Partisan Ambivalence and Electoral Decision Making

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Abstract

American politics today is driven largely by deep divisions between Democrats and Republicans. That said, there are many people who view the opposition in an overwhelmingly negative light – but who simultaneously possess a mix of positive and negative feelings toward their own party. This paper is a response to prior research (most notably, Lavine, Johnson, and Steenbergen 2012) indicating that such ambivalence increases the probability that voters will engage in “deliberative” (or “effortful”) rather than “heuristic” thinking when responding to the choices presented to them in political campaigns. Looking first at the 2014 gubernatorial election in Florida, we find no evidence that partisan ambivalence reduces the importance of party identification or increases the impact of other, more “rational” considerations (issue preferences, perceived candidate traits, economic evaluations) on voter choice. Our second study uses data from a survey experiment to determine whether a high degree of ambivalence toward one’s own party makes voters more responsive to negative attacks against the candidate of that party by his or her opponent. Once again, results do not indicate that partisan ambivalence plays a major role in promoting deliberative as opposed to heuristic thinking among voters.1

Introduction

Since the 1950s, scholars have recognized that most citizens identify with one of the major parties and that this attachment provides a powerful cue influencing their attitudes and choice of candidates on Election Day (Campbell et al. 1960). Yet, despite evidence of increased issue consistency in recent years (fewer citizens expressing a mix of liberal, moderate, and conservative opinions; see Abramowitz 2010; Pew Research Center 2017), many rank-and-file partisans do not share the same “extreme” policy views that predominate among their respective party elites (Hill and Tausanovitch 2015; Fiorina 2017). A lack of ideological congruency does not, of course, prevent individuals from positively identifying with a party, nor does it preclude their developing a strong dislike for the opposition. But it does suggest that partisan attachments at the grassroots may be rooted in something other than shared values or policy preferences (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Achen and Bartels 2016; Mason 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018) – and, as a result,

1 Portions of this paper were presented at the 2014 annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and the 2015 annual meetings of the Southern Political Science Association. We would like to thank the University of Florida’s Bureau of Economic and Business Research and Jim Kitchens for their assistance with the implementation of the two surveys that form the basis for our analysis, and Jason Gainous for his contributions to an earlier version of the paper.
that citizens' feelings toward one party or both may be more equivocal than one would expect during a period of intense discord among both elites and the parties' rank and file.

In fact, numerous studies indicate that many Americans, including a fair number who consider themselves to be either Democrats or Republicans, simultaneously possess both positive and negative feelings about the party with which they identify and/or the one with which they do not, that is, they are ambivalent partisans (Greene 2005; Mulligan 2011; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; also see Klar and Krupnikov 2016). Further, this blend of positive and negative affect has important consequences. Compared to their univalent counterparts, for example, ambivalent partisans appear more likely to correctly perceive candidate policy positions (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012), more likely to use issues or ideology when evaluating candidates and making vote decisions (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012), more likely to cast a split ballot (Mulligan 2011; but see Thornton 2014; Davis 2015), and less likely to exhibit a variety of party-oriented attitudes and behaviors (Greene 2005). In this paper, we examine voter behavior in two very different contexts to determine whether ambivalence also "motivates individuals to devote additional cognitive resources to judgment tasks" (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012, 39), specifically, whether it increases the probability of voters employing deliberative rather than heuristic thinking when responding to the choices presented to them in political campaigns.

Partisan Ambivalence and Electoral Choice

Scholars have increasingly embraced the idea that people do not always have a single "true" attitude about a given topic; to the contrary, they often possess multiple and even contradictory attitudes that they might draw upon, for example, when thinking about a policy issue or deciding which candidate to vote for in an election. When someone's evaluations, beliefs, or emotions concerning an attitude object are in conflict or, more simply, when that person simultaneously possesses positive and negative evaluations of an attitude object, s/he can be described as being ambivalent (Kaplan 1972; Alvarez and Brehm 1995). Prior studies have examined ambivalence across a range of issues, including abortion (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002), gay rights (Craig et al. 2005), and social welfare (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Gainous 2008).

Social and political psychologists who study the consequences of ambivalence have posited that it tends to decrease one's reliance on heuristics (or cognitive traps) while increasing thoughtful deliberation and the use of a broader array of information in decision making (Hochschild 1993; Jonas, Diehl, and Bröemer 1997; Guarana and Hernandez 2016). While they were not the first to examine partisan ambivalence (Basinger and Lavine 2005; Greene 2005), Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen (2012) apply this general idea to electoral decision making and explain how and why ambivalent voters may come to think more deeply and thoroughly than others when making political judgments. These authors suggest that partisanship functions both as a stable psychological construct based on affective attachment to the party, and as a temporal
summary judgment of party performance. In line with theories of cognitive consistency (Festinger 1957), they assert that citizens strongly prefer there to be harmony between attachment and summary judgment. When the information flow regarding one's own party trends negative, the ability to maintain harmony and to objectively justify their support for that party is compromised. As a result, the individual is likely to become an ambivalent partisan.

Inherent in this argument is the idea that voters are motivated to have "resolve" when it comes to their attitudes; in other words, they prefer to possess an objectively justifiable attitude that avoids ambiguity, uncertainty, and doubt (Kruglanski and Webster 1996) because to experience doubt is unsettling and uncomfortable. The problem here is that if one's partisanship, long thought to be a filter or perceptual screen through which people evaluate the political world (Campbell et al. 1960), is riddled with ambivalence, it may become blurred and the ability to justify one's attitude through the prism of partisanship will no longer be effective. Lavine and colleagues (2012) posit that such a development encourages voters to think more deliberatively about their political options. This argument is framed around the idea that citizens are motivated to find a sufficiency threshold, or level of confidence, when making a decision (Chaiken, Libermanm, and Eagly 1989). Specifically, the sufficiency threshold "provides a commonsensical mechanism for predicting when – and more important, why – decision makers will transition from heuristic to deliberative thinking" (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012, 35).

The transition supposedly occurs when partisan cues no longer furnish enough confidence to create a settled or resolved preference in a given judgment option; in short, a high degree of confidence is not present for ambivalent partisans because partisanship no longer serves as an effective heuristic, and so they are compelled to look elsewhere to objectively justify their position. The research presented here offers a re-consideration of this argument by examining the relationship between ambivalence and deliberative thinking in two different electoral settings. In Study 1, we use survey data from the 2014 governor's race in Florida to compare the determinants of candidate choice for ambivalent versus univalent voters. In Study 2, the findings from an Internet experiment allow us to determine whether ambivalence helps to shape voters' reactions to campaign attacks made against a hypothetical incumbent seeking re-election to the U.S. House.

**Study 1: Determinants of Voter Choice in a Gubernatorial Election**

The Florida gubernatorial election in 2014 pitted incumbent Republican Governor Rick Scott against Democratic challenger Charlie Crist. This race was unusual in that Crist was himself a former governor, having been elected in 2006 as a Republican following service in the state legislature and as a member of Florida's state cabinet. After being considered as a potential running mate for GOP presidential nominee John McCain in 2008, Crist opted to run for an open U.S. Senate seat rather than seek reelection. Initially thought to be a shoo-in for his party's nomination, he quickly fell behind fellow Republican Marco Rubio in terms of both fundraising and voter support, and chose to drop out of the primary to run as an Independent in the general election. Despite losing that race to Rubio (by 48.9 to 29.7 percent, with Democrat Kendrick Meek
finishing third), and notwithstanding reservations among some party stalwarts about Crist's Republican roots, the former governor soon emerged as the leading Democratic alternative to Scott in 2014. Indeed, Crist won a two-way primary (against former state senator Nan Rich) with 74.4 percent of the vote before losing in November by the narrow margin of 48.1 to 47.1 percent.²

Our analysis tests the argument that ambivalent partisans will tend to think more deeply and thoroughly than others in making political judgments. Specifically, we expect to find that:

- H1: Issue preferences, candidate traits, and economic evaluations are more strongly correlated with candidate choice, and partisanship less so, among voters who express a high degree of ambivalence toward their own party.³

Hypothesis 1 is tested using data from a statewide survey of likely voters conducted by the University of Florida's Bureau of Economic and Business Research in early September 2014. The sample was drawn from a list of registered voters provided by a commercial vendor, with likely voters defined as individuals who (a) voted in both the previous gubernatorial election (2010) and the previous presidential election (2012); (b) voted in either 2010 or 2012, and indicated a subjective probability of voting in 2014 of at least 8 out of 10; or (c) registered to vote after the 2012 presidential election, and indicated a subjective probability of voting in 2014 of at least 8 out of 10. Respondents were contacted by either landline or cellphone, with at least one callback attempt if needed, and the survey was offered in both English and Spanish. After applying weights to reflect the statewide population in age group, party registration, and media market, our effective sample size is 916.52. Table A1 in the online appendix shows the sample distribution on key demographic variables.

The dependent variable for our analysis is gubernatorial candidate choice (41.4 percent Scott vs. 36.6 percent Crist). Similar to our previous work (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002; Craig et al. 2005), partisan ambivalence was measured by asking respondents to indicate both how positively and how negatively they viewed each party (see Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995):

Next are some questions asking how you feel about the two major political parties in American politics today. First, we are going to ask about how positive you feel, then how negative you feel. Please rate each party based solely on how positively you feel about it, while IGNORING OR SETTING ASIDE for the moment any negative feelings you may also have. First, the Republican Party. Would you say you have no positive feelings, some positive

3 While a similar pattern should logically be evident among those who harbor mixed feelings about the opposing party, our data suggest that out-party ambivalence is uncommon in American politics today (see Figures 1 and 2).
feelings, generally positive feelings, or extremely positive feelings?

Respondents were asked a similar question tapping their positive feelings toward the Democratic Party and then, after some filler, asked how negatively they felt (setting aside positive feelings) about each party. Answers were coded from 1 (no positive/negative feelings) to 4 (extremely positive/negative feelings), with an ambivalence score for each party calculated as

Democratic Ambivalence = \[\frac{(Dem \ Pos + Dem \ Neg)}{2} - |Dem \ Pos - Dem \ Neg|\]
Republican Ambivalence = \[\frac{(Rep \ Pos + Rep \ Neg)}{2} - |Rep \ Pos - Rep \ Neg|\]

This algorithm yields a "similarity-intensity" (SIM) score in which ambivalence can range from a low of -0.5, reflecting extremely positive and no negative feelings (or vice versa), to +4.0, reflecting extremely positive and extremely negative feelings toward the same party.4

At a time of heightened partisan polarization, and in the context of a bitter campaign between two well-known (if not especially well-liked; see Martinez 2015) candidates, we might expect that overall levels of ambivalence would be low. This is not the case, as our results reveal a moderate amount of ambivalence toward each party (a mean SIM score of 0.84 for Democrats and 0.99 for Republicans). As shown in Figure 1, however, ambivalence is much more often directed at one's own party than at the opposition; that is, to the extent that Republicans and Democrats possess both positive and negative feelings (something that is more common among weak identifiers and leaners than among strong partisans), those feelings are almost always directed at their own party. In contrast, feelings toward the opposition tend to be univalent and highly negative (again, primarily among strong identifiers on both sides of the aisle).

4 We should point out that our measurement approach is different from that employed by Lavine and his various co-authors. For Basinger and Lavine (2005) and many other scholars (Rudolph and Popp 2007; Mulligan 2011; Thornton 2014; Davis 2015), partisan ambivalence is considered to be high when an individual’s evaluations of the Democrats and the Republicans are, comparatively speaking, mixed or inconsistent. For Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen (2012), however, partisan ambivalence is high when one’s evaluations are inconsistent with his/her partisan identity, e.g., as when a Democrat likes some things about the Republicans and/or dislikes some things about the Democrats. In contrast, we look for evidence of mixed feelings toward each party separately – and, specifically, for evidence that someone has both positive and negative feelings about his/her own party (which is about the only form in which such ambivalence can be found in today’s politics). Also, whereas others have used the party or candidate likes/dislikes (Basinger and Lavine 2005; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012), Democratic and Republican feeling thermometers (Johnson 2014), or other closed-ended questions (Greene 2005) to measure ambivalence, our approach is more common to experimental research in social psychology than to survey-based studies in political science (but see Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002; Craig et al. 2005; Gainous 2008).
The following analysis excludes respondents for whom ambivalence toward their own party was undefined (pure Independents, third-party identifiers, and those who failed to answer the party identification question), as well as two Republicans and one Democrat who were indifferent (holding no positive or negative feelings) toward their party.\(^5\) For everyone else: (a) low ambivalence is indicated by a SIM score of -0.5 or 0, (b) high ambivalence by a score of 2.0 or higher, and (c) medium ambivalence by a score in between those ranges. Counting leaners as partisans, Table 1 shows the distribution of in-party ambivalence for Democrats, Republicans, and the two combined.

Table 1. In-Party Ambivalence by Party Identification (Florida)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (SIM ≤ 0)</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (SIM ≥ 2)</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data are from the September 2014 Florida survey of likely voters, conducted by the University of Florida’s Bureau of Economic and Business Research. Respondents who say they lean toward one party or the other are classified as partisans.

\(^5\) Although we recognize the conceptual distinction between ambivalence and indifference (Basinger and Lavine 2005; Thornton 2011, 2014; Davis 2015), the paucity of identifiers in the Florida sample who expressed neither positive nor negative feelings toward their party precludes analyzing these individuals separately.
If, as previous research suggests (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012) and has been hypothesized in H1, ambivalence creates cognitive discomfort that motivates a deeper (or more "effortful"; see Rudolph and Popp 2007) processing of information, we should observe stronger correlations between vote preference (on the one hand) and issue preferences, trait perceptions, and economic evaluations (on the other) – and a weaker correlation between vote preference and party ID – among individuals who possess mixed feelings toward the party with which they identify. Among our independent variables, a factor analysis of respondents' preferences on six issues revealed two dimensions, together accounting for 57 percent of the common variance in a varimax rotation: economic-plus (the Affordable Care Act, minimum wage, Medicaid expansion, immigration reform) and cultural (medical marijuana, same-sex marriage).6

We also compared respondents' perceptions of the two candidates on each of five traits (can be trusted, understands the problems of people like me, provides leadership, intelligent, honest and ethical) to determine a relative candidate evaluation.7 Evaluations on all five traits loaded onto a single scale, so we calculated a single relative trait evaluation index that ranged from -5 (for those who ranked Crist higher on all five traits) to +5 (for those who ranked Scott higher on all five). Finally, economic evaluations were captured by a single question regarding Florida's economy; scores ranging from 0 ("It will be a long time before the economy recovers") to 1 ("Florida's economy is recovering").

H1 proposes that individuals who are ambivalent about their party are less likely to be guided by a party heuristic and more apt to vote based on other, more "rational" considerations (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012, 122). A preliminary test of this argument is presented in Table 2, which shows the bivariate correlations between vote choice and (a) partisanship, (b) issue preferences, (c) candidate trait assessments, and (d) economic evaluations for each level of in-party ambivalence. Neither aspect of H1 receives much support. First, we expected to find the strongest association between party ID and vote among respondents with the least ambivalence toward their party; instead, it occurs among those in the medium-ambivalence group. We further anticipated that high ambivalence would yield the strongest correlations between vote choice and the other independent variables – a pattern that is seen only for economic evaluations, where the relationship is weak to nonexistent across all ambivalence categories. For issue preferences (both dimensions) and candidate trait assessments, the strongest correlations with vote choice are found among respondents who express low and/or medium rather than high levels of in-party ambivalence. We also ran a series of multivariate logit models (details of which are summarized in Tables A3, A4, and A5 in our supporting materials) and found, if anything, even less support.

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6 Question wordings for both surveys employed in this paper are provided in online Appendix B. Scores on the first dimension range from 0 to 4, and on the second from 0 to 2, with higher scores reflecting more conservative attitudes.

7 For example, someone who believed that "can be trusted" described Crist but not Scott was scored as favoring Crist on that trait; a respondent who believed that "can be trusted" described neither Scott nor Crist (or less commonly, both) was scored as seeing no difference.
for H1 than is provided by the bivariate correlations in Table 2.

| Table 2. Correlations with Candidate Preference, by In-Party Ambivalence (Florida) |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                  | Overall         | Low Ambiv       | Med Ambiv       | High Ambiv      |
| Party Identification             | 0.748*          | 0.720*          | 0.791*          | 0.695*          |
| Economic-Plus Issues             | 0.657*          | 0.667*          | 0.689*          | 0.569*          |
| Cultural Issues                  | 0.373*          | 0.258*          | 0.415*          | 0.373*          |
| Candidate Traits                 | 0.864*          | 0.892*          | 0.883*          | 0.818*          |
| Economic Evaluations             | 0.050           | 0.025           | 0.060           | 0.062           |

* p < .05

Data are from the September 2014 Florida survey of likely voters, conducted by the University of Florida’s Bureau of Economic and Business Research. Respondents who say they lean toward one party of the other are classified as partisans. Table entries indicate the bivariate $r$ between candidate preference and party identification, issue position, trait assessments, and economic evaluations among all respondents, and among those with low, medium, and high levels of ambivalence toward their own party.

According to Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen (2012, 122), ambivalence undercuts "the judgmental confidence that citizens typically derive from partisan cues," thereby leading them to "turn away from these perceptual anchors and pay more attention to the particulars." An analysis of the 2014 Florida gubernatorial race provides little reason to believe that this might be the case. To the extent that partisan ambivalence existed in our sample, it was directed overwhelmingly at one's own party. Contrary to expectations, however, high levels of in-party ambivalence did not motivate citizens to employ deliberative rather than heuristic thinking when responding to the choices presented to them in 2014. This finding does not settle the question, of course. In our second study, we investigate whether ambivalence shapes the way in which voters respond when confronted with negative information about their party's candidate.

**Study 2: Ambivalence and Voter Response to Negative Campaigning**

The communications strategy of many modern campaigns focuses more on disparaging one’s opponent than on emphasizing one’s own strengths as a candidate. The reason is simple: Political professionals almost uniformly believe that negative campaigning is effective (Mattes and Redlawsk 2014, 30), if not all of the time then at least under certain circumstances. While there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence to suggest that they are correct, academic studies have yielded mixed results regarding the persuasive effects of campaign ads generally (Fowler, Franz, and Ridout 2016), and of negative advertising or other forms of negative campaigning in particular (Geer 2006; Lau and Rovner 2009; Fridkin and Kenney 2011; Mattes and Redlawsk 2014; Banda and Windett 2016; Malloy and Pearson-Merkowitz 2016).

It seems likely that the inconsistent findings of this literature are due at least in part to the fact that negativity lies in the eye of the beholder, that is, "whether a tactic, a candidate, or a
campaign is [perceived as] negative depends on whose ox is being gored” (Sigelman and Kugler 2003, 144; also see Lipsitz and Geer 2017). The fact that self-identified partisans react differently to attacks coming from the other side than they do to criticism by candidates of their own party should therefore come as no surprise (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Stevens et al. 2015). What we seek to determine is whether voters with ambivalent feelings about their party are more open to persuasion than those whose feelings are more uniformly positive. The idea here is simply that ambivalent partisans will be, relatively speaking, compelled to weigh the content of a negative ad and incorporate it into their own position in order to pass the sufficiency threshold described earlier, thereby attaining the necessary resolve for their personal comfort or satisfaction.8 Thus,

- H2: An attack against one’s fellow partisan is more effective among voters who express a high degree of ambivalence about their party.

Our emphasis on attacks against co-partisans reflects the fact that, all else equal (as is the case in our experimental simulation), few identifiers will be moved by an attack on the opponent because most do not plan to vote for that candidate in the first place, i.e., there is a ceiling (or floor) effect that leaves little room for a meaningful erosion of support.

Study 2 results are based on a controlled experiment involving a sample of 660 individuals who participated in an Internet survey conducted between July 9-14, 2015.9 Respondents were randomly assigned to one of sixteen treatment groups 10 and asked to complete a background questionnaire that measured basic demographics, partisanship, issue attitudes, and a number of other political orientations. They were then told to imagine that it was the fall of 2016, and one of the races on their ballot involved a congressional matchup between an incumbent seeking a third term and an experienced challenger who had served in both local office and the state legislature. After reading short biographies,11 participants were asked to indicate a preference (“Based on the information you currently have, which candidate would you vote for if the election were held today?”) and to

8 Essentially, we are looking for evidence that “the degree to which effortful thinking is biased or objective [depends] largely on the extent to which party identification reduces the gap between actual and desired judgment confidence” (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012, 37).
9 Data were provided by qSample (www.qSample.com) from panels consisting of millions of pre-screened members who have been recruited to participate in a variety of research studies. Respondents for this study were drawn from the national panel of registered voters in a random sample stratified by region. The response rate (RR1) was 66 percent. Although qSample’s panel is quite diverse (see Table A7 in our supporting materials), we make no claim that it is representative of registered voters nationwide.
10 The sixteen groups are summarized in online Table A6. Our randomization process appears to have been successful. No statistically significant differences were observed among members of the sixteen groups with regard to demographics, partisanship, ideological self-identification, issue positions, or baseline candidate preferences (vote choice, favorability). Thus, if differences are found across groups after respondents read the attack, we can be confident that these were driven by exposure to the experimental stimulus.
11 Each candidate’s party affiliation and status as either challenger or incumbent was specified, but otherwise the biosketches were crafted in such a way as to ensure that the two portrayals were essentially equivalent (including the fact that both candidates were men).
rate both contenders on a 7-point scale ranging from “very unfavorable” (1) to “very favorable” (7); answers to the vote and incumbent favorability questions serve as the dependent variables for our analysis. Participants subsequently read what was described as a direct-mail attack (see below) by the challenger and again registered their vote choice and candidate assessments. In a final stage of the experiment not reported here, each person read one of two responses (positive or negative/counterattack) by the target candidate and answered the vote and favorability questions a third time.

Our analysis examines the effects of attacks in four policy areas that represent areas of sharp conflict between the Republican and Democratic parties: inequality, immigration, national security, and the environment. The content of issue-based ads will usually vary with the identity of the attacker, e.g., a Democratic-sponsored negative ad about inequality will criticize different policy stands, reference different symbols, and propose different solutions than a Republican-sponsored negative ad on the same topic. Our challenge, then, was to create two more-or-less equivalent (in terms of their tone, specificity, credibility, and likely effectiveness) but substantively distinct attacks for each of the four issues, as well as a positive and a negative response to accompany each. A brief summary of these attacks is laid out in Table 3, with a full description provided in our supporting materials. According to Fridkin and Kenney (2011), relevant (containing information on how a politician has influenced/is likely to influence voters’ lives) and uncivil (uncertain about where to draw the line, we prefer “hard-hitting”) negative ads have the greatest impact on evaluations of a targeted candidate. The allegations made in these ads seem clearly to meet each of these standards.

<p>| Table 3. Four Policy-Based Attacks on Incumbent, by Party of Challenger (National) |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| <strong>Attack Type</strong>                           | <strong>Democratic Challenger Attack on Republican Incumbent</strong> | <strong>Republican Challenger Attack on Democratic Incumbent</strong> |
| Inequality                                | Incumbent represents “the powerful few, not you.” | Incumbent stirs up “class warfare” with ideas that are outdated and ineffective. |
|                                           | • supports the fantasy that lowering taxes on the rich will benefit working families | • ignores the fact that more people are living in poverty than before Obama was elected |
|                                           | • opposes a higher minimum wage, child-care tax credits, and paid sick leave policies | • thinks that higher taxes, more spending, and bigger government will solve every problem |
|                                           | • opposes a federal jobs program to rebuild our nation’s crumbling infrastructure | • supports rules and regulations that make it harder for businesses to create new jobs |
|                                           | • is unconcerned that the richest 3% hold more than half of the nation’s wealth | • opposes policies that would help to create opportunities for all citizens to have a better life |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Democratic Challenger Attack on Republican Incumbent</th>
<th>Republican Challenger Attack on Democratic Incumbent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>Incumbent hasn’t learned from “mistakes of the past.”</td>
<td>Incumbent is “dangerously wrong” on national security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• supports a reckless increase in defense spending that will dramatically increase our national debt</td>
<td>• does not grasp the threat posed by radical terrorists and the spread of WMDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• believes that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was worth the high cost in money and lives lost</td>
<td>• supports deep cuts in military spending that would leave our troops without the equipment and logistical support they need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• is prepared to send ground troops to fight terrorist groups in the Middle East</td>
<td>• is willing to negotiate with foreign nations even if they have ties to terrorist groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• says that the U.S. should act unilaterally in taking military action if other countries choose not to get involved</td>
<td>• thinks we should ask other nations for permission before acting to protect our own security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>Incumbent should stop “political grandstanding” on this important issue.</td>
<td>Incumbent is “the best friend that an illegal alien ever had.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• proposes to deport immigrant children</td>
<td>• supports giving amnesty to illegals and even allowing them to become citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• opposes a “path to citizenship” even for those with high-tech skills that could help to jumpstart the American economy</td>
<td>• objects to building a fence along our southern border and hiring more federal border agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• is willing to risk a government shutdown if restrictive new laws are not adopted</td>
<td>• wants to give illegals taxpayer-funded benefits such as drivers licenses and Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• falsely claims that immigrants have taken millions of jobs away from American workers</td>
<td>• opposes state governments penalizing businesses that hire undocumented workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Incumbent “has his head in the sand about climate change.”</td>
<td>Incumbent supports policies that “cost billions of dollars, lead to higher energy prices, and destroy American jobs.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• fails to recognize that it is a serious threat to our national security</td>
<td>• voted against the Keystone XL pipeline that would create thousands of new American jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ignores scientific evidence of human responsibility for warming trends</td>
<td>• supports a moratorium on oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Mexico, which also costs jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• opposes stricter limits on carbon pollution and then accepts campaign money from the polluters</td>
<td>• wants to impose stricter pollution controls that will prove burdensome for businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• inaction on the issue puts our families, homes, and businesses at risk now and in the future</td>
<td>• is beholden to environmental extremists and has little regard for anyone’s job but his own</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Taking everything into account, our full experimental design was as follows: 4 (number of issues) X 2 (number of party attacks/responses on each issue) X 2 (response type, positive or negative) = a total of 16 treatment groups. For present purposes, however, we will not examine differences by either issue or response type, thereby reducing the effective number of groups from 16 to 2: self-identified Democrats and self-identified Republicans (including leaners) who were exposed to an attack against the candidate of their party. To test our hypotheses, these two sets of respondents were pooled.

We created three separate measures of partisan ambivalence, each of which yields similar conclusions. The first of these, labeled affective ambivalence, is based on the same questions about positive and negative feelings toward the parties used in the Florida survey. To measure emotional ambivalence toward the parties (cf. Citrin and Luks 2005), respondents were asked, "Has the Democratic Party – because of its policies, its leaders, or something else the party has done – ever made you feel . . . afraid, proud, angry, enthusiastic, anxious, hopeful?" The identical 6-item battery was then repeated for the Republican Party. A third index (which we will call evaluative ambivalence to distinguish it from the affective measure) was patterned after the open-ended likes and dislikes questions used by Lavine (2001) and others. Respondents were asked if there was anything they liked and disliked about each party and offered the following options: good/bad candidates, good/bad policy ideas, has done a good/bad job when in office, all of the above, and "nothing in particular."

As with Florida voters, respondents in our internet sample exhibited a fair amount of partisan ambivalence. Similar to what we observed in Study 1, however, each type of ambivalence (affective, emotional, evaluative) was usually directed at one's own party rather than at the opposition (toward whom feelings tended to be highly negative, especially among strong identifiers; see Figure 2 and Table 4 for affective ambivalence, Figures A1-A2 in our supporting materials for the other two measures) – something along the lines of: *We're not perfect, but the other guys are worse.* It is ambivalence about one's own party that is expected to promote an "effortful"

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12 Response options to these questions were never (coded 0), rarely, occasionally, fairly often, and very often (coded 4). The mean score for proud, enthusiastic, and hopeful reflected positive emotion for each party, while the mean score for afraid, angry, and anxious reflected negative emotion. Emotional ambivalence for each party was then calculated using the same algorithm described earlier for affective ambivalence. Distributions are reported in Tables A11 and A12 in our supporting materials.

13 Answers were coded as 0 for nothing, 1 for either candidates, policy ideas, or performance, and 2 for all the above, and evaluative ambivalence was calculated for each party based on the same algorithm as before. Distributions are reported in online Tables A12 and A14. Not surprisingly, our various measures are positively correlated: affective-emotional ($r = .435$ for ambivalence toward the Republicans and $.54$ for ambivalence toward the Democrats), affective- evaluative ($r = .382$ and $.399$, respectively) and emotional-evaluative ($.463$ and $.480$, respectively). There also is a positive correlation ($r = .305$ to $.536$) between ambivalence toward the Republicans and ambivalence toward the Democrats within each of the three types, and a positive but less strong correlation ($r = .097$ to $.266$) between ambivalence toward the Republicans and ambivalence toward the Democrats across types; see Table A15 in our supporting materials.
processing of information and thereby to play a significant role in shaping citizens’ reactions to negative campaign communications.\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Affective Party Ambivalence by Party Identification (National)}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Democrats & Republicans & Both \\
\hline
Low (SIM \leq 0) & 29.2\% & 25.2\% & 27.6\% \\
\hline
Medium & 45.4 & 39.3 & 42.9 \\
\hline
High (SIM \geq 2) & 25.4 & 35.4 & 29.6 \\
\hline
Number of cases & 291 & 206 & 497 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{In-Party Affective Ambivalence by Party Identification (National)}
\end{table}

Note: Data points indicate mean SIM score (which can range between -0.5 and 4.0; higher scores reflecting greater ambivalence) for each partisan category.

In addition to partisan ambivalence, we examine several other factors (see Appendix B in our supporting materials for question wordings) that could plausibly moderate the effects of a negative ad. Our expectations are that:

- \textbf{H3}: An attack against one's fellow partisan is more effective among voters whose policy views on the issue addressed in the attack are in line with the charges leveled in the attack.

- \textbf{H4}: An attack against one's fellow partisan is more effective among voters who believe that candidates "need to criticize their opponents because it is important for voters to know the strengths and weaknesses of all candidates."

\textsuperscript{14} As before, the analyses for Study 2 exclude pure Independents, third-party identifiers, and those who failed to answer the party identification question.
• H5: An attack against one’s fellow partisan is more effective among voters who believe that the specific ad to which they were exposed was either “negative but acceptable” or “not really negative at all.”

• H6: An attack against one’s fellow partisan is more effective among voters who report that they follow what’s going on in government and public affairs “only now and then” or “hardly at all.”

The reasoning behind H3 is straightforward: Why would voters be motivated to cast an issue-based vote (or in our case, to be moved by a policy-based attack) if they disagree with the substance of the attack? Further, although there is evidence indicating that negative ads may be more effective among voters who express a lower tolerance for campaign negativity (Fridkin and Kenney 2011), we think it makes more sense to expect that, as a general rule, the opposite will be the case (hence H4 and H5). Finally, H6 is in line with prior studies that have found the persuasive effects of campaign ads to be greater among those who are less politically engaged and therefore less likely to have strongly held policy views in the first place (e.g., Fridkin and Kenney 2004; Valentino, Hutchings, and Williams 2004; Franz and Ridout 2007).

If, as prior research suggests (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012) and is predicted by H2, ambivalence creates cognitive discomfort that motivates a deeper (or more “effortful”) processing of information, we should observe stronger effects of the challenger’s attack among incumbent co-partisans who express higher levels of ambivalence toward their party. Our experimental results provide no support for this argument. For affective ambivalence, Table 5 indicates that the attack ad was effective in changing, at least temporarily (Gerber et al. 2011; Hill et al. 2013; Bartels 2014), both vote intention and attitudes about the candidates among all three groups of respondents. Specifically, electoral support for the incumbent dropped between 10.9 and 17.8 percentage points, and mean incumbent favorability declined between 0.261 and 0.680 points (on a 7-point scale) – all changes that were statistically significant at $p \leq .02$. However, contrary to H2, Column 1 of Table 5 shows that diminished support for the incumbent was not most pronounced among those who exhibited a high degree of ambivalence toward their party ($p > .05$ for differences between all three groups). Further, Column 2 shows that the decline in

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15 We initially suspected that the effect of policy consistency might depend on how salient an issue was to the respondent, such that respondents whose policy views were more consistent with the attack charges and who believed the issue in the ad was highly salient would be more likely to find the attack persuasive. However, when we included in our regression models (see below) an interaction term to reflect this we found that neither the interaction nor the individual consistency and salience variables were statistically significant. Such a result may reflect the fact that our sample does not include enough cases, distributed appropriately across these variables, to detect the differential effects. See Tables A18-A19 in our supporting materials for more details.

16 The coding scheme used to classify respondents as either high, medium, or low on ambivalence is identical to that employed in the Florida survey. It is worth noting that prior to the attack, based solely on the biographical information provided, at least 89 percent of respondents at each level of affective, emotional, and evaluative ambivalence said they would vote for the candidate of their party.
incumbent favorability was greater \( (p < .05) \) among those with low affective ambivalence than among their high-ambivalence counterparts. Differing only slightly in the particulars, results for both emotional and evaluative ambivalence (shown in Tables A18 and A19 in our supporting materials) also are inconsistent with the expectations laid out in H2. Most notably, there is not a single instance where the magnitude of post-attack change is significantly \( (p < .05) \) different for high- vs. low- ambivalence respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ambivalence about Incumbent’s Party, Incumbent Co-Partisans</th>
<th>Vote for Incumbent</th>
<th>Favorability, Incumbent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>( Prop )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High (SIM ≥ 2)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline eval.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-attack eval.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( diff )</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p = 0.002 )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( p = 0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline eval.</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-attack eval.</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( diff )</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p = 0.017 )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( p = 0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low (SIM ≤ 0)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline eval.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-attack eval.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( diff )</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p = 0.004 )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( p = 0.000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance of Differences in Effects Across Levels of Ambivalence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>( p ) value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate vs. Low</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High vs. Low</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate vs. High</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data are from a July 2015 national survey of registered voters, conducted by qSample. The analysis is based on paired t-tests. For vote choice, difference is calculated as proportion (post-attack vote) – proportion (baseline vote). For favorability, difference is calculated as mean (post-attack) – mean (baseline). Significance tests are 1-tailed. Respondents who say they lean toward one party or the other are classified as partisans.
The deliberative thinking argument fares no better when we move from t-tests to a multivariate model of vote choice. Counting leaners as partisans (Keith et al. 1986; Magleby and Nelson 2012), the results in Table 6 indicate that none of the three measures of ambivalence had a significant impact on a respondent’s post-attack candidate preference. Unsurprisingly, voting for the incumbent at the pre-attack baseline is a strong predictor ($p < .01$) of one’s decision to support the incumbent a second time. Such stability was not, however, universal. In line with our expectations (H3), those whose policy views were generally consistent with the charges made in the attack had a significantly ($p < .01$) lower probability of voting for the incumbent at T2. Across all three models, each one-unit increase in policy consistency corresponds to an approximately 25 percent drop ($\text{1 -.740}$) in the odds of voting for the incumbent following the attack.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Effect of Issue-Based Attacks on Vote for Incumbent by Ambivalence Measure (National, Incumbent Co-Partisans)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affective Ambivalence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coeff.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vote of Incumbent, Baseline</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic Incumbent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambivalence</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents’ policy preferences were measured by a pair of questions (see online Appendix B) in each of the four policy domains represented in our experimental treatments: the environment (protecting the environment vs. maintaining jobs and a good standard of living; whether climate change is a serious problem requiring government action; $r = .55$ between these two items), national security (fighting terrorism with force vs. helping poor countries to develop their economies; ensuring peace with superior military power or with diplomacy; $r = .40$), immigration (do immigrants strengthen the country or take jobs and end up on welfare; what should be done with undocumented immigrants currently living in the U.S.; $r = .36$), and inequality (whether it is the government’s business to ensure that money and wealth is more evenly distributed; raising taxes on the wealthy and corporations vs. lowering taxes to promote economic growth; $r = .60$). Our measure of “policy consistency” captures the degree to which an individual’s views are in line with the charges leveled in the attack, e.g., an immigration conservative who read the Republican attack on that issue would receive a high consistency score. Four additive indices were created, one for each issue, with all responses coded in the same ideological direction and calculated on a scale from 1 to 5; thus, index values range between 2 and 10 (higher scores representing greater agreement between one’s policy positions and the charges leveled in the attack, while controlling for the attack’s partisan origins).
Table 6 (continued). Effect of Issue-Based Attacks on Vote for Incumbent by Ambivalence Measure (National, Incumbent Co-Partisans)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Consistency</th>
<th>-0.302***</th>
<th>0.740***</th>
<th>-0.292***</th>
<th>0.747***</th>
<th>-0.293***</th>
<th>0.746***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criticize Opponents:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid criticizing (feel not so strongly)</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>1.058</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>1.107</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>1.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed, in-between</td>
<td>-0.675</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>-0.646</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>-0.643</td>
<td>0.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to criticize (feel not so strongly)</td>
<td>-0.613</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>-0.637</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>-0.633</td>
<td>0.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to criticize (feel strongly)</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>2.123</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>2.098</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>2.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of Ad:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not really negative at all</td>
<td>-1.866***</td>
<td>0.155***</td>
<td>-1.858***</td>
<td>0.156***</td>
<td>-1.816***</td>
<td>0.163***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative but acceptable</td>
<td>-1.875***</td>
<td>0.153***</td>
<td>1.868***</td>
<td>0.154***</td>
<td>-1.848***</td>
<td>0.158***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Politics:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly at all</td>
<td>-1.101*</td>
<td>0.333*</td>
<td>-1.172*</td>
<td>0.310*</td>
<td>-1.200*</td>
<td>0.301*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only now and then</td>
<td>-0.465</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>-0.529</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>-0.619</td>
<td>0.539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>-1.129**</td>
<td>0.323**</td>
<td>-1.156**</td>
<td>0.315**</td>
<td>-1.160**</td>
<td>0.313**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Attack</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>1.050</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>1.032</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>1.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Attack</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>1.366</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>1.366</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>1.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Attack</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>1.581</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>1.556</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>1.567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.186***</td>
<td>24.187***</td>
<td>3.319***</td>
<td>27.628***</td>
<td>3.298***</td>
<td>27.048***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perceived negativity and political engagement also are significant predictors of post-attack vote choice. As expected, respondents who believed the attack they viewed was either "negative but acceptable" or "not really negative at all" (H5) were much less likely, compared to those who felt it was "too negative and should not be made" (the reference category, \( p < .01 \) for both groups) to back the incumbent/target after reading the attack. We find no support, however, for the hypothesis (H4) that an attack will be more effective among individuals who possess a greater tolerance for campaign negativity in general, i.e., who believe that it enables voters to know the weaknesses of candidates that might affect their performance in office. Similarly, the results in Table 6 indicate that the persuasive effects of our policy-based attacks were inconsistent across levels of political engagement: greater among the least engaged (H6) but also those who said they follow government and public affairs "some of the time" (cf. Huber and Arceneaux 2007), weaker among voters who follow politics "only now and then" or "most of the time" (the reference category). Finally, neither the party of the incumbent nor the specific issue discussed in the attack had a significant impact on citizens' vote preferences.

