

Institutional Representation As Institutional Accountability In The Arkansas General Assembly

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Introduction

In her masterful analysis of the many faces of representation Hannah Fenichel Pitkin (1967) notes that the individual-representative-and-her/his-constituency is the typical way that representation has been conceptualized. And, the usual component studied in this representational interaction (since the influential Miller-Stokes work in 1963), is the congruence of the public policy positions of individual legislators and their constituencies (Eulau and Karps in Eulau and Wahlke, 1978:55-58). Pitkin suggests a change in focus to a conception of whom, what, and how a legislature as an overall system represents a political community rather than the individual-legislator-and-her/his-constituency conception. She writes that representation is:

...primarily a public, institutional arrangement involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex ways of large-scale social arrangements. What makes it representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the overall structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people .. (Pitkin, 1967:221-222).

This concept of representation may be named institutional or systemic. It is "...a collective phenomenon..." that may or may not emerge in the given political situation, depending upon the "... overall structure and functioning of the system..." (222). Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau (1969), Eulau and Paul D. Karps (in Eulau and Wahlke, 1978:59) and Robert Weissberg (1978) have added their voices to the call for such a change.

Justification

The Pitkin institutional-systemic approach permits a many-faceted perspective on what she has shown to be a complex concept with several meanings. Secondly, as Wahlke approvingly quotes Thomas Dye, the way a democratic system allocates values is more important than the actual outcomes (Wahlke in Eulau and Wahlke, 1978:156). And, institutional representation surely is oriented toward the overall manner in which a legislative system allocates values. Thirdly, the institutional approach is more realistic in its expectations of citizen involvement. It only requires the potential for citizen involvement (e.g., interest articulation and voting), while the individual-representative-and-her/his-constituency focus requires unrealistically high levels of citizen involvement (Eulau and Abramowitz in Eulau and Wahlke, 1978:257-259). Fourthly, the institution-systemic approach permits empirical-logical methodology to replace the inappropriate (albeit, highly sophisticated) causal modelling that has been employed in recent individual-representative-and-her/his-constituency studies (Eulau and Karps in Eulau and Wahlke, 1978:69). Finally, the older individual-and-her/his-constituency perspective has reached an impasse with regard to helping us understand representation in modern democratic systems (Eulau and Wahlke, 1978:49, 74-75).

Methodology

Regrettably, Pitkin did not operationalize her concept of institutional-systemic representation. Indeed, her terminology poses difficult measurement problems. To deal with the operationalization/measurement problem we turn to Prewitt and Eulau (1969; Prewitt, 1970). They converted institutional/systemic representation into institutional accountability and derived a set of conditions that might enhance institutional accountability. After testing these variables, Prewitt and Eulau offered them as positive enhancements to institutional accountability. We employ their conversion of institutional-systemic representation into institutional accountability as a practical research method of dealing with the operationalizing of institutional-systemic representation. And, the Prewitt-Eulau conditions for enhancing institutional accountability are also used because: (1) their conditions are derived from a thorough literature review and tentative testing with city legislatures; (2) their conditions are a translation of institutional representation into testable measures of institutional accountability; and (3) their conditions are factors which enhance institutional accountability and where present in a given system, provide reasoned assurance of at least institutional accountability being present.

The Prewitt-Eulau conditions are:

(1) a certain complexity of the social environment (Prewitt and Eulau, 1969:440); (2) not a significant amount of sponsorship in political recruitment (p. 440) with low volunteerism (Prewitt, 1970:15-16); (3) not trustee representative role-orientation (Prewitt:16), instead public support should be sought (Prewitt and Eulau:440); and (4) elections should not be rituals (Prewitt:16), but have an impact upon forcing incumbents from office (Prewitt and Eulau:440).

Purpose

It was necessary to present the previous material to make my purpose clear. My purpose is to map (describe) the basic contours of institutional-systemic representation conceived as institutional accountability in the Arkansas General Assembly. Professor Wahlke suggests (Eulau and Wahlke, 1978:282) that descriptions of little known legislatures are an important step in developing a conceptual map of legislative functioning.

