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Does Partisanship Stop at Scandal's Edge? Partisan Resiliency and the Survival of Political Scandal

Jeronimo Cortina
University of Houston

Brandon Rottinghaus
University of Houston
bjrottinghaus@uh.edu

The outbreak of political scandal depresses the approval ratings of the individuals involved, especially the president. Yet, less is known about the partisan effects of approval ratings during scandal, especially the "stickiness" of partisan ties to leaders involved in scandal. Using a survey experiment, we expose respondents to manufactured news coverage of both illegal and not illegal (mismanaged policy) activities involving President Obama. The results demonstrate that the President's co-partisans are more likely to approve of the President and less likely to desire to impeach the president, even after being informed about illegal activity. In contrast, out partisans are more likely to demand the President's impeachment for both illegal and not illegal activity. This article provides evidence of how partisanship persists (and even expands) during presidential scandals and how partisan linkages are important to surviving scandal.

Political scandals can have impacts that are minor and short-lived or major and long term, depending on the issues and players involved. The character of executives as revealed through scandal is consequential to American politics and can inform us about the governing style and public accountability of an elected executive. Pfiffner (2004) argues that "there is a widespread consensus in American politics that presidential character is just as important as intellect, organizational abilities, television presence, or effective public speaking" (6). Variations and violations of the implicit oath of reasonable harmony and clean governing are not tolerated by voters. Fousek and Wasserman (2010) argue that "the public has continued to demand ethical leadership from its elected representatives. This is particularly true of the president, who sits at the pinnacle of government and sets the moral tone for the executive branch" (2). Such character issues are associated with political responsiveness to the public, political judgments, fidelity to ones convictions and democratic legitimacy (Galston 2010). Scandals, and the events that precipitate or follow, have the potential to damage these often delicate relationships, especially in the aftermath of major violations.

Most presidents must deal with some form of political scandal while in office, either involving them directly, implicating them indirectly or those that involve their appointees, nominees or staff. Political cynicism may shape an individual's responses to these scandals (Dancey 2012). Certain types of scandal may affect public support differently than others and scandals that happened longer ago in time may have fewer consequences in declining approval than those that happened more recently (Doherty, Dowling and Miller 2011). Partisan politics plays a major role in the survival of scandal. Scholars have shown the key to surviving these affairs include public support and the ability to withstand an impeachment process as measured by the co-partisan base of legislative support (Rottinghaus 2014). Partisan politics clearly affects the politics of scandal as favorable partisans provide a soft cushion of support for a candidate

embroiled in wrongdoing (Ginsberg and Shefter 1999; Shah, et al. 2002; Puglisi and Snyder 2011). The good news for presidents is that they can more easily maintain support of their fellow partisans (Edwards 2006) and, if necessary, persuade their fellow partisans to believe what the president says is correct (Ponder and Moon 2005) especially if the president's actions are viewed as more partisan (Kriner and Schwartz 2009).

We know that partisanship shapes voting behavior and impressions of politicians. Presidential public support is often based on core partisan support (Newman and Siegle 2010). We also know that partisan survival is stronger when a politician has more supporters (especially in the legislature). What we do not know is whether or not partisanship provides a political actor in a scandal with support through both *legal* and *illegal* activities. Do the president's partisans stick with him through all types of scandals? If the president is caught doing something illegal, will the president's partisans abandon him? In short, at what point and for which kinds of political scandal does partisan support become attenuated? In this article, using a survey experiment, we expose respondents to manufactured news coverage of both illegal and not illegal (mismanaged policy) activities involving President Obama. In effect, we want to understand how far partisan support can be stretched to protect a politician from loss of support or removal from office. In the following sections, we outline the effect of scandal on public opinion, describe how partisanship shapes attitudes towards the president, identify expectations of presidential partisan survival, outline the survey experiments to test the expectations and describe the conclusions. In doing so, this paper helps us to understand the dynamics of political scandal and the boundaries of political partisanship.

Public Opinion and Political Scandals

The easiest way to measure reputational damage due to scandals is to examine the decline in public support in public opinion polls. It is not a stretch to say that being associated with a scandal will harm the popularity of a politician, especially an executive. Newman and Forcehimes (2010) argue that negative events, such as scandals, have negative effects on presidential approval. They find that many scandals, including the breaking of the Iran-Contra scandal, the resignation of John Sununu and the exposure of the scandals at the Housing and Urban Development, in addition to other negative events, contribute negatively to presidential approval. An "approval diminishing" event, such as a scandal, combined with no rallying moment to galvanize the public, drops presidential approval by almost 3% (Ostrom and Simon 1989). Although scandals tend to hurt the approval ratings of a politician, the public can distinguish between behavior it believes central to the actor's job and those it considers private (Renshon 2002). In fact, in isolated instances, presidents may actually maintain or even expand their popularity, depending on the specific conditions that are present (Zaller 1998). Prior approval of a politician and perceptions of the importance of the scandal also shape the attitudes of the public. In the case of President Clinton during the Lewinsky scandal, citizens "construct seemingly reasonable justifications" for what they believed and wanted to continue to believe: that the President was an effective leader (Fischle 2000, 151).

Why does scandal affect approval as it does? The degree of elite political cueing (either for or against a politician involved in scandal) has an effect on the evaluation of a hypothetical executive (Woessner 2005). A favorable (or unconcerned) media can frame the issues in a way

that limits political damage. Favorable media attention also has an effect on public judgments. For instance, in the case of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, more media coverage in general is associated with a positive favorability of the President while more media coverage of the scandal is associated with a negative relationship on job approval (Kiousis 2003). More media coverage may also simply generate "white noise" that the public ignores (Lawrence, Bennett and Hunt 1999). Again, the type of scandal matters, where "competence qualities" are more important as an evaluative factor in a candidate evaluation (Funk 1996). Approval is also tied to how the scandal is framed. Shah, Watts, Domke and Fan (2002) note that the "mass approval of Clinton was sustained and encouraged by news content presenting the scandal in terms of attacks by conservatives and critical responses by liberals" in addition to partisan frames about the President's performance. Scandals also have the ability to prime the public's assessment of a politician's policy actions, as intervention in Central America "loomed larger" in the public's assessment of President Reagan's performance after the Iran-Contra scandal broke in November of 1986 (Krosnick and Kinder 1990).

Presidential Partisans During Scandal

We argue the president's partisans are key to their support and their political leadership. Essentially, presidents hope to remain in the good graces of their partisans during scandal in order to maintain a minimum level of public support to stay in office. Active partisan support provides ballast to a president as a means to allow sufficient public support. Party identity is among the stronger predictors of how voters evaluate party leaders or party platforms. Attachment to a partisan group is powerful and enduring, overwhelming several other possible predictors of behavior, and found to be as strong as religion or ethnic attachments (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002). The divergence in affective polarization between the parties, causing co-partisan judgements to be positive and out-partisan to be negative, has been increasing for decades (Baufumi and Shapiro 2009; Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). Political partisan attachments trump other judgements as well. Rosy judgements of fellow partisans are held in contrast to universally negative traits to those in the other party (Iyengar and Westdood 2015).

Partisanship is cemented by what political psychologists call "motivated reasoning" specifically citizens' opinions on policy are influenced by the party sponsoring the messages. Cues from members of a political party activate "heuristic processing" that assist partisans in understanding the party's message and minimizing the need for additional information (Petersen, et.al 2013). In other words, partisans are motivated to reach a conclusion that is consistent with the existing party's message. This cognitive heuristics are more likely to be employed by decision makers when the choice they face is complex.

Motivated reasoning shapes the way individuals "chunk" information and organize their knowledge, attitudes and inferences (Taber & Lodge 2003) into "consistent, meaningful, discernible units and integrate that information with previously acquired information" (Markus et al. 1985, p.1496) in favor of correspondence biases (Nussbaum et al. 2003). When a respondent is confronted with arguments which are "attitudinally incongruent" they are still more likely to based their opinions on prior attitudes, demonstrating evidence of disconfirmation bias (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). There is also confirmation bias where people seek out confirmatory

evidence leading to attitude polarization. Individuals with strong priors and high levels of political sophistication are more likely to engage in confirmation and disconfirmation bias (Taber & Lodge 2006).

Although little work exists that documents partisan support during scandal, work in other elements of presidential leadership of or responsiveness to public opinion provides support to these assertions. Partisan politics can provide a ballast for presidents caught in the web of scandal in several ways. Empirical evidence suggests that partisan cues exert significant effects on political and non-political judgements (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Indeed, partisans rally when presidents speak (Welch 2003; Edwards 2003; Tedin, et. al 2011), partisans are more attentive to the president's messages than others (Kernell and Rice 2011), especially recent presidents like President Obama (Milkis, Rhodes and Charnock 2012). Presidential approval is built on partisan approval (Ponder and Moon 2005; Newman and Siegle 2010) and the stability of partisan approval in enhanced with more partisan activity by the president (Kriner and Schwartz 2009).

Indeed, some scholarship identifies the role of partisanship in explaining political support during political scandals. Miller (2013) finds that exposure to scandalous information about a candidate had an immediate negative effect on evaluation, but the magnitude of this negative effect declined over time, especially among the candidate's supporters. Partisanship was a ballast against further slippage in the polls. Similarly, President Clinton was able to maintain his approval ratings (and his job as president) by persuading his supporters that he was still a credible and active political figure and the general public that the fervor surrounding the Lewinsky scandal was politically motivated (Sonner and Wilcox 1999). This may be because partisans are less likely to be attentive to the events of a presidential scandal (Dancey 2012). Partisan cues help in this phenomenon where presidential approval during scandal is strongly affected by elite partisan cues in addition to a priori public support from partisans (Woessner 2005).

Beyond public support, should an impeachment scenario arise, the president can leverage their partisan public support to maintain a minimum level of support and to forestall any possible removal from office. For instance, the president can use his skills to ensure co-partisan members of Congress vote with their party to support him (Edwards 2006; Beckmann 2010). Indeed, presidents have more success bargaining with members of their own party (Peterson 1990; Bond and Fleisher 1990). Edwards (2006) notes slippage in partisan support in Congress "forces the White House to adopt an activist orientation towards party leadership and sometimes devote as much effort to converting party members to support them as to mobilizing members of their party who already agree with them" (176, 272; see also Edwards 1989; Heith 2012, 133). Covington, Wrighton and Kinney (1995) argue that the president can influence legislative outcomes through the party leadership's influence on the rank-and-file members. Partisan support in the legislature has been demonstrated to link to survival of chief executives in office as a way to demonstrate the ability to govern and hold the line against impeachment (Rottinghaus 2014). Hinojosa and Perez-Linan (2006) note for presidents, where "popular presidents are more capable of enduring accusations, while declining presidential approval typically provides a strong signal for legislators to defect from the president's camp" (655).

From Inside the White House

Internal White House discussions during scandal often point to support from the political base as a means to survive a scandal. All administrations can hope to control is their own party, and even this fete is difficult to pull off, even for a unified White House. In an internal White House document from William Timmons to General Alexander Haig where the impetus concerns where the President's partisans stand on their positions about impeachment of the President. Timmons notes that "only friends and possible 'swing' votes were contacted (no opponents)." Indeed, understanding and controlling the president's fellow partisans and keeping them in line may prove helpful in maintaining the president's survival. In a memoranda to Alexander Haig, at that point the acting Chief of Staff of the Nixon White House, only days before the President resigned, a staff member appealed to the Chief of Staff to take a public relations stand to "demonstrate the President's personal strength and resolve as President and also as leader of the Republican Party. This would increase the pressure on those Republicans thinking of jumping ship."[1]

The White House is also concerned about what partisan opponents think. For instance, in the aftermath of the scandal that led to the resignation of President Carter's Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Burt Lance, the President's pollster surveyed the effects of the scandal. Patrick Caddell, the President's pollster, wrote in a memorandum to the President "strongest approval of Lance's resignation came among Independents and Republicans; higher-than-average sentiment that Lance should remain in office was evidenced by those giving Carter an excellent performance record."[2] Even after Senate Committee Hearings, headed by Senators Ribicoff and Percy, conducted an investigation, "a majority of both Republicans (53%) and Carter detractors (58%) approved of the way the Committee had conducted the hearing, with Independents (39%), Carter supporters (40%) and those that think Carter is doing an excellent job (46%) were more likely to disapprove of the Senate Committee members' behavior."[3] Ultimately, Caddell reported "while Democrats were slightly more inclined than either Independents or Republicans to view the President and Lance in a favorable light, differences were apt to be small, and an indication that the affair was not really a 'political issue.'"[4]

Expectations

The previous sections outlined expectations that demonstrate that (1) presidents who maintain partisans support through scandal are more likely to survive the scandal and (2) presidents can maintain that support by engaging in partisan defenses of their actions. Given these past findings, in this section we identify specific expectations with respect to specific (but hypothetical) conditions a presidential administration may find themselves in during a scandal: a

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[1] Richard Nixon Presidential Library, "House Impeachment Proceedings," Parker to Haig, David Gergen Papers, August 2, 1974, Staff Files, Box 111.

[2] Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, "Aftermath of the Lance Resignation." Caddell to the President, November 2, 1977, Chief of Staff, "Caddell Patrick [1], Box 33.

[3] Ibid, page 10.

[4] Ibid, page 14.

policy failure or illegal actions by the president. For a policy failure (but not illegal activity) the president's co-partisans should maintain their support of the president and remain less likely to support impeachment of the president. For an illegal policy activity, when the president is directly involved, the president's co-partisans should also maintain their support of the president and not support impeachment at similar rates as non-partisans. Given the severity of the charges (illegal activity) and consequences (impeachment) we expect presidential co-partisans to rally more to show firm support of their embattled party leader. In general, then, presidents should be able to count on support of their partisans during scandals and more so when the consequences are more severe.

On the other hand, out-partisans (those of the opposite party of the president) should decrease support of the president and be more likely to favor removal from office for the president in contrast to partisans for both of the scandal conditions presented (illegal and legal activity). Given their position as the opposition, being predisposed to oppose a president not of their party and receiving cues from their fellow opposition partisans (Shaw, Watts, Domke and Fan 2002), out-partisans should be more likely to be dissatisfied and disappointed with any presidential action that ends in failure or illegal activity. Although out-partisans can be persuaded to support a presidential policy initiative (Tedin, et al. 2011), the conditions that allow for opposition persuasion require a successful policy and direct persuasion from the president himself. Because the events in question in the experimental conditions here all describe failure, we should expect a negative effect on presidential approval and support for removal from office from out-partisans. However, because we are primarily interested in the president's partisans, we focus our analysis in the following sections on the president's partisans.

This theory yields three specific expectations. Because co-partisans are more likely to exhibit evidence of motivated reasoning (i.e., confirmation and disconfirmation bias) and reject arguments against their party's standard bearer we expect that partisans will be statistically significant less likely to support impeachment of the President when confronted with evidence of clear illegal wrong doing in comparison to out-partisans exposed to the same treatment (Expectation 1). We expect presidential support to be the same among Democrats whether they were exposed to the illegal policy frame or to the control frame (Expectation 2). We expect no statistically significant change for impeachment among presidential partisans when respondents were exposed to the policy mistake frame (Expectation 3).

Experimental Survey Design

In order to experimentally manipulate exposure to the two types of presidential speech formats, we conducted a survey experiment with undergraduate students at a major university in a large state in the southwest. In the spring semester of 2014, student subjects in nine Introduction to American Government classes[5] were surveyed on a range of factual, policy, ideological and political issues. The surveys were done over the Internet using Qualtrics. A total of 1,013 subjects completed the survey. The sample was highly diverse, with a significant representation of African-Americans (13%), Asians (28%), Hispanics (any race 32%) and Whites

[5] Introduction to American Government is a required. The students were given minor course credit for participating in the project.

(38%). We acknowledge the limitation of using a convenience sample of students who may not be representative as well as potential self-selection issues into a particular class. The only problem our sample would have is in the case that the size of the treatment effect would be dependent on certain characteristics (i.e., partisanship for the purpose of this paper) on which the sample has no variation (Drukman and Kam 2011), which is not the case for these data (see Table 2 below).

For the treatment manipulation portion of the experiment, the respondents were randomly assigned to one of three experimental treatment groups: one group was presented with a presidential "scandal" that involved illegal action, one group was presented with a presidential "scandal" that involved legal actions and one group was the control group who read a history of the Chicago Cubs. Random assignment to different treatment conditions ensures that the experimental units – in this case students – are probabilistically similar to each other on average, so any differences in the outcome variable potentially observed between groups are likely to be due to the treatment and not to confounding factors between the groups that existed at the beginning of the study (Fisher 1925, 1926; Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002). After viewing their assigned speech, additional questions were asked to measure their approval of the president. The full text of the random treatments are shown in Table1.

TABLE 1: Scandal Treatments

"Illegal" Scandal Treatment	**"Legal" Scandal Treatment**
WASHINGTON -- Republican congressional investigators have concluded that President Obama is responsible for the failed Fast and Furious gun-tracking operation that was **"marred by illegal actions, poor judgments and inherently reckless strategy."** A federal operation dubbed Fast and Furious allowed weapons from the U.S. to pass into the hands of suspected gun smugglers so the arms could be traced to the higher echelons of Mexican drug cartels. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, which ran the operation, has lost track of hundreds of firearms, many of which have been linked to crimes, including the fatal shooting of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry in December 2010. According to a copy of the report obtained Monday by *Politico*, the investigators said their findings are "the best information available as of now" about the flawed gun operation that last month led to **President Obama being found subject to possible legal action against him.** The joint staff report, authored by Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Vista), Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, the top Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, was highly critical of the President. They found that the President exhibited "repeatedly risky" management and "consistently pushed the envelope of legal investigative techniques." **Such action may be illegal and may find the President himself in violation of several domestic laws about firearm trafficking.**	WASHINGTON -- Republican congressional investigators have concluded that President Obama is directly responsible for the failed Fast and Furious gun-tracking operation that was **"marred by missteps, poor judgments and inherently reckless strategy." Investigators stopped short of calling the operation illegal.** A federal operation dubbed Fast and Furious allowed weapons from the U.S. to pass into the hands of suspected gun smugglers so the arms could be traced to the higher echelons of Mexican drug cartels. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, which ran the operation, has lost track of hundreds of firearms, many of which have been linked to crimes, including the fatal shooting of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry in December 2010. According to a copy of the report obtained Monday by *Politico*, the investigators said their findings are "the best information available as of now" about the flawed gun operation that last month led to **President Obama being charged with failure to adequately oversee the Department of Justice.** The joint staff report, authored by Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Vista), Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, the top Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, was highly critical of the Attorney General. They found that the President exhibited "repeatedly risky" management and "consistently pushed the envelope of legal investigative techniques without breaking any laws." **Such action did not violate any laws but has exposed weaknesses in the Administration's policies to control gun trafficking.**

NOTE: Bold type specifies alteration of language in the "Politico" news story.

The sample provides a convenient way to test the theoretical expectations outlined in this paper. Student samples pose a problem when in the case of an heterogeneous treatment effect – one that is moderated by individual-level characteristics– is contingent upon a trait (i.e., partisanship for the purpose of this paper) on which the sample has no variance (Druckman and Kam 2011). However, as Druckman and Kam (2011) show if the heterogeneous treatment effect is theorized in terms of how it should vary along a specific covariate then it is possible to estimate the treatment effect as long as there is sufficient variation in the sample. In this case the treatment effect will be accurately estimated and with significant confidence (Druckman and

Kam 2011). Table 2 shows the frequency distribution of the outcome, treatment assignment, predictor and control variables.

TABLE 2: Frequency Distribution

	All	Illegal Policy	Legal Policy	Control
Impeach	20%	23%	18%	20%
Treatment Assignment				
Illegal Policy	33%	--	--	--
Legal Policy	33%	--	--	--
Control	34%	--	--	--
Party ID				
Democrat	35%	37%	34%	34%
Independent	40%	38%	43%	39%
Republican	23%	22%	22%	25%
Other	2%	3%	2%	2%
Ideology				
Very liberal	5%	7%	6%	3%
Liberal	26%	25%	26%	28%
Moderate	49%	49%	49%	50%
Conservative	16%	16%	16%	16%
Very Conservative	3%	3%	4%	3%
Presidential Approval				
Unfavorable	12%	11%	11%	14%
Somewhat unfavorable	14%	14%	14%	14%
Neutral	38%	40%	36%	37%
Somewhat favorable	25%	25%	24%	25%
Favorable	11%	10%	14%	10%
Race & Ethnicity				
Hispanic	32%	32%	33%	31%
Asian	28%	28%	32%	26%
Black	13%	12%	12%	15%
White	38%	41%	33%	39%
Sex	54%			
Female (%)		54%	52%	56%

In terms of partisan affiliation, for instance, our data reflects the national distribution among "Millennials" (born 1981-1994). A poll by the Pew Research Center (2012) reports that among millenials, 45% self-identify as independents, 31% as Democrats and 18% as Republicans. Ideologically, almost half of the respondents (49%) self-identified as ideologically moderates, while only 5% and 3% self-identified as very liberal and very conservative, respectively. Given the overrepresentation of Hispanics, African Americans and Asians as identified above, our sample provides a unique opportunity to test for any potential ethnoracial effects that could mediate the relationship between partisanship and political scandals. Below in Figure 1 we assess the mean values across groups and find that there are no significant imbalances across groups.

The scandal in question was adapted from the misbegotten "fast and furious" gun trading scandal during the Obama Administration in 2011 and 2012. The *Los Angeles Times* summarizes federal operation "Fast and Furious" as where The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives "allowed weapons from the U.S. to pass into the hands of suspected gun smugglers so the arms could be traced to the higher echelons of Mexican drug cartels. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, which ran the operation, has lost track of hundreds of firearms, many of which have been linked to crimes, including the fatal shooting of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry in December 2010."[6] Congressional Republicans Representative Darrell Issa of California (Chair of the House Oversight Committee) and Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa (Ranking Member on the Senate Judiciary Committee) investigated the scandal to determine the scope of the failed policy and held a series of hearings in 2011 and 2012. Attorney General Eric Holder was called to testify in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee where he decried the "gotcha" politics (Hennessey 2011). The White House evoked executive privilege to restrict access to certain internal deliberations (Jackson 2012). As a result, the House of Representatives, along partisan lines, held the Attorney General in contempt of Congress for failing to disclose those documents the Committee desired (Weisman and Savage 2012). Although the operation lead to deadly ramifications, twenty individuals were indicted in 2011 on charges of buying high-powered firearms in Arizona to be used by Mexican drug gangs and were sentenced in federal court to 57 months in prison in 2012 (Perry 2012).

There are several advantages to experimentally using the "fast and furious" scandal, the first major scandal of the Obama Administration. First, the event meets the classic definition of a scandal. For instance, Marion (2010) requires that a public figure has been "accused of unethical or immoral behavior" defined as offending behavior or an event "that is disgraceful, shameful or discredits someone" or that transgresses "societal norms, moral codes or values" (11). Thompson (2000) offers a detailed definition which requires that actions "transgress or contravene certain values, norms or moral codes" and that the actions' disclosure might damage responsible individuals' reputations, so that they attempt to conceal the action. For the White House, "by attempting to limit its exposure to the fallout, the Obama administration only helped Republicans build their case that a nefarious coverup occurred" (Barrett 2013). Second, we can experimentally manipulate whether or not the actions undertaken were legal or illegal. This distinction is imperative because it gets at the core of the research question concerning when and

[6] http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/atf-fast-furious-sg,0,3828090.storygallery#ixzz2swxd6BCF

whether or not the president's partisans stick with or abandon him during scandals which are alternatively legal or illegal. Third, the events from "fast and furious" were both domestic and international, spanning the president's presumed policy advantages on issues of foreign policy and national security.

Findings: Does Partisanship Restrict Scandal?

Figure 1 presents the mean values and 95% confidence intervals for our outcome variable as well as for our main confounding variables. Given the experimental design we expect that the differences between treatment groups are not statistically significant. The patterns depicted in Figure 1 confirm that respondents assigned to each treatment condition are, on average probabilistically similar to each other, we would expect then that any observed differences in the outcome variable observed between groups are likely to be due to treatment and not to pre-treatment confounding factors. We begin with a *t-test* to compare the mean values of our outcome variable (i.e., impeachment) between those who were assigned to the policy illegal condition and self-identified as Democrats versus those who self-identified as Republicans, Independents or something else and were randomly assigned to the policy illegal condition. The mean value for the former group is 11%, while for the latter is 30%. Partisans were statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) less likely to say that they wanted the President to be impeached than non-partisans suggesting that even after being informed about the illegal activity partisans kept rallying behind the President (see Table A1 in the Appendix).