Our tests using incumbent favorability as the dependent variable yield similar (though not identical) results, as shown in the OLS models depicted in Table 7. First, only the affective measure of ambivalence is a significant predictor of change in incumbent favorability from baseline to post-attack – and the direction of that change is opposite of what we hypothesized (H2), i.e., respondents who are more ambivalent about their party award the incumbent a larger increase in favorability from T1 to T2 compared to their less ambivalent counterparts (\( p < .10 \)). Consistent with H3, we find that voters who have policy views that are more consistent with the charges made in the attack punish incumbents significantly more in all three models compared to respondents with less compatible views (\( p < .05 \) for the model using affective ambivalence; \( p < .10 \) for the others). Finally, the change in incumbent favorability was significantly greater (\( p < .10 \)) for respondents who read the national security attack compared to those who read the inequality attack (the reference category) in one of our three models. None of the other variables we tested produced statistically significant results.
Table 7: Effect of Issue-Based Attacks on Incumbent Favorability, by Ambivalence Measure (National, Incumbent Co-Partisans)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affective Ambivalence</th>
<th>Emotional Ambivalence</th>
<th>Evaluative Ambivalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>-0.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalence</td>
<td>0.150*</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Consistency</td>
<td>-0.085**</td>
<td>-0.073*</td>
<td>-0.074*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticize Opponents</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Ad as Negative</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Politics</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Attack</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Attack</td>
<td>0.445*</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Attack</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.429</td>
<td>-0.330</td>
<td>-0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data are from a July 2015 national survey of registered voters, conducted by qSample. Models are OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is change in incumbent favorability from baseline to post-attack (T2 rating - T1 rating). Significance tests are 2-tailed: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Respondents who say they lean toward one party or the other are classified as partisans.

One might ask whether the inability to detect effects similar to those reported by Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen (2012) reflects differences in our respective measurement strategies. To address this possibility, we replicated their analytic approach using the items that comprise our measure of affective ambivalence (positive/negative feelings). For the incumbent’s co-partisans, including leaners, we calculated (1) a "conflicting" score equal to own-party negative affect plus opposite-party positive affect, and (2) a "consistent" score equal to own-party positive affect plus opposite-party negative affect.¹⁸ We then regressed change in incumbent favorability

¹⁸ For this analysis, all affect scores are re-scaled from zero to one.
(baseline to post-attack) on the "consistent" score, the "conflicting" score, and, as a control, general political interest. The logic outlined in *The Ambivalent Partisan* leads us to predict that the attack will be more effective (in terms of lowering incumbent favorability) among respondents with conflicting evaluations, i.e., those with higher levels of partisan ambivalence. Results of the OLS regression were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Δ Inc Favorability</th>
<th>Consistent</th>
<th>Conflicting</th>
<th>Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.138 (.049)</td>
<td>+0.052 (.031)</td>
<td>+0.002 (.038)</td>
<td>+0.010 (.043)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 240
R² = 0.014

The negative constant in this equation is meaningful, as it shows that the ad "worked" to significantly reduce incumbent favorability rating among co-partisans. While there is a hint that consistent evaluations may have limited the effectiveness of the ad (p < .10), there is no discernible impact of conflicting evaluations as that coefficient is positive (contrary to expectations) and falls far short of being statistically significant (p = .96). In other words, our replication for affective ambivalence using the measurement approach employed by Lavine and colleagues (2012) comes no closer than our own analysis to supporting the hypothesis that ambivalence promotes a greater responsiveness by voters to negative campaign messages.

**Conclusion**

Amidst the intense ideological and partisan conflict that exists at the elite level in U.S. politics today, and a growing antipathy for the opposition among rank-and-file Republicans and Democrats, it is clear that many citizens possess a mix of positive and negative feelings about the party with which they identify. In this paper, we have tested the idea that such ambivalence reduces the probability of voters employing heuristic thinking when responding to the choices presented to them in political campaigns. According to Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen (2012), partisan ambivalence encourages voters to consider their options in a more deliberative (p. 39), objective (p. 37), and rational (p. 122) manner and, in the end, to cast their ballot based less on party and more on issues (p. 179).¹⁹

If this is true for voting (and our analysis of the 2014 Florida governor’s race suggests that it is not), then it should also be true for the manner in which citizens respond to other types of campaign stimuli. Accordingly, we tested the proposition that ambivalence will moderate the effectiveness of the negative attacks (and, specifically, attacks on the candidate of one’s own party) that are a defining feature of modern campaigns in the United States today. Even political

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¹⁹ For a different take on the causal ordering of these variables (ambivalence and the "effortful" processing of information), see Rudolph and Popp (2007).
consultants, who generally believe that negative ads "work," don’t believe they *always* "work" (after all, many candidates who go negative end up losing) or that they "work" equally well among all segments of the electorate. Our expectation was that individuals who possess mixed feelings about their party would be more receptive than others to attacks made against fellow partisans.

In fact, analyses based on three distinct measures of ambivalence (one of which was also adapted so as to permit a replication of the approach used in *The Ambivalent Partisan*) provided virtually no support for our main hypothesis (H2). To be sure, with political scientists having only just begun to scratch the surface in their efforts to understand the nature of ambivalence generally, and of partisan ambivalence, in particular, the findings of any single study should be regarded with a healthy dose of caution. That said, our results are consistent across a range of measures and in two different contexts (a simulated U.S. House race and a real-life campaign for governor): There is little to suggest that ambivalence undercuts "the judgmental confidence that citizens typically derive from partisan cues" (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012, 122) and encourages them to consider negatively valenced information that they might otherwise be inclined to reject, distort, or ignore. More generally, it remains to be seen whether feelings of partisan ambivalence affect in a meaningful way how voters respond to the choices presented to them in political campaigns.

This is not, of course, the final word. Future research might want to determine, for example, whether the moderating role of ambivalence varies with the repetition of ads (Fernandes 2013); their timing (Chong and Druckman 2013; Gerber et al. 2011; Hill et al. 2013; Bartels 2014); the degree to which they receive earned media coverage (Ridout and Smith 2008) or are judged by the media to be accurate (Fridkin, Kenney, and Wintersieck 2015); candidate vs. party vs. external sponsorship (Brooks and Murov 2012; Weber, Dunaway, and Johnson 2012; Dowling and Wichowsky 2015); variations in context (Keele and Wolak 2008; Klar 2014; Johnson 2014); and the specific type of ads being examined (e.g., positive rather than negative, policy- rather than performance-based; see Craig and Cossette 2018). For now, however, the jury remains out.
Bibliography


Contextual Effects of Redistricting on Old and New Voters: Sometimes Newcomer Ignorance Can Mean Electoral Bliss for the Incumbent

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Abstract
Research directed at the effects of congressional redistricting on individual voters mainly has centered on transplanted constituents’ lesser tendency relative to that of retained constituents to back the incumbent. Differences in the impacts that district-level (i.e., contextual) factors have on the two types of voters, however, have been slighted. In this study, we find that campaign spending affects transplanted and retained voters commensurately, but that the effects of district partisan homogeneity in raising the odds of a pro-incumbent vote and of member ideological extremity in decreasing these odds are only exerted on retained constituents. The explanation seems to be that information conveyed by candidate spending, which emerges only over the duration of the campaign, is equally accessible to new and old constituents alike, whereas old constituents have had longer opportunity to process information about district partisanship and incumbent ideology. From the reelection perspective of incumbents who represent districts with unfriendly partisanship or who have extreme ideology, the non-responsiveness of new constituents to these latter two contextual factors is therefore an electoral asset, implying that such members, contrary to the conventional wisdom, benefit from large-scale transfusions of new constituents at redistricting time.

Introduction
Much work in the extensive literature on U.S. House redistricting has focused upon the electoral role played by constituents newly appended to an existing member’s constituency as a result of redrawn district lines. With partisanship held constant, “new” (i.e., transplanted) constituents have been found to vote less strongly for the incumbent than do “old” (i.e., retained) constituents, especially when the incumbent’s party is the recipient of an unfavorable regional or national election tide (Petrocik and Desposato, 1998, 625-29; Crespin, 2005, 259; McKee, Teigen, and Turgeon, 2006, 315, 316; McKee, 2008a, 126-29; Hood, III and McKee, 2010, 351-54; Yoshinaka and Murphy, 2011, 437-38; Hood, III and McKee, 2013, 208; McKee, 2013, 636). The chief causal factor appears to be the difficulty faced by the member in establishing over the relatively brief period available before election day “personal vote” connections with newly appended constituents; i.e., non-party-based relationships stemming from name recognition and constituency service. Thus, unmoored by the centripetal force of incumbency, these constituents’ voting behavior closely resembles that in open seat districts (Ansolabehere, Snyder, Jr., and Stewart, III, 2000, 26; Rush, 2000, 55).

Aside from less proclivity to support incumbents, however, there is only limited knowledge about differences between new and old constituents. This is particularly true with regard to the question of how district-level (i.e., contextual) characteristics associated with the
candidates in a campaign and the composition of the district affect the behavior of the two types of voters. A full accounting of individual voting behavior, regardless of whether any connection to redistricting is being considered, demands recognition that the geographical context in which such behavior is embedded matters; i.e., contextual environment, as McDaniel puts it, is more than just a “neutral container” (2014, 5). Thus, contextual variables capturing various elements of the campaign, such as spending levels of incumbents and challengers and whether the challenger has elected office experience, are a staple of the general congressional election literature.

Contextual variables tapping the political and demographic composition of the constituency also have been employed in a variety of non-redistricting voting studies, albeit to a lesser extent. For example, Pattie and Johnston find that the prevailing partisanship in British polling districts helps explain party switching by individual voters in these districts from the 1987 to the 1992 general election (2000, 48-50). Likewise, Burbank’s comparative study of voting in the 1987 U.K. general election and 1988 U.S. presidential election shows that political party dominance in the local community, as measured by constituent perceptions, has significant effects on individual voting behavior (1997, 120-26). In a third example, this time focusing on states as the geographical unit of interest, Gelman and Hill (2007, 310-14) and Gelman, Park, Shor, Bafuni, and Cortina (2008, 43-54) demonstrate that while higher income respondents within states are more likely to cast votes for Republican presidential candidates, states with higher average incomes have exerted a pro-Democratic pull upon their residents in recent elections.

With regard to congressional redistricting, however, the effects of context have been given short shrift, despite reasons to think that new and old voters may interact differently with various contextual factors. Based upon an analysis of California census blocks that were retained in U.S. House members’ districts after redistricting or that were newly shifted to their districts, work by Desposato and Petrocik does draw the conclusion that new constituents in 1992 and 1994 were influenced more to vote against the incumbent than were old constituents by the ratio of challenger to incumbent spending (which they use as an indicator of challenger quality) (2003, 24-28; 2005, 48-57). Their study does not deal with individual-level survey data per se, however, instead relying upon interactions between census block variables to make inferences about the behavior of individual voters. Similar analysis by them of California state assembly districts fails to turn up any clear-cut pattern involving responsiveness to campaign spending. In another aggregate data study - - this time centered on turnout rather than vote choice - - Hayes and McKee find for Texas voting tabulation districts after the state’s 2002, 2004, and 2006 redistrictings that there was only a mixed tendency for total campaign spending to enhance congressional election turnout more in newly appended areas than in retained areas (2009, 1014-19). Accompanying analysis of 1992 ANES survey data leads them to a similar verdict that higher campaign spending does not consistently have a greater effect on new constituent turnout (2009, 1010-14).
While the contextual effects of spending generated by redistricting, despite the lack of consensus as to their operation, have at least been touched upon, there is the wholly unaddressed question of whether another campaign variable - challenger quality - has differential impacts.

As just stated, Desposato and Petrocik rely upon the ratio of challenger to incumbent spending as a proxy for challenger quality, but the more direct measure of quality that has been used in the general congressional election literature is whether the challenger either in the past or present has held some form of elected office. A reasonable expectation is that both spending and challenger quality should have greater impact on new constituents, given these voters’ relative lack of personal vote information about the incumbent himself or herself.

Likewise slighted in redistricting studies is the question of how the two kinds of voters are influenced by the population composition of the new district. Desposato and Petrocik do include a variable in their work tapping Democratic registration percentages within census blocks, but the form of their analysis does not address the question of whether blocks new to a district differ from old blocks in their electoral responsiveness to such registration percentages (2003, 22–24; 2005, 48–52). Here, the finding from the general literature on voting, as evidenced in the works cited above by Pattie and Johnston and by Burbank, is that “individuals living in areas predominantly supporting one party are influenced to vote for that party” (Books and Prysby, 1988, 216). This can occur in two basic ways: through social interaction, and through personal perceptions (Books and Prysby, 1988, 221–22; Books and Prysby, 1991, 48–50; Burbank, 1997, 115–17). Social interaction, even in an era of social media, has a heavy spatial dimension. When people belonging to a single party are dominant in a geographical area, one’s political conversations, ceteris paribus, would disproportionately be with neighbors and acquaintances holding this partisanship, and the messages conveyed about the House member, who quite likely comes from the same party, would be very complimentary. A second possibility is that even without such interaction, constituents themselves still might be able to perceive the prevailing political leanings of the community from letters to the editor, local news reports of past election outcomes, etc. A desire to conform to this dominant partisanship in voting behavior may then be the consequence for these constituents.1

Paralleling the arguments outlined above in the cases of campaign spending and challenger quality cues, voters moved into an incumbent’s district likely would also be more in need of cues arising from the partisan makeup of the district in light of their scarcity of knowledge about the incumbent himself/herself. The other side of the coin, however, which we suspect outweighs the influence of this factor, is that new voters probably have greater difficulty assessing

1 Books and Prysby also discuss the “information flow” explanation as a third way by which contextual effects may be transmitted. This explanation focuses on openness to new information and the odds that people will consequently alter their opinions. But as the authors acknowledge, the argument has only been presented in fragmentary mode. Furthermore, its basic tenets to some extent seem subsumable within the social interaction and perceptual frameworks, in that both focus on the form in which contextual information is transmitted to the individual (Books and Prysby, 1988, 222; Books and Prysby, 1991, 50).
district partisanship in the first place. Changes in the partisan composition of most districts induced by redistricting will be relatively modest and retained constituents can be expected to experience a considerably more familiar political landscape than that experienced by those shifted from one district to another.\(^2\) Thus, longer term residents would be more likely to have neighbors and acquaintances who could pass on positive cues about the incumbent. In addition, they would have greater ability to discern district partisanship on their own through extended perceptual experience, even though some of this advantage over transplanted constituents would be mitigated in cases where the latter had been transferred from areas with media markets that covered both the old and new member.\(^3\) On the whole, the situation with regard to district partisan homogeneity should be different than that involving the variables of spending or challenger quality, where new and old constituents alike will have had exposure to such campaign stimuli for approximately the same length of time. Thus, our expectation is that the voting impact of district partisanship would be greater for retained constituents.

A final district-level contextual variable that has been overlooked in previous research on redistricting is the ideological extremity of the incumbent up for reelection. At least in a broad sense, constituents are aware of where their incumbent stands ideologically and to take this placement into account at election time. In particular, the general voting literature shows that with the partisanship of the constituency controlled, members with relatively extreme roll call records receive smaller reelection percentages. The impact of roll call extremity, in fact, has been found to be commensurate with that of variables such as campaign spending (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, 2002, 132-37). Other studies by Ansolabehere, Snyder, Jr., and Stewart, III (2001, 151-52) and by Erikson and Wright (2013, 105-08) likewise have confirmed that ideology matters. It would be surprising, however, were this relationship to be equally strong for transplanted and continuing constituents, given what, in all probability, is lesser familiarity of the former voters with their new member’s legislative record. The same arguments as before with regard to district partisan homogeneity presumably apply; i.e., even though new voters have a greater need for cues about the member in light of their lack of a personal vote connection, fewer interactions with long-term residents of the new district and less knowledge of the member’s

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\(^2\) Specifically, across the 1992, 2002, and 2012 elections that will be analyzed in this study, we compute mean change of 2.7 percent in district partisanship caused by redistricting, and median change of 1.5 percent. These figures result from using a district’s Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote as the indicator of partisanship, and then calculating the absolute value of the difference between the actual presidential vote resulting in the most recent pre-redistricting election and the presidential vote recomputed to correspond with the new district lines. New districts that did not have a clear-cut pre-redistricting predecessor have been dropped from these calculations. (Complete data are available by request.)

\(^3\) Note, however, that lower congruence between congressional district and media market reduces the ability of constituents to recall incumbents (Winburn and Wagner, 2010, 78-81). Thus, constituents transplanted from areas where the media cover more than one incumbent still could be expected to have a shortfall in recall of the new member compared to that of retained constituents.
legislative record absorbed through prolonged media exposure would make them less cognizant of member ideology and hence less able to vote on this basis.\textsuperscript{4}

In this study, we shall analyze how all four of the contextual effects outlined above operate upon new and old constituents in districts with incumbents seeking reelection. Individual-level survey data are utilized, so that we will not be forced to make inferences about the behavior of individuals on the basis of aggregate-level findings. The elections to be covered are 1992, 2002, and 2012, the only immediate post-redistricting elections for which it is possible to extract from ANES surveys the requisite data on whether voters have switched districts.\textsuperscript{5}

Data and Methods

Data for the above elections will be combined together in our analysis.\textsuperscript{6} We perform multilevel analysis with three different levels, in which individual voters are nested within congressional districts, and congressional districts are nested within election years.\textsuperscript{7} At the lowest, individual-voter level, fixed effects for both intercept and slope coefficients are computed, while at the two higher, contextual levels, random effects variances for the intercepts are calculated. The primary advantage of employing multilevel analysis, rather than simply entering at a single level the contextual variables alongside the individual-level variables, is that in the later situation, standard errors of the parameters will be biased downward because of lack of independence among a contextual grouping’s cases; i.e., such cases bear similarity to one another because of the common influence exerted by the contextual variables (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002, 220; Bickel, 2007, 9-12). Aside from the general problem posed for significance testing by underestimation

\textsuperscript{4} The same caveat as above, however, applies here: some transplanted constituents from district with media markets covering multiple members will probably have a sense of the new incumbent’s ideology for this reason.

\textsuperscript{5} The 1992 and 2002 datasets we utilize contain variables directly indicating whether a respondent’s district was switched by redistricting from the previous election. No such variable existed for 2012, so we relied here upon the district number information for the respondent provided just before and just after redistricting. This meant comparing the pre- and post-district numbers to determine whether the respondent’s member stayed the same across both elections. Earlier elections lacked either kind of information. The 1982 ANES contains no direct indicator of switching; furthermore, while a respondent’s district in 1982 is identified, his/her prior district in 1978 - - not 1980 - - accompanies this listing. Some respondents from 1978 to 1980 would have moved to a new district, and the new district might have remained the same after redistricting. Thus, based on the 1978 identification, they would be improperly classified as having been switched to a new district as a result of redistricting. Alternatively, it is possible that the 1978 district of a respondent who moved to a new district in 1980 was the same as the 1982 district; in this case, the respondent would be incorrectly classified as a retained constituent. In the three pre-1982 ANES post-redistricting surveys as well, no direct indicator exists for whether a respondent’s district was changed by redistricting. Furthermore, the 1972 ANES only lists the respondent’s district number as of that year’s election, while no district number information whatsoever is provided in the 1962 and 1952 surveys.

\textsuperscript{6} The three ANES data sets that are used are the 1990-1992 Merged File, the 2000-2004 Merged File, and the 2012 Time Series Study.

\textsuperscript{7} Both face-to-face and online respondents included in the 2012 ANES are used in the analysis.
of the standard errors, an additional problem of single-level analysis that applies specifically to
testing of the contextual variables is erroneous assignment of degrees of freedom. Rather than
degrees of freedom based on the total number of individual cases, the correct degrees of freedom
should be based on the number of groups (Bickel, 2007, 110). Our multilevel estimation is
performed using the \textit{gllamm} (Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models) program of
STATA.

Because the individual-level dependent variable is whether the respondent voted for the
incumbent running in his or her district (1=yes, 0=no), binomial logit is used to generate the
parameters. Respondents voting in districts without major party competition are excluded, as well
as those in districts with major party competition who vote for a minor party candidate.\(^8\)
Individual-level independent variables include the following:

- New constituent (1 if constituent has been shifted into district as result of redistricting, 0 if
  retained constituent)
- Same partisanship (1 if constituent identifies with member’s party, 0 otherwise. Independent
  leaners are grouped with weak and strong partisans)\(^9\)
- Independent partisanship (1 if constituent identifies as pure independent, 0 otherwise).

Constituents identifying with the non-incumbent party comprise the reference partisanship
category.

District-level contextual variables, which have been merged with the survey data, are:

- Campaign spending (\(\ln (\text{incumbent’s spending}) - \ln (\text{challenger’s spending})\). All
  amounts are in 1990 constant dollars)
- Challenger quality (1 if challenger has held any kind of elected office, 0 otherwise)\(^10\)
- District partisan homogeneity (For Republican incumbent district, homogeneity is
  mean two-party Democratic presidential vote proportion across all 435 districts minus
  Democratic presidential vote proportion in district; for Democratic incumbent district,
  homogeneity is Democratic presidential vote proportion in district minus mean Democratic
  presidential vote proportion across all districts. In 1992 and 2012, presidential returns are
  from those same

\(^8\) Respondents in the 2002 data set residing in the at-large Vermont district of Independent Bernie Sanders
were excluded from the analysis.

\(^9\) Including independent leaners with those who identify from the start as Republicans or Democrats on the
ANES’s partisanship question is justified, insomuch as leaners demonstrate almost as much party loyalty in
House elections as do weak identifiers (Jacobson and Carson, 2016, 151-52).

\(^10\) I am grateful to Gary Jacobson for providing his data detailing the elected office experience of House
challengers.
years; for 2002, returns are from 2000, recomputed to fit the new redrawn district boundaries.

Roll call extremity (For Republican members, extremity is first dimension DW-Nominate score in current Congress; for Democratic members, extremity is first dimension DW-Nominate score multiplied by -1) 11

Incumbent’s party (1 for Republican member, 0 for Democratic member).

The spending variable incorporates natural logarithms to allow increasing campaign expenditures to have diminishing returns. Presidential vote proportions, in accordance with standard practice in congressional election studies, are used to proxy district partisanship because of the strong association between presidential voting and party identification. Republican incumbent districts with Democratic presidential vote proportions below the overall mean, and Democratic incumbent districts with Democratic presidential vote proportions above the overall mean have greater levels of partisan homogeneity. Because more negative DW-Nominate values connote greater roll call liberalism and more positive values connote greater conservatism, multiplying Democratic values by -1 means that higher scores for members of both parties are indicators of greater extremity.

Each of the models to be estimated will include the four cross-level effects that were discussed above, whereby the new constituent variable is interacted with Campaign spending, Challenger quality, District partisan homogeneity, and Roll call extremity. In accordance with our previous arguments, the expectations are that transplanted constituents will, compared with retained constituents, rely more on spending and quality in deciding how to vote, and less on partisan homogeneity and extremity. 12

Besides the core model delineated above, we also estimate a second model that includes additional interaction terms. Here, two individual-level interactions are introduced: New constituent is interacted with Same partisanship, and with Independent partisanship. The

11 Using the first dimension DW-Nominate score to measure roll call ideology is customary in the congressional literature. It mainly taps between-party conflict over economic policy and accounts for the majority of variance in roll call voting (Poole and Rosenthal, 2007, 32-77).

12 Were there a general tendency for line drawers to bolster the safety of more marginal incumbents by transferring fellow party partisans to their district, while making safer incumbents less safe by bringing in opposition party voters, the expected negative interaction between the New constituent and District partisan homogeneity variables might then spuriously be made more negative. Many new voters in the more marginal districts would tend to be pro-incumbent because of their partisanship, whereas many new voters in the safer districts would tend to be anti-incumbent. The likelihood of an inflated negative interaction, however, is checked by including variables for voter partisanship in the equation. Furthermore, the relationship between new voter partisanship and district partisan homogeneity is weak. Combining our two partisanship variables so that incumbent party partisans are coded as 3, independents as 2, and opposition party partisans as 1, the summary measure correlates with district partisan homogeneity only at .180. (The small positive coefficient, of course, indicates that on the whole safer districts are made slightly safer by redistricting, and less safe districts made slightly more marginal.)
expectation is that transplanted voters, possessing less personal vote information about the incumbent, would vote more heavily on the basis of their partisanship than would retained voters.

The Effects of Contextual Factors on Old and New Constituents

Table 1 displays the results of the multilevel analysis. Fixed effects parameters are first listed for the independent variables, followed by the variances of the random effects intercepts existing at the two contextual levels. Focusing on the first model, the coefficient of the variable at the center of our inquiry – New constituent – confirms that being a transplanted voter reduces the odds of casting a vote to reelect the incumbent (p<.05). Interaction of this variable with the campaign-related contextual factors, however, leads to inability to confirm the first two cross-level hypotheses. The parameter of Campaign spending, which reveals this variable’s effect on retained constituents (i.e., when the value of New constituent equals zero), indicates that greater campaign expenditures for the incumbent relative to those of the challenger make for greater likelihood of a pro-incumbent vote (p<.05). But contrary to expectations, the interaction term, while having the proper positive sign, is far from being significant, meaning that old and new constituents alike react similarly to this stimulus. Challenger quality, as evidenced by the lack of significance for both the variable by itself as well as its related interaction term, has no effect on either group of constituents.

The third and fourth hypotheses are confirmed in Table 1. District partisan homogeneity significantly influences the vote for old constituents (p<.01), while the significant negative interaction term for this variable (p<.05) shows that new constituents are not similarly affected. The negative sum of the two parameters here – 2.615+(-3.179)= -.564 – indicates that new constituents in response to increasing homogeneity actually experience falloff in their tendency to support the incumbent, but the magnitude of the decline is minimal. (This slight decline itself, not surprisingly, is also insignificant. Were the polarity of Same district reversed so that 1 stands for old constituents and 0 for new constituents, the -.564 parameter then resulting for District partisan homogeneity, which would now directly measure the variable’s impact on new constituents, is far from being significant.) Furthermore, retained constituents cast pro-incumbent votes at a significantly reduced level in response to growing incumbent roll call extremity (p<.01), but the anti-incumbent effect of extremity for transplanted constituents is significantly less (p<.10), weak in magnitude (-1.879+1.048 = -.831), and, by itself, insignificant. One last feature of the fixed effects parameters – unrelated to our hypotheses, however – is that Republican incumbents tend to be more attractive to voters than are Democratic incumbents (p<.10).
### Table 1. Multilevel Analysis of the Effects of Contextual Variables on Old and New Constituents, 1992-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Constituent</td>
<td>-.763** (.411)</td>
<td>-.896** (.455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same partisanship</td>
<td>4.285*** (.162)</td>
<td>4.194*** (.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent partisanship</td>
<td>2.123*** (.189)</td>
<td>2.165*** (.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign spending</td>
<td>.118** (.059)</td>
<td>.117** (.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger quality</td>
<td>-.019 (.235)</td>
<td>-.023 (.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District partisan homogeneity</td>
<td>2.615*** (1.080)</td>
<td>2.649*** (1.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll call extremity</td>
<td>-1.879*** (.605)</td>
<td>-1.884*** (.602)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent's party</td>
<td>.430* (.231)</td>
<td>.430* (.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New constituent * Campaign spending</td>
<td>.043 (.098)</td>
<td>.055 (.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New constituent * Challenger quality</td>
<td>-.036 (.371)</td>
<td>-.038 (.375)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New constituent * District partisan homogeneity</td>
<td>-3.179** (1.791)</td>
<td>-3.356** (1.814)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New constituent * Roll call extremity</td>
<td>1.048* (.667)</td>
<td>1.086* (.675)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New constituent * Same partisanship</td>
<td>.295 (.296)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New constituent * Independent partisanship</td>
<td>-.121 (.408)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.337*** (.501)</td>
<td>-1.305*** (.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variances of Random Effects Intercepts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 (House Districts)</td>
<td>1.026*** (.206)</td>
<td>1.012*** (.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 (Years)</td>
<td>.502 (.446)</td>
<td>.498 (.443)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-1165.011</td>
<td>-1164.286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the second model, where the two additional, individual-level interactions have been included, a positive sign for the interaction between New constituent and Same partisanship would signify that those identifying with the member’s party are more likely to vote their partisanship when they have been moved into a new district by redistricting. While this, in fact, is what emerges, the coefficient is no larger than its standard error. The term for the interaction between new constituent status and independents does not even have the proper positive sign and is much smaller than its standard error. In neither case can it be concluded that party-based voting is more pronounced when other information about the incumbent is circumscribed, as it typically is for new constituents. All other fixed effects terms in model two, of course, are very similar in magnitude to those in the previous model.

The random effects parameters of both models listed in the lower part of the table, which are the estimated variances of the intercepts for the two contextual levels, are significant (p<.01) at the second, but not the third, level. With all fixed effects accounted for, therefore, the likelihood of voting for the incumbent still varies among congressional districts. However, significant variation at the third level – i.e., among the years of redistricting – does not exist.

All told, these results highlight the importance of accessibility to contextual information that can help guide an electoral decision. In the case of district partisanship and incumbent ideology, as argued above, retained constituents owing to their longer period of district residency can be expected to become more conversant with district partisanship and incumbent ideology than will new constituents. Thus, they should be more able to weigh such information in their voting calculus.

Evidence backing this inference, at least so far as it relates to the incumbent’s ideology, can be extracted from the ANES, where in 2002 and 2012 (but not in 1992) respondents were asked to place their member on the seven-point scale of liberalism/conservatism. (No questions in any of the three total surveys relate to respondents’ perceptions of constituency partisanship, the variable that was available to Burbank in his previously referenced study.) The difference in voters’ inability to offer an ideological placement for their member is as expected, but small in magnitude: 6.1 percent for new constituents, vs. 4.3 percent for old constituents (p<.05, one-tail

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>3099</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N of Respondents</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of House Districts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are binomial logit coefficients and standard errors resulting from multilevel analysis. One-tail tests used to determine significance of all coefficients, except for Incumbent’s party and Constant where two-tail tests apply.

***Significant at .01 level; **significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level.
Greater difference exists, however, with regard to the percentages of those making a placement who select the “neutral” category of 4: 22.1 percent vs. 16.1 percent (p<.01, one-tail t-test). This hints at the possibility that new constituents are engaging in a greater amount of guesswork, a possibility that we now take up in Table 2.

For this analysis, we create a folded scale of perceived member ideology by recoding original ratings of 1 and 7 (“extremely liberal” and “extremely conservative”) into 3, 2 and 6 (“liberal” and “conservative”) into 2, 3 and 5 (“slightly liberal” and “slightly conservative”) into 1, and 4 (“moderate/middle of the road”) into 0. Thus, as with the measure of roll call extremity used in Table 1, larger values here once again signify greater extremity in either a liberal or conservative direction.

In Table 2, perceptions of member ideology are related to Roll call extremity and New constituent, plus the cross-level interaction of these two independent variables. Multilevel analysis continues to be performed, employing congressional district and year, respectively, as the second and third contextual levels. Ordered logit now generates the estimates, given that the dependent variable has four categories. For old constituents, perceptions of ideology are very significantly related to actual roll call extremity (p<.01), reinforcing the finding of past research that constituents have a general sense of where their incumbent stands ideologically. The negative coefficient of the interaction term and its corresponding standard error, however, show that the relationship is significantly weaker for new constituents (p<.05). In addition, reversing the polarity of Same constituent to directly reveal the effect of extremity on the perceptions of new constituents shows that the resulting .236 coefficient falls far short of significance, meaning that new constituent perceptions of members’ ideology simply are not affected by actual ideology. Finally, second level random effects parameters, but not those at the third level, are significant (p<.05), so ideological perceptions vary from district to district with independent variable impacts accounted for.

13 These percentages are based only on respondents who, on an earlier question asking them to rate their incumbent on the 100-degree feeling thermometer scale, said that they recognized the incumbent’s name. The ANES automatically codes respondents citing non-recognition on the thermometer question as unable to place the incumbent’s ideology as well. Were these non-recognition respondents included in the calculation along with those specifically saying they could not make an ideological placement, then the non-placement percentages listed here would be considerably larger, as would be the difference between old and new constituents.

14 In the 2002 ANES, the labels from most to least extreme were “Strong,” “Not Strong,” “Leaning,” and “Moderate.”

15 The three cut points in Table 2, which are not relevant to the substance of the analysis, are the estimated thresholds differentiating regions on the unobservable continuous variable being proxied by the fourfold dependent variable actually used in the ordinal logit analysis, when all independent variables equal zero. The insignificant coefficient for cut12 reflects uncertainty in the location of the threshold between the slightly liberal/slightly conservative voters and the liberal/conservative voters.
In contrast to district partisanship and member ideology, however, campaign-related information arising from candidate spending is equally accessible to both old and new constituents, transmitted over the limited duration of a congressional campaign. Particularly important in this regard is information about the challenger; i.e., research generally has shown that of the two types of spending referenced in the independent variable we have formulated, challenger expenditures are more powerful in attracting votes than are incumbent expenditures (Jacobson and Carson, 2016, 65-70). And it is here where new constituents, who will have been exposed to challenger messages for essentially the same period of time as will retained constituents, should not be at a comparative informational disadvantage. Supporting this contention are the findings of McKee (2008b, 970-75) and of Hayes and McKee (2009, 1011-
12), who determine that recognition and recall of challengers – which in good part are driven by campaign advertising – are no lower among transplanted constituents than among retained constituents.\(^{16}\) Thus, campaign spending, unlike district partisanship and incumbent ideology, does influence voters regardless of redistricting status, even though the greater influence on new voters that we hypothesized arising from their greater need for electoral cues did not materialize.

Of course, the one contextual variable that failed to have any impact on either old or new constituents is challenger quality. This may well be because of the increased tendency over time for higher quality potential challengers to act strategically in deciding whether to run. As a result of basing their candidacy decisions to a greater extent on whether local and national conditions likely will be more conducive to success for their party, the independent effect of quality has diminished (Jacobson, 2013, 137-38; Jacobson and Carson, 2016, 205). A second possibility for the inconsequential effect of this variable, however, can be ruled out. Even though it was argued above that challenger quality should be considered in its own right rather than simply being proxied in terms of challenger vs. incumbent spending, it is certainly true that the two variables are related, perhaps leading to a collinearity problem. But when the Table 1 estimations are redone leaving out spending, the parameter for quality increases in size, but not nearly enough to approach statistical significance, and the interaction term remains virtually unchanged.

**Specifying the Impact of Cross-Level Effects on Members’ Reelection Safety**

The final analysis that is performed focuses on the two interactions where contextual variables affected new and old voters differently. Specifically, we address the implications of these differential effects for incumbents’ reelection security. With voters’ actual values retained on every independent variable used in the first model estimated in Table 1, save the contextual variable being singled out for attention, we simulate their probabilities of casting a pro-incumbent vote were they all to have the same value, first, on partisan homogeneity, and, then, on extremity. The probabilities, which represent population average impacts, are generated with regard to the prior distribution of the random effects.\(^{17}\)

The starting and end points of the x axes in Figures 1 and 2 have been selected to encompass respondents’ minimum and maximum values on District partisan homogeneity (-.236, .446) and Roll call extremity (-.076, 1.191), respectively. We focus in our interpretation on values that span two standard deviations below and two standard deviations above the respective means of .104 and .522. On partisan homogeneity across this ± 2 s.d. range, old constituents can be expected to increase their probability of supporting the incumbent from .582 to .698; for new constituents, the probability declines negligibly from .606 to .581. With regard to ideological

\(^{16}\) McKee (2008b, 968–72) and Hayes and McKee (2009, 1010-11) find, in contrast, that recognition and recall of incumbents are considerably higher among retained constituents, understandable in light of their opportunities for exposure to the incumbent across a longer time frame than just the campaign period itself.

\(^{17}\) More details about this procedure may be found in Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2009, 673-81), who were responsible for developing the gllamm program.
extremity, the comparable movement for old constituents is from .725 to .546, while the much
slighter decline for new constituents is from .634 to .551.

Particularly interesting in both plots is the fact that the lines for old and new constituents
intersect. At very low values of partisan homogeneity and very high values of ideological
extremity, new constituents actually have better odds of casting a pro-incumbent vote than do
retained constituents, thus nullifying the normally strong anti-incumbent effect of new
constituent status. This occurs in districts with a partisan homogeneity value of -.033 or lower
(i.e., where the vote proportion for the presidential candidate of the incumbent’s party is at least
.033 below the overall mean district vote for this presidential candidate), and where the
incumbent’s folded DW-Nominate score is at least .934. 8.1 percent of all districts considered in
this study are in the former category (incorporating 6.4 percent of all constituents), and 2.9
percent of all districts have members in the latter category (incorporating 3.1 percent of all
constituents). In contrast to the preponderance of their colleagues, therefore, the minority of
incumbents who represent such districts actually benefit from redistricting that results in
relatively large numbers of newcomers being added to their constituencies. And even in districts
that are not such outliers, the divergence in pro-incumbent voting between old and new
constituents rapidly diminishes as the threshold points are approached, mitigating the damage of
large-scale population migration. In either situation, owing to newcomers’ relative lack of
knowledge about district and member characteristics, they, unlike established constituents, will
not be swayed in an anti-incumbent direction by the balance of district partisanship tilting
against the member’s party, or by the member’s ideological extremity.
Summary and Conclusions

This study presents clear evidence that congressional district-level contextual variables matter in helping to explain how transplanted and retained constituents are affected by redistricting. The particular effects of these contextual variables depend upon whether they emerge over the short-term period of the reelection campaign or are of longer duration. Old and new constituents are on an equal footing with regard to exposure to messages about the challenger that are delivered through campaign spending. Thus, both kinds of constituents react similarly to such spending, decreasing in their odds of voting for the incumbent as challenger spending relative to incumbent spending increases. Information about a district’s partisan homogeneity and its member’s degree of ideological extremity, however, is more likely to be possessed by constituents with longer-standing ties to the district, thus accounting for the finding that only old constituents rely on such information in deciding how to vote.

From the standpoint of reelection safety, the members with the most to gain from new constituents’ non-responsiveness to partisan homogeneity and extremity, therefore, are those representing districts with the most unfavorable ratios of same party to opposition party constituents, and those with the most extreme ideology. This is more important for incumbents of the former kind. Aside from the fact that districts with these members are more numerous than are districts with ideological extremists (i.e., as reported above, 8.1 percent v. 2.9 percent), members from districts with unfavorable partisan balances will be much more electorally endangered. Their mean reelection margin across the three election years considered was only 56.6 percent, compared to the mean 67.6 percent margin attained by ideological extremists.

A sense of the contribution that new constituents in the partisan-unfriendly districts make to incumbent reelection success through non-responsiveness to district partisanship can be garnered by calculating, through replication of the procedure used to generate the plot appearing in Figure 1, the expected probability that newcomers in districts below the -.033 partisan homogeneity value where the lines intersect would have supported the incumbent, had they instead been continuing constituents with actual values maintained on all other independent variables. On average, their odds of a pro-incumbent vote would then be reduced by 1.9 percent. And if constituents only from the very most partisan-unfriendly districts (i.e., those with partisan homogeneity values below -.10) are singled out, the expected pro-incumbent odds shrink by 4.7 percent. So, given the fragile reelection margins of incumbents from districts with adverse partisan balances, it seems reasonable that the new constituents are responsible for some of their survival in office.

