysis and interpretation of data. For either type of course, consider the following example from page one: "Between 1910 and 1990 the South and the West have consistently gained seats [in the U.S. House]. . ." The conclusion is reasonable, but it raises a plethora of methodological and theoretical questions. Focusing solely on the South, a close examination of Table 1-1 raises methodological questions regarding time trends (the South gained four seats from 1910 to 1970 and seventeen seats from 1970 to 1990) and aggregation (seven southern states lost representation from 1910 to 1990, two states gained a total of three seats, and then there were Florida and Texas -- up a total of 31 seats. The theoretical questions raised by the redistribution of representation are many and so widely researched that they need no elaboration here.

By utilizing the tables and descriptions provided by the authors, instructors might provide a non-conventional entree into a variety of topics. Such possibilities seem endless -- I intentionally chose an example from *page one* to illustrate my suspicion that one can turn to any page to raise those types of questions.

Second, the book and its introduction take such a broad swipe at a comprehensive explanation of various phenomena that we can forget the wealth of understanding to be gained by considering the enormous amount of subtle and not-so-subtle unexplained variance that remains. Much more can be gained from this work by exploring the detail offered by the wealth of data in *Vital Statistics*.

The third limitation in the usage of this book is that the authors fail to provide much information about the First Congress, or the Second, or the Tenth or, even, the Fiftieth. In fact, most tables do not go back further than 1947. The lack of systematic data from earlier periods hampers our ability to think about longer-term patterns. In my case, at least, my mind tries to make missing data a "constant"--seriously affecting my ability to conceptualize the evolution of the body. The

authors, of course, are not to blame for not undertaking the herculean task (or for my intellectual shortcomings), but when I saw the first edition in 1980 I hoped that it would be the launch pad for a backward trip as well as for updates. Unfortunately, absent a unique scholar or, more likely, a team of scholars who are well-funded we cannot hope for much change in that regard. Fortunately, a team of scholars currently is engaged in planning such a project. If they succeed they will greatly complement the book under review here.

In short, continue to use this book, but use it better than does the person in my sample of one.

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Savage, Sean. *Roosevelt the Party Leader 1932-1945*. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1991 (\$25.00).

Sean Savage has written a timely, important and interesting book on President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his role as leader of the Democratic Party and as a party builder. It is an important and timely book in the sense that many of the issues confronting Roosevelt, the Democratic Party, and the nation in the 1930s are still with us today. The solutions, both governmental and political, devised by Roosevelt and the Party in the 1930s are now heavily debated as part of today's political agenda. The most basic issue then was how to tackle the economic and political challenges of the great Depression. Roosevelt's solution was to develop an activist national government with significant intervention into the economic sphere and to advocate a reasonably coherent set of public policies designed to address a wide range of socio-economic ills. His major political instrument, according to Savage, was a liberal Democratic party. In all of this, Roosevelt was challenged by a set of committed conservatives, first the conservative, mostly southern elites of his own party and then by the conservative business and media elites of the Republican party. There are clear echoes of all those basic philosophical debates of the 1930s heard in the political rhetoric of the left and the right in the 1990s.

This is a book about partisan realignment. It is a case study of the most recent, and probably most significant realignment in the nation's history -- the building of the New Deal coalition. Of course scholars have long debated whether a new realignment is underway, long overdue, or practically complete. What we find in Savage's book is a series of important insights into how Roosevelt brought about the New Deal realignment and created the majority party which dominated American politics for almost half a century. Put simply, according to Savage, Roosevelt was a master party builder and he saw a strong Democratic Party as crucial to the success of his policies. He also positioned the Democrats for the first

time as the clearly liberal alternative and this positioning helps clarify Roosevelt's much criticized actions during the party purges of 1938. FDR's strategy was validated by Truman's adoption of the New Deal and even by the policies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson according to this thesis.

There is a curious ambivalence in Roosevelt's record and overall strategy that Savage fails to specify clearly or to resolve. As Governor of New York and in the 1932 presidential election, Roosevelt is depicted as a pragmatic politician reaching out to Independents and Progressive Republicans, and anyone else who would support him. He used ambiguous language and advocated contradictory policies in order to attract liberals while at the same time trying to hold the support of the conservative South. Later Savage depicts Roosevelt as becoming increasingly pure in his ideological appeal and even combative in his liberalism. (Clearly the intervening events of World War II and the increasing internationalism of Roosevelt were crucial in sustaining Roosevelt's base and probably more important than Savage acknowledges). These debates are still heard in the Democratic Party today; however, the labels are "liberal" versus "moderate." Senator Tom Harkin and Governor Bill Clinton played out this unresolved argument in their presidential campaigns of 1992. It is not entirely clear that FDR was as unambivalently liberal as he is depicted in this book. At the least, his liberalism was an evolutionary adaptation to the circumstances as they unfolded.

Franklin Roosevelt has probably attracted the interest and analysis of more political scientists and historians than any other president. From James McGregor Burns, Richard Neustadt and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s seminal works to Clark Clifford's recent popular memoir, Roosevelt's model of the activist president and his legacy to Truman have dominated our academic discourse on the presidency. FDR's model is often the standard by which other presidents are judged. Sean Savage has made a useful contribution to that large body of presidential literature by developing his thesis around the view of Roosevelt the consummate party-builder and committed liberal. One does not have to believe that the record is entirely as clear as the one Savage has painted to still acknowledge the accomplishment of this useful book.

John S. Jackson, III

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Schumacher, Paul. *Critical Pluralism, Democratic Performance, and Community Power.* Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991. 258 pp. (\$29.95 cloth).

Critical Pluralism, Democratic Performance, & Community Power is a book by a pluralist for pluralists. While Schumacher, a political scientist at the University of Kansas, develops a critical methodology for assessing the democratic performance of political institutions in Lawrence, Kansas, he largely takes

the pluralist definition of democracy developed by Dahl and Lindblom for granted, while attempting to enhance the empirical tools pluralists employ. The bulk of the book is devoted to applying substantive criteria to local institutions to buttress the essentially procedural tenets of normative pluralism. Hence Schumacher develops and applies a paradigm he calls *critical pluralism*.

The rationale for the book is Schumacher's contention that theorists of pluralist democracy can profit from the arguments of their recent critics. These critics have used highly developed methodologies to rebut pluralist contentions and paint contemporary American democratic practice as less than responsive, representative and open. Schumacher intends to, and largely succeeds in, using their criticisms to inject pluralist theory with a more skeptical attitude and a methodology to match. Both are overdue, as pluralism has yet to come to terms satisfactorily with either the difficulties people of color and other marginalized elements faced in breaking into the political system in the 1950s and 1960s, or the vocal movements demanding a greater measure of popular control over institutions. Schumacher implicitly addresses this failure when he incorporates into his critical methodology the concerns of the "elite," "economistic," and "regime" schools of community studies.

From this combination of traditional pluralism and its critics, Schumacher develops a multi-faceted set of criteria. Substantively, he argues that we should expect three things of pluralist democracies: 1) that policies correspond to popular wishes, measured in terms of "dominant principles;" 2) that elected representatives act responsibly by using their judgment to pursue the common good rather than bowing to the wishes of elites or other particular segments of the community; and 3) that inequalities of power (measured by scorecards of who wins and who loses in policy battles) be susceptible to reasonable and normatively acceptable explanations. He then fleshes out these criteria by drawing convincingly on Michael Walzer for the concept of "complex equality."

Methodologically, Schumacher's aim is to "describe and explain variations in the attainment" of his normative criteria (p. 38). If this language alerts the ordinary reader to the onset of a predominantly statistical approach, that expectation is not disappointed. Schumacher bases his argument firmly upon the foundation of survey research and statistical operations, which he uses to measure popular assessments of principles, policies and reputational power and to measure the correlation between group preferences and policy outcomes. The result is a reasonably readable statistical rendering of the "issue" approach to power measurement, although some background in statistics is necessary to grasp fully the implications of the evidence he provides.

Relying upon a ranking of levels of "responsible representation" (ranging from a low of "external domination" to a high of "consensus"), a division of citizens into groups based on gender, age, ideological orientation, etc., and a division of policy decisions into issue areas, Schumacher proceeds to analyze the outcomes of 29 issues decided between 1977 and 1987. He comes to two main

conclusions. First, he asserts that explanations of policy outcomes have little to do either with “culture,” or with economism of the economic imperative or the economic elite varieties. Rather, the views of elected representatives provide outcomes. This empirical conclusion leads to his second, normative conclusion that, by his measure of democratic performance, “the overall assessment of the political process in Lawrence would seem generally positive” (p. 209). Schumacher can make this judgment despite a variety of problems he highlights because he shares in the pluralist elevation of representation as the *sine qua non* of democracy. Lawrence achieved a relatively low principle-policy congruence, but Schumacher attributes this to contradictory principles. Complex equality is not substantially achieved (as the middle class is dominant) but for Schumacher this is explicable by reference to the dominance of middle class elected officials, and the tendency of the middle class to espouse dominant principles. Thus, while he is at pains to argue that all three of his measures of democratic performance are necessary, he comes uncomfortably close to concluding in the end that rule by representation is sufficient.

Taken solely as a part of the pluralist literature, *Critical Pluralism, Democratic Performance & Community Power* is generally stimulating and welcome. It provides a hitherto absent critical edge to the *genre*. But there are problems with the book both internal to and external to that literature. Internally, one could have wished for more on certain occasions. Take, for example, his concept of “dominant principles.” What exactly are they? Attitudes that a bare majority of citizens hold? If so, can the majority change from year to year, or even more quickly, and still be considered dominant? Or if “dominance” implies something deeper and more permanent, what is the common text that gives these principles their dominance? Similarly, he offers no justification for his normative ranking of levels of responsible representation. While some rankings are self-explanatory, why, for instance, must “representatives act as trustees” always be ranked above “representatives act as instructed delegates?” A little justification of the norm of pluralist representation itself would have been welcome.

This latter shortcoming points to the difficulties the book will face outside the pluralist literature. It does particularly little to address, among others, the important questions posed by the multi-cultural character of larger American cities. One can foresee vehement dissatisfaction with Schumacher’s concept of “dominant principles” as a substantive measure of democratic performance, and with his tendency to posit issues, and to a lesser extent power, in binary terms. Thus while Schumacher succeeds in stretching the limits of the pluralist paradigm, he does not succeed in transcending them nor in contributing substantially to the larger debate over the meaning and measure of democratic practice.