FIGURE 1. Balance in Averages of Treatment and Covariates across Treatment Groups with 95% Confidence Intervals



To further test the relationship between partisanship and scandals we fit a series of logistic regression models estimating the probability of impeachment conditional on treatment assignment (whether respondents were randomly assigned to either the presidential scandal that involved an *illegal* action or to the presidential scandal that involved *legal* actions) in comparison to those who were randomly assigned to the control group (those who read a history of the Chicago Cubs). Given that we are interested in knowing if partisans tend to stick with the President under a scandal we interact partisanship and treatment assignment. In addition, we control for ideology (very liberal to very conservative), sex (female = 1), race (White, Black/ African-American, Asian) and ethnicity (Hispanic = 1). Furthermore, to test if partisans "stick" with the president, that is, whether partisans have an unfavorable, somewhat unfavorable, neutral, somewhat favorable or favorable opinion on the president we fit two ordered-logit regression models predicting presidential approval sub-setting the data by treatment, that is, by whether respondents were assigned to the scandal involving. Overall, we expect that partisans will be both less likely to want to see the president impeached and more likely to have a favorable opinion on the president in both scandal treatments.

The President illegal frame is the toughest test of the theory because it presents a clear impeachable offense so we specifically focus on that treatment here. The first model estimates the probability of impeachment when respondents are exposed to the presidential "scandal" that involved an *illegal* action in comparison to respondents who were exposed to the control condition. The results are summarized in Table 3, which presents the estimates of a logit model providing support for Expectation 1. The results show that those who were exposed to the illegal presidential political scandal were more likely to indicate that the President should be impeached ($p < 0.05$), while partisans were less likely to indicate that the President should be impeached but its impact is not statistically significant at traditional levels. The interaction between Democrat and being exposed to the political scandal indicates that Democrats exposed to the treatment condition were less likely in a statistically significant way ($p < 0.05$) to indicate that the President should be impeached. In terms of our confounding variables, ideology works in the expected theoretical direction in the sense that more conservative individuals are more likely to indicate that the President should be impeached but its impact is not statistically significant at traditional levels ($p < 0.10$). Being a female, Black, White, Asian or Hispanic, *per se*, does not have a significant impact on the probability of indicating that the President should be impeached.

TABLE 3: Logit Regression predicting the probability of impeachment for respondents exposed to a political scandal that involved an illegal action

	Coef.
Policy Illegal	0.44**
	(0.22)
Democrat	-0.01
	(0.32)
Policy Illegal x Democrat	-1.16**
	(0.45)
Ideology	0.23*
	(0.12)
Female	0.23
	(0.20)
Black	-0.27
	(0.40)
White	0.01
	(0.27)
Asian	-0.02
	(0.32)
Hispanic	-0.05
	(0.24)
Constant	-1.41***
	(0.32)
Observations	657
PseudoR^2	0.0373
χ^2	25.62
$p > \chi^2$	0.00236

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 2 plots the predictive margins with 95% confidence intervals illustrating the treatment effect of being exposed to the presidential scandal and partisanship. Democrats (black circle) exposed to the treatment condition were 18% less likely than out-partisans (gray circle) to indicate that the President should be impeached. Democrats and non-Democrats exposed to the control condition were 20% and 21% more likely to indicate that the President should be impeached, respectively (see Table A2 in the Appendix for predictive margins).

FIGURE 2. Control Group Versus President Illegal Activity Comparison



Knowing that partisans are less likely to indicate that the President should be impeached given his illegal involvement only takes us half way. In order to test if partisanship restricts scandals we need to estimate the likelihood of "sticking" with the President during bad times. Using an ordered-logit regression, our second tests predict presidential approval conditional on whether respondents were exposed to the presidential "scandal" that involved an illegal action or the control. Table 4 summarizes the results of two models which include party and all the relevant controls that might impact presidential approval. The findings lend support of Expectation 2. The aim of these models is to test whether co-partisanship will hold regardless of treatment assignment, that is, regardless of whether respondents were exposed to the *illegal* presidential scandal frame or to the control frame.

TABLE 4: Ordered logit regression predicting Presidential support

	Policy Illegal Coef.	Control Condition Coef.
Democrat	1.29***	1.42***
	(0.25)	(0.27)
Ideology	-0.71***	-0.70***
	(0.13)	(0.14)
Female	-0.13	0.18
	(0.21)	(0.21)
Black	1.48***	1.14***
	(0.42)	(0.40)
White	-0.43	-0.37
	(0.30)	(0.30)
Asian	0.57	0.56
	(0.35)	(0.35)
Hispanic	0.60**	0.25
	(0.27)	(0.26)
Cut 1	-1.92***	-1.44***
	(0.36)	(0.36)
Cut 2	-0.66**	-0.38
	(0.34)	(0.34)
Cut 3	1.64***	1.74***
	(0.35)	(0.36)
Cut 4	3.66***	3.73***
	(0.40)	(0.41)
Observations	331	325
PseudoR^2	0.136	0.132
χ^2	131.0	127.7
$p > \chi^2$	0	0

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In general, co-partisan Democrats were more likely to have a favorable opinion of President Obama ($p < 0.01$). Democrats who were assigned to the treatment condition were 15% more likely to have a *favorable* opinion of President Obama, while non-Democrats were only 5% more likely to have a favorable opinion on the President after exposed to the illegal frame (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Five percent appears high especially following a treatment where they were told that the president has done something illegal but the non-democrat category includes both Republicans and Independents who may lean Democratic. In contrast, Democrats

exposed to the presidential illegal scandal were 3-times less likely to hold an *unfavorable* opinion on the President (4%) in comparison to non-Democrats (12%) (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities for Democrats (black line) and non-Democrats (gray line) in the treatment condition. Figure 3's pattern shows that Democrats who were randomly assigned to presidential scandal that involved an "illegal" action tend to "stick" with the President during a scandal (see Tables A3 and A4 for predicted probabilities).

FIGURE 3: Predicted probabilities for presidential approval for Democrats and Non-Democrats in the Scandal "Illegal" Treatment Condition



Our next model tests the probability of support for impeachment when respondents are exposed to the presidential scandal that *did not* involve an illegal action (i.e., policy mistake scandal) in comparison to respondents who were exposed to the control condition. Once again we focus on the interaction term between party and treatment assignment. Table 5 shows the results, which provide support for Expectation 3. The results suggest that when there is a scandal that does not involve an illegal action, partisanship does not have a statistically significant impact on indicating that the President should be impeached. In short, the policy mistake scandal has no effect on the President's partisans — they pass off the information as general political attacks that all presidents face. Such information has no effect on their support for impeaching the President either positively or negatively. Moreover, none of the variables included in the model (i.e., ideology, race, sex and ethnicity) had a statistical significant impact on the outcome

variable. Again, even among groups we might expect to favor the President (more liberal respondents, Black respondents, female respondents), a scandal has no clear effect on the perception of wrongdoing significant enough to impeach the president among these groups.

TABLE 5: Logit Regression predicting the probability of impeachment for respondents exposed to a political scandal that *did not* involve an illegal action

	Coef.
Policy Not-Illegal	-0.08
	(0.24)
Democrat	-0.09
	(0.32)
Policy Not-Illegal x Democrat	-0.44
	(0.45)
Ideology	0.15
	(0.13)
Female	0.15
	(0.20)
Black	-0.12
	(0.40)
White	-0.01
	(0.29)
Asian	0.20
	(0.33)
Hispanic	0.15
	(0.25)
Constant	-1.47***
	(0.33)
Observations	662
PseudoR^2	0.0127
χ^2	8.180
$p > \chi^2$	0.516

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Discussion and Conclusion

In answer to the question raised at the beginning of this article—does partisanship restrict scandal — partisanship helps presidents maintain minimum levels of public support. The results of this paper put in perspective the impacts that political scandals may have among partisans and non-partisans and its consequences. One caveat is the limitation of experimental research in the sense that the effects are temporary and treatment-bound in the sense that we experimentally manipulate illegal presidential activity, which may be less than credible to a respondent given that the events may not capture reality. Despite these limitations inherent in all survey experimental work, the results of this paper find that partisans exposed to the presidential "scandal" that involved an illegal action are less likely to indicate that they would like to see the President impeached and removed from office in comparison to partisans who were exposed to the control condition. Moreover, partisans, even after being exposed to a policy failure involving an illegal action tend to support to the President in comparison with non-partisans. Party identification not only "shields" partisans from political scandals but when exposed to one party identification seems to activate partisans' "psychological attachment" (Campbell et. al. 1960) prompting group identity and loyalty (Huddy 2003) manifested by being the group less likely to hold unfavorable views of the President.

Political cohesion among Democrats is developed through the creation of a subjective identity via party identification, which resembles religious affiliation in the sense of not only belonging to a particular political party but in the sense of absorbing the political doctrine of the party (Green at al. 2002) and manifesting it by being supportive of the quintessential leader of the political party: the President. Partisans not only seem to be oblivious and agreeable in looking the other way for potentially illegal scandalous activity but will go as far as to maintain either a neutral or somewhat positive evaluation of the President. In fact presidential support for impeachment declines significantly amongst co-partisans even in the face of reported illegal activity. Race only played an important role in predicting presidential support, not support for impeachment. A plausible explanation may be given by African Americans' sense of group membership and identification (Tajfel 1981) or what Dawson calls "linked fate," which prompts solidarity between group members and thus sticking with the President.

From an electoral perspective our results suggest that the delicate relationship between politicians and voters is kept somewhat intact and does not appear to be significantly damaged by the shadow casted by a political scandal. Partisanship provides political actors in a scandal with support regardless of the legality of the policy itself. The stability of government and the institutional duration of these elected officials is therefore oddly related to the amount of partisanship generated by these scandals. Despite the obvious problem of having a president involved in illegal activity, partisan patterns provide support for a president accused of serious (and likely impeachable) wrongdoing. An important point for future research is to test how partisans react when facing different types and magnitudes of scandals and different potential perpetrators. Clearly, the type, severity and who is involved in the scandal may have different impacts on how partisans process and react to the scandal.

From a normative perspective these findings are problematic because partisans have serious blinders on when it comes to identifying potential problems in the system. Partisans do not see illegal activity as impeachable despite evidence that the events may warrant such an

inquiry. The creeping cancer of illegal activity cannot be removed from constitutional governance if there is no consensus on what the effect of illegal activities should be. This partisan limitation complicates the ability of the system to adequately maintain a separation of powers and enforcement of that balance through impeachment. Madison's worst nightmare was an "uncheckable" power accumulating in a single branch of government. Our findings show that the system's integrity is potentially compromised by partisan limitations on support for clear checks and balances.

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Appendix

TABLE A1. t-test

	Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf.Interval	
Policy Illegal	Non-Democrats	214	0.30	0.03	0.46	0.24	0.36
	Democrats	124	0.11	0.03	0.32	0.06	0.17
	Difference		0.19	0.05		0.09	0.28

Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001

TABLE A2. Predicted Margins Corresponding to Table 3

	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>z	95% Conf.Interval	
Control Condition	0.20	0.02	9.20	0.00	0.16	0.25
President-Illegal Condition	0.23	0.02	10.19	0.00	0.19	0.27
Non-Democrat	0.25	0.02	11.58	0.00	0.20	0.29
Democrat	0.16	0.03	5.90	0.00	0.10	0.21
Control x Non-Democrat	0.21	0.03	7.51	0.00	0.15	0.26
Control x Democrat	0.20	0.04	4.86	0.00	0.12	0.29
President-Illegal x Non-Democrat	0.29	0.03	9.12	0.00	0.22	0.35
President-Illegal x Democrat	0.11	0.03	3.63	0.00	0.05	0.17

TABLE A3. Predicted Margins Corresponding to Table 4 Policy Illegal Treatment

	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>z	95% Conf.	Interval
Unfavorable-Non-Democrat	0.12	0.02	6.41	0.00	0.08	0.16
Unfavorable-Democrat	0.04	0.01	3.76	0.00	0.02	0.06
Somewhat Unfavorable-Non-Democrat	0.17	0.02	7.48	0.00	0.13	0.22
Somewhat Unfavorable-Democrat	0.08	0.02	4.79	0.00	0.05	0.11
Neutral-Non-Democrat	0.45	0.03	15.31	0.00	0.39	0.51
Neutral-Democrat	0.37	0.03	12.64	0.00	0.32	0.43
Somewhat Favorable-Non-Democrat	0.21	0.02	8.91	0.00	0.16	0.25
Somewhat Favorable-Democrat	0.36	0.04	10.00	0.00	0.29	0.43
Favorable-Non-Democrat	0.05	0.01	4.41	0.00	0.03	0.08
Favorable-Democrat	0.15	0.03	6.01	0.00	0.10	0.20

TABLE A4. Predicted Margins Corresponding to Table 4 Control Treatment

	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>z	95% Conf.	Interval
Unfavorable-Non-Democrat	0.16	0.02	7.47	0.00	0.12	0.20
Unfavorable-Democrat	0.05	0.01	3.67	0.00	0.02	0.07
Somewhat Unfavorable-Non-Democrat	0.17	0.02	7.31	0.00	0.12	0.21
Somewhat Unfavorable-Democrat	0.07	0.02	4.36	0.00	0.04	0.11
Neutral-Non-Democrat	0.43	0.03	14.33	0.00	0.37	0.49
Neutral-Democrat	0.35	0.03	11.33	0.00	0.29	0.41
Somewhat Favorable-Non-Democrat	0.20	0.02	8.46	0.00	0.15	0.24
Somewhat Favorable-Democrat	0.36	0.04	9.28	0.00	0.29	0.44
Favorable-Non-Democrat	0.05	0.01	4.18	0.00	0.03	0.07
Favorable-Democrat	0.16	0.03	5.73	0.00	0.11	0.22

Public Attention and Head-to-Head Campaign Fundraising: An Examination of U.S. Senate Elections

William Curtis Ellis
Oral Roberts University
wellis@oru.edu

Joseph T. Ripberger
University of Oklahoma
jtr@ou.edu

C. Douglas Swearingen
John Carroll University
cswearingen@jcu.edu

Does public attention to political candidates impact fundraising margins in U.S. Senate elections? Applying a novel conceptualization of public attention, we examine U.S. Senate elections from 2004 through 2014 and find that increases in relative public attention relate to increases in head-to-head fundraising margins in open seat races. We conclude by asking whether or not all attention to candidates is "good" attention. Evidence from the 2006 Allen/Webb election suggests that all attention is not "good" attention. This race demonstrates that candidates can supply attention-grabbing action that increases relative public attention while stimulating exceptional losses in relative fundraising margins. Further research must clearly theorize conditions under which supplying public attention-grabbing behavior may damage political campaigns**.**

Introduction

Fundraising is critical to campaign success in congressional elections – winners raise and spend a lot of money (Jacobson 1992; Krasno, Green, and Cowden 1994; Grier 1989; Gerber 1998; Epstein and Zemsky 1995; Adams and Squire 1997). Similarly, fundraising success indirectly contributes to election success by scaring away potential opponents (Epstein and Zemsky 1995; Squire and Wright 1990). Thus, if candidates want to win elections, they will engage in fundraising (Krasno, Green, and Cowden 1994). However, our understanding of what drives fundraising success limits the predictability of campaign-fundraising success to *ad hoc* observations of experiential candidate characteristics and structural factors that do not allow for theoretical extrapolations predicting fundraising success during the campaign season. This study explores the key factors of head-to-head campaign fundraising success in an attempt to identify how public attention, as measured by Google Trends search data, can help us better predict a fundamental component of political campaigns.

In House races, empirical evidence demonstrates that candidate experience, name recognition, district population and partisanship, the timing of member retirement, the inertia of campaign successes, and lead-time to establish campaign activity all predict higher fundraising

totals (Goldenberg and Traugott 1980; Squire and Wright 1990; Krasno, Green, and Cowden 1994; Gimpel, Kaufmann, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2007; Swearingen and Jatkowski 2011). In Senate races, the evidence suggests fundraising is reciprocal within elections (Stewart 1989), and factors such as "pivotal status," ideology, and committee positioning increase total interest group and PAC contributions (Grier 1989; Mixon, Jr., Crocker, and Black 2005).

We argue that candidates who gain a "public attention" advantage over their opponent will earn systematic gains in fundraising success, controlling for other factors. Managing public attention fits into the strategy and purpose of political campaigns. Different than public opinion, which captures "what people think," our concept of public attention captures the public's intentional use of personal resources to process information about political candidates. Two conceptual components distinguish this project from traditional studies of campaign fundraising. First, we explore the impact of head-to-head public attention differences on head-to-head differences with respect fundraising. In so doing, our theory and evidence justify strategic political actions or statements that garner the direct interest and attention of the public relative to their opposition.

Second, to demonstrate these components, we tie our conceptualization of public attention to the fundraising literature and provide the theoretical link between relative public attention and relative fundraising success. We then describe how relative attention is measured and present empirical analyses of Senate general election campaigns from 2004 through 2014 confirming the significant impact of public attention on fundraising success. Head-to-head advantages in attention appear to elicit competitive advantages in total fundraising for Senate campaigns generally and even more so in open seat races.[1] While these findings suggest that attention is important, not all attention is "good" for candidates and their campaigns. To illustrate this point, we briefly explore the 2006 Senate race in Virginia between then-Senator George Allen and Jim Webb. We conclude that further research should examine how certain campaign actions and events involving candidates may account for the conditions in which public attention becomes "good" or "bad" attention and how campaigns can strategically supply drivers of "good" attention.

Using Public Attention to Predict Fundraising Success in Congressional Campaigns

In general, we believe the elections and fundraising literature could be expanded in two important ways: by first theoretically and empirically examining factors that may influence head-to-head campaign fundraising, and secondly building theoretical leverage to extrapolate towards fluid predictability of head-to-head fundraising successes during campaign cycles.[2] We define public attention as the *scarce resources—time and other—that boundedly rational citizens willingly devote to processing information about a particular topic* (Ripberger 2011). Though related, it is not the same thing as public opinion or issue salience. Public opinion (at the macro level) denotes aggregate beliefs, predispositions, and attitudes about a particular topic and public attention captures the amount of resources that members of the public spend thinking about that

[1] Replication data is available upon request by emailing the corresponding author.

[2] While Eom and Gross (2006) examine fundraising success, their population is gubernatorial campaigns.

topic. In other words, public opinion taps "what people think," whereas public attention measures "what people think about" (Newig 2004). Issue salience denotes issues that impact the most people (Gormley 1986; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006) or issues people consider to be "most important"(Behr and Iyengar 1985; Wlezien 2005). At times, the two variables are related to one another, but this is not necessarily the case. For instance, an individual voter might have a relatively strong opinion about a particular candidate, even without having spent much time thinking about that candidate. By comparison, another voter might have spent a lot of time thinking about a candidate without having developed an opinion about the candidate. Voters also might consider certain issues to be important when asked, but do not dedicate time or resources exploring the issue. Distinguished from both public opinion – which provides direction of opinion – and issue salience, public attention denotes the active process wherein members of the public selectively allocate limited resources (time and other) towards processing information about a particular signal (or set of signals) while ignoring others (Ripberger 2011). In other words, was a candidate successful in getting her name in the limelight enough that someone was interested in finding more information about her?

In many instances, the signals that compete for and stimulate public attention in the political domain are substantive issues—like the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq, the economy, or global warming (e.g., Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1999; Henry and Gordon 2001; Zhu 1992; Neuman 1990; Wlezien 2005; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Jennings and John 2009). During election season, however, political candidates are added to the list of signals that compete for and elicit attention. We argue that campaigns should try to stimulate attention to, or interest in, themselves vis-à-vis their opponent.

Similar to companies selling products or firms seeking capital investment, campaigns must separate themselves from their competition. In the business world, one way that companies/ firms accomplish this is public information or marketing campaigns, designed to elicit public (or sector-specific) attention. People will not go to the store to buy your product if they are not aware that it exists. Recognizing this, companies and firms compete with one another to elicit the most attention. On average, the company that receives the most attention sells more products (Falkinger 2008) and the firm that captures the most attention attracts the most investors (Mondria, Wu, and Zhang 2010). If this is true of campaigns, then the candidates who stimulate more attention than their competitors will, on average, attract more donors, and ultimately, more money. This logic yields our first hypothesis:

> *(H_1) Candidates with higher relative public attention will raise more money than those candidates with lower relative public attention.*

When considering election campaigns, it is important to note that all elections are not equal. There are effectively two types of elections: races with an incumbent, and open seat races. Compared to races with incumbents, open seat races are unique in that they tend pose a choice between fairly equal candidates (Abramowitz 1988), resulting in high levels of candidate fundraising (Gaddie and Bullock 2000). Likewise, open seat races tend to attract candidates are relatively unknown to potential contributors. Because open seat races often provide the best opportunity for a party to pick up seats (Mayhew 1974),

having an advantage in fundraising is critical to winning (Lazarus 2008). Thus, it may be that open seat races provide an environment where there battle for public attention and financial resources is particularly intertwined. This consideration yields our second hypothesis:

> *(H_2) Candidates with higher relative public attention will raise more money than those candidates with lower relative public attention, particularly in open seat elections.*

Data and Measurement

In order to empirically test the impact of public attention on fundraising in Senate campaigns, the following sections detail an analysis of all Senate elections from 2004 to 2014.

Explanatory Variable – Public Attention

Similar to a Swearingen and Ripberger's (2014) recent study on U.S. Senate election outcomes, we adopt an Internet search-based measure of public attention. To collect these data, we use Google Trends.[3] This decision was made for three reasons: First, Google is the most widely used search engine in the United States. According to *Hitwise*, Google owns approximately 68% of the US market share, as compared to Yahoo, which is the next closest at roughly 14% (Ripberger 2011).[4] As such, collecting data on Google rather than Yahoo or Bing searches yields the largest cross-section to the Internet-using population. Second, the vast majority of social scientists, and scientists in other disciplines such as epidemiology, utilizing search-based measures of public attention have used Google Insights, further validating the data studies (Granka 2013; Mellon 2013; Reilly, Richey, and Taylor 2012; Scharkow and Vogelgesang 2011; Scheitle 2011; Gruszczynski and Wagner 2010; Ayers, Rubisl, and Brownstein 2011; Askitas and Zimmermann 2009; Pelat et al. 2009; Koehler-Derrick 2013; Mccallum and Bury 2013; Ragas and Tran 2013; Zheluk et al. 2013). Finally, we decided to use Google Trends because it is freely available and easy to access, enhancing the ability of future researchers to replicate and expand upon this research.

Collecting data by way of Google Trends involves a two-step process. First, users are prompted to enter up to five search terms or keywords that they would like to analyze. Next, users are asked if they would like to filter their query by geographic location, category, or timeframe (Google Trends dates back to 2004). After the user completes these two steps, Google Trends will generate a dataset that estimates search volume for the specified keywords during the specified time and within the specified region. These estimates, which can be downloaded to a .csv file, represent *relative* volumes that are normalized by region and scaled by dividing the search volume at each point in time (e.g. week or month) by the estimated search volume at the highest point in time and multiplying by 100. The end result is a series of data points ranging

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[3] To access Google Insights for Search, visit http://www.google.com/trends/explore.

[4] According to *StatCounter*, another prominent web analytics provider, Google's market share is much higher, accounting for approximately 81% of the search engine market (Ripberger 2011).

from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the point at which search activity for the most popular keyword that the user has entered was the most intensive.

In order to measure relative public attention, we entered the first and last name of the two major party candidates for each Senate contest as keywords in Google Trends. We then filtered our results by the state in which the campaign was waged and the timeframe of January through November of each election year. After downloading our results, we computed an attention score for each candidate by averaging the amount of relative attention that he or she received between January and November of the election year.[5] Relative public attention, which is the variable utilized in subsequent analyses, was calculated by subtracting the attention score of the Republican Party candidate from the attention score of the Democratic Party candidate.[6] A positive attention margin indicates that the Democratic Party candidate received more public attention than the Republican Party candidate. Descriptive statistics for our measure of relative public attention and the control variables we included in our models can be found in the Appendix.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this study is relative fundraising, which we measure in three different ways. First, we use *total fundraising* based on relative campaign receipts by subtracting the total amount of money raised by the Republican Party candidate from the total amount of money raised by the Democratic Party candidate (in $100,000s), as reported by the Federal Elections Commission (FEC). Second, we disaggregate fundraising into two separate categories —funds received by *individual contributions* and funds received from *political action committee* (PAC) *contributions*.[7] Similar to our indicator for total fundraising, the individual and PAC measures are relative in that we subtract Republican Party candidate fundraising from Democratic Party candidate fundraising in order to construct the measures (in $100,000s). All dollar values are standardized in 2014 dollars. Consistent with previous research, we exclude special elections and races in which one candidate is uncontested (Stewart 1989; Abramowitz 1988), as well as races where Google search volume was insufficient to register a score for both candidates. This left 177 individual Senate races between 2004 and 2014.

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[5] The algorithm that Google uses to estimate search volume is sensitive to sample size. If there are a lot of searches to sample from, Google estimates weekly search traffic over a given timeframe. However, if there is not enough search volume to generate precise estimates, Google estimates monthly rather than weekly search volumes. When collecting the data for this project, Google estimated weekly volumes for most of the races. In those races, attention scores were calculated by summing up the relative search volume for each candidate between the first week in January through the first week of November in each election year and then dividing by the number of weeks in that timeframe. In the few cases where monthly estimates were necessary, attention scores were calculated by averaging across January through November.