In sum, the redistricting literature seems short-sighted in its focus on the damage that new constituents can cause incumbents. Newcomers may actually serve the interests of at least a limited number of members, above and beyond the obvious situation whereby the distribution of new constituents’ party identification simply is slanted in the direction of an
incumbent who shares this partisanship. Sometimes ignorance can indeed be bliss, in the sense of newcomer obliviousness to information that, when possessed by constituents with longer-term district attachments, makes them less likely to cast a pro-incumbent ballot.

But even were members aware of such an electoral benefit, they would have to weigh it against the burden - - common to all members undergoing sizable district boundary changes (DeGrazia, 1963, 146; Cain, 1984, 116-17) - - of establishing working relationships with new political and non-political organizations and with local governments in the appended areas. This, combined with the dissipation of the benefit across subsequent post-redistricting elections as new constituents acquire the missing information, might mean on balance that the addition of the new constituents was not a price worth paying.
References


“Family Values Don’t Stop at the Rio Grande . . .”:
Can the Republican Party Convert Hispanic Voters?

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Abstract
As the Hispanic community becomes increasingly important in American politics there are competing views about whether they can be converted to the Republican Party. One perspective argues that Hispanics’ religion and traditional social values makes them natural constituents of the Republican Party. Alternatively, Hispanics are primarily concerned about issues promoting their well-being, while topics such as moral values or religion are private. I use a novel approach to test whether traditional social values might attract Hispanic voters to the Republican Party. Using exit poll results for ballot propositions on moral issues from Arizona, Colorado, and Florida I find weak evidence that traditional values will convert Hispanics to the Republican Party. Instead, the results indicate that traditional social values issues reinforce the polarization between the two parties.¹

Keywords: Hispanic, Republican Party, moral values, referenda

Introduction
There is widespread agreement about the increasing importance of the Hispanic population in American politics. The size of the Hispanic community is estimated to increase 121% between 2010 and 2050; soon the United States will be a majority-minority nation (Frey 2015). Generally, Hispanic voters have preferred Democratic over Republican Party candidates. For example, in 2012 Barack Obama received 71% of the Hispanic vote compared to only 27% for Mitt Romney. Hillary Clinton received 66% of the Hispanic vote and Donald Trump received 28% in the 2016 election. This is partially related to immigration’s salience in American politics that seems to divide both political parties and large segments of the Hispanic and white populations. The hostility towards immigration by many Republicans, personified by Donald Trump’s disparaging characterizations, doubtlessly alienates many Hispanic voters. A second explanation offered is that the rapid growth of the Latino population motivates some white voters to align with the Republican Party in opposition to immigration which, in turn moves Latino voters to the Democrat Party. Also important are the different party positions on issues basic to opportunity such as education, health care, and jobs.

Yet some conservatives believe Hispanics’ religiosity and embrace of traditional values are opportunities for the Republican Party to attract converts—perhaps not a majority of Hispanic voters but enough to offset their losses in recent elections. George W. Bush often said,

¹ The author wishes to thank the Robert Morse Genius Foundation for their support of this research.
“Family values don’t stop at the Rio Grande and a hungry mother will try to feed her child.” (The Growth and Opportunity Project 2013). In other words, according to the Republican National Committee, President Bush’s statement communicated to Hispanics that he cared about them and their future. In return, George W. Bush received 40% of the Hispanic vote in 2004 which is seen as evidence of the possibility that when a temperate posture, moral values, and national security concerns are communicated to Latinos then their voting decisions makes them similar to other Republican-leaning voters (Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler 2008).

Can Hispanics really be convinced to adopt the Republican Party? A large percentage of the Hispanic population is either Catholic or evangelical Protestant. These faith traditions tend to favor traditional religious and social values. The Republican Party’s long-standing opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage, support for religious liberty, and promotion of the family—it is argued—should be attractive to many Hispanic voters. Following their loss in 2012, the Republican National Committee admonished its membership to be less offensive and more inclusive as well as appeal to traditional values in order to attract Latino support (Growth and Opportunity Project 2013). Yet alternatively, perhaps social values issues are less consequential than immediate concerns such as jobs, health care, education, and immigration.

I find weak evidence at best indicating that appeals to traditional values are sufficiently strong to persuade Hispanic voters to join the Republican Party. Specifically, I argue that Latino voters appear to separate issues into public and private domains. Issues touching upon moral values lie inside Latinos’ personal domain. Latinos may hold traditional attitudes regarding social values but prefer government and politicians to refrain from acting in these areas (Barreto and Segura 2014). Conversely, issues of personal well-being such as education, jobs, health care, and immigration are appropriately in the public domain and suitable for political action. The Republican Party should not count on attracting large numbers of Latinos based upon the party’s values positions—at least not until bread and butter issues are first satisfied.

**Partisan Identification, Moral Values, and Issues of Personal Well-Being**

The political significance of the Hispanic community is realized as America’s largest and most rapidly growing minority. Furthermore, Hispanics are becoming an increasingly important component of the Democratic Party’s coalition. Some argue that the growing Hispanic population—especially in states such as Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, Arizona, and New Mexico—will eventually contribute to a long-lasting Democratic majority (Oakford 2015; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). The competition for the loyalties of Hispanic voters though should be understood partially through the theoretical perspective of partisan identification and understanding which issues matters most to them.

The classic interpretation of partisan identification views membership as a foundational orientation acquired early in voters’ lives (Campbell 1961). Individuals gain their political orientation from their parents, it strengthens over time, and is resistant to change. Further,
individuals’ social and economic attributes reinforce their partisan and political predispositions. Since partisan loyalty is inherited at a young age then it exists prior to political experiences.

Partisanship shapes how policy issues and problems, political information, messages, and candidates are perceived. Later scholars find that party identification exhibits more volatility—at least in the short-term—than the classicists concluded. Citizens’ partisan attachments can exhibit short-term change in response to evaluations of economic conditions (Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983), foreign policy crises, and other salient political events which can produce considerable fluctuation in individuals’ partisan loyalties at particular moments (MacKuen, Erikson, Stimson 1989). Nevertheless, the partisan changes identified by recent scholarship still tend to be small movements; wholesale partisan realignments of the electorate are rare.

Perhaps Hispanic preferences operate differently from those of whites and African Americans even when social and economic factors are controlled (Claussen 2004). Instead, different life experiences, separate national origins, and social identities might better explain the political opinions of immigrant groups (Alvarez and Beddola 2003; Kinder and White 2000). In other words, many Latinos’ partisan attachments are politically and contextually shaped by their experiences after arriving in the United States. This leads some to see Latinos available to acquire an allegiance to the Republican Party because they have not yet adopted strong partisan loyalties. Consequently, since partisan inheritance is weak then the cues and messages appealing to fundamental values delivered to Latinos can be instrumental in cultivating their partisan identity.

It is within this context that competition for Hispanic loyalty becomes politically consequential. The traditional interpretation asserts that partisan identification is a prism through which political reality is interpreted. For Hispanics and other recent immigrants, political events and salient policy issues such as immigration may ‘push’ weakly aligned new migrants to one of the political parties because many have no American partisan inheritance to pass down (Bowler, Segura, Nicholson 2006; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Important policy positions might influence Latino partisan identification more than ideology or demographic factors such as education or income (Nicholson and Segura 2005; Uhlener and Garcia 2005). Since their partisan inheritance is weaker compared to others then their experiences with the state and the appeals by parties and their candidates potentially can exert significant influence on their choices (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). Abrajano and Alvarez (2011), for instance, find that many Hispanics who identify as Democrats do not consider themselves ideologically liberal. In other words, many Hispanic Democrats do not equate their partisanship with an ideology as is typical of Anglo voters although Hispanics who identify with the Republican Party think of themselves a little more as conservatives. Hence, the relationship between ideology and political party is weaker for Hispanics compared to the rest of the American electorate. Nor are classic demographic factors such as education and income levels strong predictors of Hispanic partisanship (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011).

What replaces ideology and personal demographic characteristics as predictors of Hispanic partisanship? National origin, age and length of residency in the United States,
inclusion into communities, and issues that directly impact their daily life appear to be important sources of partisan affect. Issues of immediate concern such as access to education, jobs, health care, and the parties’ positions on immigration are important predictors of Democratic identification. Thus, Hispanic partisan preference may be more dynamic and nuanced compared to the generally stable party identifications of Anglos; it is potentially receptive to the overtures and appeals of the parties.

Another explanation for the Hispanic lean to the Democratic Party is offered through the dynamics of dramatic demographic change and its resulting polarization. Traditional applications of conflict theory argue that significant demographic change often produces anxiety by the majority [white] population. As the Latino community grows a heightened sense of threat is experienced by many white voters who move to the Republican Party (Hajnal and Abrajano 2015; Hajnal and Rivera 2014; Barreto and Segura 2014; Teixeira, Frey, Griffin 2015). The feeling of threat can be ignited by local elites who serve as issue entrepreneurs (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015). For example, Republican Governor Pete Wilson’s advocacy of Proposition 187 in California rallied some white voters to the perceived threat posed by immigration (Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006; Monogan and Doctor 2017). In response to the heightened fear and perhaps its exploitation by political leaders states often adopt restrictive immigration policies. Hispanic voters may be repelled away from the (Republican) party sponsoring hostile legislation and conversely embrace the (Democratic) party proposing policy positions that are less threatening and aligned with their preferences. Given these factors potentially affecting Hispanic partisan identity, can Republican appeals to religious and traditional values offset the losses attributed to antagonistic posturing, harsh immigration positions, and an agenda of lower taxes and personal liberty?

Can Cultural Values Bring Hispanics to the Republican Party?

Given the lean toward the Democratic Party by Hispanics over the past 25 years is there evidence that socially conservative values might offer the Republican Party some hope? A large literature establishes the movement of religious conservatives to the Republican Party (Kellstedt 1994; Layman 1997b; Green, Guth, Smidt, Kellstedt 1996). Indicators of religious conservatism such as frequent church or worship service attendance, biblical literalism, and born-again experiences predispose individuals towards the Republican Party. Further, the Republican Party intentionally recruited religiously conservative voters through specific policy appeals which bridge traditional religious and cultural values. The so-called ‘Culture Wars’ of the 1990s and early 2000s were waged over issues including abortion, gay rights, and contraception.²

² Morris Fiorina, though, questions whether a ‘Culture War’ exists in the United States. He believes the majority of the American population hold centrist opinions on most issues. The source of polarization is ideologically extreme elites offer radical policy alternatives to the public. (2011).
The possibility to attract Hispanics is seen by both the Republican Party organization as well as by conservative intellectuals. Strategists acknowledge the Democratic advantage but contend the Republican Party can and must broaden its appeal to Hispanic voters. They argue Republican positions on traditional religious and cultural/family values, and the large percentage of Latinos who are Christian are attractive to many Hispanic voters; Latino social conservatism predisposes many to adopt the Republican Party. Thus, the Republican National Committee after the 2012 presidential election acknowledged the need to soften its “unwelcoming” rhetoric. “The RNC must improve how it markets its core principles and message in Hispanic communities (especially in Hispanic faith-based communities)” (Growth and Opportunity Project 2013). George W. Bush was able to win 40% of the Latino vote because of his softer rhetoric and using family values as a broad appeal to sympathetic Hispanic voters. Frequent attendance at worship service or being ‘born again’ reinforces traditional religious values which in turn, strengthens conservative (i.e., Republican) attachment. Indeed, according to the 2008 national exit poll 80% of Hispanics identified as Catholic or belonging to another Christian denomination. Approximately 38% of Hispanics attend church or worship service at least once per week and 34% acknowledge being born again. Indicators of religious identity and commitment, therefore, seem to offer an opening for the Republican Party to increase its Hispanic support.

Writing in National Affairs—a conservative thought journal—Mike Gonzalez (2014) advances an intellectual agenda for the Republican Party to attract Hispanic voters. Gonzalez argues that Hispanics became a Democratic constituency for three related reasons. When the Census Bureau classified Hispanic as a “minority” in the 1960s a particular identity was created that fostered a view of “persecution.” Second, Great Society programs encouraged Hispanics to become consumers of government social benefits. And finally, the “countercultural revolution of the 1960s eroded Hispanics’ family traditions and values . . .” (118). The Republican Party can attract Hispanics by emphasizing the importance of traditional family values and structures as well as the virtue of climbing the social hierarchy similar to the paths followed by the Scots-Irish and Roman Catholics decades ago.

Barreto and Segura (2014) though argue that while Latinos are religious, particular issues dominate their decision calculus. They find that Latinos are primarily concerned about matters affecting their personal well-being such as immigration, jobs, health care, and education. Latinos separate issues between their personal and political identities. Latinos overwhelmingly reject abortion but believe politicians and government should refrain from being involved in these types of issues. Conversely, many Latinos view job opportunity, expanded educational access, and health care are appropriate policies for elected officials. Unlike other religious traditionalists, Latino voters appear to differentiate between the political/public domain and personal space that is reserved for moral issues. Perceptions of political parties’ ability to solve the issues important to voters are consequential for partisan affection and analysis suggests that Latinos see the
Democratic Party as better able to respond to their policy preferences (Nicholson and Segura 2005).

Data and Methods

This research uses a novel approach to examine whether Hispanic voters can be attracted to the Republican Party through their religiosity and family values. I examine support for ballot initiatives that advanced family value outcomes in Arizona, Colorado, and Florida from 1996 through 2008 as a test of these competing interpretations. During this time several states proposed referenda prohibiting gay marriage or imposing new restrictions on abortion. Ballot initiatives offer several unique advantages. Ballot propositions simplify a voter’s decision calculus because citizens do not need to figure out which candidate/party is closest to their overall ideal preference point. Ballot measures allow voters to express their sincere policy preference without considering the influences of candidate characteristics, the tradeoffs among a host of other policy positions held by candidates, or the implications for the balance of power in an assembly. Further, the referenda permit Latinos to express their preference for policies advancing traditional values without voting for a Republican Party that may be perceived as hostile to immigrants or instrumentally using pro-family rhetoric. Second, 1996 – 2008 is a period when ‘moral values’ are a strong theme in Republican presidential campaigns and are becoming a visible component of their coalition. The Republican Party successfully attracts social conservatives during this period. If there is a context when Hispanics could be drawn by the appeal of moral values, then the selected ballot initiatives during this time frame provide a straightforward test. Finally, this period precedes the intense polarization over immigration and disturbing caricatures of Latinos used by some politicians today. Indeed, this is an interval largely distinguished by “compassionate conservatism” and temperate language. Therefore, the potential pull of traditional values on Latinos’ preferences on referenda are less jumbled by the contemporary hostility of the Republican Party.

The selected states experienced substantial increases in their Hispanic populations in the period. There is a total of seven instances of ballot initiatives concerning moral values or indicators of religiosity between 1996 and 2008 in these three states. This provides separate tests of our proposition whether Hispanics distinguish between issues located in their personal and public spheres, displayed in Table 1. If family values occur in their public, (i.e., political, domain)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1. Hispanic Share of Total Population</th>
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<td>Arizona</td>
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<td>Colorado</td>
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<td>Florida</td>
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Source: Pew Hispanic Study; Population counts for 2010 are tabulated from P.L. 94-171 Summary Files released by the Census Bureau beginning in February 2011.
then it is a relatively easy choice for these concerned voters to support the ballot proposals and express affect for the Republican Party.

Contemporary research on the Hispanic population typically relies on national level surveys. The American National Election studies and the General Social Surveys are nationally recognized resources but provide a limited sample of Hispanic respondents which limits subgroup and state-level analysis. A further limitation of national surveys is high-growth Hispanic states do not fall within a distinct region as is the case when studying race in the South. Even large-N surveys of Latino respondents such as the PEW National Hispanic Survey or the Latino National Survey can produce small samples when controlling for citizenship status and numerous variables included in models. To overcome these problems, we use the state-level results from the General Election Pool for each presidential election from 1996–2008. A potential limitation of exit surveys is they typically ask voters a slightly smaller battery of questions compared to the national surveys. This means that some equations used to estimate the behavior of Hispanic and white voters are possibly slightly under-identified. At the same time, exit polls offer several valuable advantages. First, exit polls provide a satisfactory Hispanic sample within each state for each election that permits subgroup analysis. Second, the 12-year time span allows for an analysis of trend prior to the prominence of immigration on the public agenda. Is there evidence of the Hispanic population’s movement towards the Democratic Party prior to immigration becoming a national issue? Also exit polls give a profile of the ‘true’ voting public. They recreate the ‘real’ electorate in each election and provide a good explanation for why citizens voted the way they did. Exit polls, too, are used by many significant scholars to study Hispanic political behavior reflecting their usefulness.

The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, can we detect the Latino community organizing behind the Democratic Party in our selected states? We expect to see the greatest drift toward the Democratic Party in Arizona and moderate patterns in Colorado and Florida. Latino voters are the least likely to display Republican sympathies in a hostile state like Arizona, but they may be more open to moral issues in Colorado and Florida where their experience with the state is

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3 We use exit polls from Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International. Sponsor: National Election Pool (ABC News/Associated Press/CBS News/CNN/Fox News/NBC News) and from Voter News Service. Voter News Service General Election Exit Polls, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The Arizona data files were obtained from the Roper organization.

4 There are no ballot initiatives concerning moral values in states with high Hispanic growth rates after 2008.

more welcoming. State senator Russell Pearce and former Sheriff Joe Arpaio can be considered playing the roles of anti-immigrant issue entrepreneurs in Arizona. Russell Pearce introduces Senate Bill 1070 which authorizes state and local law enforcement officers to inspect the citizenship status of anyone appearing suspicious. This culminates after a decade of anti-immigrant policies being advanced by the Arizona legislature. Sheriff Arpaio aggressively enforced Arizona’s anti-immigrant policies during his tenure in Maricopa County. The increased white mobilization and perceived hostile legislation in turn raises the sense of threat by the Latino community who are assumed to move en bloc to the Democratic Party. In contrast, Colorado and Florida pursue more restrained policy agendas regarding immigration and have widely-respected Latino political leaders. Federico Pena was mayor of Denver and served in President Obama’s cabinet and Mel Martinez was elected to the United States Senate from Florida and was a former chair of the Republican National Committee.

Second, we directly test whether Latino support for the seven referenda and religiosity items predicts Republican Party affect. We are less interested in the specific point estimates of factors; instead, we test whether the counterfactual is statistically significant. Specifically, we are keenly interested in whether the factors measuring Latino support for moral values initiatives and traditional religious appeals are statistically significant with Republican Party affect.

As a further test of our propositions I estimate a logistic model using the Latino National Survey (2006) as a test of robustness. The dependent variable is the likelihood of Republican identification predicted by sets of questions measuring respondents’ social and demographic characteristics, positions on issues, financial situation, ideology, and perceptions of inequities between themselves and the majority white population. If the results are consistent with those from the exit surveys, then we can be more confident about the weakness of traditional values as a vehicle for partisan conversion.

Moral Values and Polarization

The white and Hispanic populations agree about many national issues, however, there are nuanced differences. Hispanics appear more concerned with immediate policy problems connected to issues of social mobility and economic opportunity. The white population illustrates a slightly greater sensitivity to general policy issues such as national security and taxes. Table 2 reports the percentage of the white and Hispanic populations who found an issue to be the most important for their vote in each presidential election. Predictably, the economy and jobs are important issues for both groups. Second, approximately 16% of Hispanics report moral values are significant for their presidential vote. Also, the Hispanic community consistently regards education and health care to be crucial to their vote decision. These differences probably Hispanics’ greater concern with policies that offer the potential for opportunity and personal security as well as their economic vulnerability.
Michael Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla (2003) argue that Hispanics display a preference towards the Democratic Party even though their partisan loyalty is not as complete as that of African Americans—some potential sympathy for the Republican Party seems to exist. Recently, however, the Hispanic population is considered to be emerging as a Democratic bloc. The Republican Party’s opposition to immigration reflects white “backlash” to the rapid increase in the Hispanic population in communities (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Hajnal and Rivera 2014). Is there evidence that Republican sponsorship of perceived hostile immigration-related legislation contributes to distinctive partisan alignments? We estimate the likelihood that the white and Hispanic populations in our states identify with the Republican Party from 1996 to 2008 using logistic regression where the dependent variable is party identification (scored 1 for Republican and 0 for Democrat) predicted by typical indicators of partisan identification. (Refer to the Technical Appendix for an explanation of the method).

<table>
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<th>Year/Issue</th>
<th>Arizona White</th>
<th>Hispanic White</th>
<th>Colorado White</th>
<th>Hispanic White</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Cuban</th>
<th>Hispanic/Non-CubAn</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economy/jobs</td>
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<td>19%</td>
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<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
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* The exit poll in Florida did not distinguish between Cuban and Hispanic respondents of non-Cuban descent until 2004.

Figure 1 reports the likelihood that white and Hispanic voters identify with the Republican Party in each state. The results for Cuban voters in Florida are reported beginning in the 2000 presidential election—the first year the exit polls distinguish between Hispanic and Cuban voters. Beginning in 1996, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida illustrate a trend where the Hispanic community becomes less Republican and white identification grows for the Republican Party. Cuban voters in Florida identify with the Republican Party about as strongly as the white population in 2000 but decay over the decade. Cuban voters’ declining fidelity to the Republican Party appears to be consistent with theories of assimilation by latter-generation Cubans; younger Cubans are less likely to profess strong commitment to the Republican Party over their opposition to the Castro regime. There is noticeable state by state variation in partisan identification. In part, this is likely the result of differing state political, economic, and social contexts. Yet in each election since 1996 the white population increasingly identifies with the Republican Party. Furthermore, the Hispanic community continues to move gradually away from the Republican Party and toward the Democratic Party.

Next, is there evidence that traditional moral values might attract Hispanic voters to the Republican Party? There are several questions used in our states which permit analysis of the attraction of traditional religious and cultural issues for Hispanic voters. Arizona (2008), Colorado (2004), and Florida (2008) all ask voters if they had a born-again experience—an important indicator of religious traditionalism. Florida placed Amendment 2 on the ballot in 2004 and Arizona listed Proposition 102 on its 2008 ballot which legally defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman. In 2008 Colorado offered Amendment 48 which legally defines a “person” to exist at the moment of fertilization. Finally, Florida voters were asked how frequently they attended church or worship service in 2004. Collectively these states offer seven instances of either referenda or survey questions that permit a test of whether the Republican party might attract Hispanic voters due to traditional values.
Figure 1: Probability of Republican Identification

**ARIZONA**

- White Prob
- PID-Rep
- Hispanic Prob
- PID-Rep

**COLORADO**

- White Prob
- PID-Rep
- Hispanic Prob
- PID-Rep

**FLORIDA**

- White Prob
- PID-Rep
- Hispanic Prob
- PID-Rep
- Cuban Prob
- PID-Rep
Similar to Equation 1, the analysis uses logistic regression to estimate the likelihood that a voter casts a ballot for the Republican presidential candidate in each election. Republican presidential vote is predicted by a series of independent variables (depending on which are used in each exit poll), dichotomous (i.e., dummy) variables used for race and ethnicity, the relevant variables tapping religiosity and cultural values (i.e., Colorado Amendment 48, etc.) and a series of interaction terms. The interaction terms show the combined effect of race/ethnicity with the variables tapping religiosity and traditional family values.

The interaction terms are the variables of most interest because they estimate the effect between a religious or family value variable and race/ethnicity. Statistically significant interaction terms indicate that religiosity (church attendance or a born-again experience) and/or a family value (heterosexual marriage or personhood begins at fertilization) are important for their respective racial/ethnic group which motivates them to vote Republican. In other words, the test for the hypothesis that the Republican Party can convert Hispanic (or White) voters is whether the coefficient for the interaction term is both positive and statistically significant; the specific point estimates are of less concern.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arizona</th>
<th>Colorado</th>
<th>Florida</th>
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<tr>
<td>Marriage is union between a man and a woman.</td>
<td>Personhood begins at moment of fertilization.</td>
<td>Amendment 2 (2004)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marriage is between a man and a woman.</td>
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Table 4. Likelihood of Republican Presidential Vote – Florida (Logistic Estimates)

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<td>-.026 (0.209)</td>
<td>-.043** (0.024)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>.149** (0.000)</td>
<td>.189** (0.000)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.604** (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Frequency of Church Attendance</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born again</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.220** (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>.049 (0.918)</td>
<td>.194 (0.648)</td>
<td>1.124** (0.005)</td>
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<td>-.2123** (0.000)</td>
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<td>Cuban</td>
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<td>.612 (0.217)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.679 (0.264)</td>
<td>1.538** (0.024)</td>
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<td>1.657** (0.000)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic (non-Cuban) x amendment 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuban x amendment 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.267** (0.036)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>White x born again</td>
<td></td>
<td>.019 (0.964)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic (non-Cuban) x born again</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuban x born again</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.832 (0.169)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>-.1667*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-.2211** (0.000)</td>
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Asian is omitted group for dummy vars. P (z); * p<.05; ** p < .01
### Table 4. Likelihood of Republican Presidential Vote (Logistic Estimates)

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<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
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<td>.030 (.186)</td>
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<td>.121 (.156)</td>
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<td>-.492 (.266)</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>(marriage is union between man and woman)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>White</strong></td>
<td>.768 (.296)</td>
<td>-.345 (.668)</td>
<td>-.413 (.406)</td>
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<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
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<td>-.2201* (.027)</td>
<td>-.1658** (.005)</td>
<td>-.1462 (.346)</td>
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<td>.774 (.370)</td>
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<td><strong>Colorado Amendment 48</strong></td>
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<td>-.2437* (.038)</td>
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<td>(‘person’ begins at moment of fertilization)</td>
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Asian is omitted group for dummy vars. P(z); *p<.05; **p < .01
Consistent with other research, in every election the likelihood of voting Republican increases as household income increases. Education, too, mostly conforms to expectations. In most elections, higher levels of education indicate greater support for Democratic presidential candidates. Respondents’ age, however, is not significant in most models. The explanation might be age crosscuts other issues and divisions in these particular electorates.

The results from the interaction terms provide inconsistent-to-weak support for the hypothesis that religiosity increases Hispanic support for the Republican Party. Of the seven elections analyzed the interaction term for Hispanics was significant in only two—church attendance for Florida in 2004 and having a born-again experience in Colorado in 2004. Both states were won by George W. Bush. The interaction term for Hispanics and ‘born again’ is significant in Arizona in 2008, however, the sign is negative indicating support for the Democratic Party. The only factors with statistical significance for Republican presidential vote are limited to traditional indicators of religious commitment.

Arizona and Florida placed constitutional amendments on their state ballots which legally define marriage as the union between a male and female. Favoring traditional marriage is strongly supported and statistically significant among white voters in both states. The coefficients in both instances are quite large indicating support for traditional marriage exerts a substantial influence on white support for the Republican Party. Similarly, Cuban respondents in Florida strongly favor traditional definitions of marriage. In contrast, the interaction term fails the test of statistical significance for non-Cuban Hispanics in both states—traditional marriage does not influence the partisan choice of non-Cuban Hispanics. Gay marriage, of course, is an issue undergoing rapid evolution in public opinion although Republican attitudes were relatively more fixed in 2008 compared to 2014.

Colorado Amendment 48 legally defined a person to exist at the moment of fertilization. Interestingly, Amendment 48 does not achieve statistical significance for either white or Hispanic voters. Importantly, again, an indicator of traditional values does not appear to motivate Hispanic voters to consider the Republican Party.

The results are even less encouraging for the Republican Party when re-estimating Equation 2 for the likelihood that voters claim Republican Party affiliation. Only one interaction term is significant for Hispanics. The interaction term for Hispanic voters and born-again is statistically significant in Colorado in 2004. All other interaction terms using religious or moral values referenda fail to demonstrate any evidence of converting Hispanics to Republican Party identification—even in Colorado and Florida where their state environments are more welcoming and Hispanic movement to the Democratic Party is weaker compared to Arizona.

Conversely, the interaction terms for white voters are consistently significant predictors of Republican identification: the importance of being born again is significant for white voters in Colorado in 2004, traditional marriage is significant in Arizona and Florida in 2008, life begins at the moment of fertilization in Colorado in 2008, and frequent church attendance in Florida in 2004.
Table 5. Likelihood of Republican Identification – Florida (Logistic Estimates)

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<td>-.026 (.209)</td>
<td>-.043** (.02)</td>
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<td>Cuban x born again</td>
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Asian is omitted group for dummy vars. P (z); * p<.05 ; ** p < .01
Table 5. Likelihood of Republican Identification – Arizona and Colorado (Logistic Estimates)

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<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
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<td>(0.000)</td>
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<td>.033</td>
<td>-0.103**</td>
<td>-0.192***</td>
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<td>(0.677)</td>
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<td>11.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-1.225**</td>
<td>12.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.833)</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.202**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x born again</td>
<td>.617</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.402**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.381)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>White x Arizona Prop 102</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.113’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
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<td>Hispanic x Arizona Prop 102</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.981)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Colorado Amendment 48</td>
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<td>-0.268</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(‘person’ begins at</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.773)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moment of fertilization)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White x CO Amend 48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.036**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic x CO Amend 48</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.168)</td>
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<td>1.004</td>
<td>-13.921</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.857)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1018</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>2091</td>
<td>1028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asian is omitted group for dummy vars. P (z): * p<.05 ; ** p < .01
Together the results are more consistent with the view of increasing polarization between the Republican and Democratic electoral coalitions. We believe the Republican Party is increasingly dominated by white voters in high-Hispanic growth states where the Democratic Party appeals to racial and ethnic minorities. Our findings provide weak support at best for the RNC’s ability to attract Hispanic voters through traditional moral appeals. To the contrary, these appeals appear to resonate mostly with white voters, reinforcing the growing distance between the two groups in American politics. Nor does it seem that even if the Republican Party finds a way to move beyond the immigration issue that their appeal to Hispanic voters will improve. The above evidence for Arizona, Colorado, and Florida suggests that the trajectory is Hispanic voters are settling into Democratic Party allegiance. Of course, simple plurality electoral rules mean many elections in the United States can be won with relatively small movements of voters; marginal improvement by the Republican Party among Hispanic voters can be enough to win particular elections. At the same time, the trend appears to be one of an increasing attachment to the Democratic Party by Hispanic voters.

**Test for Robustness using the Latino National Survey (2006)**

The results from the referenda offer little evidence that the Republican Party can use appeals to traditional moral values and religion to convert Latino voters. Even the more temperate states of Colorado and Florida provide little support that these issues activate favorable Latino affect. As an additional test I use the Latino National Survey (LNS) from 2006 as a test for robustness. The LNS roughly corresponds to the time interval for the referenda. Therefore, it is administered during the similar national context regarding immigration and the Republican Party’s appeals to religion and social issues to attract conservative voters. Further, the LNS offers more issues and respondent characteristics. Generally, the results from the LNS are consistent with the evidence produced from the state-level exit polls.

The approach is similar to that of the earlier models. I use logistic regression to estimate the likelihood that a respondent identifies as a Republican (1) or a Democrat (0). Partisanship is predicted by factors organized into four conceptual domains: (1) standard demographic variables including age, education, marital status, household income, and gender, (2) variables used to measure religiosity and traditional social values such as the frequency of church attendance, whether the respondent had a born again experience, should a woman be the primary care giver for children, attitudes toward same sex marriage, and whether abortion is permitted under any condition, (3) issues of immediate concern and general philosophical orientations toward the role of government including support for the DREAM Act, national health care, equal spending across public school districts, support for school vouchers, and personal financial situation, and (4) characteristics of immigrant groups including citizenship and national origin coded as dummy variables. The issue variables and religious indicators are coded such that positive coefficients correspond to Republican leaning. Two additional variables of interest are included in the model. The relationship between ideology and partisan identification is clear and strong.
for Anglos who inherit their party affiliation from their parents. The process might be different for immigrant groups because they do not have an American partisan identity to inherit. Hence, the direct effect of ideology is estimated in the model. Also included is the degree to which Latinos believe they share similar experiences regarding job opportunities, educational access, and income mobility with other minority groups such as African Americans. If Latinos see themselves sharing more in common with African Americans regarding the opportunities for personal advancement then Republican appeals to traditional values logically will be less effective, especially in the absence of strong ideological predispositions.

At best, the results from the Latino National Survey offer mixed support that appeals to traditional religious and moral values provide modest leverage for Latino Republican identification. Frequent church attendance is not statistically significant, and a born-again experience predicts Democratic identification. Even the typically powerful abortion issue is not statistically significant. Also, the belief that government should redistribute resources to equalize school funding across districts moves Latinos to the Democratic Party. National origin—except for Cubans—and attitudes toward immigration policy measured by support for the Dream Act are significant and nudge Latino voters to the Democratic Party. Interestingly, access to education measured by favoring vouchers and opposition to same sex marriage do increase the likelihood that Latinos identify with the Republican Party. This suggests the possibility that an agenda of selective conservative issues can gain some support although it must include positions on issues providing opportunity instead of solely traditional values.

The separate effects for ideology and Latinos’ shared experiences with other minorities reinforce the view that everyday issues of life are more important than traditional values. Ideology predicts Latino partisan identification. However, 28% of Latinos answered they do not think in left-right ideological terms and 8% reported they do not embrace an ideology. This is consistent with the idea that immigrants evaluate politics using a different calculus. Their encounters with the political and social world might well be more important compared to Anglo voters who largely inherit their partisan identification. Second, Latinos who believe they share similar experiences with African Americans regarding diminished opportunity is powerful and predicts Democratic identification. This supports the idea that Latino political behavior is motivated by issues affecting their immediate life. In short, the test for robustness is consistent with the conclusion that traditional social values and religious appeals offer only weak support for the belief that Latino voters are available for conversion to the Republican Party. For the Republican Party to convert potential Latino voters requires fundamentally refocusing the party’s agenda and abandoning its hostile posture.
| Central and South America | -2.649**  
|                         | (1.330) |
| Mexican                | -1.042*  
|                         | (0.594) |
| Cuban                  | 1.535*   
|                         | (.913)  |
| Puerto Rican/Dominican Republic | -0.546   
|                         | (0.686) |
| Citizen                | 0.267    
|                         | (0.528) |
| Church attendance      | 0.085    
|                         | (0.184) |
| Born again             | -0.786*  
|                         | (0.430) |
| Same Sex marriage      | 0.771*** 
|                         | (0.310) |
| Abortion               | 0.228    
|                         | (0.254) |
| Dream Act              | -0.328*  
|                         | (0.174) |
| Health care            | 0.057    
|                         | (0.214) |
| Equal funding for schools | -0.646**   
|                         | (0.264) |
| School vouchers        | 0.329*   
|                         | (0.178) |
| Mother care for kids   | -0.161   
|                         | (0.132) |
| Married                | 0.413    
|                         | (0.499) |
| Education              | 0.227*   
|                         | (0.141) |
| Household income       | 0.034    
|                         | (0.122) |
| Gender                 | -0.144   
|                         | (0.394) |
| Age                    | -0.017   
|                         | (0.014) |
| Financial situation    | 0.680**  
|                         | (0.274) |
| Ideology               | -1.186*** 
|                         | (0.320) |
| Common with African Americans | -0.341*   
|                         | (0.212) |
| Constant               | -0.448   
|                         | (2.696) |
| Pseudo R²              | 0.332    
|                         |         |
| N                      | 258      

Omitted category is “Hispanic from other countries”  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (standard error)
Discussion

Can appeals to traditional social values help the Republican Party convert Hispanic voters in high-growth states? The results suggest that Hispanic voters do not respond to religious and moral value positions in the political arena. Indeed, the likelihood that Hispanic and white voters identify with the Republican Party have been diverging from each other since 1996. The most dramatic change occurs in Arizona which adopted the most restrictive anti-immigrant legislation. However, even in Florida and Colorado where the state responses are more mixed, there is consistent movement by Hispanic voters away from the Republican Party.

What does this imply about the importance of religion for minority politics? One possibility is that economically and socially marginalized voters weigh issues differently compared to white voters. Barreto and Segura (2014) seem correct when arguing that Hispanic voters are more concerned about issues addressing their immediate economic security rather than religious appeals. A second possibility is that conceptualizations of ‘God,’ religion, social suffering, and moral issues are different for minority citizens who might connect religion with social justice outcomes. Religious appeals may reinforce a collective identity of social suffering and injustice that interprets hardship as a pathway to God instead of God becoming one’s personal savior (Horner and Martinez 2015). Hence, religious appeals that resonate with comparatively advantaged white voters may not ring similarly with Hispanic voters. In fact, religious primes may inspire the desire for a larger role of government as a way of reducing unjust inequities. Yet, Latinos’ weak ideological predisposition and focus on issues that advance their economic and social opportunity suggest they could become an important swing constituency under the right configuration of issues. These results suggest that if the Republican Party wishes to attract potential Latino voters then it needs to adjust its policy positions away from an agenda of limited government, lower taxes, and personal liberty. Instead the Republican Party must embrace positions that tangibly responds to personal well-being and opportunity as well as abandon its hostile posture.

What explains Latino support for George Bush in 2004? Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler (2008) argue that moral values and national security concerns motivated 40% of the Latino vote for President Bush. National anxiety over terrorism following the September 11 attacks combined with Republican exploitation of national security issues likely contributed to some portion of his Latino vote. I am less convinced that moral values is a primary causal factor that moved Latinos to support President Bush. Instead, it might be more likely that President Bush’s personal outreach to Hispanic voters and his record as governor of Texas mobilized Latino support. Or Latino support for President Bush reflects candidate-centered characteristics in national elections rather than the potential for the conversion of significant numbers of voters to the Republican Party. In either case the results call attention to the need for additional research at the state-level in order to better understand minority political behavior.
Finally, the rhetoric and policy positions of Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential election campaign and as president reinforces the likelihood that Latinos will solidify around the Democratic Party. Candidate Trump clearly seemed uninterested in the RNC’s recommendation for welcoming rhetoric and appeals to family values; President Trump’s strategy seems designed to strengthen the existing partisan divisions in the United States.

Bibliography


Technical Appendix

Partisan identification is regressed on typical indicators and may be estimated using Equation 1. The estimated logits are used to retrieve the predicted probability for $i^{th}$ member of each group who considers him/herself Republican by calculating $P$ for the average voter,

$$P = \frac{1}{1+e^{-L}}, \text{ when } e = 2.7182,...$$

$$L = \alpha + \beta_{1}(education) + \beta_{2}(income) + \beta_{3}(age) + \beta_{4}(black_{0/1}) + \beta_{5}(hispanic_{0/1}) + \beta_{6}(asian_{0/1}) + \beta_{7}(other_{0/1}) + \epsilon,$$

when $L =$ predicted logit ($1=$Republican/ $0=$Democrat) for partisan identification (or presidential vote),

- $\beta_{1} =$ coefficient for education level,
- $\beta_{2} =$ coefficient for income level,
- $\beta_{3} =$ coefficient on age,
- $\beta_{4} =$ coefficient on dummy for black population,
- $\beta_{5} =$ coefficient on dummy for Hispanic population,
- $\beta_{6} =$ coefficient on dummy for Asian population, and
- $\beta_{7} =$ coefficient on dummy for other population, (white is omitted category).

