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Clearing the Field: How do Presidential Primary Candidates Win Big on Super Tuesday?

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Abstract

In presidential primaries, Super Tuesday elections play a significant role in winnowing candidate fields and establishing nomination frontrunners. Despite their importance, scholars know little about why and how candidates win or lose the states comprising these events. This study explores which factors help explain candidate performance in Super Tuesday primaries between 2008 and 2016. Using pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis, the results indicate three key drivers of Super Tuesday success: candidate viability, public attention, and media attention. These findings imply that while there are similarities between Super Tuesdays and the broader explanations of presidential primary results, there are opportunities for upstart candidates to improve their performance vis-à-vis frontrunners, particularly since winning prior primaries or caucuses are not a uniquely significant predictor in our models. Future research should explore the interrelatedness of these three critical factors as well as how campaigns strategically attempt to influence Super Tuesday voters.

Keywords
Campaigns, elections, presidential primaries, public attention, Google Trends, media attention, polling, fundraising, endorsements

Introduction

On February 5, 2008, 23 states participated in a Democratic Party presidential primary or caucus pitting Barack Obama against Hillary Clinton. With nearly 1,700 delegates at stake, this "Super Duper Tuesday" event had the potential to alter the course of what had been a tight battle for the party's nomination (Schneider 2007). Instead, the candidates split the delegates (with a slight edge for Obama), the popular vote (with a slight edge to Clinton), and the number of states won (with a slight edge for Obama). That same day, Republicans in 21 states voted for their preferred presidential candidate. Despite a narrow popular vote win by John McCain over Mitt Romney, McCain won nearly two-thirds of the available delegates and cemented his status as the party's front-runner for the nomination (Sullivan and Luo 2008).

There a few ways in which Super Tuesdays play a significant role in the presidential nomination process. They provide information to voters by signaling a candidate's momentum and viability, as happened in the 2008 Democratic primary, which can result in increased fundraising (Steger 2008). They can serve to winnow the field of candidates, as those who perform poorly – in terms of both delegates won and expectations – may drop out of the race (Norrander 2000). Finally, they may signify the end of a competitive nomination battle, as exhibited in the 2008 GOP race.

Despite the importance of Super Tuesdays, elections scholars know little about why and how candidates win or lose the states comprising these events, nor do we know whether they

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empirically differ from other primary election events, such as Iowa, New Hampshire, or the overall contested primary vote (CPV). This study attempts to fill this gap by first detailing the role these events play in the nomination process. We then explore whether traditional explanations of presidential primary outcomes apply to this context. Using pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis, we identify three key drivers of Super Tuesday performance: viability, public attention, and media attention. These results suggest that while there are similarities between Super Tuesdays and the broader explanations of presidential primary results, there are opportunities for upstart candidates to improve their performance vis-à-vis frontrunners.

Super Tuesday Primaries

Super Tuesdays are largely a product of the "front-loading" phenomenon in presidential primaries. State legislators noticed the amount of attention given to Iowa and New Hampshire, both by presidential candidates and the media, as well as the reality that post-McGovern-Frasier Commission presidential nominations were being settled early in the process, and decided to move their primary or caucus to earlier in the calendar (Ridout and Rottinghaus 2008). The desire to attract attention and play a greater role in determining presidential nominees led some states to create the first media-designated Super Tuesday in 1984 (Stanley and Hadley 1987), when five states held primaries and another four held caucuses (Mayer and Busch 2004).

The 1988 primary marked an important strategic shift in Super Tuesdays: the creation of a regional election. After the Reagan general election victories in 1980 and 1984, southern states were frustrated by the Democratic Party's lack of success in general elections, particularly in their region, the perceived inability of a conservative Democrat to win the party's nomination, and the amount of attention given to Iowa and New Hampshire. In what Hadley and Stanley (1989, 23) describe as an "organizational success", every southern state agreed to hold their primary or caucus on the same day. Combined with some non-southern states, one-third of all delegates were up for grabs that day, an event spanning 16 states, 121 media markets, and 171 congressional districts (Norrander 1992; Hadley and Stanley 1989). While scholars found little evidence that the southern states were effective in their goals (Hadley and Stanley 1989; Norrander 1992), the idea of regional primary events did not go away, with 1996's "Yankee Primary" and "Big 10 Primary" serving as examples of geographic regions attempting to influence presidential nomination outcomes (Ridout and Rottinghaus 2008). If anything, Super Tuesdays became bigger after 1988, culminating in the 2008 event that involved close to two dozen states between the two major parties.

The combination of front-loading and Super Tuesdays has implications for the type of candidates that can win a primary. Front-loaded primaries require candidates to raise more money during the invisible primary – the time between when candidates announce they are running and the Iowa caucuses – in order to have a large enough campaign organization in multiple states at once. As Mayer and Busch (2004) point out, this amounts to an entrance fee

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just to run for president, one that most candidates are unable to afford (Norrander 2000). Finally, Hadley and Stanley (1989) present compelling evidence that the 1988 southern state strategy aimed at nominating a more moderate Democrat backfired, arguing that the presence of multiple candidates with southern roots helped keep the more liberal Michael Dukakis campaign alive as Jesse Jackson and Al Gore split the southern delegate pool. Furthermore, Gore's candidacy was only viable in the South; with every state in the region voting on Super Tuesday, there were no other winnable states on the calendar, thus depriving him of receiving any momentum later in the campaign.

Despite the increased size and frequency of Super Tuesdays (Norrander 2010), elections scholars have spent little time exploring who wins the states comprising these events and why. Many of the studies focusing on Super Tuesday look at the phenomenon from the vantage point of the state and/or region. For instance, states tend to receive more media attention when they host a primary earlier in the process (Ridout and Rottinghaus 2008), there are not too many other states holding a primary or caucus on the same day (Mayer and Busch 2004), and when more delegates are at stake (Gurian 1993; Norrander 1992). Counter to the southern state strategy of 1988, Ridout and Rottinghaus (2008) find that geographic proximity – i.e., the regional primary – does not significantly increase media attention for the individual state (Gurian 1993). This suggests that if states want to receive more media and candidate attention, states would be wise to avoid holding a primary on Super Tuesday.

States are not the only entity looking for increased media attention; candidates know that unless the media covers their campaign, they have little chance of winning the nomination. This is the reality of a sequential primary process and stems from the uniqueness of Iowa and New Hampshire receiving their own day in the spotlight. Candidates who perform better in these two states generally do better in Super Tuesday states. As Redlawsk et al. (2011) find, 25 percent of 2008 Super Tuesday voters said that winning Iowa was important; another 25 percent said the same of New Hampshire. The clear implication is that Super Tuesdays favor front-runners and candidates with significant momentum coming out of the early states (Norrander 2010). An example of the latter is the 1984 candidacy of Gary Hart. Hart finished a surprising second place in Iowa before rattling off victories in New Hampshire and Vermont. These victories increased his name recognition among Super Tuesday voters from 50 percent to 90 percent (Bartels 1989). Indeed, even in 1988 as southern states were hoping for candidates to ignore the early states, candidates spent more time in Iowa and New Hampshire than all the southern states combined (Hadley and Stanley 1989).

Studies focusing on Super Tuesday results typically include one of two nomination cycles: 1988 or 2008 due to the novelty factor (1988) or the number of states involved (2008). There is consensus that, while Super Tuesday state results can be volatile (Norrander 1992), they often boil down to a few key factors: viability and momentum. Viability, or the likelihood that a candidate can win, is the main factor, as it can supersede momentum. Presidential primary voters can be strategic; they will vote for the candidate they believe will win the primary and/or who

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they perceive has the best chance of winning in November. In the 1988 primaries, 10 percent of Republicans and 9 percent of Democrats voted for their second choice for this reason (Abramson et al. 1992). The importance of viability played a role in John McCain's 2008 GOP victory, in part due to the lack of a strong front-runner. Republicans simply viewed him as the most electable candidate (Redlawsk, Tolbert, and Donovan 2011).

The 1988 Democratic primary was somewhat similar in that Michael Dukakis was only narrowly ahead in delegates heading into Super Tuesday. In this case, however, Norrander (1992) finds that momentum played an important role in his performance as his support increased by 17 percent among voters aware of his New Hampshire primary victory. Interestingly, preferences among Republicans were stable coming out of the early primaries; George H. W. Bush effectively wrapped up the nomination in part because voters did not perceive his rivals to be viable. One implication of Bush's victory is that clear front-runners are favored unless there is significant momentum behind a candidate (Mayer and Busch 2004). Bartels (1989) argues that the closest example of this came in 1984 when Gary Hart over-performed in every Super Tuesday state due to the momentum he earned from his second-place finish in Iowa. Still, while Hart came close to beating Walter Mondale, momentum alone was not enough.

The Importance of Super Tuesdays & Their Distinction from Other Presidential Primaries

Super Tuesdays play an instrumental role in determining who wins a party's presidential nomination, the effects of which are apparent through recent presidential primary history. Some candidates, such as George H.W. Bush in 1988, are able to effectively end the race by dominating the Super Tuesday primaries. For others, like Michael Dukakis, Super Tuesday is about performing well enough to justify moving on to the next round of primaries (Norrander 2010, 1992). In this lens, Super Tuesdays are not just about establishing a clear winner. They are an attrition game that can have clear losers; candidates who perform poorly typically drop out of the race, effectively winnowing a party's candidate field and clarifying the front-runner. Thus, Super Tuesdays speed up the nomination process after the early primaries and caucuses (Norrander 2000).

Super Tuesdays are also unique from the early primaries and caucuses. Due to the sequential nature of the nomination cycle, candidates are able to focus on a couple of states, knowing that a poor performance in Iowa or New Hampshire can end their candidacy. But in the lead up to a Super Tuesday, they must choose which states they visit and run ads in (Wendland 2017). Candidates who win one or more early states receive significantly more media attention (Bartels 1993) and are seen as more viable candidates (Kenney and Rice 1984). These realities provide Super Tuesday voters with more information about the surviving candidates as well as an opportunity to alter the state of the race for subsequent voters.

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This distinction between the early primary/caucus states and Super Tuesday, combined with frontloading, allows for different types of candidates to win states. Wendland (2017) notes that presidential primary candidates are strategic in their use of campaign resources, messaging, and advertising in attempting to win delegates throughout the primary season. This includes their preparations for Super Tuesday states, as candidates understand that success in these events are paramount to both winning the nomination and staying in the race. Unlike in the early states, it is more difficult for a campaign to achieve parity in candidate visits, although well-resourced candidates may have a significant presence in the Super Tuesday states. As such, upstart candidates who win one of the early states but lack the financial resources of a frontrunner can perform well in places where their message is well received. For instance, after winning the 2008 GOP Iowa caucuses, Mike Huckabee was able to win some southern states (Alabama and Georgia) despite trailing John McCain and Mitt Romney in national polling and fundraising. In 2012, Rick Santorum won a geographically diverse set of contests – Alaska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Tennessee – despite significantly trailing Mitt Romney in delegates won heading into that Super Tuesday.

What is Super Tuesday & What Explains Super Tuesday Performance

While the term "Super Tuesday" is frequently cited in media and academic sources, there appears to be no standard definition. One key reason for studying Super Tuesdays is because they are winnowing events in an attrition game. If scholars spend time analyzing Iowa and New Hampshire results and their relation to shrinking the pool of candidates, it makes sense that we understand other important junctures that can have a similar effect. The problem with studying Super Tuesdays in this lens is that the term itself is not precisely defined by scholars; it is more of a label used by the media and political pundits dating back to at least the 1976 presidential primaries (UPI 1976). The size and timing of these electoral events change with the political cycle, but there are some common characteristics of what constitutes the media giving a set of primaries this label.

First, there can be multiple Super Tuesdays in a nomination contest. Norrander (2015) notes that in recent presidential primaries, the initial Super Tuesday does not completely end the nomination contest. This extended competitive phase allows additional primaries/caucuses to winnow further the candidates, including additional Super Tuesday events. For instance, the 2016 contests had three media-designated Super Tuesdays: March 1 (*Washington Post* 2016), March 15 (Bradner 2016), and yet a third on April 26 (Collinson 2016). Sometimes these Super Tuesday events are labeled slightly differently, such as "Super Duper Tuesday" in February 2008, when close to two dozen states held either a primary or caucus (Schneider 2007). Each cycle since 1976, with the exception of 1988, had more than one competitive Super Tuesday (although the term "Super Tuesday" was not formally used in 1976) (see Putnam 2009a). It is important to note that each cycle does not necessarily have multiple Super Tuesdays, but any working definition of Super Tuesday must allow for multiple occurrences in the same cycle.

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The second characteristic of Super Tuesdays is that the media-christened events usually included at least five states. The final Super Tuesday of the 1984 Democratic primary included five states: South Dakota, New Mexico, West Virginia, California, and New Jersey (Church 1984). Even the "Mini-Tuesday" in February 2004, consisted of seven states. The possible exception to this characteristic is 2016's Super Saturday, during which Democratic voters in three states and Republican voters in four states went to the polls. Under this condition, there has been at least one Super Tuesday in each presidential primary cycle since 1976 (see Putnam 2009). Thus, while it is possible that a cycle could not have such an event, it is historically unlikely.

With Super Tuesday defined, we move next to outlining the potential explanations of a candidate's performance in these events. To this point, presidential primary scholars focus primarily on explaining results from the Iowa caucuses, New Hampshire primaries, and the contested/aggregate primary vote (CPV and APV, respectively). These scholars use a variety of factors in an attempt to both explain and predict presidential primary outcomes. Steger (2007, 2008; 2013; 2015), Adkins and Dowdle (2002; 2001; 2005), Mayer (2000, 2003), and others (Cohen et al. 2008) model at least one of these dependent variables as a function of polling, media, endorsements, momentum, cash-on-hand, and/or public attention.