[6] We also ran the models using the Democratic candidate's share (as a percentage) or the public attention. The results did not change.

[7] Data for the individual and PAC measures come from www.fec.gov and www.opensecrets.org.

Control Variables

We include a battery of control variables in order to help replicate prior research on Senate campaign fundraising. *Partisanship* is measured as the percentage of the two-party vote that the Democratic Party presidential candidate received in each state in the two most recent elections (Bond et al. 1997). Following Jacobson (1992), *candidate experience* is measured by way of a simple dichotomous indicator, where candidates were coded as 1 if they held any public office prior to the election and 0 if they did not.[8] To code for *open seat* races, all races with an incumbent are coded 0 and races without an incumbent candidate as 1. *State income* was measured by way of Census Bureau estimates of median state income (using 2-year-average medians). As a proxy for *electoral competitiveness*, we utilize Westlye's (1991; 1983) *ex ante* measure of campaign intensity. To control for the number of potential donors in each race, we include the natural log of the *voting-eligible population* in each state (VEP).[9] To control for media attention, calculate the relative share of newspaper mentions for each candidate between January 1 of the election year and Election Day, via *LexisNexis*.[10] Because various scandals may impact fundraising margin, we include a dichotomous measure of scandal, where one equals the presence of a scandal.[11] Lastly, to control for the noise and idiosyncrasies associated with each *election year*, we include dummy variables to mark 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012, leaving 2014 as the referent category.

Methods and Findings

In order to explore the relationship between relative public attention and relative fundraising in Senate races, we proceed in two phases. In the first phase, we estimate three OLS models, each of which is summarized in Table 1 (below). The first model regresses relative fundraising on the aforementioned control variables and serves as a baseline to which we compare models two and three. The second model adds our measure of relative attention to the baseline model. The third model interacts public attention with the open seat dichotomous variable in order to test the conditional hypotheses that the impact public attention on fundraising is magnified open seat races. In the second phase, we look at the way in which these models change when fundraising is broken down by source—individual contributions and PAC contributions. Accordingly, we regress relative individual and then relative PAC contributions on the abovementioned set of variables. Table 2 summarizes the results of our phase two analysis. Each OLS model is estimated utilizing robust standard errors if the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity is statistically significant. Note that these models do not provide a causal estimate of the impact of public attention on fundraising. Rather, they indicate the presence or

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[8] The data on challenger experience come from CNN candidate bios.

[9] The VEP data come from Michael McDonald's United States Elections Project: http://elections.gmu.edu/.

[10] Our search criteria included the candidate names plus the word "Senate". To calculate the relative margin, we subtracted the Republican candidate's percentage of newspaper mentions from the Democratic candidate's percentage. Media attention is significantly correlated with public attention ($r = 0.77$), but not so highly as to suggest multicollinearity. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the models confirm a lack of multicollinearity.

[11] Our scandal measure replicates the LexisNexis-based coding scheme used by Swearingen and Jatkowski (2011).

absence of a relationship between the two variables, when controlling for a number of potentially confounding variables. It is possible (and indeed likely) that the relationship between attention and fundraising is reciprocal--in some cases attention drives fundraising (as we ague above), and in other cases fundraising may generate attention.[12]

[12] Understanding the potential endogenous relationship between fundraising and public attention, we looked for a statistically relevant instrumental variable, including the number and percentage of Internet users in each state. Ultimately, we were unable to find an instrument that was "truly" random and either preceded or co-occurred with public attention (see Morgan and Winship 2015).

Table 1: OLS Models of Relative Total Fundraising in Senate Elections

	Base Model	Attention Model	Open Seat Model
Candidate Factors			
Democrat Incumbent	73.77***	74.29***	90.28***
	(21.34)	(21.74)	(23.37)
Democrat Experience	-36.79*	-36.69*	-40.11*
	(15.18)	(15.40)	(15.77)
Republican Experience	40.13	40.05	40.77
	(21.30)	(21.47)	(21.35)
Democrat Scandal	-36.55	-36.26	-35.06
	(73.31)	(74.38)	(73.55)
Republican Scandal	68.95*	68.91*	71.94*
	(31.70)	(31.83)	(77.44)
Statewide Factors			
VEP (natural log)	9.79	9.69	7.87
	(5.20)	(5.24)	(5.10)
State Income ($1,000s)	-0.47	-0.48	-0.47
	(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.80)
Democratic Partisanship	1.42*	1.44*	1.48*
	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.70)
Campaign Factors			
Electoral Competitiveness	-29.82*	-29.81*	-32.60*
	(12.75)	(12.77)	(12.76)
Open Seat	19.10	19.32	31.82*
	(14.64)	(14.92)	(16.08)
Media Attention	0.56**	0.57**	0.48*
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Public Attention	--	-0.04	-0.16
		(0.31)	(0.30)
Public Attention x Open Seat	--	--	1.69** (0.91)

	Base Model	Attention Model	Open Seat Model
Other			
2004	9.48	9.72	6.63
	(19.35)	(19.61)	(19.85)
2006	-7.09	-6.81	-10.61
	(13.33)	(13.26)	(13.65)
2008	4.01	4.40	1.20
	(12.78)	(12.96)	(12.79)
2010	-31.80*	-31.76*	-35.40*
	(15.27)	(15.40)	(16.14)
2012	-18.02	-18.15	-22.00
	(18.88)	(19.18)	(19.33)
Intercept	-201.91*	-201.30*	-177.72*
	(79.66)	(79.90)	(77.44)
F-statistic	10.39***	9.97***	9.43***
Adj. R^2	0.41	0.41	0.42
Breusch-Pagan	4.10*	4.19*	5.92*
N	178	178	178

*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05; one-tailed probabilities for hypothesized relationships. Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Dependent variable is the Democratic Party candidate's fundraising margin ($100k).

Although we are primarily interested in the relationship between public attention and relative fundraising, it is useful to briefly comment on the base model (Table 1), which validates our data by corroborating previous research. Beginning with candidate-specific attributes, we find that Republican Party candidate experience is positively associated with the Democratic Party candidate's relative fundraising margin. In the context of Stewart's (1989) findings, that one candidate raises more money as his/her opponent also does so is not surprising. We also find that the presence of a Democrat incumbent increases the Party's fundraising margin by nearly $7.3 million. Again, given the built-in fundraising base among incumbents, this is not surprising. A second significant candidate-based variable is the presence of scandal for the GOP candidate. Among the statewide factors, partisanship is the only significant predictor of relative fundraising; the Democratic the state, the larger the fundraising advantage for the Democratic candidate. Finally, among the campaign factors, the base model indicates that Democrats are expected to outraise Republicans in less intense races and when they receive a larger share of the media attention. Overall, this model is statistically significant (F-statistic = 10.39, $p < 0.001$) and explains 41 percent of the variation in fundraising margin.

Though the base model offers important findings that validate the data, the more interesting findings are presented in the public attention and open seat models, which simply add the indicator of relative public attention and then an open seat interaction to the baseline model. In the public attention model the same candidate and statewide factors are statistically significant as in the base model. Relative public attention is not a significant contributor to the incumbent party candidate's fundraising margin.

The significance of relative public attention comes when we interact public attention with open seat elections. Our open seat model, displayed in the third column of Table 1, has the highest adjusted R-Squared (0.42) of the three models. More importantly, the coefficient for the interaction term is both statistically and substantively significant in the expected direction. In open seat elections, a unit increase in relative attention to the Democratic candidate is associated with an expected $169,000 increase in relative fundraising margin. Since Democrats in open seats do not enjoy nearly the same level of relative public attention advantage as actual incumbents (mean advantage of -0.74 for the former compared to 1.66 for the latter), those who can maintain a year-long advantage in public attention can bolster their relative fundraising advantage. Based on this finding, candidates have a clear incentive to look for ways to spark public attention in their campaign, whether through speeches, television appearances, or other means. Doing so means more money, which allows for an advantage in campaign activities, whether they be get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives, field workers, or television ads.

Figure 1: Conditional Effects of Public Attention on Relative Total Fundraising



To put this relationship into perspective, Figure 1 plots the conditional effect of relative public attention on relative fundraising in Senate elections. Focusing on the open seat model, we

see that Democrats who generate the average difference in relative attention are expected to raise approximately $125,000 *less* than their Republican opponents. By comparison, our model predicts that a Democrat who generates significantly more public attention than his or her opponent (by one standard deviation) would raise roughly $1,000,000 more than their opponent. Given that the median Democrat faced a very slight fundraising deficit in our timeframe, the extra money would have been useful for additional advertising or GOTV efforts. For instance, in the 2010 New Hampshire open seat race between Paul Hodes (D) and Kelly Ayotte (R), it was Ms. Ayotte who had the relative public attention advantage (6.7 points, about one standard deviation away from the mean). In the end, she outraised Mr. Hodes by nearly $500,000 and won the election handily.

Having noted the general relationship between attention and fundraising, it is important to think about the kind of fundraising that are influenced by public attention. Do increased levels of relative attention correlate with campaign contributions by individuals, PACs, or both? To answer this question, phase two of our analysis slightly modifies the open seat model in Table 1 by changing the dependent variable to individual and PAC receipts (standardized at 2014 dollars), but keeping the same battery of independent variables.[13]

[13] Correlations between net, individual, and PAC receipts range from a low of 0.51 (PAC, Total) to a high of 0.71 (Individual, Total).

Table 2: OLS Models of Relative Individual and PAC Fundraising in Senate Elections

	Individual Receipts	PAC Receipts
Candidate Factors		
Democrat Incumbent	75.62***	46.90***
	(19.10)	(4.10)
Democrat Experience	-10.05	2.33
	(10.47)	(2.70)
Republican Experience	-11.00	-0.59
	(13.30)	(2.37)
Democrat Scandal	40.52	1.94
	(32.95)	(5.08)
Republican Scandal	55.65	2.62
	(41.44)	(3.77)
Statewide Factors		
VEP (natural log)	4.83	-1.98*
	(4.96)	(0.99)
State Income ($1,000s)	0.28	-0.01
	(0.53)	(0.13)
Democratic Partisanship	1.56*	-0.04
	(0.65)	(0.13)
Campaign Factors		
Electoral Competitiveness	-13.25	-3.98*
	(13.15)	(1.96)
Open Seat	41.59**	23.84***
	(14.33)	(3.05)
Media Attention	0.20	-0.003
	(0.12)	(0.03)
Public Attention	-0.42	-0.03
	(0.22)	(0.06)
Public Attention x Open Seat	1.38**	0.52***
	(0.50)	(0.16)

	Individual Receipts	PAC Receipts
Other		
2004	19.46	1.87
	(16.56)	(3.43)
2006	9.02	1.01
	(14.43)	(3.11)
2008	-0.28	3.15
	(11.66)	(3.04)
2010	-18.22	3.70
	(13.10)	(2.97)
2012	-10.61	3.83
	(12.42)	(2.94)
Intercept	-167.09*	7.14
	(79.22)	(15.26)
F-statistic	12.81***	35.59***
Adj. R^2	0.41	0.75
Breusch-Pagan	57.24***	1.09
N	177	177

*** $p \leq .001$, ** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$; one-tailed probabilities for hypothesized relationships. Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. Dependent variable is the Democratic Party candidate's margin ($100k).

As summarized in Table 2, the more nuanced fundraising models highlight the notion that not all fundraising is the same. For instance, Democratic incumbents tend to receive significantly more individual donations ($7.6 million) than non-incumbents, although their margin of PAC receipts is smaller ($4.7 million). By comparison, Democrats raise more money from individuals in pro-Democratic states, but state partisanship has no impact on PAC receipts. While electoral competitiveness does not influence individual receipts, Democrats raise more PAC money in less competitive races. Finally, from 2004 to 2014, Democrats did exceptionally well in open seat elections, outraising their Republican counterparts on average by almost $4.2 million in individual receipts and $2.4 million in PAC donations, controlling for other factors.

Figure 2: Conditional Effects of Public Attention on Relative Individual Receipts



The important similarity between the two models, though, is that the relationship between public attention and fundraising is similar to the first phase of our analysis. Relative attention is not related to individual or PAC contributions in campaigns where an incumbent is running, but it related to both types of fundraising in open seat elections. Figure 2 shows that Democratic Party candidate that generates only the average amount of attention (-0.74) is predicted to generate $138,000 less than their challenger in individual contributions. An otherwise comparable Democrat who generates more attention than their challenger (by one standard deviation) is expected to raise an expected $900,000 more in individual receipts, which equates to a difference of almost $800,000. By comparison Democrat who generates an average amount of attention is predicted to raise $52,000 less in PAC contributions than their opponent. A similar Democrat who creates a larger attention gap (by one standard deviation) is expected to raise $335,000 more in PAC donations (Figure 3). In other words, increased levels of public attention are associated with increases in both types of fundraising.

Whether examining total fundraising margin, individual receipts, or PAC donations, these findings highlight the relevance of public attention in open seat elections. This analysis reflects the words of Krasno, Green, and Cowden (1994, 459), that candidates "generally have to spend money to win elections". In order to spend resources on campaign activities, candidates have to find ways to raise money. While this may mean hiring additional fundraising consultants or holding more large-donor events, it also includes increasing their share of public attention.

Figure 3: Conditional Effects of Public Attention on Relative PAC Receipts



Discussion and Conclusion

Our findings suggest that public attention deserves greater consideration in the explanation of political phenomena, especially campaign and election outcomes. Through the analysis of all Senate general election campaigns from 2004 to through 2014, we find that there is a strong positive relationship between public attention and relative fundraising. This finding is consistent with the sequential view of campaign processes (e.g., Stewart, 1989): candidates and campaigns that are able to stimulate a competitive advantage in public attention may in turn reap the benefits through an increasing advantage in relative fundraising—including individual and PAC contributions. If people are paying attention to you more than they are to your opponent, you are likely to experience a fundraising advantage. Given the influence of fundraising on election outcomes, this finding makes a substantial contribution to the knowledge of political campaigns. In congressional races, candidates and campaigns should strategically act to draw the public's eye.

Finding that public attention relates to fundraising in congressional elections provides the opportunity to build more dynamic models fundraising success. We suggest that future scholarship leverage this dynamic to address outstanding questions about causality and the candidate-campaign activities that produces "good" vs. "bad" attention. Does public attention generate fundraising, or does fundraising lead to attention? Is all attention "good" attention, or do some types of attention (i.e., attention prompted by a gaffe) hurt fundraising efforts? In-depth investigation of individual races over time with help to answer these questions. To illustrate this point, we briefly examined the 2012 open seat Senate race in Nevada between Shelley Berkley

(D) and Dean Heller (R) and the 2006 Senate race in Virginia between then-Senator George Allen (R-incumbent) and Jim Webb (D).

Beginning with causality, we used the temporal dynamics in the Berkley-Heller race to investigate the "order" of the relationship between attention and fundraising. We selected the Berkley-Heller race because relative attention and fundraising varied rather substantially throughout the course of the race. This variance is shown in Figure 4, which plots relative attention and fundraising (individual contributions) by week from January of 2012 through the beginning of November of 2012. On average, Heller (the eventual winner) received more attention and raised more money than Berkley, but Berkley had several positive weeks, both in terms of attention and fundraising. Though each change in attention/fundraising is interesting, the general trend in Figure 4 suggests that notable changes in attention generally lead changes in fundraising. This is true of increases in attention, which correspond with increases in fundraising in the week that follows, and decreases in attention that are followed by decreases in fundraising.

Figure 4: Relative Individual Receipts vs. Relative Attention in the 2012 Berkley-Heller Senate Race



To corroborate this general trend, we used Granger causality tests to identify the temporal association between the two variables.[14] The tests indicated that relative attention "Granger-caused" relative fundraising (F-statistic = 8.348; p-value = 0.006), whereas relative fundraising *did not* "Granger-cause" relative attention (F-statistic = 0.753; p-value = 0.391). These results are consistent with the causal theory outlined in this study, that attention leads to fundraising. However, it is possible (and indeed likely) that fundraising, and the activities that correspond with fundraising, generate public attention in some races. We expect that the measure and theory we have outlined in this study will encourage future investigation into when and how this might happen.

Moving now to the idea of "bad" attention, the Allen-Web race provides an important cautionary tale for Senate candidates that would do anything to grab attention. To investigate this case, we collected weekly relative public attention and relative fundraising data for both candidates from January of 2006 through September of 2006. During this time period, there is a significant and negative correlation between relative public attention advantages for Allen and relative fundraising outcomes. Figure 4 provides a visual demonstration of the relationship. While there is clearly a sharp divergence in George Allen's public attention advantage and an exploding relative fundraising disadvantage after the notorious "macaca incident," the Allen campaign was consistently unable to turn a maintained public attention advantage into relative fundraising success. Given the importance of fundraising on campaign success, after looking at Figure 4 one would not be surprised that Jim Webb ultimately won this race, upsetting the incumbent Senator. Certainly the 2006 elections were influenced by other factors as well, the

[14] The variables were non-stationary, so the Granger causality tests were done using first differences. Fit statistics indicated that one week was the appropriate lag time for both tests.

anti-Republican mood for example, yet it appears that all attention is not necessarily "good attention." "Bad attention" is possible.

Figure 5: Relative Individual Receipts vs. Relative Attention in the 2006 Allen-Webb Senate Race



A look at the Allen/Webb case suggests that actions and events by candidates and campaigns influence public behavior toward campaigns. It appears the Allen campaign was ineffective at building on existing attention and fundraising advantages throughout the election year. The inability to transform the attention advantage into a substantive fundraising advantage left the challenger, Webb, with an opening to win the race. In our statistical analysis of this case, that we unable to find a significant time-based relationship between the "macaca incident" and the impact of Allen's attention advantage suggests that Allen and his campaign simply failed to provide the type of events or actions to galvanize its consistent public attention advantage. Possibly, because the campaign was unable to turn the public attention advantage into fundraising gains, the presumably negative public attention following the August incident only served to exacerbate the already negative fundraising impact of an ineffective and ineffectual campaign.

This brief examination of a single case suggests that public attention advantages play a significant role in campaign outcomes and deserve further investigation from political scientists. Certainly, understanding the importance of public attention in open seat races is critical given that open seats are the primary source of membership change in Congress, however the impact of public attention on incumbent races must be explored further. Do incumbents have a natural advantage in relative attention and fundraising that must be capitalized on to impact campaign outcomes? When could public attention be a "bad" thing for incumbent candidates? How and under what circumstances do candidate and campaign actions and events capture the curiosity of the public? Answering these questions will not only build on the scholarly understanding of

public attention's impact on political phenomena, but also provide practical implications for political campaigns and consultants. Applying the concept of public attention to political phenomena is an agenda worthy of further examination.

Appendices

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics for Interval-Level Variables

Variable	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum	Std. Deviation
Dependent Variables[a]					
Total Fundraising ($100k)	4.83	-1.36	-452.90	397.61	87.16
Individual Receipts ($100k)	14.19	11.03	-144.36	492.01	69.36
PAC Receipts ($100k)	-0.87	-1.38	-51.34	55.69	22.85
Explanatory Variables					
Relative Public Attention	1.66	-0.19	-73.10	63.64	23.53
Relative Public Attention (open seat)	-0.74	0.00	-42.82	23.1	6.42
Media Attention	2.76	-2.28	-100	100	60.48
Partisanship	48.92	48.80	27.50	72.40	9.32
State Median Income	50,128	49,158	34,733	73,397	8,289

[a] Measured as the incumbent party candidate margin.

Appendix B: Histogram for Relative Public Attention



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The Newest Southerners: Generational Differences in Electoral Behavior in the Contemporary South

Charles Prysby
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
prysby@uncg.edu

Young voters contributed disproportionately to Barack Obama's presidential victory in 2012. In fact, if the electorate had been limited to those over 30 years old, Mitt Romney might be in the White House today. Obama captured 60 percent of the vote of those under 30, compared to 49 percent of those over 30, according to the national exit polls (Schier and Box-Steffensmeier 2013, 86). A similar pattern characterized the 2008 presidential election: Obama won 66 percent of the vote among those aged 29 or less, but under one-half of voters older than 45 (Pomper 2010, 53). The tendency for younger voters to be disproportionately Democratic emerged in the 2004 presidential election. Prior to that, Democratic presidential candidates did not consistently do better among younger voters. In 2000, for example, Al Gore did as well among older voters as he did among younger voters, and in 1992, Bill Clinton did his best among older voters, as did Walter Mondale in 1984 and Michael Dukakis in 1988 (Pomper 2001, 138; Pomper 1989, 133).

If these recent national patterns also characterize southern political behavior, there could be significant implications for the future of politics in the region. Generational replacement could slowly alter the partisan balance in the South, making it more political competitive. A region that recently appeared to be a stronghold for the GOP for both federal and state elections might become fertile ground for Democratic candidates. This study examines this possibility by analyzing generational differences in voting behavior in the South in 2012, using the 2012 American National Election Study data. The 2012 ANES survey contained an unusually large number of respondents (N=5914), yielding a sizable number of southern respondents (N=1906). Even if we restrict the analysis to voters, there still are 1300 southerners, which allows for a more thorough, detailed, and reliable analysis than is the case with any previous ANES survey.

This study addresses three research questions that seem important, each of which has some subsidiary questions:

(1) What is the nature and strength of generational differences in voting behavior in the South? Are young voters significantly more Democratic, as compared to the rest of the southern electorate? What are the political tendencies of older voters? The answers to these two questions are essential for estimating how generational replacement will alter the southern electorate.

(2) What are the sources of current generational differences in partisan preferences? In particular, how much of the difference is due to demographic differences in the composition of the generations? Are younger voters more Democratic simply because they are more likely to be a member of a minority racial or ethnic group? Do younger white voters differ from older ones in their partisan orientations?

(3) What predictions can we make about the future of southern politics, based on the answers to the above questions? What assumptions are necessary to make these predictions, and what are the possibilities that these assumptions might prove to be incorrect?

Previous Studies of Generations and Political Behavior in the South

Several studies of southern politics published in the 1970s and the 1980s focused on generational differences in partisan attachments. Beck (1977) found that generational replacement contributed far more to the changing politics of the region than did partisan conversion of voters; younger southern voters (those born after 1945) were more likely to be independents and less likely to be Democrats, thus producing a dealignment in the South. Cassel (1977) came to similar conclusions, although she only analyzed white southerners born before 1932. On the other hand, Campbell (1977) found both generational replacement and conversion to be important sources of the changing voting behavior of white southerners. Petrocik (1987) attributed much of the decline in Democratic identification and increase in Republican identification among white southerners to changing party loyalties among older age cohorts. Analyzing data through the mid-1980s, Stanley (1988) found that shifts in party loyalty among older and younger native southern whites were comparable in magnitude, but the increasing size of the younger generation contributed more to overall change in partisan loyalties in the region. While these studies differed in their estimate of the contribution of generational replacement to the changes in southern voting patterns, all agreed that newer southern voters were less Democratic in their partisanship.

There has been far less recent research into generational differences in southern political behavior. Nadeau and Stanley (1997) analyzed the relationship between age and partisanship for native southern whites from the early 1950s through the early 1990s; they found those born after 1963 were more Republican than previous generations, although the older generations were more Republican after the mid-1980s than they were earlier. These findings reinforced those of the earlier studies discussed above. However, a more recent study (Knuckey 2010) found that younger southern whites (i.e., those under 30 years old) voted more strongly for Obama in 2008 than did those over 30, although the patterns varied by state, and even younger southern whites voted strongly for McCain in many states. These findings suggest that newer patterns of change might be emerging, with young voters contributing to Democratic, not Republican, growth, but it would unwise to conclude that without more research. The 2008 patterns might be a temporary deviation, not the start of a new trend. A more careful examination of the political attitudes and behavior of the youngest southerners is necessary in order to assess the likelihood of partisan change in the South.

Most of the existing research into generational change in the South has focused on whites or even just native southern whites. The concern of this study is with all southern voters, not just whites. To determine how generational replacement might affect southern politics, it is essential to include non-white voters in the analysis, particularly since they seem likely to be more, rather than less, important for future electoral behavior. In fact, one aim of this study is to determine how much change in southern voting patterns is likely to occur because of demographic differences across generations and how much because of change in attitudes across generations within each racial/ethnic group.

Defining Generations

Different studies have defined generations differently. Conceptually, a generation refers to an age cohort that has similar experiences, especially in the formative political years of its members, which are generally considered to be adolescence and early adulthood (Jennings and Niemi 1981, 3-9). For example, southerners who were teenagers or young adults during the 1950s and 1960s, and therefore experienced the civil rights movement in their formative years, would be expected to have different political attitudes from those who were born later. However, it is difficult to establish precise boundaries for any particular generation. Baby boomers are typically defined as those born between 1946 and the early 1960s, for example, but the difference in the political socialization experiences of someone born in 1944 would differ little from someone born in 1946. With that in mind, the following four generations are defined as follows:

Millennials: Those 18 to 32 years of age in 2012. These individuals were born between 1980 and 1994, and they entered the electorate (i.e., turned 18) between 1998 and 2012. This definition of millennials is somewhat broader than the one most often used, which refers to those who turned 18 in this century, which began either in 2000 or 2001, depending on how one counts centuries (Howe and Strauss 2000). However, some analysts use an earlier starting date for this generation. A Pew study defined millennials as those born in 1980 or later, for example (Pew Research Center 2010). The broader definition used in this study is justified largely because those in their early 30s are more similar in their voting behavior to younger voters than to older ones. This generation constitutes 26 percent of all southerners and 21 percent of southern voters in the 2012 ANES survey.