David Lorenzo
Yale University

Slack, James D. *AIDS and the Public Work Force: Local Government Preparedness in Managing the Epidemic.* Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1991. 182 pp. (\$22.95 paper).

The AIDS epidemic will be with us for a long time, and this small book argues that we need to get more serious about dealing with the crisis at the local level because that is where the relationship between people and their government is most apparent. The author intends to “examine the extent to which local governments are prepared to manage the workplace ramifications of the AIDS epidemic” (pp. ix-x). Because local governments represent the largest work force in the United States, discerning precisely how the local bureaucracy might respond to the HIV disease in its own workplace will condition both the scope of public services available to AIDS victims and the manner in which those services are delivered to the citizenry.

Overall, this short volume is systematically organized, well written, substantially documented, and methodologically sound. It also contains an extensive list of appendices reviewing the survey questions asked of local public officials in the 50 states, the distribution of the sample, and some selected examples of AIDS guidelines received from various cities ranging from Anchorage, Alaska to Los Angeles. A short bibliography and an index are also included. Chapter One provides a brief overview of the AIDS crisis, noting that since the disease was discovered in the United States in 1981, nearly 100,000 victims had died by October 1990 of complications resulting from the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Some well-known facts include its fatal consequences, the lack of a cure, its transmission via body fluids, its concentration in major coastal metropolitan areas, and its potential to invade all communities and population groups in spite of its concentration in the homosexual and IV drug abuser populations.

Chapter Two advances the author’s thesis that AIDS presents a major crisis for the local public service, both because of its “external” and “internal” implications. Chapter Three discusses the legal context of a few major federal laws and several less protective state regulations dealing with the AIDS epidemic that will seriously afflict the local workforce in the 1990s. Slack insists that local governments must significantly increase their access to various kinds of epidemiological and legal information relating to the AIDS crisis, and he recommends that because AIDS poses a substantial risk to public health *nationally*, a far more substantial federal role in regulatory, distributive, and coordinative terms will be essential for dealing with the AIDS epidemic.

The real value of this study lies in its alerting us to the enormous costs -- financial, moral, social, and psychological -- that will accompany this nation’s confrontation of the AIDS epidemic in the 1990s and beyond. One set of challenges is presented by the “external” side of the local bureaucracy, and local government’s ability to deliver municipal services such as police and fire protection and emergency medical care, which place the public service and the

general citizenry in close contact. Assuming that the local bureaucracy mirrors the general population in its probable exposure to the AIDS virus, “as many as 180,000 government employees are currently within the HIV spectrum” (all persons inflicted with AIDS-related conditions or impairments). Slack is concerned that the fundamental mission of delivering services will invariably be impaired by the onslaught of AIDS among the local public work force. Beyond this external face of AIDS is the “internal” side of the disease, which concerns how public servants infected with HIV will be treated by local governments. Several relevant questions arise: (1) how prepared is government to address workplace ramifications of the HIV disease; (2) what particular devices are appropriate in the selection and screening of public employees; (3) what is the appropriate balance between a person’s right to confidentiality of health status and the citizen’s right to know about matters relating to general public health risks and budget allocations necessary to deal with the AIDS epidemic; and (4) how much actual and perceived risk is government prepared to assume, from both citizens and public servants in the “HIV spectrum,” in order to perform its duties and responsibilities? These questions constitute the main focus and heart of the book.

Some specific findings presented by Slack are indeed troubling, and they reflect some of the misgivings of an ill-informed and ambivalent public work force. Eighty percent of the city managers and mayors surveyed favored local government collecting information about workers’ health. Only 36 percent feel that they are sufficiently knowledgeable about AIDS, and only 24 percent feel that local policies and procedures are adequate to deal with AIDS. But the respondents surveyed were noticeably divided on the question of mandatory blood testing for all employees, with 42 percent opposing testing and another 38 percent favoring it. When combined with other findings, three overall impressions emerge. First, local officials express supportive attitudes toward workers who might test positive for the HIV, that they have a right to be employed, that local management is presently unprepared to deal with the crisis, and that worker confidentiality should be preserved. But beyond this initial impression, a second one indicates that many local government practitioners are not supportive of the HIV-positive employee. Twenty-one percent feel that discrimination in the workplace against the HIV-infected employee should not be prohibited, 27 percent voice concern that the city should not hire HIV-infected personnel, and 20 percent feel that AIDS blood tests should not be confidential. Finally, substantial inconsistency exists among local government officials with respect to how workers in the HIV spectrum should be treated on the job, whether they should be accorded special accommodations in order to perform job tasks, and whether they should be isolated from the general work force.

A few criticisms of this generally competent and overdue study are necessary. First, the author tends to repeat himself. Although summaries are helpful in synthesizing various points made in the chapters, they tend to be superfluous in the rather short narratives which characterize this brief work. More careful editing of

the finished manuscript may have corrected this slight defect. Additionally, some relatively minor errors are apparent. One is the author's calculation about the segment of the population potentially exposed to the AIDS virus. On page 31, Slack notes that "[g]iven that 1 percent of the population may be HIV positive, it is reasonable to predict that as many as 180,000 government employees are currently within the HIV spectrum." On page 83, he states: "More than 108,000 local government workers, 1 percent of each municipality's work force, are likely to be in the HIV spectrum." Assuming that one is speaking about the same population and work force, both statements cannot be correct. Finally, a few references are made to the "Lickert" [sic] scale employed in the survey (pp. 77, 81). Other than these relatively minor blemishes, this book is an important contribution to the growing literature on the AIDS epidemic and the public capacity to deal with it honestly and equitably.

Richard B. Riley
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Sloan, John W. *Eisenhower and the Management of Prosperity*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1991. 191 pp. (\$25.00 cloth).

The title of this book is drawn from Clinton Rossiter's well-known enumeration of presidential roles which includes "manager of prosperity." It evokes the contrast between Rossiter's preference for a president who is "a kind of magnificent lion who can roam widely and do great deeds" and his description of Eisenhower as a "gradualist in a time of gradualism" who "never really put his heart into the attempt" to be a great president. It also brings to mind the contradictory scholarly perspectives on Eisenhower: the early assessment of Eisenhower as a rather passive and disinterested delegator, and the more recent revisionist assessment of Eisenhower as an active and engaged "hidden hand" leader. John Sloan places himself firmly in the revisionist camp, though he tells us we can find two Eisenhowers in the Eisenhower Presidency -- an "old Eisenhower" in the early 1950s who was "interested in, attentive to, and a major player in economic policymaking" (p. 10), and a "new Eisenhower" in the late 1950s who became more rigid and "less capable of exerting positive executive leadership" (p. 160). Sloan praises the first Eisenhower, arguing that his performance as manager of prosperity "merits a much higher regard than it has previously received" (p. 3). He seems disappointed that the "new Eisenhower" became a "lonely moralist" who was "a less effective politician and ended up achieving fewer of his objectives" (p. 161).

The book is a well-written and well-organized study that draws from previous research on Eisenhower, the literature of bureaucratic politics, and the memoirs, papers, and memorandums of Eisenhower and his chief advisors. In a very fine introductory chapter, Sloan lays out his argument that by the 1950s, the president's

role as manager of prosperity was politically significant, that popular expectations for effective performance of that role rose throughout the decade, and that Eisenhower understood and accepted this role and actively and effectively played his part. The introduction also provides a nicely textured sense of the political context within which the president operated -- a context marked by bureaucratic complexity and political nuance and shaped by larger political-economic forces. Sloan's approach to understanding the Eisenhower Administration's economic decision making process is explicitly influenced by Graham Allison's analysis of bureaucratic politics.

The second chapter explains the economic philosophy of President Eisenhower and the main players in his economic policy making process. Eisenhower is portrayed as seeking to reconcile welfare liberalism with a deeply held fiscal conservatism. As the tension between the two increased during his presidency, Eisenhower opted for a more hardened conservatism dedicated to balanced budgets and anti-inflationary monetarism at some political cost. His various advisors, including George Humphrey and Arthur Burns, tended to reinforce his economic conservatism, though there were vigorous debates and disagreements among advisors.

The third chapter provides a backdrop for the economic policy battles by describing the political economy of the 1950s. The decade is painted by Sloan as one of fairly lively conflict between a traditional and skeptical conservative defense of free markets and reduced government against a more progressive confidence in the possibilities of rapid growth and widespread prosperity through the marriage of active government and "the new economic science." These conflicts are played out in the context of a major military build-down, recession, and upward pressure on domestic budgets.

The subsequent three chapters take a detailed look at the specific battles to balance budgets, control inflation, and respond to two recessions. The conflicting advice of chief aides and Eisenhower's own role in economic policy making are analyzed. The pictures of the "old and new Eisenhower" emerge from this analysis. In his first term, Eisenhower was anxious to learn and was committed to a conservative view of American economic strength and stability grounded in a clear-eyed recognition of the United States' world leadership role and the "long haul" struggle with the Soviet Union. He was politically sophisticated in achieving his objectives. In his second term, the "clarifying experience" of a budget battle with advisors seeking bigger spending programs made him more bitter, withdrawn, and politically less effective and successful. Ironically, his overall economic successes, combined with second term political failures "bequeathed to his Democratic opponents a healthy economy that would finance a number of policies that he opposed" (p. 162).

Sloan provides interesting insight into Eisenhower's economic philosophy and governing skills as they developed over the course of his presidency. He provides further corroboration for the revisionist argument that Eisenhower was

a conservative activist who used a firm hand in his role as manager of prosperity, though his political skill and leadership diminished in his second term. I wish he had attempted to draw some broader conclusions about what Eisenhower's experience might say about the presidency in general. M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine McDonnell have used Eisenhower's economic policy making examples to support a broader theoretical argument that a president's ideology is often a more important factor in economic policy decisions than are short-term electoral considerations. William Grover argues that, ideology aside, any president is limited in economic policy making by the structural constraints of the political economy -- that a president is a "prisoner" of the imperative to sustain "business confidence." Perhaps Sloan's case study approach makes these types of generalizations difficult.