Data

The data were collected from interviews of 84 of 100 Arkansas General Assembly House members and 30 of 35 senators during the 1981 regular session. This was repeated on new members in the 1983 regular session with 14 of 17 new representatives and 10 of 11 new senators responding. The questions--found in the tables--were developed jointly by the author and Dr. Dunn who is an experienced pollster and the University's Governmental Affairs Director. The latter administered the 1981 survey employing senior students in a methodology course as interviewers. The author conducted the 1983 survey also with senior student interviewers.

Findings

1. The first condition for enhancing legislative institutional accountability is societal complexity. It has as its conceptual antecedent the well known economic-societal complexity underpinnings of democratic nation-states (Cnudde and Neubauer, 1969:151-235; Dahl, 1973: 48-104) focused at a lower unit of government. Arkansas "with a little bit of help from its federal friends" has recently developed both economically and democratically. In 1950 the number of Arkansas' agricultural workers was 221,000 and 395,000 non-agricultural; by 1979 these numbers were 66,000 and 749,000 respectively (Holifield, 1981). After losing population in the 1950's, Arkansas' growth rate in the 1970s was 18 percent (1980 census) with continued "sun-belt" growth expected, further altering the state's demographics. Concomitantly, very substantial democratic political reforms have taken place in the electoral

(Amendment 50 in 1963 and 51 in 1964), judicial (Bryant, Vol. II, 1978: 520-578), executive (Dumas in Nunn, 1973:168-178), and legislative systems (Ledbetter, 1973).¹

Regrettably, the precise amount of societal complexity required to support democratic institutions cannot be specified (Dahl, 62-81). It seems safe to say, however, that Arkansas is now more diverse than many American states given its ranking as twenty-second on an industrialization index (Morehouse, 1981:513-514).

2. From the preceding milieu, women and men are recruited, or recruit themselves, to the state legislature. The second Prewitt and Eulau condition is in two parts dealing with recruitment. First, there should not be extensive amounts of sponsorship in recruitment, i.e., candidates should not be asked, prompted, co-opted, etc., by interests that retain undue influence over the representative's legislative actions. And second, running for public office as a by-product of higher private social status with predisposed public policy preferences unconcerned with the public's policy preferences should be kept minimal. Prewitt calls this "volunteerism." The Arkansas state legislators meet both of these conditions.

On the first point, recruitment in Arkansas is from long-standing personal interest in politics, stimulation by family and "friends," and claim of concern for civic service (Tables 1 and 2). Reinforcing this is information obtained from interviews not reported in the tables (see footnote 2). When an Arkansas state legislative seat is vacant, up to

¹First, G.I.s returning from World War II experiences with other states' systems initiated reforms and established a climate more receptive to reform. Second, federal interventions in the form of Eisenhower's use of troops to integrate the public schools in 1957 (Ferguson and Atkinson, 1966:321-328); the federal court's reforms of Arkansas state prisons (Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 1969), and reapportioning the state legislature (Yancey v. Faubus, D.C., 238 F. Supp. 290, 1965); federal HEW racial quotas for higher education in Arkansas; the impact of federal programs/grants-in-aid (Halbrook, 1981:1-10); and recent national Democrat Party rules have affected participants/policies of the state party (Crotty and Jacobson, 1980:156-165). Third, Winthrop Rockefeller's move to Arkansas in 1953 resulted in massive organizational and monetary expenditures on behalf of the reforms he sought (Ward, 1978). Fourth, the emphasis placed upon economic development and prestige associated with the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission have fostered greater receptiveness to national (international) concerns. Fifth, a state-level news media has developed with connections outside the state (Nunn, 1975:84-100). Sixth, Arkansas' status as a "sunbelt" state has increased population from outside the state and retirees from outside the state.