Generation X: Those 33 to 49 years of age in 2012. These individuals were born between 1963 and 1979, and they entered the electorate between 1981 and 1997. Various age boundaries have been used in the popular media to define this generation. All agree that it follows the baby boomer generation, but some commentators define the end of the baby boomers as early as 1961, while other place it later in the 1960s (Miller 2011). The end of this generation often is defined as those born in the early 1980s, but this study establishes an earlier end, partly because those born between 1980 and 1982 are more politically similar to those born later than they are to those born earlier. This definition of generation X creates a 17-year span, which is similar in length to the age span for millennials (15 years). In the 2012 ANES survey, generation X accounts for 27 percent of all southerners and 28 percent of southern voters.

Boomers: Those between 50 and 66 years of age in 2012. These individuals were born between 1946 and 1962, and they entered the electorate between 1967 and 1980.[1] The post-World War II Baby Boomer generation usually is defined as those born between 1946 and the early 1960s, so this definition is consistent with most other ones, and it creates an age span for this group of 17 years, the same as that for generation X. Boomers make up 30 percent of all southerners and 32 percent of southern voters in the 2012 ANES survey.

Seniors: Those at least 67 years old in 2012. These individuals were born no later than 1945, and they entered the electorate before 1967. This is the smallest of the four generations, but even here, we have about 320 total respondents and about 250 voters, which are sufficient Ns for the analysis. This generation has a greater age span than for the other three generations, but most of the voters in this group are between 67 and 80; only about 15 percent were older than 80 in 2012. In the 2012 ANES survey, 17 percent of southerners and 19 percent of southern voters are seniors.

We should keep in mind that the definitions of the four generations are somewhat

arbitrary and that the terms used to refer to these four generations are shorthand notations that are not precise descriptions. While accounts in the popular media may give the impression that sharp differences exist across generational boundaries, that probably is not the case. The youngest seniors are likely to be not much different from the oldest baby boomers. Similarly, the oldest millennials are unlikely to differ significantly from the very youngest members of generation X, regardless of what birth year is used to define the start of the millennial generation. The fact that there are no precise boundaries for the generations does not present any problems for this study. The goal here is to compare younger and older voters so that we can understand what impact generational replacement may have on southern politics, and these data are fine for that purpose.

Voting Behavior and Partisanship of the Generations

Table 1 shows the 2012 presidential vote for the four generations of southern voters defined above. Whether we look at all voters or just major-party voters, millennials were about 20 percentage points more Democratic than seniors and over 10 points more Democratic than the middle two generations.[2] Millennials were more likely to vote for a minor party candidate, as we might expect, but the minor party vote was still quite small for this group. The most interesting finding in this analysis is that the millennials are the most Democratic and the seniors the least so. Since the seniors are the group of voters most likely to leave the electorate in the future, and the millennials are likely to be the most representative of those entering the electorate, the contrast between these two groups provides useful information about how southern voting patterns might change over time.

Table 1
Presidential Vote in the South by Generation, 2012

	Generation			
Presidential Vote	Millennials	Generation X	Boomers	Seniors
All Voters:				
% Obama	60.1	49.4	49.8	39.8
% Romney	35.5	46.3	48.8	59.0
% Other	4.4	4.2	1.4	1.2
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(273)	(356)	(414)	(251)
Major Party Voters:				
% Obama	62.8	51.6	50.5	40.3
% Romney	37.2	48.4	49.5	59.7
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(261)	(341)	(408)	(248)

Note: See the text for the definition of the generations.
Source: 2012 American National Election Study.

Examining presidential voting could be misleading. Possibly, the strong vote for Obama among younger voters represents the appeal of a particular candidate, not a general inclination to vote Democratic. In order to investigate this possibility, we can look at two other measures of partisanship: congressional vote and party identification. Table 2 presents the 2012 congressional vote by generation. What we find is that all generations were less likely to vote Democratic in the House elections than they were in the presidential election, but generational differences remain: millennials are about 14 percentage points more Democratic than seniors and about several points more Democratic than the middle two age groups. The generational differences for House elections are smaller than those for the presidential election, suggesting that some of the differences observed for the presidential election represent a particular appeal that Obama had to younger voters.

Table 2
Congressional Vote in the South by Generation, 2012

	Generation			
Congressional Vote	Millennials	Generation X	Boomers	Seniors
% Democrat	47.3	41.7	44.5	33.6
% Republican	49.5	53.4	53.8	65.9
% Other	3.2	4.9	1.7	0.5
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(188)	(309)	(357)	(217)

Note: See the text for the definition of the generations.
Source: 2012 American National Election Study.

Table 3 shows the party identification for each generation of voters. To make comparisons easier, party identification has been collapsed in two different ways, each creating three categories: Democrats, independent, and Republicans. In one case, the independent leaners are included with the Democrats or Republicans; in the other case, the independent leaners are included with the pure independents. Regardless of which grouping we examine, the conclusions are similar. Millennials are substantially more Democratic than seniors (14 to 20 points more so, depending on the grouping), and they are not more likely to identify as independents, which might be a little surprising.[3] Millennials also are significantly more Democratic than generation X or boomer voters; in fact, the differences here are stronger than they are for presidential or congressional voting. Thus, millennial voters in 2012 were truly more Democratic in their overall partisan orientations than the other generations, especially seniors.

Table 3
Party Identification in the South by Generation, All Voters, 2012

	Generation			
Party Identification	Millennials	Generation X	Boomers	Seniors
% Strong Democrat	23.4	21.0	25.7	26.0
% Weak Democrat	25.3	13.0	7.3	8.4
% Independent Democrat	10.3	13.3	12.1	4.8
% Independent	5.5	7.4	10.9	8.0
% Independent Republican	11.7	10.2	14.0	16.0
% Weak Republican	10.6	15.0	12.1	10.4
% Strong Republican	13.2	20.1	17.9	26.4
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(273)	(353)	(413)	(250)
Collapsed Party Identification				
% Democrat (includ. leaners)	59.0	47.3	45.1	39.2
% Independent	5.5	7.4	10.9	8.0
% Republican (includ. leaners)	35.5	45.3	44.0	52.8
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Collapsed Party Identification				
% Democrat	48.7	34.0	33.0	34.4
% Independent (incl. leaners)	27.5	30.9	37.0	28.8
% Republican	23.8	35.1	30.0	36.8
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: See the text for the definition of the generations.
Source: 2012 American National Election Study.

One more possibility needs to be considered. It might be that millennial voters in 2012 were so much more Democratic because the Obama campaign mobilized those millennials who were strongly Democratic. Perhaps if we examine all millennials, voters and nonvoters, we would find that they are not so disproportionately Democratic. To examine this possibility, we can look at the party identification of all respondents, broken down by generation, which is what Table 4 does. Among all respondents, the difference between the youngest and the oldest individuals is not as great as it is among voters: millennials are about 7-10 percentage points more Democratic than seniors, depending on the grouping of party identification. The reduction of the difference between these two groups is almost entirely due to the fact that the millennial voters are considerably more Democratic than all millennials, which suggests that one reason

that Obama did so well among younger voters is because the Democratic mobilization effort was particularly effective in identifying young voters with Democratic inclinations and in getting them to vote.

Table 4
Party Identification in the South by Generation, All Adults, 2012

	Generation			
Party Identification	Millennials	Generation X	Boomers	Seniors
% Strong Democrat	18.6	19.6	24.3	22.0
% Weak Democrat	19.4	12.5	8.6	9.4
% Independent Democrat	10.5	13.6	11.9	7.6
% Independent	15.5	11.7	13.3	11.0
% Independent Republican	13.4	13.2	13.7	14.2
% Weak Republican	11.1	13.6	12.4	9.7
% Strong Republican	11.5	15.8	15.8	26.1
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(485)	(514)	(571)	(318)
Collapsed Party Identification				
% Democrat (includ. leaners)	48.5	45.7	44.8	39.0
% Independent	15.5	11.7	13.3	11.0
% Republican (includ. leaners)	36.0	42.6	41.9	50.0
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Collapsed Party Identification				
% Democrat	38.0	32.1	32.9	31.4
% Independ. (includ. leaners)	39.4	38.5	38.9	32.8
% Republican	22.6	29.4	28.2	35.8
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: See the text for the definition of the generations.
Source: 2012 American National Election Study.

Still, even if we look at all millennials, they are more Democratic than the other generations, especially seniors. Furthermore, if we examine another measure of feelings toward the parties, we find substantial differences between millennials and seniors, and we find only small differences between millennial voters and all millennials. Table 5 shows the mean scores toward the two major parties on the feeling thermometer by generation.[4] Millennials are substantially warmer toward Democrats and cooler toward Republicans than any of the other generations, and seniors are just the opposite. Moreover, the difference between all millennials and those who voted in 2012 is modest: young voters were 15 degrees warmer toward the Democrats, while all young adults were 13 points warmer. Even if Democrats are less effective in mobilizing young Democratic voters in 2016, or if Republicans are more effective in mobilizing their young supporters, younger southern voters should be disproportionately Democratic in their voting, and not just in the presidential election. Furthermore, seniors should continue to be the most Republican, and this generation will be a declining share of the electorate as time marches on.

Table 5
Feelings Toward the Parties in the South by Generation, 2012

Mean Scores on the Feeling Thermometer Toward:	*Generation*			
	Millennials	Generation X	Boomers	Seniors
All Voters:				
Democratic Party	57.6	51.6	49.2	46.9
Republican Party	42.5	45.4	48.3	53.8
Difference in scores	15.1	6.2	0.9	–7.1
All Adults				
Democratic Party	55.2	52.6	49.9	47.4
Republican Party	42.7	45.1	48.0	52.9
Difference in scores	12.6	7.3	1.9	–5.5

Note: See the text for the definition of the generations.
Source: 2012 American National Election Study.

The fact that seniors are the most Republican generation seems to contradict earlier research into generational differences in southern politics. As was pointed out above, several studies in the 1970s and 1980s found that seniors were more Democratic than baby boomers. One explanation for the difference in the findings of earlier research and this study probably is the increasing tendency for southerners to bring their party identification into alignment with the ideological orientation (Knuckey 2001; 2006). In the 1970s, older white voters, even those in their 40s or 50s, may have retained their strong Democratic identification, which was established during the Solid South era, even though they were more conservative than baby boomers, and even though they may have voted for Republican presidential candidates. By 2012, these older voters, all of whom would now be seniors, were likely to have brought their

party identification in line with their ideological orientation. Additionally, most voters who were seniors in the 1970s and 1980s were born before most of those who were seniors in 2012, which means that the 2012 seniors had different life experiences on the whole. For example, over one-half of the 2012 seniors were born after 1939, which meant that they entered the electorate after 1960, and thus were adolescents or young adults during the civil rights era.

Sources of Differences in Voting Patterns Across Generations

The differences between the generations that are present in Tables 1-5 could be a result of racial and ethnic differences. MacManus (2012, 56-62) describes how these demographic patterns are changing in the South, changes that have the potential to alter politics in the region. Table 6 shows that there are substantial differences between the generations in their racial and ethnic composition. Almost three-fourth of seniors are white, but only about one-half of millennials are, with the other two generations about halfway between these two figures. Blacks, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans are all more Democratic than whites, both in the South and in the North, so these racial and ethnic differences could be the reason why millennials are the most Democratic generation and seniors the least so.

Table 6
Race by Generation for Southern Voters, 2012

	Generation			
Race or ethnicity	Millennials	Generation X	Boomers	Seniors
% White, not Hispanic	51.1	60.8	65.9	73.6
% Black	31.0	20.0	23.2	12.8
% Hispanic	13.5	15.2	7.0	10.0
% Other	4.4	3.9	3.9	3.6
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(273)	(355)	(413)	(250)

Note: See the text for the definition of the generations.
Source: 2012 American National Election Study.

To determine the extent to which these racial and ethnic differences are responsible for the political differences between the generations, we can look at the voting patterns of each generation with race or ethnicity held constant. Table 7 has these data, and they show that significant differences remain across generations even within most racial/ethnic groups. Among whites, millennials were about 12 points more Democratic than seniors in their 2012 presidential vote. A similar generational difference is present among Hispanics. No such pattern exists among blacks, who were highly likely to vote for Obama regardless of their age. Strong differences exist between millennials and seniors in the Asian and other category, but the Ns are so small that no reliable conclusions can be drawn from these figures. As we can see from the top row of Table 7, among all voters, millennials were over 20 points more for Obama than seniors. Comparing this difference against the generational differences among whites, we can

estimate that roughly one-half of the total difference between millennials and seniors is a result of the difference in racial and ethnic composition, and the other half is due to the tendency for younger whites, Hispanics, and perhaps other minorities (excluding blacks) to be more Democratic in their voting than older individuals of the same race or ethnicity.

Table 7
Presidential Vote by Race and Generation in the South, 2012

Percent of two-party vote for Obama	*Generation*			
	Millennials	Generation X	Boomers	Seniors
All major-party voters	63% (261)	52% (341)	51% (408)	40% (248)
White, non-Hispanic voters	37% (134)	34% (207)	31% (266)	25% (182)
Black voters	93% (80)	100% (69)	95% (96)	100% (32)
Hispanic voters	81% (36)	60% (52)	66% (29)	68% (25)
Asian and other voters	100% (11)	50% (12)	75% (16)	57% (7)

Note: Figures are the percent of the two-party vote for Obama, with the Ns that the percentages are based on in parentheses. See the text for the definition of the generations.
Source: 2012 American National Election Study.

There are other demographic differences between the generations, many of which reflect life cycle forces. For example, millennials are more likely to be students, to be unemployed, or to be unmarried. Seniors, not surprisingly, are more likely to be retired and to be married or widowed. These life cycle characteristics of millennials will change as they age, but that does not mean that millennials will become more Republican as they age. Most research has shown that while that while the intensity of partisanship is stronger among older voters, there is little tendency for individuals to shift the direction of their party identification as a result of life cycle forces (Abramson 1979; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Miller and Shanks 1996). One possible exception might be the effect of change in marital status, which has recently emerged as a significant influence on voting behavior (Ray 2008). Republicans now do better among married voters, so perhaps as the proportion of millennials who are married increases (only 35 percent are married, although another 17 percent have a partner), there could be some movement toward the GOP.

One important demographic characteristic cannot be examined with these data: where the individual grew up. It could be that the greater inclination of younger southerners to vote for Democrats is a result of there being a disproportionate number of young southerners who grew up in the North. Hood and McKee (2010) found that factor to be an important explanation for the support that Obama received in North Carolina in 2008. Unfortunately, while the 2012 ANES survey asked respondents where they grew up, that variable is not included in the most recent release (April, 2014). Until this demographic variable is included in a later release, we

can only speculate on its possible effect.

Having established that younger voters are more likely to vote for Democrats, even when race and ethnicity is taken into account, we now can analyze the attitudes that are behind this behavior. Since blacks are so heavily Democratic, it is better to exclude them from this analysis, as including them might confound the relationships that exist among non-blacks. Table 8 shows the attitudes of the four generations on a number of issues. On economic issues, millennials stand out as the most liberal group in each case, being considerably more liberal than even those in the next oldest generation. Seniors are overall the most conservative generation on economic issues, and the other two generations fall between the oldest and youngest generations in their economic attitudes.

Table 8
Issue Orientations in the South by Generation, 2012

	Generation			
Issue Orientation	Millennials	Generation X	Boomers	Seniors
ECONOMIC ISSUES:				
% favoring more government services and spending	28.2	23.7	21.8	17.1
% in favor of the ACA (Obamacare)	39.6	27.8	33.4	29.5
% favoring government action to reduce inequality	32.1	18.2	19.8	13.6
% favoring more environmental regulation	57.7	51.9	52.8	33.2
SOCIAL ISSUES:				
% believing that abortion should always be allowed	44.7	47.5	43.0	31.3
% believing that gay marriage should be allowed	49.2	41.3	24.5	21.0
RACIAL ISSUES:				
% favoring govt. action for fair job treatment for blacks	34.9	32.2	28.1	31.8
% high on the support for blacks index	36.7	23.9	20.2	21.6

Note: Blacks and nonvoters are excluded from the analysis. See the text for the definition of the generations and for details on the variables.
Source: 2012 American National Election Study.

For the two social issues examined, abortion and gay marriage, millennials are significantly more liberal than seniors, although millennials do not differ much from boomers and members of generation X when it comes to abortion. The more liberal attitudes of millennials on abortion and gay marriage reflect the fact that millennials are much less religious. Over one-third of millennials report that they are not religious, compared to only one-fourth of generation Xers and even small proportions for seniors. Only 27 percent of millennials are regular church attenders, compared to 44 percent of seniors. Millennials also are more likely to say that the Bible is the word of man, not God.

Millennials also are quite different from the other three generations on racial issues. One of the variables in the table is an index of attitudes toward blacks, which is formed from three questions about blacks; this index measures how favorable or unfavorable the respondent views blacks.[5] Similar measures have been used by other researchers, who often term this racial resentment (Aistrup, Kisangani, and Piri 2010; Knuckey 2005; 2011). The other racial issue variable is a question about whether the federal government should take action to ensure that blacks receive fair treatment when it comes to jobs; this variable is a measure of government policy toward blacks. Interestingly, the three older generations do not differ much in their attitudes on racial issues. Seniors are not significantly less favorable toward blacks than others, contrary to what some might expect. Millennials stand out as more favorable toward blacks on these questions and distinct from all three other generations.

These differences in issue orientations and attitudes could be why millennials are more Democratic in their voting. To determine if this is indeed the case, we can look at logistic regressions of the 2012 presidential vote. Three different regression models are shown in Table 9. Model 1 predicts the vote using just party identification, ideological self-identification, and three attitudinal indices, one each for social welfare issues, moral issues, and feelings toward blacks.[6] Because blacks voted overwhelmingly for Obama, they are excluded from this analysis, since there is little voting behavior to explain. This simple model predicts the vote rather well. We then can add in dummy variables for generations, which will tell us whether a voter's generation is related to voting once party identification, ideology, and the three other attitudes are considered.[7] Model 2 shows us that adding generation to the equation does not add any explanatory power to the analysis. The coefficient for each dummy variable (millennials, generation X, and boomers) is weak and statistically insignificant, and there is no increase in either the psuedo R^2 or the percentage of cases predicted over Model 1. Finally, Model 3 includes several short-term attitudes in the equation: evaluations of Obama's economic and foreign policy performance and assessments of the character traits of the candidates.[8] The more complete model does improve our predictive ability, measured either by the psuedo R^2 or the percentage of cases predicted, but the dummy variables for the generations again have weak and statistically insignificant coefficients. The coefficients for party identification and for attitudes toward blacks are much lower in Model 3 than in the other two models, which indicates that these two orientations strongly influence evaluations of Obama, which in turn affect the vote. The conclusion that we should draw from this analysis is that millennials are more Democratic because of their party identification and their liberal attitudes on the issues identified here.

Table 9
Logistic Regression of the Presidential Vote in the South, 2012

	Regression Model		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Party identification	1.097** (.096)	1.103** (.097)	.668** (.140)
Ideological identification	.082 (.130)	.066 (.133)	-.530 (.209)
Social welfare index	.675** (.129)	.671** (.131)	.496** (.188)
Moral issues index	.788** (.161)	.783** (.163)	.759** (.244)
Index of attitudes toward blacks	.407** (.105)	.410** (.108)	.111 (.162)
Obama's economic performance			.809** (.236)
Obama's foreign policy performance			.400* (.205)
Candidate character trait index			1.077** (.219)
Millennials		.141 (.436)	-.505 (.649)
Generation X		.219 (.401)	-.041 (.600)
Boomers		.066 (.356)	-.004 (.584)
(N)	(928)	(928)	(885)
Nagelkerke R^2	.811	.811	.909
% of cases correctly predicted	92.0	91.6	95.5

****p<.01, *p<.05 (one-tailed tests)**
Note: Figures are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Blacks are excluded from the analysis. Seniors are the generation that the other generations are compared to. See the text for the definition of the generations and for details on the independent variables.
Source: 2012 American National Election Study.

The above analysis assumes that the independent variables have similar effects across the generations, but it is possible that younger voters are more strongly influenced by some variables, while older voters are more affected by other factors. One hypothesis is that the presidential vote of younger voters will be affected less by long-term political dispositions, such as party identification or ideological orientation, and more by short-term attitudes toward the candidates and current issues, at least in comparison to the voting behavior of older voters. Older voters are more likely to have deeply held partisan and ideological dispositions, which will make them less influenced by short-term forces. This possibility is examined by running separate logistic regressions for each generation, using the complete model of the vote discussed above (Model 3). The analysis results are reported in Table 10. To simplify the comparison, the two middle generations have been combined.

Table 10
Logistic Regression of the Presidential Vote in the South by Generation, 2012

	Generation		
Independent Variables	Millennials	Generation X and Boomers	Seniors
Party identification	-.314 (.486)	1.012** (.204)	1.273* (.654)
Ideological identification	.335 (.660)	-.872 (.292)	-1.613 (1.133)
Social welfare index	2.128* (1.040)	.200 (.237)	1.509 (1.419)
Moral issues index	1.236 (.859)	.510* (.294)	3.348** (1.304)
Index of attitudes toward blacks	-.871 (.655)	.247 (.201)	1.086 (.794)
Obama's economic performance	2.400** (.986)	.435 (.290)	-.914 (1.837)
Obama's foreign policy performance	.573 (.957)	.593* (.256)	.978 (1.228)
Candidate character trait index	2.528* (1.292)	1.023** (.263)	3.435* (1.940)
(N)	(191)	(527)	(194)
Nagelkerke R^2	.952	.900	.967
% of cases correctly predicted	97.4	95.9	99.0

****p<.01, *p<.05 (one-tailed tests)**
Note: Figures are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Blacks are excluded from the analysis. See the text for the definition of the generations and for details on the independent variables.
Source: 2012 American National Election Study.

There are differences across the generations in the effect of various variables on the vote, although the interpretation of the results is complicated by the fact that for the seniors there are a number of variables that have large coefficients but large standard errors. With this caveat in mind, some conclusions seem clear. First, the presidential vote of millennials in 2012 is not related to party identification, once other variables are included in the equation, which is consistent with the hypothesis discussed above. In contrast, the other generations were strongly influenced by their party identification, even with all of the other variables included in the analysis. Second, millennials were more strongly affected by their assessments of the character traits of the candidates than were the two middle generations, although the comparison with seniors is ambiguous: the coefficient for the trait index is larger for seniors, but it has a large standard error, so the confidence interval for the coefficient is wide. Third, seniors were affected

by their attitudes on moral issues much more than were younger voters. Fourth, millennials were more responsive to economic concerns, including both evaluations of Obama's economic performance and attitudes toward social welfare issues, than were the older generations.

While millennials do seem to have been more strongly affected by short-term attitudes, particularly assessments of the character traits of the candidates and evaluations of Obama's handling of the economy, we should keep in mind that these short-term attitudes are shaped by more stable political orientations, such as party identification and ideological orientations. One important reason why younger voters had more positive evaluations of Obama's performance and more favorable assessments of his character traits, relative to Romney's, was because younger voters are more liberal and more Democratic. Nevertheless, these results suggest that younger voters may be more volatile in their voting behavior than older voters. Shifts in short-term forces that are strongly favorable to Republicans could reduce the Democratic advantage among younger voters in future elections more than would be true for older voters.

Implications for the Future

The findings of this study show that millennials are the most Democratic generation and seniors the least so. It is not just that millennials voted disproportionately for Obama in 2012. These younger voters also display stronger attachments to the Democratic Party in general, and they are not more likely to be independent in their party identification, contrary to what some might expect. Seniors, who constitute the most Republican generation, are certain to be departing the electorate at a much greater rate than the younger generations. Their departure will disproportionately deplete the ranks of Republican voters. Therefore, Democrats will gain electoral strength as generational replacement unfolds provided that two assumptions hold true: (1) the other generations remain about as Democratic as they currently are; and (2) the post-millennial generation resembles millennials.

There are possible reasons why the above two assumptions might not hold true. First of all, the generations examined in this study could become more Republican in the future through: (a) the conversion of existing voters so that they are more Republican or less Democratic than they are now; (b) the net addition of Republican voters to these generations through migration into the South from the North or from outside the country; or (c) the net addition of Republicans to these generations from current nonvoters becoming voters in the future. Another way for Republicans to compensate for the loss of seniors would be by attracting a higher percentage of the post-millennial generation voters.