Polling

Haynes et al. (2004) identify three main resources of a presidential primary campaign: polling, press, and money. Polling is a direct measure of where a candidate stands in a given race. Although it is not a perfect predictor of who will win an election or nomination, candidates who poll better perform better. In this sense, polling is a standard explanatory variable when modeling presidential primary results because it is an indicator of support heading into an election (Mayer 2003, 1996b). Primary polling is important theoretically because it can signify which contests are divisive (Mayer 1996a). Similar to Haynes et al.'s (2004) model of candidate exits, strategic campaign decisions, such as how to deploy resources for Super Tuesdays, are at least partially informed by internal polls as they provide a measure of future success. Finally, while Steger (2007) finds that polling is significant only for Republican nomination battles, the general consensus among scholars is that polling helps predict nomination outcomes (Adkins and Dowdle 2001; Adkins and Dowdle 2005; Norrander 2006; Mayer 2003).

Media

The second of the resource triumvirate, media attention plays a critical role in presidential primary campaigns because it helps to tell voters what to think about (Steger 2015). Much of the media attention in presidential primaries focuses on the horse race and reflects a commercial bias, as the media will portray the races as exciting and/or controversial in an attempt to increase ratings (Norrander 2015, 96). There a couple of specific ways by which media attention impacts presidential primaries. First, candidates who receive a significant amount of

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media attention tend to stay in the race longer (Fei Shen 2008). Second, media attention can help long-shot candidates stay in a primary when they lag the frontrunners in other resources (Haynes et al. 2004; Haynes, Flowers, and Gurian 2002). Finally, media attention helps candidate performance in both Iowa and New Hampshire (Donovan and Hunsaker 2009). Since this literature finds a positive relationship between media attention and performance, we expect the same.

Fundraising

Fundraising is the last of the three main resources of a presidential campaign. As Hinckley and Green (1996) note, candidates must prioritize their fundraising organization in order to be successful. At the same time, it is very difficult to measure campaign organization, particularly in presidential primaries. Campaigns that last beyond the early states reshuffle their staffs according to financial resources and strategic decisions. None of these activities are reliably recorded. For instance, Feigenbaum and Shelton (2011) note that since FEC filings allow candidates to categorize spending, such reports are very broad and occur infrequently. Even if these reports were more specific and reliable, they would not allow us to measure the quality of an organization. Other conceptualizations of campaign organization, such as campaign field offices, are difficult to track during the middle to late stages of a presidential primary due to the compressed calendar. For these reasons, fundraising is frequently used as a proxy for campaign organization and/or activities (Curry, Herrnson, and Taylor 2013; Hinckley and Green 1996). While candidates can raise money based on their success in primary elections (Aldrich 1980), there is less certainty that raising money helps candidates win. While Adkins and Dowdle (2005; 2001) find that cash reserves can help scholars predict presidential primary outcomes, Steger (2007) finds that this only explains primary results for Democratic candidates. Still other scholars are unable to find evidence that money helps candidates win (Mayer 2003; Swearingen, Stiles, and Finneran 2019).

Endorsements

Endorsements are another important component of presidential primaries. Candidates seek the support of elected officials in an attempt to raise money and build a winning primary coalition (Cohen et al. 2008). Broadly speaking, endorsements help candidates increase their share of the primary vote (Steger 2008), although Steger (2015) argues that this only occurs when elites coalesce behind a particular candidate early in the process. For instance, while elite support played a role in the 2008 Democratic primaries (Summary 2010), Swearingen et al. (2019) find no evidence of elite influence in the 2016 GOP nomination. Since a higher share of endorsement signals greater cohesion of party elites behind a particular candidate, we expect a positive relationship between this factor and Super Tuesday performance.

Momentum

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The logic of how momentum plays a role in presidential primaries is straightforward. A candidate wins and/or exceeds expectations in an early primary or caucus, which in turn leads to increased media attention and fundraising success. This combination of more media coverage and financial resources then translates into more votes (Steger 2008; Bartels 1988). While momentum is not the only way to win a presidential nomination, it helps explain candidate performance in the overall primary (Steger 2008), particularly in Democratic Party contests (Steger 2007). During the 2008 presidential primaries, both John McCain and Barack Obama were able to use their stances on the Iraq war into an early state victory and gain enough momentum to eventually secure their party's nomination (Norpoth and Perkins 2011). Still, there is some evidence suggesting that momentum may help candidates improve their relative standing among their competitors but not win the nomination (Adkins and Dowdle 2001). Recent primaries highlight the fleeting nature of momentum as Mike Huckabee (2008), Rick Santorum (2012), and Ted Cruz (2016) each won the first-in-the-nation Iowa caucuses but failed to win the GOP nomination. Among Democrats, Hillary Clinton (2008) and Bernie Sanders (2016) won New Hampshire but were unable to translate momentum into the nomination. In keeping with the literature, we expect a positive relationship between momentum and Super Tuesday performance.

Public attention

Public attention is a relative newcomer to the presidential primary literature and thusfar focuses on the invisible primary. Reuning and Dietrich (2016) find that public interest plays a key role in helping the media choose which candidates it covers. Similarly, Swearingen (2017) finds that increased public attention helps presidential candidates raise more money. Finally, public attention also helps explain which candidate wins the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary as well as the contested primary vote (CPV, or a candidate's share of the vote while the presidential primary is actively contested) (Swearingen, Stiles, and Finneran 2019). These recent findings suggest that the mass public plays a significant role in deciding elections and we expect a similar relationship here.

Data & Methods

In defining our cases, each primary election date with at least five actively contested primaries/caucuses was labeled as some sort of Super Tuesday by the media. Thus, we set this as the minimum number of states voting for one party's nomination at five. Across the 2004-2016 primary cycles, there were nine Super Tuesdays: February 3, 2004; March 2, 2004; February 5, 2008; March 6, 2012; April 12, 2012; March 1, 2016; March 15, 2016; April 26, 2016; and June 7, 2016. All told, this provided us with 429 candidate-election observations.

Since this manuscript builds on previous scholarships that explores who wins early nominating contests, we utilize similar statistical models. Our dependent variable is a candidate's share of a state's vote in a given primary or caucus on a Super Tuesday. This is calculated as the

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number of votes for a candidate divided by the sum of votes for all candidates still actively running at that time.

In our efforts to understand what contributes to a candidate's success on Super Tuesday, we include a number of explanatory variables. Many scholars discuss the role of elite endorsements in determining the outcome of a presidential primary (Cohen et al. 2008; Whitby 2014; Summary 2010; Steger 2007, 2015; Rapoport, Stone, and Abramowitz 1991). Similar to Swearingen, Stiles, and Finneran (2019), we measure a candidate's share of endorsement points at the time of a given Super Tuesday. Not all endorsements have an equal bearing (Cohen et al. 2008), we weight the endorsement points as follows: gubernatorial endorsements are worth 10 points; U.S. Senator endorsements are worth five points; U.S. Representative endorsements are worth one point. The main reason for our weights is that governors have more control over the state party as well as the distribution of funds throughout their state (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006) than do U.S. Senators, especially those with greater control over the budgetary process (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003, 409). We summed the total endorsement points for each candidate as of the Super Tuesday and divided it by the total endorsement points awarded on that day. For instance, heading into the March 2, 2004 Democratic Super Tuesday, John Kerry received 230 endorsement points out of a total of 305 awarded (or 75.41%). Our source for the endorsement data for 2004, 2008, and 2012 is Democracy In Action; for 2016 it is fivethirtyeight.com.[1]

Media attention is measured as a candidate's share of local media stories within a state as reported by newlibrary.com, a news-aggregating website that includes not only newspaper stories but many local television stories as well. We searched each candidate's name in the database over the week prior to the Super Tuesday. To calculate the share of local media attention, we divided that candidate's mentions by the sum of all candidate mentions. We also looked at the media mentions for the two weeks preceding Super Tuesday, but a candidate's share did not change much as the correlation between the one-week and two-week measures was 0.99.[2]

Analytically, including polling poses an interesting issue for our models. Not all polls are a valid measurement of where a race stands (Pickup and Johnston 2008) as polls can be inaccurate and/or biased (Martin, Traugott, and Kennedy 2005). Second, polling is often correlated with other measures of primary success such as media attention and public attention (e.g. Swearingen, Stiles, and Finneran, 2019). This reality is an important reason why additional public-driven measures, such as public attention, should be included in elections models. In this study, polling support is measured as a candidate's statewide share of the polls in the RealClearPolitics average

1 For more information, see the Democracy In Action endorsement sites for 2004, 2008, and 2012, and the fivethirtyeight.com endorsement tracker for 2016.

2 We also explored using national media attention using data from the Vanderbilt TV News Archive, again for the two weeks preceding Super Tuesdays. The national measures were highly correlated with local media attention ($r = 0.866$ for one week and $r = 0.874$ for two weeks).

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heading into Super Tuesday. However, there were multicollinearity issues when including both media attention and public attention in a model.[3] We kept both variables in Model 3 in Table 1 so that readers can see their partial effects on the dependent variable. Because polling was not available for slightly over half of the observations, we drop polling in subsequent models.

Some recent studies look at the validity of using Google Trends as a measure of public attention (Ripberger 2011; Ellis, Ripberger, and Swearingen 2017), as well as its impact on election results (Swearingen, Stiles, and Finneran 2019; Reuning and Dietrich 2016). These studies indicate that, while not perfect, Google Trends effectively measures public attention and its relationship with political phenomena. We replicate their measures by calculating a candidate's share of public attention in a given state derived from Google Trends.[4] This is done by entering each candidate's name into Google Trends for a party's candidate field in a particular state for the 90 days prior to the primary. The peak search traffic for a candidate during those 90 days is a 100; all other scores are relative to that point. Then we calculated each candidate's average share of the attention for the week heading into the primary For example, for the California primary on March 2, 2004, John Kerry's public attention score averaged 18.29, John Edwards' was 7.71, Dennis Kucinich's was 7.57, Howard Dean's was 4.71, and Al Sharpton's was 4.51. These scores total 42.85, so dividing each candidate's score by that sum provides their share of public attention. We tried different weekly increments for public attention, ranging from one week to the full 90 days. Ultimately, the one-week measure since many exit polls indicates a strong plurality of voters decides who to vote for during the week leading up to the primary. Furthermore, a candidate's public attention share did not change much over the increments as the correlation between public attention share over the final week and final two weeks was 0.98.

Next, similar to Adkins and Dowdle (2005) we include a candidate's share of the cash-on-hand at the end of the month preceding a Super Tuesday. The data for this variable comes from the monthly FEC filing reports required of candidates once the primary phase of the nomination process begins. The percentage is calculated by taking a candidate's listed cash-on-hand totals divided by the sum of all cash-on-hand totals for all candidates of that party still actively running at that time. Since much of the presidential primary focuses on momentum (Steger 2007; Norpoth and Perkins 2011; Fei Shen 2008; Donovan and Hunsaker 2009;

3 We use Gujarati's (2004) work as a reference on multicollinearity. We explored pair-wise correlations among the regressors, none of which were above 0.8, a mark that could distinguish the presence of high collinearity. We also looked at each model's variance inflation factor (VIF); since media and public attention had VIFs of less than 10, we are confident there is not a high degree of multicollinearity due to the inclusion of these regressors. However, these tests indicated that there was evidence of multicollinearity between polling and media attention (for which, the VIF was 16.2).

4 See Ripberger (2011) and Swearingen and Ripberger (2014) for a more detailed look into the validity of Google Trends as a measure of public attention.

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Adkins and Dowdle 2001), we add a measure of the share of delegates won by each candidate heading into Super Tuesday.[5]

In addition to the explanatory variables, we included several controls. Because candidates in large primary fields can split the vote, we added a control for the number of candidates. We explored another control variable for the type of election (primary versus caucus), but it did not significantly add to the models. Finally, we include two candidate-driven dummy variables: one for if a Super Tuesday state bordered a candidate's home state and another if a candidate had a long-term personal history in that state. The latter was generally confined to a candidate's home state with the exceptions of Arkansas for Hillary Clinton and Utah for Mitt Romney. We limit this variable to direct personal experience because there is little evidence that candidates receive a regional bounce (Norrander 1992).

Because the public attention variable is available starting in 2004, we look at all Super Tuesday states beginning with that cycle. This yields a total of 429 observations (each candidate by state), 211 of which had an RCP polling average while 218 did not. Since we have multiple candidates in a single-state election, we use fixed effects regression accounting for both factors using the "*plm*" package in R 3.5.1. Due to the presence of heteroscedasticity, we report robust standard errors.

Results & Discussion

We run three main models of a candidate's share of the vote in a Super Tuesday state where polling was available. Due to the presence of multicollinearity between polling and media attention, we ran one model without one of the two offending variables and a third that included both. Each model has an adjusted R-square of at least 0.61 and a statistically significant F-statistic.

Although Model 1 leaves out the polling variable, there are still a couple of interesting findings. First, public attention is statistically and substantively significant in explaining a candidate's Super Tuesday performance. For each one percent increase in a candidate's share of public attention, their share of the vote is expected to increase by 0.79 points. This means that a candidate one standard deviation above the mean is expected to receive nearly 39 percent more of the vote than the average candidate.

The substantive importance of public attention helps us understand the success of some presidential primary candidates. Barack Obama's candidacy was greatly aided by the amount of public attention he received. Heading into the February 5, 2008 Super Tuesday, he regularly received over 60 percent of the public attention compared to his chief rival, Hillary Clinton. While polling indicated he trailed Senator Clinton in Alabama and Missouri, he ended up

[5] We also looked at the percentage of states won, total states won, total caucuses won, and whether the candidate won the Iowa caucuses and/or New Hampshire primary. Because the nomination process is about winning delegates, we settled on this measure of momentum.