²Two senior Legislative Council staffers, two retired legislators, and two current members were interviewed as part of a different project (Whistler, 1983: Ch. 3).

one-half of the competitors will have been sponsored by some interest or grouping. When an incumbent is challenged, some one-third of the challengers will have been sponsored. However, incumbents are not often challenged. In 1980, 30 of 100 House members and 5 of 35 senators had primary opponents, while 16 representatives and 2 senators had an opponent in the General Election.³ Over one-half of the General Assembly members, then, are self-starters, not sponsored. The most cited set of reasons (Table 2) for running are psychologically/socially positive projective categories (serve community, general interest) and the next most cited reasons are personally aggrandizing (opportunity-vacancy, ambition) with the freshman members seemingly slightly more inclined to admit the latter reasons.

On the second part of the second condition, the Arkansas legislators clearly meet it. They are not "volunteers" unconcerned with a public career; and, they do not have prominent personal preferences on policies. Table 3 demonstrates their overwhelming concern for a career in the legislature, especially once their political career pattern unfolds. Nearly two-thirds have served three or four terms and fully three-fourths of the 1981 group intended to run at least three more times. The freshmen of 1983 are a little less certain of a career in the General Assembly, but nearly two-thirds say they expect to run three or more times. Almost 80 percent of the 1981 sample envision their political career as remaining in the General Assembly. The freshmen are less "settled into" the General Assembly; in the House some 57 percent say they intend to seek another office, although five of these eight House members refused to say what office. The new senators are more inclined to see the Senate as their career.

Regarding their legislative goals, Table 4 displays that "no mention/not codeable" is the largest response in both samples, with the freshmen 1983 group's goals scattered over more currently high visibility issues. The scattered goals probably reflect the fractional recruitment milieu discussed earlier under the first part of this condition, as well as the current concerns receiving media and public notoriety.

The 1983 group was asked if there were any specific issues or concerns they felt strongly about; over 90 percent (Table 5) claimed yes. And, while 29 percent (House) and 20 percent (Senate) gave no codeable response, the others distributed replies over a range of areas. This would appear to be a major change from 1981 until the congruence of their position and perceptions of constituents' on the issue is observed (Table 6). Moreover, they waffle about what to do if the public's position is different; only one new member of each house stays with his conscience in such a conflict (lower half of Table 6).

Still on the matter of Arkansas legislators not being volunteers,

³The 1982 figures are: Preferential Primary: House 52, Senate 7; General Election: House 20, Senate 11.

they do have higher socio-economic status than the typical Arkansan but it does not produce public office seeking as a by-product of their higher private social status as found among city legislators (Prewitt and Eulau, 440). Quite to the contrary, desired social status is attached to Arkansas state legislative office (Tables 7 and 8). The point is that being a member of the Arkansas General Assembly boosts the social esteem felt by its members, while apparently membership in some legislatures does not (e.g., San Francisco Bay city councils); and, the Arkansans therefore have another motive for complying with constituents' demands in order to remain in the General Assembly.

3. The third condition is that trusteeship (i.e., the trusting of the legislator's own conscience in decision-making) be minimal; instead, representatives should seek public support. These Arkansas state legislators, representatives and new members are especially disinclined to trust their own consciences in making legislative decisions (Table 9). These Arkansas figures are in strikingly lower than the 60 percent trustees reported for other state legislators (Wahlke, et. al., 1962: 117), to the 65 percent trustee-orientation among congresspersons (Keefe and Ogul, 1981:69), and to the 60 percent trustees among city legislators (Prewitt and Eulau: 407). Only a 31 percent trustee figure reported for the Pennsylvania state legislature is as low (Keefe and Ogul, 1981:67) as these Arkansas percentages.

Looking at the second aspect of condition three--public support should be sought by legislators--again, the Arkansas legislators clearly meet this. Table 10 illustrates their strong orientation toward looking after their districts compared with 24 percent district-oriented reported among congresspersons (Keefe and Ogul, 1981:64).