What is the likelihood of each of these possibilities? Probably the best hope for Republicans is that period effects—developments that have significant lasting effects on the party identification of voters—alter the partisan landscape in a Republican direction. Such effects could be produced by some combination of important political events, the success or failure of presidential administrations, and the behavior of the parties and their leaders. These effects probably would disproportionately influence millennial voters, as many of them are still forming their basic political orientations. If Obama ends his second term with a low approval rating, for example, that not only would benefit Republican candidates in 2016, but also might help shift more lasting partisan orientations toward the GOP. If an unsuccessful Obama administration were followed by a successful GOP presidency, the likelihood of shifts in partisan orientations would increase. Of course, future political developments might benefit Democrats, not Republicans. We can only speculate on the possible scenarios that might unfold, but there have been enough examples in recent decades to demonstrate that predictions about

the future of American politics often fail to materialize because of unpredicted developments.

Apart from period effects, Republican hopes for the conversion of existing voters seem more problematic. One group that the GOP might do better among is the boomer generation. In presidential and congressional voting in 2012, boomers were very similar to members of generation X, but they are more conservative on racial and social issues (although not on economic issues), and they have more favorable attitudes toward the Republican Party, as measured by feeling thermometer scores. Some of these more conservative boomers who nevertheless voted Democratic could be converted to Republican voters, especially on the basis of racial resentment. As minorities become a greater part of the Democratic coalition, some older whites might react by becoming more Republican.

Republican conversion of existing millennial voters seems less likely, absent strong period effects, given that these voters hold relatively more liberal attitudes on economic, social, and racial issues. Party identification and ideology are more closely related now than in the past, and they seem likely to remain strongly related, so it will be more difficult for Republicans to gain support among those who are ideologically closer to the Democratic Party. Furthermore, life cycle effects on the direction of party identification are generally considered to be weak, so there is little reason to think that these younger voters will naturally become more Republican as they age, although changes in marital status could shift the millennials a bit toward the GOP, as discussed earlier.

Could Republicans gain through the mobilization of nonvoters? This study shows that young nonvoters were less Democratic than young voters, suggesting that Democrats did a better job than Republicans in getting their young supporters to the polls. The turnout of young voters will increase as they get older, and an improved Republican effort to mobilize them would at least slightly reduce the Democratic advantage among millennials, although they still would be the most pro-Democratic generation. Republican gains through the mobilization of generation X or boomer nonvoters seem more problematic, largely because it is more difficult to change the voting habits of older individuals, but small gains might be possible. Also, Republicans might make small gains by making it more difficult for Democrats to mobilize their voters through voter suppression measures, such as those that have already been enacted in several southern states.

Republicans potentially could compensate for the loss of senior voters through migration patterns. In the past, migration from the North helped the GOP, and perhaps it could again. Northern migrants to the South, either those coming for an employment opportunity or to retire, tend to be whites who are above average in income, and southern Republicans tend to do well among upper-income whites, so these new migrants could contribute to Republican electoral success. However, future migrants from the North may be less Republican than has been the case in the past. There is some evidence that the most recent northern migrants have been disproportionately Democratic, despite their high income levels, especially in states such as Virginia and North Carolina (MacManus 2012). The growing success of Democrats in northern Virginia and in the Raleigh-Durham area of North Carolina attests to this trend (Hood and McKee 2010). The Democratic appeal to these new southerners presumably is because they are well-educated professionals who are liberal on many issues; also, there may be a sizable number of blacks and other minorities in this group. Unfortunately, the 2012 ANES data do not allow us to identify recent migrants to the South, so this study cannot investigate this question. While more research is needed to develop a definitive description of the political character of the most recent northern migrants to the region, and research surely is necessary to determine what the

future migrants will be like, Republicans in many southern states may find new migrants to be less inclined to support the GOP. Migration from outside the country is an even less likely source of help for the GOP. First of all, most of those coming to the South from other countries will not be citizens, preventing them from being voters, at least until they attain citizenship. Second, most are likely to come from Latin America, and Latinos have been strongly Democratic in recent elections. Even if Republicans improve their appeal to Latino voters by modifying their policies on immigration issues, Democrats are likely to retain an advantage with this group of voters.

Finally, Republicans could compensate for the loss of older Republicans by attracting a large number of voters who enter the electorate in 2016 or later, which we can label the post-millennial generation. In some ways this seems like the least likely way that Republicans could compensate for the decline in the number of senior voters. First of all, the post-millennial generation is projected to have a higher percentage of minorities than the millennial generation; unless Republican are able to drastically improve their appeal to Latino voters, this will work to the advantage of the Democrats. Second, millennials are disproportionately Democratic because they are more liberal than the older generations, and there is little reason to think that the post-millennial voters will be more conservative in their political attitudes than the millennials. However, this conclusion should be qualified by recognizing that post-millennials will be particularly influenced by the events and life experiences that take place during their formative years.

Exit polls from the 2014 midterm congressional elections show the continuation of generational differences, despite the widespread success of Republicans in the South.[9] In Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia, the Democratic candidates for the U.S. Senate ran about 10 to 12 percentage points better among major-party voters under 30 than they did among those 65 and older. Differences were even greater in some states: a 14 point Democratic advantage in Louisiana, a 17 point advantage in Georgia, and a whopping 23 point advantage in Texas (even though a majority of younger voters cast a ballot for the Republican candidate, John Cornyn). Overall, these generational differences were a bit smaller than in the 2012 presidential vote, where there was a 20 point difference between seniors and millennials, but they are quite comparable to the 2012 congressional vote patterns, where there was a 14 point difference. Furthermore, there were three Senate races where the Democratic candidate was the same in both 2008 and 2012 and where there was a contested election in both years, and the difference in support for Democrats between millennials and seniors in 2014 was similar to the difference in 2008.[1] In all three cases (Louisiana, North Carolina, and Virginia), the Democratic candidate did worse across all age groups in 2014 than in 2008, going down to defeat in Louisiana and North Carolina and narrowly winning in Virginia, but the difference between younger and older voters remained. It will be interesting to see if these generational differences persist in 2016.

Conclusion

The findings of this study suggest that Democrats are likely to gain electoral support, albeit slowly and unevenly, as a result of generational replacement. Seniors, who are the most Republican generation, will be departing the electorate over the next few decades. Millennials are the most Democratic generation, partly because more of them are non-white and partly because younger whites are more liberal. These factors suggest that post-millennials, who are just beginning to enter the electorate, are likely to be similar to millennials in their voting behavior. Democrats should therefore gain as millennials and post-millennials become a greater

share of the southern electorate.

Republicans could maintain their current electoral strength by compensating for the loss of senior voters through net gains from the conversion of existing voters, from migration to the region, from greater mobilization of Republican nonvoters, and from winning the vote of the next generation. None of these possibilities appears to be a likely source of significant Republican gains, but they should be monitored to verify that assumption. We should also recognize that how the process of generational replacement plays out will undoubtedly vary across the states, for all of the reasons suggested above. Furthermore, any assessment of the future of southern electoral politics also must take into account the possible impact of important period effects, which are difficult to predict, but cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. Moreover, the outcome of any particular election may deviate substantially from the long-term trends because of short-term forces. Thus, Republicans may do extremely well in a number of future elections, even if their long-term prospects are slowly eroding, as the 2014 election results illustrate. While the direction of change in southern politics may be changing, there is sufficient uncertainty to make the future study of southern politics interesting and worthwhile.

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Endnotes

[1] Because the 26th Amendment lowered the voting age to 18 in 1971, most of the members of this generation entered the electorate when they turned 18, but the older members of the generation entered at a later age. Those born between 1946 and 1950 became eligible to vote when they turned 21, while those born after 1953 became eligible upon turning 18.

[2]The 2012 ANES survey overrepresents the Obama vote in the South. The ANES data have Obama winning 49.9 percent of the total vote and Romney winning 47.4 percent. The results calculated from the election returns are Obama receiving 45.0 percent and Romney 53.8 percent. However, the concern of this study is with the differences between generations, not with the actual vote percentages, so as long as the data are representative of generational differences, the inaccuracy in the actual vote percentages is unimportant.

[3] If we analyze all millennials, including nonvoters, we find that this generation does have a higher percentage of independents. However, independent millennials are less likely to vote, even more so than older independents, so among voters, there are relatively few millennial independents.

[4] The feeling thermometer used by the ANES surveys asks the respondent to place a person or a group on a scale from 0 to 100 degrees, where 0 degrees is very cold, 100 degree very warm, and 50 degrees neutral.

[5] The index of feelings toward blacks was formed from responses to three questions about blacks: (a) whether blacks should work their way up without any special favors, as other minorities did; (b) whether blacks face special conditions that make it difficult to work their way up; and (c) whether blacks have received less than they deserve. The index runs from 1 to 5.

[6] Party identification was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from strongly Democratic to strongly Republican. Ideology also was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. There were a number of voters who did not place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale but who did classify themselves as liberal, moderate, or conservative with further prompting; these voters were classified as slightly liberal, moderate, and slightly conservative, respectively.

The index of social welfare issues combined responses to four questions: (a) whether government services and spending should be increased or decresed; (b) whether the federal government should see that everyone had a job and a good standard of living; (c) what level of government involvement in heath was desirable; and (d) whether or not the government should try to reduce economic inequality. All four components were measured on a scale from 1 to 7. The index is the mean score on the component items for respondents who had at least three valid responses.

An index of moral issues was formed from the following two components: (a) a question about when abortion should be allowed; and (b) an index of gay rights, formed from four separate questions. Both components were measured on a scale running from 1 to 4, and the index is the mean score on the two component items.

[7] Seniors are the base generation for these dummy variables. A positive coefficient for any of the dummy variables for the generations would mean that generation is more Republican than seniors.

[8] Two measures of evaluations of Obama's performance were used in the analysis: approval of Obama's handling of the economy, and approval of his handling of foreign affairs. Each of these items are a four-point scale ranging from strongly approve to strongly disapprove. Candidate character traits were measured by an index that calculated the difference between Obama's mean score on six trait items and Romney's mean score on the same items. For details on this measure, see Holian and Prysby (2014).

[9] Exit poll results were taken from the CNN Web site (http://www.cnn.com/election/2014/ results/exit-polls).

[10] Mary Landreau in Louisiana, Kay Hagan in North Carolina, and Mark Warner in Virginia all were incumbents who ran for reelection in 2014. Mark Pryor in Arkansas also was on the ballot in both 2008 and 2014, but he was uncontested in 2008, so it is not possible to compare the voting patterns in the two elections in this case.

Presidential Agenda-Setting on the Economy during the "Great Recession"

Jeffrey S. Peake
Clemson University
jpeake@clemson.edu

Presidents are often identified as the most significant agenda-setters in the policy making process. However, agenda-setting theory indicates significant limitations on presidential leadership, particularly under certain policy contexts. In order to assess the presidency's capacity to lead the systemic agenda in the context of an economic downturn, I analyze President Obama's public relations efforts on the economy from January 2009 through May 2012. Specifically, I track the amount of attention given the economy in Obama's public speeches and remarks and assess the degree to which they impacted or responded to media coverage of the economy and public concern for and confidence in the economy at both a weekly and monthly level. The findings suggest that the president's attention to the economy was largely responsive to shifts in media attention and public opinion on the economy. This was especially the case with regard to the president's attention to jobs and unemployment. However, Obama's public leadership efforts on the topics of debt and spending directly impacted media coverage and indirectly affected public opinion on the economy.

Introduction

The ability to influence the policy agenda and the broader systemic agenda is an important component of presidential leadership and is of primary importance to the distribution of power in American politics. Presidents are the "principal instrument" for nationalizing policy debates (Schattschneider 1960, 14) and agenda-setting research has emphasized the significance of presidents in setting the national policy agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kindgon 1995). The significance of agenda setting to presidential leadership is apparent when we examine the institutional resources devoted to it by recent White Houses, best exemplified by the extensive communications operations devoted to affecting the broader systemic agenda (Cohen 2010; Kumar 2007; Maltese 1994; Stuckey 2008).[1] Through the "permanent campaign," recent presidents have attempted to lead the systemic agenda using a number of strategies, ranging from nationally-televised addresses to travelling across the country pushing their policies to local audiences (Cohen 2010; Kernell 2007). Such leadership is particularly significant early in a president's term of office, as they translate campaign promises into policy (Bose 2016).

More broadly, presidential public leadership efforts largely focus on two types of leadership: changing public preferences and agenda setting. For a number of reasons, the former has met largely with failure by recent presidents (Edwards 2003, 2009, 2012; although, see Canes-Wrone 2006). However, agenda setting provides presidents with an important opportunity to affect media coverage of their policies, and hence the public's priorities (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011). Despite its significance to presidential leadership, scholars have mixed opinions on the degree that presidents are able to influence the broader systemic agenda (Cohen 1995; Edwards and Wood 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011; Rutledge and Larsen-Price 2014; Young and Perkins 2005). A key finding of the research, however, is that presidents rely on the

news media in their efforts to lead the public, given the degree of influence media have on the public's agenda (Iyengar 1991; McCombs 2004).

The president's reliance on the news media presents a significant challenge, given the fickleness of modern media and their proclivity to shift focus to stories besides the president's priorities. Moreover, media's focus on "soft news" over policy-related "hard news" (Baum 2003) and their emphasis on political conflict increase the difficulty of leading the media (Baum and Groeling 2010). Analyses of the direct relationship between the president's public statements and media coverage indicate that presidents are often unsuccessful in their efforts to lead the media's agenda (Edwards and Wood 1999), although there is some variance based on policy areas (Larsen-Price and Rutledge 2013), prior issue salience, and the strategy employed by the president (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011).

Analysis of presidential leadership of public opinion indicates that the more recent presidents have had a difficult time leading the public (see Rottinghaus 2010), and changes in news media coverage of politics may be one reason (Cohen 2008). For example, the ratings of televised presidential addresses have decreased over time (Baum and Kernell 1998; Edwards 2003), making it more difficult for presidents to reach an audience unfiltered. As they rely on the media to deliver their messages, presidents understand the difficulty this reliance presents. President George W. Bush, for example, routinely complained about how the national press filtered his messages, and in response to this belief, he altered his communications strategy to focus more on local media and audiences (Edwards 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2008). President Barack Obama leveled similar complaints with regard to the media, stating, "In this political environment, what I haven't always been successful at doing is breaking through the noise and speaking directly to the American people…"[2] President Trump has also complained about the media filter, instead emphasizing the use of Twitter and other social media platforms to deliver his message, as well as focusing on what he considers to be less hostile news outlets, like Fox News.

An important theme in presidential agenda-setting research is that policy contexts matter considerably (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; Rutledge and Larsen-Price 2014). When we consider economic policy, specifically, the state of the economy is likely to greatly influence whether presidents are able to lead the systemic agenda or whether they are likely to be responsive to the systemic agenda. Given the overwhelming context of the "Great Recession" during Obama's first term as president, one would expect very limited presidential agenda-setting leadership. Prior research on economic agenda setting, specifically, while covering multiple presidential administrations did not consider the degree to which an economic calamity, like the "Great Recession," might limit presidential leadership. For example, Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake's research (2005; 2011), for the most part, examined the dynamics of attention to the economy from 1980 through 2000. Does the presence of an economic crisis expand or limit the president's capacity for agenda leadership?

The present study adds to existing research by assessing the dynamics of presidential economic agenda setting during the "Great Recession," using similar data and methodology as prior research. I apply agenda-setting theory to President Obama's efforts to lead the media and public during his first term, using data from Obama's speeches and remarks, media coverage of the economy, and various measures of public opinion. The findings are largely consistent with prior research and demonstrate the durability of agenda-setting theory. The findings suggest that the president's attention to the economy was largely responsive to shifts in media attention and public opinion on the economy. However, Obama's public leadership efforts on the topics of debt

and spending directly impacted media coverage and indirectly affected public concern for these economic issues.

President Obama's Early Efforts to Lead the Public on the Economy

Two key domestic issues dominated President Obama's first term in office. Obama's focus on the economy, as will be seen, was primarily a response to the "Great Recession" crisis and the overwhelming public concern for economic issues. The second key Obama priority was clearly an effort on the part of the president to fulfill a critical campaign promise to reform the health care system. On health care reform, while the president was ultimately successful in setting the agenda and enacting landmark legislation (Bose 2016), his efforts to get the public behind his policy failed to alter public preferences on health care. Rather, as Edwards (2012) has shown, Obama's efforts to lead the public on health care did more to solidify opposition among the public than it did to alter preferences toward supporting the president's proposals.[3]

In terms of the economy, while Obama's initial efforts on the federal stimulus were successful, in that they appear to have increased public support for the $787 billion stimulus plan passed in February, 2009 (Rottinghaus 2010: 214-215), public assessments of his handling of the economy (and, thus, his overall approval ratings) decreased steadily during his first few years in office. On a range of economic policies, Obama was simply unable to move public preferences toward his favored policy positions (Edwards 2012), although in many instances early on his preferences were aligned with a plurality of voters (Canes-Wrone and Kelly 2013). Both of Obama's efforts to sell his major policies in 2009 met with little payoff in terms of shifting the public's policy preferences. In fact, this is unsurprising, given the inability of presidents to persuade the American public to adopt the presidents' policy stances (Edwards 2003; 2009; 2010). Does this mean, however, that going public is a defunct presidential leadership strategy, as Edwards (2012) concludes?

Presidential efforts at public leadership may engender benefits with regard to influencing the systemic agenda, i.e., those issues salient in the media and among the public. While the president may be unable to demonstrably shift public preferences on an issue, his or her efforts may place the issue onto the public and media's agendas and have the effect of pushing others in government (most notably Congress) to move on the perceived public problem. A corollary benefit may come if it is evident that the president is responding to the public's agenda, rather than leading it. Here, the perception that the president is doing something about a perceived public problem can serve to help the president move the rest of government to act on the problem, where it otherwise may not.

It is evident that President Obama led the public's agenda on health care and that this success may have contributed to his ultimate legislative victory (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011). Less clear, however, is the degree to which Obama led on the economy, despite a signature legislative success on the economic stimulus in February 2009. When he entered office in January, Obama's agenda was set for him due to the economic calamity that faced the nation as a result of the financial collapse in late 2008. The "Great Recession" dominated news coverage at the start of his term[4] and 79% of the public cited some component of the economy as the nation's most important problem, according to the Gallup Poll. It is clear, then, that on the economy, President Obama was responding to the public's agenda, rather than leading it as he was able to do later in the year on health care. Obama went public to show that he was tackling job number one (the economy), making several trips spanning the nation pushing his economic

stimulus and trumpeting his success following its passage in early February. His efforts had all of the trappings of a typical "going local" effort (Cohen 2010).[5]

Despite Obama's success on the economic stimulus, the economy remained the number one priority of the American public. Media coverage also remained relatively high through 2010, though at times other issues competed with the economy for attention from the news media. Also, public concern for the economy increased markedly early in 2010 and again late in the year. As unemployment continued its march upward, peaking at 10% in October 2009, public concern for unemployment, as a specific economic problem, started to increase reaching a high of 31% as a "most important problem" in the Gallup Poll. President Obama responded with increased public relations and legislative efforts for the extension of unemployment benefits and job creation during the remainder of 2010 and into 2011.

In April 2011 and later that summer, the federal debt became a critical issue in Washington, despite not having registered higher than 11% in Gallup's "most important problem" question over the previous two years. Republicans decided to make funding the government's obligations and the debt ceiling a partisan issue, drawing Obama into a pitched battle over the debt. The conflict over the debt increased coverage of the economy and public concern for the economy increased markedly during the summer of 2011. Specific responses regarding the debt as a "most important problem" also increased, hitting 17% during April and August. This provided an important political opportunity for President Obama to emphasize responsibility in tackling the debt (Canes-Wrone and Kelly 2013), while refocusing attention back to an issue that remained high on the public's agenda: unemployment.

Following the battle over the debt ceiling, Obama shifted his public efforts to pushing his jobs plan. His public relations efforts on behalf of the jobs plan followed a similar pattern that was used for health care reform in 2009, though on a smaller scale and with little legislative success, as it was dead on arrival in the Republican controlled House of Representatives. During August, 2011, Obama travelled to five different states pushing his jobs plan. He followed that up with seven more "going local" trips and a national address before a joint session of Congress in September and five more domestic trips in October.[6] Obama's focus on economic issues clearly shifted from talk on the debt to talk on jobs during these efforts, as can be seen in the data graphed in Figure 1. The data indicate a similar shift by Obama toward unemployment during the first half of 2012, as he geared up for reelection.

While the above discussion suggests Obama led on the economic agenda, determining with some degree of certainty whether or not Obama's public relations efforts on the economy were largely responsive or constituted agenda-setting leadership requires more sophisticated analysis. I start with a basic theory.

Theoretical Expectations

According to Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2011), the president's relationship with the public, particularly with regard to agenda setting, involves both leadership and responsiveness. They argue that existing public opinion and media coverage largely "shape opportunities for the direction and extent" of presidential agenda-setting (79). The president's relationship with the public is affected by the president's ability to "break through the noise" of modern news media (getting the news media to cover the president's issues), such that presidential influence on the public's agenda is likely to be indirect, through the news media. This expectation is referred to as the "indirect leadership hypothesis" (67). The hypothesis rests on the well-established causal link between news coverage of issues and public concern for issues (McCombs 2004). Additionally,

Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2011) argue that those issues that are especially salient to the public and media are likely to engender responsiveness on the part of the president. They refer to this as the "salience hypothesis" (67). Soroka (2002) makes similar arguments for a salience hypothesis in his work on policy agenda setting in Canada.

In line with this salience hypothesis, I expect to find President Obama's attention to the economy to be highly responsive to media coverage of the economy and public concern for the economy. My expectation for responsiveness, here, is due to the context in which Obama was inaugurated: in the midst of the "Great Recession," public concern for the economy stood at 79% in January, 2009. When one looks at a subset of economic issues, it is clear that unemployment is much more salient to the public than are other economic issues, such as the debt and federal spending.[7] In the analyses to follow, I disaggregate the president's emphasis on each of these subsets of economic issues in his speeches and remarks. Given the salience hypothesis, then, I expect to find a very responsive president, in general, on economic issues. However, I expect variation with regard to the separate economic topics, with the president's attention to unemployment being primarily responsive and his attention to debt and spending providing greater opportunities for agenda-setting leadership.

It should be stated from the outset that the context of the "Great Recession" presents a hard test for presidential agenda-setting leadership of the public. While the crisis situation may present an opportunity for the president to push Congress to act, the relationship between presidential rhetoric and public opinion is likely to be responsive, given the salience hypothesis discussed above. That said, any finding of presidential effects on public opinion, given this context, would be especially noteworthy.

Data

In order to test the degree to which President Obama was leading or responding to the systemic agenda with regard to the economy, I first had to come up with an appropriate measure of the president's agenda. Using prior research on presidential agenda setting as a guide (Edwards and Wood 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005), I used presidential speeches and remarks in the *Public Papers of the Presidents*.[8] Specifically, coders read all of President Obama's public remarks, recording the location of the remarks, his audience, and the total number of paragraphs in each document that contained public utterances by the President. The documents included speeches made before a variety of audiences (both local and national), remarks to reporters, press conferences, and interviews. While reading through the documents, coders counted the number of paragraphs uttered by Obama devoted to some aspect of the economy and noted the number of paragraphs in each qualifying document devoted to separate economic categories.[9] The measures were aggregated to the weekly and monthly level January 20, 2009 through June 3, 2012, giving a total N of 176 and 41, respectively.[10]

In Figure 1, I graph Obama's rhetoric on the economy as a percentage of all rhetoric at the monthly levels, separating out remarks on jobs, debt, and a summed category of all economic issues.[11] Figure 1 shows a substantial drop-off of Obama's public attention to economic issues during 2010. This is probably a result of the 2010 congressional midterm election, major events that occurred during that year (e.g., the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico), the president's final efforts on pushing health care through Congress during the year's first three months, and the uptick in attention to foreign policy in the summer of 2010. The graph also demonstrates that a very high percentage of Obama's remarks have emphasized the economy in some fashion. Finally, the data suggest that there may be competition between economic issues. This is

especially clear for the separate economic issues of jobs and the federal debt. Take, for instance, the data from the last half of 2011. Obama's economic rhetoric focused heavily on the federal debt at the same time that the debate over raising the debt ceiling was ongoing in Washington. Immediately following that debate, Obama worked to shift attention away from the debt crisis to his jobs program, and the data clearly show that shift occurring in September.

Figure 1. The Monthly Percentage of President Obama's Public Rhetoric Devoted to Economic Issues, January, 2009 through May 2012.



To measure media attention to the economy, I used the News Coverage Index from the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ).[12] The PEJ data include weekly samples of dozens of outlets from print, network TV, cable, online and radio. The purpose of the index is to "determine what is being covered and what is not—a broad sense of the American news agenda."[13] The measure is superior to prior efforts to measure the news agenda, which are typically limited to a single news outlet (e.g., the *New York Times*, Baumgartner and Jones 1993) or a single media sector (e.g., network TV news, Wood and Peake 1998). Given the recent changes in media, which have made the president's efforts at public leadership more difficult (Cohen 2008), a broad measure of the news agenda using a variety of sources encompassing a wide range of media sectors is important if we are to make conclusions regarding presidential leadership in the "new media age."