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winning those states. The same held for Donald Trump's campaign in the 2016 GOP primary. In a field of five candidates heading into the March 1 Super Tuesday, he dominated in public attention, garnering well over 60 percent in many of the states. This helped him pull out a narrow victory over Florida Senator Marco Rubio in Virginia and win easily in southern states targeted by Ted Cruz, such as Alabama and Georgia.

The second interesting finding from Model 1 is that the substantive impact of local media attention is higher than that of public attention. A one percent increase in local media attention is expected to bring an additional 1.13 percent of support in a Super Tuesday state. Greater media attention surrounding front-running candidates certainly helps them solidify their status, but it can also help less-known candidates in the right circumstances. On the February 5, 2008 GOP Super Tuesday, Ron Paul (TX) averaged roughly 7.5 percent of the vote across the twenty primaries/caucuses. In the three caucus states where his local media share was over 20 percent – Alaska, Minnesota, and Montana – he averaged over 19 percent of the vote.

When polling is not included, a candidate is expected to receive a nearly nine percent bump in performance in states where they have a strong personal history. This same cannot be said for neighboring states, which fails to reach statistical significance. Also worth noting is that Model 1 is the only one for which a candidate's share of cash-on-hand is significant. Rather than helping a candidate, though, this variable is expected to decrease their performance.

The next model replaces media attention with polling; while the adjusted R-square remains the same, the F-statistic jumps from 45.16 to 131.22. The key finding in this model is that the public-driven measures are the key drivers of candidate performance. With a coefficient of 0.91, polling is strongly significant; in Model 3, which includes media attention, the coefficient only drops slightly (0.80). This indicates that despite some highly publicized misses in predicting Super Tuesday outcomes, polling is still a starting point when discussing electoral performance.

Public attention is significant even when controlling for polling and, in Model 3, media attention. The coefficient for both models is between 0.47 and 0.41, indicating substantive significance as well. The average candidate is expected to add 11.6 – 13.3 percent to their performance; above-average candidates (one standard deviation) are expected to add 20.2 – 23.2 percent. Again, this underscores the importance of public-driven measures in explaining electoral performance.

There are two changes in Model 2 compared to Model 1. First, candidates are not expected to increase their vote share in personal states, likely due to the inclusion of polling in the model. This finding holds for Model 3 as well. Candidates are, however, are expected to receive a two percent increase in neighboring states, mirroring other scholars (Norrander 1993) that found geography plays a role in Super Tuesday results. Second, once polling is added to the model, cash-on-hand ceases to achieve statistical significance. This could be due to the post-Iowa and New Hampshire that winnows out weaker candidates from the race (Norrander 2006); by the time Super Tuesday arrives, many of the remaining candidates have some fundraising ability.

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Table 1. Models of Polled Super Tuesday States, 2004 – 2016			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Elite-Driven Measures			
Endorsements (Pct)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.48)	0.02 (0.05)
Local Media Attention (Pct)	1.13*** (0.14)	-----	0.43** (0.14)
Public-Driven Measures			
Public Attention (Pct)	0.79*** (0.13)	0.47*** (0.10)	0.41*** (0.10)
Poll Standing	-----	0.91*** (0.04)	0.80*** (0.04)
Candidate-Driven Measures			
Personal State	8.58*** (2.12)	1.59 (1.42)	0.58 (1.42)
Neighbor State	3.05 (2.66)	2.03* (0.89)	1.85* (0.89)
Fundraising Measures			
Cash-on-Hand (Pct)	-0.49*** (0.11)	0.09 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.13)
Momentum Measures			
Share of Delegates Won	0.27* (0.12)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.10)
Other			
Number of Candidates	1.19 (1.54)	1.00 (0.91)	1.38** (0.52)
Adj. R^2	0.61	0.83	0.85
F-Statistic	45.16***	131.22***	132.7***
N	211	211	211

Dependent variable is a candidate's vote share. Fixed effects regression model with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-tail test where hypothesized.
$^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Finally, Model 3 adds local media attention back into the analysis. Despite the multicollinearity between polling and media attention, there are no changes to the substantive or statistical significance of public attention, polling, or the neighbor state bump. With a coefficient of 0.43, the media attention variable is an important driver of Super Tuesday performance. The typical candidate is expected to receive an additional 12 percent from media attention, while above-average candidates (by one standard deviation) are expected to get an almost 19 percent increase. The stability of this model suggests that all three consistently significant variables play a role in understanding Super Tuesday performance.

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Polling is available for roughly half (211 of 429) cases in our data set. In order to understand who wins Super Tuesday races where there is no polling data, we ran two models that removed polling – one for all 429 observations and another for the 218 cases where polling did not exist (Table 2). These models perform well with adjusted R-squares of 0.51 and 0.42, respectively, and statistically significant F-statistics ($p < 0.001$ for both).

Table 2: Non-Polling-Based Models of Super Tuesday Results, 2004 – 2016

	All Cases	Polls Unavailable
Elite-Driven Measures		
Endorsements (Pct)	0.13***	0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Local Media Attention (Pct)	1.15***	1.09***
	(0.11)	(0.13)
Public-Driven Measures		
Public Attention (Pct)	0.53***	0.42**
	(0.14)	(0.14)
Candidate-Driven Measures		
Personal State	12.69***	20.18***
	(1.95)	(2.91)
Neighbor State	2.85*	0.98
	(1.32)	(2.09)
Fundraising Measures		
Cash-on-Hand (Pct)	-0.59***	-0.52*
	(0.15)	(0.22)
Momentum Measures		
Share of Delegates Won	0.08	-0.09
	(0.15)	(0.17)
Other		
Number of Candidates	1.31	1.64
	(1.02)	(1.38)
Adj. R^2	0.51	0.42
F-Statistic	59.34***	23.87***
N	429	218

Dependent variable is a candidate's vote share. Fixed effects regression model with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed test where hypothesized.
*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

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Looking at both models, public attention again plays a key role in improving candidate performance in Super Tuesday contests. With a coefficient of 0.53, candidates with above-average public attention are expected to receive an additional 26 percent of the vote. Among the cases without a polling average, this coefficient drops slightly but is still expected to add 21 percent to a candidate with above-average public attention. Taken jointly, these results reiterate that public attention is an important metric with which to measure campaign effectiveness.

Media attention is another factor that helps explain Super Tuesday performance. In fact, sans polling, an additional one percent in local media attention vis-à-vis the opposition is expected to add just over one percent to a candidate's vote total. This underscores the importance of campaign stops and interviews with local media outlets. Beyond the early primary/caucus states when candidates can attack each race singly, a campaign must make strategic decisions about where to go. As Bartels (1985) notes, the candidate is a campaign's greatest resource, in part because of the media attention that follows him/her. Generating greater media attention is not only a sound strategy, it serves as a barometer of who may be performing well in a given state.

Importantly, Table 2 shows that in some cases, elite endorsements can help explain Super Tuesday results. For all cases, a one-percent increase in endorsements is expected to add 0.13 percent to a candidate's vote share; for cases where polling is unavailable, the coefficient is 0.17. This indicates that candidates who are able to win an above-average backing of key party elites can add between seven and nine percent to their vote share in a Super Tuesday state. This finding reiterates Steger's (2015) notion that when the establishment is unified, that candidate has a much higher chance of performing well in presidential primaries.

Without polling included in the models, the variable for a candidate's personal state is again significant. In all observations, a candidate is expected to increase their vote share a bit less than 13 percent in personal states; in states without polling available, the impact increase to over 20 percent. Finally, cash-on-hand is a statistically significant, negative determinant of Super Tuesday performance. Again, this could be due to the quality of candidates remaining beyond the initial primary/caucus states.

The no polling models are robust in explaining Super Tuesday results when combining observations from all four election cycles. Does this hold when analyzing each cycle independently? It is plausible that there were cycle-specific anomalies that get covered up by the overall sample. For instance, did Howard Dean's highly-covered scream on the night of the 2004 Iowa caucuses increase his share of both media and public attention, even though he averaged less than ten percent of the vote in the February 3 Super Tuesday? We note the RCP polling average is not included for two reasons. First, there was a problem with multicollinearity for the 2012 races between polling and local media attention. Second, there were relatively few observations with polling data in 2004 and 2012, the years when only one party had a contested presidential primary. In order to make comparisons across election cycles, we decided to drop the polling variable.

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Table 3: Regression Models of Super Tuesday Results, by Cycle				
	2004	2008	2012	2016
Elite-Driven Measures				
Endorsements (Pct)	0.16 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.14)	-0.56 (0.41)	0.11** (0.04)
Local Media Attention (Pct)	1.13*** (0.29)	0.84*** (0.14)	1.10** (0.32)	0.59*** (0.12)
Public-Driven Measures				
Public Attention (Pct)	0.06 (0.05)	1.19*** (0.13)	0.54*** (0.08)	1.14*** (0.11)
Candidate-Driven Measures				
Personal State	14.40* (5.63)	9.55*** (1.87)	17.80*** (2.55)	12.26*** (3.29)
Neighbor State	2.94 (2.94)	3.50 (1.94)	3.02* (1.50)	0.86 (1.88)
Fundraising Measures				
Cash-on-Hand (Pct)	-0.58** (0.19)	-----	0.51 (0.37)	-1.02*** (0.14)
Momentum Measures				
Share of Delegates Won	0.10 (0.15)	-----	-0.05 (0.09)	0.44*** (0.10)
Other				
Number of Candidates	1.49 (0.89)	-----	-----	-4.08 (2.71)
Adj. R^2	0.42	0.64	0.66	0.53
F-Statistic	10.68***	47.56***	17.08***	22.22***
N	99	128	58	144

Dependent variable is a candidate's vote share. Fixed effects regression model with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed test where hypothesized.
$^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

As Table 3 indicates, the no polling model holds up fairly well when disaggregating the cases by election cycle. Local media attention is a driving factor of Super Tuesday performance, as is having a personal history in a state. There are some differences across the cycles when it comes to public attention, which is significant in each cycle except 2004. This is where we see some evidence that the "Dean Scream" may have inflated Howard Dean's share of the public attention. In the states voting on February 3, Dean averaged 9.96 percent of the vote (fourth place among Democratic candidates) but over 20 percent of the public attention share (second highest). One month later, Dean averaged 8.7 percent of the vote, third-highest behind John Kerry and John Edwards; by this time, he had dropped to third place in public attention. In 2008,

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public attention was significant, adding an expected 1.19 percent of the vote for each one percent increase in attention. On the Democratic side, Barack Obama received over 57 percent of the local media attention heading into Super Tuesday and almost 70 percent of the public attention *en route* to winning 13 of the 22 states. Among Republicans, John McCain received about 41 percent of the public attention and 34 percent of the local media attention as he won the plurality of Super Tuesday contests.[6]

Four years later, local media attention was once again the strongest predictor of Super Tuesday results. This could be due to Ron Paul averaging 34 percent of the public attention but only 16 percent of the vote across 14 states and two Super Tuesdays. Still, public attention was significant, and each one percentage increase was expected to add about 0.5 points to a candidate's vote share. In 2016, public attention had a higher coefficient, perhaps in part to the dominance of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump in getting people to pay attention to their campaigns. Interestingly, 2016 was the only year for which endorsements were an asset – each increase in a candidate's endorsement share was expected to add 0.11 percent of the vote on Super Tuesday. For above-average candidates, this meant an added six percent of the vote. Again, these models reiterate the strength of both local media attention and public attention as key predictors of Super Tuesday results, particularly in the absence of polling data.

Table 4: Regression Models of Super Tuesday Results, by Party		
	Democrats	Republicans
Elite-Driven Measures		
Endorsements (Pct)	0.09***	-0.32
	(0.03)	(0.22)
Local Media Attention (Pct)	1.09***	1.02***
	(0.12)	(0.15)
Public-Driven Measures		
Public Attention (Pct)	0.34*	0.88***
	(0.17)	(0.10)
Candidate-Driven Measures		
Personal State	13.98***	11.87***
	(3.50)	(2.18)
Neighbor State	2.28	3.49***
	(2.43)	(0.74)
Fundraising Measures		
Cash-on-Hand (Pct)	-0.70***	-0.06
	(0.15)	(0.19)
Momentum Measures		

[6] Because there was only one Super Tuesday in 2008 and our models control for candidate and state fixed-effects, the cash-on-hand, share of prior delegates won, and number of candidates variables did not vary along these clusters and were thus removed from the model.

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Table 4: (*continued*) Regression Models of Super Tuesday Results, by Party		
Share of Delegates Won	0.16 (0.15)	0.13 (0.11)
Other		
Number of Candidates	1.42* (0.68)	0.32 (1.65)
Adj. R^2	0.37	0.66
F-Statistic	15.07***	51.55***
N	197	232
Dependent variable is a candidate's vote share. Fixed effects regression model with robust standard errors in parentheses. *$^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$*		

Finally, because Republicans and Democrats vary in their delegate distribution rules, we ran the models for each party (Table 4). There are some similarities across political party. Local media attention is a statistically significant factor in explaining Super Tuesday vote share (b = 1.09 for Democrats and 1.02 for Republicans) and having a primary/caucus in a home state can add around 12-14 percent to a candidate's total. While public attention is statistically significant for both parties, there is a substantive difference. For Democrats, a one-percent increase in public attention was expected to add 0.34 percent to a candidate's vote share, compared to 0.88 percent for Republicans.

Interestingly, there were some differences across party. Endorsements were statistically significant for Democrats, but not for Republicans. A one-percent increase in endorsements was expected to add 0.09 percent to a Democrat's vote share. The same was true for both cash-on-hand and the number of candidates still in the race. Counterintuitively, cash-on-hand was a negative predictor of Super Tuesday performance, while the number of candidates was positive. One possible explanation for the latter is that with more candidates in the race, voters were more concerned with viability. With respect to the former, we admit to being puzzled by this result. A simple mean comparison indicates that the average vote share is inversely related to the number of candidates in the race. Perhaps this finding is due to the winnowing process of presidential primaries: those candidates running come Super Tuesday may have more resources and a better ground game which may help the median candidate, although not the mathematically average one. For instance, in reviewing the descriptive statistics, we found that median vote share increased as the field moved from six to seven candidates and the median vote share at three and four candidates was very similar. Still, this finding is not consistent across all our models and we hesitate to read too much into it.