The Arkansas legislators' orientation to follow what constituents want and to be concerned with their district needs is reflected in the way these legislators perceive their jobs. Table 11 shows their four salient views of the job: legislators are conduits of the public policy preferences of constituents by directly accessing and processing constituents' preferences; watchers of the legislative process on behalf of constituents, "pulling down" legislation they object to; performers of various services for the public (constituents mostly); and, concerned with the internal procedures/rules of the General Assembly. Moreover, the internal structures and procedures reflect the same legislator orientation toward constituency preferences. The standing committees are employed as testing grounds where almost all non-budgetary bills are constituency-oriented measures. There is little or no substantive public deliberation in committee decision-making. Instead, the committee's procedure is designed to test the degree of opposition to the constituency-originated bills. If opposition is not great, it is passed (Whistler, 1983: Ch. 4). Arkansas leads the nation's state legislatures in percentage of bills passed (60 percent compared to 50 percent for eight other southern states and 30 percent for the remainder of the states (Rosenthal, 1981:49). Arkansas even divides its budget into more than 300 specific appropriation

bills which are then treated as identifiable constituency bills (Whistler, Ch. 6). The legislators do not necessarily support/fight for constituency-initiated bills but rather are conduits for them. They fight for constituency-oriented measures that may have electoral ramifications upon their own reelection and a very few issues they personally feel strongly about. Finally, the internal structures and procedures have overwhelming support. The 1981 sample advises adherence to them in no uncertain terms (Table 12), while the new members place emphasis upon establishing their credibility within the on-going system.

4. As to the fourth condition of elections not being mere rituals but having a meaningful impact on forcing legislators from office, while actual competition is low (less than 30 percent in primaries and less than 10 percent in the General Elections), Arkansas legislators are very fearful of electoral competition. Their behavior in the legislature reflects this concern. The attention Arkansas legislators give to "constituents" has been noted earlier. This attention readily becomes translated into attention to interest groups. This is so because general political participation is low (Reviere, 1982), and an agricultural state like Arkansas produces a small number of interest groups (Grey, Jacob, and Vines, 1983: Ch. 4).⁴ They are considered normal parts of the "constituency" and are positively responded to whenever possible.⁵ Occasionally, a group will elicit negative feeling but positive action because of perceived electoral strength, e.g., the AEA. Concern for electoral consequences is also reflected in the Arkansas legislators' rankings of which communication with legislators is most effective (Table 14). "Informally, through an intermediary" such as a "constituent" or "friend" is ranked first, unlike the rankings of four other state legislators (Zeigler and Baer, 1969: 176). Finally, Table 14 reflects the Arkansas legislators' fear of the sponsoring of a competitor by a dissonant interest of faction common in the rural recruitment settings. The Arkansas state legislator seems to naturally adopt and prefer the same style of communication as is customary in other aspects of Arkansas politics, (i.e., contact by a constituent, friend, or known representative of a known group are routine in electoral outside-the-legislature politics also) but at the same time, they expect and respond to other modes of communication (Table 14).

⁴Indeed, Wahlke observes that the surprisingly small number of groups organized in any American state legislature is a topic which merits explanation (Eulau and Wahlke, 1978:168).

⁵It should be noted, however, that more than half the substantive and appropriations bills are from state and local government operations. Governments breed their own fuel more effectively than breeder reactors!

Summary/Conclusion

In sum: (1) Arkansas' societal complexity appears adequate to support the diversity that may give rise to sufficiently competitive sources of demands for public policies; (2) less than one-half the state legislators are sponsored, and they do not have strong personal policy preferences; (3) most--especially house members--do not trust their own consciences in the making of public policies; instead they are sensitive to their perceptions of constituents' preferences; (4) electoral competition is pronounced although the level of actual competition is low. These observations, based upon Prewitt-Eulau conditions for enhancing legislative (institutional) accountability (see Methodology section), provide the basis for concluding that the Arkansas General Assembly does display adequate conditions for legislative accountability. In light of Arkansas' recent past this is certainly a source of satisfaction to those of us committed to democratic practices.