Equation 1:

The test for whether moral values has the potential to attract Hispanic voters is expressed as the following function for relevant election years as,

Eq. 2 \[ L = (\alpha + \beta_{1} Age + \beta_{2}Income + \beta_{3}Education + \beta_{4} Financial Situation + \beta_{5} Born Again + \beta_{6} Marriage + \beta_{7} Person + \beta_{8} Attend + \beta_{9} White + \beta_{10} Black + \beta_{11} Hispanic + \beta_{12} Cuban + \beta_{13} Other race + \beta_{14} Interaction white + \beta_{15} Interaction Hispanic + \beta_{16} Interaction Cuban + \epsilon, \]

when,

$L =$ predicted logit (Republican presidential vote = 1, Democrat =0), $Age =$ age of respondent, $Income =$ household income, $Education =$ respondent educational level, $Financial Situation =$whether respondent’s financial condition has improved or worsened, $Born Again =$ has respondent had a born-again experience, $Marriage =$ state referenda defining marriage only between male and female, $Person =$ legal definition of ‘person’ begins at fertilization, $Attend =$ frequency of church attendance from rarely attends to more than once per week; $Interaction white =$ interaction term for white dummy and relevant independent variable, i.e., marriage, person, born again, attend, $Interaction Hispanic =$ interaction term for non/Cuban Hispanic dummy and relevant independent variables (marriage, person, born-again, attend), and $Interaction Cuban =$ interaction term for Cuban dummy and relevant independent variables (marriage, person, born again, attend).
Bill Clinton, Republican Strategy, and the 1994 Elections: How Midterms Become Referenda on the President

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Abstract
The surprising 1994 midterm congressional election gave Republicans control of the House of Representatives for the first time in four decades and offers an opportunity to study the dynamics of a referendum on the president. District-level contextual data on Republicans’ anti-Clinton campaign themes are used to demonstrate the dynamic of creating a presidential referendum in a midterm election. Making President Clinton a focus of the campaign within the constituency decreased the probability of an individual voter casting a ballot for the Democratic congressional candidate, heightened the impact of Clinton’s popularity on individual vote choice; and decreased the aggregate vote percentages for the Democratic candidates. It is unmistakable that highlighting the president’s job performance and his policies at the district level transformed the midterm congressional election into a presidential referendum.

“Republicans clearly want to run this as a national referendum on Bill Clinton and his policies.” — David S. Broder (1994b)

Introduction
Few election results were more surprising than those of the 1994 midterm congressional election. The 54-seat loss by the Democratic Party in the House of Representatives was the largest change in seats held by a political party in nearly half a century and far exceeded the expectations of most political observers. When asked for their predictions, only three of fourteen scholars and journalists polled by the Washington Post accurately predicted the Republican takeover of the House (Broder 1994c). Earthquake and tidal wave metaphors were common in describing the election outcome. New York Times columnist William Safire (1994) combined the two: “Tsunami is the Japanese word for ‘great wave caused by underwater seismic shock.’ What was the shock that caused the conservative wave of 1994?”1 Even House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich, an architect of the Republican campaign strategy and the prospective Speaker of the House, was surprised by the Republicans’ gains. President Bill Clinton (2004, 629) in his memoirs was blunt in his assessment of what occurred in the midterm election: “On November 8, we got the living daylights beat out of us.”

Republican candidates and leaders were quick to credit the Contract with America, a pledge to bring ten specific proposals to votes in the House of Representatives, as the reason for their successes in 1994. While there is no doubt that the Contract with America represented one

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of the leading attempts at establishing responsible party government in the United States, the president remained the central topic of the campaign in many congressional districts. “It’s fine for Republicans to talk about positive programs at Washington TV extravaganzas,” wrote Washington Post columnist David Broder (1994a) shortly after the Contract was unveiled, “but across the country their candidates seem to be running, not for any policy, but against President Clinton.”

The 1994 campaign merits re-examination at its twenty-fifth anniversary. The nature of this campaign provides an opportunity to study midterm elections from the perspective of the strategy of opposition party candidates. The “nationalization” of the congressional campaign is not one of happenstance but one of candidate strategy. As Alan Abramowitz (1985, 33) observes, “national issues can become local issues if these issues are raised by the local candidates.” This paper uses data from the American National Election Study and district-level contextual data from 1994 to demonstrate that the “presidential referendum” characterization of midterm elections is in part the product of calculated decisions by opposition party candidates. The consequences of candidates making the president and his policies the focus of the campaign at the constituency level are examined. Specifically, making President Clinton a focus of the district-level campaign decreased the probability of a voter casting a ballot for the Democratic congressional candidate and decreased Democratic candidates’ vote percentages.

The Midterm Election as a Presidential Referendum

The loss of 54 House seats by the Democrats in 1994 was the largest for a president’s party in a midterm election since 1946. Through 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the president’s party suffered greater losses in the second midterm election of a party’s regime, a pattern that was broken in the 1980s when Republicans lost more seats in 1982 than in 1986. Although unknowable at the time, the 1994 election set up a similar pattern for the Clinton presidency.²

Many reasons for the larger-than-expected gains by Republicans have been offered. While Republicans were quick to credit the Contract with America as the reason for their successes in 1994, surveys conducted both before and after the election show extraordinary majorities of Americans were unaware of the Contract. New York Times/CBS News Polls taken in late October and in December showed 71% and 73% of respondents, respectively, indicating that they had never heard of the Contract with America (Abramson et al. 1995; Jacobson 1996). Students of American elections looked for other explanations. Campbell (1997a) attributed the surprising Democratic loss to a realignment within the electorate that favors the Republican

² Democrats gained seats in the House of Representatives in the 1998 election, as the Republican majority pushed for Clinton’s impeachment in the face of polls showing a majority of Americans opposed to removing the president. This was the first instance of the presidential party gaining seats in a midterm election since 1934.
Party. Others contend that Republicans had various advantages concerning key resources – particularly having a higher percentage of experienced candidates and having better financed candidates in contested races (Jacobson 1996; Owens 1998). Finally, Jacobson (1996) and Brady et al. (1996) argue that support for Clinton’s legislative agenda factored into Democratic incumbents’ vote percentages and likelihood of defeat, making the election a referendum on the Clinton presidency.4

There is little original in the claim that a midterm election was a referendum on the president. Early in the twentieth century British political observer James Bryce (1912, 128) wrote that midterm elections enable the voters “to express their approval or disapproval of [the president’s] conduct by sending up another House of Representatives which may support or oppose the policy he has offered.” President Woodrow Wilson, reflecting on the 1914 midterm election, commented that people “know that to vote against a democratic [sic] ticket is to vote indirectly against me” (Berg 2013, 344). Nearly a half-century later, political scientist V.O. Key (1958, 612) also placed the president at the heart of midterm campaign: “In truth, the President and his program create the central issue of the campaign, and the midterm election becomes in a sense a referendum on the conduct of the government by him and his party.” These observations have received substantial empirical support from studies of both election outcomes and voter preferences that have shown public evaluations of the president’s job performance to be a significant factor in midterm congressional elections.5

What is uncertain is why assessments of the president’s job performance are so influential in midterm congressional elections. One possibility is that assessment of the president is a convenient voting cue. Campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives do not generate the public or media interest evident in presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial campaigns. Voters therefore operate with limited information about the candidates and their positions. With little known about the candidates, the voters look for related cues, accepting partisan affiliation—either shared with or opposite of the president—as proxy information about the candidate’s own position (Popkin 1991, 213). Voters may not know much about the congressional candidates, but they know how they feel about the president. Or voting in midterm elections could be a

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3 Coleman (1997) argued that the 1994 Republican gains in the House of Representatives were only slightly larger than what would be expected, based on his findings that Republican presidents are advantaged – and Democratic presidents disadvantaged – in midterm congressional elections.

4 Owens (1998) found Democratic incumbents’ support of Clinton’s legislative agenda not to affect their vote percentages.

5 The list of macro-level studies of midterm congressional election outcomes is extensive. Among the more notable studies are Tufte (1975); Kernell (1977); Jacobson and Kernell (1983); Born (1986); Oppenheimer et al. (1986); Jacobson (1989); Marra and Ostrom (1989); Gaddie (1997); Campbell (1997b); Newman and Ostrom (2002). Notable among the studies of individual voter preferences in presidential elections are Piereson (1975); Hinckley (1980); Abramowitz (1980, 1985, 1995); Born (1986); Jacobson and Kernell (1990); and Nicholson and Segura (1999).
product of displaced anger. Tufte (1975, 813) argues that with “no other targets available at the midterm, it is not unreasonable to expect that some voters opposed to the President might take out their dissatisfaction with the incumbent administration on the congressional candidates of the President’s party.” Not being able to vote against an unpopular president, the voters vent their frustration by voting against his party’s congressional candidates.

The dynamic of the local campaign also could account for the election being a referendum on the president. As Jacobson (2009, 174) notes, “[t]he connections between national issues and individual voting decisions are forged by the rhetoric of campaigns.” Voters in a district may take aim on the president not merely out of convenience but because the congressional candidate of the opposition party attacks the president and the president’s policies. Congressional elections are often characterized as local affairs, with emphasis on political characteristics of the district, local conditions, and the candidate’s personal connections with the constituency (Herrnson 2016; Mann 1978; Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Wattenberg 1991). This follows former Speaker of the House Thomas P. O’Neill’s (1994, xv-xvi) mantra that “all politics is local.” But when candidates emphasize national issues in their campaign rhetoric, national issues and the local campaign dynamics converge to give greater weight to the former than would be felt otherwise, and the most prominent “national issue” of a midterm congressional election is presidential performance. Candidates make strategic decisions that guide their conduct and the allocation of resources (Burden 2004; Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin 2009; Lau and Pomper 2002; Sellers 1998; Skaperdas and Grofman 1995). Important choices include whether to focus on the candidate or the candidate’s opponent and whether to emphasize the candidate’s strengths or the opponent’s weaknesses. For a midterm election, which strategy to follow hinges, at least in part, on the candidate’s party affiliation and the popularity of the president in the district. Table 1 presents a schematic of how these factors become part of the campaign calculus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Campaign Strategies Based on Party and President’s Popularity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Candidate’s Political Party</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>President’s Popularity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidates of the president’s party will support the administration when the president’s popularity is high but focus on local issues, such as service to the district and the candidates’ qualifications for office, when the president’s popularity is low. Candidates of the opposition party adopt contrasting strategies, drawing attention to the administration when the president is unpopular in the constituency and focusing on local concerns or personal traits when the president is popular. Low approval ratings in public opinion polls, difficulty in getting an economic package through Congress the year before, failure of health care reform during the election year, and questions about personal financial dealings set the stage for the 1994 midterm
election to be a referendum on the Clinton presidency, but it remained for the candidates to take advantage of this situation at the local level.

The president becomes a focus of the local campaign if the opposition party—as an organization or through its candidate—criticizes the president and his policies or the opposition party characterizes the candidate of the president’s party as a supporter or potential supporter of the president. There can be circumstances when the presidential party characterizes the opposition party candidate as an opponent or potential opponent of the president, but these are rare.6 The first two scenarios are the most likely since opposition party candidates have more to gain by attacking a president whose popularity has undoubtedly declined during his term than candidates of the president’s party have by defending him.7 This reflects the impact of negativity in campaigns, as viewers respond more strongly to negative news (Smith and Searles 2014; Soroka and McAdams 2015), viewers are more likely to remember information from negative advertisements than from positive advertisements (Brians and Wattenberg 1996; Fridkin and Kenney 2004; Lau and Redlawsk 2005), and voters are motivated more by opposition to a candidate or officeholder than by support (Cover 1986; Kernell 1977; Lau 1982).

Measuring Campaign Focus

The key variable for this analysis is whether the district-level campaign for the House of Representatives emphasized the president and his policies. Information for all competitive House races—that is, those featuring both Democratic and Republican candidates in 1994—was examined and coded using a simple dichotomy: 1 if the Republican candidate made President Clinton a focus of the campaign at the district level and 0 if not. This measure does not reflect support for the president for the simple reason that few Democrats offered explicit defenses of the president. Additionally, the few districts featuring defenses of the president also featured Republican attacks on the president.

Two sources were used for identifying congressional campaigns having a presidential campaign focus. First, campaign advertisements available at the Julian P. Kanter Political Commercial Archive at the University of Oklahoma were viewed for messages that linked either the sponsoring candidate or opposing candidate with the president and/or the president’s policies. No distinction was made between advertisements sponsored by candidates or by political parties as voters are unlikely to draw such distinctions and the requirement of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Act that candidates explicitly identify themselves in advertisements they authorize was several years into the future. Opposition to the president was indicated by such acts as criticism of the president’s policies, criticism of the incumbent

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6 An obvious example of this scenario was 1986, when Republican candidates sought to share in the glow of Ronald Reagan’s high approval ratings.

7 Brace and Hinckley (1992,31-38) demonstrate a “decay function” in presidential popularity, with the president’s approval rating nearing its lowest point at or just before the midterm elections.
Democrat for voting for the president policies, boasts by incumbent Republicans of having voted against the president’s legislative program, and assertions that a Democratic challenger would be an ally or puppet of the president. Links to the president by the Republican candidate must be unambiguous: President Clinton by name or title must be mentioned explicitly; a word or phrase that clearly indicates the president (e.g., “the White House”) must be used; or President Clinton or the White House pictured in the advertisement. One common advertising approach involved picturing the president and Democratic candidate together; another common approach had a photograph of the Democratic congressional candidate fade while a photograph of Clinton emerged.

The second source of information on campaigns is the descriptions of the campaign at the district level presented in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report’s election preview and post-election review. The following are examples of phrases used by Congressional Quarterly’s correspondents in 1994 that resulted in the district being coded as featuring an attack on the president:

- “McIntosh’s first ads criticized Clinton on crime, health care, welfare reform and his 1993 budget—and did not even mention Hogsett.” (Indiana 2nd)
- “Hartzell has attacked Lowery for her support for Clinton on issues such as the deficit-reduction bill and the crime bill.” (New York 18th)
- “Thornberry . . . labels Sarpalius a Clinton loyalist.” (Texas 13th)
- “Salmon has aired an ad similar to those seen in other states, in which a computer ‘morphs’ a photograph of Blanchard into Clinton, indicating that Blanchard would be a consistent Clinton supporter.” (Arizona 1st)
- “Kreidler was one of the Democrats chastised for voting for Clinton’s budget in radio ads aired in selected districts last year by the Republican National Committee.” (Washington 9th)

Each of these campaign descriptions reports the Republican candidate or Republican party drawing the voters’ attention to the president, making Bill Clinton a focus of the district-level congressional campaign. A reporter’s comment that the incumbent was a regular supporter of the president’s legislative initiatives, or that the president was unpopular in the constituency is not sufficient for coding the district as having a presidential campaign focus. There must be an indication that President Clinton and/or his policies were explicitly part of the campaign message presented the Republican candidates or party.

This simple dichotomous measure of presidential campaign focus is not elaborate yet satisfies the needs of this inquiry. While undoubtedly there were districts not coded as possessing a presidential focus in which a candidate discussed the president and his policies in campaign speeches or advertisements, there is a significant qualitative difference between occasional mention and emphasis to a degree that makes the president a theme of paid political advertising.
or that warrants comment by national media. A shortcoming of this coding scheme is that it does not provide a scale of campaign intensity; this is due to differences in information available across congressional districts. For example, only one advertisement aired by Republican Terry Everett in Alabama’s second district is archived, compared with more than a dozen by Republican Ron Lewis in Kentucky’s second district. Nor is information available on the frequency particular advertisements were aired or if the advertisement was viewed across the district or in separate media markets. The simple measure nevertheless distinguishes between districts where the campaign focused extensively on the incumbent president and where it did not. Nonetheless, because of this limitation the analysis is constrained to the 192 House districts featuring candidates of both major parties for which district-level information is available through either the Kanter Archive or Congressional Quarterly’s district-by-district analyses. Just over one half of the competitive districts are included in the sample. The sample is not randomly drawn and tilts slightly toward more competitive districts and open-seat districts at the expense of districts with Republican incumbents (Appendix B). Nonetheless, a majority of sample districts were won by the Republican candidate, reflecting the results of the election.

Despite the measurement limitations we can identify many contested districts featuring overt attacks on the administration by the Republican candidate and/or Republican Party and in patterns as would expected under the presidential referendum theory of midterm congressional elections. Figure 1 shows that attacks on Clinton were most frequent in districts where a Democratic incumbent sought reelection with three-fifths of Democratic incumbents being characterized as Clinton supporters. Such characterizations of the Democratic candidate appeared in open-seat contests as well but with notably less frequency. Only one-third of Republican incumbents thought it necessary to raise the specter of the Clinton presidency, undoubtedly because they were running in Republican-leaning districts and their reelections were near certainties. Similarly, Republican attacks on the president were more frequent in more competitive districts (Figure 2). Three-fifths of the districts where the victor’s margin was less than ten percentage points featured attacks on the president, as compared to two-fifths of less competitive districts. The context of the campaign—incumbency and closeness of the election—set the stage for the local race being a Clinton referendum.
Effect of Targeting President Clinton

The campaign contextual data are merged with survey data from the 1994 American National Election Study to assess the impact of campaigns focusing on the administration and the conditional effects of presidential popularity. Two hypotheses are tested:

- **H1**: Attacking the president in the constituency-level campaign decreases the probability of voting for the presidential party candidate for the House of Representatives.

- **H2**: Making the president a focus of the constituency-level campaign increases the effect of evaluation of the president’s performance on vote choice for the House of Representatives.

Other research has shown preference between major party candidates in midterm congressional elections to be a function of the voter’s evaluation of the president’s performance, the voter’s partisan and ideological predispositions, and the presence of an incumbent seeking reelection (e.g., Abramowitz 1985 and 1995; Born 1986; Nicholson and Segura 1999; Pierson 1975). To assess the impact district-level campaigns drawing attention to the administration have on voters’ decisions, a measure of campaign context and an interaction term between campaign context and presidential evaluation are added. These factors come together in a model of vote choice specified as:

\[ V = b_0 + b_1CF + b_2PE + b_3(CF*PE) + b_4PI + b_5ID + b_6IN + e \]

where \( V \) is vote for United States representative in 1994, coded one if the respondent voted for the Democratic candidate and zero if for the Republican candidate; \( CF \) is Clinton focus, coded as one if Clinton was a focus of the campaign in the congressional district and zero if not; \( PE \) is presidential evaluation, measured by the feeling thermometer scale toward Clinton; and \( CF*PE \) represents the interaction of Clinton focus and presidential evaluations. The remaining factors serve as control variables reflecting political predispositions and district campaign characteristics:

---

8 A component of the referendum theory of congressional elections is that voters respond to perceptions of economic conditions. Although economic variables commonly demonstrate statistically significant effects in aggregate models of midterm election outcomes, individual-level analyses provide little evidence of voters’ assessments of personal financial situation and national economic conditions affecting vote choice. The model was estimated including variables for both perceptions of personal financial situation and national economy performance, but no statistically significant effects were identified. Additionally, while some analyses find spending by candidates to affect voters’ decisions, our test of several measures of candidate spending showed no statistically significant effects on voter choice. Therefore, in the interest of parsimony, variables reflecting perceptions of personal financial condition, perceptions of economic performance and candidate spending are not included in this analysis.
PI is party identification, coded as one if the respondent was an identifier with or leaner toward the Democratic party, zero if a pure independent, and negative one if an identifier with or leaner toward the Republican party; ID is ideological identification, measured as a scale ranging from +3 if extremely liberal to -3 if extremely conservative; IN is incumbency, coded as one if an incumbent Democrat sought reelection in the voter’s district, zero if an open seat, and negative one if an incumbent Republican sought reelection; and e designates the error term. All coefficients are expected to be positive except that for campaign focus (b1), where a negative coefficient indicates that drawing attention to President Clinton decreased the probability of voting for the Democratic candidate.

Table 2 shows the logistic regression estimates for assessing the effects of campaign context on vote choice in the 1994 midterm congressional election. The left-hand column presents a base model of congressional election vote choice. Four-fifths of the cases are predicted correctly, the error in predicting the dependent variable is reduced substantially, and the control variables behave as expected: Democrats, liberals, and residents of districts with a Democratic incumbent seeking re-election were most likely to vote for the Democratic candidate in 1994. Also as expected, voters’ assessments of Clinton’s performance in office positively affected their choice between the Democratic or Republican candidate.

The coefficients in the right-hand column of Table 3 provide the tests of and support for our hypotheses that targeting the president influenced voter behavior in 1994. In short, controlling for political predispositions and incumbency, voters reacted to campaign messages regarding Clinton when casting their ballots for U.S. representative. The coefficient for Clinton focus is negative and statistically significant, indicating that drawing attention to President Clinton and his administration decreased the probability of individuals casting their ballots for the Democratic candidate. The effect of drawing attention to the president during the local congressional race is also evident from the interaction between campaign focus and presidential evaluation. The coefficient for the interaction term is larger than that for unconditioned presidential evaluation and statistically significant while the coefficient for unconditioned presidential evaluation is not statistically significant.

Clearly the Republican strategy of targeting the president reduced the probability of voting for the Democratic candidate and magnified the effect of voters’ perception of Clinton. Candidates are more likely to concentrate on the opponents’ issue positions in competitive races (Herrnson 2016) and, as indicated above, candidates of the other political party are more likely to focus their policy-based attacks on the president and link their opponents to the policies of the administration. Negativity increases with the competitiveness of congressional elections and in 1994 the effect of negativity was to enhance the effect that evaluation of the president had on voters’ decisions.
Table 2. Effect of Campaign Focus on U.S. House Vote Choice in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>Referendum Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinton Campaign Focus</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-1.498*** (.564)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Evaluation</td>
<td>0.019*** (.006)</td>
<td>0.007 (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (CF*PE)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>0.0125** (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Identification</td>
<td>1.031*** (.156)</td>
<td>1.027*** (.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Identification</td>
<td>0.449*** (.111)</td>
<td>0.447*** (.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>0.651*** (.164)</td>
<td>0.662*** (.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.064 (.355)</td>
<td>-.311 (.421)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Chi-Square</td>
<td>159.42</td>
<td>158.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases predicted correctly</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional reduction of error</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variable is vote for the U.S. House (1=Democrat, 0=Republican). Entries are logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (one-tailed tests)
The importance of taking campaign context into account when assessing voting behavior in the 1994 midterm congressional elections is underscored when the probabilities of voting for the Democratic candidate are considered. For this exercise, individual voter characteristics (party identification and ideological identification), incumbency status, and campaign context—whether the president is a focus of the local campaign—are manipulated to test the impact of presidential evaluation on vote choice under varying conditions. In calculating the probability of voting for the Democratic congressional candidate, the value of the presidential evaluation variable is the sample mean for the party identification category. The probabilities displayed in Table 3 indicate that a campaign drawing attention to President Clinton decreased an independent or Republican voter’s probability of casting a ballot for the Democratic candidate for U.S. Representative. Only voters identifying themselves as Democrats or Republicans where a Republican incumbent sought reelection were immune to attacks on the president and his administration. In general, the differences in the probability of voting for the congressional candidate of the president’s party are consistent with the notion that highlighting the administration in the campaign disadvantages candidates of the president’s party.

Individual votes, when aggregated, produce election outcomes. A second way of considering the impact of targeting the president in campaign messages is to examine election results at the district level. For this, we define a linear model of election outcome specified as:

\[ D_{94} = b_0 + b_1 CF + b_2 PV_{92} + b_3 PS + b_4 DV_{92} + b_5 IN + b_6 CQ + b_7 DE + b_8 RE + e \]

where the dependent variable \( D_{94} \) is measured in two ways. The first is Democratic percent of the two-party vote for United States representative in the district. The second measure of the dependent variable is Democratic win, a binary variable where 1 indicates a win by the Democratic

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9 Among the survey respondents who voted in the 1994 congressional election, the mean score on the feeling thermometer for Democrats was 72.6, for independents was 43.8, and for Republicans was 31.2.
candidate and 0 indicates a win by the Republican candidate. Among the independent variables, \( CF \) is *Clinton focus*, coded as one if Clinton was a focus of the campaign in the district and zero if not; \( PV_{92} \) is *presidential vote* in 1992, measured as the percentage of the vote received by Bill Clinton; \( PS \) represents *presidential support*, the incumbent representative’s support for the Clinton administration’s position on four salient pieces of legislation considered during the 103rd Congress; \( DV_{92} \) is *1992 Democratic vote* for U.S. representative in the district; \( IN \) is *incumbency*, coded as one if an incumbent Democrat sought reelection, zero if an open seat, and negative one if an incumbent Republican sought reelection; \( CQ \) is *challenger quality*, coded as one if the Democratic challenger had prior experience in elective office, zero if the challenger had no experience, zero if both challengers for an open seat had prior experience in elective office, and negative one if the Republican challenger had prior experience in elective office; \( DE \) is the natural log of the *Democratic candidate’s expenditures*; \( RE \) is the natural log of the *Republican candidate’s expenditures*; and \( e \) designates the error term.\(^{11}\) The coefficients for presidential vote (\( b_2 \)), Democratic vote in 1992 (\( b_4 \)), incumbency (\( b_5 \)), challenger quality (\( b_6 \)), and Democratic candidate’s expenditures (\( b_7 \)), are expected to be positive; coefficients for campaign focus (\( b_1 \)), presidential support (\( b_3 \)), and Republican candidate’s expenditures (\( b_8 \)), are expected to be negative. The key, again, is the coefficient for campaign focus, which indicates that drawing attention to President Clinton decreases the Democratic candidate’s vote percentage.

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10 The votes used to construct this proportional scale are the Family and Medical Leave Act (House vote 22, 1993); the 1993 budget reconciliation (House vote 406, 1993); implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (House vote 575, 1993); and the Omnibus Crime Bill (House vote 416, 1994). In each instance, a “yea” vote supported the Clinton administration’s position.

11 This model is based on those used by Brady et al. (1996), Jacobson (1996), and Owens (1998).
Table 4. Effect of Campaign Focus on Democratic Vote Percentage for U.S. House in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Democratic Percentage</th>
<th>Democratic Win</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinton campaign focus</td>
<td>-2.17*** (0.80)</td>
<td>-1.58** (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 presidential vote</td>
<td>0.46*** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.16*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential support</td>
<td>-0.04* (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Democratic vote for House</td>
<td>0.10* (0.05)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>7.33*** (0.86)</td>
<td>3.06*** (0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger quality</td>
<td>2.17*** (0.69)</td>
<td>0.80 (0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic candidate’s expenditures</td>
<td>1.03*** (0.28)</td>
<td>-0.18 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican candidate’s expenditures</td>
<td>-1.57*** (0.70)</td>
<td>-0.48 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>30.89 (10.39)</td>
<td>0.46 (6.47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F / Wald chi-square: 61.39*** 59.49***
R² / pseudo-R²: 0.732 0.506
Root MSE / Cases correctly classified: 5.3 86%
Proportional reduction of error: ----- 0.671
N: 192 192

Dependent variables are the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote for U.S. House (left-hand column) and outcome of the election for the U.S. House (1=Democrat won, 0=Republican won; right-hand column). Entries are OLS and logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (one-tailed tests)
The results of the ordinary least squares regression appear in the left-hand column of Table 4. All regression coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level (or better) and are in the hypothesized direction. What is important to note is the coefficient for presidential campaign focus. The regression coefficient indicates that, other things being equal, making President Clinton the focus of local campaign rhetoric decreased the vote for the Democratic candidate by 2.2%. The importance of this number is evident when we consider what 2.2% of the vote meant to Democratic candidates in hotly contested races. In 1994, there were 20 House districts in which the Democratic candidate losing that 2.2% of the vote was the difference between a Democratic victory and a Republican victory. Had the Democratic candidate prevailed in each of these districts, Democrats would have retained control of the House of Representatives and the 1994 midterm would not have been heralded as unusually detrimental to the president’s party. The Republican Revolution would have stalled.

The right-hand column of Table 4 presents the results of the logic regression for Democratic win. The conclusions are similar, as three factors significantly impacted the outcome in the district: Clinton’s vote percentage in the 1992 presidential election; whether a Democrat or Republican was seeking reelection; and whether the Republican candidate made Clinton a focus of the campaign at the district level. This highlights once again the importance as the probability of Democratic candidate decreased when the Republican targeted the president in campaign messages.

Discussion

Following the 1994 midterm election, Newt Gingrich, the prospective Speaker of the House, proclaimed the election results as proof that Americans wanted the Contract with America enacted (Dowd 1994). But the more common perspective was expressed by Senate Republican leader Robert Dole, who characterized the election as “a vote of no confidence” in President Clinton’s agenda (Balz 1994b). Dole’s interpretation seems more accurate, as the analysis presented here demonstrates the effects of the Republican campaign strategy of attacking the president and linking Democratic candidates to the president’s agenda on voters’ decisions and district-level outcomes.

Former Speaker Tip O’Neill’s often-repeated axiom that “all politics is local” runs counter to the notion of national campaigns lying at the heart of the presidential referendum theory of midterm congressional elections, but this analysis supports O’Neill by demonstrating the importance of the local campaign dynamics. Candidates transform the national issue of a president’s performance into a local issue by their choice of a campaign theme. The 1994 congressional election illustrates how making the president a focus of the campaign within the constituency can pay significant dividends. The probability of an individual voter casting a ballot for the Democratic congressional candidate decreased when President Clinton became the focus of the local campaign. Additionally, the impact of President Clinton’s popularity on vote choice increased when the local Republican candidate cast the election as a presidential referendum. It
is unmistakable that highlighting the president’s job performance and his policies at the district level transformed the midterm congressional election into a presidential referendum.

Kahn and Kenney (1997, 1201) note that “the political actors who are successful in shaping the content of campaigns determine how the candidates will be assessed.” Casting the 1994 midterm election as a choice between a supporter and an opponent of Bill Clinton amplified the role that evaluation of the president plays as a voting cue and, by extension, the presidential referendum effect of the midterm election. The positive effects of the Contract with America can be debated, but unquestionably a key element of congressional Republicans’ 1994 campaign strategy was the decision to frame the campaign as a referendum on the presidency of Bill Clinton. And just as unquestionably, this strategy was successful in drawing votes of citizens dissatisfied with the Clinton presidency away from Democratic candidates for Congress.

The lessons of the 1994 congressional election have not be lost on Democratic and Republican candidates. In 2006, Democratic candidates attacked the policies of President George W. Bush concerning Iraq in a manner reminiscent of the 1994 campaign and with great effect; Democrats gained control of the House and Senate for the first time in twelve years. Four years later, Republicans took back the House, at least in part, by campaigning aggressively against President Barack Obama and his signature domestic policy program, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, often dubbed “Obamacare.” Obama won re-election in 2012 but two years hence was again the target of Republicans’ midterm campaign attacks, an election Washington Post reporters Philip Rucker and Robert Costa described the 2014 in a manner reminiscent of their colleague David Broder’s description of the midterm campaign twenty years before: “From the outset of the campaign, Republicans had a simple plan: Don’t make mistakes, and make it all about Obama, Obama, Obama” (Rucker and Costa 2014). Republicans in that election retained their hold on the House of Representatives and added control of the Senate despite the president’s efforts to defend his legacy.

Discussions of the 2018 midterm congressional election as a referendum on Donald Trump’s presidency began shortly after his inauguration. Writing early in midterm year, media commentator Juan Williams (2018) commented that “Trump is too big. The election will be a referendum on him.” Political observers found evidence both in public opinion polls and in the results of eight special elections to the House held during Trump’s first two years. These races, with Democratic candidates emphasizing opposition to the president and Republican candidates faring worse than in previous elections, set the stage for another change in party control as Democrats won a majority of seats in the November election.

Each election year presents a different set of circumstances regarding the president’s popular standing, saliency of issues, and the dynamic between the White House and Capitol Hill. The conceptualizations of elections to the House of Representatives as referenda on the president and as local affairs are not as much at odds as they might appear. As the 1994 election demonstrated, the referendum nature of the midterm election is magnified when the local
campaign dynamic focuses on the occupant of the Oval Office.

Acknowledgements
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Bibliography


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Appendix A: District Coding

The following congressional districts featured contested elections for U.S. Representative in 1994 and were coded as having a presidential campaign focus to the local campaign. Districts included in the American National Election Study sample are in italics:

Appendix B: Sample Assessment

“Competitive districts” are the U.S. House of Representatives districts featuring both a Democratic and Republican candidate in the 1994 general election. Column totals might not sum to 100% because of rounding error.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral margin:</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Competitive districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Margin &lt; 10%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin 10% – 20%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin &gt; 20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incumbency:</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Competitive districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic incumbent</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open seat</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican incumbent</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victorious candidate:</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Competitive districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Book Reviews


With its title, *From Inclusion to Influence: Latino Representation in Congress and Latino Political Incorporation in America*, there’s no doubt what this book is about – Latinos, Congress and the contours of the Latino voice in this institution. But because this work stems out of a year of the author’s soaking and poking on the Hill, thanks to the American Political Science Association Congressional Fellowship, it is also a lovely ode to Dick Fenno and an interesting analysis of the institution of Congress 40 some odd years removed from Home Style.

The protagonist in the book is the Latino member of Congress, but with a strong supporting role by the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC). The CHC is a collective of most Latino members of Congress and as such a prism through which to view the national Latino policy landscape. Throughout the book, Wilson weaves in vignettes based on the CHC’s legislative work and advocacy. These vignettes provide a nice illustrative piece on the team nature of the sport of politics.

The driving question of the research is determining how ethnicity shapes representative action. Relatedly Wilson asks how Latino representatives matter. The latter question is more difficult to quantify and thus answer than the latter. Given the numerical minority of Latino members of Congress (and their near absence in party leadership), an easy default answer is that Latino members do not matter a whole heck of a lot. But because Wilson’s emphasis on the question of how descriptive representation influences representative action beyond mere committee assignments or sponsoring of successful bills the reader’s attention is shifted to a Home Style story arc.

The secondary question to how ethnicity shapes representative action is whether Latinos provide more substantive representation. The first part of the book spends a significant amount of time on considering descriptive versus substantive representation in a Hannah Pitkin infused discussion. Spoiler alert—Wilson finds the interests of Latinos within plurality or majority Latino districts are best served by co-ethnics. This is not surprising given the literature on the subject over the last two decades. However, throughout the book Wilson argues as if this were a highly contested finding.

Yes, descriptive representation compliments substantive representation (as he and others find). Where Wilson misses the boat is in considering the macro implications of descriptive representation, namely what happens to the general nature of our political environment when ultra-safe districts are drawn, either Republican or Democratic. The author does not discuss the hyper-partisan byproduct of ultra-safe districts, majority-minority districts included. The creation of highly homogenous partisan districts, which usually means majority-minority
districts, is an important question in and of itself which the author should have noted in his ledger of pros and cons of descriptive representation.

That bone to pick aside, Wilson does a very good job of considering the nature of “upstream” representational work—congressional speeches, constituency services, committee participation, and coalition building. Voting on roll call votes is the bare minimum job requirement of members of Congress. Where members earn their keep is in their constituent work and long-game political coalition building, here is where Wilson is at his best. Through a focus on upstream representation, the second part of the book teases out how Latinos as a constituency have gone from inclusion in our democratic system to exerting influence, via members of Congress, within the American political system.

The first analytical chapter zeroes in on the representative constituent relationship. Wilson relies on interviews, observational data and painstaking content analysis of member websites to test his hypotheses of whether co-ethnic representatives better amplify the needs of the community as well as providing more robust lines of communication with the district. The findings illustrate that Latino members of Congress provide a distinct Latino perspective through which they view the entirety of their role, “Latino representatives generally recognize a national Latino constituency and see many if not most issues from a Latino perspective” (126). In turn, this lens allows for what Fenno termed “soft” policy connections, where the representative can better cultivate relationships and support in the district. However, in terms of outreach and casework, less of a differential was found between co-ethnic and non co-ethnic representatives and their Latino districts.

The following chapter digs into agenda setting via bill sponsorship and committee hearings. Overall, Latino members of Congress do not sponsor as much legislation as their non-Latino colleagues however Latino representatives disproportionately sponsor Latino interest issue legislation. In the realm of committees (and subcommittees) Latino chairs were found to provide a more robust forum for the Latino perspective, “This occurred through their emphasis on Latino concerns in statements and questioning as well as in testimony…” (167). Wilson is upfront about the limitation of his committee analysis given the dearth of Latinos serving as chairs, but as he notes it is an important piece to the puzzle of understanding Latino influence within Congress.

In the aptly titled, “Speaking for Latinos,” chapter Wilson analyzes the content of floor speeches and “Dear Colleague” letters. The focus here is on how Latino representatives amplify Latino voices beyond that of their non-Latino congressional colleagues. This amplification serves the purpose of getting Latino concerns on the political radar (and keeping them there) which then ties into the process of coalition building to ultimately influence legislative decisions.

The final analytical chapter highlights the need for a long-game and collective action when it comes to Congressional politics. A series of mini-case studies of how the CHC played the role of advocate and defender illustrated how Latino influence is hard won (and also
sometimes lost). One example is how a big push by the CHC in the 110th Congress saw increased support for Hispanic Serving Institutions, a cause that had been previously stalled.

Wilson ends on the big picture notion of coalition building and collective action. But he also ties in the upstream representational work that allows Latino members to collectively keep moving the Latino policy ball forward. The take home message is that policy making, especially Latino relevant policy making, is not easy and it does not happen overnight. Within this tough landscape, Wilson walks through this process and answers his initial question of how Latino representatives shape representative action and forcefully posits that a Latino congressional voice matters for the quality of that action.

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As a result of exclusionary practices such as redlining, suburbia was a predominantly white space for most of the 20th century. But the percentage of African Americans residing in U.S. suburbs has increased dramatically since the 1990s, with more than 50 percent of all U.S. African Americans living in suburbs in 2010 (p. 4). Who are these individuals who differ racially from suburban whites and differ socioeconomically from urban African Americans? Moreover, does social network matter for black suburbanites’ identity and political behavior? This is the topic Ernest McGowen III examines in his timely and accessible book, *African Americans in White Suburbia*.

Academics have increasingly studied suburban blacks as a growing population, but most of this research comes from anthropology, sociology, and urban ethnography (i.e., Bruce Haynes, Valerie Johnson, and Mary Pattillo-McCoy), and not political science. Moreover, most of the work on black suburbanites has been qualitative, has not focused on political behavior, and is quite dated. *African Americans in White Suburbia* builds on, and complements, this rich research of suburban black political behavior by employing quantitative analysis to answer the following overarching question: “How does this suburban environment, especially the racial makeup of one’s neighborhood and social networks, affect the political behavior of suburban African Americans who have strong racial identifications and policy preferences aimed at aiding the racial group writ large?” (p. 1).