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Stanley, Harold W. and Richard G. Niemi. *Vital Statistics on American Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992. 465 pp. (\$28.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper).

This popular sourcebook, now in its third edition, has been updated with politically relevant statistics on the 1990 census, the 102nd Congress, and the Persian Gulf War. The more than 225 charts and figures provide "hard" statistics as well as "soft" measures or indices developed by political scientists. All entries give the original sources for the tables or figures displayed, and an appendix lists additional references for topics covered in this volume and other subject areas. At the end of each chapter the authors provide questions for students to evaluate based on the statistical data. The topics of the thirteen chapters parallel the organization of introductory American government textbooks; 1--Constitution, 2--Mass Media, 3--Elections and Campaigns, 4--Political Parties, 5--Public Opinion, 6--Interest Groups, 7--Congress, 8--Presidency/Executive Branch, 9--Judiciary, 10--Federalism, 11--Foreign/Military Policy, 12--Social Policy, 13--Economic Policy.

The Constitution chapter gives the dates when all states entered the union, details about each state constitution, and Supreme Court cases which incorporated the Bill of Rights. Data on mass media include the growth of radio and TV, newspaper circulation, presidential press conferences, and newspaper endorsements of GOP or Democratic presidential candidates.

Coverage of elections and campaigns extends to turnout and registration rates, methods used to select delegates, and results of presidential preference polling. For parties, a diagram shows the historical evolution of major/minor parties, followed by frequency statistics on how often each state voted Republican for president, measures of party competition and party control of state governments, and a profile of convention delegates.

Statistics on elections and campaigns include partisan identification over time, a cross-sectional profile of party identifiers, trends on the Gallup “most important” problem, and the ability of each party to deal with war and prosperity. The next chapter shows the growth of PACs, identifies the largest PACs, summarizes federal and state campaign finance laws, and compares types of interest groups against the adult population.

Data on Congress include demographic attributes of members, their seniority status, turnover, campaign costs, party votes and “conservative coalition” votes, data on the growing congressional staff, and measures of Congress’ workload. The following chapter lists every president, dates their terms of office, their ratings by the historians, and their “approval ratings” from the public. For the executive branch there is information on each department and the major agencies, the growth of the EOP, and number of federal employees. Executive-legislative relations are explored using presidential victories on roll calls, support scores, veto use, executive nominations, treaties, and executive agreements.

Information on the judiciary ranges from characteristics of district and appellate judges by president, failed Supreme Court nominations, “ratings” of the Justices, to caseload data for the federal judiciary, and the number of laws thus far declared to be unconstitutional. To illustrate the working of federalism, there are trend data on employment by levels of government, measures of tax “capacity” by state, and federal grants-in-aid distributions. Foreign and military policy are indicated by the history of U.S.-Soviet Summit Meetings and arms control agreements, personnel engaged in major military conflicts, military stationed abroad, size and racial makeup of military forces, foreign aid, investment abroad, and U.S. balance of trade statistics.

Social policy is signified by demographic variables such as urban/rural population, median family income, and percent below poverty, by expenditures for social welfare and Medicare, and by measures of race relations (school desegregation by region, poll data on racial attitudes, number of black elected officials) and of criminality (crime rates, number of prisoners, public attitudes toward the courts).

The final chapter on economic policy uses the standard kinds of macroeconomic indicators: GNP, CPI, size of labor force, the unemployment rate, “consumer confidence” over time, federal expenditures as a percentage of GNP and by functional area, size of the national debt, and estimates of revenue losses from various “tax expenditures,” in addition to opinion polls on public attitudes toward a proposed balanced budget amendment.

Beyond its utility for social scientists and journalists who have a need for basic information on government, politics, and policy, *Vital Statistics on American Politics* offers faculty an interesting paradigm for teaching undergraduates, in a beginning “scope and methods” course, how to interpret quantitative data.

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Stuckey, Mary E. *The President as Interpreter-in-Chief*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1991. 192 pp. (\$14.95 paper).

Presidential use of the media, particularly television, to develop a relationship with citizens has become one of the defining characteristics of the modern presidency. Despite the prominence of this relationship, political scientists are just beginning to develop an understanding of the communication between president and citizen. In this book, Mary Stuckey attempts to trace the development of this relationship. According to Stuckey, the president has taken on a new role as the nation's chief storyteller or interpreter-in-chief. In this capacity, the president recounts events and places them in context. This role has been created by the interaction of social and historical forces with changes in the medium of communication. These forces have shaped not only what the president says, but how it is said. Stuckey concludes that the presidency has been weakened because his communication with citizens has been simplified.

One of the biggest contributions made by this book comes from the broad historical perspective it takes. In order to help the reader understand the transformation of political communication caused by electronic media, Stuckey includes a brief examination of the political rhetoric of Puritan ministers in Colonial America. The chapters that follow trace the evolution of presidential speech through the introduction of radio and television to the present. Throughout, the author is careful to include print and electronic communication, as well as communication used during their campaigns and while in office.

Even though one of the strengths of this book is its acknowledgment that political speech did not emerge with Franklin Roosevelt, only recent presidents are given a detailed examination. Earlier presidents are all covered in one chapter in an expeditious manner. The discussion of each president from Roosevelt to Bush is given roughly equal treatment, although the contributions of these presidents to the development of communication varies greatly. While each modern president merits discussion, an expansion of some of the most interesting or important cases might have better served the development of the author's argument. For example, the style of the Reagan Administration presents a rich case study for analysis and deserves more discussion than that of Gerald Ford.

It is during the Reagan presidency that the case of the president as interpreter-in-chief is most compelling. As American society has become more televised and dramatized, so has our politics. Reagan entered the White House well-equipped to handle the medium. According to Stuckey, he was able to play "both the hero, who promised to slay the villain, and the narrator, who told us who the real villains were, and whether or not the hero had done his job" (114).

Political science has had trouble assessing the role of presidential communication. While political scientists like Jeffrey Tulis and Samuel Kernell have made important contributions, many other significant contributions have come from scholars like Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Roderick Hart, who work in other fields.

While many of the book's conclusions resemble those of Jamieson's *Eloquence in an Electronic Age*, Stuckey's arguments are focused more on democratic issues such as accountability.

The historical analysis presented does a good job of demonstrating the differences in the styles of recent presidents. However, the book ultimately may be much more successful at detailing the styles of presidential communication than explaining them or supporting the idea of the president as "interpreter-in-chief." While many readers will not find the book's arguments compelling, Stuckey's study should provide the historical and theoretical framework needed to focus future debate within political science.

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Urwin, Cathy Kunzinger. *Agenda for Reform: Winthrop Rockefeller As Governor of Arkansas, 1967-1971.* Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1991. 270 pp. (\$25.00 cloth).

Agenda For Reform is more than a personal biography of Rockefeller. Urwin analyzes a minority party's struggle to come alive in the country's most one party state. She records the difficulties encountered by the sophisticated New York Yankee who chose to live in a rural Southern state emerging from a quagmire of corruption, poverty, and ignorance. Contemporary political scientists would do well to remember the changes in Arkansas since WR's election as governor in 1966.

Winthrop Rockefeller began his efforts to build the Arkansas Republican party in 1960. At the time, the GOP was little more than a collection of post office and presidential republicans whose sole function was sending delegates to national nominating conventions. Goldwater conservatives and moderate Rockefeller Republicans fought over control of the national convention delegation. In 1976 the Reagan delegation led by Judy Petty, and the Ford supporters, led by party Chairman Lynn Lowe clashed. A minor party purge followed the 1980 Convention. These continuing factional fights contribute to the party's ineffectiveness at the polls because they divert attention and money from local elections. Moreover, local party organizations, isolated and surrounded by overwhelming numbers of Democrats, have failed to make any sustained effort to recruit and support local candidates. Lacking a local base, uninterested in or unable to locate candidates for state legislative offices, and barely managing to secure credible candidates for governor, the party remains without significant power or influence. For example, in 1952, the candidate for governor received 12.6%, in 1960 Henry Britt, received 30.8%, and in 1990 Sheffield Nelson attracted 42% (pp. 32, 39).

If a party is an organization devoted to electing candidates it is difficult to consider this Republican organization a party. However, Winthrop Rockefeller

provided the spark that ignited expansion in the Arkansas GOP. Rockefeller began his campaign to strengthen it before his anticipated run for the governor's office. Rockefeller's significant contributions included the controversial hiring of a public relations expert, developing modern campaign fund raising techniques, establishing a state party headquarters staff and hiring an executive director, adding party field men, and introducing polling. Rockefeller also established the Election Research Council in 1964. He promoted honest elections by helping to file suits for election fraud and by securing Republican poll workers (p. 52).

With Rockefeller's 1966 election as governor, the party leadership consisted of three Republicans in the Arkansas House, plus the Governor. Jim Caldwell joined them in 1968 as lone member of the Senate and minority leader. This stalwart band confronted a state legislature unaccustomed to meeting and talking with opposition party members. The Republicans did not control one county in the state. The sparse number of Arkansas Republicans had to create a party.

Thus, commanding the governor's office and stimulated by Rockefeller's interest in party affairs, Arkansas Republicans began an effort to build from the top down. They made an intensive effort to attract young people and blacks. WR sponsored annual picnics for young people at Petite Jean and financed trips by Young Republicans to national party affairs. However, conflicts raged within the Arkansas Young Republican Federation between conservatives and liberals (p. 172). The Arkansas Women's Federation and the Arkansas Black Council, extra-party organizations, emerged. WR recruited, financed and assisted candidates for state-wide constitutional offices, and for the state legislature. Rockefeller, a former resident of a two-party state, understood and advocated the advantages of a competitive system. However, as Urwin often points out, Rockefeller's devotion to competitive party politics intensified his difficulties with the Democrat-dominated state legislature.

In 1970 the GOP fielded 54 candidates, 43 for the House and 11 for the Senate (p. 180). This WR led accomplishment was and remains the largest number of state legislative candidates ever nominated by the GOP. The 1970 Arkansas Republican convention met amidst balloons, music and demonstrations. Yet, the party did not elect anyone from the large list of candidates. Urwin suggests that Rockefeller lost the 1970 election because white moderates returned to the Democrat party to support Dale Bumpers (p. 186). She implies that WR's growing conservatism alienated his strongest blocs of supporters -- urban liberal democrats and blacks (p. 182). WR could defeat conservative rural candidates like Jim Johnson and Marion Crank; he could not defeat the moderate Dale Bumpers. Others have suggested that rural conservative elements defeated Rockefeller because his reforms and projected tax increases did not suit them.