Yet, while the above findings are significant (and the data in the tables are likely to be very helpful in state and local classes), I am not content. It is apparent that legislative (institutional) accountability is the institutional-systemic equivalent of "policy-congruence" used in the individual-representative-and-her/his-constituents focus (see first two pages of this work). As such, legislative (institutional) accountability is only one component of the institutional-systemic concept of representation. What is needed are studies that conceptualize and operationalize other components of institutional-systemic representation. Components that have been suggested, in addition to the policy congruence component, are: service responsiveness, e.g., "case-work" done for constituents; allocative responsiveness, e.g., "pork-barrel"; and, symbolic responsiveness, e.g., building and maintaining diffuse support (Eulau and Karps in Eulau and Wahlke, 1978: 63-66; Jewell, 1982: 18-21).

Another type of problem arises from use of legislative (institutional) accountability as a component of institutional-systemic representation. The Pitkin concept of a responsive representative requires that they act in the interest of constituents even if the constituents are in favor of a different position on the matter⁶ (1967: 209-210). When acting contrary to constituents' preferences, representatives are required by Pitkin's notion to publically give "good" reasons for having opposed constituents. My point here is to illustrate

⁶Methodologically this requires that the preferences of the representatives and of the represented be measured to show their direction so direction does not have to be inferred by inappropriate (albeit highly sophisticated) causal modelling (Eulau and Karps in Eulau and Wahlke, 1978: 61-62).

the serious methodological problem Pitkin's "responsiveness" creates. Is the General Assembly "responsive" in Pitkin's sense when it is characterized in its overall representational posture as an extremely neutral processing system of constituency-originated policy preferences with very little substantive decision-making regarding the contents of the constituents' demands? Is the General Assembly "responsive" in Pitkin's sense when it assumes, as it routinely does, that state-wide policy decisions are largely the governor's responsibility? Eulau and Karps have also drawn attention to the methodological problems of Pitkin's notion of "responsiveness" by writing that she "...gives us no clue on how responsiveness as a systemic property can be ascertained or measured..." (in Eulau and Wahlke, 1978:59).

Turning now to the concept of institutional-systemic representation at the most general level, this study began with a shift in focus from the usual individual-representative-and-her/his-constituents to an institutional-systemic approach. This was done because the former focus is too narrow (Pitkin, 1969:17). Indeed, if taken to extremes, the ingredients in individual representation (e.g., trustee, delegate) become antithetical to democracy (p. 17). It turns out, however, that the institutional perspective is not without problems.

The first problem with an institutional representational focus at the most general level is that it is a type of systems analysis. It evaluates a legislature as an interacting subsystem within other subsystems. In such a conceptualization a legislature is institutionally representative provided that it is functioning integrally with the other subsystems (assuming they in turn accurately reflect their milieus). This, of course, has the virtue of not asking the impossible of political institutions given their social and economic circumstances (Eckstein in Lindfield, 1968: 120-122). But, surely the objection may be raised that an independent measure is needed of whether representatives' actions are what the represented prefer, or if not, whether an adequate explanation for the difference can be given by the representative. Pre-witt and Eulau's focus on institutional accountability provides something of an outside-the-interacting-subsystem criterion for evaluation of one component in institutional representation. But even with it, we are left with nonspecific cut-off points for making judgments regarding whether a given legislature is institutionally accountable; to wit, the Arkansas General Assembly would seem to meet the conditions their studies have suggested. Secondly, the problem of holding legislators accountable only after they have acted remains a logical problem with institutional accountability, just as Pitkin has demonstrated is the case with concepts of individual representation (1969: 57). Thirdly, it seems highly likely that varieties of institutional representation will arise from the diverse conditions at different levels of U.S. governments, as well as from the diverse state conditions. Fourthly, different representations are obviously occurring in advocacy bureaucracies and

guardian judiciaries, as well as within subsystems such as standing committees that provide differing representation by virtue of varying access, operating premises, and procedures. Finally, different issues provide different representation because the stakes and participants vary, e.g., state "home" bills versus state-level matters, and Lowi's "pork barrel, distributive, redistributive" categories. Ideally, a general empirical theory should be able to account for/predict these conditions and their interactions with different notions of representation as well, although in actuality this may be a "Holy Grail" pursuit.