While the first chapter of *African Americans in White Suburbia* focuses on the study’s primary questions and methodology, McGowen also highlights the context for the project. He discusses the financial, educational, and employment gains African Americans made between 1990 and 2010, and the social and political questions that have arisen as a result of those gains. McGowen points out that it is not clear how suburban social networks and environments influence black suburbanites’ identity and political behavior. On one hand, political science literature shows the importance of class in understanding the ideology, partisanship, and behavior of wealthier Americans. And on the other hand, racial and ethnic politics literature demonstrates that racial identity among both low-income and high-income blacks is relatively strong and that a racial identity is one of the most important determinants of black political behavior. As McGowen points out, it is not obvious who black suburbanites would resemble. They might resemble and behave in the political arena like their wealthy white neighbors and colleagues, but they might also resemble and participate like urban African Americans.

The theory McGowen advances in *African Americans in White Suburbia* is grounded in and informed by the following prominent bodies of literature: racial identity and consciousness formation, environment and social network contexts and political behavior, and the black public and counterpublic sphere. McGowen’s theory is that, because black suburbanites have strong
racial identities, and live and work in spaces that are often inconsistent with and hostile towards black interests, suburban blacks will seek out networks that center black interests and opportunities that empower and aid the broader black community and group. To test his theory, McGowen conducts quantitative analyses and draws on three surveys: 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES); 2008 American National Election Study (ANES); and 2004 National Politics Study (NPS).

Does the racial makeup of social networks influence African Americans and whites’ political views, and do suburban African Americans view their residential and work places as welcoming or hostile to their racial identities? These questions guide the analysis in the third chapter. McGowen finds that African Americans in white networks hold opinions that differ significantly from the opinions of their white neighbors and work colleagues, with African Americans in white networks having lower trust in several societal institutions, like police, when compared to whites in white networks. Blacks in white networks not only differ from their white neighbors, but they also differ from their white work colleagues. Taken together, these differences in opinion lead blacks in white networks to perceive their views as being in line with other black Americans and not in line with whites in their neighborhoods and workplaces. Consequently, blacks in white networks view their neighborhoods and workplaces as more hostile than welcoming to them and their racial identities.

Chapter Four builds on the data analysis in Chapter Three by asking where blacks in white networks go in order to find environments that reinforce their racial identity and center their interests if their neighborhoods and workplaces are often hostile to them and their racial identities. McGowen posits that black suburbanites near metropolitan areas will travel to the urban inner city where they can find a robust cultural community and be inundated with “norms of behavior” that are central to an authentic or “true” black racial identity (p. 102). McGowen finds that “Suburban white and urban African Americans actually use their cultural community more frequently than suburban African Americans,” but “the fact that suburban African Americans are over the midpoint of the index (57.4 percent) shows their usage is not negligible” (pp. 104-105). Additionally, the data highlight the importance of church attendance to suburban African American community usage – black suburbanites who attend black churches use the cultural community much more than those who do not attend black churches, and find the cultural community to be more informative and less depressing than black suburbanites who do not attend a black church. Finally, McGowen’s analysis demonstrates how black suburbanites differ from white suburbanites on political attitudes and opinions but hold opinions similar to their urban co-ethnics. Taken together, McGowen concludes that black suburbanites generally seek out cultural communities because they see them as being in line with their views, reinforcing their racial identity, and centering their interests, but “the confluence of suburban environment and race does not appear to have an independent effect on the racial opinions of suburban African Americans” (p. 120).
The final empirical chapter in *African Americans in White Suburbia* centers on the effect of suburban political environment on suburban African Americans’ political behavior. McGowen examines four aspects of political behavior: “the political choices that confront suburban African Americans, whether they are more or less likely to seek out confirmatory information, their voting behavior, and whether they engage in political participation that could more directly benefit their groups” (p. 124). The data show black suburbanites with a strong racial identity were very interested in politics and news and thought their congressional districts were more in line with their views, compared to black suburbanites without a strong racial identity (pp. 126-128). The data also show there was no difference between black suburbanites, white suburbanites, and urban blacks in terms of presidential voting, but suburban blacks were less likely to participate in local and state elections than urban co-ethnics and white suburbanites. Finally, the data show that, while they are less likely to participate in House elections, black suburbanites often seek and engage in alternative forms of political participation that better target and benefit black communities, such as attending political meetings, giving to religious organizations, and passing along political information (pp. 132-138). In sum, McGowen finds that both race and political environment matter for suburban blacks’ participation in the political arena.

*African Americans in White Suburbia* makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of suburban blacks. McGowen’s book complements, and extends, the body of research on black suburbanites, and shows how black suburbanites possess a strong racial identity and intentionally seek out, (re)connect to, and participate in, black counterpublics and cultural communities because they often find their predominantly-white residential and employment networks hostile and unwelcoming to them and their interests. While this quantitative research is important because it addresses understudied questions, this project is also important because suburban blacks represent a burgeoning population in the U.S. and we know very little about how this group’s politics are being affected by their social networks. This book is truly a must-read for scholars and students interested in the relationship between race and racial identity, social networks and environment, and political behavior.

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Discussions about the media’s role in politics have never seemed more important or more necessary. In a moment when casual consumers of media do not hesitate to make harsh critiques of the media’s role in politics, many could benefit from an effort to make the discussion more grounded in social scientific principles. Adam Schiffer’s clear-eyed and informative review of bias in American political news sets out to do this by providing an accessible primer for anyone interested in thinking about the role of the press in politics in a more rigorous and even-handed way than might come naturally.

Schiffer’s primary argument is that charges of partisan bias in the mainstream media not only fail to stand up to the available evidence but also are not even the most pernicious form of media bias. Rather, what he terms “real biases” – such as the propensity to select dramatic narratives over meaningful policy discussions, or to create the appearance of balance on issues rather than focus on the truth (see news coverage of global warming) – are perhaps more consequential and, stretching a bit further, may have even contributed to the unexpected results of the 2016 presidential election.

The first part of the book tackles the question of partisan bias and, specifically, the oft-repeated charge that the mainstream media has a liberal bias. A comprehensive review of the relevant academic literature reveals that, on balance, the claim of a left-leaning bias is unsupported. What, then, are bias cops and commentators getting wrong? Schiffer draws on a number of relevant cases to explain. Here’s one example: news coverage leading up to the 2008 presidential election heavily favored Barack Obama to John McCain. A remarkable 57 percent of stories on McCain were negative, while only 29 percent of stories on Obama tilted negative. Such a sizable disparity in the balance of sentiment towards the two candidates unsurprisingly led to a cascade of charges of bias. The watchdog Accuracy in Media, for example, noted that the mainstream media “were overwhelmingly in the tank for Barack Obama” (Schiffer, p. 22). But, as Schiffer points out, failing to meet a balanced baseline, which would mean equal amounts of negative and positive coverage for both candidates, does not necessarily equate to bias. Rather, sometimes reality itself is slanted in favor of or against a particular candidate. Thus, in the midst of a Great Recession brought on in part by Bush economic policies that had been supported by McCain, simply observing an imbalance in coverage is not sufficient to conclude that the media had slanted their coverage against McCain.

Going a step further, Schiffer sets forth a helpful framework for evaluating claims of bias. He makes the case that any valid bias charge ought to propose a normative standard for quality news coverage, apply that standard to the case under consideration by laying out what unbiased coverage would look like, and then evaluate whether or not the observed coverage meets the standard. In some sense, this approach is reminiscent of how political scientists evaluate claims of gerrymandering in electoral systems by relying on a partisan fairness standard for how votes
are translated into seats. In both instances, bias is present only when one party would not be
treated equivalently to the other party if the circumstances were switched. In my view, this
approach is intuitive and will push readers to treat claims about partisan bias in media coverage
with more skepticism.

The strongest and most informative parts of the book come in the later chapters when
Schiffer moves beyond the discussion of partisan bias to examine other forms of bias and their
role in understanding recent moments where the media has fallen short. Coverage of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) provides one compelling example that illustrates the harm done by
real media biases. These failures span from reporting false or misleading information (such as
when CNN, in a rush to provide commentary before its competitors, misreported that the
Supreme Court had struck down the individual mandate at the heart of the ACA) to over-
emphasizing political maneuverings behind the legislation rather than substantive changes in
health policy.

Real biases in reporting also played a role in the 2016 presidential election. Examining
the early stages of the race for president (i.e., the pre-primary and Republican primary contest),
Schiffer demonstrates convincingly that the media’s blanket coverage of candidate Donald
Trump likely contributed to the “Trump phenomenon”. During a four-month stretch early in
the campaign, Trump received more coverage than any other candidate in the Republican
primary every single day. In July of 2015, Trump received an astounding 70 percent of all
mentions of Republican candidates for president on CNN. Furthermore, news coverage drove
additional interest (as opposed to interest driving news coverage), as Schiffer shows that Trump’s
social media follower count spiked after media mentions but not vice versa (Schiffer, p. 107). All
told, the author makes a compelling case that the overwhelming attention paid to Trump arose
not from any underlying or structural factors – Trump’s early poll numbers hovered under 20
percent – but rather because the media was susceptible to a number of real biases exploited by his
candidacy. The media’s tendency to put eye-catching narrative and entertainment over policy
substance, to report on scandal, outrage and negativity, to erase “the line between electoral
politics and reality TV” were all driven by an incentive to garner the most viewers and pageviews
and intuitively exploited by a savvy candidate (Schiffer, p.110). Thus, the book argues, the media
outlets who have made the choice to cover politics in this way in some sense facilitated the early
success of the Trump campaign.

Overall, the book hits its mark as a clear and concise introduction to the subject of media
bias for readers beginning to dive into the subject. If I were to offer an additional direction to
explore going forward, it would be to consider how underlying changes in the media landscape
that have resulted in informational interdependence between traditional media outlets, social
media, and the views held by the public (a notion articulated by Lawrence Jacobs and Robert
Shapiro in their handbook chapter Public Opinion and the Media in the New Communications
Era) have altered the direction and magnitude of real (and partisan) media biases. For example,
to what extent are biases amplified and compounded by the social media ecosystem?
Furthermore, in an era where the mainstream media sometimes puts sensationalism over substance, where partisan media sources report news as if from different realities, and where misinformation spreads virally with the click of a button, what should consumers of media be doing to navigate this unsettling moment?

Benjamin Schneer

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In 2006, thousands of immigrants took to the streets across the United States to protest H.R. 4437, known as the Sensenbrenner bill, named after the Republican congressman from Wisconsin. This bill would have made it a federal crime for citizens to assist undocumented immigrants. While the bill did not pass, it ignited a social movement that has without question shaped U.S. politics. Chris Zepeda-Millán’s book is the definitive account of how these protests emerged and their impact on local, state, and U.S. politics. Richly informed, theoretically rich, and meticulous, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in social movements, Latino politics, and immigration policy.

Before discussing the substance of Zepeda-Millán’s book, a brief note about the research methodology is in order. The book is based on 131 semi-structured interviews in four cities between 2006 and 2009 combined with statistical and survey evidence from reputable sources. His research design is well explained in the appendix, which painstakingly details the careful design and methodologically informed approach of the book. As an activist himself, Zepeda-Millán relies on his own personal contacts from Los Angeles in his interviews and reflects in an important way the role of “biases” in social science research. This appendix is essential reading for graduate students and other researchers who are interested in conducting high quality and methodologically rigorous qualitative research.

Because the immigrant rights movement did not begin in 2006, the book begins with a contextual analysis of immigration policy since the Hart Cellar Act of 1965. In particular, Zepeda-Millán takes us through the 1970s and 1980s and how immigration policy has not always had a restrictive bent. Indeed, President Ronald Reagan signed IRCA in 1986 granting amnesty to thousands of immigrants in the United States. Because of the growth of immigrants between 1990 and 2000, we have seen a backlash culminating in a patchwork of restrictive policies most recently exemplified by the crackdown on sanctuary cities as well as state restrictions such as Arizona’s SB 1070.

Zepeda-Millán focuses on three cities in his analysis of the 2006 marches. He examines Los Angeles, one of the most high-profile cities in the immigrant rights movement. In addition, New York City and Fort Myers, Florida provide regional and ethnic diversity since the population of these two cities is more diverse, with Dominicans and other non-Mexican groups involved in the marches.

Zepeda-Millán argues that HR 4437 triggered a widespread individual and collective threat culminating in collective action. Immigrant group membership was fostered by a hostile external threat, which in turn led to a heightened sense of group consciousness. This sense of linked fate is observed in all three locations, and pre-existing social networks such as churches, soccer leagues, and other community-based organizations harnessed their efforts for political action.
Zepeda-Millán’s book also examines the important role of Spanish language media in this social movement. Especially in Los Angeles, with DJ’s such as Piolín, Spanish language media played an indispensable role in giving voice to organizers who leveraged these considerable audiences to take action. This section of the book is quite impressive because it demonstrates an in depth knowledge of the role of the mass media in the success of the mobilization in Los Angeles during this time period.

While the title of the book implies an analysis of Latino mass mobilization, Zepeda-Millán also examines the role of different coalitions in the immigrant rights movement. In particular, Asian American groups including Chinese and Korean organizations were also active in New York but so many diverse groups yielded an underwhelming protest movement in that city. Mexican-origin immigrants clearly felt more threatened by the Sensenbrenner bill and responded in a more tangible way in New York City.

After 2006, in the absence of any federal immigration legislation, states and localities began to implement measures aimed at dealing with the perceived rising numbers of immigrants. Backlash against the rising influence of Latinos took many forms. The Department of Homeland Security began the so-called 287 (g) program which collaborated with local law enforcement agencies to identify undocumented immigrants, detain them, and begin deportation proceedings. States also passed laws enacted new enforcement measures, most notably Arizona’s “show me your papers” law. The city of Farmers Branch, Texas passed an ordinance enacting penalties for renting apartments and homes to undocumented immigrants.

In the aftermath of the marches of 2006, immigration reform failed during the waning years of the George W. Bush presidency. President Obama promised immigration reform when he ran for president, but instead focused on passing the Affordable Care Act during his first term with a Democratic majority in Congress. Despite his appeals to the Latino community, President Obama continued enforcing immigration policies by deporting more non-citizens than any previous president. One area that the book could have been more explicit about is the role of party politics in shaping immigration policy. In particular, an examination of how the Republican party has in a short time period transitioned from a pro-business free market approach to a restrictionist and nativist viewpoint while the Democratic party has embraced what Tichenor calls the “cosmopolitan” view of expanded rights and admissions. Both political parties, it seems, have incentives to appeal to their bases with fiery nativist rhetoric in the case of Republicans and promises to protect immigrants in the case of Democrats.

Zepeda-Millán makes the case in his conclusion that the rise of Donald Trump and his emphasis on immigration enforcement represents the most blatant and transparent backlash against Latino immigrants in the United States. As the issue of immigration shows no sign of going away, this book is as timely as ever. While the conclusion only hints at the potential reaction to the policies of the Trump Administration, the next question becomes: at what point will marches and mobilization occur in support of DACA and in opposition to the border wall? It seems that many of the policies at the state level and the federal level would have inspired
responses exceeding that of the 2006 marches. As with most policies, gridlock and stalemate continue to dominate Washington, with all sides doubling down on their positions.

Immigration policy will continue to drive American politics for the foreseeable future, and this book is must reading for anyone interested in American politics. With Latinos comprising 18 percent of the U.S. population and significantly higher in states such as California and Texas, the future of American politics simply cannot be understood without understanding the role of race and ethnicity. Zepeda-Millán’s book is a perfect place to begin to understand the role of race, ethnicity, and immigration in modern day American politics.

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As a political geographer with a central focus in electoral geography, I was quite interested in reading *Red Fighting Blue* by David A. Hopkins, given its stated emphasis on the role of geography in the current politics of the United States. His goal is to broaden the study of the interaction of voter preferences and the polarization of politicians “to encompass the crucial intermediating role played by the interaction between political geography and electoral institutions” (13).

The book is broken into seven chapters with the first highlighting the central role of Ohio in determining the outcome in recent presidential elections. As Hopkins notes, Ohio’s electoral competitiveness and its number of electoral votes makes the state a prime target for campaign stops. The campaign strategies of both parties reflect the realities of the few remaining truly electorally competitive states, the geographically defined electoral college, and the limitations of the time and money allocated to campaigns. Analysis of campaign stops by both of the 2016 presidential candidates in the recently released *Atlas of the 2016 Elections* (Watrel et al., 2018, 36-42) cartographically confirms Hopkins’ assertion.

The remainder of Chapter 1 highlights that “Geography is thus a fundamental component of the mechanics of democratic representation” (11) in discussions of geographic polarization, geographic coalitions, geographic bastions of party support, geographically polarized electoral outcomes, the manipulation of district boundaries in the U.S. system of geographic representation, the resurgence of regionalism and “geography . . . [as] . . . a foundational element” of the electoral system (18). In the discussion of regionalism Hopkins notes “There are no consensus definitions of geographic regions in the United States” (26). Geographers regionalize the United States on any number of factors from landforms to religion, and there are models delineating electoral regions. Archer and Taylor’s (1981) S-mode factor analysis model delineated three principal electoral regions in the United States based on presidential returns beginning in 1872. The model can be updated as new elections occur and could be scaled to yield more than three electoral sections.

Chapter 2’s focus is on the development of regional polarization, making a distinction between individual voters and collective outcomes. Hopkins notes that even comparatively small differences in preferences can lead to substantial effects due in winner-take-all elections. At times such outcomes may lead some to conclude that geographic contrasts between places are even larger than they are in reality. This is an important point – we too commonly place seemingly electorally inflexible states in categories that hide their true diversity. Thus, while many consider Alabama among the reddest of all red states, over a quarter of its population is African American, strongly supportive of the Democratic Party and politically active. With a reduction in white voter enthusiasm for the Republican candidate in the December 2017 special senate election and
a simultaneous increase in African American turnout, the state now has a Democratic Senator, an outcome very few experts or pundits would have suggested was possible.

This chapter also critiques what others have argued is the “myth of American political geography,” which holds there is little or no geographic political polarization. Using an alternative calculation for vote margins in all states, Hopkins finds “steadily increasing state-level partisan polarization that began in the 1990s” (47), and that the level of polarization nearly doubled between 1992 and 2016. While the graphs used in the chapter are effective to make these points, additional cartographic analysis at the county and state levels would likely have aided in confirming the author’s points.

Chapter 3 reviews the twentieth century’s experience with geography, ideology, and partisanship which began in an era of internal factionalism and concluded in a pattern of regional partisan polarization. This is an interesting chapter which very ably distills a century of change in party politics in the United States. The chapter highlights the effects of the New Deal on regional partisanship, the election of 1964 on the electoral loyalties of the South, the post-1968 era of divided government with Republican presidents and a Democratic Congress, the influence and effects of “Dixiecrats” in Congress, the national party coalitions that developed between 1968 and 1992, and more recently the return to both elite and mass partisanship. This is an excellent chapter which nicely weaves together history and interpretation of American partisan politics over the past century.

Chapter 4 examines the reappearance of regional and partisan divisions in the United States and changes that occurred to the previous pattern of the electorate voting for a Republican president and Democratic member of congress. The root of many of these changes are arguably social issues and cultural politics. As Hopkins writes, “The significant divide between residents of Red and Blue America in collective religiosity and adherence to cultural traditionalism has gained a newfound political importance over the past three decades that is particularly powerful in shaping the geographic coalitions of the parties” (100). The author also notes that while these patterns may not produce substantial contrasts between individuals, they do in the aggregate provide geographic context and explanation to the national electoral map. I think these are excellent points and I fully agree, most particularly with respect to the South, where religion has become a compelling electoral cleavage arguably rising to the level of race. Thus, many traditional white voters in Alabama in the November special senate election to replace Attorney General Jeff Sessions voted for Republican Roy Moore in spite of accusations of sexual impropriety because he was much more strongly anti-abortion than Democrat Doug Jones. Finally, this chapter’s title is “Mapping the Cultural Battlefield” but it includes a single map. I suspect maps of religious indicators and social positions on issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage would have aided the discussion.

Chapter 5 focuses on changes in partisan regionalism as they affect Congress in terms of polarization. Hopkins highlights two specific issues that have affected Congress during the past thirty years: “the steady polarization of the congressional parties and the increased success of
Republican candidates in both House and Senate elections” (147). He attributes these changes to voters in different parts of the country becoming more ideologically consistent in their voting patterns, resulting in increasingly distinct electoral sections, and leading to a more polarized and Republican legislative branch. Clearly, a substantial portion of these changes has resulted from the movement of congressional seats from the North to the more conservative and religiously oriented South and growing Republican partisanship among traditional white voters in the region.

Chapter 6 examines the sub-state electoral geography of the United States, with an emphasis on the Democratic Party strength in large cities and the dominance of the GOP in rural settings. The chapter further includes a focus on the Midwest due to its greater balance in party support compared to other regions. From a geographic perspective, metropolitan, micropolitan and rural areas are increasingly distinct in their party preferences (Watrel et al., 2018: 93-101), meaning topically this is an important chapter. While the graphs in this chapter are helpful and indicate the differences between different types of population concentrations, maps presenting the geographic patterns of areas falling into different segments of the rural to urban continuum would have aided in the confirmation of these findings. Also, maps of precinct level returns for some large metropolitan settings could provide interesting local examples of the urban-suburban-exurban-rural voting patterns found across the country. Finally, I found the discussion of the Midwest both thoughtful and illuminating, though again a few maps of the contrasts in voting profiles between the region’s major cities and its rural environs would provide examples of the patterns Hopkins identifies.

Chapter 7 nicely pulls together the discussion and findings from the first six chapters. The chapter reviews the large body of literature pertaining to partisan change – this review is well-done. Hopkins concludes that neither party today has a “lock” on Congress or the Presidency with diverse outcomes in the past four elections. That being said, he argues that it is at the local level where electoral “locks” are becoming increasingly abundant. As he states, “The relatively even overall balance of the parties masks the proliferation of dependable local, state, and regional bastions on both sides at the expense of marginal battleground constituencies” (217). I fully agree and believe more finely detailed spatial analysis of lower level geographic units will both confirm and suggest this process is further along than many realize.

I believe political scientists, political historians, political sociologists, and political geographers will find much to like about this book. It is well-organized, well-written and thoughtful. My sole criticism is that it suggests substantial geographic analysis, but this is limited though it could have added a dimension to make a good book even better.

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References


The midterm elections of 2014 resulted in a wave of electoral victories that gave Republicans control of the United States Senate, strengthened their majority in the House, and extended their dominance of state legislatures and governors’ mansions. While members of the president’s party typically lose seats in midterm elections, the Democratic defeat was particularly severe. In *Political Communication & Strategy: Consequences of the 2014 Midterm Elections*, the editors have assembled an informative collection of essays that describe how well existing theoretical frameworks explain the results of the 2014 elections, document important ways in which the 2014 electoral cycle differed from previous cycles, and suggest that developments in electoral communication and strategy evident in 2014 will shape American politics moving forward.

The first of the book’s five sections deals with primaries. Using campaign finance data from Senate campaigns, Robert G. Boatright makes a strong case that primary elections have become more nationalized, with significantly larger percentages of campaign expenditures coming from out-of-state in 2014 than in prior election cycles. Furthermore, out-of-state independent expenditures tended to be made in defense of party-backed, establishment incumbents. In the subsequent chapter, Kevin Parsneau and Christopher Chapp use machine-based textual analysis of campaign websites to show that incumbents took more ideologically extreme positions than general election challengers in 2014, particularly when they faced primary challenges. Apparent attempts to avoid being outflanked by ideologically extreme primary challengers were especially common among incumbent Republican women.

In the section titled “Political Communication & the Republican Wave,” Kenneth M. Cosgrove utilizes historical and case-study approaches to describe partisan branding efforts. Employing a political marketing framework, he argues that Republican success in 2014 was due largely to the Republican Party building a stronger brand than the Democratic Party. Because alternative explanations for electoral outcomes are not addressed in detail in this chapter and little is said about how and why one party is able to build a better brand than the other at a given point in time, the value of this chapter lies largely in its perceptive description of partisan branding efforts dating to the mid-twentieth century. In the subsequent chapter, Neal Allen and Brian K. Arbour’s analysis of campaign advertisements documents the extent to which Democratic Senate candidates facing Republican-leaning constituencies emphasized issues believed to be owned by the Democratic Party while employing frames meant to differentiate them from that party. This is followed by Matthew A. Shapiro, Libby Hemphill, and Jahna Otterbacher’s analysis of what candidates say on Twitter and when they say it. In line with spatial models of electoral competition, they find that candidates become less likely to take ideological positions on Twitter a few weeks before Election Day but become more ideological once the polls have closed.
The next two chapters examine outside influence on general election contests. Jeff Gulati and Victoria A. Farrar-Myers find that independent expenditures had little effect on vote shares in general in 2014 but had a modest effect on open seat races. Dante J. Scala and Tegan O’Neil analyze direct mail pieces from the New Hampshire Senate contest between Jeanne Shaheen and Scott Brown. They find that in contrast to groups that spent less, big-spending Super PACs often deviated from their mission statements to highlight election-specific issues that seemed likely to influence the outcome. In doing so, these groups acted more like political parties and less like single-issue focused interest groups.

The subsequent section of the book is devoted to Republican dominance in the South. David A. Hopkins argues that 2014 represents the culmination of southern realignment. Putting trends in the partisanship of southern office-holders in historical context, Hopkins shows that outside of districts with substantial black or Latino populations, electoral support for Democratic candidates in the South has all but vanished since Barack Obama’s election to the presidency in 2008. Caleb Orr, Dylan Brugman, Suzanne Fournier Macaluso, and Cindy Roper agree that a new, Republican-controlled Solid South has emerged, and show how candidates have responded to this development in their campaign strategies. In 2014, southern Republicans sought to nationalize their campaigns and tie Democratic candidates to President Obama, whereas Democrats sought, largely unsuccessfully, to localize their campaigns.

The final section of the book addresses the roles that gender and race played in the 2014 elections. Vincent Vecera and Danielle Currier identified gendered language in television news coverage of the 2010 and 2014 elections and integrated their quantitative analysis of that coverage with a broader qualitative analysis of political news and campaign language. Their thoughtful analysis suggests that conceptions of women’s political interests have shifted from a focus on reproductive issues to consideration of the economic interests of women. In the book’s final chapter, David P. Redlawsk, Natasha Altema McNeely, and Caroline J. Tolbert analyze survey data related to Cory Booker’s Senate reelection campaign. They find that the degree to which candidate evaluations were affected by racial attitudes was moderated by positive emotional responses to the candidates. While it is not clear that emotional responses should be thought of as being strictly exogenous to racial attitudes, this result builds on findings related to Barrack Obama’s candidacies in 2008 and 2012 and suggests that the interaction between emotions and racial attitudes remains important, even in uncompetitive races for offices other than the presidency.

As its editors suggest, the wide range of topics addressed and the variety of methodological approaches employed are among the book’s strengths. The volume should be of interest to a broad range of readers, including scholars, instructors of undergraduate courses in parties and elections, and more casual observers of politics. In terms of advancing scholarly research, the chapters by Shapiro et al., Gulati and Farrar-Myers, Vecera and Currier, and Redlawsk et al. are among the most compelling contributions. Other chapters do an excellent job of situating the real-world elections of 2014 within broader theoretical frameworks. The
outstanding literature reviews and historical context provided by Parsneau and Chapp and Hopkins, for example, make their chapters ideal candidates for assignment in classes in which students do not yet have much methodological training.

The brevity of the chapters may also be beneficial in some classroom contexts, but one weakness of the volume is that some of the chapters are shorter than ideal and could benefit from additional analysis and discussion. Despite its rather limited overall length, however, the book covers a lot of ground, addressing perhaps all of the most defining characteristics of the 2014 election cycle other than its distinctively low level of voter turnout. The book should serve as a valuable resource for anyone interested in how theories about American politics can help us understand actual campaigns and elections.

Matthew L. Jacobsmeier

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Michael Holt’s fresh look at the 1860 election persuasively highlights the important role of the corruption issue in facilitating Lincoln’s nomination and election, a point that most previous historians have not fully appreciated. Holt correctly maintains that Lincoln was not perceived as more moderate on slavery than William Henry Seward, his main competitor for the Republican presidential nomination. Lincoln prevailed because he was as firm an opponent of slavery as was Seward, but was also considered more electable because he was unsullied by corruption. Seward, on the other hand, had an alter ego, Thurlow Weed, widely known as a shady wheeler-dealer who had recently been involved in questionable street railroad contract awards in Manhattan. In addition, Lincoln had not been as conspicuous a foe of nativism as Seward and, unlike Seward, he came from a key swing state.

In 1856, the Republican presidential nominee, John C. Fremont, had lost mainly because 400,000 Northerners voted for the American Party candidate, Millard Fillmore. To triumph in 1860, Republicans had to retain the Fremont backers (by nominating a committed antislavery man) and woo enough Fillmore supporters (by emphasizing some other issue), along with many first-time voters. Lincoln managed to win because he was an outspoken anti-slavery champion who was viewed as a man of integrity who would restore honest government to Washington. If Republicans had wanted to play down the slavery issue, they would not have nominated Lincoln but rather someone like Edward Bates.

There is abundant evidence – far more than Holt musters in this brief contribution to the press’s American Presidential Elections series – that Republicans in 1860 heavily stressed the Buchanan administration’s corruption, and that such an appeal persuaded many men who cared little about slavery (e.g., Fillmore supporters in 1856) to vote Republican. As Holt acknowledges, in the absence of public opinion surveys, it is impossible to identify with precision which issue was the primary one influencing the outcome of the election. But based on what happened in 1856, it seems reasonable to conclude that corruption was an important secondary issue in 1860 and that opposition to slavery was the main issue. In 1856, Fremont won a million more Northern votes than did Fillmore. In all likelihood, Lincoln’s 1,800,000 Northern votes in 1860 included the vast majority of the 1,400,000 Northern votes that Fremont had received while running on an anti-slavery (not anti-corruption) platform in 1856.

Holt “decenters” (his term) the Lincoln campaign, focusing mostly on the Constitutional Union and Democratic parties. He argues that the slavery issue was the principal concern only of the Southern Democrats, who nominated John C. Breckinridge. But in fact, the Republicans as well as the Northern Democrats, led by Stephen A. Douglas, emphasized the slavery issue much more heavily in their platforms and campaigns than Holt acknowledges. One of the Republicans’ most widely circulated campaign documents was Lincoln’s edition of his debates with Douglas in 1858, which focused on slavery, not corruption. Moreover, by 1860, it
was widely understood that Republicans were first and foremost opposed to slavery. Holt rightly states that slavery expansion was less of an immediately pressing issue in 1860 than it had been in 1856, but for many Republicans, slavery expansion served as a proxy for slavery extinction. So even if it did seem that slavery was not likely to expand into any territory then owned by the U.S., the issue of slavery itself still remained salient. (Moreover, new territory suitable for plantation slavery might be acquired in the future.) Lincoln had famously declared that Republicans were dedicated to the “ultimate extinction” of slavery.

Holt rightly notes that mid-nineteenth-century American voters paid closer attention to parties than candidates. That was especially true in the South. Kenneth Rayner, a North Carolina Whig and later Unionist leader, explained that Southerners objected less to Lincoln than to “the fundamental idea, that underlies the whole movement of his nomination, the canvass, & his election. It is the declaration of unceasing warfare against slavery as an institution, as enunciated by the Representative men of the party – the Swards, & Wades, & Wilsons & Chases, & Sumners &c. &c. We Southern people, being warm-hearted, and candid, & impetuous, are also confiding & credulous. When men of high position assert anything seriously, we believe they are in earnest.”

Holt’s well-written book is a useful contribution to the literature, even if it oversells one of its most important theses. Holt was moved to write it in part because he disagreed with James Oakes’ 2012 study, Freedom National, which stressed how deeply committed most Republicans were to the eventual abolition of slavery. In fact, Oakes makes a solid argument which Holt’s book ably supplements rather than contradicts.

Michael Burlingame

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In an era of declining governing capacity and intractable polarization in Congress (Lewallen, Theriault and Jones 2016; Binder 2014), legislative staff increasingly turn to lobby groups for assistance. This tendency injects significant bias into policymaking which is largely unseen if not hidden (Curry 2015). In their thoughtful, comprehensively researched, and interesting book, LaPira and Thomas go far beyond previous studies to describe and analyze the lobbyists that now play an essential role in federal policymaking. In so doing they advance our understanding about the role of expertise and access in lobbying and the nature and effects of the so-called revolving door between government and advocacy.

The authors first put the common metric of revolving-door lobbyists to the test, which it fails. They find that revolving door status is significantly underreported: performing extensive searches of the lobbyists in their sample to develop comprehensive employment histories, they find that only 42 percent of revolving door lobbyists correctly identified themselves as covered officials. In 2008, 52 percent of lobbyists had been through the revolving door. The average lobbyist had 0.93 government jobs. And, the more federal jobs a lobbyist has had, the more money he or she earns. The median reported revenue of revolving-door lobbyists is 3.3 times the median for conventional lobbyists who nonetheless work on contract for multiple clients.

The authors then present two Weberian ideal-type lobbyists: the K Street Kingpin and the Librarian. The former is a contract lobbyist for a top Washington lobbying firm. He is a policy generalist, representing a wide variety of industries, and counts himself among the “process people” who understand policymaking as an activity rather than the detailed substance of policy content. The Librarian is an in-house lobbyist for an association of librarians. She has a relevant Masters degree and relocated to Washington to take this job, in contrast to the Kingpin who formerly worked as a top staffer for a senator. What the Kingpin lacks in policy information, he makes up for in process knowledge, and vice-versa for the Librarian. Yet the Kingpin earns many times the salary of the Librarian. What explains such a large differential for doing very similar work?

From this puzzle, the authors develop a novel theory about the purpose of lobbying. They argue that from the higher income of the Kingpins that lobbyists’ clients value certain attributes more than others. In particular, the Kingpin’s familiarity with the people and activities of lawmaking enables him to anticipate, and therefore avoid, problems that might befall his clients. (The authors do not specify what these problems might be, but I assume the hazards are financial costs.) The Librarian, meanwhile, lobbies about e-government and Patriot Act transparency. While she has her finger on the pulse of legislation that relates to these narrow issues, the Librarian does not have sufficient experience in Washington policymaking to identify threats before they happen. The authors argue that the Kingpin is more valued on Capitol Hill because he can provide political insurance to clients. Importantly, for LaPira and Thomas lobbying is not the transmission of public will to government as part of the “influence production process” (Lowery and Gray 2004). Lobbying is instead consumption by those with the resources
to invest in the reduction of political uncertainty. This is why policy outcomes better represent the preferences of wealthy interest groups.

The authors argue that the Kingpin’s process knowledge is especially important in the current era of partisan acrimony and gridlock. Must-pass bills such as the Wall Street bailout (pushed through by the Bush administration), and routine reauthorizations such as the Farm Bill (lobbied on by 847 lobbyists, only 3 percent of which represented agribusiness), are prioritized over more substantive bills. In such cases the policy alternatives (Kingdon 1984) are well known; what is needed is political will. Getting the requisite number of votes requires political intelligence, not policy information. Thus, Kingpins are more likely than Librarians to be deployed in crucial moments on bills that are likely to pass. Indeed, as bills move further toward passage, the proportion of the lobbyists on the bill who are revolvers increases.

Consequently, Kingpins’ and revolvers’ clients have more opportunities to influence policy outcomes than do Librarians. For the 10 most-lobbied bills in 2008, revolving door lobbyists outnumbered conventional lobbyists in every case but one, and at high levels: On each of the top 10 bills, an average of 72 percent of active lobbyists were revolvers. This is profound new evidence that particular lobbyists—those who have been through the revolving door—have greater influence than others.

LaPira’s and Thomas’s theory explains their analytical findings from lobbying disclosure reports and that, relative to other lobbyists, revolvers tend to represent more and more diverse clients and issues, are more likely to represent business interests, and focus on bills at the top of party leaders’ agendas. Further, the more diverse the government experience of a revolving door lobbyist, the more likely they are to represent a diverse set of clients and broader issue domains.

The unique theoretical contribution of Revolving Door Lobbying is to show that frequently, business interests hire lobbyists who are process specialists in order to reduce political uncertainty. The authors’ most salient finding is that revolvers are more likely than conventional lobbyists to work on bills that become law because it means that revolving-door lobbyists and the wealthier, business interests they tend to represent have considerably more opportunities to influence public policy. In addition to these remarkable and compelling advances in theory and scientific evidence, the literature is thoroughly and precisely cited, the writing is clear enough for undergraduates, and the analysis is sophisticated but simply presented.

Often, the authors discuss contract lobbyists rather than revolving door lobbyists, though they are not the same: half of revolvers work in-house and 30 percent of conventional lobbyists work on contract. The ambiguity is amplified by the authors’ use of the Kingpin, who is both contract lobbyist and revolving-door lobbyist; as such it is not clear if he focuses on process because he formerly worked in Congress or because he is employed by a lobbying firm that has many clients. Yet this is a critique of minor importance since in their analyses, the authors generally distinguish—more precisely than anyone has done before—lobbyists who are documented revolvers from conventional lobbyists. Moreover, the results support the theory and justify the treatment of revolvers as process specialists.

The authors’ notion of lobbying as political insurance is a welcome and compelling theory that moves beyond competing arguments in the literature that lobbying is a corrupting force in policymaking or that lobbying has minimal influence. Given the high and underreported
rate of revolving-door lobbying, and especially given the growing reliance on lobbyists for research and even legislative language (McKay 2018), Revolving Door Lobbying represents a timely and laudable piece of research that is well-deserving of the attention it is getting.

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References

The highest praise that I can offer to a book is that I approach the text dispositionally skeptical of the argument but largely convinced of the data analysis by the end. Stone’s book provides compelling evidence that legislative elections are far more effective vehicles for democratic responsiveness than most skeptical readers may believe.

Stone approaches the topic of legislative elections with broad ambitions. He is interested in the topic from the perspective of individual voters, aggregate election results, and their normative implications for spatial theory and democratic theory. Spatial models have become a staple in studies of legislative elections, and within the theoretical realm, we have adopted the use of Stokes’s concept of “valence” to incorporate a valence dimension along with a policy dimension to consider the competing incentives voters have when faced with the possibility of one candidate having a policy advantage, while the other holds an advantage with respect to traits like competence and honesty. Testing these models, though, has always been difficult, and that is where Stone’s book impresses.

The book continues Stone’s past use of an important methodological technique in assessing candidates in legislative elections—local expert surveys. Surveying local experts allows Stone to put both candidates on the same scale with respect to both ideology and valence. In *Candidates and Voters*, Stone takes this technique to its logical conclusion by asking a set of questions, together, giving us the most comprehensive empirical analysis of spatial-valence models to date.

How often do voters actually vote for the most proximate candidate? How often do they vote for the most qualified, by experts’ assessments of qualification? Combining those characteristics, how often do voters vote “correctly” at the individual level, and what does that indicate about the success of democratic institutions at the aggregate level?