A pivotal year for the Arkansas GOP was 1972. Internal difficulties resumed between the conservative and liberal factions. Moreover, frictions existed between WR's public relations staff, state party headquarters staff, urban Little Rock members, rural, conservative eastern party leaders, and Third District

Hammerschmidt supporters. However, the ten-year effort had produced remarkable results. The membership base of the party increased, county committee organizations developed, and an increasing number of Arkansans were voting Republican at all levels. However, the attention given to internal dissidents obscured the considerable expansion made in the party's statewide voting totals. Urwin and others concentrate on flashy and well publicized disagreements rather than upon the gradual increase in voting statistics. There is no way to prove that more people would have voted Republican without these conflicts. However, Arkansas Republicans have failed to weld together an effective coalition.

The Arkansas GOP survived Rockefeller's 1970 defeat. They made a difficult transition to minority status by leaning on White House coattails. Following a complex election of delegates to the 1972 national convention, the state committee elected Winthrop Rockefeller national committeeman. Rockefeller attended the convention, hosted the delegation to a pool side party, appeared at delegation caucuses, and sat through much of the convention's floor proceedings. Unknown to the delegation and the party leaders, attendance at this national convention completed Rockefeller's active participation in party affairs. Rockefeller gained the admiration of his conservative Republican critics by continued party work after leaving the governor's office.

The Rockefeller era concluded without the GOP achieving Rockefeller's goal of a competitive two-party system. This elusive prize still evades them today. However, the Arkansas GOP had difficulty recovering from the twin blows of WR's defeat and death, and post-Watergate fallout. Raising money and paying the expenses of the headquarters staff proved to be difficult tasks for a party leadership grown too accustomed to receiving generous financial support from Rockefeller. Despite WR's efforts to build a party from the Governor's office, to recruit and finance a slate of legislative candidates and constitutional officers, to create a professional state headquarters operation, to establish many support groups, and to introduce modern campaign techniques, the WR-directed effort at party building in Arkansas achieved only modest success. The Arkansas experience provides one case study in the academic debate over whether one develops a party from the top or from the grass roots. However, the Arkansas case is different from other Southern state Republican parties which operate mainly in urban areas. Winthrop Rockefeller's winning coalition consisted of moderate Arkansans who resisted a politics dominated by rural interests. Arkansas Republican expansion came from retirement communities, blacks, middle-class professionals, businessmen and out-of-state carpetbaggers. Additional party development depends upon its ability to attract and meld together educated middle-class voters, conservative rural groups, and evangelical religious believers. Continued conflicts within the party reflect differences of opinion and interest between these groups. Moreover, any further development of a competitive party system requires some base, for example a rural/urban division. Additional expansion in the Arkansas GOP may follow from further industrialization, educational improvement, and increased

Republican migration into the state.

Rockefeller began his public career in 1955 on the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission. Former Governor Faubus did not overlook the advantages to Arkansas of Rockefeller's financial connections (pp. 19-30). If one links the development of the Arkansas Republican party to urbanization and industrialization, Rockefeller's attracting 600 industries expanded the party's potential base. He used the governor's office to lure other Republican candidates and build the party structure. For the first time since Reconstruction Arkansas had a general election at the state level. Rockefeller's major contributions moved the Arkansas Republican party from a small faction to a weak party.

Cathy Kunzinger Urwin makes a substantial contribution to Arkansas political history in *Agenda For Reform*. She records the events of the Rockefeller years in minute detail. The bibliography is an important resource for continued research on Arkansas politics. Urwin's analysis of Rockefeller is balanced and objective. It stands in marked contrast to the personal invective and pettiness exhibited by many of Rockefeller's contemporary critics. For older Arkansans, reading Urwin rekindles and sharpens our memories of that exciting era in Arkansas politics.

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Vogel, Ronald. *Urban Political Economy: Broward County, Florida*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1992. 160 pp. (\$24.95 cloth).

In this book, Ronald Vogel re-tackles the long-standing question "who governs?" using a political economy approach and a reputational methodology. He studies rapidly growing Broward County, Florida (containing Fort Lauderdale), a community whose political and economic structures were in flux as a result of population growth. He concludes that local economic and political leaders (Broward County's "growth machine") worked together and had a considerable degree of autonomy as they struggled to bring some centralized decision making to their relatively fragmented "regime" structure.

The author's work goes well beyond most of the earlier community power studies. He is to be complimented for recognizing the political role of economic elites, key linkages between economics and politics, and the domination of economic development issues. In addition, rather than falling victim to a rather simplistic determinism, merely assuming that potentially mobile businesses can extort any thing they want from government, Vogel emphasizes the variation possible in both a community's economic and political centralization and the fact that all capital is not equally mobile. He concludes that "leadership and institutional arrangements can and do affect the city and its quality of life" (p. 126) as well as the efficiency of the local "growth machine."

In general, the book demonstrates that this type of analysis is still quite

relevant and can be done in an intelligent and useful way. It is very clearly organized and crisply written, including a full list of references and an index. It contains a concise and insightful theoretical summary and synthesis. And, overall, it is a thorough case study -- at least within its own theoretical and methodological limits.

My main difficulties with the book relate to these latter limitations. To begin with, the reputational approach entails all the usual problems. In particular, it is prone to missing the more subtle exercises of power, e.g., non-decisions, information and values control, agenda setting and bureaucratic discretion. There is also a tendency to slip into focusing on which elites emerge in any given situation, with the average citizen and consequent democracy implications falling out of the discussion. In addition, a focus on leader perceptions and choices often misses the objective interests served. To get at the latter, it is better to locate important distributional outcomes and work backwards to find out how individuals and groups became and remain privileged.

Charles Lindblom, Clarence Stone and others go as far as to suggest that “systemic biases” exist which all but dictate that certain interests will take precedence over others. In particular, because of local dependence on the private investment of capital within their confines, the interests of those capital investors will predominate in local affairs. And, as Barry Bluestone and others remind us, this has become all that much truer given the “hypermobility of capital” present since the latter 1970s. Thus, even when business elites are compelled to strike compromises, it is a matter of how many concessions they will be granted and in what form, not whether private economic growth will be a top city priority or whether the existing ownership structure will remain intact. For example, as a former Broward County elected official put it, “Private property is intended to be in private hands . . . It can be tempered but there is a point beyond which you cannot tell them to stop” (p. 85). Our well entrenched political culture simply would not tolerate a city doing something like using eminent domain to seize recalcitrant businesses and run them as public enterprises.

Vogel is correct when he concludes that “Economic dependence on business and political dependence on higher levels of government limit the ability of localities to act independently and cause development issues to dominate the local agenda, as cities compete for capital” (p. 18). But, he overstates the case when he follows that “Localities have a great deal of latitude in how they respond to the conditions that capital imposes. . . , not just in how they respond to economic and political constraints from above but in altering those constraints” (p. 19). The key is that even on those rare occasions when anti-growth coalitions succeed, the logic of the existing political-economic system dictates that they ultimately lose. Less capital will be invested in that community, and the local citizenry will suffer accordingly. As Vogel himself states, “Mayor Dennis Kucinich of Cleveland learned this lesson the hard way” (p. 104). How capital is owned remains at the very heart of “who governs.” Unfortunately, that consideration is not a sufficient

part of this study.

Marcus D. Pohlmann
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Wald, Kenneth D. *Religion and Politics in the United States*, second edition. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992. 380 pp. (\$17.95 paper).

This book is a sensitive and intelligent contribution to the literature on politics and religion. It blends empirical findings and reasoned analysis with facility, and provides a highly readable and balanced analysis of the relationship between politics and religion in the American experience. Wald's analysis leads the reader through a consideration of the so-called anomaly of religious influence in a secular society to a review of the historical and cultural roots of religious and political contacts in American culture. He then presents a thorough review of the differences in political views of major religious groups, the nature of the church-state debate, and the influence of religion in the formation of public policy. The last two substantive chapters focus on in-depth analyses of the various major groups, ranging from mainline Protestants to Mormons and the Afro-American Christian community. Wald offers an especially thorough interpretation of the latest surge in religious politics, that of the "religious right," or as he describes them, "evangelical Protestants."

In his discussion, he is careful not to oversimplify, warning of the complexity of the issues under consideration. For example, he is emphatic in alerting the reader to the complexity of belief and commitment to politics even in such a seemingly monolithic group as the evangelicals. He is clear, too, in his emphasis that the influence of religion on politics has both positive and negative impacts. To the religious Christian zealots of the right he would point to their tendency toward intolerance and a rejection of the pluralistic tradition which has served us so well. To those who decry all religious influence in politics, he reminds them of the positive and democratizing influence of religion that inspired the civil rights movement, from the abolitionists to the civil disobedience movement in the 1960s.

Wald rejects simplistic causal relationships between religion and politics, showing with considerable empirical data that religion is only one of many factors influencing political attitudes and behavior. To the thesis of the increasing influence of the "accommodationists" in American politics (those who wish to resacralize the secular society), he offers convincing evidence that the battle between accommodationists, strict separatists, and religious neutrals has by no means been settled. In fact, he concludes that the "American compromise" among all these groups has worked and continues to work very well.

My criticisms are more quibbles or minor sins of omission than anything else. I was disappointed that his consideration of the evangelical Protestant influence on politics ended in 1988. A bit more timely follow-through might be expected,

considering the 1992 copyright date. Too, I wish he had spent more time, even a chapter, on the Afro-American church, focusing on the staying power of this group, now more than 30 years, in weighing heavily on American politics. I was somewhat less than satisfied with the manner in which he divided religious groups for comparative purposes. His “ambiguous” Protestant group, which included Christian Scientists, Unitarians, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Quakers, is hardly a homogenous group -- anything such an aggregate might reflect, with respect to attitudes on race or civil liberties, for example, would not tell very much at all. In a like manner, I was not happy, either, that he lumped together members of the southern wings of the Methodists and Presbyterians in his evangelical category. My own experience working with co-religionists of this type for many years would not lead me to place a very large portion of these folks in the same category with evangelical Christians.