Conclusion

In this study, we explore which factors help explain the outcome of Super Tuesday races. While polling is a main determinant of Super Tuesday performance, it is not the only one. Both public attention and media attention are consistently statistically and substantively significant, particularly when polling data are not available for a state. The strong findings for polling, public

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attention, and media attention indicate that elections are more complex than simply stating that the polling frontrunner will win a given state. These complexities are highlighted by the lack of polling in many Super Tuesday caucus states. Because of this, pundits and scholars need to examine additional data to understand and predict Super Tuesday races. Both public attention and media attention are important indices to explore in this context. Even when polling data are available, the industry has been hit with questions of its validity after some recent high-profile misses (Zukin 2015; Silver 2014). Comparing polling results to other data can help scholars and pundits make better predictions and understand when polling could be wrong.

One interesting component of our results is that, while there is explanatory overlap between Super Tuesday and early nomination contests, there are some key differences. In terms of Haynes et al.'s (2004) resource triumvirate, polling and media attention matter while cash-on-hand does not. Moreover, we find that upstart candidates can use local media and public attention to win states even if they are at a financial disadvantage. Those who are able to create considerable interest among primary voters were consistently able to outperform their challengers. This finding is more optimistic for such candidates than previous studies of presidential primary results. Future research should explore how candidates can create positive public attention moments for their campaign and how the timing of such moments could affect the primary process.

Also worth noting is that candidates receive a bit of a boost in geographically proximal states (Norrander 1993). The results are more mixed when considering states where candidates have a personal history, however. This variable is only significant when polling data are unavailable or not included in a model. This does not mean that candidates do not benefit from having their state host a Super Tuesday election. Indeed, only four candidates lost their home state in this sample: Dennis Kucinich and Al Sharpton in 2008, Rick Santorum in 2012, and Marco Rubio in 2016. The first two candidates were unlikely to win because they were not strong contenders for the nomination. The last two cases are a bit more interesting. Santorum lost his home state of Pennsylvania to Mitt Romney, 58 percent to 18 percent, at the end of April. By this time in the primary, Romney had won 24 states to Santorum's 10; Romney had won almost 62 percent of the prior delegates. In other words, Romney was the presumptive nominee fending off the last-ditch efforts of his opposition. Rubio's loss at the hands of Donald Trump came earlier in the primary process, six weeks after the Iowa caucuses, and represented the end of his campaign. Rubio had won Minnesota and Washington, DC, prior to the March 15 Super Tuesday, but Trump entered the day with wins in 15 states and was beginning to receive stronger backing from GOP primary voters. While other Republicans continued to challenge Trump for more than a month after March 15, his status as frontrunner was not in doubt.

The final noteworthy observation from this study is that cash-on-hand and endorsements do not consistently help candidates win Super Tuesday races. The null finding for financial resources underscores the fiscal reality of Super Tuesdays: in order to compete in at least five elections on one day requires a certain fundraising competence. This reiterates the finding

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from other scholars that fundraising is a necessary but insufficient condition for presidential primary success (Goff 2004; Adkins and Dowdle 2002; Mayer 2003). This can be seen from a deeper dive into the data; in most election cycles, the candidates competing in Super Tuesdays were all relatively proficient fundraisers. Among Democrats, every Super Tuesday in 2008 and 2016 was contested by only two candidates – Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in 2008, and Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders in 2016. Among Republicans, there were more candidates, but almost all of them had money. Those candidates that lacked resources were still able to win some states, including Donald Trump, who had less than 10 percent of the field's cash-on-hand in the first two 2016 Super Tuesdays.

Based on these results, there are numerous avenues for future research on Super Tuesday elections. First, polling, public attention, and media attention are interrelated. Candidates who do well in one area typically do well in the other two. The nature of these relationships could be explored in more depth, perhaps using case studies or a time-series analysis. Second, underfunded candidates can eke out victories in demographically and socio-economically favorable states. For example, Rick Santorum, despite winning the 2012 Iowa caucuses, was less organized than Mitt Romney. Still, he was able to win numerous Super Tuesday states, such as North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. Which demographic and socio-economic factors made these states prime targets for his campaign? By exploring these questions, scholars can better understand the nuances of presidential primaries and how we elect our chief executive.

Finally, more work needs to be done to explore how campaigns strategically attempt to influence Super Tuesday voters. Wendland's (2017) recent book on campaign visits and presidential primaries is an important guide here. He notes that visits play a prominent role in campaign strategy and can make a positive difference for some candidates. Combining visits with survey data from Super Tuesday voters may help scholars better understand campaign effects in the presidential primary process.

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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics					
Variable	Mean	Median	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Local Media Attention	28.5	26.2	15.2	0	72.3
Public Attention	28.5	23.0	21.0	0	82.7
Polling	26.3	25.9	17.7	0	84.5
Prior Delegates	28.1	26.6	22.5	0	65.2
Prior States	28.5	25	28.3	0	100.0
Prior Caucus Wins	1.3	1.0	2.12	0	11.0
Cash on Hand	28.5	24.8	19.9	-0.11	82.1
Disbursements	28.5	28.7	16.6	0.28	61.4
Vote Share	28.1	25.6	21.2	0	90.1

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Emotional Voting, Racial Animus and Economic Anxiety in the 2016 Presidential Election

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Abstract: In the wake of Donald Trump's presidential election victory, several competing theories were offered purporting to explain Trump's appeal to American voters. These included arguments that Trump voters were mostly "white working class" voters who felt left behind in an increasingly globalized economy; that Trump voters were those who simply felt negatively about the direction of the economy; or that Trump voters were attracted to the candidates use of overtly racialized language against minority groups such as immigrants and Blacks.

This paper utilizes data from AdSAM, an emotional response survey system, to measure the emotive responses of likely voters toward candidates in the 2016 election. The survey also measured emotional responses towards issues including immigration, the economy, and the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. The results suggest that the strongest predictors for voting for Trump were negative feelings towards the economy and negative responses to the BLM movement, and emphasizes emotional, rather than cognitive responses as explaining support for Trump.

Introduction

Following Donald Trump's Electoral College victory in the 2016 presidential election, researchers offered several alternative theories explaining Trump's appeal to voters, including economic anxiety, authoritarian tendencies, or positive reactions towards Trump's racist and sexist appeals. This paper first summarizes the literature on the election results, before then relating more broadly to the contention in the literature between rational and emotional voting. Rather than considering voters rational actors who select the candidate closer to them on some ideological spectrum (Downs 1957), emotional voting suggests that voters may simply select the candidate who resonates with them emotionally or delivers the highest level of consonance with their own identity (Bruter & Harrison 2017).

The research's primary contribution to the literature is the unique manner in which respondents' positions are measured. There is an increasing body of literature (Lodge and Taber 2012; Westen 2008; Garry 2014) that suggests emotionality plays a critical role in the formation of opinion towards candidates and relevant policy topics. In order to measure emotional (rather than rational) responses to candidates and relevant topics, this paper uses a method developed specifically to measure the emotional response of individuals to verbal stimuli known as AdSAM.

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The advantages of measuring emotional responses rather than traditional public opinion polling are briefly summarized here.

A number of more traditional explanations for Trump support—economic anxiety, racist ideologies, status threat, or authoritarian personalities—implicitly suggest an *emotional* basis for Trump support. For instance, economic anxiety theories suggest that the state of the present or future economy engenders feelings of anxiety or fear, which drive voters towards certain candidates who propose easy solutions to complicated problems. These fears are developed as the result of information that comes from personal economic planning, including personal social networks and the media (Ansolabehere, Meredith, Snowberg 2014). Measuring the emotional responses of Trump and non-Trump voters to relevant topics is interesting because most theories that explain Trump's rise are explicitly *cognitive*; they emphasize how individuals rationally acquire and make sense of the world. Nevertheless, these theories also imply that voters should also have strong *emotional* responses to the economy or race, respectively. By measuring the emotional response of voters to relevant candidates or topics in the 2016 election, this study can more precisely isolate what affectively drove voters towards Trump or other candidates.

This paper first summarizes the literature regarding "traditional" explanations for Trump's support and victory as a function of economic anxiety, racial animus, status threat, and/or authoritarian personalities. This paper next develops a set of testable hypotheses from these traditional hypotheses and then operationalizes them through a unique emotional response survey system known as AdSAM. The research then provides a detailed explanation of AdSAM and how it operationalizes the relevant independent and control variables. This design allows for testing the degree to which emotional bases for Trump support run in parallel with more traditional "cognitive" or "rational" explanations for Trump's success. By measuring emotional response directly, this paper provides a strong test of theories of economic anxiety, racial animus, and status threat as primary drivers of support for Donald Trump. Finally, the results are discussed and re-contextualized within the growing literature on the 2016 election.

Literature Review

This section briefly examines some of the most common factors that scholars offered to explain the 2016 outcome, including economic anxiety, racial animus, and status threat. Testable hypotheses are then developed from each of these strands of research, which can be tested using our emotional survey response system.

Economic Anxiety

Perhaps the most prominent "common sense" explanation for Trump voters was that they were voters "left behind" by globalization, a process thought to lead to stagnant wages and a sense of anxiety about the future (Levitz 2017). These voters felt alienated from their government and were compelled to vote for the "outsider" candidate who had no previous political

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experience. The Trump campaign policy included a strong sense of economic protectionism: threatening companies with higher tax rates if they moved jobs abroad, opposing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and promising to bring back coal jobs to Kentucky. Coupled with Trump's electoral victory, which largely hinged on strong showings in classic "rust-belt" states--especially Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio--it is not hard to imagine that Trump voters were largely motivated by economic concerns.

Generally, these "economic anxiety" arguments were paired with ethnographic accounts of the "white-working class," who were allegedly at greater risk to outsourcing in a post-industrial society. Early work suggested that "economic anxiety" is a strong predictor of support for Trump, at least at a county level (Kolko 2017, Casselman 2017). When compared to the 2012 General Election results, counties whose jobs were particularly susceptible to outsourcing seemed to move towards Trump at greater rates than counties with diverse, more service-oriented job profiles. Importantly, however, many other classic proxies of the economy seem to do a poor job in predicting support for Trump. Regions with higher unemployment rates were no more likely to vote for Trump than regions with lower employment rates (Kolko 2017). The difference, then, is that it is not "objective" economic conditions of the state or county in which the voter resides that ought to best predict Trump support. Instead, the subjective, *emotional* response to questions about an individuals' economic future ought to correlate with voting for Trump.

Previous works have emphasized objective conditions of the economy, including GNP/GDP, as driving voter perception of the economy (Abramowitz 1996). However, traditional economic explanations of voting behavior (Kramer 1983) have been called into question by critiques that voters consider not their own personal economic conditions but rather their overall *perceptions* of the economy (Scicchitano 1983). Authors such as Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2001) have demonstrated that under certain conditions, the aggregate perception of the economy is more successful in predicting presidential voting than more "objective" measures of the economy. The researchers, therefore, expect that anxiety and negative opinions about the economy--*not* individual economic conditions-- will correlate significantly with Trump support, leading to the first hypothesis:

- *Hypothesis 1: Voters who display more negative, insecure, and pessimistic emotional responses towards the economy generally are more likely to indicate support for Trump.*

Racial Animus and Status Threat

In contrast to economic arguments, other scholars argue that Trump's appeal is a function of darker undercurrents within the electorate, including his blatant appeals to authoritarianism, racism, and sexism. According to the authoritarian argument, Trump appealed to authoritarian voters in the American electorate, who were energized and galvanized by Trump's explicit authoritarian appeals (Choma 2017, MacWilliams 2017). In particular, adherence to right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO)

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helped explain Trump's appeal to certain sectors of the electorate. SDO, drawing on the work of Pratto et. al (1994), is defined as the belief that there ought to be a hierarchy of some groups over others--in this context, SDO was operationalized as agreement with statements such as the belief that America is a primarily "white" country that ought to serve white interests. Higher levels of agreement with statements that emphasized RWA or SDO were significantly ($p < .001$) and positively correlated ($r = .29$ and $r = .32$, respectively) with intention to vote for Trump in the 2016 General Election, controlling for partisan affiliation (Choma 2017).

Perhaps the most prominent explanation for Trump's support was racial animus among Trump voters, who held latent, anti-immigrant, and anti-Black sentiment that were mobilized by Trump's explicit racial appeals. White Trump supporters are more likely to support housing-assistance policies if they are primed with an image of a white applicant rather than a Black applicant (Luttig et. al 2017). Trump supporters were also more likely to express anger about the policy and blame beneficiaries of the policy if the beneficiary in question was Black. Importantly, these theories argue that these racist views were not created by Trump; rather, they are learned during adolescence and childhood (Sears 1993) and are "activated" by the salience of Trump's racial views.

Closely related to theories of racial animus are theories that point to the increasing salience of identity politics and white status threat as the main drivers behind Trump's rise. Sides, Tesler, & Vavreck (2018) argue that narratives which emphasize voter anger ignore "who was angry and why"--namely, white Americans were angry towards groups that had seemingly risen in status during the Obama administration, namely Blacks, Muslims, and immigrants. The increased salience of these groups caused an "activation" of whites' racial and religious identities, which drove support for Trump. Experimental research supports this theory--Major, Blodorn, and Blascovic (2016) found that voters who strongly identified as white were more likely to support Trump once they were reminded that by 2042, non-whites will constitute a majority of U.S. citizens.