The PEJ data are reported as a percentage of the news hole for the top ten story topics for each week. For all of the weeks within our time period (2009 through May 2012), the economy (or economic crisis) was a top-10 story.[14] The economy was the most consistent, ongoing top-10 story for the period, routinely scoring as the top story on the news agenda and among the top two or three stories otherwise.[15] The PEJ data are available weekly and I aggregated them to the month for the monthly analyses reported below.

To measure the public's agenda, I use aggregate responses to Gallup's "most important problem" (MIP) question. Gallup asks this question on a monthly basis so I am able to develop a monthly series, which includes responses indicating the following categories as most important problems: the economy, unemployment/jobs, and debt/spending. I also add all three of these totals to create a single measure for all economic issues.[16] There is no weekly measure of the public's concern for the economy and computing a weekly variable is not plausible when using time series methods.[17] However, as a proxy for the public's concern for the economy, I use the

three-day rolling average of Gallup Daily's Economic Confidence indicator, which combines responses to Gallup's Economic Conditions and Economic Outlook measures.[18] The measure tracks respondent ratings on the health of the economy, as well as opinion on whether economic conditions are improving or getting worse.

Figure 2. The Monthly Percentage of President Obama's Public Rhetoric Devoted to Economic Issues, Percentage of Respondents Citing Economic Issues as Most Important Problem (Gallup), and Percentage of the News Hole Devoted to Economic Issues (Media), Jan. 2009 – May 2012.



I graph each of the monthly measures in Figure 2. Three clear trends are evident from the graphed data in Figure 2. First, the economy was considered the "most important problem" for a *majority* of Americans, according to the Gallup Poll, over the entire time frame, with one exception: October, 2009, when it dipped to 48%. The average monthly percentage of respondents citing some aspect of the economy as the most important problem during the time frame is 66. As discussed above, public concern for the economy was very high (79%) at the beginning of Obama's presidency, well above the average. A second important point is that there is a great deal of variability in both monthly news coverage of the economy and presidential rhetoric on the economy, but attention across the time period was relatively high. The average monthly percentage of Obama's rhetoric that was devoted to the economy is 27.6. The economy filled, on average, 16.3% of the news hole according to the PEJ data.[19] Finally, there is a strong relationship between monthly news coverage and presidential rhetoric on the economy.[20]

Similar patterns emerge in the weekly data. Gallup's Economic Confidence indicator shows strongly negative opinions on the economy throughout the time period; however, there is significant variation around the average of -31.6. There is a strong relationship between Obama's rhetoric on the economy and news coverage of the economy ($r = 0.46$). A similarly high correlation, though negative, exists between Obama's rhetoric and Gallup's Economic Confidence indicator ($r = -0.48$).[21] Simple correlations indicate that the three series representing presidential rhetoric, media coverage, and public concern for the economy co-vary significantly. We require more sophisticated time series analyses, however, to test whether or not Obama's rhetoric is responding to or leading media coverage or public opinion.

When analyzing agenda setting, it is also critical to account for the objective state of the economy. There are a variety of economic measures available at the monthly level, including the

unemployment rate (as reported by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics) and the misery index (which is the unemployment rate plus the inflation rate). I employ each of these measures, where appropriate, to control for the objective state of the economy. There are more limited data available at the weekly level, however. I employ weekly changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) as a control variable at the weekly level (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005).

Additional variables that might influence presidential and media attention to the economy include exogenous international or domestic events[22] and a national election.[23] Measures accounting for each of these concepts are included in the analyses reported below. Because issues compete for attention, focusing events involving issues unrelated to the economy are likely to divert both presidential and media attention from the economy to other issues (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The same is likely for a national election. Elections garner a great deal of presidential and media attention, and the media are likely to attend less to the economy during the election season. Finally, I include a seasonal variable to account for the decreased number of presidential remarks during the December holiday season.[24]

Statistical Methods

I use Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology to evaluate the causal directions of the relationships between presidential rhetoric, news coverage, and public concern for the economy, estimating models that are similar to those reported in prior research (see Edwards and Wood 1999; Wood 2007). Since our theory indicates that reciprocal causation is likely between presidential rhetoric, news coverage, and public opinion, imposing parameter restrictions in order to identify a structural equation model is inappropriate. VAR also allows us to assess whether Obama's speeches impact public opinion indirectly, through its impact (if any) on media coverage of the economy. This is an important consideration, given the significance of the news media to the president's relationship with the public, particularly with regard to agenda setting.

VAR can be viewed as a multivariate extension of the Granger (1969) approach to causal inference. Each endogenous variable, in our case Obama's attention to the economy, news coverage of the economy, and public concern for the economy, is regressed on lagged values of itself, as well as lagged values of the other endogenous variables in the system.[25] Relationships are evaluated by conducting joint hypothesis tests for the blocks of lags associated with each variable. It is appropriate to conclude that one endogenous variable "Granger causes" another endogenous variable in the system when joint exogeneity tests indicate that changes in the first variable in one month (or week) independently affect the second variable.[26]

Following convention (see Wood 2007), I illustrate the direction and duration of the relationships using moving average response (MAR) graphs because the Granger tests are suggestive of an underlying causal relationship and they provide no information with regard to the direction or duration of the relationship.[27] MAR graphs account for positive feedback in the system, an important attribute of agenda-setting processes (Liu, Lindquist, and Vedlitz 2011; Wolf, Jones and Baumgartner 2013). Wood (2007) contends that Granger tests are not definitive evidence of a causal (or lack of a causal) relationship, so it is appropriate to inspect the MAR graphs whether or not causality is indicated by a statistically significant Granger test. It is the MAR simulations that account for the potential for dynamic feedback, which may dampen or accentuate relationships between endogenous variables.

Agenda-setting research should also account for policy and politically related exogenous variables, in order to more effectively control for context (Delshad 2012). I treat the following variables as exogenous within the VAR models analyzing economic agenda setting: events,

elections, a seasonal variable to represent the December holiday season (see above), and the indicators representing the state of the economy (the misery index and, for the weekly analysis, changes in the DJIA). A VAR model with variables treated as a priori exogenous is often referred to as an ARX model (Wood and Peake 1998, 177). Although we cannot simulate the effects of changes in exogenous variables, the VAR models that are reported include coefficients and significance tests for each exogenous variable.

Results

I conducted two batteries of hypothesis tests using the monthly and weekly data series. In the first set, I analyzed the monthly data for all economic issues combined, jobs/unemployment, and debt/spending separately. In the second set, I conduct similar tests on the weekly data.

Table 1. Granger F-Tests for Monthly VAR of Obama's Public Remarks (President), News Coverage Index (Media), and Public Concern for the Economy (Gallup), 1/2009-5/2012[28]

Independent Variable	All Economic Issues (Model 1)	Jobs (Model 2)	Debt/Spending (Model 3)	Dependent Variable
President	(0.037)→	(0.000)→	(0.409)	
Media	(0.092)→	(0.028)→	(0.813)	President
Gallup MIP	(0.511)	(0.292)	(0.965)	
State of Economy				
Events	NEG		NEG	
Elections	POS	POS		
Holiday				
President	(0.145)	(0.201)	(0.834)	
Media	(0.311)	(0.000)→	(0.009)→	Media
Gallup MIP	(0.061)→	(0.064)→	(0.708)	
State of Economy				
Events		NEG	NEG	
Elections	NEG	NEG	NEG	
Holiday				
President	(0.668)	(0.978)	(0.403)	
Media	(0.707)	(0.928)	(0.191)	Gallup MIP
Gallup MIP	(0.000) →	(0.003)→	(0.024)→	
State of Economy	POS	POS		
Events	NEG			
Elections				
Holiday	NEG	NEG		

Note: Numbers in parentheses are *p*-values. The arrows indicate that an independent variable Granger causes the dependent variable at a significance level of .01. POS indicates a positive relationship for an exogenous control variable, whereas NEG indicates a negative relationship.

Monthly Analysis of the Economic Agenda

The VAR results for the monthly data on the economy are presented in Table 1 and Figures 3 through 5. Recall that the Granger tests in the VAR system are only suggestive of a causal relationship, so the results should be interpreted with that understanding in mind. One should closely examine the MAR graphs presented in each of the figures. Taking the analysis covering all economic issues first, the VAR results at the monthly-level indicate limited Granger causation between the three variables (see Table 1, Model 1), which is unsurprising given the low N of the analysis. The tests indicate that public concern for the economy (Gallup MIP) Granger causes news coverage of the economy and that media coverage of the economy Granger causes presidential attention to the economy. The F-tests indicate that the president's speeches have little causal effect on the media or public concern.

The MAR graphs are more encouraging in that they indicate additional significant, but short-lived, causal relationships in the VAR system. For example, the graphs indicate that the relationship between media coverage and Obama's rhetoric is reciprocal (see the graphs in Figure 3, column 1, row 2; and Figure 3, column 2, row 1). There is an estimated brief response of one month by the news media to increased presidential attention to the economy.[29] There is also a corresponding, although delayed, response by the president to an increase in media attention. The president's response is substantively significant, with an estimate of nearly 50 paragraphs of attention following a significant increase in media coverage. Such an increase represents a significant response, given that the average weekly number of paragraphs devoted to all economic issues is about 75. The delayed response is also interesting, as it may reflect the desire by the president to emphasize other issues with the eventual realization that he had no choice but to address the economy (see Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011, 140). The MAR graphs also indicate a reciprocal relationship between media coverage and public concern for the economy (Figure 3, column 2, row 3; and column 3, row 2). The simulations estimate about a brief two percent increase in respondents citing the economy as the most important problem following a significant increase in media coverage. The response by the media to public concern is delayed by one month but endures for about two months.

In addition to analyzing the president's attention to all economic issues in the aggregate, Table 1 also presents results specific to the issues of jobs/unemployment and debt/spending. Recall from above, the expectation here is that the president is likely to be most responsive on the highly salient issue of unemployment, given its close association with presidential approval ratings and reelection prospects. As a corollary, I expect greater opportunities for the president to lead on the issue of debt and spending, given that it is not traditionally a concern of the public.

Figure 3. Moving Average Response (MAR) Graphs for All Economic Issues (Monthly)[30]



The results presented in Table 1 and Figures 4 and 5 lend some support for these expectations. First, for jobs and unemployment, from Table 1, media coverage of the economy Granger causes presidential attention to unemployment, and public concern for unemployment Granger causes media coverage of the economy. The MAR graphs in Figure 4 confirm that each of these relationships are positive—an increase in media coverage of the economy leads to a delayed but significant response in presidential rhetoric (JOBS) on unemployment (see Figure 4, row 1, column 2). Again, the delay is similar to that found by Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2011, 140), who analyzed Presidents Reagan through Clinton. Second, while the Granger tests indicate no causal relationships on the issues of debt and spending, the MAR graphs in Figure 5 indicate that increased attention by the president (DEBT) leads to a statistically significant response by both the media and public opinion (see Figure 5, column 1, rows 2 and 3). Thus, an increase in presidential attention to debt and spending increases media coverage of the economy, as well as public concern for the deficit. The response is estimated to last about two months for both the public and media. Taken together, the results support the salience hypothesis. President Obama's remarks on the debt had a greater impact on the media's agenda and public concern for the deficit; whereas, his remarks on unemployment were largely responsive to media coverage and public concern for the issue.

Figure 4. Moving Average Response (MAR) Graphs for Jobs/Unemployment (Monthly)[31]



Figure 5. Moving Average Response (MAR) Graphs for Debt/Spending (Monthly)



Weekly Analysis

Table 2 presents the Granger test results from the weekly VAR models, with the corresponding MAR graphs displayed in Figures 6 through 8. Taking presidential attention to all economic issues (model 1) first, the Granger tests indicate Obama was highly responsive to both media coverage and economic confidence. Both variables Granger cause Obama's rhetoric on the economy. The Granger tests also indicate a reciprocal relationship between media coverage and economic confidence, as each appears to impact one another.

The MAR graphs presented in Figure 6 provide additional evidence and information regarding each of these relationships. First, the responsiveness of the president is verified (see Figure 6, column 2, row 1; and column 3, row 1). An increase in media coverage of the economy leads to a positive response by the president that endures for roughly three weeks, which is both statistically and substantively significant. The relationship between the president's attention to the economy and economic confidence is negative—such that improving public assessments of the economy lead to decreased presidential attention to the economy over time and falling assessments increase presidential attention. The president's response endures for several weeks. The reciprocal relationship between public opinion and media coverage is also confirmed in the MAR graphs (see Figure 6, column 2, row 3; and, column 3, row 2), and the relationship is a negative one—increased economic confidence leads to decreased media coverage and increased media coverage leads to decreased economic confidence.

Table 2. Granger F-Tests for Weekly VAR of Obama's Public Remarks (President), News Coverage Index (Media), and Economic Confidence, 1/19/09-5/28/12[32]

Independent Variable	All Economic Issues (Model 1)	Jobs (Model 2)	Debt/Spending (Model 3)	Dependent Variable
President	(0.373)	(0.000)→	(0.000)→	
Media	(0.007)→	(0.003)→	(0.247)	President
Confidence	(0.000)→	(0.014)→	(0.352)	
DJIA				
Events	NEG			
Elections	POS	POS		
Holiday	NEG	NEG	NEG	
President	(0.374)	(0.423)	(0.004)→	
Media	(0.000)→	(0.000)	(0.000)→	Media
Confidence	(0.000)→	(0.000)→	(0.000)→	
DJIA	NEG	NEG	NEG	
Events	NEG	NEG	NEG	
Elections	NEG	NEG	NEG	
Holiday				
President	(0.246)	(0.915)	(0.466)	
Media	(0.029)→	(0.022)→	(0.066)→	Confidence
Confidence	(0.000)→	(0.000)→	(0.000)→	
State of Economy	POS	POS	POS	
Events				
Elections				
Holiday	POS	POS	POS	

Note: Numbers in parentheses are *p*-values. The arrows indicate that an independent variable Granger causes the dependent variable at a significance level of .01. POS indicates a positive relationship for an exogenous control variable, whereas NEG indicates a negative relationship.

The Granger tests in Table 2 (Model 2) suggest that the president's attention to jobs and unemployment is responsive to media coverage to the economy and economic confidence. The MAR graphs in Figure 7 (column 2, row 1; and, column 3, row 1) verify that the president is highly responsive in his attention to unemployment, which supports the theoretical expectations. As media coverage of the economy increases, the president's attention to unemployment also increases; and, as economic confidence improves, the president's attention to unemployment decreases. Thus, falling public assessments of the economy increase presidential attention to unemployment and jobs.

The analysis of the president's attention to debt and spending indicate that Obama was able to lead media attention on this aspect of the economy. The Granger tests reported in Table 2 (Model 3) indicate that presidential remarks on debt and spending Granger cause media attention to the economy. Moreover, the relationship between the media and economic confidence is again reciprocal, suggesting that if the president can increase media attention to the issue of debt and spending, he can indirectly influence economic confidence through the media, as well. The MAR graphs in Figure 8 reveal that media coverage to the economy responds significantly to an increase in presidential attention to debt and spending issues (see Figure 8, column 1, row 2). The simulations estimate a corresponding eight percent increase in the percentage of the news hole addressing the economy over a period of five weeks.

Figure 6. Moving Average Response (MAR) Graphs for All Economic Issues (Weekly)[33]



Figure 7. Moving Average Response (MAR) Graphs for Jobs/Unemployment (Weekly)[34]



Figure 8. Moving Average Response (MAR) Graphs for Debt/Spending (Weekly)[35]



Regarding the exogenous variables that were entered into the VAR models as controls, the findings indicate that the state of the economy has little direct influence on presidential attention to economic issues. The lack of a direct effect does not mean, however, that worsening economic conditions do not lead to presidential attention, because a worsening economy increases media coverage and alters public assessments of the economy, which lead to presidential responses. For example, in the weekly analysis, weekly gains in the DJIA decrease media attention to the economy and improve the public's economic confidence. Worsening unemployment also increases public concern for the economy in the monthly analysis. The lack of a direct effect may be a result of weak economic measures (especially the weekly DJIA), or may indicate the president would likely focus on other issues absent a media or public response. Our analysis does not let us make such fine tuned conclusions. As expected, the events series tended to depress presidential and media attention to economic issues. An election season appears to increase overall presidential attention to the economy, particularly in terms of jobs, but not with regard to presidential attention to debt and spending. On the issues of debt and spending, Obama talked less during the election season, focusing more on unemployment, suggesting that Obama was most responsive with his economic rhetoric during periods preceding the midterm and presidential elections. Such responsiveness during electoral periods comports with prior findings regarding presidential congruence and public opinion (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-Wrone and Kelly 2013).

Overall, the VAR results provide additional support for the argument that presidential attention to economic issues is largely responsive to media attention to economic issues, but that the president is most responsive on issues that are especially salient to voters and most likely to impact the president's approval ratings and reelection. Economic issues of lower salience and less tied to presidential approval and reelection offer the president the opportunity to lead the agenda, with the best examples of such issues being the federal deficit, debt and spending.

The results presented above correspond fairly well with the results presented in prior research on economic agenda setting for earlier presidents. To illustrate, Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2005) found that President George H. W. Bush was more responsive to media coverage to the economy than were Reagan or Clinton and surmise that this was largely a result of the recession that Bush had to deal with. While the "Great Recession" was clearly more pronounced, taken together, the results suggest that opportunities for agenda leadership are substantially constrained by the economic context. In the case of President Obama, his economic agenda was clearly set for him with the "Great Recession" at the start of his term; however, pitched battles with Republicans on spending and the federal debt, as well as his own legislative efforts (e.g., the economic stimulus), afforded him the opportunity to influence the economic agenda. Moreover, on issues related to the debt and spending, Obama was able to indirectly influence public opinion through his ability to influence media coverage of these issues. Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2005) found that Clinton and Reagan were also able to lead the agenda on these issues. They argue that this was largely a result of favorable circumstances for each president and the relatively low salience of these issues to the public.

Conclusion

Existing research has established that recent presidents have limited capacity for leadership of the public, especially when we consider leadership as altering public preferences on policy issues (Edwards 2003; 2009; Rottinghaus 2010). Despite this limited capacity, presidents continue to "go public" at high rates (Kernell 2007; Kumar 2007), although their tactics in going

public have changed in recent years as a result of changing political and media contexts (Cohen 2010). Given these difficulties in presidential leadership, why do presidents continue to expend so many political resources trying to lead the public?

The benefits that accrue from agenda setting and presidential responsiveness to demands for action on public problems provide some important answers to this puzzle of presidential leadership.[36] Recent research by Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2011) indicates that the president's agenda is largely responsive on highly salient issues, such as the economy, but even so, there is substantial payoff for presidential efforts at political leadership in the form of maintaining media (and thus, public) attention to presidential priorities and pushing others in government to address key public problems. Their time series analysis on economic issues covers recent presidents through Bill Clinton. I use a similar approach to analyze the first term of the Obama presidency, using different media data and at both monthly and weekly time frames.

While the results of the present study largely corroborate prior research, the analysis is an important extension of this earlier work because of the overriding context presented by the "Great Recession" during Obama's first term. While recessions occurred during the periods studied in earlier research, they were not as profound as what Obama faced. Thus, Obama's first term presents a difficult case for presidential agenda leadership given the place afforded the economy on the nation's policy agenda at the start of 2009.

As expected, given the economic context and high salience of economic issues, President Obama's public relations on the economy during his first term was largely responsive to both media coverage of the economy and public concern for the economy. Obama was especially responsive with his rhetoric related to unemployment and jobs, a highly salient economic issue and one tied directly to evaluations of his stewardship of the economy. This does not mean, however, that Obama was unable to lead during this time frame. His public relations efforts on debt and spending influenced both the media's agenda, and thus indirectly, public opinion. This is an important finding, as prior research (Eshbuagh-Soha and Peake 2005) has demonstrated that issues related to the deficit and spending provide an important opportunity for presidential agenda leadership, given their relatively low salience, generally, compared to other economic issues.

The impact on public concern (positive) and public confidence (negative) that resulted from increased media coverage stemming from Obama's rhetoric on debt and spending present somewhat of a catch-22 for the president, however. When the president attends to economic issues, public concern may increase (indirectly, as a result of increasing media coverage) and public confidence in the economy may decrease. Such shifts in public opinion are not helpful for building the president's political capital, although they might move others in government (most notably, Congress) to act on the president's economic policy proposals. This was clearly Obama's strategy during 2011 and 2012. Even so, this leadership conundrum with regard to public relations on the economy is clearly evident in Obama's public relations efforts.

To be sure, the analyses above may underplay President Obama's success as an agenda leader, especially when we consider the difficult test provided by the overbearing issue of the economy during the "Great Recession." As discussed above, Obama met with successful agenda-setting leadership on health care reform. He was also able to push a major banking regulation package and three important free-trade agreements through Congress in 2010. Obama met with surprising successes in December 2010, following the shellacking Democrats took in the congressional midterm elections, passing an extension of the Bush tax cuts and ratification of the New START treaty with Russia. A key component of each of these policy successes was

Obama's capacity to influence the agenda—both the media and public agendas, but also the agendas of others in Washington. In each of those cases, contexts mattered greatly, considering that the Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress and the presence of unified government increased Obama's influence on the congressional agenda (see Edwards and Barrett 2000). Even so, the results reported here indicate that the president's public relations efforts are a critical component of the presidency's agenda-setting capacity and were a contributing factor to Obama's policy successes during his first term in office.

There are two significant trends in political behavior and presidential use of media that provide future researchers possible avenues of inquiry. The public and much of the media they consume are significantly more polarized today (and during the Obama presidency) than during previous presidencies. With this increase in polarization, we are likely to see differences in how media outlets and the public respond to presidential leadership. Work by Edwards (2012) points to this polarization as one reason why Obama's impact on the public's preferences was muted—Republicans, in effect, tuned him out. This could also carry over to right-leaning media, like Fox News. Additionally, recent trends in social media use by presidents are unaccounted for in the present study, as the measures of presidential attention focus on President Obama's spoken words. President Obama's two campaigns revolutionized the use of social media in presidential elections and he made use of various social media platforms while in office. Such platforms may capture some of what is in the present study (e.g., a speech posted on Instagram would be in the data), but not all, and as the first social media president, Obama made propitious use of the medium. The impact of social media on presidential leadership and agenda setting is certainly worthy of future study. This is especially the case for President Donald Trump, given his habitual use of Twitter to make policy pronouncements. Trump's tweets certainly garner significant media attention; although it is too soon to know what impact this new strategy has in terms of leading the policy agenda.

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Endnotes

[1] Presidents since 1980 average about 400 public speeches per year, compared to about 150 speeches per year during the 1950s and 1960s (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011, 6).

[2] Interview with George Stephanopoulos of ABC News on January 20, 2010.

[3]A full discussion of Obama's efforts to lead the public and impact the agenda on health care is beyond the scope of the current article. For an extended discussion of Obama's efforts to impact the systemic agenda on health care reform, see Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2011, 174-79).

[4] According the Pew Research Center's PEJ, the economic crisis filled between 44 and 47% of the news hole during the last week of January and the first two weeks of February.

[5] Prior to congressional passage of the stimulus on February 11, Obama delivered speeches on the economy in Elkhart, Indiana, Ft. Meyers, Florida, and Springfield, Virginia. Followings its passage, Obama delivered speeches in East Peoria, Illinois, Denver, Colorado (where he signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009), and Mesa, Arizona. In total, Obama held 22 events between his inauguration and the end of September, 2009, where he delivered extended remarks on the economy before local audiences outside of the DC area (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011, chapter 6).

[6] The trips counted here only include trips where policy-related speeches were delivered to local (nonpartisan) audiences outside of the Washington, DC region. Thus, trips where the president exclusively delivered remarks at Democratic fundraising events are excluded in the count of trips.

[7] Clear evidence exists for this contention in the data discussed below. For example, the average monthly percentage of respondents citing unemployment as the "most important problem" in the Gallup Poll was 23.9 for 2009 through 2011. For the debt/federal spending, the percentage was just 8.5. Both figures are quite high in comparison to the historical averages reported by Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2011, 130, n. 9), reflecting the high relative salience of economic issues during Obama's first term and an average monthly unemployment rate of 9.25 percent for the years 2009 through 2011.

[8] The *Public Papers* are available online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/. We searched the papers based on year (e.g., 2009), which yields a listing of all documents in the *Papers* for the year. We only read documents that included public utterances by President Obama, so statements by the press office, written statements, proclamations, executive orders, treaty transmittal documents, etc., were excluded from our analysis.