In any case, these objections are minor. The book almost makes one want to start a course on the vital issue of politics and religion.

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Williams, Walter. *Mismanaging America: The Rise of the Anti-Analytic Presidency.* Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1990. 179 pp. (\$19.95).

Walter Williams presents a thoughtful and well-reasoned account of policy-making and the recent American presidency. His concern is with the organizational structures that surround the Executive Office of the President.

For Williams, the research is necessary because policy analysis and development are both increasingly important and increasingly difficult, given the organizational structure of the executive branch. His basic concern is thus “how to organize and staff the executive branch to increase the availability to the president of sound policy information and analysis, to strengthen presidential governance, and to increase the capacity of governmental agencies to manage the president’s policies” (p. ix). This is an ambitious set of tasks, to say the least.

While the initial outline sounds a bit like a politically naive “salvation through staff” prescription, the book is neither oppressively dedicated to organization nor naive. Williams does acknowledge that it matters who is president, that no one can save presidents from themselves, and that the policy process is both subjective and partisan. Williams’ goal is to design a bureaucratic structure that is responsive to the individual presidents’ political goals while not neglecting institutional needs and long term concerns.

Williams begins with the premise that “the United States is *the* information society . . . nowhere is the information explosion problem more critical than in the

White House” (p. 1). The problem with so much information is that once the information is gained, it must also be interpreted, and control over the interpretation is inherently undemocratic. Williams illustrates these problems with an administrative history beginning with Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and ending with Ronald Reagan’s “anti-government, anti-analytic presidency.”

He then moves to a discussion of policy advisors and policy analysis, and how they have been affected by the increase in administrative complexity. For Williams, the most important factor in the prevailing administrative climate is a lack of trust of policy experts which provides “fertile ground for a retreat into ideology” (p. 27). He recommends that the best response to this environment is for presidents to surround themselves with advisors who are “policy generalist virtuosos” (p. 40) and who combine the virtues of competence, commitment, integrity, and loyalty.

Williams deplores the lack of “organizational mastery” among presidents since Eisenhower, and offers a wide range of “institutional fixes” in order to provide the structure of such mastery. He reviews both “post-Watergate” reform proposals as well as the Tower Commission Report, before offering “ten guiding propositions for structuring and staffing the EOP institutional analytic structure, including the organizational relationship between the White House and the agencies” (pp. 126-127). The result is a clear preference for a “broad range of knowledge and skills needed in a White House policy unit if it is to have the technical and generalist capacity to improve the president’s base of decision-making” (p. 133). The skills required of policy generalists include integration capacity, strategic thinking, process management leadership, policy analysis and quantitative techniques, substantive knowledge of the issue area, political knowledge, organizational knowledge, and monitoring ability.

This is an impressive list, but does not appear to Williams unrealistic. He believes that such people are created through experience gained, partially at least, within the policy structure he advocates.

Williams makes an impressive case for why policy generalists are needed, valuable, and currently rare. While his prescriptions contain clear echoes of the Brownlow Commission Report, they are nonetheless interesting for that. Less satisfying, perhaps, is the belief that structural solutions can be applied to political problems, but this is a minor problem with a solid work. At the very least, Williams’ ideas merit serious consideration by students of administration and of the American presidency.

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International/Comparative Politics

Kaufman, Robert Gordon. *Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation Between the Two World Wars.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 289 pp. (\$40.00 cloth).

The end of the Cold War has transformed the world security environment. Cold War plans and presumptions have been rendered inappropriate or irrelevant; American leaders, policy analysts, and academics have found they must rethink the foundations of defense policy. Although the very pace of change has necessarily focused attention elsewhere, inextricably entangled in the larger security debate is the issue of arms control. How can arms control contribute to a new world order -- and how *much* can it contribute? What domestic and international forces will constrain or propel arms control negotiations, and how will these affect the terms of agreements? Will the achievement of effective arms control obviate a major defense procurement effort or require it? Such questions are likely to take on increasing importance in the next few years as the international situation stabilizes sufficiently for the great powers to turn their attention back to arms control.

Robert Kaufman's recent study is thus particularly timely. In an effort to expand our empirical basis for understanding and judging arms control, Kaufman has carefully explored the history of interwar efforts to limit and naval forces. Now largely forgotten, the interwar naval treaty regime was a fascinating experiment; it represented a major and, for a time, quite successful effort to control military expenses and guarantee the national security of the great powers through diplomatic means. The Washington Treaties of 1922 quite literally -- to use Harold and Margaret Sprout's classic phrase -- established "a new order of sea power:" they limited the great powers' battle fleets, annulled the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and prohibited the fortification of key Pacific bases. Eight years later the London Treaty, which marked the high water point of the treaty regime and which revealed the logical shortcomings and political quicksands of the process, extended limits to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The treaties not only required substantial reductions in the signatories' fleets but had the effect of assuring Japanese control over the northwest Pacific, American hegemony in the eastern Pacific, Caribbean, and western Atlantic, and British predominance in European waters.

Obviously, we will never know what would have happened in the absence of the treaties. There is, as a consequence, room for viewing the treaties as a success, as a failure, or as both. On the one hand, the interwar arms control regime appears to have prevented a costly and provocative arms race between the great powers, contributed substantially to Anglo-American detente, and supported liberal democracy in Japan, thus encouraging a decade and a half of peace. On the other hand, the arms control process and the treaties it generated may also have helped to make World War II inevitable by reducing British and American forces to levels

too low to deter Japan, provoking Japanese militarism, permitting Japanese leaders to miscalculate the balance of power in the Pacific, and providing a screen behind which Japanese leaders could cynically prepare for a construction “breakout.”

Kaufman’s treatment of his historical material in *Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era* is deliberately comparative: rather than focusing simply on the American case, he examines parallel developments and circumstances in Britain and Japan. For each of these three principal participants in the treaty regime, Kaufman investigates the intellectual and domestic political roots of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 and studies the negotiating history and consequences of the 1922 Washington Treaties, the abortive 1927 Geneva conference, and the 1930 and 1936 London Treaties. This comparative approach allows him to form judgements about alternative approaches to arms control, differing capacities of states to employ arms control, and contrasting ways in which arms control and domestic politics interact.

It is somewhat ironic that this study was initially undertaken during the 1980s and was designated to address the problems of the Cold War. The interwar period, at least in its initial stages, resembles the present far more than the immediate past and the lessons it offers seem far more relevant now than when the book was written. Even so, Kaufman’s extremely cautionary and quite pessimistic conclusions about arms control -- that “events confounded American civilian leaders’ hopes for their assumptions underpinning naval arms limitation;” that “arms control will fail without corresponding political detente;” that it is difficult to mesh arms control with foreign policy objectives; that “democracies face major disadvantages in negotiating arms limitation agreements;” and that a vigorous construction program is necessary to achieve satisfactory arms agreements -- must be treated carefully.

In the first place, as Kaufman recognizes, it is dangerous to extrapolate from a single experience: “Every historical situation is in some way unique.” In the second place, the lessons even of this one experience are far more clear. From time to time, readers may well find themselves disagreeing with the meaning Kaufman ascribes to his evidence or to the prescriptive implications he draws from it -- not because his work is flawed but because the complexity of the intellectual, domestic political, and international interaction he traces supports a number of competing explanations.

Thus, *Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era* challenges its readers to rethink basic assumptions in the light of actual experience. Eminently readable, this work is a wonderfully thought-provoking historical examination: not only does it provide an important comparative perspective on a critically important and tragically understudied era of American diplomatic-military history, but it offers an excellent case study of the potential for and problems with using arms control to achieve security.

Edward Rhodes
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Nincic, Miroslav. *Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 299 pp. (\$37.50 cloth).

Democracy and Foreign Policy is a thoughtful analysis of the nature of foreign policy and of the weakness of political realism as a guide to understanding foreign policy. The author addresses several key questions: (1) to what extent are foreign policy and domestic policy separate realms; (2) which is a greater danger to rational foreign policy: disruption from popular pressures or derailment from problems arising from our separation of powers system; and (3) is the concept of the “national interest” an effective standard for foreign policy decision makers? Finally, he supports a foreign policy alternative for political realism: “principled pragmatism.”

Nincic argues persuasively against the political realist proposition that foreign policy and domestic policy are separate realms. He quotes Charles Beard: “Domestic affairs and foreign relations are intimately linked. Often both are but different aspects of the same thing” (p. 1). Of course, many contemporary theorists have contended that policy makers must deal with a variety of “intermestic” issues (international-domestic issues). Realists traditionally treated foreign policy as “high politics” and domestic policy as “low politics.” Much of the realist analysis on this matter seems outdated, but surely there remain some purely *foreign* policy issues and some purely *domestic* policy issues. The increasing degree of blending of the two categories has not eradicated certain intrinsic, unique characteristics of each area.

Realists tend to concentrate on the disruptive effects of popular emotions and misperceptions on the foreign policy making process. They have often argued for greater executive autonomy, as a shield from both public pressures and Congressional dominance. Nincic, on the other hand, contends that public opinion is more likely to have a “moderating” influence on policy. But the historical record is mixed: public pressures have occasionally pushed decision makers to extremes and at other times have discouraged extremes.

To what extent does the structure of American politics militate against effective foreign policy decision making? Nincic claims that this may be a more serious problem than public opinion. Leaders are frequently impacted adversely by the election cycle, resulting in unwise or extreme policy choices.

The concept of the “national interest” is of key importance to political realists. Nincic, however, downplays the concept as too broad, vague, and abstract -- thus making it exceptionally difficult to measure progress toward achieving the interest. He quotes Raymond Aron: “the plurality of concrete objectives and of ultimate objectives forbids a rational definition of ‘national interest’ (p. 166). Nincic further asserts, “. . . it is possible to speak of an objective national interest only when crucial interests are most gravely threatened (a rare occurrence); in most other circumstances a national interest emerges only from an authentically

democratic aggregation of domestic preference” (p. 168).