Trump's support was at least partially caused by raising the specter of the United States losing its primary white "identity." Fear of changing demographics may lead to a sort of white "backlash," in which voters identify Trump as capable of maintaining the United States as a primarily white country. Mutz (2018) summarizes this as the "status threat" theory--leveraging unique panel data from 2012 and 2016, she shows that individuals who perceived the rising status of non-whites as a threat to white livelihood were more likely to support Trump. Essentially, increasing demands from domestic minority groups (such as Blacks) as well as fears of globalization led whites to crave a return to more hierarchical social and political arrangements and a maintenance of the status quo.

This leads to a rise in the appeal of nostalgic conservatism, which emphasizes more positive feelings towards in-group members (whites) and more negative feelings to outgroup individuals (Blacks & immigrants). Importantly for Mutz (2018), for a group to be perceived as a threat, they must also be viewed as sufficiently powerful. For this reason, she argues that due to

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their inherent weakness, immigrants would not be viewed as a threat, while Blacks, due to their seeming cultural ascendency in the immediate wake of a two-term Black president, *would* be viewed as a threat. This survey asked directly about respondents' feelings towards the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, a social movement with the explicit goal of raising the social status of Black Americans. Coupled with a question about negative feelings towards immigrants, this research design allows for teasing out which particular "strand" of anti-non-white behavior drove our subgroup of Trump supporters. The racial threat literature therefore suggests the following hypothesis:

- *Hypothesis 2: Voters who display more negative, insecure, and pessimistic emotional responses towards Black Lives Matter (BLM) are more likely to vote for Trump.*

Hypothesis 2 can therefore be best understood as the "racial threat" hypothesis. Authors have pointed out that, despite Trump being most famously associated with anti-immigrant rhetoric, Trump rallies were more commonly sites of frequent violence against Black protesters, and that white Trump voters displayed a higher tendency to consider Black people closer to apes than white Republicans generally (Watts 2017, Jardina & Piston 2016).

Nevertheless, Trump's campaign did contain explicitly racist and anti-immigrant rhetoric-- famously initiating his campaign by labeling Mexicans as people who were bringing drugs, criminals, and rapists into the United States, and frequently promising that he would build a "great wall" on the U.S/Mexico border to drive down illegal immigration. It is natural to expect that Trump supporters would have a visceral reaction to immigrants generally, which leads to our third hypothesis:

- *Hypothesis 3: Voters who display more negative, insecure, and pessimistic emotional responses towards immigrants are more likely to vote for Trump.*

While Hypothesis 2 speaks to the racial threat literature, hypothesis 3 is best understood as the "nativist" or simply "anti-immigrant" hypothesis. By determining which variables are significant in our logistic model, we are able to determine which of the two "strains" of anti-minority sentiment most clearly drove our sample—anti-immigrant or anti-Black.

Methods

Data Collection

The data were collected from a survey administered during the last week of the presidential campaign in 2016 and was the third of three cross-sectional surveys administered throughout the campaign. The surveys were conducted prior to the general election, and as a

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result, the dependent variables are an "indication that they will vote for Trump" in the general election rather than actual voting behavior. The survey was administered through Amazon's MTurk platform and collected 326 unique responses. Much attention has been given to survey designs using MTurk in recent years, with a wide variety of researchers (Arceneaux 2012, Ahler 2014) turning to MTurk due to its dramatically lower cost and ability to recruit relatively diverse samples of subjects (Berinsky et. al 2012). Nevertheless, there are significant concerns about generalizing from a non-randomly selected sample: the chief concerns within the literature appear to be the degree to which the sample is externally valid (Krupnikov & Levine 2014), and whether or not individuals who fulfill MTurk surveys are paying sufficient attention to their responses, leading to concerns about data quality.

With regards to external validity, while the sample is non-random, the collection of demographic data allowed us to control for factors known to impact political preferences, including partisan identification, age, race, education, sex, and income. Additionally, our findings appear in line with the larger literature on the 2016 election, providing some evidence that the types of individuals who fulfilled the survey may not be systematically different from the average voter. Nevertheless, concerns about external validity can never be completely eradicated—however, due to the unique measurement mechanism of AdSAM, this data would have been prohibitively expensive to collect in any other way. Furthermore, previous research has suggested that at least in the field of political psychology, MTurk samples offer "substantively identical" findings as gold-standard surveys such as the ANES (Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner 2015). Additionally, concerns about attention can be mitigated in two ways: first, an attention check was inserted halfway through the survey to determine if individuals were actually reading and responding to the questions, rather than randomly satisficing. Moreover, recent research has suggested that MTurk respondents actually pay at least as much, if not *more* attention than average survey populations (Paolacci et. al 2010, Weinberg et. al 2014).

AdSAM Response System

The survey was conducted through the administration of Attitude Self-Assessment Manikin (AdSAM), an emotional response modeling survey system designed to measure respondents' reactions to survey questions along three dimensions: appeal, engagement, and empowerment. This measure is widely used in research and marketing, with the original dimensions refined by Morris (1995) in its present form. AdSAM has the advantage of measuring the emotional aspects of individual public opinion through its utilization of human pictographs or manikins. Each question was posed in the format "How do you feel about blank?" For instance, a respondent may be asked "How do you feel about businessman Donald Trump?" Rather than simply indicating if they approve or disapprove of then-candidate Trump, respondents are prompted to indicate how they feel on the three aforementioned dimensions of emotional response: *satisfied/dissatisfied, engaged/calm,* and *in-control/out of control.* Their responses are indicated on a scale from 1-9, each number indicated by a different pictograph

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shown below. Responses were then recoded so that scores of "1" indicated negative feelings (dissatisfaction and lack of control), while "9" indicates positive feelings.

Figure 1. *AdSAM* Pictograph



Note: Respondents were shown unlabeled Pictographs. The labels are provided here for ease of interpretation.

AdSAM has a number of advantages over traditional survey methodology. First, it captures the emotional response of respondents, unchanged by rationalization. Rather than verbalizing how they feel, respondents are simply able to indicate their feelings by filling in a bubble. The visual measurement is superior because verbal measurement requires cognition to translate emotions into words, therefore losing the "raw" emotion of interest. Additionally, the precise meaning of emotionally laden words can vary from person to person.

Due to its multidimensionality, it also allows the researcher to consider more than simple approval or disapproval. Emotional responses are not unidimensional in the way that simple support or opposition to a candidate is—an individual may support a candidate because they feel that they are losing control over their own life and their candidate offers a way to "take back their country,"; because they are afraid of perceived changes in the country that threaten their way of life; or because the candidate quite simply makes them feel happy or sad. Understanding which dimensions of emotional response are driving candidate support allows us to better understand the appeal of certain candidates or topics within the 2016 presidential election.

For this project, only the dimensions of *in control/not-in control* and *satisfied/dissatisfied* were included in the model. The reasons for this are theoretically justifiable and make analysis of the results easier to interpret. The *in control/not-in control* measure allows one to determine the level of insecurity that respondents feel when prompted by the survey questions: essentially, this can be understood as the amount of anxiety that these prompts engender. This becomes immediately relevant when one considers explanations for Trump's support: theories which

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suggest that Trump supporters sought to "take back control" of their previous dominant position (the racial threat hypothesis); or those that argue that Trump voters suffered from high levels of economic insecurity (the economic anxiety thesis) are both suggesting an emotional basis for voting behavior. The *satisfied/dissatisfied* measure allows researchers a direct measurement of how positively or negatively individuals *feel* towards a prompt, rather than their cognitive position on the topic. Finally, due to high levels of engagement in the election across our sample, the *engaged/calm* dimension was largely omitted from the analysis. This is to be expected, as regardless of partisan orientation, we would expect individuals to be highly engaged in such a high salience election, especially given how late in the campaign the survey was administered. Each AdSAM variable is therefore the composite measurement of the *satisfied/dissatisfied* and *in control/out of control* dimensions for a separate question prompt, with a theoretical minimum of two and maximum of eighteen.

Independent Variables

This model includes a set of independent variables designed to test the three hypotheses proposed earlier, as well as a set of controls known to influence voting behavior. The variables designed to test the three hypotheses directly are *Individual Economy, General Economy, Black Lives Matter,* and *Immigration.* Individuals' perception of the economy was measured through the response to the prompt "How do you feel about your ability to afford a major expense in the next 6 months?" Individuals who do not seem worried about their ability to afford a major expense are likely those who are not particularly anxious about their own subjective economic conditions. The variable *General Economy* is the score for the question prompt "How do you feel about the general state of the United States Economy?" The *Black Lives Matter* and *Immigration* variables were the composite score for the questions "How do you feel about the Black Lives Matter movement?" and "How do you feel about the state of immigration in the United States?," respectively.

Additionally, the model included a number of controls known to influence candidate preference, including age, race, income, education, sex, and party identification. Race was controlled for through two dummy variables indicating whether respondents were Black or Hispanic (variables named *Black* and *Hispanic* respectively). Income was controlled for through a categorical variable with income brackets of $0-19,999, $20,000-49,999, $50,000-99,999, $100,000-149,999, and above $150,000. Age was also included as a categorical variable, with respondents indicating whether they were between 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, or 55+.
Education was collapsed into a single dummy variable (*College Grad or More*) to determine if the role of non-college-educated whites in Trump's victory were also significant in ordering emotional responses to candidates and topics such as BLM. A *Republican Dummy* variable, indicating whether a respondent either identified as a Republican or leaned Republican, was

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included due to the wide literature that indicates that party ID is a primary driver of vote choice and that its effect is only increasing over time (Miller 1991, Bartels 2000).

Results

While this paper is largely concerned with the degree to which the proposed independent causal variables—the *Individual Economy, General Economy*, *Immigration*, and *BLM*—can predict Trump support, the basic descriptive statistics were also examined to see how Trump supporters varied from non-Trump supporters in the sample. In order to establish that Trump voters and non-Trump voters differed significantly on the explanatory variables, a series of independent t-tests were conducted. Groups were divided along those who indicated that they would vote for Trump (N=128) and those who indicated they would vote for Clinton or a third-party candidate (N=198). Clinton and third-party candidates were grouped together to examine the difference between Trump voters and the non-Trump population. Four separate *t*-tests were conducted on the explanatory variables, and the results are summarized in the table below.

Table 1: Difference of Means Test for Trump and Non-Trump Voters

Variable	Trump Voters (N=128)		Non-Trump Voters (N=198)		$\lvert t \rvert$
	M	SD	M	SD	
BLM	8.06	3.73	10.82	3.39	6.76**
Immigration	6.59	3.56	9.02	3.21	6.26**
Personal Economy	7.74	3.96	8.12	4.26	.79
General Economy	6.43	3.40	8.88	3.28	6.50**

*significant at the p <.05 level (two-tailed); **significant at the p <.01 level (two-tailed)

The Levene's test was significant for the *BLM* (F=.02) and the *Immigration* F=.002) variables and so equal variance was not assumed for these variables. The Levene's test was not significant for the two economic variables at the p=.05 level for both the *Individual* & *General Economy* variables (F=.21 & F=.07, respectively). Based on the difference of means tests, Trump voters were found to hold significantly more negative emotional feelings towards the Black Lives Matter movement (t=6.76, p<.001), the state of immigration (t=6.26, p<.001), and the general state of the economy (t=6.50, p<.001). Interestingly, the variable measuring perception of one's own

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economic prospects was not significantly different between Trump and non-Trump voters, suggesting that the negative feelings that Trump voters held towards the economy may have been on a sociotropic rather than individual level.

A logistic regression with voting Trump as the dependent variable was then conducted, to see if the possible explanatory variables for Trump support were still significant when controlling for a number of factors known to influence candidate preference formation. The final models for the dependent variable "Vote Trump" are shown below, which is simply coded "1" if the individual indicated voting for Trump and "0" if they indicated any other candidate.

Table 2. Logistic Regression of AdSAM Response and demographic factors on Trump support

Variable	β	*SE*	*OR*
Immigration	-.07	.06	.94
BLM	-.19**	.05	.83
Personal Economy	.04	.05	1.04
General Economy	-.20**	.06	.82
College Grad	-1.08**	.41	.34
Age	.15	.14	1.16
Female	-.09	.37	.92
Income	-.11	.21	1.11
Republican Dummy	3.71**	.41	40.85
Black	-.47	.65	.63
Hispanic	.03	.93	1.03
Constant	1.32	1.06	.22

*significant at the p <.05 level (two-tailed)
**significant at the p <.01 level (two-tailed)
Model $\chi^2 = 229.9$, $df = 11$, $p < .001$

Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression to analyze the effect of negative feelings towards Black Lives Matter (BLM), immigration, demographic data, and concerns about the economy on propensity to indicate support for Donald Trump. The Trump model was statistically significant (X^2=232.8, p<.001), and explained 68.6% (Nagelkerke R^2) of the variance in voting for Trump rather than another candidate, correctly classifying 87.1% of cases. Ultimately, four individual covariates were significant in predicting support for Trump: being a *Republican,* negative feelings towards *BLM,* concerns about the *General Economy,* and not being a *College Grad*. Unsurprisingly, being a member of the Republican party is significant in

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predicting support for Trump, with self-identified Republicans over 40 times as likely to vote for Trump than non-Republicans. The odds of voting for Trump also decreased by 17% for each one-unit increase in positive feelings towards *BLM* as measured by our index variables and decreased by 18% for each one-unit increase in positive feelings towards the *General Economy*. In line with verified voting records, college graduates were also 66% less likely to indicate support for Trump compared to those who had not earned a college degree. Neither the *Immigration* nor *Personal Economy* variables were significant in predicting voting patterns for Trump, nor were the other control variables (*Black, Hispanic, Female, Income, or Age).* The demographic variables likely were not significant due to the high correlation between certain demographic factors and partisan identification.