[9] The separate categories include: jobs & unemployment; debt, deficits, spending and the budget; inflation, prices, banking, and housing; international trade; and, other. The categories were summed to create an all-economic issues count, which is used for the bulk of the analyses reported below. Admittedly, counting paragraphs is less refined than counting sentences or words, as a paragraph might constitute just one sentence or numerous sentences. Counting paragraphs allows for direct comparison to prior studies that use this method. In the graphs below, I account for this by looking at the percentage of total rhetoric devoted to the economy. For the reader's reference, Obama averaged 277 paragraphs per week of spoken remarks, or over 1100 per month. Machine content coding of rhetoric provides another avenue for researchers doing this type of analysis. Here, researchers build a library of terms relevant to the topic and then run the text through analysis software. I elected for the human coding procedure, as I am more familiar with that approach having authored numerous published studies using it. Moreover, the coding required coders to distinguish between paragraphs emphasizing different economic topics (see above), which were more readily achieved using human coders.

[10] The data collection ended on June 3, 2012 for the simple reason that the media data used in the analysis (see below) was no longer collected by the PEJ. Rather than attempting to extend the PEJ's media data, which would have taken significant effort to replicate, I made the decision to end the analysis at this time point, making the reasonable judgment that the data series were long enough to conduct time series analysis.

[11] I use raw counts of paragraphs in the *Public Papers* in the analyses reported below. Percentages allow for more simplified and easy to read graphs of the data.

[12] An overview of the PEJ data can be found at the following link: http://www.journalism.org/datasets/. The actual data is located here: http://www.journalism.org/news_index/99.

[13] See http://www.editorandpublisher.com/news/first-of-pej-s-weekly-news-coverage-index-appears-tuesday/.

[14] Unfortunately, we are not able to separate out coding of media based on the same set of economic issues that we do for the presidential data (jobs, debt, etc.), as the PEJ data only report broad topic codes. Economic stories that made the top-10 lists include: economic crisis, the economy, auto industry, and taxes. The debt crisis, which occurred during the summer of 2011, is simply coded as the economy. There were four weeks of data (over the entire sample frame) where PEJ does not report top-10 stories for the week. To fill in for the missing data, we simply averaged the time period prior to and immediately following the missing data point. Unfortunately, the data series ends during the last week of June 2012.

[15] During 32% of the weeks covered by the time period, the economy or economic crisis was the number one news story, according to the News Coverage Index. It was always among the top-10 stories provided by the News Coverage Index. It was eclipsed periodically by major international events (e.g., unrest in the Middle East, the Japanese tsunami, the killing of Bin Laden and the earthquake that hit Haiti); domestic events (e.g., domestic terrorism and the Gulf oil spill); other domestic issues (e.g., health care reform); and coverage of elections (the 2010 congressional and the 2012 presidential election).

[16] The monthly average for 2009 through May 2012 for economy (general) is 32.8%. For unemployment, the average is 24.2%; and for debt, the average is 8.6%. The average total (which is a summation all economic responses reported by Gallup) is 65.5%.

[17] I could create a weekly measure by simply repeating the last reported value for each week, but this creates a data series that is nonstationary, which creates problems for time series analysis of the sort reported below.

[18] The time series is available from Gallup here: http://www.gallup.com/poll/122840/gallup-daily-economic-indexes.aspx. The measure is explained here: http://www.gallup.com/poll/113842/GALLUP-DAILY-Measures-Explained.aspx. The three-day rolling averages are aggregated to the weekly level for the analyses reported below.

[19] The standard deviation for the media series is 9. The standard deviation for the presidential rhetoric series is 12.8.

[20] The Pearson's r between the presidential rhetoric series and the media series is 0.55. There is also a relationship between the media series and the Gallup series ($r = 0.52$), and between the presidential rhetoric series and the Gallup series ($r = 0.45$).

[21] The Pearson's r between the media series and Economic Confidence is -0.62.

[22] I use a dummy variable to account for the onset of a major international or domestic event. Major international events include: unrest in the Middle East (starting in late January, 2011), the slaying of Osama bin Laden (early May, 2011), the earthquake in Haiti (January, 2010), and the tsunami in Japan (mid-March, 2011). The domestic event that had the greatest likely impact on attention to the economy included the Gulf oil spill (late April through June, 2010).

[23] A dummy variable was created for the 2010 midterm congressional race, coded 1 for the period August through November 2010. I added to this a variable for the 2012 presidential primaries and lead-up to the general election, coding 1 for the period September 2011 through May 2012.

[24] This variable is simply coded 1 for December (and 0 otherwise) in the monthly time series and coded 1 for the last 3 weeks in December and first week in January for the weekly time series.

[25] The method allows us to control for the history of a time series by taking into account multiple lags of all of the endogenous variables in the system. Lag lengths are determined using the Akaike Information Criteria test (Simms 1980).

[26] Like most time series techniques, VAR assumes that the endogenous variables in the system are stationary, meaning that the mean and autocovariances are not time dependent. I ran Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests in Eviews 7.2 in order to test for a unit root for each of the endogenous variables. The tests indicate that our weekly and monthly series for presidential rhetoric and media coverage are stationary. However, tests indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that a unit root exists for our monthly Gallup MIP series and our weekly Gallup Economic Confidence series, indicating that these series are nonstationary. The test statistics were very close to rejecting the null (both at the .11 p-level). I differenced each of the series, which made each stationary, and re-ran each of the VAR models to determine whether the reported results between the other variables remain valid. Some minor differences exist between the Granger tests using the differenced data and the leveled data. However, no real differences emerged for the MAR graphs with regard to the direction and magnitude of the relationship. I report Granger tests and the MARs using the leveled (non-differenced) data, for ease of interpretation.

[27] MAR graphs track the responses of endogenous variables to simulated changes (called shocking) in each of the endogenous variables in the VAR system. MAR's use the VAR estimates for computing forecasts and the reports generated include 95% confidence intervals. See Wood and Peake (1998) and Wood (2007) for further explanation.

[28] Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the VAR Granger Causality / Block Exogeneity F-test. The shaded arrows indicate that the independent variable Granger causes the dependent variable at a significance level of 0.1. POS or NEG indicates the direction of a statistically significant ($p < 0.1$, two-tailed) exogenous variable coefficient. The N for each series is 41 (January, 2009 to May, 2012). The measure for the State of the Economy is the misery index. The VAR includes two lags. Gallup is the summed economic MIP responses for Model 1, unemployment MIP responses for Model 2, and debt/spending MIP responses for Model 3. The analysis was run with two lags.

[29] The MAR graphs included 95% confidence bands (the dashed lines in each graph). If the confidence band does not cross the zero axes, the indicated response is statistically significant. With regard to interpretation, the simulations indicate that, for example in Figure 3, the percentage of the news hole devoted to the economy increases by about two following an increase in presidential attention to the economy equal to one standard deviation (about 14 paragraphs, which is about half of the mean value for the series). An increase of two percentage points in the news hole is quite significant, as the mean value of the media news hole devoted to the economy is about 16%.

[30] President represents the number of monthly paragraphs devoted to all economic topics President Obama's public speeches and remarks (Jan. 2009 - May 2012). Gallup represents the percentage of respondents identifying unemployment at the "most important problem" in a given month in the Gallup Poll. Media represents the percentage of the news hole (all sectors) devoted to economic issues, as measured by PEJ.

[31] JOBS represents the number of monthly paragraphs devoted to the topic of jobs and unemployment in President Obama's public speeches and remarks (Jan. 2009 – May 2012). MIPJobs represents the percentage of respondents identifying unemployment at the "most important problem" in a given month in the Gallup Poll. Media represents the percentage of the news hole (all sectors) devoted to economic issues, as measured by PEJ.

[32] Numbers in parentheses are p-values for the VAR Granger Causality / Block Exogeneity F-test. The shaded arrows indicate that the independent variable Granger causes the dependent variable at a significance level of 0.1. POS or NEG indicates the direction of a statistically significant ($p < 0.1$, two-tailed) exogenous variable coefficient. The measure of the State of the Economy is the weekly change in the DJIA. Confidence is the Gallup Daily's Economic Confidence Indicator. The N for each series is 176 (weeks starting January, 19 2009 to May 28, 2012). The analysis was run with four lags.

[33] President represents the number of weekly paragraphs devoted to all economic topics President Obama's public speeches and remarks (January 19, 2009 – May 28, 2012). Confidence represents weekly averages for Gallup Daily's Economic Confidence Indicator. Media represents the percentage of the news hole (all sectors) devoted to economic issues, as measured by PEJ.

[34] JOBS represents the number of weekly paragraphs devoted to the topic of jobs and unemployment in President Obama's public speeches and remarks (January 19, 2009 – May, 28 2012). Confidence represents weekly averages for Gallup Daily's Economic Confidence Indicator. Media represents the percentage of the news hole (all sectors) devoted to economic issues, as measured by PEJ.

[35] Debt represents the number of weekly paragraphs devoted to the topic of debt, deficits and spending in President Obama's public speeches and remarks (January 19, 2009 – May 28, 2012). Confidence represents weekly averages for Gallup Daily's Economic Confidence Indicator. Media represents the percentage of the news hole (all sectors) devoted to economic issues, as measured by PEJ.

[36] Other benefits may accrue, as well, with regard to the president's rhetoric on the economy. For example, Wood (2007) has presented evidence that the tone of the president's economic rhetoric can directly impact public and investor assessments of the economy.

Parker, Christopher S., and Matt A. Barreto. *Change They Can't Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. xv, 361 pp. ($29.95 cloth).

In post-war America, the Tea Party has been one of the most successful political movements. It has successfully organized chapters across all 50 states and elected sympathetic representatives at the local, state, and national levels of government. The Tea Party has become a major force in the Republican Party and one of President Obama's most strident critics. In *Change They Can't Believe In,* Parker and Barreto marshall social science theory and empirical data to explain the emergence and staying power of the Tea Party.

Their central theoretical proposition is that the Tea Party movement is not simply a conservative movement — it is a reactionary one. A conservative movement, in the classical sense, would advocate the maintenance of the status quo. In contrast, supporters of the Tea Party seek a radical shift to a time when the social hierarchy was unquestionably led by male whites, who were native-born, Christian, and heterosexual. The election of the nation's first Black president made clear that the dominance of social groups that many Tea Party adherents consider "real Americans" has slipped, fueling anxiety and urgency in their need to "take back their country."

In making the case that the Tea Party is properly categorized as reactionary, Parker and Barreto revisit two previous reactionary movements in American history, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and the John Birch Society (JBS). Both of these movements were driven by the sense that outsiders were bent on subverting (white and Christian) American culture. For KKK, Blacks, Jews, Catholics, and immigrants stood in as the enemies of real Americans, while the JBS was far more concerned with the specter of communism. Similar to these movements, Parker and Barreto argue that Tea Party supporters share an ideology rooted in conspiratorial beliefs about their perceived enemies. In the current day instantiation of the radical right, Tea Party adherents in many ways combine the bugaboos of the KKK and JBS: minorities and the perceived socialist tendencies of the left. Drawing on content analysis of Tea Party websites and a survey experiment, they demonstrate that relative to mainstream conservatives, Tea Party supporters are more likely to concoct conspiracy theories that cast President Obama as the lynchpin in a socialist plot to undermine the American capitalist system and ultimately destroy the country.

Drawing on an array of originally collected survey data, Parker and Barreto devote the rest of the book to explaining the factors that underlie support for the Tea Party and its influence on political attitudes and behavior. Consistent with previous scholarship, they find that Tea Party supporters tend to be white, male, middle aged, evangelical, wealthy, and of average education. They also show that Tea Party supporters tend to score high on measures of racial resentment, social dominance orientation, and fear of Obama.

Beyond this descriptive analysis, Parker and Barreto propose that Tea Party support is a marker of a more deep-seated predisposition, and in support, they report numerous analyses in which Tea Party support predicts political attitudes beyond conservatism and related measures of conservative predispositions. In particular, they show that Tea Party supporters resolve value conflicts between freedom and egalitarianism in a distinctive way. Although Tea Party supporters are not uniformly committed to freedom as a principle — in fact, they prioritize security in many domains — they appear to be most wedded to freedom when it is framed as pursuing self-interest, rather than when it is defined as putting community before the self.

Perhaps more fundamentally, Tea Party supporters are much more likely than others, including non-Tea Party conservatives, to express strong negative attitudes towards out-groups, especially immigrants and homosexuals, both ascendant minority groups. Their intense dislike of Barack Obama seems to be driven, in part, by the fact that as President of the United States, he stands as a symbol of the nation and his election therefore symbolizes America's shifting demographic landscape. It affirms that the reactionary nightmare may have come true: the country in which they believe in has been taken from them. These beliefs create a sense of urgency among Tea Party supporters, who are especially politically active and, therefore, efficacious in their influence on congressional politics.

Parker and Barreto offer a compelling case for the thesis that fear of Obama lies at the center of Tea Party support. I see this as their most important contribution. Many of the analyses of polarization in American politics, particularly around health care reform and the debt ceiling, overlook the potential importance of Obama's race in the drive by some congressional Republicans to deny the president any legislative successes. In short, *Change They Can't Believe In* should be required reading for observers of American politics.

No book can accomplish everything and it would be unfair to expect that here. Consequently, I will sketch out what I see as the next steps in this area of research. First, Parker and Barreto advance the provocative thesis that Tea Party support is the marker of a predisposition that goes beyond the typical elements of conservatism. I believe that this claim needs more theoretical development. What omitted variable(s) does Tea Party support proxy? One possibility is that psychological motivations beyond the ones political psychologists have enumerated remain to be discovered. Another possibility is that Tea Party support is more or less a behavioral indicator of preference intensity.

Second, more attention should be given to investigating the role played by the 2008 collapse of the financial markets. Economic adversity has been the catalyst for many other populist movements in American politics, most notably in the late 19th century and more recently in the early 1990s. The Tea Party seems to share many common elements with populism, including nativism.

Finally, what about radical left movements? Scholarship tends to focus on the radical right, but a smaller radical left movement does exist in the United States (and certainly beyond). Do these movements create similar normative dilemmas for democracy? What explains why people are attracted to them? Does the politics of race privilege right radical movements in the American context?

Kevin Arceneaux
Temple University

Nancy D. Wadsworth. *Ambivalent Miracles: Evangelicals and the Politics of Racial Healing*. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2014. 320 pp. ($39.50 cloth).

In this volume, Nancy Wadsworth meticulously traces the rise and evolution of the Evangelical Racial Change Movement (ERC). She uncovers how the conservative evangelical tradition developed a passionate investment in racial transformation within their religious communities on the heels of a storied history with racism and white supremacy. This passion is juxtaposed to their political ambivalence toward efforts to unearth structures that undermine the very racial equality they seek. This work is timely, as Wadsworth mentions the push to limit the reach of the federal government and state-sponsored social policies by American neo-conservatism has recently peaked the interest of political scientists.

By carefully tracing the historical, political, and cultural contexts that shape ERC over two decades (1990-2010), this volume is the first of its kind in political science to use the intersections of race, religion and politics to provide a window into emerging political orientations within a social movement. *Ambivalent Miracles* challenges the discipline of political science to better understand how deeply these intersections matter to the construction of American politics and political allegiances.

This qualitative study draws from interviews and a survey with active ERC participants, content analysis of the evangelical flagship publication *Christianity Today*, participant observation and a three-year case study of a multiethnic congregation informed by the emerging field of political ethnography. A qualitative approach unearths cultural practices and assumptions that most participants take for granted yet remain vital to unlocking the paradoxical nature of the movement.

It is unlikely however, that discussions of race and religion surface without mention of the widely cited *Divided by Faith*, by sociologists Michael O. Emerson and Christian Smith (2000). Wadsworth includes the first study to systematically capture racial attitudes in American evangelicalism. *Divided* exposed the cavernous divide between black and white evangelicals concerning their respective outlooks on race related issues. While her work stands on its own, Wadsworth uses this seminal study as a platform to gauge its influence on ERC.

In *Divided*, Emerson and Smith conclude that the ideological toolkits white evangelicals draw from renders them ill-equipped to make substantial changes to the problem of race in U.S. congregations. Wadsworth pushes further by featuring what she calls *epiphanal spaces* and *social etiquettes* to elucidate how Emerson and Smith's claim is limited. These conceptual tools are much more efficient in explaining how white conservative evangelicals express genuine interest in race relations, while avoiding and/or rejecting policy-based solutions to racial inequality. Wadsworth argues that rituals of admitting, trust building, and apology/forgiveness practices create epiphanal spaces that feel like "miracles" to reconcilers. Consequently, epiphanal spaces allow for the cultural mechanisms of social etiquettes (e.g. *customs* and *rituals*) to create meaning-making systems that render racial reconciliation efforts "a challenge cut out

for Evangelicals." This *challenge* emphasizes relationship and spiritual intervention in place of politically oriented conversations and action.

Leaders of *Promise Keepers*, an evangelical organization at the helm of early reconciliation efforts, argue that secular systems fail because inherent racism is a *sin issue* and individuals rely on secular programs rather than their relationship with God. These sentiments result in political activity seen as threatening to reconcilers rather than an inherent next step. Wadsworth contends that even with exposure to more critical frameworks, the cultural context surrounding evangelicals, not just their intellectual toolkits, prevents active participation in progressive political agendas by members of ERC.

Wadsworth helps to confound the picture of political avoidance among ERC advocates by offering extensive attention to the reconciliation efforts a decade later. ERC transitioned to promote what they called the Multiethnic Church Movement (MEC). For ERC advocates, multiethnic congregations are the pinnacles of reconciliation efforts. In the final section of the book, Wadsworth provides observations from a three-year case study of a multiethnic congregation as well as a series of survey questions and interviews with ERC advocates, broadly centered on the question, *how do people who choose to join multiethnic faith-based communities think about power, politics and social change?*

Through a developing awareness of identity and power configurations, MEC reconcilers were more politically conversant on global poverty, social inequality and diversity within their own community than their predecessors. MEC reconcilers broke free of the politics-avoidant etiquette that was definitive of the 1990s. Conversely MEC participants had a wider range of non-white voices entering into the conversation. More inclusivity gave reconcilers a level of comfort with political conversations and activism absent in the decade prior. This produced a wider range of orientations to social justice and race politics visible in the content change of *Christianity Today*, ERC conferences and institutional efforts. However, Wadsworth cautions that while MEC's are beginning to dislodge entrenched cultural habits within ERC, the political ambivalence at the very heart of ERC may persistently inhibit its potential for relevance and impact on a larger, political scale.

While Wadsworth makes outstanding efforts to gain leverage on this wave of racial change among the evangelical community, a more directed treatment of how contemporary *reconcilers of color* (ROC) operate in this movement would aid in further understanding why political ambivalence is endemic of ERC efforts. For example, the counter-framing of ROC in chapter six was rendered just two pages but explicated the frameworks ROC engage to make sense of the movement and its lack of political activism. A more robust treatment dedicated to the complexities of these processes from a marginalized perspective may unearth further implications for conservative bridge building across racial divides.

However, the success of the task Wadsworth set for herself is evident. Wadsworth took great care to provide a methodologically rigorous and comprehensive volume. She thoughtfully and compellingly argues for ERC to demand the attention of political scientists and those

interested in American politics more broadly such that they include the intersections of race and religion in their inquiries. Wadsworth masterfully argues that the evangelical tradition, their history with racism, and their current efforts towards reconciliation is a prime site not only to expand our context of American political culture but to also shed light on social change efforts as they unfold.

Jessica M. Barron
Duke University

Emerson, Michael O and Smith, Christian. 2000. *Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America.* Oxford University Press.

Sotirios A. Barber, *The Fallacies Of States' Rights*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013, 256 pp. ($39.95 cloth).

In his seminal 1908 work titled *Constitutional Government in the United States*, then-Princeton University President Woodrow Wilson wrote that "the relation of the states to the federal government is the cardinal question of our constitutional system" which has confronted the Nation at "every turn of our national development…." Wilson concluded that this issue "cannot, indeed, be settled by the opinion of any one generation, because it is a question of growth, and every successive stage of our political and economic development gives it a new aspect, makes it a new question" (p. 173).

Referring to federalism as "America's oldest constitutional debate" (p. 1), Notre Dame Political Science professor Sotirios A. Barber, in his 2013 book, *The Fallacies of States' Rights,* echoes Wilson's sentiments but believes that, notwithstanding its passionate presence in the 21st century, the states' rights debate has been resolved. Asking, "What's so good about states' rights"? (p.28), Barber concludes that this perspective has little constitutional or practical policy justification.

Barber maintains that federalism can only be understood within a larger theory of constitutional government. His 1984 book titled *On What The Constitution Means,* addressed this question, and Barber revisits the subject almost three decades later with penetrating insights.

How, he asks, is one to read the Constitution? Is
it to be construed simply as an allocation of responsibilities within a framework of separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism? This, he argues, is the view of dual federalism: the Constitution establishes two separate and distinct sovereignties, which expressly limit powers given to the central government and confer a vast reservoir of reserved and implied powers to the states. Barber's strongest criticism is directed to this position. He also focuses on Marshallian federalism, cultivated during the thirty-four years' tenure of Chief Justice John Marshall (1801-1835), and process federalism, where states' policy preferences can be better expressed by their representatives in Congress than in fifty separate state legislatures.

Barber emphasizes that federalism must be construed in the context of original intention. States' rights advocates have maintained that the states, as separate sovereign entities, voluntarily conferred in Article I enumerated powers to the central government and that powers not specified are reserved to the states in the 9th and 10th Amendments. Barber rejects this on several grounds. This suggests that the twelve states present at the 1787 Philadelphia Convention were essentially in accord as to what was given to the new government. However, deep commercial, banking, religious and property differences among the states precluded consensus on what might have been conferred. Moreover, the states met not as twelve separate entities but with a mandate from Congress to convene for "the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation," giving the Constitution a national as opposed to separate state vision. Thus, while states' rights figured in many of the delegates' debates, the states convened not individually but as a united entity, which, for Barber, undercut the 1787 underpinnings of dual federalism.

Barber meticulously and evenhandedly discusses pre-Civil War dual federalism with the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and John Calhoun's theories of states' rights and nullification. While the question of whether the Civil War was fought mainly over slavery or states' rights will never be conclusively answered, Barber explains that this was a watershed event in the evolution of federalism.

His further examination of industrialization in the late 19th century, the Populist and Progressive movements around the turn of the 20th century, and the New Deal and Great Society initiatives illustrates that public policy evolved into a national focus. In the post-Reagan years, globalization of the domestic economy and proliferation of electronic communication greatly accelerated the scope of social policy away from the local and regional arenas. Thus, the evolving nature of public policy since the Civil War has, for Barber, made states' rights less viable, if not obsolete.

Barber also presents an intellectually rigorous examination of how the wording of the Constitution and key rulings of the Marshall Court gave far greater momentum toward nationalism. The Constitution, Barber emphasizes, is far more than a delineation of powers and responsibilities among branches of government; it is a charter embodying the aspirations of civilized society.

Barber heavily focuses on the Preamble: "We the People of the United States" have established the Constitution "to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty…." These are substantive responsibilities given to the national government to be viewed as an embellishment on the powers conferred in Article I.

Rather than simply look at enumerated powers as encompassing what is given to the central authority, Barber believes that fulfilling the Preamble's mission is the collective goal of all three branches. Congress, he explains, can legislate on any subject area which it believes will enhance the general well-being of the American people, and the Court should construe constitutional provisions with this objective. Thus, the powers given to Congress in Article I, and unlimited means to implement them by the Necessary and Proper Clause, viewed in the context of Preamble enable the federal government to legislate on virtually any policy area it chooses. States are free to experiment with social welfare policy and seek to fulfill federal directives.

Barber anticipates dual federalism arguments that this leaves little policy discretion with states by addressing Justice O'Connor's five claims on the advantages of states' rights in *Gregory v. Ashcroft* (1991). O'Connor writes that two sovereigns will enhance federalism with a greater sensitivity "to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society"; more opportunities for "citizen involvement in democratic processes"; more "innovation and experimentation in government"; government which is "more responsive by putting States in competition for a mobile citizenry"; and a greater "check on abuses of government power" (pp. 94-95).

Barber meticulously responds with rigorous constitutional analysis from dissenters' arguments and support from *The Federalist*. Citing numerous examples from slavery and civil rights policies to 21st century initiatives with national health care and medical marijuana, Barber insists that states' innovation has often diminished human dignity and thus undermine arguments for experimentation and more intimate responsiveness to local needs. He also argues that citizen involvement will be more meaningful in a national setting and that opportunities for citizens to relocate to states with more desirable policy innovations are not economically realistic alternatives.

Barber buttresses his enhancement of national policymaking initiatives with an examination of contemporary constitutional scholars who have written both in support of states' rights and uniformity at the federal level. A key individual omitted from his book is Raoul Berger. Author of over one hundred law review articles and seven books on original understanding, Berger, who died at the age of 99 in 2000, emphatically emphasized that the

original understanding of key constitutional provisions on federalism mandated a far weaker federal government from what has evolved and a preeminent role for states' rights. Berger advocated dual federalism as fervently as Barber opposes it, and his 1987 book titled, *Federalism: The Founders' Design,* examined the same clauses as Barber with equally fervent rigor. Berger's name does not even appear in the index, and the reader would welcome Barber's response to Berger's conclusions.