Stone’s ambitions are nothing less than to answer all of those questions, and the value of the expert survey methodology is the ability to do so in a systematic way. Stone finds that voters, given the constraints they face, make relatively rational choices, although I shall return to the constraint issue shortly. Voters tend to vote for the most proximate candidate, and they tend to vote for the most qualified candidate, even given the possibility of those being in conflict, which is an important issue that Stone addresses throughout the analysis because it is central to the spatial models that incorporate valence dimensions.

The primary critique I can offer from an empirical perspective is the same critique I offer from a normative perspective, and it is one of which Stone is well aware. Candidates’ choices may be, in game theoretic terms, endogenous, yet voters are constrained by the choices that the candidates make. To the degree that voters create effective responsiveness by voting “correctly,” for example, it can only be in the context of the choices with which they are presented. They can vote for the most proximate and most qualified candidate, but if the most proximate candidate
is ideologically distant, then that choice, while scored as a victory in a relative sense, is a minor one. They can vote correctly for the most qualified candidate as experts assess them, but if that candidate is objectively not particularly competent, then they have chosen best among weak choices. So what? From an empirical perspective, that process is worth teasing out, and from a normative perspective, without an absolute standard against which to measure democratic responsiveness, what have we really found?

Stone’s framework is to study voters’ choices within the constrained context of an election because that is how they make their choices. Writing the phrase, “median voter” in the write-in section of a ballot in response to two candidates who are alternately somewhat distant and very distant from the median is a refusal to make a real choice. At a pragmatic level, then, Stone’s framework is difficult to dispute.

However, as Stone observes throughout, the choices that candidates and potential candidates make are choices that constrain voters, and those choices are made in at least loose anticipation of voter responses. How, then, do we measure democratic responsiveness? Stone measures the frequency of correct voting with his improved measures over past approaches, and the frequency of representative election outcomes, again with his improved measures, and given the constraints that voters face, he finds relative health in the electoral system. If, however, we assess voters by the incentives they create for parties and candidates to make different choices and create different constraints, then we miss something by focusing on how voters behave within the constraints that Stone takes as given for the sake of his methodology.

To be sure, the expert survey methodology is not suited to addressing these kinds of questions, and Stone is fully aware of the questions that go unanswered by his approach. How do voters behave given their constrained choices, at the individual and aggregate level, and what does that indicate about the health of democracy? These remain valid questions, best addressed using methods such as the expert survey approach that generates the vital data for *Candidates and Voters*. As of now, Stone’s text is the most compelling one I have read assessing voters’ responses to candidate ideology and non-ideological characteristics. Building more dynamic models around such an approach may be necessary to tease out how voters’ behavior creates, or fails to create, incentives for better representative behavior among candidates and legislators. Until then, scholars of legislative elections need to read this book.

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After the January 21, 2017 Women’s March, the #MeToo movement, and the historically high number of women running for and winning elective office in the 2018 midterm elections, it might be difficult to remember that women are still a small share of officeholders at the local, state, and national levels, and that they face different challenges than men.

From early on, the women and politics literature has documented these challenges, including reports from female officeholders that they must work harder than men to be perceived as effective and successful. This takes the form of producing more, paying more attention to detail, and delivering higher levels of preparation for daily tasks. Women of color have been especially likely to report such hurdles. Even as the proportions of women in elective office have grown, female officeholders’ reports of disparate treatment continue unabated.

One aspect of working harder is providing service and representation to legislative constituencies. Extant studies on women’s constituency representation have established that they have been more willing than men to listen to constituents and help them with problems. Women also spend more time on constituent services. This research, however, has relied on self-reports rather than objective data. It is here that Lazarus and Steigerwalt pick up the baton.

Focusing on the 103-110th Congresses (1993-2005), Lazarus and Steigerwalt define attention to constituency broadly and operationalize it in multiple ways. Direct constituency service is measured via the use of franking, assignment of staff to district offices, and members’ travel to their districts/states. Bringing home the bacon is measured by individual earmarks in the 110th Congress and bureaucratic awards from the 2009 stimulus package. Legislative representation is assessed by the number and type of bills and resolutions members introduce, co-sponsorship activity, committee memberships, and roll-call votes. Additionally, the authors conducted several interviews in 2013 with current and former members of staff and Members of Congress.

Linking empirical findings with a theoretical framework, Lazarus and Steigerwalt coin the term “gendered vulnerability”. They argue that women face multiple manifestations of gendered disadvantages including gender stereotypes, more competition for election and re-election than men, and differential media coverage. Together with the effects of gendered social identities, women face pressure to counter these obstacles both in themselves and in society. Their answer is to work harder than men. Doing so helps convince women that they are “qualified” for office and convinces voters that they are good at their jobs and have earned support.

Overall, Lazarus and Steigerwalt’s findings show that, in most cases, women simply produce more than men. First, in terms of direct constituency service, women in both chambers took more trips to the district, sent more franked mail, and placed more staff in the district than their male counterparts.
Second, in terms of bringing home the bacon, women of the House and the Senate brought in more earmarks and earmarks that were worth more money. Women in the House also secured more stimulus money allocated from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Perhaps even more impressively, as the level of poverty of districts increased, female House members secured a greater number of stimulus projects and more funding than men. No such gender differences in ARRA funds were in evidence in the Senate, however.

Third, analysis of direct legislative representation shows that women in the 103-110th Congresses introduced more bills and resolutions and co-sponsored more legislation than men. But, what about legislative success? Here, the picture changes. Weighting all bills equally, Lazarus and Steigerwalt find that women moved fewer of their bills through each stage of the legislative process than men. They explain this anomalous finding by asserting that women introduced more “messaging” bills than men. Such bills are not meant for focused legislative attention and passage; they are meant to take a position in line with constituent expectations. However, tests of the messaging explanation withstand scrutiny in the House, but not in the Senate.

Next, the authors offer three sets of findings to buttress the “messaging” conclusion: (1) Monte Carlo simulations indicating that female legislators’ committee assignments were more consistent with constituent preferences than those of men; (2), comparisons of bill introductions in five policy areas (agriculture, crime, labor, health care, and defense) to a measure of constituent demand showing that women of the House introduced more bills in specific policy domains as the level of district demand increased. These findings were not, however, replicated in the Senate; (3) roll call voting behavior models showing that women of the House and Senate deviated less from constituent preferences than men.

In summing up the implications of their research, Lazarus and Steigerwalt assert that, in many ways, women are better representatives for their constituents than men, and that this is due to gendered vulnerability. To close, the authors expand the discussion of effective representation to consider the theoretical and empirical pluses and minuses of mirroring constituent preferences.

Overall, this is an excellent volume that contributes much to the literatures on women and politics, legislative politics, and American politics. By situating the questions of how women legislators attend to their constituencies in both well-grounded theory and wide-ranging empirical evidence, the authors expand our understanding of women officeholders appreciably. And they have done so with care, ingenuity, and skill.

A shortcoming of Lazarus’s and Steigerwalt’s work pertains to an uneven assessment of their findings. The results from multivariate models used to explain gender differences in bill passage and the policy-specific bill introductions analysis are two examples. Each set of findings holds in one chamber only (the House) and, together, they render the messaging hypothesis less than wholly persuasive.
Additionally, although the range of data-gathering and analysis in *Gendered Vulnerability* is impressive, there is one area for which additional investigation would be welcome: the finding that women pass fewer bills than men throughout the legislative process. Even though this result is at odds with most other findings of the volume, Lazarus and Steigerwalt do not unpack it. Further examination by type of bill – as measured by constituent demand, policy domain, scale of proposed policy changes, or costs of the proposals – would fit into the authors’ approach. Indeed, in another section, they analyze bill introductions by policy type and constituent demand. Using the suggested measures or others may yield insights into legislators’ pursuit of policy goals and help explain the stark differences between women and men.

It is in these few weak points of *Gendered Vulnerability*, though, that scholars find fertile ground for continuing the work to understand how women and men behave in legislatures and why. One of the biggest gifts of *Gendered Vulnerability* is that the impressive effort to extend previous research on women’s attention to legislative constituencies also results in bridging seemingly contradictory evidence – that, all else equal, female candidates win as often as male candidates – and that the electoral and legislative playing field are still not close to being level. It appears that to succeed, women need only work harder than men and have superior qualifications.

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Daniel Bennet’s study of the politics of the conservative Christian legal movement is based mostly on his examination of press releases by conservative Christian legal organizations and interviews with lawyers associated with these groups. These are: Alliance Defending Freedom, American Center for Law and Justice, Center for Law and Religious Freedom, First Liberty, Freedom of Conscious Defense Fund, Liberty Counsel, National Legal Foundation, Pacific Justice Institute, Thomas More Law Center, and Thomas More Society. The latter two were founded by and are run by Catholics while the other eight were founded by and are run by evangelical Protestants.

Bennet’s research indicates that there are differences among the organizations in size, resources, issues emphasized, litigation strategies, and that the most important objective by far to the collective is defending the religious liberty of conservative Christians whose mores and practices are increasingly out of step with the sprawling regulatory state. Whether it is defending traditional marriage and family structures, pro-life advocacy, or conscience rights of medical professionals, among other issues, the press releases and interviews indicate that religious liberty arguments are the central, though not necessarily exclusive, means by which these issues are engaged. Bennet shows that although press releases of these groups tout their religious liberty advocacy as advancing the liberty interests of all Americans, in practice these groups, or at least some of them, are often indifferent to the religious liberty claims of non-Christians. And this is to say nothing of the fact that their litigation successes are often, as Bennet notes, harmful to the cause of progressive sexual equality.

To observers of contemporary politics, there is little surprising in Bennet’s study, something he himself seems to acknowledge (p. 32). The strength of Defending Faith is in illustrating how Christian conservative legal organizations have publicized their activities in press releases in recent years and how the lawyers of the groups understand their work—they are motivated by their faith and generally see their work as a necessary part of cultural reform.

Unfortunately, the value of Defending Faith is badly diminished by its flaws. To begin, Bennet repeatedly says he’s studying the legal advocacy of the organizations in question (pp. 5, 10, 17). One would thus expect a careful examination of legal arguments the groups have advanced across countless cases over the last few decades. But Bennet hardly looks at case briefs. Instead, Bennet, as indicated, examines press releases, which are how the groups frame their activities for the media and supporters and contributors (p. 34). Defending Faith is thus a study of framing, of public relations about legal advocacy but not of legal advocacy itself. That legal arguments are largely ignored is especially puzzling given that Bennet conclusory asserts that conservative legal organizations “exercise tremendous influence in law” (p. 49). Whatever their influence, to the extent they have impacted the law it is because primarily appellate judges have
found their legal arguments persuasive. The heavy reliance on press releases thus necessarily makes for a narrow study.

This is true also in the sense that because Bennet relies on the groups’ own press release archives, of which he found those of only seven organizations useful, the earliest press release he has is from November 2000 (the study is through the end of 2014) (p. 35). Yet of these groups, all were founded from two to ten years prior to this (p.20). Moreover, of the firms for which no press releases were utilized, two of these are the oldest groups in the study, founded in 1980 and 1985, respectively (pp. 20, 36).

Detracting most from the book is that it reads like a first draft. Bennet’s writing is careless or, to be charitable, lacking in precision and clarity and is replete with conclusory statements in need of supporting arguments and evidence. A few examples will suffice. Bennet writes that legal organizations emphasize religious liberty because they see it as a “cure-all for all other culture war conflicts” (p.4). Yet nothing in the book suggests that this is the case. He repeatedly writes that the groups, by emphasizing religious liberty, are transforming the culture wars (a phrase Bennet uses excessively) but fails to explain what this means or to give evidence of any such transformation. He writes, too, that the emphasis on religious liberty is a movement towards “a more sophisticated form of political mobilization” (99) yet provides no evidence, or even arguments, that the legal advocacy of these groups is really about political mobilization or how we might distinguish the sophisticated from the unsophisticated.

Additionally, Bennet fails to convey that he has a clear grasp of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions he discusses. For example, he explains Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision striking the contraception care regulation at issue, as though the outcome was determined by the fact that the Court agreed with the owners of three closely held for-profit corporations that the regulation substantially burdened their religious beliefs (p. 88). This is incomplete, however, in that the substantial burden finding triggers the compelling interest test. The Court assumed without deciding that the regulation was supported by a compelling governmental interest but held that the government failed to show that the regulation was narrowly tailored in furtherance of that interest. Similarly, Bennet erroneously states that the Court, in Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013), upheld lower federal court rulings declaring unconstitutional California’s Proposition 8, which amended the state constitution to define marriage in exclusively heterosexual terms (p. 70). But the Court concluded that the parties defending the constitutionality of Proposition 8 on appeal lacked standing, so did not rule on the merits, which left in place the district court’s ruling that the amendment was unconstitutional. In isolation, Bennet’s treatment of case law is perhaps inconsequential but it is of a piece with the overall inattentiveness of his writing.

Defending Faith is not without value, but a careful, well-written study of the legal advocacy of Christian conservative legal organizations and its impact remains to be written.

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In his new book, *The Road to Inequality: How the Federal Highway Program Polarized America and Undermined Cities*, Clayton Nall explores partisan geographic polarization through the lens of transportation policy. More specifically, he looks at the way federal transportation and infrastructure policy since the post-war period impacted residential patterns that we still see today.

First, Nall demonstrates that transportation infrastructure, fed by federal policy to finance a nationwide highway system, was a necessary condition for suburban growth and subsequently partisan change and sorting. The introduction of highways allowed people to sort themselves in ways previously unavailable. Until the federal subsidy to build highways and the construction of the Interstate Highway System, workers of all stripes functionally had to live near work. Workers show a primary preference for short commutes and quality neighborhoods and a secondary preference regarding the partisan makeup of their neighborhood. For the first time, the brand new sprawling highway infrastructure allowed people to act on both primary and secondary preferences. And so began the partisan sorting. People with more money tended to own more cars thus giving them the ability to act on those preferences. Those people tended to be Republican.

This also meant that people who did not own cars were still urban bound and could not enjoy the same geographic freedom. This translated into fewer opportunities for what came to be understood as ‘middle class’ life including things like single-family homes and employment opportunity. In this way, federal policy influenced spatial inequality. Nall finds the partisan geographic polarization is most active in metropolitan areas where highways were constructed. As highway networks developed, so did urban-suburban partisan geographic polarization. Also, the more highway infrastructure in the metropolitan area, the more politically polarized the area. They go hand in hand in cities across the country.

Second, Nall employs an impressive list of historic surveys and datasets to examine the relationship between partisan geographic polarization and the development of transportation policy. While we expect race, income, population density, and place-based interests to be strong explanations for transportation policy positions, Nall demonstrates that partisanship appears to be just as strong an explanation. The analysis is focused on partisanship, but Nall writes about the high correlation between race and geographic polarization. He thoughtfully conceptualizes partisanship as a social identity that captures multiple cleavages in the electorate and not just race. Nall shows the geographic polarization between urban and suburban areas cannot be simply explained away by ‘white flight’ or the suburbs as car-dependent neighborhoods. Rather, the geographic polarization is in part a consequence of federal transportation policy which had enduring effects including partisan polarization and systematic inequality.
Finally, Nall shows that when our cities are geographically partisan, American federalism and the importance of state and local politics fuel inequality. In this case, federally funded transportation planning was left to state and local actors. As he notes, the “longstanding devolution of transportation programs to state and local institutions exposes policy to a host of local biases, including those arising from the urban-suburban partisan geographic divide” (p. 8). Cumulatively, Nall argues, these factors explain why we see a partisan split on transportation politics, a traditionally low-salience issue.

The Road to Inequality is an important book right now given our aging and decrepit infrastructure, the lack of recent federal investment, and the partisanship of infrastructure and transit-based policy. In this book, we have a glimpse into how current-day geographic polarization began, how it crept across the nation, and where we stand now. This is an examination of a federal policy that quietly and stealthily created clear inequality that persists today, and a lesson on how to move forward.

Nall’s entire thesis is an inherently spatial question - how sprawling nationwide highways created localized geographic partisanship and deep inequalities demonstrable in urban life. Yet, the book is wholly void of maps. The book is a quick and enjoyable read while maintaining quantitative rigor but as a reader and unabashed map lover, I would have enjoyed maps illustrating the history, thesis, and findings. Nall focused on the results of federal transportation policy and explicitly not the intent. Given the deeply local nature of phenomena, an examination of the question of intent is a natural next step.

We hear a lot in our modern politics the notion of the urban/suburban divide. And it is now commonplace to see electoral support for any given candidate or issue sliced by the sub/urban divide and not just race, age, and gender. Academic literature also has much to say on the geographic divide. However, this partisan geographic divide did not always exist. We built the physical infrastructure of the country, remote bridges, urban rails, and the highways that connect us all. But in all of these arenas, there is very little examination into how that came to pass. Now, with Nall’s book, there is.

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The thesis advanced in Incarceration Nation is clear and parsimonious: the United States is now home to the world’s largest prison population because the public became more punitive. Because in democracies such as the United States, “political actors face a direct incentive to consider opinion change,” (p. 28) elected officials responded to rising punitiveness by adopting tough-on-crime policies. Enns also offers a succinct account of the rise of punitive attitudes: crime rates rose and news stories about crime therefore proliferated. Insofar as news stories about crime rarely explore the underlying causes of crime and disproportionately focus on offenses committed by people of color, increased media coverage of crime fueled public support for tough anti-crime policies.

The argument presented in Incarceration Nation can, then, be summarized as follows: rising crime rates drove increased news coverage of crime, which in turn fueled punitiveness among the mass public to which politicians were compelled to respond. The result was mass incarceration. To support this argument, Enns draws on theories of democracy that emphasize the incentives that motivate elected officials to respond to shifts in public opinion in order to ensure their re-election. He also employs various quantitative methods to analyze the determinants of rising public punitiveness, as well as time series analysis to assess the impact of shifts in public opinion on national and state incarceration rates. The results indicate that changes in crime rates (based on UCR data, which include crimes reported to the police and recorded by police departments) closely correspond to the volume of news coverage of crime, which in turn corresponds to popular punitiveness. In addition, Enns finds that changes in punitiveness were a significant predictor of shifts in the incarceration rate. In substantive terms, the U.S. incarceration rate would have been 20 percent lower if not for rising punitiveness.

Incarceration Nation is clearly and concisely written, and its argument is highly accessible. Enns’ effort to systematically test his empirical propositions is admirable and provides a clear organizational structure for the book. And Enns’ central thesis – that shifts in public opinion fueled mass incarceration – contains a kernel of truth that we ignore to our collective peril. At the same time, Enns elides and obscures a number of important dynamics that, if considered, significantly complicate his theoretical model and empirical claims.

As noted previously, Enns emphasizes the fact that democracy incentivizes elected politicians to respond to changes in public opinion. There is clearly some truth to this, as many of the scholars Enns critiques also acknowledge. Yet these incentives coexist with other similarly consequential dynamics, recognition of which challenges the idea that mass incarceration is simply the result of (politically innocent) shifts in public opinion. In particular, a vast body of literature on contemporary racial politics, which Enns largely ignores, shows that the controversy over civil rights and race relations in the 1960s precipitated a fundamental partisan realignment.
in which many Southern states shifted their allegiance from the Democratic to the Republican party. This shift triggered intense electoral competition for socially conservative, white “swing voters” whose partisan allegiance was up for grabs and, given the nature of our two-party system, especially important. The use of “coded” racial language was a key element of politicians’ efforts to secure the loyalty of white swing voters. John Ehrlichmann, special counsel to President Nixon, described Nixon’s campaign strategy in exactly these terms: “We’ll go after the racists. That subliminal appeal to the anti-black voter was always present in Nixon’s statements and speeches.”

Rhetoric about crime and punishment (and welfare, as Gilens (1999) has shown) was key to this effort to woo socially conservative white voters in which Republicans took the lead but Democrats also participated (see Weaver 2007). For example, many political elites framed civil rights protest and urban riots as a sign of the “breakdown of law and order” and strategically employed racially-charged “law and order” rhetoric and references to “welfare queens” in an effort to attract swing voters and shift state policy in preferred directions. This use of such “subliminal” racial appeals has been remarkably successful, and coded racial rhetoric remains a powerful means of tapping into racial resentments for electoral benefit and influencing popular support for particular policies, particularly among those segments of the electorate that have been prioritized in the wake of partisan realignment (Mendlberg 1991). Indeed, a similar dynamic played out in the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections: despite broad popular support for DACA and opposition to construction of a border wall, GOP candidates relied heavily on racially-charged immigration-related rhetoric to secure the votes of electorally crucial and socially conservative white voters (Davis 2018; Tyson 2018).

In short, the literature suggests that in the context of a two-party, winner-take-all system that has undergone a significant partisan realignment, politicians in the contemporary United States pay more attention to the views of some voters than others and proactively emphasize and frame racially charged issues in ways that are electorally useful. By contrast, in Enns’ account, politicians respond to shifts in the attitudes of the “mass public” as a whole and they play no role in facilitating those shifts. This argument is inconsistent with a vast body of work that highlights the centrality and utility of racially charged rhetoric to politicians in the context of partisan realignment in the post-civil rights era.

Enns’ analysis of the connection between race and attitudes about punishment analysis also differs from those offered by most scholars. Research shows that anti-Black attitudes have been, and remain, a strong predictor of support for punitive policies (Brown and Socia 2016). Enns implies that the link between racial bias and penal attitudes is solely the consequence of the news media’s tendency to over-represent crime suspects of color in crime news coverage; politicians are entirely innocent in this account. By contrast, the literature on contemporary racial politics emphasizes the use of racially code in language and imagery, particularly around crime and punishment, in the context of partisan realignment to make sense of this association.
Enns’s analysis also ignores the fact that politicians’ efforts to frame issues and influence popular attitudes take place largely through the mass media, especially the news media. Politicians enjoy a high degree of access to the news media, particularly in the prominent national news outlets from which Enns’ count of news stories is drawn (Gamson 1992; Schlesinger 1990). Nevertheless, Enns’ models assume that news media coverage is entirely independent of the activities of political elites, an assumption that is incompatible with widespread evidence that news reporters rely heavily on politicians and other “official sources” in the production of the news. While scholars disagree about why the news media routinely treat politicians and other officials as authoritative sources, there is little question that this pattern exists.

In short, Enns’s account ignores the fact that political elites routinely seek to shape attitudes and enlist the news media in their efforts to frame issues such as crime in particular ways in order to achieve desired political goals. Enns’ lack of attention to these dynamics may stem in part from his focus on the quantity of news stories about crime. Enns’ measure of crime news coverage is based on the number of stories containing the word “crime” that appeared in six nationally prominent newspapers over an extended period of time; he does not analyze the nature of this coverage. Instead, Enns draws on the work of Shanto Iyengar (1991) to infer that these stories adopted an episodic, rather than thematic, frame, meaning that they mainly described particular crime incidents without discussing the root causes of crime.

Iyengar’s work is instructive, and if large, nationally prominent newspapers mainly covered individual incidents of crime, this might be a plausible inference. But such outlets also devote significant attention to the crime issue; even when their focus is on particular crime incidents, news stories often portray individual crimes as emblematic of broader trends (Sacco 1995). For example, crime news stories in the 1980s and 1990s featured numerous stories about the alleged proliferation of juvenile “super-predators,” exaggerated and misleading claims regarding crack cocaine, and complaints about permissive judges who refused to lock up dangerous criminals (Hartman and Holub 1999; Gilliom and Iyengar 1998; Reeves and Campbell 1994; Reinarman and Levine 1997). It is in these discussions of the causes of criminality, crime trends, and penal practices that political elites and prominent law enforcement authorities have a crucial impact on both the quantity and nature of news coverage (Beckett 1995). The assumption upon which Enns’ statistical models rest – that political claims-making and news media coverage are entirely independent of each other – is thus untenable.

Enns’ argument that politicians (merely) respond to public opinion also obscures the degree to which they engage in what Hinton et al. (2016) call “selective hearing.” Many studies show that increasing punitiveness has co-existed with other, seemingly contradictory impulses such as the long-standing belief that prisons should retain their focus on rehabilitation (Cullen, Cullen and Wozniak 1988; Forman 2017; Roberts and Stalans 1997). Enn’s own data show that even after a period of rising punitiveness, a majority of survey respondents continued to believe that the main purpose of prisons is rehabilitation (as opposed to punishment) (p. 35). Similarly, at the height of the prison buildup, respondents were asked in the 1995 National Opinion Survey
on Criminal Justice whether government should spend money on "social and economic problems" or on "police, prisons and judges" in order to reduce crime. More than half of the sample preferred the former, while fewer than one-third chose the latter (Gerber and Engelhardt-Greer 1996: 71). Enns does not acknowledge the strength of public support for rehabilitation and prevention through social investment, which a majority of Americans continued to express throughout this time period, instead emphasizing only the direction of change.

By contrast, much of the literature shows that support for punitive policies can co-exist with other kinds of beliefs and preferences. For example, James Forman’s recent book, Locking Up our Own (2017), shows how rising crime and addiction fueled frustration, desperation, and punitiveness among the predominantly African-American residents of Washington D.C. in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. But his nuanced analysis shows that support for community investments and crime prevention also persisted during this time. As Forman and others (Hinton et al. 2016) have pointed out, politicians selectively heard and responded to (real) punitive impulses while ignoring coexisting – and also real – support for more progressive anti-crime policies. In fact, national politicians have largely disregarded long-standing public support for rehabilitation and other progressive crime control policies such as crime prevention and some gun control measures even as they responded to popular expressions of punitiveness. Recent evidence that congressional staffers systematically misperceive public opinion, imagining it to be more conservative than it actually is (Hertel-Fernandez 2018), may help explain this pattern.

In short, Enns’ methodological approach does not allow for recognition of nuance, complexity or contradiction in public opinion, and his theoretical model cannot explain why politicians ignore some aspects of popular opinion while carefully attending to – and cultivating – others.

Relatedly, Enns’ approach to public opinion cognitive bases and their empirical implications. For example, whereas Enns treats the rise in the percentage of poll respondents agreeing that “the courts are too lenient” as evidence of growing punitiveness, this perception stems largely from the fact that most Americans believe sentences to be much more lenient than they actually are (Roberts and Stalans 1997). In fact, when asked to sentence hypothetical defendants, members of the public frequently recommend less severe sentences than judges do (ibid). The widespread belief that the courts are too lenient thus appears to stem from a widespread misperception regarding actual sentencing practices. It is difficult to account for this misperception without reference to ubiquitous conservative complaints about permissive judges and lenient politicians such as those featured in the now-infamous Willie Horton ad released by the Bush campaign in the run-up to the 1988 presidential election.

While Enns’ analysis shows that support for some punitive policies grew in tandem with the prison buildup, his analysis overstates the monolithic nature of popular attitudes and, by largely ignoring race and racial politics, provides an incomplete and arguably misleading account of increased punitiveness in the post-civil rights era. Enns’ argument also obscures the fact that politicians seek to shape popular opinion even as they face incentives to respond to it. Even
setting these concerns aside, Enns’ analysis indicates that the incarceration rate would have been just 20 percent lower in the absence of rising public punitiveness. In other words, Enns’ findings show that the United States still would have experienced a massive increase in the incarceration rate and would still boast the largest prison population in the world even if popular punitiveness had not intensified. While *Incarceration Nation* usefully highlights one dynamic that encouraged penal expansion, it sheds little insight on the politics that shaped this dynamic and the many other dynamics that helped to create the largest prison system the world has ever known.

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**References**


The famous 1950 report of APSA’s Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, has cut a strange career path, serving in turn as a high-stature disciplinary statement, a scholarly punching bag, a cautionary tale about academic ventures in real-world prescription, and—in our current polarized age—an ironic invocation by political scientists warning each other to be careful what they wish for. What it has not been, until now, is the subject of a sustained book-length intellectual history that both contextualizes the work’s outlook and unpacks its particulars. Mark Wickham Jones’s exhaustively researched monograph draws from existing historical analyses of the committee while vastly outstripping them in its archival detail and comprehensiveness. In the process of doing this, the book also joins the surprisingly limited ranks (alongside works by Jessica Blatt and Theodore Rosenoff) of sustained historical analyses of the development of American political science writ large.

The major value of the book lies in the granular detail enabled by Wickham-Jones’s herculean research effort in over twenty-five manuscript collections. What his excavation unearths is the early postwar story of a scholarly field in flux, with leading political scientists returning from wartime public service eager to engage prescriptively in major questions of good governance just as an ascendant behavioralism began to promulgate a new skepticism of the discipline’s institutional focus and normative bent. The APSA Committee on Political Parties, led by E.E. Schattschneider and championing the responsible-party doctrine he had helped to revive, did its work during just this transitional period, which is partly what left it so vulnerable. Wickham-Jones engages this key dynamic as well as a kaleidoscopic array of additional questions—so many, indeed, that the book’s thoroughness can sometimes overshadow its arguments. He lays out the book’s inquiry thusly:

How did the committee come to write such a report, what impact did it have, what theory fashioned its conclusions, what role did the British political system play in its deliberations, and what part did partisan politics have in shaping these activities? Why did party government ostensibly drop off the intellectual agenda surrounding American political science in the early 1950s? (p. 17)

Wickham-Jones addresses each of these subjects in turn with a characteristic care and restraint that can occasionally leave the reader yearning for more definitive and sweeping claims. But the benefit of such analytical caution lies precisely in conveying the multiple, complex motivations driving both the production and reception of a collective work of public scholarship like the APSA report.
He does a particular service in moving the Committee's work out from under Schattschneider's shadow. While crediting the Wesleyan University professor both for guiding the committee's correspondence and meetings over the course of the late 1940s and for ensuring that the animating spirit of responsible party advocacy would inform the group's output, Wickham-Jones emphasizes the more central role played by three members employed full-time in the federal government: Paul David, Bertram Gross, and Fritz Morstein Marx. As Senate and executive branch staffers, these three worked intensively on the 1946 Full Employment Act; an article by Schattschneider about the necessity of party cohesion for making the legislation's provisions on national economic planning work inspired David and Marx to propose to APSA a committee to study American party organizations. Formally emulating the APSA committee on Congress chaired by George Galloway (which had directly influenced reform legislation in 1946), the Committee on Political Parties reflected more broadly the discipline's confidently prescriptive postwar mandate, well captured in an APSA pamphlet in 1946: “The purpose of the study of political science is the maximum of good government for the people” (213).

A political motivation more ideologically pointed than mere “good government” drove the key committee members' work, however. Wickham-Jones effectively situates the midcentury revival of responsible party doctrine within the context of liberal Democratic frustration at the obstructionism of dissident southern conservatives in the congressional party during the Roosevelt and Truman years. Remaking the American party system into a contest of two centralized, disciplined, and programatically distinct national parties would, so the thinking among the liberal scholars who advocated it went, eliminate such obstructionism and facilitate more active federal planning, regulation, and social provision. As Schattschneider put it in an unpublished manuscript, “The idea of party government is a Democratic idea” (232).

It continued to be even after the scholarly debate over the committee's report died down. On this subject, I think, Wickham-Jones gives the report's influence short shrift by remaining too focused on the immediate, committee-centered discussion (or lack thereof) in the broader public. He emphasizes APSA's botched rollout, which generated little publicity for the report, and the rapid decline of literal references to it in journalism and politics. But the language and outlook of party responsibility and issue-driven partisanship survived for years after, informing the work of liberal advocacy groups, Democratic club organizations, and the belated push for reforms aimed at congressional seniority and the committee system. No doubt the absence of sustained discussion of race and civil rights in the book reflects the same absence in Wickham-Jones's archival sources, moreover. But the importance of civil rights to the party realignment that responsible-party advocates envisioned—epitomized by the career-making 1948 convention speech by the doctrine's great political champion, Hubert Humphrey, on behalf of a robust civil rights platform plank—makes the omission regrettable.

The robust critical response that the report engendered has long colored its reputation. Wickham-Jones identifies two key dimensions of critique, distinguishing those who disagreed normatively with the reports' prescriptions from those who considered its analysis fundamentally
crude and unscientific. Along the first dimension, the report inspired champions of traditionally decentralized and non-ideological American parties to mount a defense of its virtues. American parties are “big and clumsy, and loosely hung together,” wrote one such critic, Ruth Silva, “largely because the United States is big and clumsy, and loosely hung together” (121). Along the second dimension, Wickham-Jones uses a nuanced account of the scholarly relationship between Schattschneider and V.O. Key to shed light on how behavioralism’s rise impacted political science’s public role. He rightly points to recent evidence for a revived interest by political scientists in “wider engagement outside of the immediate scholarly community” (17). This mammoth, essential history of a particularly notable past effort at such engagement richly conveys both its perils and its promise.

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An important debate has emerged regarding how much political representation varies across social classes. One perspective argues that, “The voices of citizens with lower or moderate incomes are lost on the ears of inattentive government officials” (Jacobs and Skocpol 2005, 1; also see Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2017). Others offer a more nuanced assessment, showing that political responsiveness to different income groups is often statistically indistinguishable (e.g., Bhatti and Erikson 2011; Brunner, Ross, and Washington 2013; Enns 2015) and when differences do emerge, the rich do not always win (e.g., Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien 2017; Ellis 2017; Flavin 2012; Rigby and Wright 2011).

In *Class Attitudes in America*, Spencer Piston flips this debate on its head by shifting the focus away from individuals’ class position to how individuals’ view those in different economic classes. Piston finds that those with more “sympathy for the poor” are more likely to support a host of social welfare policies and redistributive efforts, such as aid to the unemployed, housing for the homeless, and reducing the gap between the rich and the poor. Similarly, “resentment of the rich” corresponds with increased support for higher taxes on the wealthy. Piston also shows that individual’s sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich are only weakly correlated with income level.

In other words, it is one’s view of different social classes, not the social class a person occupies, that matters most for redistributive policy preferences. However, the redistributive implications of the policy must be clear. For example, the relationship between resentment of the rich and support for the estate tax only exists for those who understand that the estate tax affects only a small percentage of Americans (also see Bartels 2005). Thus, the focus on class attitudes and relevant policy knowledge helps explain public opposition to the estate tax, which is surprising considering that over 90 percent of the estate tax was paid by the top 10 percent of income earners and only about 80 small farms and businesses paid any estate tax in 2017 (Sammartino, et al., 2016).

Chapter six extends the analysis from policy preferences to vote choice and we see evidence that class attitudes corresponded with presidential support in 2008 and 2012. In addition to offering a rich theoretical account of the importance of class attitudes, Piston uses an impressive array of existing survey data, novel experiments, and new survey data to test his arguments. Equally as impressive—and laudable—Piston has made all replication data available for his book on his website (Piston 2020). This is a model of transparency for others to follow.

Not surprisingly, such a novel theoretical and empirical contribution opens many pathways for future research. One important extension for future research will be to move beyond attitudes toward the “rich” and the “poor” to also consider attitudes toward the middle class. Given the weak economic conditions preceding the 2008 presidential election and the
long-standing belief that the Democratic Party is better than the Republican Party at helping the poor, in Chapter 6 Piston predicts that class attitudes will benefit Obama. Consistent with this prediction, Figure 6.7 shows that ANES survey respondents were more likely to use the word “poor” when talking about what they like about Obama and what they dislike about McCain. However, when I looked at the open-ended responses in the 2008 ANES, I found that respondents invoked “middle” or “working class” more than three times as often as “poor” for why they liked Obama (108 vs 33 mentions). This pattern does not challenge Piston’s argument in any way, but it suggests that considering attitudes toward the middle and working class could be an important theoretical extension.

Another possible extension relates to the findings for 2016. In contrast to the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, Piston finds no relationship between resentment of the rich and feelings toward Trump. Was 2016—and Donald Trump—so unique that typical relationships between class attitudes and presidential support did not apply? Or does the null finding suggest a broader shift, with attitudes toward the rich and the poor having a diminished influence on U.S. politics moving forward? Perhaps attitudes toward the middle class have become the critical consideration for voters. It is also possible that the null result for 2016 reflects something unique about the survey sample. For example, there are almost twice as many Democrats (43%) than Republicans (22%) in the unweighted Qualtrics sample. None of these possibilities suggest a deficiency in Class Attitudes. Rather, they highlight the many opportunities for important new research that stem from the research agenda and the data presented in Piston’s book.

In sum, Class Attitudes in America combines an important theoretical paradigm with a wealth of data (which Piston has made publicly available) and careful measurement. This research also holds important normative implications and political recommendations. A better public understanding of the redistributive implications of policies and greater sympathy for those in need would combine to increase support for social welfare policies and redistribution. While this may sound intuitive, the focus on class attitudes represents a novel approach in political science that speaks to the longstanding, but surprising finding, that different social classes often share similar policy preferences (Enns and Wlezien 2011; Gilens 1999; Hochschild 1979; Sears and Funk 1990). While questions remain, these questions reflect the importance of the research agenda that Piston has begun.

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References


Based on the title and blurbs on the back of the book, one might expect the focus of Arthur Paulson’s new book to be President Donald Trump and what his election means for the future of American democracy. Indeed, it seems as if the author is set to ponder the implications of electing a leader with authoritarian inclinations or perhaps grapple with the question of what it means when the popular vote is no longer predictive of electoral outcomes. Early in the course of reading *Donald Trump and the Prospect for American Democracy: An Unprecedented President in an Age of Polarization*, however, readers may develop a sneaking suspicion that they are the victims of a bait-and-switch. The book’s title makes clear that while the author’s scope is wide (our “Age of Polarization” and the fate of “American Democracy” itself), President Donald Trump will appear front and center, as he himself would no doubt see fit. The volume appears to be offering one of the first book-length scholarly forays into the nature of this peculiar presidency and its broader implications for the nation and its governance. After the first few pages recap Trump’s “unconventional candidacy” and offer a fleeting glimpse at what the author—along with the rest of us—foresees as an “unprecedented presidency,” we are led headlong into a history of the Democratic and Republican parties in the twentieth century and a process of ideological polarization that begins to take place in the 1960s, eventually culminating in recent events. We are treated to a grand tour of presidential primaries, general presidential elections, and even congressional polarization along the way.

While one may at first have the impression that Paulson is simply laying the historical groundwork for his theory about the emergence of Donald Trump and a meditation on his presidency’s implications for the future of American democracy, it becomes increasingly clear with each subsequent chapter that we may not actually be heading where the title led us to believe we would wind up. Indeed, the reader would be forgiven for feeling distracted by the disconnect between setup and delivery. This is a shame, because the meat of the book—while not what was promised—offers a solid and illuminating, if not especially original, reflection on party polarization suitable for a wide audience. In fact, my hunch is that the author may have proposed just such an account of the historical roots of polarized partisanship, aimed at placement on U.S. parties and elections course syllabi, but that after November 2016, editors everywhere were anxious to seize the opportunity they saw in our seemingly insatiable appetite for media offering to make sense of the Trumpian moment. The result, whether due to author or editorial inspiration, is, in this case, a book that reads as an American Political Development take on the institutional roots of party polarization, intermittently interrupted with attempts to connect the narrative to the events of 2015–2017.