Nincic offers a foreign policy alternative to political realism as well as to idealism: “principled pragmatism.” It would display “some *combination* of ethical concerns, parochial interest, and commitment to national power and security, but with no single class of concerns dominating the agenda” (p. 169). The alternative is attractive insofar as it posits a foreign policy dominated by executive branch leaders who might exaggerate threats to the nation or who might manipulate foreign policy objectives for electoral purposes. But the alternative is tainted with a substantial degree of ambiguity, just as are the other competing models: idealism and realism.

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Tismaneanu, Vladimir. *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel.* New York: The Free Press, 1992. 312 pp. (\$22.95 cloth).

The political upheavals that shook Eastern Europe in 1989 unquestionably altered the map of Europe and the world. Yet there is little agreement about *why* these transformations took place. To be sure, we all watched the same events on television: the destruction of the Berlin wall, the velvet revolution in Prague, and the violent overthrow of Ceausescu in Romania, and for the most part we empathetically identified with those intellectuals, workers, and students who rose up to overthrow the old order. But even as we watched, many undoubtedly wondered how these revolutions had come about so seemingly easily. Why now, and why this particular form of revolution and these particular leaders?

Vladimir Tismaneanu argues that the revolutionary events of 1989 stemmed from the rebirth of “civil society” in Eastern Europe within the framework of the decaying communist order. “Civil society” therefore is to be understood as the antithesis of the Leninist-Stalinist model of an organized, disciplined, planned, and above all, bureaucratized society. It is a form of “antipolitics,” embodying “forms of human cooperation and communication . . . outside the state’s controls . . .” Finding its semi-institutionalized expressions in the debating circles of writers and intellectuals, in the “flying universities” of the 1970s and 1980s, in sometimes tolerated and sometimes suppressed workers’ organizations such as Solidarity, and in groups that sprung up to express public concern with new issues such as the environment, the civil society cobbles together an alternative social and political order, separate from and critical of the Leninist-Stalinist formal structures of the state. It is more than just an opposition force or a would-be government in waiting; it is an alternative *society* with ideas about the creation of democratic institutions, a social and intellectual agenda, and a program of economic reform.

In Tismaneanu’s view, it is the emergence of such civil societies that explains the dramatic events of 1989. The strength of his argument -- and the value of this

book in general -- lies in his attention to phenomena that most outside observers ignored: the creation of such alternative societies and leadership cadres which took to the streets in 1989. As he convincingly demonstrates on a country-by-country basis (and, to be sure, there were differences separating the comparatively open societies such as Hungary from the new-Stalinist regimes in Romania or East Germany), such civil societies existed in varying incarnations throughout Eastern Europe, and they both paved the way for popular revolts and provided, however temporarily, the leadership and inspiration needed to defy the old order.

The single-minded focus on the emergence of civil societies is also the major weakness of Tismaneanu's analysis. The argument that the east European revolutions were distinctly home-grown phenomena rooted in the creation of alternative "apolitical" forces marginalizes other important domestic and foreign factors. The importance of the Gorbachev reforms in the Soviet Union is vastly underestimated, leading Tismaneanu to argue that these events merely "facilitated" the revolutions of 1989. Moreover, little is made of the changing Soviet view of the importance of Eastern Europe in Moscow's thinking about defense needs, to say nothing of the increasing economic burden that the faltering bloc economies were imposing on the USSR. The domestic impact of economic difficulties is also marginalized in Tismaneanu's view of events; while the new civil society was created and led by political activists, it was populated by more common folk whose discontent with the regime grew as their economic plight deteriorated.

Tismaneanu's attention to the growth of the pre-1989 civil societies masks two realities that are now becoming painfully apparent. First, no matter how well intentioned, such civil societies were at heart essentially negative phenomena, at least in the operational sense that they had a clearer vision of what they wished to destroy than they did of what would take its place. The generalities and platitudes they professed with intellectual abandon proved difficult to translate into day-to-day operational codes and political movements. Second, the democrats who led the revolutions of 1989 had little notion how to deal with the ethnic and economic tensions that had always been a part of their societies or that had emerged under communist rules. Tismaneanu's argument that the post-communist chaos should be attributed to the destruction of a pre-existing "social solidarity" by the Leninist-Stalinist institutions imposed by Moscow hardly reflects the political and social realities of the divided and conflict-ridden societies that existed before 1945.

These criticisms aside, *Reinventing Politics* makes an important contribution to the literature on the revolutions of 1989 in that it focuses on the creation of alternative societies, even as it attributes too much to such civil societies and slights other important domestic and international factors.

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Brand, Laurie A. *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. 286 pp. (\$13.50).

In her book, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State*, Laurie Brand undertakes a systematic study of the relationship between host governments of Egypt, Kuwait, and Jordan and their resident Palestinian communities since 1948. Specifically, Professor Brand focuses on the development inside these countries of five important Palestinian institutions which serve the needs of the Palestinian diaspora: the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), the General Union of Palestinian Workers (GUPW), the General Union of Palestinian Teachers (GUPT), the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPWOM), and Palestinian Red Crescent Society. These organizations were founded in response to the difficult conditions in which Palestinians have been forced to live in various countries since the 1948 war.

The study fills a void in the literature since most sources take the founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Egypt in 1964 as the starting point of Palestinian nationalism and gloss over the years 1948-64, which Brand shows are crucial in understanding the political culture of the Palestinians. It also places the study of the Palestinian community in the context of political development studies.

Brand's is a scholarly treatment. It uses Charles Tilly's political mobilization model which argues that the emergence of a political movement involves the three major elements of motive, opportunity and resources. Brand focuses on the element of opportunity in this study, coming to the conclusion that opportunity (for political organizing) declines as integration (of the Palestinians into the host society) increases. That is, a host state's propensity to repress the efforts of Palestinians to organize among themselves increases as these efforts increasingly pose a threat to the internal stability or external security of the host state. The opportunity to organize is a function of the extent to which the Palestinian community has become integrated into the host society. Thus, "the evidence suggests that the regime's willingness to exercise repression is based on the degree of economic or political marginality of the Palestinian community to the country's productive structure" (p. 229).

The focus of the study is how these efforts at organization have fared in three categories of states represented, respectively, by Egypt, Kuwait, and Jordan. In Egypt, the monarchy which still ruled in 1948 strictly limited Palestinian immigration from Gaza. The majority of those who were accepted were not enfranchised and initially the Egyptian government even forbade the refugees to work. Although under Nasir's Arab nationalist regime the Palestinians (most notably the university students) were able to openly organize, their activities were carefully monitored by Egyptian intelligence. To the extent that the GUPS pursued policies that were basically compatible with those of the Egyptian regime, no problems arose. After Palestinians demonstrated in opposition to Sadat's 1977 visit to

Jerusalem, however, large numbers of Palestinian students were expelled from the country. Brand concludes that the fact that Egypt had supported the organizational efforts of Palestinian students and women was only due to "the small numbers of Palestinians permanently residing in the country and to the strength and efficiency of Egyptian internal security, which was capable of suppressing elements that strayed too far from the regime's line" (p. 231). Other countries which fall under this category include Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.

Kuwait represents a second category of state (which includes the other Gulf states) characterized first by the fact that Palestinians migrated there for economic reasons and second that "these states did not offer citizenship or travel documents (with a few exceptions), nor the prospect of permanent residence" (p. 229). Kuwait did not even extend refugee status to the migrants. Still, because the Palestinian community was relatively large, it acquired significant but unquantifiable power because it has played an important role in the development of the bureaucracy, educational system, and the economy. "The community's legal status combined with its conservative orientation and Kuwait's distance from the battlefield have afforded it considerable freedom to organize" (p. 231). This includes organization of Palestinian grammar schools and among Palestinian women and workers.

Jordan is in a category by itself because it annexed a part of Palestine and granted citizenship to Palestinians. The problem Palestinians encountered here stemmed from their fundamental opposition to the government's pro-Western regional policies. King Husayn closed the offices of the PLO in 1966, just two years after it opened, in response to this criticism. After the Jordanian military had recovered from the 1967 war, Husayn "precipitated military confrontation with the Palestinian Resistance Movement and finally, in July 1971, drove the resistance from the country. As a result, all independent Palestinian institutions were either closed or destroyed" (p. 232). Since then "separate Palestinian institutional development in the Hashemite Kingdom has been . . . meager at best and subject to very close monitoring and control. Barring any radical changes, this situation will persist in the future" (p. 233).

This book will be valuable both to those who study the Palestinian community and those interested in general in the political development of the Middle East. Instead of detailing the Palestine Liberation Organization, it focuses on other routes of political mobilization and unification within the Palestinian diaspora, some of which predate the founding of the PLO. Much of the information about this is apparently being presented for the first time, and perusal of the bibliography shows that Brand's research was based largely on interviews conducted between 1983 and 1986.

When Brand prepares a second edition of the book, which is certainly called for in the wake of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War in which the PLO supported Iraq, she should also consider extending her study to the life of the organizations in question in Gaza and in other Arab countries. She could also improve the work by integrating her descriptive history with the theoretical framework throughout

the book, instead of bringing in the framework only in the introductory and concluding chapters. Other small touches such as the inclusion of maps would also be helpful.

Thus, Brand's study makes two contributions. First, it provides information, based largely on interviews, on how the Palestinian community organized within three host states. Secondly, it sets the relationship between the Palestinian community and its host states in the context of political development studies.

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Fuller, William C., Jr. *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*. New York: Free Press, 1992. 557 pp. (\$35.00 cloth).

Professor Fuller's comprehensive and masterful treatment of three centuries of Russian military and diplomatic strategy will no doubt receive the wide readership it deserves, for this is not strictly a study in military history and strategy. Fuller set himself an extremely challenging task, to examine the triangular relationship among Russian political objectives, strategy and military potential over a period of three hundred years. Because of his logical and well-organized approach, he succeeds admirably in what otherwise could have been an impossible broad undertaking.

Readers will immediately see that Russia's problems are perennial, the land is too vast. There are no natural frontiers. Transportation is woefully inadequate. Autocracy seems necessary to hold the country together, but autocracy itself keeps Russia backward relative to the west. Russian soldiers are asked to make up in "spirit" for inadequate provisioning. Minorities are seen as potentially treasonous, and foreign enemies (German, Swedes, Turks, Japanese, to name just a few) are, correctly, suspected of waiting for the slightest sign of Russian weakness to roll back the frontiers. Meanwhile, always, the state is underfinanced.