Table 1 Age of Initial Interest and Source of Political Interest

Question: "Approximately how old were you when you first became interested in politics?"^a

	House		Senate	
	1981	1983	1981	1983
Under 15 years	31% (26)	36% (5)	20% (6)	30% (3)
15-21	23% (20)	21% (3)	27% (8)	20% (2)
22-30	20% (17)	29% (4)	37% (11)	20% (2)
31-40	19% (16)	14% (2)	10% (3)	30% (2)
Over 40	6% (5)	0%	7% (2)	0%
	99%	100%	101%	100%

Question: "Who or what stimulated your interest in politics?"

	House		Senate	
	1981	1983	1981	1983
Family-friends	33% (28)	21% (3)	13% (4)	10% (1)
Constituent Request	2% (2)	0%	0%	0%
General Interest	31% (26)	21% (3)	37% (11)	30% (3)
Need for Civic Service	11% (9)	21% (3)	17% (5)	20% (2)
Times-Events-Persons	13% (13)	21% (3)	20% (6)	30% (3)
Specific Policy	2% (2)	0%	10% (3)	0%
Media-Publications	2% (2)	7% (1)	0%	0%
Not codeable/No mention	6%	7% (1)	3%	10% (1)
	100%	98%	100%	100%

^aData in all tables are from UCA Legislative Studies, Regular Sessions of 1981 and 1983. See earlier Data Section.

^bThe numbers in parentheses are the absolute number. Percentages are rounded and may add to more or less than 100 percent in all tables herein.

Table 2. Factors Causing Seeking of Legislative Office

Question: "What factors caused you to seek a seat in the legislature?"

	House		Senate	
	1981	1983	1981	1983
Policy preference	9% (7)	0%	0%	0%
Honest, moral government	5% (4)	7% (1)	3% (1)	0%
Represent group interests	3% (2)	7% (1)	7% (2)	0%
Represent ideology	1% (1)	7% (1)	0%	0%
Dissatisfaction with incumbent	11% (10)	7% (1)	3% (1)	30% (3)
Opportunity-vacancy	11% (10)	21% (3)	13% (4)	30% (3)
Ambition	4% (3)	21% (3)	13% (4)	10% (1)
General interest	21% (17)	14% (2)	20% (6)	10% (1)
Opportunity by occupation	3% (2)	14% (2)	0%	0%
Serve community	22% (18)	0%	30% (30)	0%
Previous civic involvement	4% (3)	0%	3% (1)	0%
Personal contacts	5% (4)	0%	0%	20% (2)
Other	1% (1)	0%	7% (2)	0%
	100%	100%	99%	100%

Table 5. Strongly Felt Issues or Concerns (1983)

Is there an issue or concern that you personally feel very strongly about?		House (1983)		Senate (1983)	
Yes		93%	(13)	90%	(9)
No		7%	(1)	10%	(1)
If "yes," then what?					
Utility reform		14%	(2)	10%	(1)
Legal system reform		7%	(1)	10%	(1)
Ad valorem tax		0%		10%	(1)
State income tax		0%		20%	(2)
Social security disability		0%		10%	(1)
Education		29%	(4)	0%	
Forest products		0%		10%	(1)
Revenue Stabilization Act		14%	(2)	0%	
4 yr. terms for Const. offices		7%	(1)	0%	
Elect Public Utilities Comm.		7%	(1)		
Highways		0%		10%	(1)
Response (not codeable)		29%	(4)	20%	(2)

Table 6. Legislators' Perception of Constitutional Congruence with Position: 1983

1. Do you think the public's position on this issue is the same as yours?
(Follow-up to question asked in Table Five)

	House		Senate	
Yes	79%	(11)	70%	(7)
No	7%	(1)	10%	(1)
No response	14%	(2)	20%	(2)
	100%		100%	

2. What do you do if it is different from yours?

	House (1983)		Senate (1983)	
Try to educate constituents	7%	(1)	20%	(2)
Brokage tactics	0%		10%	(1)
Give time for constituents to change	0%		10%	
Vote conscience	7%	(1)	10%	(1)
Reevaluate position	14%	(2)	10%	(1)
Explain to constituents	0%		10%	(1)
Keep trying	14%	(2)	0%	
Be delegate	14%	(2)	0%	
No response	43%	(6)	30%	(3)
	100%		100%	

Table 7. Legislators' Perception of Public's Esteem for General Assembly: 1983

Does being a state legislator give a person a feeling of esteem from other Arkansans?