The first chapter provides a quick look back at the 2016 presidential campaign and election from the vantage point of the Trump presidency’s first year. Paulson argues that what is
"unconventional" about Trump is more style than substance and reminds us of various historical precedents for questions of personal character, electoral illegitimacy, and populism in presidential elections. This is the first of several passages in the book in which the author seems to undercut the titular lack of precedent for what occurred in 2016. For instance, he describes the Republican nomination process as having been "unusual, but not necessarily system changing or unprecedented" (p. 57), and reminds us that the phenomenon of a nominee winning the presidency despite losing the popular vote is "unusual, although certainly not unprecedented" (p. 75).

In chapter two, Paulson traces the evolution of what were once "umbrella parties" covering diverse ideologies, identities, and interests, into homogeneous "polarized parties" aimed overwhelmingly at particular types of constituents (e.g., southern vs. northern, rural vs. urban, civil rights voters, wall street vs main street). Chapters three through five focus primarily on electoral history, with 2016 as a special case of interest. In the third chapter, "Trumping the Republicans and Berning the Democrats: Post-Reform Presidential Primaries and the Case of 2016," it is the subtitle that truly captures the chapter's scope. By this point in the book, it will have become evident that the author's main question is, in fact, the backward-looking "How did we get here?" rather than the forward-oriented question of the "prospect for American democracy." Paulson identifies institutional reforms and ideological sorting by party--with increasing polarization across parties and homogeneity within them--as weakening party leadership and leading to unpredictable electoral results. Chapter four turns from primaries to general elections, again with 2016 feeling like more of an afterthought than the focus. Chapter five looks at party polarization within Congress and, peripherally, the implications for congressional relationships with the executive branch.

The final chapter, "The Trump Era and Beyond: Postindustrial Democracy in America," claims to evaluate the prospects for democracy under Trump (and the aftermath of his presidency), but quickly makes clear that the true threats to democracy have little to do with Donald Trump or the recent election, which the author sees (uncontroversially) as a symptom of broader historical processes in play. While the author promises that at last, this sixth and final chapter of the book will reveal "the prospects for American democracy in the twenty-first century," it is not until page 136 (of 150) that we get to the section entitled "The Trump Era and Beyond: Prospects for American Democracy." Indeed, it is Alexis de Tocqueville rather than Trump who emerges to take center stage in this final chapter, for it is in his Democracy in America that Paulson grounds his expectations for what lies ahead for our modern democratic institutions. The first half of the chapter reads as if it could be a stand-alone essay on equality, class, and popular decision-making in Tocqueville and the implications of changing economic growth rates for democracy as seen through a Tocquevillian lens. Needless to say, this feels like one final instance of misdirection given the expectations built at that start of the book. When, in the final few pages, we finally arrive at what was to have been the main theme of the book--"Donald Trump and the Prospect for American Democracy"--we are rewarded for our
persistence with a brief argument about post-industrial modernization and a decline in “equality of conditions” leading to Trump’s election. The punchline (spoiler alert!) is that American democracy is not that democratic after all, and recent changing economic conditions have just exacerbated this. So, what are “the prospects” going forward? In the final paragraph, Paulson makes his prediction: “Democracy in America in the twenty-first century will either become much more democratic or much less so. Either way, in the twenty-first century, how Americans experience their economic lives and their relationship with their government is changing fundamentally—for better or for worse.” It is telling that even this giant hedge feels only weakly supported by what precedes it, with little evidence against the alternative that the state of democracy will remain pretty much where it is today for the foreseeable future.

For the reader seeking a book that grapples with the threats to American democracy posed by a norm-breaking, race-baiting president with authoritarian inclinations, this is not your book. If, however, one is looking for a book to assign an undergraduate class on parties, elections, and/or polarization, and has no qualms—in this age of click-bait—about offering up attention-grabbing Trump as a way to entice students to read it, this book would be worth considering.

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Introductions to anthologies are often lowest common denominator affairs – throw away reads on the way to the meaty essays that might lurk within a volume. Not so in *The Political Thought of the Civil War*. Editors Alan Levine, Thomas W. Merrill, and James R. Stoner present a thoughtful essay that is itself one of the highlights of this collection.

Levine, Merrill, and Stoner observe that despite the Civil War’s definitive conclusion, its meaning and its implications are still unclear and therefore worth the careful attention of political theorists. This “deliberative approach” (3) avoids the reductionist “morality play” (2) present in much of the popular literature on the era. It also supplements historical and philosophical scholarship. While crediting the insights offered by these other fields, the editors describe how the particular methods of political theory grants special insight: by deliberately crossing boundaries of chronology and thought, by being sensitive to the interplay of ideas and outcomes, and by introducing considered normative judgments.

Three critical “regime questions” are engaged by the essays gathered: the place of slavery within the United States, the “tension between substantive morality and procedural constitutionalism” (6), and whether the Constitution is up to the task of organizing a multiracial, pluralistic society. The thematic coherence of the volume is understandably thin, however. Each author explores their own subject in turn, often without much reference to these categories, making the essays seem organized as much by chronology as by theme.

Subjects for chapters range widely. Levine himself explicates “scientific racism.” This was a view offered by some academics prior to the war, which claimed that the “African race” was a different and inferior species, not capable of sustaining civilization. His conclusion is that since science itself is value-neutral it will inevitably be tinged with the prejudices of the day, as it was in this instance. Not surprisingly, several essays deal with Abraham Lincoln’s political thought. They include Diana J. Schaub’s spry defense of how Lincoln moved public audiences from racial animus toward racial sympathy through “rhetorical jujitsu.” The speech examined is his 1857 response to the Dred Scott decision. Schaub describes how Lincoln subtly moved the rhetorical frame away from whites being polluted by racial intermarriage (a favored theme of Stephen Douglas and others) to the toll slavery took on black women. Among the essays dealing with the war’s aftermath is Jonathan O’Neill’s consideration of the value of Southern criticisms of the North. Various Southerners found the North too coarse, too consumerist, overly committed to a leveling egalitarianism, and bent on the centralization of power. O’Neill suggests that these observations still offer valuable insight when shorn of their original racist rationale.

Certain essays serve as useful primers for those who simply want to understand the era’s constitutional politics. Steven B. Smith and Caleb Verbois both provide defenses of Lincoln’s actions as a constitutional leader, as opposed to one less committed to legality and more dictatorial in nature. This is familiar scholarly ground and what they observe is well within the
mainstream of Lincoln scholarship. The pair of essays offers the only serious editorial misstep of the collection. These chapters overlap significantly and draw similar conclusions. The same extensive quote of Lincoln’s July 4, 1861 address to Congress is used, for instance, claiming that he did not violate any law. Besides being repetitive, the quotes themselves are from different sources that employ different syntax and have reference styles that do not match. A further rewrite, substantial or not, would offer each author a better chance to signal his unique contribution.

There are essays that offer substantial new views. Perhaps the most insightful is Michael Zuckert’s linking of James Madison’s political thought with the “Civil War Amendments.” Despite Madison’s terrific efforts to affect a new constitutional order in 1787, he famously ended up being rather disappointed by the end result. The Constitution could not effectively restrain tyrannical practices by states because it lacked a national veto of state legislation. Zuckert argues that Madison’s wish for “corrective federalism” is what also animated the Civil War Amendments. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in particular granted the national government “a general supervisory power over the states” (314). Governing decisions would remain primarily with the states, including decisions about the administration of justice and the conduct of elections. At the same time, these new amendments allowed the federal government the power to provide effective and meaningful curbs on problematic state behaviors. Thus, the Civil War Amendments completed American constitutionalism in a vital Madisonian way.

James H. Read enters the fray with an essay about how a variety of Southern politicians viewed secession, noting in each the long and problematic shadow cast by John C. Calhoun. William B. Allen offers the novel interpretation that once the war had begun, slavery itself could not have survived. Phillip B. Lyons praises Lincoln’s approach to Reconstruction, combining a zeal for the end result of securing African American rights with a patient and realistic gradualism about who would have the franchise. These essays will spark fresh dialogue about this familiar era in American political history.

While there is very little self-conscious interplay between chapters, there is an interesting latent discussion about natural rights worth noting. Merrill’s chapter on Thomas Jefferson describes what may be a fatal contradiction in natural rights theory: Jefferson logically posited that the natural rights familiar to the founding era justified the self-preservation of the American citizenry and their regime. Unfortunately, in Jefferson’s mind this right to preservation necessitated denying the rights of others, most notably slaves, because freed slaves posed an existential threat to the American regime. This observation brings fresh insight to Jefferson’s pithy phrase of “having the wolf by the ear,” and not being able to safely hold him or let him go. Merrill’s larger question is this: when domesticated, do natural rights become a weapon aimed at outsiders?

Daniel S. Malachuk stakes out a position that seems diametrically opposed to Merrill. Malachuk laments the loss of the natural rights consensus that existed during the founding that Lincoln was heir to. He stresses that this makes us misunderstand the Abolitionists. Because
they fit firmly within the natural rights tradition, they were not the radicals of the age. The real radicals were slavery advocates who helped end the natural rights consensus. In the years since a variety of forces have led soulless statism to replace that former polestar of liberalism. Malachuk argues that natural rights could again be effectively marshaled to benefit millions, particularly those held in conditions of slavery. O’Neill’s chapter likewise defends natural rights over a more relativist modern pluralism, as does Peter C. Myers’ work on Frederick Douglass. These ideas will joust in the minds of readers.

Each chapter is a convenient length, easily read in one sitting. As a whole, the volume is probably not sufficiently accessible for lay readers or any but the most specialized of graduate classes. Scholars of American Political Thought will want The Political Thought of the Civil War on their shelves. Despite the inevitable gaps produced by a one-volume treatment, it demonstrates the eclecticism and vibrancy of historical political theory and adds greatly to our consideration of the era and the American nation.

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*The Cash Ceiling* is a well-written and comprehensive examination of why there are so few working-class candidates in American politics. This book is a sequel to Carnes’ first book *White Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making* (The University of Chicago Press 2013). In Chapter 1, Carnes introduces his central argument that the uncertainty and costs associated with American elections disincentivize working class citizens from being recruited and running for office. He notes that while workers make up half the workforce, they are few and far between in the halls of power. The underrepresentation of the working class results in economic policies that mirror the preferences of wealthier professionals and not the demands of workers.

Chapter 2 is critical in analyzing the scarcity of working-class candidates. Carnes reviews some common theories behind the underrepresentation of workers in American legislatures. He critiques a common notion that workers are not qualified for office and that voters have internalized this fact and vote accordingly (or not vote as the case may be). Carnes systematically examines if workers are as a category are perceived as less qualified than professionals in running for office. He draws upon his own unique and impressive survey of political party leaders and citizens in studying traits that are important in evaluations of quality candidates. The survey asks respondents about three different types of qualifications: general (politically active, active in community, etc.), professional (occupations), and personal (assertive, hard worker, etc.). Carnes argues that both party leaders and voters identify similar personal traits (honesty and hard work), and more importantly, that professional and workers identify similar levels of these traits in themselves. He concludes workers are perceived as qualified and that many workers choose not to run.

However, voters and party leaders did report traits in the other two categories of qualifications (general and professional) that indicate at least a soft preference for professional candidates. First, both party elites and voters identified professional occupations such as business, law, and education as desirable backgrounds for political candidates. Second, voters and party leaders emphasized quality candidates as those who are active in politics and their community. And again, professionals scored higher on these traits than did workers. Carnes acknowledges these gaps but argues that these perceptions can’t explain the large occupational differences of political candidates. This is true, the socioeconomic gap is staggering. Although I would have liked to read more about why the similarities in personal traits, which seem rather universal and banal, are more important in determining a quality candidate than voter evaluations of a candidate’s professional experience and political engagement.
Chapter 3 studies the problem of why working-class citizens do not run for office. Carnes finds that political elites are less likely to recruit workers because of perceived differences in both resources and ambition. In a unique survey of state legislators, he finds that sitting legislators view workers as having resource and time restrictions that might hurt them running for office. Carnes notes that workers are structurally disadvantaged in campaigning in two ways: one, from not being embedded in social networks with wealthier professionals, and second, workers can’t afford to lose wages from taking time off to campaign. A unique survey of candidates shows that workers (as compared to professionals) are more concerned about losing their income or job when running for office. Carnes also shows that states with higher levels of economic inequality correlate with fewer working class legislators. He convincingly shows that it is not a lack of ambition but political recruitment by elites that helps explain the shortage of workers in political office.

Chapter 4 examines the institutional barriers for working class candidates. Carnes extends his argument that elections are also expensive, uncertain, and salient to recruiters and party insiders who view working class candidates as risky recruits. He studies how campaign costs and recruitment serve as obstacles to workers who might run for office. Carnes finds in an analysis of statewide and district characteristics that larger and more expensive elections produce fewer working-class office holders. Additionally, recruiters rely on their social networks to identify new candidates and these elite networks have few workers in them. Party chairs also have negative attitudes about workers’ ability to fundraise and win elections that bias their recruitment of working-class people. However, party recruiters with connections to workers and unions recruit more working-class candidates.

After identifying the hurdles for working-class candidates, Carnes then turns to examine the various plans to address the dearth of workers in American politics. Carnes separates the numerous plans into pretenders and contenders. He concludes that popular solutions such as publicly financing elections and increasing legislators’ salaries are not targeted enough at workers to increase their participation in campaigns. Other potential solutions like reenergizing unions, and redistributing wealth are categorized as too unrealistic to help workers into politics. The strategies that he finds more promising address the recruitment and personal financing difficulties of working-class candidates. Carnes claims that the most promising programs are candidate schools, seed money, and political scholarships. There are not enough of these programs for him to systematically evaluate their viability, but these programs do directly address problems identified in his earlier analysis of working candidates.

This is an important contribution to both work on representation in American politics and studies on how income inequality influences politics. The amount and varied analysis thrown at the problem of the underrepresentation of the working class is impressive. Carnes makes a convincing argument about how elections and campaigning as currently constituted create institutional barriers for workers becoming involved in public service. There are some questions that arose from reading this book that I would hope Carnes or other researchers explore
in the future. How has the shift from industrial to service jobs changed what it means to be working class? Is there a lack of social capital among the working class compared to professionals that influence running for office? If personal financial burdens are a factor in why workers don’t run, then why were there not more working class officeholders when workers were firmly middle class in the 1950s and 1960s? Most importantly, how does class intersect with race and gender in disincentivizing citizens to run for office? Since women and racial and ethnic minorities are so prevalent in the American working class it is hard to divorce these characteristics from class in analyzing the barriers to entry into the political class.

Christopher Faricy
Syracuse University
Campaign donations have an ambiguous place in American representative governance. Federal campaign finance law and the Supreme Court consider them a form of free speech but recognizes that at sufficiently large levels, though currently murkily so, they can transform into bribes. The American campaign money literature generally echoes this understanding. Large donors are political elites whose contributions afford them access—the gateway drug to bribery—to government officials, whereas small donors are engaged citizens with efficacious policy goals. Few studies have been able to examine this spectrum of contributors because election law and the Federal Election Commission do not require presidential candidates to itemize donations below $200 unless they accept primary election matching funds, an all-but-abandoned practice. Hence, their givers’ identities are otherwise unknown to researchers seeking to understand the rationale for making small donations.

The authors of *Who Donates in Campaigns: The Importance of Message, Messenger, Medium, and Structure* have been able to bridge this empirical gap via their survey of donors to the major party presidential nominees of 2008 and 2012, including those who made unitemized contributions, thanks to the cooperation of the McCain, Obama, and Romney campaigns. With these data, amongst other survey and observational evidence, they document a transitional moment in American campaign finance policy and technology. Traditional campaign donors have responded divergently to the advent of SuperPACs: with donations to candidates’ campaigns, some seek to balance what they deem a corruptive influence (despite the candidates’ own see-no-evil-hear-no-evil sponsorship of these “independent-expenditure-only” committees) while others are alienated and abandon campaign donation. Online giving has supercharged small donations by reducing its relative cost and facilitating more unsolicited donations than ever before, though comparable shares of large donors contribute online as well.

The authors also find evidence that candidates’ dependence on large donors continues, especially when building a campaign apparatus early in an election cycle or during the competitive heat of a contest when campaign funds are in the highest demand. Even Barrack Obama’s vaunted small-fundraising machine sought big donations when the going got tough in 2012. While the relative timing of small and large donations may vary across the election cycle, the authors find greater demographic than policy or ideological divides between the two types of donors, controlling for party. A relatively modest contrast is the greater policy extremism of Mitt Romney’s than John McCain’s small donors, though the former rejected any public funds, as did Obama, and therefore concentrated more intently on building an engaged small and large donor base via the internet than did McCain.

Although the recent surge in small campaign donations motivates more young, female, non-white, and middle-income Americans to participate politically via their credit cards, large
donors still predominate. It is beyond the scope of the study, though, whether small donors are less pernicious to representative democracy and ideals of good governance than large donors. The survey evidence credibly demonstrates that they are no less polarized. Small donors, if more polarized than non-donors, are a feature of the growing, diversifying engagement of Americans in national politics. This work adds to the portrait of early 21st century American electoral politics as more participatory and polarized than for many decades, with campaign fundraising law, policy, strategy, and practice a chief culprit.

However, *Who Donates in Campaigns?* offers a novel argument, in contrast to much of the literature, for the polarizing mechanism of political fundraising. The authors argue that the messenger drives fundraising as well as the message, such that positive or, more importantly, negative reactions to candidates encourage campaign giving. Campaign events are a major stimulus. Negative candidate responses are especially salient for last-minute fundraising before FEC deadlines. Here, the argument becomes more provocative than conclusive due to the difficulty of separating message from messenger. The authors posit Barrack Obama’s historic candidacy in 2008 to be more important to his fundraising than his message, compared to four years later, but both his image and message changed as an incumbent weighted by a four-year record in the White House. Yet in the campaign finance environment after 2016, a year in which major parties nominated historically unfavorable candidates, their argument’s appeal warrants application to future research of presidential nominating contests. The less favored the candidate, the easier an opponent raises money. Does the current nomination system and its fundraising institutions and practices stymie the American electorate’s ability to choose the best candidates for its highest office?

*Who Donates in Campaigns?* is so richly documented and detailed that students and scholars of American election campaigning will find much in it to help answer the questions it poses and raise new ones.

Sean Cain

*Loyola University New Orleans*

In *Perceptions of a Polarized Court*, Michael Salamone endeavors to provide insight on the dynamics involved in how the public views the nation’s High Court. His fundamental argument is that dissent by the justices in the institution’s legal decisions affects how people assay the decisions of the Court. However, the public typically receives decision outcomes through the media and, accordingly, he considers that interaction as well.

Theoretically, his primary argument is intuitive and straightforward – if the Court issues decisions that lack consensus, then the public will perceive the institution’s decisions less favorably. However, as we soon learn, such matters do not always work out as we might reasonably expect. Given the current state of a polarized citizenry and the salience of Supreme Court personnel decisions, this study is especially timely and compelling. It is well-written and its empirical analysis thoughtful and well-executed. It is recommended reading for anyone studying public opinion or the Court.

In the book’s introduction and first two chapters, the author outlines his approach and basic arguments. He introduces his basic premise in compelling fashion – comparing and contrasting the tasks before Chief Justice Earl Warren in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (1954) and Chief Justice John Roberts in *National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius* (2012). In the former case, the nation was provided with a unanimous decision by the High Court, whereas – in more polarized times – the public received a divided opinion in the latter. Both Chiefs “shared a reverence for unanimity,” but Roberts dealt with a Court that Salamone dubs “hyperpolarized” (p. 2). The next chapter reviews the extant literature on public perceptions of the Court and the more limited literature on media and Court interplay. That the Court depends on public backing and cares about how the public perceives it are well-known. Less well-established is how the media portrays and, arguably, manipulates the Court’s image. This latter aspect may have been developed in more detail, but Salamone does set up his later empirical assessment of media phenomena rather well here. Perhaps more attention could be paid here (and elsewhere) to the rich vein of literature on institutional policy agenda-setting which suggests that controlling the questions an institution handles (e.g. certiorari decisions) is possibly as important as dictating the substantive outcomes.

In his final analytical chapter Salamone employs an experimental approach to assess whether division among justices affects public perception of the Court’s decisions and, if so, how. Of course, division may manifest itself in degrees – unanimity, close decisions (e.g. 5-4 vote), and split, but not close decisions (e.g. 8-1 vote). Specifically, he considers whether division (or the lack thereof) affects respondents’ agreement and acceptance of case outcomes. While some of his findings are expected (e.g. unanimity promotes acceptance of decisions on certain legal issues), other findings may be somewhat counterintuitive to some readers. For instance, under certain
conditions, a 5-4 split is associated with higher acceptance of decisions. Salamone explains that such a result may be driven by respondents who feel that such a split evinces an element of procedural fairness and due deliberation in the decision. We could also imagine that if it is an outcome is inconsistent with a respondent’s prior ideological inclinations, then such a split result at least suggests that their ideologically allied justices did not ‘cave’ to the other side and that perhaps, in the future, they will ultimately gain the majority of the Court. In his final chapter, Salamone again considers the modern hyperpolarized Court against Courts of yesteryear that were typified as revealing less division to the media and public. Does such dissent harm the Court’s image or its ability to govern? As discussed above, the results are mixed and hinge on contextual concerns. He concludes, “It is clear there are certainly some public image effects that stem from division and polarization, but the concern that dissent is harmful appears to be overblown” (p. 151).

Salamone’s study provides valuable insight into the very complex dynamic of Court institutional workings and media and public perceptions of legal outcomes. His disciplined focus on the effects of justices’ division on public perception is both the advantage and shortcoming of the book. There are many other considerations that might affect how the media and public view Court decrees, and the Court as an institution. This very thoughtful treatment on the effects of polarization among governing elites stands as an excellent introductory point of reference for future study on how the public views policy outputs as well as the implications of division within governing institutions.

Jeffrey L. Yates
Binghamton University

Since 1996, Florida is only one of two states (Ohio is the other) that has voted for the winner of every presidential election. This combined with its history of razor-thin margins of victory as well as its increasing number of Electoral College votes demonstrates why Florida is a must-win state for presidential candidates. *Florida and the 2016 Election of Donald J. Trump* is the most recent contribution to the study of the importance of Florida in Presidential Elections and the dynamics of the state which resulted in the awarding of its Electoral College votes to Trump. Specifically, Corrigan and Binder ed. find that Trump was able to capitalize on criteria in the state which traditionally help Republican candidates, while his unconventional approach to campaigning was also able to shift some unfavorable trends in his favor to win.

In this work, Matthew Corrigan, chair and professor of political science and public administration at the University of North Florida, and Michael Binder, associate professor of political science and director of the University of North Florida’s Public Opinion lab, bring together an all-star group of academics, political commentators, and up-and-coming graduate and undergraduate students from Florida to examine the environment in their home state which led to Donald J. Trump winning the 2016 presidential election (Corrigan and Binder, p. 2 & 179-180). The collaboration of these scholars gives great insight into the state of Florida and what exactly Donald Trump did, and Hillary Clinton did not do, to secure this must-win state.

The research was conducted to provide a thorough explanation of what happened in the 2016 election and why (Corrigan and Binder, p. 2). To get the best understanding of the atmosphere in Florida, the text examines the state’s history, demographic makeup, and election practices in seven information-packed chapters. Chapter one argues the importance of Florida in Presidential Elections. Next, chapter two explores Trump’s success in the primary election. Chapters three and four examine demographic data at the city and county levels, most specifically along the I-4 corridor. With immigration from Mexico and Latin America being one of Donald Trump’s major campaign issues, the Hispanic vote is investigated in chapter five. And finally, chapters six and seven look at voting practices in the state, primarily early voting and whether or not the vote was rigged.

In order to conceptualize the electoral environment in Florida during the 2016 election, the authors rely on a vast number of sources for data. Data from the Census Bureau, National Archives and Record Administration, as well as original data are used, in an historical comparison, to explain why Florida is so important to presidential candidates. Moving forward into the characteristics of the 2016 election specifically, data from the Florida Voter Registration System and the Florida Division of Elections are used. In the end, this array of data sources help provide a comprehensive picture of Florida, its voters, and candidate activity.

While reading this book, it becomes apparent that the authors put significant thought into the displaying of data and this is easily one of the text’s strengths. Throughout, the
researchers display data in figures and tables that should be easily understood by undergraduates and lay people. The vast array of data and the concerted effort to display it in a multitude of fashions brings me to the shortcoming of the text. When looking at the text as a whole, chapter two lacks a use of data and visuals that are apparent elsewhere.

As previously stated, chapter two explores how Trump won the primary in the state, most specifically how he beat the two other primary candidates (former Governor Jeb Bush and U.S. Senator Marco Rubio) from Florida. It is by no means absent of data, as the authors use information gathered from CNN exit polls and the University of North Florida Public Opinion Research Lab. However, throughout the chapter, significant time is spent on discussing the imbalance in the amount of free media that Trump received in comparison to his challengers, but this is done through references to the reader’s own experiences. For example, “if you paid attention to the mainstream news, web channels, talk radio, or updates on Twitter, Donald Trump dominated all of these during the Republican Primary season” (Corrigan, Moreno and Lastre p. 39). As political scientists, we are expected to be members of the attentive public and were most likely paying attention to these news sources and took note of the imbalance, but this is not true of all, or even most voters. Therefore, it would have been helpful if the authors were able to quantify this in some manner and provide a visual of some type of data displaying the imbalance of media attention, either through the amount of air time that rallies were covered, the value of the free media, or the number of tweets and articles each candidate was mentioned in, etc...

Regardless of this shortcoming, this text is a great tool for those wishing to learn about the role the Sunshine state plays in presidential elections. Overall, it provides a comprehensive examination of the factors which led to Donald Trump winning the state of Florida and ultimately the presidency. As a shorter, well-written text, this book is perfect for undergraduates and will definitely be on my required reading list for my next course on US elections.

Michael J. Pomante II
Jacksonville University
Norris, Cameron, and Wynter’s edited volume examines a timely and important issue facing American politics: the integrity of our electoral system. Connected with the Electoral Integrity Project (https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/), the volume puts forth an argument for electoral integrity that link areas of the electoral cycles often thought of as separate, but show, in reality, these areas are an intricately linked feature of electoral democracy. This volume establishes a sobering reality of elections in America. As witnessed in the 2016 presidential election, the American system faces problematic issues that often plague struggling democracies around the world. From orchestrated misinformation campaigns and “fake news” to a lack of a bipartisan consensus on the basic ground rules of the electoral playing field, the United States election system is facing both new issues that have emerged in recent years and old ones that have never really gone away.

This volume starts by developing a theoretical framework that captures the complexity and interconnectedness of the concept of electoral integrity in eleven stages of the electoral cycle. The subsequent chapters cover most of these steps with campaign finance being one noticeable missing component from the volume. This framework and measurement of electoral integrity is based around international standards from the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) expert rolling survey. The PEI has been used since 2012 to provide a comparison of election performance of not only countries with presidential and parliamentary elections but also within countries that use a federal system. This provides a good setup for the book as the first chapter establishes not only how the United States compares globally but also how states within the U.S. compare to one another. This added comparative perspective is something many scholars of American politics often ignore. Chapter 4 deals with the methodological issues related to trying to boil down the complexities of electoral integrity into a single measure and the advantages and disadvantages of the measure. Most notably, the PEI is a measure of perception, with the potential biases involved in individual perception that go along with it, rather than actual impact. This allows for greater inclusion in the data of countries around the world where administrative data are not, in some cases, as accessible as in the United States. While voting and election data are generally (with some exceptions specifically at the state and local level) more readily available and detailed in the United States, as chapter 4 points out, the result is often that the challenges to electoral integrity in the American context have become subtler and often more difficult to discern.

Most chapters focus on individual aspects of the eleven stages of the electoral cycle established in the introduction. These chapters provide a variety of approaches to the individual questions that range from overviews of current practices and laws to empirical analyses. Additionally, the chapters range in coverage of the United States electoral system at the federal
level to the state and local level while some provide a comparative comparison of the United
States to other countries. Overall, most of the chapters relate the findings directly back to the
electoral cycle and integrity framework providing a cohesiveness to the argument throughout the
volume about electoral integrity in the United States. The areas covered range from well-known
topics related to elections (i.e. gerrymandering) to newer areas emerging as relevant to the health
of electoral systems (i.e. misinformation and fake news), and other topics cover areas most
Americans probably associate with emerging democracies, such as electoral transparency and the
use of electoral observers.

Taken together, the examinations of these individual stages of the electoral cycle presents
a serious consideration of a variety of trade-offs found in electoral systems (i.e. the law v.
implementation, security v. access) and shows understanding the full breadth of electoral systems
goes beyond simply knowing what happens on Election Day. The findings show there must be
careful consideration paid to the costs and benefits of all aspects of administering elections.
Perhaps one of the most obvious paths for consideration that emerges is the need for greater
cooperation among election officials at and between all levels throughout the country. However,
this is not something the American federal system or current partisan climate easily lends itself
to.

Overall, the American system appears to suffer from many of the same concerns facing
democracies around the world. While outright voter fraud is a rare occurrence in U.S. elections,
Vickery and Szilagyi (Chapter 10) note that systemic manipulation, such as gerrymandering, and
malpractice, such as various voter registration maintenance standards, present the biggest
concerns in the American system. However, Americans appear to have a blind spot when it
comes to recognizing electoral struggles within their own country that they often notice in others.
Without acknowledging this blind spot, any true reforms will most likely not be attempted or be
unsuccessful.

The arguments presented in this volume do not paint a rosy picture of the health of
elections in the United States, and do not provide any easy answers to right past and ongoing
wrongs. However, the volume closes by presenting a sequence of four reforms that should be part
of any comprehensive movement to strengthen electoral integrity in the United States. This
sequence includes: 1) improving legal regulations regarding registration and ballot access, 2)
building greater capacity for implementing the laws and managing the administration of
elections, 3) expanding transparency through greater use of electoral observers, and 4)
strengthening accountability and oversight of elections. Given the American federal system with
its patchwork set of electoral laws and administration and the general apathy of many Americans
towards electoral reform in the country, this sequence would seemingly face an uphill battle
towards implementation.

Jonathan Winburn
University of Mississippi

This book examines the development of women’s caucuses in American state legislatures. The central focus is on those aspects of the legislative environment that serve to enhance or diminish the collective action of women to create effective mechanisms for influencing public policy. Hypotheses concerning the influence of various factors ranging from party polarization and control to the proportion of legislative seats held by women are examined through a case study analysis of four states. The varying political conditions present in the states provide an ideal setting for understanding caucus development. The findings provide important theoretical insight into the conditions that make it possible for women to organize in a way that enhances their influence in the legislative process.

The author begins by pointing to the importance of caucuses in legislatures generally and how they can perform a vital role in the representation process. Caucuses provide a place where likeminded legislators deliberate and formulate policies on issues of mutual interest. They give an opportunity for communicating, sharing experiences, and strategizing for effecting change. Ultimately they are mechanisms that women can use for acting on the priorities of their constituents. The author defines a women’s caucus as a “bipartisan, institutionalized association of legislators that seeks to improve women’s lives” (p. 8). Such an expansive definition encompasses caucuses that vary dramatically in their purpose and objective. Some are merely social caucuses that give women an opportunity to build relationships and to share information. While others are policy caucuses enabling women lawmakers to discuss and debate policy issues, or even to advocate for specific policy proposals.

Looking at the lay of the land in 2016, Mahoney finds the states almost evenly divided between those that have such caucuses and those that do not. She develops a number of hypotheses that might help explain the presence or absence of women caucuses and tests them using recent data on state characteristics. For example, she finds that women’s caucuses are more likely to form in states where there is already a black caucus, where Democrats are in control, where legislative professionalism is low, and where there are comparatively few women holding seats. However, she concludes that descriptive statistics are only suggestive before turning to in-depth case studies to ascertain the conditions that enhance or impede the development of caucuses.

She chose four states to examine, two where women’s caucuses were successful at establishing themselves (New Jersey and Colorado) and two where such attempts failed (Pennsylvania and Iowa). Using a variety of data sources and 180 personal interviews with party officials, caucus members, and staff, she compiles an impressive assessment of how various factors produce the specific outcomes observed. In each case study she examines how the institutional features just mentioned play a role along with several additional actors and conditions. For
example, she examines how party competition and polarization might constrain women’s ability to organize. She also explores whether characteristics of women legislators play a role. For example, does the presence of more women of color increase the likelihood of forming a caucus? Are a sizable number of freshmen women in the legislature likely to reduce the likelihood of caucus formation? How might the attitudes of women legislatures have an influence? For example, does a shared gender consciousness result in caucus development? How do perceptions concerning the responsiveness of party organizations or of opposition from male colleagues play a role?

Each of four chapters offers an impressive and thorough assessment of the conditions specific to that state that affects the likelihood of caucus development. The key finding to emerge is that the conditions affecting the success of caucus formation vary greatly from state to state. In the successful states, entrepreneurs working within a context of Democratic Party control eased the pathway for caucus development. The presence of other caucuses along with low levels of partisanship also contribute to successful caucus formation. Lack of a strong gender consciousness, low enthusiasm from party leaders, and highly polarized environment were usually associated with failed attempts.

Overall, the four case study chapters provide a clear and detailed accounting of how the various conditions and actions of pivotal players had an influence. My only criticism of the book is that I wish the conclusion had provided a more systematic evaluation of the findings that summarize the relative effects of the variables examined. In other words, what set of variables are most important for understanding the presence or absence of women’s caucuses in the states? Could the factors be ranked in some fashion to demonstrate their relative effects? Clearer statements characterizing these effects would help the reader understand how these findings contribute to existing theories. But even without such summary statements, the findings provide an enlightened assessment of the conditions that contribute to an important aspect of women’s representation in state legislatures. This book will be of interest to a wide array of scholars who study issues of gender representation, state legislatures, and organizational development. In more practical terms, these findings provide a blueprint for legislators interested in creating a women’s caucus by pointing to the conditions that generally work to facilitate or impede such efforts.

Robert E. Hogan

Louisiana State University

Bernard Fraga provides a compelling explanation of the gap in voter turnout between white and non-white voters since 1960. This data-rich analysis uses the American National Election Study, the Current Population Survey, and voter files from Catalist to test a theory of electoral influence to explain the turnout gap: simply, the larger the relative size of a racial or ethnic group in a given jurisdiction (county or congressional district), the higher their turnout relative to other groups.

The first chapter provides an overview of the argument. Chapter 2 presents the historical and legal context for turnout and race, starting with the founding of the republic. Chapter 3 examines whether socioeconomic characteristics (income, education, and age) can account for the turnout gap. While differences in SES do account for much of the turnout gap for African Americans, it does not for Latinos and Asian Americans. Furthermore, Fraga points out that even if the gap goes away for African Americans after controlling for SES, the gap is still real. That is, SES is a “post-treatment” characteristic: education and income are partly a “product of the life circumstances an individual finds herself in as a result of her race” (p. 69).

Chapter 4 presents the theory of electoral influence and the turnout gap. Fraga builds his theory from three individual-level explanations for the decision to vote: the Downsian calculus of voting, empowerment theory, and elite mobilization. He notes that each theory recognizes the importance of the relative size of an electorally relevant group on the decision to vote. He focuses on this shared factor – the relative size of a racial or ethnic group – to shift attention from “individual-level understandings of who votes into the arena of contextually contingent behaviors” (p. 84). He also notes that his theory is “not designed to replace understandings of minority turnout, but rather to synthesize an existing body of research. . .” (p. 83).

The next two chapters provide the evidence to test this theory. The first step is to identify who voted by race and ethnic status. There are two ways to do this – surveys and voter files. The former are well known for overstating the frequency of voting due to a “social desirability bias” (people don’t like admitting they didn’t vote), but can accurately identify the race and ethnic status of respondents through self-reporting. The voter lists are better at accurately determining levels of turnout but less reliable in determining race. Fraga shows that the Catalist voter files underestimate turnout by an average of only .5% from 2006-2016, while the CPS overestimates turnout by as much as 12% in 2006 and 10.8% in 2014 (the CPS errors are smaller in the other four elections, averaging about 2.5%; p.104). On the other hand, Catalist uses a proprietary algorithm to estimate the race and ethnicity of the voters, with an accuracy that Fraga estimates to be “over 90%” (p.105). Given the different strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches, Fraga appropriately reports both types of data. The turnout gap is substantially larger with the
voter file data (between 12 and 20 percent for African Americans, 24 to 28 percent for Latinos, and 25 and 32 percent for Asian Americans from 2006-2016) than the CPS (with virtually no gap for African Americans, 16 to 21 percent for Latinos, and 15 to 19 percent for Asian Americans; see Figure 5.1, p.110).

The second step is to show how turnout varies, given the relative size of the racial and ethnic groups. Chapters 5 and 6 present this evidence at the state, county, and congressional district level. In general, the data support the theory: where the minority population is a larger share of the electorate, turnout is higher. Some of the strongest evidence examines what happens to turnout in congressional districts that are substantially redrawn after redistricting. If the theory is correct, voters who get moved into districts that have a higher percentage of voters from their racial and ethnic groups should vote at a higher rate. This is exactly what happens (but to a lesser extent with Latinos). Fraga demonstrates this with both panel survey data and electoral data with a multivariate GEE model that controls for co-ethnic candidacy and electoral competition.

Chapter 7 examines the question, “Do election policies exacerbate the gap?” Fraga finds that felon disenfranchisement does not explain the gap, while voter ID laws and restrictions on convenience voting had an inconsistent effect with varying impact across states and election years. Fraga advocates for expanding the language provisions of the Voting Rights Act and making voter registration automatic as the most promising election policies to reduce the turnout gap.

As with any research of this magnitude, I have a few quibbles. For example, I was confused by the discussion in Chapter 1 of the increase in the turnout gap from 1960-2016 (pp.10-14), because the conventional wisdom is that the turnout gap for African Americans had disappeared in 2008 and 2012. Indeed, analysis elsewhere in the book (pp. 64 and 110) shows the shrinking gap for African Americans and a stable gap for Latinos and Asian Americans elections (although as noted above, Fraga shows that a gap remains in 2008 and 2012 when using the voter file data rather than CPS data). The discrepancy is explained by the focus on total voting age population in Chapter 1 and citizen voting age population elsewhere in the book (the latter is clearly the more appropriate data when discussing turnout in federal elections). While Fraga is generally very careful in presenting his statistical results, there are a few errors, such as the claim that “Nearly every congressional district nationwide had a majority-White population . . .” (p.159). “Nearly every” suggests all but a handful of districts – maybe five to ten. In fact, 122 of the 435 districts are not majority-white (as of 2015; this number would be somewhat higher today).

However, these minor concerns do not detract from this otherwise impressive book. Anyone who is interested in understanding patterns of voter turnout based on race and ethnic status should start with this book.

David T. Canon

University of Wisconsin, Madison
Place matters in politics. To the extent that scholars of American politics acknowledge this at all, they rarely focus on the way place shapes Black politics. However, Black populations’ movement or dispersal has the potential to greatly change or upend political environments. Candis Watts Smith and Christina Greer, editors of *Black Politics in Transition: Immigration, Suburbanization and Gentrification*, have done a great service by showcasing this important role of place. Contributors help readers understand how the “three important mechanisms of demographic change—immigration, gentrification, and suburbanization—are influencing Black politics across the United States” (Watts Smith p. 3). Like the book, this review is organized into three sections.