Fuller's thesis is that until the Crimean War, Russian generals and statesmen brilliantly crafted strategies to exploit the "advantages of backwardness," but that after 1856 advances in military technology, particularly the growing importance of railroads in strategic planning, made this impossible. The author's approach is relentlessly rigorous -- he presents and defends a series of propositions by disproving as many as four or five competing explanations. For each time period, Fuller examines a complete range of actors that could explain Russian triumph or defeat: generalship, military technology, tactics and operations, and endurance. Almost always, it seems, victory depends on endurance. Russian generals must always overcome hunger and thirst before closing with the enemy. "Russia made war in spasms, racing to seize important military objectives before the money ran out. This, then, was the last root cause of Russian military weakness: the poverty

of the state" (p. 34).

Several of Fuller's interpretations are unorthodox. He asserts (p. 44) that Peter the Great "never succeeded in creating a regular Russian army at all." Russia's expansion was not the product of macrohistorical forces, not preordained at all, but the result of conscious decisions. Factionalism at the court in the eighteenth century did not really weaken Russia. No national awakening in the War of 1812 defeated Napoleon -- that interpretation was propagated by "a conscious or unconscious process of self-delusion" (p. 217). No doubt historians will find much here to dispute, but Fuller's persuasive theses are drawn from extensive research in the Central State Archive of Military History, the Central State Archive of the October Revolution, and the Archive of the Foreign Policy of Russia, all in Moscow.

Now that the Soviet Union is no more, and Russian communism has expired and with it the Russian empire, the reader looks back and wonders if it could have turned out differently. Fuller does not supply the answer, because he resolutely sticks to his self-defined time frame, but he does provide suggestive hints. The empire simply grew too big. To deter attack, Russia had to try to appear strong nowhere. Worse yet, once Japan entered the picture, Russia became so desperate to keep her French ally happy that she was forced to overextend herself in Europe precisely because she had overextended herself in Asia! Fuller gives the reader much to mull over.

This book has one major flaw: completely inadequate maps. Readers will be unable to understand Russian tactics in Poland, the Black Sea region, central Asia or Manchuria without reference to other books and atlases. If the publishers ever contemplate a second edition, they should rectify this shortcoming. Typographical errors and errors of fact seem remarkably few, and Fuller's crisp, lively prose carries the reader across a range of topics and centuries that might otherwise seem daunting. Highly recommended.

Ross Marlay
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Wedel, Janine R., ed. *The Unplanned Society: Poland During and After Communism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 271 pp. (\$35.00 cloth).

Specialists on Eastern Europe have always decried the tendency of non-specialists to refer to this region as the East Bloc. Though they were paid little heed, their main point was that the Stalinist model failed to provide an accurate description of these countries at all save on a superficial level, and that the indigenous political and social systems in Eastern Europe persisted despite communist rule. Now with the demise of the communist systems, scholars within those countries have the opportunity to offer the world their own observations on

postwar history. Janine Wedel has collected a number of essays written by Polish scholars, meticulously translated them, and offers them as what may be the first comprehensive glimpse of how the Poles look at themselves. The insights these authors share should help dispel the notion that the countries of Eastern Europe were mini-clones of the Soviet Union.

The essays represent a diversity of approaches and backgrounds. All are written by members of the intellectual elite. Many are academics. As a result of this diversity, the essays range in tone from dispassionate analyses of social arrangements, to personal accounts of life in the opposition, to polemics on the future directions of Polish democracy. Moreover, the essays cover a long time span, written between 1945 and the present.

Editor Wedel has organized the wide ranging essays into roughly three categories: discussions of economic arrangements, individual responses to life under communism, and social institutions and movements. Together they serve to confirm common knowledge as well as offer new concepts worthy of consideration in comparative perspective. As a confirmation of common knowledge, most western assumptions about life under communism appear to have been fairly accurate. Central economic planning was a catastrophe, most public officials really did not believe the official lines their positions demanded they reiterate, and despite the apparent continual shortage of goods, people got along by resorting to many informal and unofficial forms of exchange. Graft, corruption, and an intricate form of barter were the oils that lubricated this squeaky machine.

Though none of this is new, the scholars who describe these arrangements do so with a fresh insight and with a use of terminology that is worth considering. The informal mechanisms of barter and trade in Polish society, called *handel* by El bieta Firlit and Jerzy Chopectki, were a necessary yet unsavory element of life in Poland. The term refers to “private exchanges unregulated by law, but by well-recognized rules, and tinged with cunning and legerdemain” (p. 95). While in the West this basic principle of free market exchange brings praise upon those who excel at it, in Poland the practice is viewed with disdain. Indeed, the Jewish/German word used to refer to it associates *handel* with the strong anti-semitic currents in Polish society.

Since *handel* in Poland was a central but unacknowledged fact of life, it required intimate relations of trust among members of a tightly-knit group. Called a *rodowisko* (pl. *rodowiska*), this peculiar form of social group served as a clandestine substitute for the voluntary associations that would comprise civil society in a less authoritarian country. In fact, it is difficult to make comparisons between *rodowiska* and the types of groups that arise in democratic societies. Two characteristics of the *rodowisko* are usually absent in pluralist interest organizations. One is the level of intimacy and trust necessary to inspire confidence among members of the group. The other is the degree of reciprocal obligation that membership imposes. Western sociologists interested in the comparative study of authoritarianism would find the exposition of these concepts in the book extremely

useful.

The concepts are also crucial for understanding the political economy of Polish socialism. When all incidents of *handel* are clandestine, each constitutes a political act. Indeed knowledge of these two concepts is crucial to understanding the political significance of larger social institutions such as the Catholic Church and the Solidarity movement. Essays in the final part of the book assert that a secularizing spillover from the West accounts for the demise of the Catholic church and that Solidarity crumbled when it appeared to be an elitist movement which lacked any identity except as an opposition. Despite these themes, however, the essays are organized in such a way as to lead the reader to conclude that these larger social forms are less important than the *rodowiska*.

That is precisely the conclusion Editor Wedel wishes the reader to reach. In addition to providing exceptional translations of all the essays, Wedel wrote introductory annotations for each. The theme she subtly weaves through the volume is that this structure (*rodowiska*) and process (*handel*) of Polish social exchange predates the communists and will endure after them. The case for the preexistence of the notions is derived from an essay written in 1945 by Kazimierz Wyka, which analyzes life under the occupation. Wedel uses different quotes from that essay to introduce each of the successive pieces, and to drive home the continuity in Polish society under both Nazi occupation and communism. That these are enduring features of Polish society in the post-communist era is an assertion she offers as advice to those concerned with the current Polish democratic experiment.

The major criticism that can be made of the volume is that its theme could be construed as simply an anthropologist's disciplinary defense of turf. We are left to conclude that present day micro-level social arrangements are the most important feature of Polish society; not a surprising conclusion for an anthropologist to reach, but one that will not satisfy those with macro or comparative concerns. Moreover, Wedel's theme seems to be unduly deterministic and ahistorical. It identifies the origin of Polish social organization in the Nazi era. This seems to suggest too much similarity between the occupation and communist systems, and makes the skeptical reader question whether this peculiar form of social organization is as enduring as Wedel would have us believe. A longer historical perspective would make that assertion more persuasive.

These are minor points and do not detract from the volume's significance as an important piece of historiography, and as a glimpse into the issues that confront Polish academics and social commentators. It will be useful particularly for anyone interested in Poland, or in studying Poland in comparative perspective.

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Political Theory

Williams, Howard. *International Relations in Political Theory*. Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1992. 143 pp. (\$79.00 cloth; \$29.95 paper).

Rare are the books that deal with the normative aspects of international relations. Even rarer are those which explicitly try to connect political theory with international relations. This is precisely what Howard Williams purports to do in his examination of international relations as a theme of political theory. The author selected eleven political philosophers and theorists whose works are regarded as classics of Western civilization: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Clausewitz, and Marx. For Williams a return to the classics is still a mandatory pilgrimage in the realm of political theory. His technique of sketching in eleven chapters the ideas of the classics is more than a mere survey. His focus is sharpened by a concern to assess the possibility of making sense out of international relations with the help of those aspects of the theorists' ideas which bear most relevance to international relations.

The author rejects Plato's speculative claim that the world will know no rest or security until philosophers are statesmen, and finds Plato's view of politics too undemocratic to be useful in contemporary life. More to his liking is Aristotle's more moderate position on political leadership and politics, although he fears that today's Aristotelians might have an excessive disposition to favor the *status quo*. He finds Augustine's arch-realism entirely too pessimistic and demonic, but at the same time judges Aquinas's views on the statesman's positive role in producing a world order in conformity with natural law as too cozy. Machiavelli's divorce of ethics from politics and his hard-hearted realism -- that considerations of power are the only relevant factors -- are found wanting, although the author sees value in Machiavelli's point that getting things right in politics is not merely a matter of following the right principles, the circumstances must also be propitious.

Williams is kind to Hobbes, even though he had a pessimistic view of human nature and advocated an all-powerful, centralized political authority. The author appreciates Hobbes' discussion of the laws of nature, essentially behavioral prescriptions which the philosopher deduced from a human desire for self-preservation, among them the concept of reciprocity, and the principle of state equality. Following Hobbes, Williams surmises that a successful international order might be built solely upon the rational pursuit of self-interest. Rousseau is dismissed as entirely unhelpful, leaving us with a sense of futility because beneficial ideas always run up against the barrier of human selfishness. Kant, however, is the philosopher the author favors since he offers a possible guide to a working international order. It is not so much Kant the universalist, but the Kant of Perpetual Peace, accepting the goal of a league of "republican" states, that strikes William's fancy. Kant's observation that over the years it becomes likely that reason would be a substitute for the use of force, that a learning process is

taking place pointing in the direction of an ever-widening voluntary federation, does have some basis in the reality of West European integration.

Hegel is rigorous and original, but wrong. Clausewitz's legacy remains a central contribution to the realist school: the military is properly a political means. Marxism's contribution to the understanding and practice of international politics is acknowledged, but finally dismissed as too confining.

In the end, Williams advocates a synthesis of Kantian and Hobbesian ideas as offering the greatest hope. Kant's rationalistic ethic needs to be tempered by Hobbes' survivalist ethic. Altogether Williams provides us with an intelligent guide through the thickets of political theory. The small book is well worth reading and very useful, I should think, as a challenging supplemental reading for introductory courses in political theory and international relations.