Discussion

The results demonstrate the degree to which economic and racial concerns permeated patterns of presidential support in the 2016 General Election. Support was found for many of the "commonsense" media narratives that propagated after the election of Trump: that college graduates were far less likely to support Trump (Pew Research 2018); that Trump voters were more likely to hold more pessimistic views of the economy (Friedman 2017); and that Trump voters were likely to hold negative views of non-white Americans, especially Black people (McElwee & McDaniel 2017). Of course, all three of these can be true at once.

After a review of the literature, this paper proposed three hypotheses. First, this project hypothesized that voters who display more negative and insecure emotional responses are more likely to indicate support for Trump. Utilizing a question regarding the general state of the economy, it was shown that Trump voters held significantly more pessimistic views towards the economy than non-Trump voters, and the *General Economy* variable was overall significant in the logistic model. Clearly, then, one cannot simply jettison explanations which point to the primacy of perceptions of the economy as driving vote choice in the 2016 election—subjective beliefs about the general state of the economy were at least as important as cultural factors (Morgan 2018).

Importantly, however, neither the objective economic indicator variable (*Income*) nor the variable asking about subjective finances (*Personal Economy*) were significant in predicting Trump support—this suggests that in contrast to the "Americans left behind" thesis, our sample of Trump voters was no worse off than the average American. Rather than voters being concerned about their *own* personal finances or employability, voters may instead have been compelled to vote based on how they felt about the aggregate state of the economy. They therefore engaged in sociotropic voting, a process whereby individuals support candidates who they believe will serve the economic interests of the majority of (or most deserving) citizens (Kinder & Kiewiet 1981). Likewise, our emphasis on the emotional aspect of preference formation suggests that voters

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likely are not "analyzing" in the cognitive sense at all—rather, they are emotionally responding to the candidate who generates positive feelings towards the economy more generally.

Perhaps the most striking finding was in support of Hypothesis 2, which suggested that Trump voters were more likely to display negative and insecure responses to groups which challenged the white hierarchy; in particular, the Black Lives Matter (*BLM*) social movement. A logistic regression found that negative feelings towards *BLM* was the third most potent predictor of Trump support, trailing the *Republican Dummy* and only marginally less powerful than the *General Economy* variable. As articulated by the status threat literature, for the dominant group to be motivated by the threat of an outgroup, that group must be perceived to be increasing in status and be a credible threat to the in-group (Mutz 2018). This is archetypal of the *BLM* movement, which explicitly challenges pre-existing power structures, and which may have led to a white backlash vote. It is important to bear in mind that the measures were not merely tapping approval or disapproval of the topics in mind. The BLM variable is an index variable combining *satisfaction/dissatisfaction* and feelings of *control/lack of control* that the topic generates in the respondent. The fact that Trump voters feel both negatively towards BLM and believe that it causes them to in some way to lose some control over their lives/country is essential for interpreting the results. These findings lend credence to theories that perceive of Trump's victory as at least partially a backlash against groups that seek to disrupt existing moral boundaries and the traditional position of the white-working class (Lamont, Park, and Ayala-Hurtado 2017).

This racial threat hypothesis is further strengthened by the fact that emotional responses to immigration generally were *not* significant predictors of indication to vote for Trump. Nevertheless, there are a number of confounding reasons that this might be so. Trump voters, for instance, may have lukewarm feelings towards immigrants but strongly negative feelings towards particular immigrants, such as Mexicans. As a result, the survey question asking them about the "general state of immigration" may not have sufficiently tapped into feelings of antipathy against non-white immigrants. Alternatively, immigrants may simply not have been perceived as threatening to white interests: unlike Black Americans, they are not U.S citizens, and many do not speak the same language or compete for the same jobs as white Americans.

Finally, Trump and non-Trump voters were clearly split along education lines, with college graduates far less likely to support Trump than non-college graduates, controlling for other relevant factors. This divide was perhaps the single greatest change between the 2012 and 2016 election—Clinton massively improved upon Obama's performance among college-educated voters, while her support collapsed among less-educated voters (Silver 2016a). This may fit with previous sociological research that suggests that educational attainment is highly correlated with white liberalization on race issues. Simply put, more educated people are less likely to espouse racist policies or sentiments than less educated people (Farley, Steeh, Kryson, Jackson, and Reeves 1994). Higher levels of racial resentment among Trump voters, then, may be a function of the large educational divide that erupted during the 2016 general election.

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Conclusion

This study sought to utilize the unique AdSAM response system to ascertain the role that emotion played in the 2016 election. By analyzing feelings of *satisfaction/dissatisfaction* and feelings of ontological insecurity (*control/lack-of-control*) among a small portion of the electorate, this study found significant support for a number of "commonsense" theories about the appeal of Donald Trump in the 2016 election. The sample of Trump supporters *did* generally have more pessimistic views of the economy as a whole, however, Trump voters were *not* significantly more pessimistic about their own personal finances. However, the results *do* support the finding that education was a key divide among the electorate, with Trump voters less likely to indicate that they were college graduates than Clinton supporters within our survey. This finding is consistent with a number of other studies (Galston & Hendrickson 2016, McGill 2016, Kerr 2016) that show that Trump received a higher proportion of support from non-college-educated voters both during the primaries and the general election. This gives some assurance that the analysis is externally valid. Additionally, the categorical income variable was not significant.

The assessment of Trump's support as largely driven by the "white-working class" is, therefore, split. If by "white-working class" we mean the less educated, then Trump voters were indeed "working class." However, evidence regarding how income factored into Trump's support is much less clear. While some find that Trump voters were unusually less wealthy than the average Republican voter over the last 60 years (Silver 2016b), others point out that the majority of low-income voters cast their ballot for Clinton. The distinction, of course, is that poor *whites* were more likely to vote for Trump than poor *non-whites*, who overwhelmingly supported Clinton. Theoretically, this suggests that was not so much the absolute level of income that drove the "white-working class" uprising; rather, it is the very fact that they were white.

Indeed, this is the primary substantive finding: much of what drove Trump's support was a growing sentiment of racial anxiety among the white population. By demonstrating that Trump voters hold broadly negative views of the Black Lives Matter movement, controlling for other factors, this study shows that Trump voters are unusually motivated by racial concerns. This provides support for hypotheses that argue that ideas about race undergird support for Donald Trump. When it comes to peddling narratives about Trump's support as mostly a function of the return of the "white working class," it may be time to turn our attention towards the racial component of the phrase.

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A Mix of Motives: The Georgia Delegate Challenge to the 1968 Democratic Convention and the Dynamics of Intraparty Conflict*

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Abstract

Scholarly debates over the nature of political parties and the identity of their principal actors have been hampered by relative inattention to the historical processes of internal party change. This study, drawing on archival sources, interviews, and one of the co-author's personal experiences, analyzes the Georgia delegate challenge to the 1968 Democratic Convention as a case of internal party conflict generating lasting institutional reform, with implications for existing theories of party development, nominating politics, and democratic representation. In a convention marked by an unusually large number of challenges to state party delegations, the Georgia delegate challenge was unique. There, a conflict between the segregationist regulars and the moderate and liberal Democrats was complicated by an internal division in the latter camp between Hubert Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy supporters. The McCarthy forces' success in garnering a dominant position within the challenge delegation alienated many of the Georgia movement's organizers and leaders. The McCarthy campaign's takeover also linked this southern challenge both to the antiwar politics coloring the national nomination fight and to a particular conception of representation that would influence subsequent party reform efforts. In tracing the origins, dynamics, and aftermath of Georgia's delegate challenge, we show both that group- and candidate-driven efforts together shape party development over time, and that normative ideas concerning representation can play causal roles in party development.

At a Democratic Party Credentials Committee hearing on August 21, 1968, Julian Bond—a 27-year-old Georgia state legislator, civil rights advocate, and outspoken Vietnam War critic—testified on behalf of the challenge delegation he had been recruited to co-chair. Georgia's regular Democratic slate, Bond said, not only reflected blatant "racial exclusion" in the selection process, which was under the control of Georgia's segregationist governor Lester Maddox. It also comprised a group of people opposed to the "principles" of the national Democratic Party. By contrast, the challenge delegates, calling themselves the Georgia Loyal National Democrats (GLND), were committed both to the principle of nondiscrimination (they consisted of 22 black and 22 white delegates) and to the substantive agenda of the national party.[1] Such arguments

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[1] *The Presidential Nominating Conventions 1968* (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968), 109.

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were why the insurgent presidential contender Eugene McCarthy declared the Georgia challenge to be "the most important credentials fight in the history of Democratic conventions."[2]

But Bond was not the only one to testify that day before the credentials committee in opposition to seating the Georgia regulars. Following the testimony of several challenge delegation members, Joseph Jacobs, the former secretary of a biracial Democratic reform coalition in Georgia that had been the organizational precursor to GLND, shared his thoughts while submitting a separate legal brief. Jacobs echoed the challengers' case concerning the regulars' discriminatory practices and national party disloyalty. But he also advised the committee, in one reporter's paraphrase, "to check carefully before seating either group."[3] Because "outside partisan political workers" had managed to hijack the August 10 convention that selected the challenge delegates, Jacobs said, that delegation too failed to offer "true representation" for Georgia voters.[4] Jacobs' comments were widely, and rightly, interpreted as expressing Hubert Humphrey supporters' belief that the McCarthy campaign had mounted a takeover of that challenge delegate convention, in the process destroying what had been a state-level civil rights and party-building effort of long standing to serve narrow campaign purposes.

The intra-progressive quarrel on display at that hearing in Chicago does more than lend nuance to the prevailing story of civil rights activists battling segregationist regulars found in many accounts of southern challenges in the 1960s.[5] The tensions among the Georgia challengers also provide a window into broader processes of party development. Because the 1968 convention triggered a subsequent process of sweeping party reform, close attention to its dynamics can help scholars identify forces that drive institutional changes within parties over time. Such attention compels us to consider party change as a *process*, something that party scholarship, including the literature on party reform, has often neglected to do. The Georgia conflict suggests two points about such processes. First, the interpenetration of both group- and candidate-driven dynamics shapes party development over time. And secondly, normative ideas concerning voice and representation can play causal roles in such development.

The 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, infamous for the violence on display outside the convention hall, exerted its larger impact on American party politics through the reform project it generated. The tumultuous three-way battle between the antiwar insurgent candidates, Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, and Vice President Hubert Humphrey culminated in conflicts before and during the convention over the nomination itself and the substance of the party platform. The antiwar insurgents lost both fights definitively. But, as numerous chronicles have detailed, they managed ultimately to win an institutional battle over the party's structure and procedures. The path from Chicago to the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (commonly known, and henceforth referred to here, as the

[2] Homer Bigart, "McCarthy Terms Delegate Test in Georgia Crucial to his Bid," *The New York Times*, August 17, 1968.

[3] Richard T. Cooper, "Floor Fight Threatens on Georgia Delegation," *Los Angeles Times*, August 22, 1968.

[4] *Presidential Nominating Conventions*, 109.

[5] This story was echoed in several of the obituaries of Bond in the wake of his death in 2015. See, e.g., Roy Reed, "Julian Bond, Charismatic Civil Rights Leader, Dies at 75," *The New York Times*, August 16, 2015.

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McGovern-Fraser Commission), which would transform the presidential nominating process in both parties, was partly paved by the record number of credentials challenges filed in 1968.

Georgia was one of six southern states that saw credentials challenges that year, and one of only two (along with Mississippi) where some challengers won seats in Chicago. Georgia also shared with another southern state, Alabama, the experience of internal tension among anti-regular forces resulting in a three-way party split in the state. But Georgia was unique in the extent to which a particular candidate campaign intervened in the state delegate selection process.

The conflicts among Georgia reformers broke out in the open at the August 10 convention in Macon to select challenge delegates. The convention was organized by the Georgia Democratic Forum, a biracial and loyalist group that stemmed from a working alliance between labor and religious officials. Macon also included individuals who were engaged in anti-Vietnam War efforts as well as support for McCarthy's presidential bid. Many of these latter participants advanced a particular conception of intraparty democracy, in which delegates would be bound to the preferences of their voters, that would ultimately prove central to the McGovern-Fraser Commission's participatory reform project.

At a moment of renewed attention to questions of party procedure and legitimacy, Georgia's 1968 delegate challenge speaks to ongoing debates over the nature of parties and the dynamics of partisan change—over which actors are the principals and which are the agents in carrying out party activity. Two contending theories posit that parties should be understood, respectively, as teams of politicians seeking office or as coalitions of organized groups seeking particular policies from the state.[6] The nomination process has served as an arena for testing whether ambitious office-seekers or policy-demanding groups occupy the driver's seat.[7] Differing views on the identity of parties' principals, moreover, produce differing accounts of party change over time. In candidate-centered accounts, changes in the demographic characteristics and issue opinions of voters generate shifts in party position and behavior, as politicians adjust to sustain their electoral appeal.[8] In group theories, changes in the identity, influence, and allegiances of interest groups, movements, and activists explain those same changes in party behavior, as the balance of factional power within each party shifts.[9]

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[6] See, respectively, John Aldrich, *Why Parties? A Second Look* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); and Kathleen Bawn et al, "A Theory of Parties: Groups, Policy Demanders, and Nominations in American Politics," *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (September 2012): 571-597.