Barber's work is first rate scholarship. While one may take a different interpretation of the Preamble, Necessary and Proper Clause, 9th and 10th Amendments, and the enforcement clause of the 14th Amendment, the strengths of this book cannot be exaggerated. Barber clearly articulates his constitutional perspective and supports it with a cogent analysis of original intention, applicable Court rulings, key portions of *The Federalist,* evolving American social and legal history, and arguments of leading scholars. He acknowledges that states' rights will remain prominent as new social issues confront the American people and expresses optimism that Marshallian nationalism will endure and prevail.

Alan I. Bigel
University of Wisconsin,
La Crosse

Sara Merger. *Rape Loot Pillage: The Political Economy of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. viii, 238 pp. ($74.00 cloth).

In *Rape Loot Pillage*, Sara Merger makes two important contributions to our understanding of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict (SGBV): first she offers an important political economy alternative to the security paradigm that has come to dominate both academic literature and policy and aid responses in the past two decades. In so doing, she redirects feminist theorizing on the subject toward a theory of sexual violence that takes into account local-to-global gendered processes.

Rather than being an exceptional, existential threat to security demanding emergency security responses, SGBV must be understood as a political problem, inscribed in a continuum of gender-based violence in war as in peace times, regardless of the effects it has on a society's "security" (p.33). As such it demands political and economic solutions aimed to address its root causes. These, in turn, are to be found at three levels, all intertwined with, and constitutive of gender hierarchy as a "structural feature of social and political life" – a phrase she borrows from Lauren Wilcox (pp. 37): at the individual/relational level SGBV is a form of interpersonal violence, which "serves to masculinize the perpetrator and feminize the victim" (pp. 106), regardless of the sex of victim or perpetrator.

At the political level, it is a means for warring groups to pursue a particular agenda and "challenge or subvert existing power hierarchies" (p. 38). Finally, in the "global assembly line" (p.37) of macro-level political economic structures, sexual violence "operates as a cog" (p. 37) to reproduce material relations of inequality between core and periphery states. Sexual violence by armed groups in civil wars of developing states enables access to commodities sought after in the global market. Thus, "far from an unfortunate side effect of globalization, violence in the 'developing' world constitutes a key component of the current global logic" (p. 50). In sum, sexual violence is a manifestation of unequal local-to-global gendered relations of power.

In stressing both the political nature and the continuum of sexual violence, Merger joins a growing literature contesting the assumptions and consequences of securitization theory, not only with regard to sexual violence in war, but in IR theory more in general. Although the securitization approach has led policy makers to reckon with the "premeditation and deliberateness of SGBV" (p.8), it has also homogenized these kinds of violence and detached SGBV from any particular context, as well as from the causes of violence in general.

Moreover, in commandeering emergency responses and resources, the securitization of sexual violence has provoked as well its "fetishization:" SGBV "has become a key commodity in the competition among perpetrators, as well as victims, communities, states, NGOs, and academics for status-recognition and resources" (p.22). In other words, Merger claims, through securitization sexual violence has become an object of media and public obsession, focusing on simplistic narratives, and clear distinctions between victims and perpetrators, commodified for public consumption. Securitization and commodification have resulted in policy responses oriented toward medical care for victims and criminal justice responses toward perpetrators, with only a quarter of international funding directed at violence prevention programs that

address the structural causes of violence. In turn, existing programs have provided incentives for local communities and combatants to use sexual violence as bargaining tools or income-earning strategies.

Merger's call for a re-politicization of SGBV demands that it be understood contextually, because it serves different purposes for different perpetrators in different types of conflict. Merger gathers a variety of sources – policy and academic analyses, court transcriptions, NGO reports – to conclude that, for example, in interstate wars the invading army employs sexual violence for opportunistic motives. Sometimes SGBV takes the form of "authorized transgression" (p. 61 – officially sanctioned, in practice tolerated), and sometimes it is used to enforce submission, but never as a primary weapon against invaded people. In civil wars with ideological objectives – as in Latin America, Sudan, Syria, and Sri Lanka – sexual violence is primarily employed by government forces and their allies for national security motives as a "strategy of suppression of the insurgent group" (p.92) and as a means to punish and terrorize those from whom the rebels draw support. Finally, in economic civil wars, the purpose of which is not to overthrow a government but rather to create the political instability and chaos necessary for the development and maintenance of a "war economy for profiteering" (p. 67), all armed groups use widespread and often systematic SGBV. The purpose in these cases – Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo – is to pressure civilians into complying with the armed group's economic objectives, which are often related to resource exploitation and linked to global political economic processes.

Such is the case of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the discrepancy between international policy and media narratives and realities on the ground is made apparent through Merger's interviews with NGO and humanitarian workers. Here, despite an international narrative that depicts rape as opportunistic, in fact all armed groups use widespread and systematic sexual violence as a weapon of terror and torture in their pursuit of economic gains, access to natural resources, and to submit and control the population to their will in the context of "an archetypal economic civil war" (p. 139).

Merger's in-depth account of rape in the DRC, while incisive in many ways, also highlights the risks of relying primarily on Western, English-language sources to understand local realities. Her depiction of Central African masculinities and femininities is at times detached from the specific historical context of colonial exploitation in the Congo which, as in other colonized areas, likely produced changes in gender relations. Perhaps this gap is a reflection of a common challenge for IR scholars, not many of whom draw extensively and inter-disciplinarily from local sources to understand local contexts. That a painful paucity of data – especially qualitative, narrative accounts – on the extent, modalities and motivations for sexual violence in armed conflict makes the typologies of SGBV that Merger outlines tentative and provisional by her own admission, is then one but not the only weakness of this otherwise important book. A greater engagement with and inclusion of studies from African scholars of gender and/or conflict would have also strengthened its analysis.

At the same time, in highlighting the political and contextual salience of sexual violence in armed conflict, this work is a stark reminder of the need to address the gendered political and economic inequalities that inform violence, as well as the violence and victims that remain

invisible when they don't fit easily in a popular grand narrative.

Catia C. Confortini
Wellesley College

Melissa Deckman. *Tea Party Women: Mama Grizzlies, Grassroots Leaders, and the Changing Face of the American Right.* New York: New York University Press, 2016. xi, 343 pp. ($95.00 cloth, $35.00 paper).

In the early weeks of the Obama administration, the idea of a protest movement against the federal government's plans for a mortgage foreclosure relief program burst upon the cable TV scene in the form of a reporter's rant, then rapidly cascaded across the media and digital echo chamber, and resulted in public demonstrations and the formation of numerous free-market, limited-government, grassroots advocacy organizations whose political backing helped propel some fiscally and constitutionally conservative candidates to victory in the 2010 midterm elections. Since that time, the Tea Party has become an important subject for scholars of social and political movements, political ideology, state and local politics, Congress, political parties, public opinion, and voting behavior. By incorporating a gender dimension – most significantly, an analysis of the key contributions of female Tea Party leaders and activists to the movement's public discourse and policy emphases -- Melissa Deckman's *Tea Party Women* adds a most welcome and worthy contribution to this burgeoning scholarship.

Utilizing the qualitative research technique of textual analysis of the (predominantly online) documents, blogs, and Twitter feeds of Tea Party female leaders and their organizations, Deckman finds that unlike their male counterparts these women construct uniquely gendered appeals that variously focus on a *motherhood* frame (mothers as adept at balancing the family budget and thus as overseers of the federal budget; mothers' role in reducing the debt burden for future generations; mothers fighting government programs that usurp the role of the family; and mothers as protectors of the family via fiscal responsibility and even gun ownership) and a *big-government-as-harmful-to-women-in-general* frame (big government promotes female dependency; paints women as victims; and promotes a "war on women" by limiting their individual agency and equality). Deckman supplements her content analyses with semi-structured interviews of both local and national Tea Party activists, and presents in-depth case studies of their backgrounds, political and social attitudes and concerns, and paths to leadership within their various Tea Party organizations. From these interviews, it becomes obvious that there has been no single route to female Tea Party support or activism and that a nuanced explanation is essential.

Deckman also carefully notes that there exists a diverse array of Tea Party organizations, and that while all support fiscal restraint and a reduction in big government as primary goals and present individual liberty as their underlying value, some are predominantly libertarian whereas others are more socially and culturally conservative. Thus both the issues they emphasize and the discourse they employ vary, and Deckman provides useful illustrations of these differences in her textual analyses as well as the summaries of her interviews. And in her comparison of the role of Tea Party women to that of earlier female conservatives, Deckman provides an informative discussion of how the Tea Party's dispersed organizational structure has helped female activists to start and grow their own organizations, and how the external "opportunity structure" – i.e., gains in women's educational and professional backgrounds, coupled with the Republican Party's quite rigid and hierarchical organizational structure that has been reluctant to welcome right-leaning women to leadership positions – has enabled politically conservative

entrepreneurial women to emerge as independent political forces. An additional qualitative analysis of the differing political perspectives of female Tea Party and female GOP leaders provides further understanding of the often-subtle differences found within contemporary conservative U.S. political ideology.

A strength of *Tea Party Women* is Deckman's inclusion of a wealth of 2012 and 2014 cross-national survey research data from the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). Her analyses of the American Values Surveys and Religion Surveys allow her to situate the information gleaned from her interviews and textual analyses within a wider comparative context that provides answers to the following questions: How do the attitudes of Tea Party supporters in the mass public compare to those of its leaders? How do the attitudes of male Tea Party leaders contrast with those of its female leaders? How do the attitudes of male Tea Party supporters compare to those of female supporters? Of particular interest is Deckman's discussion of the sizable gap between the attitudes of female Tea Party supporters and leaders and the opinions of the usually more liberal female public – as well as many women's hesitancy to accept the Tea Party's "take no prisoners" rhetorical style -- and hence the problems confronting those who wish to expand the popularity and longevity of the Tea Party.

To answer additional questions about the major determinants of Tea Party identification as well as whether and how Tea Party membership affects attitudes on a variety of social and political issues, Deckman conducts a series of logistic regression analyses and clearly analyzes the results in the latter chapters of the book. Her discussion of the similarities as well as differences between Tea Party women and GOP women who do not support the Tea Party is particularly instructive. A quick methodological note is also warranted: the tables and charts she includes in the text are very accessible even to a non-statistically sophisticated audience, while the data analysis in the Appendix should provide additional detailed information for those who wish to understand the specifics of her quantitative analyses.

One of the hallmarks of excellent research is that it promotes further investigation of the topic as well as new ways of framing the research questions. While *Tea Party Women* was published during the waning days of the 2016 presidential primaries, it relies on textual analyses, intensive interviews, and surveys from several years prior to the current election campaign. It is my hope that Professor Deckman will continue her fine qualitative and quantitative exploration of the backgrounds, worldviews, and public discourse of female Tea Party supporters and leaders, uncovering patterns of both continuity and change in their beliefs, opinions, and voting patterns, especially in light of the harsh and misogynistic discourse of Donald Trump.

Erika G. King
Grand Valley State University

Monika L. McDermott. *Masculinity, Femininity, and American Political Behavior.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016 xiv, 256 pp. ($99.00 cloth, $47.95 paper).

The role of gender in United States elections has received nearly unprecedented attention during the 2016 campaign from academics and non-academics alike. With polls predicting the largest gender gap since 1996, explicit appeals to women based on gender by both Clinton and Trump featuring prominently in the final month of the campaign, and the frequently gendered narratives around the candidates in the media, a wave of research on gender in this election is surely forthcoming. In a timely monograph examining gendered personalities as politically salient, Monika L. McDermott offers scholars of gender and politics a more dynamic approach to the gender gaps in *Masculinity, Femininity, and American Political Behavior*. McDermott complicates the prevailing understanding of gendered political participation by decoupling gender from sex. Using Bem's Sex Role Inventory, McDermott analyses the partisanship and political engagement of Americans differentiated by gendered personalities distinctly from their gender identity in her Gender Personalities and Politics Survey (GPPS). The result is a highly readable challenge to the continued use of a conflated sex/gender construct to understanding cleavages in the contemporary electorate.

The book begins by presenting the theory that gendered personality does not conform to biological sex but rather functions on two continuums that are also distinct from gender identity and importantly shape political behavior. This theory asserts that masculine and feminine traits are stable personality dimensions akin to the Big Five factor structure in personality types that similarly influence individuals' partisanship, political engagement, vote choices, and ideology. Specifically she connects empirically masculine personality traits with higher levels of political engagement, affiliation with the Republican Party, and support for McCain and Republican House candidates. Feminine personality traits are linked with Democratic partisanship, support for Obama and Democratic House candidates, and a liberal ideology distinct from biological sex. McDermott asserts in the first chapter that American politics are infused with gender from political parties whose issue ownership reflects a gendered division of labor to institutions and elected offices perceived as masculine or feminine contingent on the role alignment with gender norms.

McDermott proceeds from the premise of gendered parties and issues and her empirical findings regarding the distinction between sex and gendered personality to demonstrate the salience for politics and political scientists. The original data and diligent analysis that systematically builds the evidence for the theory from the ground up is a substantial strength in this text. The GPPS combines Bem's Sex Role Inventory with questions addressing political participation, partisanship, ideology, and vote choice around both previous and hypothetical candidates. The empirical evidence of gender personality as distinct from sex provides grounds for reconsidering the existing paradigm around the gender gap. McDermott goes on to show scholarship would benefit from distinguishing a gender personality schema, which provides four gender types unrelated to biological sex (or perhaps gender identity, though this is less clear), from a gender conformity schema, which distinguishes conforming from cross-typed, androgynous, and gender undifferentiated. The four gender types based on two independent masculinity and femininity factors are salient to partisanship and vote choice with important

implications for accurate identification of swing voters and articulation of the gender gap. As McDermott shows, the explanatory power of sex disappears when gender personality is considered. Further, her data show that undifferentiated voters are a distinct group from both androgynous voters with strong but polarized party attachments and feminine voters with low levels of engagement. Undifferentiated voters are more likely to be persuadable by campaigns based on their weak partisanship and moderate levels of engagement. While masculinity drives political engagement, femininity proves to drive partisanship, thus understanding strength of party ties requires more nuance than a dichotomous gender measure can provide.

An individual's placement in the gender conformity schema influences their attitudes toward appropriate social and political roles based on gender. The acceptance of transgressing of gender norms importantly depends on one's own conformity rather than sex/gender. The implications for political candidates given the evidence of the double bind for women candidates is important as McDermott's findings suggest women candidates would be wise to appeal to androgynous, undifferentiated, and cross-typed voters in order of greatest likelihood of support for women demonstrating dominance via running for office.

For a text that takes disentangling the role of gender in politics seriously, it is disappointing there is not more precision of language with regard to gender and sex terminology nor inclusion of non-binary sex identities in the GPPS. This is an exceptionally minor critique however. Of greater concern is the minimal attention the author gives to the implications for future elections based on the connections between masculinity, political engagement, and strong Republican identification. Based on her findings, she logically concludes that shift toward masculine personality traits found elsewhere in demographic trend data is likely to improve the electoral prospects for the Republican Party in the future. This challenges existing scholarship on millennials partisanship and ideology, but this literature is not addressed.

Ultimately McDermott offers compelling evidence for more precision in data collection around gender as a political identity based on personality traits rather than sex. This theory is unlikely to be deployed by researchers who are not explicitly interested in gender as a construct. Despite the compelling evidence here, without a better shorthand most scholars are likely to continue to use sex interchangeably with gender and consider either a sufficient operationalization for the examination of gender-based political cleavages. Theorizing gendered politics would benefit from inclusion of McDermott's findings and more readily available survey data parsing out gendered personality from sex.

Megan E. Osterbur
Xavier University of Louisiana

Frank C. Thames and Margaret S. Williams. *Contagious Representation: Women's Political Representation in Democracies around the World*. New York: New York University Press, 2013. x, 208 pp. ($40.00 cloth).

Contagious Representation makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of women's numeric representation in political institutions across the globe. Frank Thames and Margaret Williams address the question: Is representation *contagious*? In other words, do increases in women's numeric representation in one political institution lead to increases in women's numeric representation in other political institutions? In doing so, the authors advance a new conceptual approach to explaining women's numeric representation and offer a systematic treatment of women's representation across a large number of democracies over a number of institutions. As such, this book represents an important advancement for the research agenda of women's numeric representation.

This book moves beyond existing literature by developing an argument to explain how women's representation in one institution can lead to increases in other institutions—i.e., *contagious representation*. Thames and Williams explain that for three reasons contagion affects women's representation. First, as the selectorate becomes more diverse, the institution should also become more diverse. Since the members of many political institutions are chosen at least in part by members of the other institutions (e.g., political parties select parliamentary candidates; parliament selects the PM; and high courts are typically appointed by the executive, the parliament, or both), they posit a positive relationship between women's numeric representation across different political institutions. Second, as one political institution becomes more diverse, the public and other political institutions can observe the consequences. Assuming that there are not strong negative consequences associated with diversity in political institutions, the perceived risk of diversifying should diminish, thus making other institutions more willing to diversify. Third, institutions in a given country compete among themselves for a finite amount of power. Thus, if we assume that diverse institutions garner more public support, then logically, diverse institutions will have a competitive edge when competing for the policy space to achieve policy objectives. Taken together the authors conclude that increases in women's representation in one political institution should promote increases in women's representation in other branches of government.

Thames and Williams provide empirical support for contagious representation across an array of political institutions. Indeed, the other impressive contribution of this book is the novel dataset that spans 159 democracies over 50 years and multiple political institutions: the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, political parties, and national quota laws. This large-N analysis is accompanied by a number of case studies that illustrate the authors' central findings and demonstrate the importance of contagion for women's representation.

They first examine women's legislative representation. While this is a well-studied area, the authors make several contributions. First, they explicitly distinguish between the factors that influence women's representation in the short term and those that have long term effects. Although extant research has generated notable discussion regarding the incremental track versus the fast track methods of increasing women's representation, empirical research has not given serious consideration to how different factors contribute to women's representation over time. Second, the authors amass an original dataset, which allows them to model time explicitly in their analysis to distinguish between short and long term effects. With respect to contagion, they find that in the short run contagion matters. Specifically, the adoption of national and voluntary

quotas bolsters women's representation offering a fast track solution. Once quotas are in place, however, on average, countries do not continue to benefit from an increase in women's representation. Rather, quotas result in a short-term growth in women's representation that plateaus after implementation.

Turning to women's participation in the chief executive, the authors investigate the probability of electing a female executive in 114 countries from 1945 to 2006. During this period 279 women have held an executive post, though a majority of them were interim posts. Perhaps the most significant finding to emerge from this analysis is that both the adoption of gender quotas and women's representation in parliament increase the likelihood of a female executive and decreases the time until a country has its first female executive. While Thames and Williams are not the first to report this relationship, their extensive analysis serves to corroborate extant research and to demonstrate that women's representation in the legislatures and the adoption of quotas may lay a foundation for women to enter into the executive.

Next, the authors apply their contagion argument to the high courts. Drawing on the largest dataset to date of women's appointments to the high courts (47 countries), the authors find that as the percentage of women in parliament increases, so do the number of women in the high court. Additionally, presidential appointments, life appointments, more seats on the bench, and more women in other areas of public life, all serve to increase women's appointments in high courts. This analysis is one of the major contributions of the book because women's appointments to high courts have received little attention, particularly those courts in developing democracies.

In the final two empirical chapters the authors examine how contagion influences the adoption of party quotas (voluntary quotas) and national quotas (compulsory party quotas and reserved seats). By examining the two types separately, they distinguish between the factors that promote the adoption of each. There is strong evidence that contagion matters for party quota adoption; having more women in office decreases the time until adoption and increases the probability of adoption. This is likely because there are more politically powerful women in office to advocate for the adoption of quotas. Additionally, the adoption of a national quota and the number of other political parties with a party quota increase the likelihood of adoption. Once a national quota is in place, a party quota does not impose additional costs on a political party but it can still reap any potential benefits of the quota by appealing to female voters. Similarly, as more political parties implement quotas, the adoption of a voluntary quota may become increasingly important for competition. As for the adoption of national quotas, the authors conclude that empirical evidence for contagion is less clear.

Contagious Representation provides the first comprehensive treatment of women's numeric representation across political institutions. The authors articulate the case for contagion and provide substantial support for contagious representation. Additionally, their book highlights areas for future research. In particular, it stimulates thinking about contagion more broadly. For example, does women's presence in other political organizations such as NGOs and advocacy groups create opportunities for women to enter into political institutions? Moreover, how does contagion between different levels of government (i.e., national and subnational) influence women's numeric representation? Thames and Williams' book provides an innovative theoretical framework along with a comprehensive empirical foundation to facilitate future research on the factors the pave women's paths to office.

Tiffany D. Barnes
University of Kentucky

Jessee, Stephen A. *Ideology and Spatial Voting in American Elections*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. xii, 242 pp. ($95.00 cloth, $29.99 paper).

Stephen Jessee's *Ideology and Spatial Voting in American Elections* is an ambitious effort to defend spatial theories of voting and to make them relevant to contemporary debates about mass elections. A problem for spatial voting theory since its inception has been the difficulty of linking the positions of voters and politicians. Over the past decade, political scientists have developed precise tools for measuring the ideological positions of legislators. However, most studies of American political behavior are premised on the belief that most voters do not think about politics in ideological terms. Stephen Jessee seeks both to challenge this view of voters and to develop a means to map the ideological positions of voters and politicians on a shared ideological dimension.

Jessee marshals a wide array of evidence to argue against the claim that voters do not hold meaningful ideological views. He contends that merely asking voters to place themselves on an ideological scale yields results that are not only incompatible with measures of politicians but also are often incompatible with the survey respondents' own policy views. If we use an index of policy questions, however, we can generally discover that voters have coherent sets of policy positions but also that they use these positions to evaluate politicians. Such a claim is not original to Jessee's work – it draws upon the "correct voting" studies of Richard Lau and David Redlawsk and on more recent work by James Stimson and others. Jessee's main addition to this debate, instead, is his effort to develop a model of voting in which ideological placement of candidates interacts with partisanship, valence issues, and information about the candidates. He draws upon data from two of his own surveys of voters in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections to do this. In these surveys, respondents are treated as (in Jessee's phrasing) "guest senators," given a variety of policy questions on which political candidates have voted or taken public positions. He uses these surveys to develop ideal points for survey respondents and for politicians, and he is then able to show voters' "implied indifference point" – the ideological location where voters *should* be equally far from both major party candidates on policy.

Most voters, Jessee finds, do vote according to a spatial logic, but they have other considerations as well. Voters of both parties allow their partisanship to influence choice between candidates, with Democrats at times choosing the Democratic candidate even where they are slightly closer to the Republican candidate, and vice versa. In 2004, in particular, George W. Bush held a healthy advantage over John Kerry on valence issues – that is, a large enough number of voters to swing the election to Bush chose him not because they agreed with him on policy but because they found him personally more appealing.

The effects of information about the candidates also influence the criteria voters use in selecting candidates. Ideological proximity to the candidates matters more for high-information voters than for low-information voters. For those with less information, partisanship takes on greater importance. These findings correspond to the standard findings of the Michigan school's analyses of political sophistication, but Michigan school adherents would balk at integrating them into a spatial model. Jessee shows that incorporating information measures can be done in a relatively straightforward way.

This book, then, is a thoughtful effort to develop a comprehensive accounting of the role of ideology in voting decisions, and it provides a forceful defense of the relevance of spatial voting theory to mass electorates. Jessee does not entirely defuse many of the standard criticisms of spatial voting, though he does respond to many of them. It would be good to know, for instance, whether voters hold sincere positions on issues or whether they take positions so as to conform to the positions of their preferred candidates. This is something, however, that requires a panel survey. Issue position indices also are not exactly amenable to scaling – providing the liberal response to a string of policy position questions is not actually the same as being far to the left on a scale of liberalism. But these are criticisms one might encounter of any spatial theory, and Jessee has at a minimum thought creatively about assessing ideology while listening to behavioralists' concerns.

The broader obstacle many readers may confront with this book, however, is that it is presented as a defense of the relevance of spatial theory to American elections, and yet the approach generally tends not to be one where real-world applications are emphasized but instead one where Jessee compares his model to other models. In Chapter 4, for instance, he shows how his model outperforms other spatial models in predicting vote choice. This is a credit to his model, but it is a claim that readers who are not already invested in these debates likely will not care that much about. Similarly, in Chapter 5 Jessee does a nice job of disaggregating George W. Bush's advantage over John Kerry. How might political strategists or pollsters analyzing the 2004 election have responded to these advantages? And in Chapter 2, he provides a clear and concise explanation of why one can use spatial voting concepts to explain elections even in instances where perhaps the best-known spatial voting theorem, the median voter theorem, does not apply. All of these sections of the book call out for the author to step beyond explaining his model in technical terms and to present a clear and concise explanation of how he is able to explain what happened in 2004 and 2008 in a way that makes his ideas relevant to a broader audience.

This is an elegantly written book that makes a clear case for Jessee's model as a logical next step for those who would integrate spatial theory into empirical research on elections. It will appeal to specialists on the subject; Jessee has the ability, however, to inject novel ideas into broader discussions of American elections and I look forward to seeing him do so in subsequent work.

Robert G. Boatright
Clark University