	House		Senate	
Yes, a great deal	7%	(1)	10%	(1)
Yes, considerable	14%	(2)	30%	(3)
Yes, some	36%	(5)	50%	(5)
Yes, but only a slight amount	14%	(2)	0%	
No, none	29%	(4)	0%	
No response	0%		10%	(1)
	100 %		100%	

Table 8. Legislator's Esteem from General Assembly: 1983

How much esteem do you personally feel from being a member of the General Assembly?

	House		Senate	
A great amount	14%	(2)	10%	(1)
Considerable	7%	(1)	0%	
Some	50%	(7)	50%	(5)
A slight amount	7%	(1)	20%	(2)
None	21%	(3)	20%	(2)
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	

Table 9. Legislator's Trustee Versus Delegate Role Orientation

When there is a conflict between what a legislator feels is best and what people in his district want, should he follow his own conscience or follow what the people in his own district want?"^a

	House		Senate					
	1981	1983	1981	1983				
Conscience/Trustee	25%	(21)	21%	(3)	50%	(15)	20%	(2)
District/Delegate	37%	(31)	28%	(4)	23%	(7)	20%	(2)
Depends on Issue	36%	(30)	50%	(7)	27%	(8)	60%	(6)
Not Sure	2%	(2)	0%		0%		0%	
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	

^aWilliam Keefe and Morris Ogul, The American Legislative Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 69.

Table 10. Legislator's District Orientation

"Should a legislator be primarily concerned with looking after the needs and interests of his own district or should he be primarily concerned with looking after the needs and interests of the state as a whole?"^a

	House		Senate					
	1981	1983	1981	1983				
Own District	51%	(43)	57%	(8)	40%	(12)	40%	(4)
Whole State	21%	(18)	14%	(2)	37%	(11)	10%	(1)
Both Equal	27%	(32)	29%	(4)	23%	(7)	40%	(4)
Not Sure	0%		0%		0%		10%	(1)
	<u>99%</u>		<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	

^aThis question came from William Keefe and Morris Ogul, The American Legislative Process, 5th ed., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 69.

Table 11. Legislator's Perceptions of the Job of a Legislator

"How would you describe your job as a legislator?" (Probe: What are the most important things you do here?)^a

	House		Senate	
	1981	1983	1981	1983
Public Service	21% (18)	43% (6)	20% (6)	0%
Internal Legislation	14% (12)	21% (3)	17% (5)	0%
Lawmaking-monitor	27% (23)	0%	13% (4)	20% (2)
Local Representative-service	23% (19)	36% (5)	27% (8)	60% (6)
Fiscal	4% (3)	0%	4% (4)	0%
Policy advocate	7% (6)	0%	7% (2)	20% (2)
Bureaucratic watchdog	1% (1)	0%	1% (1)	0%
No Response/Not Codeable	3%	0%	11%	0%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Table 12. Adherence to the Internal Norms of the General Assembly

"What advice would you offer to a new member of the legislature to achieve maximum influence inside the General Assembly?"

	House		Senate	
	1981	1983	1981	1983
Hard work-learn system	75% (63)	7% (1)	60% (18)	30% (3)
Establish credibility	4% (3)	57% (8)	10% (3)	60% (6)
Low profile	5% (4)	7% (1)	3% (1)	0%
Minimize internal	1% (1)	0%	3% (1)	0%
Go along, get along	4% (3)	21% (3)	3% (2)	10% (1)
Ally with seniors	1% (1)	0%	7% (3)	0%
Get to know colleagues	5% (4)	0%	10% (3)	0%
Other	1% (1)	7% (1)	1% (1)	0%
No Response	4%	0%	3%	0%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Table 13. Legislators' Perceptions of Interest Strength

"There is a lot of talk about the influence that special interest groups have on the legislative process. Which interest groups in Arkansas tend to exert the most influence on legislative voting behavior?"