This volume’s works on immigration standout. Like Greer’s *Black Ethnics* (2013), Austin, Gooding, and Carter help us think about Blackness as it interacts with immigration either directly (for those who are immigrants) or indirectly (for those who are in community with immigrants). Austin forwards our understanding of coalition-building among Black groups by describing the political involvement and history of Black American and Caribbean people in New York City. The highlight of Austin’s contribution is the thorough and accessible history of Black ethnic political participation. Also notable is her attention to Haitians and Dominican communities, who are less often written about despite their large numbers in New York City.

The idea of double or triple identity is not new but strikes me as refreshing in Gooding’s chapter about social interactions and political decision making among first- and second-generation Jamaicans and Trinidadians in Los Angeles and New York. Gooding uncovers a notion of respectability politics in immigrant networks that many Black people know intuitively, but do not discuss in mixed company and certainly do not make the focus of their scholarly work. Like Austin’s *The Caribbeanization of Black Politics* (2018), Gooding’s chapter is also noteworthy because it expands the scope of inquiry about Black immigrants beyond New York City.

Carter’s chapter examines Black Washingtonians’ opinions about immigration and what it means for the formerly “chocolate,” now “latte” city to describe itself as a sanctuary city. Here, and in her most recent book *American While Black* (2019), Carter challenges the messages we get from some politicians and media suggesting that Black Americans are at odds with immigrant communities. In this instance, she demonstrates that Black Washingtonian’s opinions are often more liberal than their white counterparts on the issue of sanctuary cities and other immigration questions.

McGowen and Rogers have different answers to the question of how living in a majority-white neighborhood shapes the political opinions of Black people. McGowen finds that Black Americans’ relocation to the suburbs did not lead to differences of opinion with their urban
counterparts. Further, suburban settings increased the likelihood that Black people were among fewer minorities in work and community settings. In some instances, this made them more racially radical. Conversely, Rogers finds that Black respondents' opinions on a number of issues vary based on their residence. Black suburbanites express more positive opinions on a range of issues—like equal treatment in the workplace and interactions with police—than their counterparts in the city.

The field would benefit from more nuance in the discussion of suburbs. As Steward alludes to in her description of the urban South, some suburbs are majority Black and marked by economic stability or vitality. What's happening in those places? What, also, about the implicit assumption of the “preferred standing” of suburbs? Little work about suburban politics considers what happens to the Black people who end up in lower income, inner-ring suburbs following their displacement from cities as a result of gentrification.

Mayorga-Gallow begins down the road of adding texture to the conversation about suburbs by offering a rich description of residents’ interactions in multiracial suburban communities in Ohio and North Carolina. Feedback from residents in both cities makes clear that Black people face social losses, like isolation and inability to establish friendships with neighbors. Even worse, they may be more likely to fall victim to systems of social control in the very communities that are supposed to improve the quality of their lives. This chapter challenges liberals’ assumptions about multiracial environments in a way that is clear, honest, and easy to digest.

The chapters about gentrification and neighborhood change are on the cutting edge of work in this area and ask questions that make way for important developments in the literature. Benjamin questions what we know about political incorporation of Black people and what we can learn when the election of Black candidates may not represent the progress we would assume. Her work will grow in importance as we try to understand other cities with majority-minority populations that may face a similar fate. This may be especially true in rapidly gentrifying places like Washington, D.C., which have long been models for Black political representation and participation.

The literature needs contributions that help us understand whether and how politics in the South has changed in the wake of the Return Migration and the selective Southern migration of older Black populations that has followed rising housing costs in gentrifying communities. Steward’s thorough description of the political economy of Black relocation sets the stage for this much-needed analysis by questioning how region influences what we understand about gentrification, who benefits from the phenomenon, and why.

I would have liked to see this volume frame its context by locating itself in the long history of Black migration in America. For example, the role of The Great Migration in Black politics is so substantial, that its placement in this text as its own chapter would have improved the work. Some of this occurs in the introduction, and in texts like The Great Migration and The Democratic Party: Black Voters and the Realignement of American Politics in the 20th Century.
(Grant, 2020), but there is still much more to be said and to know about how the mechanisms of demographic change in the eras preceding this volume shape where we are today.

The questions in *Black Politics in Transition*, about immigration, suburbanization, and gentrification, are right for this moment in American politics. Overall, the book very well done and a significant contribution to the fields of Black politics and American politics. It is required reading for any person seeking to understand the complexities of contemporary American politics in communities where Black people are present.

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**References**


Professor Richomme has produced a timely history of redistricting in a state that exemplifies the growing complexity and inescapable conflicts inherent in engineering racial and partisan representation in the single-seat electoral systems that dominate U.S. politics. Professor Richomme succeeds with the stated goal of the work: to show that the demographic and political evolution of the country, particularly our shifting racial composition, the increasing correlation of racial with partisan identity, and incongruous judicial doctrine have together made the process of redistricting both more consequential and more difficult.

The book is divided into chronological chapters, beginning with the reapportionment revolution in the 1960s and the 1971 redistricting cycle, through the implantation of the 2011 California Redistricting Commission. This is an appropriate time span as restrictions on malapportionment (placing different numbers of people in electoral districts to dilute or amplify the voting strength of certain groups) and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 incorporated racial considerations into California redistricting in a way that they had not been previously. Each decade’s redistricting cycles are given a separate chapter, and two additional chapters (4 and 7) are dedicated to studies of legal conflicts and reform, the 1988 voting rights case *Garza v Los Angeles County* and the 2001 California Voting Rights Act, respectively. The organizational design falls naturally from the subject, and relevant racial and partisan election tables, as well as election maps, are provided near the end of each chapter for easy reference.

Those interested in the dynamics of the redistricting process are treated to an extensive description of the many institutional restraints and political considerations that enter into the politics of map drawing. For example, the courts have played an integral role in the process in every redistricting cycle, as both political consideration and restraint, such as Governor Wilson’s strategic decision to try to get from the courts what he could not from the legislature in the 1990s to the bipartisan incumbent-protection compromise designed to avoid court intervention in the 2001 redistricting. As Richomme documents, court-directed redistricting recently emerged as a major force under the California Voting Rights Act, this time as a weapon deployed by voting rights groups, often in opposition to partisan and local elites.

Professor Richomme shows how term limits impact the redistricting calculus, raising the relevance of which groups are likely to be empowered in upcoming open contests. In turn, the demographics of primary elections, and the distribution of low- and high-turnout voters among adjacent seats, increase in salience. The budget process itself intervenes: how much capital could Governor Davis invest in gerrymandering when he would eventually need Republican votes to pass a budget by supermajority? These considerations, as well as tactics, from dissolving a vulnerable opponent’s seat across one’s own seats, or collapsing several opposition seats into one, strengthening existing party seats, or creating a new one by increasing competition, all shift costs and benefits across the various groups that make up a party coalition, shaping its future.
And in the case of the California Democratic Party, that coalition now includes every salient ethnic, racial and sexual orientation group within the state, basically competing within a single party for electoral representation, given the Republican Party’s strategic blundering and population shifts within their demographic strongholds. One sees shades of today’s Orange County in Richomme’s recollections of how GOP strongholds in the San Fernando Valley gave way to increasingly reactive Republican leadership and waves of immigration that eventually wiped them out. Yet the beneficiaries of that population growth and transition have not always been the newly settled populations.

The lasting contribution of Race and Partisanship in California Redistricting is to persuasively demonstrate that the goal of racial representation in line with, or proportional to a group’s demographic strength is not infrequently subverted in favor of partisan advantage. This is not a surprise to scholars of political parties, but the sacrifices that groups like the United Farm Workers made in terms of Latino/a representation in the 2000s, the dilemmas faced by African American representatives in increasingly diverse districts, and other ways that Democratic Party leaders have used the power they wield with new coalition members, to their disadvantage, brings home just how central this tension has been in California.

As control over the redistricting process is further democratized, first through the widespread availability of redistricting data to groups outside of party elites, and then institutionally through more deliberative redistricting processes, reconciliation between partisan and coalition group preferences becomes more difficult. As Richomme’s analysis unfolds, it becomes clear that conjoined racial and partisan polarization is likely to result in greater intra-party conflict over competing demands for representation under our single-seat district system.

Professor Richomme acknowledges that perhaps moving to a multi-seat, proportional electoral system could help ameliorate the dilemma, but he concludes that it remains, in the words of Bruce Cain, “the last taboo in American politics.” Alas, we are left with the stark reality that “The conflation of race and partisanship is the American political paradigm.” The lack of a well-developed theory of representation to guide analysis or prescribe a remedy to this challenge is the most significant shortcoming of Race and Partisanship in California Redistricting, though the historical goal and judicial intimations toward proportional racial representation are covered. Left largely unconsidered is whether the adoption of proportionality as an electoral design principle would leave party leaders as kingmakers, or if it would yield greater control to contending groups.

On August 25th of this year, the Democratic Party officially resolved to support the institution of proportional representation and multi-member districts “to foster greater electoral representation, provide equity to minority discourses, and increase the diversity of our elected officials.” It appears that the tension between racial and partisan representation may be forcing party leaders toward an institutional accommodation. However this next chapter plays out, Race
and Partisanship in California Redistricting provides a valuable history to understand how we have arrived here.

Michael Latner

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The term carpetbagger has had negative connotations ever since defeated Confederates hurled it at Yankees who had come South to make their fortunes after the Civil War. In politics, the term is equally negative when directed at candidates who move to a new address in order to scratch the itch of ambition by running in a jurisdiction in which they have few if any ties. Christopher Galdieri traces out the efforts of nine carpetbaggers who pursued Senate seats during the half-century beginning with Bobby Kennedy in 1964.

The success rates of Galdieri’s subjects will not inspire others to attempt a second act in a new state. Only Kennedy and Hillary Clinton made it to the Senate. One of the subjects, Liz Cheney, who had a tenuous connection with Wyoming, aborts her effort when her family name and access to campaign funds fail to drive Mike Enzi into retirement. Harold Ford, after Hamlet-like hesitancy, opts not to contest Kristen Gillibrand’s bid to extend her tenure in the seat to which she was appointed. Of those who undertook a campaign but lost, Scott Brown’s effort at a reprise in New Hampshire two years after losing his Massachusetts seat to Elizabeth Warren comes closest. Alan Keyes, the last-minute replacement for the sex scandal-tarnished Jack Ryan, turned in the weakest performance as Barack Obama trounced him on the way up the ladder to the presidency.

One is tempted to conclude that the key to a carpetbagger overcoming accusations of naked ambition is to have a famous name and run in New York since the only two winners, Kennedy and Clinton, share those characteristics. In the final chapter, Galdieri goes beyond those obvious features and suggests eight conditions that will enhance the prospects for a carpetbagger to triumph over the handicap of newcomer status. Most of these, however, are not within the control of the candidate. For example, the candidate cannot keep others from entering the primary or convention or get the state party to offer an invitation or to have national recognition. The last chapter also has a shorter list of factors for leaders of a state to ponder before courting an outsider.

Given the poor record of carpetbaggers, especially those not moving to New York, why does anyone attempt to restart or launch a Senate career or salve the sting of defeat, by moving to a new state? Galdieri’s answer is that while the prospect for a carpetbagger victory is poor, it may be the best option available. Kennedy’s heritage was in Massachusetts where his family had a record of electoral success. But brother Ted stood between Bobby and the Senate and the older brother had no interest in becoming Bay State governor. He had tasted the wine of national politics and he wanted more. Others, like Harold Ford and Scott Brown, had come close in their original states. But with the path to office no longer open there, they were receptive to the idea of restarting their careers in a new venue.
While only two of the candidates included in this research reached the Senate, Liz Cheney’s candidacy did produce a reward although not her original goal. Her unsuccessful Senate flirtation led to the House two years later when the incumbent retired.

Unfortunately, this volume had already been written when a third carpetbagger won election. Galdieri references the potential candidacy of Mitt Romney which has come to fruition with the former Massachusetts governor now representing Utah in the Senate. Like Kennedy and Clinton, Romney had national visibility and was welcomed into the state to which he relocated. He did, however, have to win the nomination in a primary, unlike the two successful New York transplants, yet the primary opponent offered only token opposition. Moreover, Romney, like the New Yorkers and unlike Bill Brock and James Buckley, had not served in Congress and therefore did not have to explain roll call votes that played well to the initial constituency but were out of step with the values of the state they hoped to represent.

Interestingly, having past ties to the state does not smooth the path for the carpetbagger. Bill Brock had long since decamped from Tennessee and lived in Maryland yet performed poorly as a Senate candidate. James Buckley grew up in Connecticut and owned a home there but that did not help him when he sought to rekindle his Senate career following rejection in New York.

A necessary but not sufficient condition for success is when the prospective carpetbagger is welcomed, even courted by a political party that needs a candidate and finds no local aspirant acceptable. The case of Alan Keyes, a failed Maryland candidate, provides Galdieri’s best example. When this occurs, two “best of a bad situation” coincide. Neither the party nor the candidate has a better option.

Galdieri keeps his task manageable by examining the challenges and campaigns of nine Senator hopefuls. If he should undertake a broader study in the future, he could document that the same kinds of charges get hurled at candidates for lesser offices who are not currently rooted in the constituency they hope to represent. In the most expensive congressional contest ever conducted, Jon Ossoff (D) narrowly lost the special election in Georgia’s Sixth Congressional District with the decisive factor being that even though he had grown up in the district, as a candidate he lived just minutes outside the district. On the other hand, numerous members of Congress have continued service after redistricting removes their homes from the district that reelects them.

The volume describes the campaigns of the nine candidates along with the way in which the carpetbagger and the other issues in the campaign played out. The forces in the state’s political constellation, the strengths and vulnerabilities of the carpetbagger and the opponents are described.

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Millions of Americans found themselves stunned on the night of November 8, 2016. As election returns rolled in, it became increasingly obvious that Hillary Clinton would not handily win the seat in the White House as most pollsters had predicted. Beyond turning to or blaming the existence of the Electoral College for making Clinton’s 3 million popular vote lead completely moot, scholars, pundits, pollsters, and the like would need to uncover helpful explanations for the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. Some suggested that the shape of the economy was to blame; Americans were still feeling economically anxious and were not impressed by the speed of post-recession improvements. Still, others focused on the effect of former FBI Director James Comey’s October surprise—a publicly announced re-opening of an investigation of Clinton’s emails—or the leaked information of the DNC’s efforts to put Bernie Sanders’ campaign to rest. Not unlike the Republican Party’s response to the 2012 presidential election, the Democratic Party found itself doing an “autopsy” of the election of a man who many would characterize as a politically inexperienced, financially irresponsible, xenophobic sexual predator. John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck dissect nearly every potential explanation of the election’s unexpected outcome.

*Identity Crisis* provides a play-by-play of every significant moment between the silent stages of the primaries and election night in the authors’ effort to pinpoint the most important factors that resulted in Donald Trump’s ascendance to the White House. In doing so, they rely on a wide array of data sets, such as the American National Election Studies, Gallup and Pew Research Center polls as well as a particularly unique data set, the Views of the Electorate Research (VOTER) Survey. The VOTER Survey allows them to disentangle whether having certain beliefs caused people to vote for Trump, or whether people who preferred Trump chose to adopt certain beliefs; the first round of the data was collected well before Trump was a salient figure in the minds of most Americans, thus providing a clean-cut opportunity to assess which previously held attitudes help to explain support for Trump in the primaries, and which do not. They leverage all of these data to not only deductively reason that it was not the shape and condition of the economy that led so many white Americans to vote for Trump, but also to put forth and support an argument that the election can best be understood in terms of Americans’ racial sentiments.

To be sure, this book is primarily about white Americans’ racial attitudes, political behaviors, and policy preferences. The term “identity crisis,” here, is not necessarily a reference to whether white folks had an existential crisis about whiteness and white identity, per se, but instead how white Americans responded to a highly racialized campaigned, whereby the two major party candidates came down in very distinct ways on racial matters. What they find and show is that “even before 2016, group identities and attitudes were becoming more aligned with
partisanship;” specifically, people of color as well as racially liberal whites were migrating toward the Democratic Party, meanwhile whites who feel less favorable toward underrepresented racial groups as well as religious minorities were shifting toward the Republican Party (pg.4). Ultimately, they argue that it is not that Trump’s racist rhetoric led people to “become racist,” as one dominant narrative suggests, but instead he was simply able to dip into an already existing reservoir of racial antipathy at the right moment.

The other identity crisis that Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck bring to light is that which exists in the Republican Party. First, they note that the best way to understand and predict white partisanship in a post-Obama era is through the lens of racial attitudes broadly speaking—not just bigotry towards racial minorities, but also in whites’ explanations of racial disparities, preference for social distance, sentiments towards immigrants as well as attitudes towards Muslims. This becomes a problem—or identity crisis—for the Republican Party because while Republican elites are not necessarily bastions of racial liberalism, the authors show that the base of the Republican Party has been chomping at the bit for more (racially) conservative candidates. The Tea Party represents the prequel of Trump’s rise, in some ways. The introduction of Trump to a line-up of conservatives who had strong connections to various parts of the “establishment” was welcomed by a significant portion of everyday white Republicans, and the media helped quite a bit to push him to the front of the pack.

The three authors write a sweeping account of the 2016 primary and general elections and do so by putting a journalistic spin on an otherwise academic endeavor. The evidence adjudicates between several possible explanations of white political behavior. This is an important effort given the ramifications that white Americans’ political and policy preferences have on everyone else. Needless to say, it is curious how little the authors consider the attitudes, preferences, and responses of people of color or religious minorities to the racial and racist rhetoric of the Trump campaign.

In the aftermath of the 2016 election, political thinkers not only looked to the white-centered explanations that the book explores, but they also questioned why people of color, and Black voters in particular, did not turn out at the same rates as they had done in the two previous elections. It is surprising that the authors did not also delve into whether and the extent to which either candidate’s treatment of issues around racial inequality or discussion of underrepresented groups produced a different kind of “identity crises” for voters of color. Of course, hindsight is 20/20; scholars are becoming more aware of the role that Black women play in electoral outcomes, particularly at the state and local level, and others have already noticed the way that Latinx Millennials and youth can be galvanized by anti-immigrant rhetoric—the same kind of rhetoric that marked the announcement of current president’s campaign announcement.

Taken together, Identity Crisis provides a longitudinal analysis of white American racial attitudes and their effects on the contemporary political landscape. It will be interesting to see whether the insights provided here will help us to understand the dynamics of future elections, especially considering the racial diversity in the Democratic Party’s 2019-2020 primary line-up.
In this fascinating and well-executed new project, Greg Goelzhauser provides an insider’s look into the workings of what has been labeled by some judicial reform advocates as “the merit plan.” In this popular but rarely observed method for selecting state court judges for their initial terms of office, a nominating commission reviews all applicants for each vacancy and creates a shortlist of qualified candidates. The governor then makes an appointment from the commission’s shortlist. In other words, merit selection is a gubernatorial appointment plan in which the choices of the governor are constrained by a commission. The label “merit” rests on the assertion that commission-based nominations are less political and result in better-qualified judges than contestable elections or unfettered gubernatorial discretion. Another claim is that a commission system better diversifies the bench than other methods of initial accession.

Commission-based appointment systems include but are not restricted to the Missouri Plan, which requires retention elections subsequent to appointment. In Judicial Merit Selection, Goelzhauser evaluates all commission-based nomination systems regardless of the method of reselection. The exception is South Carolina and their unusual plan dominated by the state legislature. This strategy expands the inquiry to such states as New York, where high court judges are appointed by the governor from a commission shortlist but where subsequent terms are granted by the commission rather than voters. Another example is New Mexico, which utilizes contestable partisan elections for reselection.

The principal question Goelzhauser poses is whether commission-based appointment systems actually work, defined as qualifications-based, depoliticized, and producing a diverse bench. Of course, these plans vary considerably across the states. Some significant differences include commission size and qualifications, applicant screening procedures, and whether partisan balance of some sort is required on the commission and the shortlist. For the first time, these differences in structural details become a significant part of the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of merit selection. Indeed, this study is the first to combine theoretically driven empirical models with detailed information about all aspects of the process, including the choices of commissions and governors, decisions by attorneys to enter the candidate pool, and the characteristics of the judges chosen.

To describe and evaluate the merit plan, Goelzhauser has assembled what seems at first glance to be a curious collection of data drawn from different states. However, these choices were dictated by the virtual absence of detailed, accessible information about the work of the commissions and other important dimensions of the process, reflecting the common criticism of
the merit plan as lacking transparency. In this study, Goelzhauser transcends these limitations by cleverly piecing together the best (and on some topics, the only) information available. In doing so, he provides an unprecedented evaluation of commission-based appointment plans for staffing state court benches.

With any case studies, there always is the possibility of the lack of generalizability, as the author acknowledges. However, there are fewer reasons for that concern here because of the theoretical framing provided for each analysis. Moreover, the findings are largely consistent across states and dependent variables with respect to judicial qualifications, the political nature of the process, and diversity. In this regard, this book is an outstanding example of how to use case studies in a theoretically powerful way.

*Judicial Merit Selection* is organized into six chapters and an appendix containing extensive robustness checks on the findings in Chapter 3. Chapter 1 is the introduction and Chapter 6 is the conclusion, and both chapters achieve the usual goals. The heart of the inquiry begins in Chapter 2, which offers a richly detailed description of the process of filling a 2016 vacancy on the Arizona Court of Appeals. This step-by-step account includes the author’s own observations during the two public commission meetings to discuss the applicants. Chapter 2 describes all aspects of the commission’s work, the participants, and the institutional features of the selection process, including rules about commission composition, characteristics of the commissioners and the twelve applicants for the judgeship, rules governing the partisan composition of the short list, and the questions each of the eight interviewees were asked. In the end, Goelzhauser describes the commissioners not as sophisticated partisans or nobly apolitical but as political appointees muddling through to find the required mix of nominees.

Chapter 3 takes us to Nebraska and the question of why commissioners and governors choose some applicants over others. Nebraska takes center stage in this inquiry as the only state providing sufficient data for rigorously assessing the choices of commissions and governors. Do commissioners and governors emphasize judicial qualifications, an apolitical approach, and diversity on the bench? The specific data evaluated are all 980 applicants for 112 judgeships on a variety of trial courts, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court from 2000 through 2016. Goelzhauser estimates two sets of models: 1) commission choices (yes or no on each applicant) and 2) gubernatorial choices (yes or no on each shortlist candidate). Key independent variables include a wide range of legal qualifications and experience, gender, and partisan politics. The results are intriguing. With commission choices, some aspects of judicial experience matter, but women are disadvantaged as are Democrats (in some specifications). With governors, the applicants’ experience and gender matter not at all but candidates from local elite law schools are preferred while Democrats are disfavored. Overall, based on these and other findings, Goelzhauser generally rejects the hypothesis that merit selection removes partisan politics and favors diversity, at least in decisions about the applicants.

Chapter 4 evaluates the factors determining the applicant pool for judgeships, framed using ambition theory and barriers to seeking office. In these models, Goelzhauser compares the
822 applicants for judicial vacancies in Alaska in 2016 to all 2,132 attorneys in the state. Using the decisions of attorneys to seek, or decline to seek, appointment as the dependent variable, the models again include specific measures of qualifications, politics, and diversity. Through a series of alternative specifications, Goelzhauser concludes that applicant pools are influenced by congruence with partisanship of the governor (a highly political factor) but not by gender. The findings about qualifications are mixed.

As the second part of this inquiry, Goelzhauser discusses progressive ambition and whether each sitting judge sought elevation to a higher court. An interesting variable is the percentage of the vote received in each judge’s previous retention election. The models do not reflect any effects of gender, race, or politics, but those who have performed better with voters and received better bar evaluations are more likely to seek promotion. Chapter 5 asks whether variations in the specific features of commission-based appointment systems affect performance, defined as increasing the likelihood of seating more qualified and diverse judges. These features include the extent to which the governors control the selection of commissioners, lawyer versus lay control, and the like. The dependent variables measure various aspects of the appointees’ quality and diversity. As a theoretical frame, Goelzhauser forwards the notion of commission capture, linking some institutional design choices to an increased threat of capture. These data include all 447 merit appointments to state supreme courts across the nation from 1942 through 2016. Somewhat counterintuitively, there do not appear to be any specific design features consistently increasing or decreasing performance, although some features are significant in some specifications.

In the conclusion and throughout, Goelzhauser summarizes key findings, identifies issues to be addressed in future research, and describes significant policy implications of the empirical results. Collectively, the findings are complex and nuanced, and the conclusions are careful and balanced. Overall, this research raises serious questions about whether the promises of commission-based systems are being realized, particularly when combined with the obvious lack of transparency throughout the process. At the same time, Goelzhauser acknowledges that although merit selection does not diversify the bench or depoliticize the process, no other selection system does that either or consistently performs better than the others. In the end, he finds it “difficult to recommend” merit selection “against less opaque alternatives that perform similarly on important dimensions such as quality and diversity” (p. 143).

This terrific new book does an excellent job of illuminating merit selection in ways heretofore unachieved, thereby interjecting balance and facts into a debate often characterized by speculation, hyperbole, and false claims. Goelzhauser also offers new theoretical insights into the scientific study of judicial politics. In these and many other ways, Judicial Merit Selection is an outstanding achievement and thus is highly recommended.

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The role of money in federal elections has been undergoing profound changes over the past dozen years. Two massive turns of events can be used to mark what has happened. Everything about this volume needs to be understood in light of those changes.

The first was Barack Obama’s rejection of public campaign financing during the general election for the presidency in 2008. (Those who prefer might begin with George W. Bush’s rejection of matching funds during the pre-nomination phase in 2000.) Under the system that had prevailed since 1976, candidates voluntarily chose whether to receive public subsidies in return for limiting their spending. The spending limit in 2008 (the year that Obama said no) was $51 million during the pre-nomination phase and $84 million for the general election for a total of $130 million. The national political party committees supplemented the publicly-funded candidates in 2004 and 2008 with anywhere from $50 million to $150 million in independent expenditures (IEs). Adding $150 million to $130 million meant that the candidates and parties spent a total of up to about $280 million for each major party nominee. In contrast, Obama – freed from the spending limits – nearly tripled the total by raising $754 million in 2008 and $784 million in 2012. The presidential candidates of 2016 fell somewhat short of Obama’s numbers, but the election took place on a radically different playing field from the one of not long ago.

The second major jolt was the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* (FEC). As is well known, the decision held that corporations (and by extension labor unions) had a constitutionally protected right to spend money independently to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. Within weeks, courts heightened the impact of this decision by ruling that donors could make unlimited contributions to organizations that only made IEs. This resulted in an explosion in IEs whose importance cut much more deeply than a mere growth in dollars. The aftermath also shifted the organizational framework for politics. By 2014, some political scientists were seeing non-party spending as undermining the candidates and political parties. But by 2016, the largest IE organizations in presidential elections were closely allied with the candidates, while the largest in congressional elections were allied with the four sets of party leaders.

*Financing the 2016 Election* traces these developments fully and well. Others have told parts of the story better, but this volume brings the pieces together. The chapters by Anthony Corrado on the regulatory environment, David Magleby and Jay Goodliffe on interest groups, John Green on the presidential nominations, David Hopkins on the presidential general election, Molly Reynolds and Richard Hall on the congressional elections, and Diana Dwyre and Robin Kolodny on political parties, are bracketed by fifty-page introductory and concluding chapters by Magleby, who is also the book’s editor. This is a book students of American politics will want to have on their shelves.
However, the book’s real strength cannot be seen if it is viewed as a stand-alone product. The volume is part of a quadrennial series that began with *Financing the 1960 Election* by Herbert E. Alexander. Alexander was the author or co-author of 17 volumes in the series, through 1992. John Green edited *Financing the Election of 1996*, which was the first with chapters by selected political scientists. David Magleby has been editor since 2000 (with Corrado the co-editor in 2004 and 2008). That makes *Financing the 2016 Election* Magleby’s fifth. It is also the 23rd in the series. This continuity is important. Tables may be repeated and extended across volumes, with consistent methodologies. Some – albeit with varying data sources and methods – can be stitched together from 1952 (and in one case from 1912) by going across older versions. This is an invaluable resource. At the same time, the more recent books give life to the financial data with interviews of key actors from the party committees, campaigns, consultants, and interest groups. I look forward to getting the new version every four years.

Having said this, the book could improve. Some other edited works are disjointed collections of essays. This one, like its 22 predecessors, is meant to be a unified book. It largely succeeds. However, there are places where the effort falls short. The opening and closing chapters take up more than 100 pages. They repeat (at length) narratives about the election that overlap substantially with other chapters. The book would have been improved if this material had simply been handed off.

More important than the repetition, however, is what is missing. The book does not have a thematic frame or real conclusion. Like the seventeen predecessors by Alexander, it is largely descriptive. To be sure, this has strengths. Thesis-driven writing could destroy the continuity that has been the series’ hallmark. Yet, it would be worth seeking a middle ground. The 2000-12 versions ended with chapters on campaign finance reform by Thomas E. Mann, who has since retired. The current team might not want to close with reform, but Mann’s chapters did force the reader to consider what the previous four years had meant for the political system as a whole. The last four pages of the current book’s final chapter are labeled “Conclusion”. The opening sentence says that, aside from Donald Trump’s campaign, most of “the financing of the 2016 election marked a continuation of several long-standing patterns” (Magleby, p. 335). If this were the main story, one would have to wonder why one has kept reading for so long. The statement may be partly true if one adopts a campaigner’s perspective with a short time frame. But it clearly is not for the subject writ large. As the book amply demonstrates, today’s political world is vastly different from that of a decade ago. The point is made throughout – explicitly in the chapters by Corrado, Reynolds and Hall, and Dwyre and Kolodny, and implicitly in others. But inner chapters cannot frame a book. The facts are all here. Many of them are reprised in the final chapter. But the opening and closing chapters would be good places to ask: What do the facts mean? And – most importantly – why should the reader care (whether as a citizen or scholar)? An ongoing series may not be the place for a definitive answer but it can be a timely checkpoint for framing big questions. I look forward with
anticipation to seeing this valuable series continue, but I also hope the next volume reminds readers why it all matters.

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In *Indecision in American Legislatures*, Harden & Kirkland seek to uncover the complex relationships surrounding legislator indecisiveness. Relying on existing literature to derive new theoretical models of legislator indecisiveness, Harden & Kirkland draw on state-level data to assemble a dataset and utilize out-of-sample predictions to explore the accuracy of their theoretical models created using in-sample models. The result of this theoretical rigor not only leaves the reader with an in-depth understanding of the complexity of legislator indecision, but also with an understanding of the weaknesses of Harden & Kirkland’s theoretical models.

Exploring the weaknesses of theoretical models using words and existing literature is one thing, but taking theoretical models created in one dataset and then testing the models using an entirely new dataset is quite another. Harden and Kirkland go well beyond traditional social science quantitative techniques to validate their theoretical models created using state legislatures from 2011 and 2012 with out-of-sample predictions from other datasets. These new out-of-sample datasets include an entirely new legislature (The United States House of Representatives) and in new state legislator data from 2013 and 2014. This is a bold new technique in the social sciences (but not the natural sciences) because the risk of invalidating theoretical models is high in social science models.

*Indecision in American Legislatures* begins with an overview of the basic question: What causes a legislator to support one side of a bill, and then take the opposite position? This chapter introduces what Harden & Kirkland consider to be the two most important principals which have direct access to punishing legislators for their behavior: constituents and party leaders.

Harden & Kirkland use the term *cross-pressuring* to refer to the conflict created by party leaders preferring one outcome for a bill and constituents preferring the opposite outcome, and use the term *waffling* to note when legislators change their position on a bill, whether this position change is related to uncertainty or strategic behavior. Harden & Kirkland also note that there is a distinction between cross-pressuring and vote switching. Waffling is related to cross-pressuring while vote switching is related to strategic behaviors which polarize legislative agendas.

One of the strengths of Harden & Kirkland’s work is on display in chapter 2 where they simulate theory using relatively simple models which examine the relationship between low district salience and high party salience, and high district salience and low party salience on the probability of indecision on a vote and district ideology for both extreme and moderate party leaders. Sound confusing? One look at Harden & Kirkland’s simulation result graphs and the strength of their work becomes clear; graphs, charts, tables, and plots can assist in understanding complex relationships not easily understood using words. This strength is something Harden & Kirkland display in spades in this book.

Chapter 3 examines the risks associated with flip-flopping on a bill. For example, one
significant risk is the appearance that legislators will say or do anything to win elections. Additionally, chapter 3 examines the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 by using co-sponsorship patterns and final roll call voting in lower state legislative chambers. Counterintuitively, Harden & Kirkland find that the introduction of nongermane legislation amendments is not strongly associated with waffling behaviors of cross-pressured legislators. Building on chapter 3, chapter 4 examines state-level patterns in waffling. Harden & Kirkland find that competition between Republicans and Democrats provide the structure for waffling; the closer a chamber comes to being equally split, the higher the rate of legislator waffling.

Chapter 5 examines out-of-sample testing on datasets using models generated on a different dataset. Herein lies one of the major strengths of Harden & Kirkland’s work. Out-of-sample testing supports most of their predictions within 1% of observed waffle rates but Harden & Kirkland also examine cases where their models are not predictive. In chapter 6, Harden & Kirkland create a placebo test which examines vote switching in California. They find that cross-pressured legislators who do not have the time to examine their initial decision on a bill, yet decide to change their position, are doing so because of electoral and career factors; sometimes abandoning the winning side of a roll call vote once the outcome is assured without their vote.

Chapter 7 examines the consequences of legislator indecision, finding that there are no electoral consequences to waffling on roll call votes, a finding that Harden & Kirkland attribute to a lack of political awareness in the public. Interestingly, while there are no direct electoral consequences, Harden & Kirkland find indirect consequences via decreases in campaign money for legislators who waffle compared to legislators who do not waffle. Chapter 8 wraps up the book with an overview of findings and offers some prescriptive measures to address the issue of waffling. For example, Harden & Kirkland note that the legislative gridlock in America might be lessened if Americans come to love the flip-flopping legislator. Towards this end, legislators should consider explaining the legislative process and the pressures they face at final roll call votes.

To the extent that there are weaknesses (and there are few to be sure), they are associated with simple models. For example, in chapter 1, a simulation of the relationship between extreme party leaders and moderate party leaders displayed in two images in figures 2.2 and two images in figure 2.3 closely mirror each other. I am unsure of the simulation mechanism causing the mirroring, but in my experience, human behavior rarely mirrors itself this closely. This critique extends to regression models that are missing potentially relevant control variables including, for example, legislator race, years in office, and gender.

The major strengths of this book include a wide range of empirical analytical techniques, out-of-sample model testing, succinct and approachable chapter conclusions and transitions, and an amazingly broad range of tables, charts, and graphs associated with indecision in American legislatures. With such a wide variety of information, there is quite literally something for everyone interested in legislator indecision, no matter what level of information is desired. For researchers interested in the implications of indecision in American legislatures, Harden &
Kirkland’s book is an amazing resource, one that has changed my perspective on legislator indecision and is certain to influence my future research into legislator behavior.

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This book is a wonderful addition to my psephological collection of scholarly works. It will be extremely helpful to me in a book I am currently writing to advance my campaign for electoral reform in Australia. For Americans, it is a treat.

For academic readers, Mulroy tells them what they already know: American democracy is in a mess – and it is getting worse. Unfortunately, many of the current problems are owed to the US Constitution and it is extremely difficult to amend. Mulroy, therefore, sets out his agenda of reform which avoids the need to change the Constitution wherever possible. All his reforms are well-argued. Critics are put down politely with rational argument. Consequently, I agree with all his reforms, with just one exception.

Briefly, he advances a very convincing case for the Interstate Compact for the National Popular Vote whereby Americans would choose their President. This proposal has been strongly advocated by reformers since 2006. For the House of Representatives, he proposes a sensible combination of Ranked Choice Voting, Instant Runoff Voting, and the Single Transferable Vote.

Before I transfer my attention to Australia (where my main interest lies) I should mention the one exception noted above. On page 160 he discusses the possibility of STV for the American Senate. He ends the section with this: “Ultimately, it seems a long walk for a short beer.” That is an understatement. It is much worse than that. The election of two politicians by STV is a very bad idea. Believe me. We have cases of that in Australia and it produces very bad results. STV voting should always be for the election of three, five or seven places.

Regarding the drawing of boundaries of electoral districts Mulroy correctly makes favorable reference to Australia on pages 7, 75, 76 and 102 concluding on page 102 with this reference: “the national Australian Electoral Commission, pretty much the gold standard when it comes to nonpartisan, professional redistricting”. He is quite right. Writing (as I do) as Australia’s present chief non-politician electoral reformer I can safely assert that we have completed that task, at both federal and state levels, to be as near-perfect as it would be possible to imagine.

Where Mulroy goes wrong is in his description of the operation of STV in Australia. Thus, on pages 131, 132 and 133 he discusses party-list proportional representation systems as used in most of Europe, South America, Turkey, Israel, and New Zealand and he concludes in brackets: “Until 2016, Australia used a hybrid form in which voters could choose either to rank individual candidates within a party’s list or simply vote for the party itself.” That is wrong in that it creates the impression of a party-list system operating until 2016 when it was replaced by STV.

What actually happened in 2016 was that the party in power, the Liberal Party, set out successfully to rig the Australian Senate voting system in its own favor by a thoroughly dishonest re-contriving of the contrivances of the immediate past system. Unfortunately, most analysts were taken in by that pretend “reform” which was, if truth be told, implemented in the most cynical way it would be possible to imagine. I know that the four Australian names given in
Mulroy’s acknowledgments were among the many analysts who were taken in by that pretense of Liberal Party virtue.

In Australia, there are 837 politicians, federal, state and territory, in 15 houses of parliament. Of those 571 (68 percent) are elected from single-member districts by what Americans call “Instant Runoff Voting”, (We call it “preferential voting.”) Then there are 216 (26 percent) who owe their seats to what I call “bastardized STV” and there are 50 (a mere six percent) elected by what I call “proper STV”. In Australia, those 50 are elected by what we call the “Hare-Clark” system, which is the gold standard form of STV, in that it is genuinely candidate-based. Most foreign analysts (correctly) think of “bastardized STV” as being party-list in character. I have spent my last five years campaigning, so far unsuccessfully, to persuade our politicians to get rid of the party-machine-driven contrivances of “bastardized STV”.

So, if Americans want to know how to implement STV they should go to Ireland, Malta, or to Australia’s island state of Tasmania. Don’t go to the Australian Electoral Commission. All they would give you is propaganda designed to persuade you that Australia’s Senate has a good voting system. In truth, it is awful, a blot on the landscape of our democracy.

Australia’s Senate is, however, more democratic than the US Senate – because it chances to be better apportioned. There are 15 New South Wales persons for every Tasmanian, but they have the same number of senators. As Mulroy correctly notes on page 53 there are 66 Californians for every American living in Wyoming – but California and Wyoming have the same number of senators. How can anyone seriously argue that the US Senate is a shining example of democracy in action?

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