[7] Marty Cohen, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller, *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

[8] Within the vast literature assessing partisan change over time chiefly as responses to electoral and demographic shifts, a minority of works take care to include factional conflicts and disagreement over strategy as important components of that process. See, e.g. Mark D. Brewer and Jeffrey M. Stonecash, *Dynamics of American Political Parties* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Robert Mason, *The Republican Party and American Politics From Hoover to Reagan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[9] David Karol, *Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Hans Noel, *Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Chris Baylor, *First to the Party: The Group Origins of Political Transformation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

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The party change that both theories seek to explain relates chiefly to party formation and agenda development, however, and only secondarily to the kinds of structural changes in the internal workings of parties exemplified by the McGovern-Fraser reforms. When candidate-centered and group-centered theorists do attend to parties' institutional reforms, they depict them as the byproduct of their respective principals' pursuit of existing goals (elective office in the first case, policy outcomes in the second) under changed circumstances. And so John Aldrich interprets the McGovern-Fraser reforms as a belated institutional adaptation to the rise of candidate-centered electoral politics, while the so-called "UCLA school" of group-oriented party theorists argue (though only implicitly) that ascendant groups in the Democratic coalition seized on the popular illegitimacy of the old practices to implement reforms beneficial to them.[10] Missing from such accounts is the contested process by which such change is brought about, and the role played by normative arguments over democracy and representation in such struggles. While party theorists largely neglect to explain the occurrence or dynamics of internally generated party reform, moreover, the scholarship assessing the McGovern-Fraser reforms specifically has neglected to ground their analyses in broader theories of party and party development. Scholarly engagement with those reforms has consisted largely of critical assessments of their impact rather than general explanations for when and why parties undergo such reform processes.[11] The need remains for a developmental account of party reform.

The particular dynamics of Georgia's delegate challenge in 1968 are what make the event useful for theory-building. Candidate- and group-centered theories might distinctly explain the emergence of a participatory party reform project in 1968 as the byproduct, respectively, of either candidate campaigns' frustrations with procedural obstacles to the nomination or a powerful antiwar social movement pressing for procedural reforms that would strengthen their position within the party. But the conflict among anti-regular forces in Georgia reveals the presence of both strategic candidate interests *and* group dynamics. Social movements jostling over party direction via nomination politics in Georgia coincided and interacted with the opportunistic tactics of campaign operations, much to the chagrin of some of those participants. Individuals acted out of diverse motivations. Their behavior shows not only that the effects of group politics

[10] Aldrich, *Why Parties?*, 266-287; Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller, *The Party Decides*, 157-161.

[11] Leading examples of this critical literature include Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Dismantling the Parties: Reflections on Party Reform and Party Decomposition* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); Byron E. Shafer, *Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983); and Nelson Polsby, *Consequences of Party Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). Two works in this tradition that do engage broader questions concerning the structural conditions and intellectual contexts that generate processes of party reform over time are Austin Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and James W. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). More sympathetic evaluations of McGovern-Fraser can be found in William J. Crotty, *Decision for the Democrats: Reforming the Party Structure* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); David Plotke, "Party Reform as Failed Democratic Renewal in the United States, 1968–1972," *Studies in American Political Development* 10 (1996): 223-288; and Adam Hilton, "The Politics Insurgents Make: Reconstructive Reformers in U.S. and U.K. Postwar Party Development," *Polity* 51.3 (2019): 559-596.

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and candidate ambition on party dynamics are hardly mutually exclusive, and often inextricably linked. It also shows that those interactions can drive party development over time, generating meaningful institutional reforms and shifting the durable balance of authority among partisan actors.[12]

Taking the internal dynamics of party development seriously also means taking the normative ideas used by the participants in that development seriously.[13] As suggested in the talk about "true representation" during the Georgia challengers' Credentials Committee hearing in Chicago, debates over party procedures and decision-making usually involve claims about whose voice should count and with what kinds of influence on party behavior.[14] A commitment to a "delegate" or "mandate" conception of representation—in which national convention participants would be bound to honor the candidate preferences of the ordinary party voters who selected them—powerfully colored the McGovern-Fraser project. Georgia's experience sheds light on how the factional dynamics of the 1968 nomination fight helped ensure the triumph of that conception over rival views, with important long-term implications for party politics. The candidate-specific interests of the McCarthy campaign, seeking delegates in Chicago who would support his nomination, inclined activists working on his behalf in Georgia to support making candidate preference an explicit component of the delegate selection process. Other longstanding activists in the homegrown movement to challenge the state party's segregationist regulars, for their part, resisted the intrusion of candidate politics into the process and advocated a "trustee" conception of representation. These debates over rival theories of representation and their place in internal party politics continue to resonate to the present day, heard, for example, in the contemporary Democratic conflict over so-called "superdelegates" and their legitimacy.

All told, the distinctive dynamics of the Georgia case in 1968 provide a useful site for bridging party theory and historical analysis. Actors associated with numerous movements—labor, civil rights, and antiwar—operated simultaneously and in conjunction with specific candidates' campaign efforts in Georgia, and their interactions helped to shape the trajectory of party developments at both the state and national levels. Georgia's 1968 delegation challenge demonstrates the churn, factional strife, and mix of instrumental and ideational motivations and of candidate-centered and movement-driven agendas that can shape party development.[15]

The rest of the article tracks intraparty developments in Georgia before, during, and after 1968, attending both to the key actors driving the developments and the implications of their normative debate over party representation. One of the authors, Nancy Schwartz, participated

[12] Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek define political development writ large as a durable shift in governing authority, in *The Search for American Political Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[13] For an argument for the causal importance of ideas in analyses of party development, see Daniel Schlozman and Sam Rosenfeld, "Prophets of Party in American Political History," *The Forum* 15.4 (2017): 685-709, esp. 690-691.

[14] For discussions of the role played by normative views of political procedure—and representation in particular—in party reform efforts, see Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction*; Ceaser, *Presidential Selection*; and William J. Crotty, "The Philosophies of Party Reform," in *Party Renewal in America: Theory and Practice*, ed. Gerald Pomper (Praeger: New York, 1980), 31-50.

[15] In this sense our account resonates with the ecumenical approach to conceptualizing party activity offered by Marjorie Randon Hershey and Edward M. Burmila, "Introduction," in *Guide to U.S. Parties*, ed. Marjorie Randon Hershey (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2014), especially 5-6.

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in McCarthy campaign efforts in Georgia in the summer of 1968. This account draws on Schwartz's personal papers,[16] archival collections housed in repositories in Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Texas, and Washington, DC, an interview with a fellow participant in the McCarthy effort in Georgia, contemporaneous journalistic accounts, and secondary sources. The article first details pre-1968 party-building efforts among Georgian anti-Maddox forces. It then assesses the state-level challenge convention in Macon as well as the Georgia delegation's experience in Chicago. A concluding discussion surveys the broader legacy of these developments both for party practice and normative views of representation, using the contemporary debate over superdelegates as an entry point for an argument about legitimating modes of representation and intraparty authority that diverge from strict "delegate" conceptions.

The Road to '68

When Bond and Jacobs offered their partially conflicting testimony at that August Credentials Committee hearing in Chicago, their remarks were accompanied by two separate legal briefs filed in challenge of the Maddox-led regular delegation. Both briefs included arguments based on procedural problems with the delegate selection process in Georgia as well as other arguments grounded in the principle of loyalty to the national party and its nominee. The GLND brief endorsed by Bond emphasized the former, however, while that of the activists who had dropped out of the delegation in frustration emphasized the latter.[17] This contrast had a history, stemming from complex political dynamics in both Georgia specifically and the South more broadly. Since the l940s, an effort led by labor organizers and civic and religious activists had encouraged Democratic party participation that would accommodate the "New South" in Georgia and bridge the programmatic and procedural divide between the state Democratic party and the national one.[18] Such a project had corollaries in several other southern states, and drew on support from liberal Democrats across the country. The struggle against Jim Crow provided the fulcrum for efforts to remake southern parties in the national party's image while challenging that party's highly decentralized structure.

The event that set in motion two decades of sectional conflict at national Democratic conventions came in 1948, when insurgent liberal activists led by Minnesota Senate hopeful Hubert Humphrey succeeded in getting a forceful civil rights plank added to the platform via floor vote. This prompted four southern state delegations to bolt and mount a third-party presidential bid that fall, while provoking a more protracted struggle over the propriety of so-called "loyalty oaths" aimed at southern national committee members and convention delegates in the ensuing years.[19] Such efforts culminated in a dramatic fight over the credentials challenge

[16] Referred to here as Nancy L. Schwartz, "Georgia Papers," author's possession, Middletown, CT.

[17] See Series 2: Box 42, Folder 8 and Box 43, Folder 1, Eliza K. Paschall Papers, 1932-1988, Emory University Rose Library, Atlanta, GA.

[18] Tim S. R. Boyd, *Georgia Democrats, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Shaping of the New South* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2012), esp. 6 and 43-44. See also, C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South 1877-1913* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1951).

[19] For a useful account of the controversy, see Abraham Holtzman, "Party Responsibility and Loyalty: New Rules in the Democratic Party," *Journal of Politics* Vol.22 (1960): 485-501.

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launched by the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) at the 1964 Democratic Convention in Atlantic City, which ended in a short-term compromise over delegate seating but a long-term victory for institutional change within the party.[20] Delegates in Atlantic City passed a Call to the 1968 Convention that included newly explicit affirmation that state delegations would have to both practice nondiscrimination and "cast their election ballots for the Presidential and Vice Presidential nominees selected by said Convention."[21] The convention also voted to establish a Special Equal Rights Committee in the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to study racial discrimination in state parties and make appropriate recommendations for reform.

The postwar party struggles manifested in conflicts like the MFDP challenge recurred in on-the-ground civil rights and party building efforts across the South. In Georgia, the "Old South" was represented by the regular Democrats who had held statewide office for decades, except for two short intervals out of power in the 1940s and 1960s. Upholding racial segregation in law and mores, Eugene Talmadge and his son Herman led a Georgia party machine that elected governors, Senators, members of Congress, mayors, and county officials.[22] Drawing its base from rural Georgians, the machine benefitted from the county-unit system of government that overrepresented rural residents.

"Aroused citizens" interrupted the Regulars' rule by electing the liberal Ellis Arnall for Governor in 1943 and the more centrist Carl Sanders in l963.[23] Arnall opened the Georgia gubernatorial primary to African-Americans in accordance with the Supreme Court's 1944 decision in *Smith V. Allwright*, sparking a backlash that helped lose him his renomination in 1946. He stepped back into gubernatorial politics two decades later, running in the 1966 primary once again as the candidate of liberal and moderate, national-party-supporting Democrats (known in the state as Loyalists) against the segregationist restaurateur, Lester Maddox.

With the passage of the federal Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act as well as Barry Goldwater's victory in Georgia in the 1964 presidential election fresh in memories, questions concerning loyalty to the national party loomed large in this contest. Arnall lost narrowly to Maddox, who went on to win another narrow victory in the general election. Maddox's state party chairman, James Gray, had supported Republican Dwight Eisenhower for President in l952 and l956 and Goldwater in 1964, and in due time would signal that the party he led would back American Independent candidate George Wallace in 1968.[24]

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[20] See Lisa Anderson Todd, *For a Voice and the Vote: My Journey with the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014).

[21] Reprinted in report by Joe Rauh and Mildred Jeffrey to the Special Equal Rights Committee, February 1, 1967, Box 19, Folder "DNC/Equal Rights Committee—Gov. Hughes," W. Marvin Watson Office Files, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

[22] V. O. Key, Jr. *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (NY: Vintage, Random House, l949), 106-120.

[23] Key, *Southern Politics*, 124-129.

[24] "Maddox Wearing a Wallace Button," n.d.; "Secret Wallace Meeting Confirmed by Maddox," *Atlanta Constitution*, June 17, l968; "Democrat on List is Working for Wallace," *Atlanta Journal*, July 5, 1968; Eliza Paschall note, "It is certain that the Dixiecrats aren't going to support the Democratic party nationally;" Lester Maddox quoted on McCarthy and Humphrey as "the gold dust twins," in Achsah Nesmith, "Selection of Agnew Declared Pointing Up Sanders," *Atlanta Constitution*, August 9, l968; newspaper clippings in Paschall Papers.

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Maddox's primary victory compelled Loyalists to organize a write-in campaign for Arnall in the general election as well as found an alternative party forum to the regular state party. In 1966, Write-In Georgia (WIG) was conceived by three women to put Arnall back on the ballot. At least 50,000 valid write-in votes were cast, a significant showing of 5.5% of the total votes, with perhaps another 18,000 deemed invalid.[25]

Two men who had participated in the WIG effort, Edward Thomas (Al) Kehrer and the Rev. John B. Morris, were key founders of the Georgia Democratic Forum (GDF) the following year.[26] Since Georgia did not have a presidential nominating primary, the GDF called for a convention, open to rank-and-file Democrats, to choose a slate of delegates to the national convention in 1968. Declaring themselves Loyalists to the national Democratic Party, willing to follow its choice of a candidate, they issued a call for a statewide convention in Macon for August 10, 1968.[27] Leaflets and ads in the media invited individuals from all walks of life to attend. Some prominent African American organizations, including the Georgia Voters League and the Georgia Association of Citizens' Democratic Clubs, also endorsed the GDF.[28]

GDF co-founders Kehrer and Morris came to hold contrasting views of trustee and delegate representation. Al Kehrer had worked in the South as a labor organizer since the l950s, initially as the Southeastern Regional Director of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. In l965 he became the Southern Director of the AFL-CIO's Civil Rights Department in Atlanta. Originally from Michigan, he played a steadfast role in Georgia's labor and civil rights movements.[29] John B. Morris, minister of an Atlanta church, founded the Episcopal Society for Cultural and Racial Unity to promote civil rights in the South.[30] Born in Brunswick, Georgia, Morris's work spanned several southern and border states. Kehrer and Morris came eventually to be at odds in 1968 about their candidate preferences and their normative outlooks on party nominating procedures.

Kehrer's participation in GDF embodied alliances between organized labor and civil rights activism in the state. The labor movement in which Kehrer and other GDF organizers worked had long been a progressive force in Georgia politics, just as the populist farmers alliances had been a century before.[31] The labor movement did not act on the Democratic Party solely as an organized interest group making particularistic demands.[32] Nor did labor concentrate on distributional benefits rather than broader social justice issues, despite being an older

[25] Boyd, *Georgia Democrats*, 178.

[26] Boyd, *Georgia Democrats*, 172-183.