	House		Senate	
	1981	1983	1981	1983
AEA - Education	51% (43)	43% (6)	50% (15)	10% (1)
Financial Institution	10% (8)	0%	10% (3)	0%
Insurance Interests	1% (1)	0%	0%	0%
Trucking	1% (1)	0%	0%	10% (1)
Railroads	1% (1)	0%	0%	30% (3)
Utilities	2% (2)	29% (4)	13% (4)	0%
Timber	1% (1)	0%	0%	0%
Nursing Homes	0%	0%	3% (1)	0%
Farm Bureau	5% (4)	0%	13% (4)	20% (2)
Labor	2% (2)	0%	7% (2)	10% (1)
Liquor	1% (1)	7%	0%	0%
Highway Commission	8% (7)	14% (2)	0%	10% (1)
Acorn	1% (1)	0%	0%	0%
City-County Governments	0%	0%	0%	0%
Other Governments	1% (1)	0%	0%	0%
Religious	1% (1)	0%	0%	0%
Medical	0%	7% (1)	0%	0%
Tourism	0%	0%	0%	0%
Retired	0%	0%	0%	0%
Chamber of Commerce	0%	0%	0%	10% (1)
Public Health	10%	0%	0%	0%
No Response/Not Codeable	14%	0%	4%	0%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Have you been contacted personally by any of these groups?^a

	House		Senate	
	1981	1983	1981	1983
Yes	89%	86%	100%	80%
No	9%	7%	0%	20%

^aThis question was inserted by R. Lawson Veasey of the UCA Political Science Department

Table 14. Legislators' Ratings of Methods of Communication^a

	Arkansas				Massachusetts Legislators	North Carolina Legislators	Oregon Legislators	Utah Legislators
	House		Senate					
	1981	1983	1981	1983				
DIRECT, PERSONAL COMMUNICATION								
Personal presentation of arguments	5.1	6.3	4.9	5.4	5.8	4.7	6.7	5.3
Presenting research results	5.6	6.7	5.1	5.7	6.0	5.4	6.8	6.3
Testifying at hearings	5.6	6.3	4.9	4.7	5.2	4.8	6.1	5.1
COMMUNICATION THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY								
Contact by constituent	7.2	7.3	7.3	6.6	2.5	3.0	2.7	3.6
Contact by friend	6.0	6.5	6.3	6.1	2.0	3.0	2.4	3.4
Contact by other lobbyists	3.8	3.3	3.6	3.7	2.4	2.5	3.2	3.0
INDIRECT, IMPERSONAL COMMUNICATION								
Letter writing campaign	3.7	3.9	3.9	2.7	2.0	1.7	1.6	2.8
Publication of voting records	2.9	3.4	3.1	3.1	2.0	1.3	1.5	2.0
Public relations campaign	4.1	4.8	3.8	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.1
KEEPING COMMUNICATION CHANNELS OPEN								
Entertaining legislators	2.6	1.9	2.7	1.4	1.0	2.0	1.7	2.8
Giving a party	2.2	1.9	2.1	0.9	1.0	2.0	1.4	2.4
Campaign contributions	3.4	4.1	3.9	3.2	1.0	1.6	1.5	2.1
Withholding campaign contributions	1.3	0.9	1.4	1.6	0.3	0.3	0.1	1.0
Bribery	0.15	/NA	0.30	/NA	0.2	0.1	0.03	0.2
OTHER DECISION-MAKERS								
Governor	4.3	4.9	4.4	3.5				
Fellow Legislators	5.6	5.3	5.3	4.3				

^aThe non-Arkansas data is from L. Harmon Zeigler and Michael Baer, Lobbying in the States (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), p. 176. The Arkansas data is from the UCA Legislative Study, 1981 and 1983. See Data Section.

^bRatings of effectiveness on a scale from 0 (ineffective) to 8 (effective).

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