Kurt K. Tweraser
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Crotty, William J. (ed). *Political Science: Looking to the Future*; Volume I: *The Theory and Practice of Political Science*; Volume II: *Comparative Politics, Policy, and International Relations*; Volume III: *Political Behavior*; Volume IV: *American Institutions*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991. Volume I: 237 pp; Volume II: 294 pp.; Volume III: 240 pp.; Volume IV: 298 pp. (Volumes I and III: \$15.95 paper, \$47.95 cloth; Volumes II and IV: \$18.95 paper, \$57.95 cloth).

With about one-half of the practitioners of political science in the United States scheduled for retirement over the next decade, the impending passing of the generational torch prompts this forward-looking assessment of the state of the discipline. Additional framing concerns include current problems facing the academy in general and the social sciences in particular, and a perceived mood of disenchantment within political science brought on by increasing fragmentation.

Editor Crotty initiated this endeavor during his 1989 tenure as President of the Midwest Political Science Association. He commissioned papers for a special series of theme panels and subsequently assembled the twenty-nine revised papers into these four volumes. In addition, he contributed a common explanatory introduction included in each volume, complemented by thorough and insightful summaries of the seven or eight articles each volume contains.

Crotty consciously confronted the generational issue by seeking out authors who, for the most part, are not themselves senior scholars. Rather, they come from the ranks of the emerging leaders of the profession. Having already begun to make their mark on the discipline, they yet promise to advance it into the twenty-first century. The editorial mandate placed few restrictions on their reflections. Crotty deliberately eschewed the criteria of balance and comprehensiveness in favor of "ideals -- a freshness of perspective, a personal signature on the

observations made" (I, p. 4).

Thus, the essays, while uniformly informative and stimulating, nevertheless have an idiosyncratic and uneven quality; they also feature substantial repetition. Several topics receive prolonged consideration in more than one setting. Much of the overlap relates to methodological issues. For example, in Volume I, Kristen R. Monroe systematically addresses the theory of rational action and its utility to political science. In turn, subsequent authors in this and the remaining volumes devote sustained attention to the application of rational choice theory to their specific areas of interest. The repetition is especially pronounced for the reader proceeding through all four volumes sequentially. However, I suspect most readers will not do so, focusing instead on single volumes or isolated articles, lessening the significance of this criticism.

The articles stand well on their own. Written by specialists, they are understandable to generalists. While not intended to provide comprehensive literature reviews, they ably acquaint the reader with previous and current scholarship and scholarly controversies; their bibliographies are usually extensive.

Collectively, the articles provide thorough coverage of the fields and subfields of the discipline, although some conceptual confusion surrounds the use of these terms. The volumes vary in cohesiveness, with Volume III, dealing with political behavior, and Volume IV, with American institutions, ranking higher on this criterion. In Volume I, thoughtful assessments of the topics of gender politics and Afro-American politics appear nevertheless peripheral to the titular focus on the theory and practice of political science. In turn, Volume II combines comparative and international perspectives with public policy and political economy concerns, detracting from its internal coherence.

The articles effectively lay out the various pieces of the puzzle of political science, typically raising more questions than providing answers. The separate volumes establish broad frameworks to facilitate aggregation. Still, the reader faces the formidable task of putting the pieces together. The absence of an index inhibits such integrative efforts.

The primary beneficiaries of these volumes will likely be the graduate students of the 1990s, who will discover that the articles offer invaluable introductions to the foundations, as well as the nooks and crannies, of today's discipline. For this reviewer, along with others for whom graduate school is an increasingly dim memory, the articles provide useful updates on developments in areas outside our areas of interest and expertise. On the other hand, specialists in each area no doubt will quibble over emphases and omissions.

These volumes should find their way quickly onto graduate reading lists, particularly in scope and methods and survey courses. Apart from their timeliness, they should come to occupy an intermediate position among timeless "state of the discipline" works. They will reside comfortably between the more encyclopedic Greenstein and Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (1975), and the less comprehensive but perhaps more cohesive single volume assessments, either by

a single author or edited collections.

Reflecting on the state of the discipline as portrayed in these volumes, I do not detect much of the perceived disenchantment with fragmentation that precipitated this endeavor. Rather, I encounter a discipline increasingly accepting of diversity. The disciplinary diversity has taken institutionalized form through the establishment and expansion of organized sections of the American Political Science Association. I found it noteworthy that several of the subfield assessments refer to the positive activities and contributions of particular sections. The abiding and ever-more-relevant question is whether the discipline is or can be anything more than the sum of its component part.

While the emerging generation of leaders does not appear to be obsessed with the quest for a holy grail in the form of a grand theoretical framework, it takes methodological sophistication for granted. Common methodologies connect work done in diverse subfields, thereby promoting integration. Political science looks to the future externally as well as internally. Traditional concerns regarding links with other disciplines, especially economics, psychology, and sociology, have not abated; they continue to attract attention. These volumes generally perpetuate the identification of political science with American-based scholarship. They feature all-too-few admirable efforts to transcend parochialism and acquaint readers with complementary work being done elsewhere in the world.

I take leave of these volumes with heightened senses of disciplinary awareness and optimism about the future of political science. The articles trace our disciplinary roots, identify significant contemporary scholarship, and project provocative research agendas. They make clear that our increasing diversity does not yet preclude dialogue across the discipline. They also call attention to the abiding importance of the generalists who are both the invokers and the primary beneficiaries of this dialogue.

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Flathman, Richard E. *Willful Liberalism: Voluntarism and Individuality in Political Theory and Practice*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 232 pp. (\$31.50 cloth, \$13.95 paper).

In his previous book, *Toward A Liberalism* (1989), Richard E. Flathman raised the possibility that liberalism could be enhanced if it were brought into contact with a voluntarist tradition that stressed the importance of the will, willfulness, and the basic mysteriousness of human life and action. Flathman believed that liberalism fell short in its commitment to individuality and to the sources of diversity found in modern liberal societies, and saw in the voluntarist tradition a way to strengthen and solidify the foundations of a liberal worldview. *Willful Liberalism* is Flathman's bold attempt to address the deficiencies found

in contemporary liberalism by merging it with a strong voluntarist perspective.

The essays in *Willful Liberalism* are self-consciously exploratory and open-ended in spirit. Moving smoothly in Part One from the proto-liberalism of Hobbes to the radical subjectivism of William James and Wittgenstein's philosophy of meaning to the conservatism of Michael Oakeshott, Flathman draws upon the history of ideas to investigate the relationship between individualism, plurality, sociability, and politics and the place that these are given in the liberal and voluntarist traditions. Essentially, he argues that while liberalism values such things, it does not adequately defend them or conceptually ground them in a coherent political theory. Moreover, he suggests that the voluntarist tradition might either help "deliver liberalism from its difficulties" or "enlarge somewhat the prevailing sense of alternatives" (128).

In Part Two, Flathman tries to show how liberalism could be enhanced by incorporating some of the central ideas found in the tradition of strong voluntarism. Once again casting a broad net into the history of ideas, Flathman explores a rich variety of topics ranging from the theological voluntarism of Augustine and William of Ockham to the secular voluntarism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. His argument can be broken down into parts: first, that liberalism contains a weak and problematic notion of voluntary action that cannot be defended from its harshest critics; second, that the strong voluntarist tradition offers liberalism a view of willfulness, the individual, and social diversity that can fortify it and better articulate, protect and promote "liberalism's most distinctive and estimable understandings and values" (222).

Flathman recognizes that his project of creating a "willful liberalism" is fraught with difficulties. Many of the theorists he draws upon for inspiration, such as Augustine, Schopenhauer, or Nietzsche, hold considerable disdain for what we consider to be liberal ideas and values. Such theorists need to be tamed before they can be consumed for liberal purposes, and tame them Flathman does. In a creative and at times somewhat strained discussion of Nietzsche near the end of the book, for example, he argues that Nietzsche's belief that "the ideas of the herd should rule in the herd -- but not reach out beyond it" is but a different way of restating the Declaration of Independence's notion that we should have "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind" (193).

For Flathman's Nietzsche, "respecting" the ideas of the herd does not mean agreeing with them or abandoning one's own values in favor of them. It appears to mean simply allowing them to exist, however begrudgingly. Nietzsche's elitism thus should be viewed as cultural, not political, and his "ungenerous, narrow, and ill-considered" personal sentiments should not be confused with those aspects of his moral and political thought that are not antagonistic to liberalism (206).

Such taming of Nietzsche and his fellow voluntarists simply goes too far, underestimating the large gap that often separates liberalism from the strong voluntarism expressed in such notions as the will to power. While there certainly is a place for a Nietzsche in a liberal society, it is questionable whether there is a

place for a liberal in Nietzsche's society. At some level in both theory and practice, liberalism demands more than a disdainful toleration of the views of other people as being merely the ideas of the herd. It requires a hearty respect for and admiration of the fact that we live in a world where people value different things and make different choices in their life plans than we do, and that that fact is in and of itself good. Maintaining a hearty respect for the admiration of the opinions and choices of others is, in the end, a far cry from Nietzsche's call for a transvaluation of all values and the creation of the overman.

There are two nagging problems that readers will encounter in the book. First, the book is poorly organized. Part One is composed of four distinct chapters, loosely tied together with the themes of individualism and plurality. Part Two, meanwhile, is an extended essay divided into five sections. Why a common organizational structure isn't provided for the two sections is unclear. Second, Flathman's argument is dense and often difficult to follow. Lengthy sentences containing too many parenthetical comments make the book frustrating to read at times, compelling the reader to spend much time breaking sentences apart trying to figure out exactly what is being said. Moreover, crucial arguments and disclaimers essential to Flathman's argument are often embedded in long footnotes (see for example 1992: 6, 13, 14, 119, 172, 174, 181, and 209). Readers would be well served to read carefully the footnotes and the complex introduction which tries to tie the book's many themes together.

Overall, Flathman has written a complex and stimulating book that provides much food for thought. While he may not have solved the problems of individualism and plurality in the liberal tradition, the book offers liberal theorists something Flathman believes the voluntarist tradition gives them: "a good read and a good think" (172).

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