[27] Leaflet, "Attend. Participate. Georgia Convention of Loyal National Democrats. Dempsey Hotel, Macon, Ga. 10 a.m., August 10, l968," in Paschall Papers.

[28] Boyd, *Georgia Democrats*, 176.

[29] E. T. Kehrer, Biography, A Guide to His Papers, Georgia State University Library, Atlanta, GA http://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/findingaids/id/1955

[30] John B. Morris Papers, Biographical Note, Richard B. Russell Library for Political Research and Studies, University of Georgia Libraries, Athens, GA http://russelldoc.galib.uga.edu/russell/view?docId=ead/RBRL126JBM-ead.xml

[31] Laurence Goodwyn, *The Populist Moment* (New York: Oxford University Press, l978).

[32] Cf. Bawn et al, "A Theory of Parties."

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movement.[33] Rather, labor worked alongside non-unionized individuals in political alliances that lasted beyond l968.

Civil rights-related conflicts like the MFDP dispute were a precursor to more potent intraparty tumult later in the 1960s. Lyndon Johnson's military escalation in Vietnam damaged his authority over the Great Society's congressional coalitions and sparked a mass antiwar movement that gravitated to the New Left's critical analysis of elite institutional power in society. For those not radicalized to the point of rejecting party politics altogether, the movement prompted a series of tumultuous intraparty conflicts. A "Dump Johnson" effort targeting the 1968 election gained strength throughout 1966 and 1967, and McCarthy entered the race in November. McCarthy's showing in the New Hampshire primary, followed by Kennedy's entrance into the race, prompted Johnson's stunning decision to drop out. Vice President Humphrey quickly emerged as the candidate of continuity for the administration. The ensuing Democratic turmoil helped generate a long-term process of institutional change in the party system.

From Macon to Chicago

The way that this process unfolded in Georgia involved not only the civil rights and labor movements, but also the anti-war movement, national candidate campaigns, *and* state-level factional dynamics. Actors working in these five contexts did not carry out their efforts in isolation or exclusion of each other. Intra-party alliances, cross-pressures, and conflicts abounded, even as numerous individuals largely unaffiliated with any of these sets of actors also went to the Macon convention and then to Chicago as challenge delegates.

Civil rights activists and anti-war figures both played roles in the Macon convention and subsequent challenge delegation. Georgia, and especially Atlanta, was a mecca of the national civil rights movement. The Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. had his church there, and both the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) were founded in Georgia. African-American activists attending the GDF convention at Macon would include SNCC's John Lewis and Benjamin D. Brown, a state representative whose lifelong political home would be the Democratic Party. State-wide, future leaders included the Rev. Charles Sherrod of the movement to desegregate Albany, the lawyer Jack Ruffin who integrated the Augusta Bar Association, and state representative and later state senator Julian Bond, another SNCC co-founder.[34] (Brown, at Clark College, and Bond, at Morehouse State, had both taken leading roles in Atlanta's student sit-ins and demonstrations starting in 1960). Embodying the growing links between civil rights and anti-war advocacy, Bond gained notoriety in 1966 by being stripped of his Georgia House seat due to critical remarks about the Vietnam War, and had his position reinstated by the United States Supreme Court. The movement against American involvement in Vietnam had been building nationally in the later l960s, and key figures such as Curtis Gans, co-organizer of the Dump Johnson movement,

[33] Cf. Bruce Miroff, "Movement Activists and Partisan Insurgents," *Studies in American Political Development* 21.7 (2007): 92-109.

[34] "The Georgia Delegation of Loyal National Democrats to the l968 Democratic National Convention," August 1968, delegate list, in Schwartz, "Georgia Papers;" Boyd*, Georgia Democrats*, 123.

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and Sam Brown, a National Student Association leader from Iowa, would come to Georgia just prior to the Macon convention.[35]

In the spring, Humphrey tried and failed to win the support of the Regulars in Georgia, meeting with James Gray and Phil Campbell, the state party chairman and the commissioner of agriculture. During subsequent months of the presidential nominating season, Humphrey did not come to Georgia to campaign, partly because the delegate selection process was a closed and governor-dominated affair, and also perhaps because he did not want to get involved in the developing intraparty fight.[36]

By contrast, the McCarthy for President campaign saw in the efforts of the GDF and in the activity leading up to the Macon convention a rich opportunity to build delegate support for their bid in Chicago. The campaign sent a paid organizer, Charles Negaro, to Georgia for the summer. The Connecticut native had worked for McCarthy in five state primaries.[37] From Atlanta, Negaro now formed "Georgians for McCarthy," issued press releases on the candidate's activities, and raised funds for media coverage.[38] Upon learning of the upcoming Macon convention called by the GDF, he focused on it. Meanwhile, in the northeast of the state, University of Georgia professors Phinizy Spalding and Robert Griffith founded a Clarke County McCarthy for President Organization, opening a storefront in Athens.[39] From the state's southeast, the Rev. James Hooten of Savannah stopped by the Atlanta headquarters in early August, later to become co-chair of the challenge delegation.[40] Local support for McCarthy came at first from professionals, some college administrators, a few college students, and clergy.

The McCarthy campaign's decision to divide the state into its ten Congressional Districts was key, ensuring geographic representation of urban and rural areas among their supporters at the Macon convention. The GDF had done this as well, choosing district leaders and asking people to be delegates. Nancy Schwartz, a volunteer from New York who had worked in the Brooklyn primary, telephoned around the state using the names of political friends of early McCarthy supporters. She also drew on her knowledge of some civil rights activists. A map and spiral notebook with each C.D. featured key cities and towns and over 100 contacts.[41] In her calls, Schwartz stressed that people would be involved in something big and exciting, affecting national as well as state politics. People responded to this, wanting to be part of something larger than themselves. The campaign broadened as it planned to assist working people to come to Macon in buses and carpools, offering bus tickets, gas mileage, and a chicken dinner.

In networking the state, Schwartz often relied on advice relayed via Negaro from Eliza Paschall. Paschall was a middle-aged white woman who advocated for dialogue on race and

[35] "Macon," notebook on the Congressional districts and other notes, Schwartz, "Georgia Papers."

[36] Boyd, *Georgia Democrats*, 190-191; James A. Wechsler, "Of HHH, Maddox, and McCarthy," *New York Post*, August 13, 1968.

[37] Authors' interview with Charles J. Negaro, May 2, 2016, Middletown, CT, recorded by Sam Rosenfeld.

[38] Schwartz, "Georgia Papers."

[39] Boyd, *Georgia Democrats*, 191, 195; Clarke County (Ga.) McCarthy for President Records, Richard B. Russell library for Political Research and Studies, University of Georgia http://russelldoc.galib.uga.edu/russell/view?docId=ead/RBRL050MPCC-ead.xml;query=;brand=default

[40] "Macon, C.D. 1," Schwartz, "Georgia Papers."

[41] "Macon," spiral notebook with 10 C.D.'s, 36 pp., Schwartz, "Georgia Papers."

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human relations in Georgia and was active in civic organizations pushing for the vote, school funding, public housing, integration, and women's issues.[42] She served on the Greater Atlanta Council on Human Relations, was president of the Georgia League of Women's Voters, and worked as the national secretary of the National Organization of Women (NOW). Her paid job was as a compliance officer on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in Atlanta. Paschall is an example of an important state and local actor who did not fit discretely into one category of social movements.

In the year preceding the Macon convention, the GDF reached out to Democratic Loyalists in the state. GDF members were motivated to open up the Georgia Democratic Party to new individuals and to fight for civil rights. The GDF recruited people to be district leaders at the Macon convention and possible delegates to the national one. When informed of a possible GDF challenge to the Regular delegation, Richard Hughes, chair of the national DNC Credentials Committee, said they were only considering challenges from Alabama and Mississippi. Morris, and separately Spalding and Griffith, sent letters in protest, and Hughes changed his mind, allowing the Georgia challenge.[43]

In the weeks immediately preceding Macon, the national McCarthy campaign sent staff to Georgia. They crisscrossed the state, speaking at rallies and radio shows and meeting with local leaders. Field organizer David Mixner visited Albany, Tifton, Waycross, and Alma in South Georgia, and youth coordinator Sam Brown was to visit Savannah and Columbus, among others.[44] Curt Gans and attorney Stephan A. Mitchell planned strategy for a floor fight at the Macon convention, and Brown mediated staff conflicts in the Atlanta office.

The campaign also sent Ivanhoe Donaldson, a SNCC activist from Washington, DC, to talk with Julian Bond. Donaldson had helped Bond's l965 election to the Georgia House of Representatives. He now convinced him to participate in the challenge. Earlier in the summer, others had tried to interest Bond, who had declined.[45] Negaro thinks Donaldson might have made the case to Bond that it would help him politically and build momentum for his career. Bond joined. Others who were active in Georgia politics, such as Jimmy Carter, who wanted to run for Governor, and Maynard Jackson, eyeing a mayoral run in Atlanta, declined, probably not wanting to lose potential white voters in those races.

The 600 to 750 attendees at the Macon convention were white and black, male and female, white-collar teachers, university staff, government workers, laborers and members of unions, Church members and religious leaders, businesspeople, and a few college students. The civil rights movement in Georgia and the anti-war sentiment spreading nationally added focus and intensity to decades of struggle within the state about what it meant to be a loyal Democrat. Some participants like Griffith, who became a floor leader at Macon but would decline to serve on the GDF board, identified themselves as advocates of the "new politics" given their interest in

[42] Paschall Papers, Biographical Note.

[43] Boyd, *Georgia Democrats*, 191.

[44] David Mixner, "NAACP, Julian Bond, and Me," *Hell's Kitchen Journal*, May 20, 2012, http://www.davidmixner.com/2012/05/hells-kitchen-journal-naacp-julian-bond-and-me.html; on Brown's travels, see "Macon," notebook in Schwartz, "Georgia Papers."

[45] Negaro, interview with authors.

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radically opening up party procedures, but most people by contrast wanted to form a strong party organization.[46]

The convention split between McCarthy and Humphrey supporters has been estimated between 60-to-40 and 75-to-25 in favor of McCarthy.[47] Not all participants were committed to a candidate, and even some people recruited by the McCarthy campaign were for Humphrey or uncommitted. But with skillful floor maneuvers, the McCarthy camp magnified its strength. Members from each of the 10 C.D.'s met and elected 4 proposed delegates and 4 alternates, as well as 5 at-large alternate delegates.[48] The delegation renamed itself the Georgia Loyal National Democrats and counted a majority in favor of McCarthy on its 12-member executive board.[49] The overall delegation was evenly divided racially, which contrasted with Governor Maddox's hand-picked slate of 64 + 3 delegates, of whom 3 were black.[50] But McCarthy supporters' domination of the challenge group left GDF leaders like Kehrer profoundly disturbed. After the convention, he resigned as head of the GLND delegation (although he stayed on as head of the GDF).

The McCarthy campaign's efforts at Macon surprised Kehrer and violated his sense of fair play. Writing to Al Barkan of the national AFL-CIO, he said that up until a week before the convention, the local McCarthy leaders "had agreed, with only one exception I can recall, that the delegation should have a majority of Humphrey delegates, with a good representation of McCarthy and uncommitted; that in this way we would have a better chance to reach the issues before the Credentials Committee of the Convention." But Rauh and Gans arrived in town on August 9, and "by that night all the understandings we had made with the local leadership had evaporated. Rauh told me that night they were going to get just as many McCarthy delegates as they possibly could."[51] For Kehrer, this opening of the party to new actors was also seen as a closing of the party to others, such as workers and unions. This presaged a later trend for the national Democratic Party.

The brief to the credentials committee filed by GLND signaled a shift in emphasis away from discussion of national party loyalty and toward criticisms of the closed nature of the delegation selection process in Georgia and its racial impact. As Bond and his GLND co-chair Hooten put it in a press release following the Macon convention, "the question of loyalty is important, but it is not the primary basis for the challenge… [T]he question of Maddox's loyalty has brought to a head the undemocratic, unjust, and inequitable system by which delegates to the Convention are selected."[52]

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[46] Boyd, *Georgia Democrats*, 195.

[47] Homer Bigart, "McCarthy Terms Delegate Test in Georgia Crucial to His Bid," *New York Times*, August 17, l968, citing McCarthy.

[48] "The Georgia Delegation of Loyal National Democrats to the l968 Democratic National Convention," mimeo., 4 pp., Schwartz, "Georgia Papers."

[49] Two lists of the Executive Board members, Paschall Papers.

[50] "Georgia's Delegates to the Democratic National Convention," mimeo., 2 pp., in Schwartz, "Georgia Papers."

[51] Al Kehrer, Memo to Al Barkan, AFL-CIO, August 12, 1968, Box 44, Folder "Political 1968 Democratic National Convention Credentials Committee," James O'Hara Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.

[52] Julian Bond and James Hooten statement, August 12, 1968, Paschall Papers.

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This rhetoric connected the Georgia challengers to a set of critiques flowing from both the McCarthy campaign and the movement activists it attracted in the spring and summer of 1968. In state after state, activists working for the insurgent candidacies of McCarthy and Kennedy encountered obstacles in the form of closed, impermeable state party procedures—not only procedural irregularities and arbitrary actions by local officials, but the impenetrable quality of the system itself. Frustration over such obstacles drove an effort by McCarthy activists in Connecticut to launch a national ad hoc commission of Democratic officials that catalogued inequities and inadequacies in delegate selection procedures throughout the country. Julian Bond was a member of this commission, whose report, entitled *The Democratic Choice*, presaged much of the argument laid out eventually by McGovern-Fraser.[53] Simultaneously, those same frustrations resulted in a record number of credentials challenges brought to Chicago in August—seventeen in total, covering fifteen states.[54]

Most Deep South states faced challenges over alleged violations of the Call to the Convention's strong provisions on racial discrimination. The drama of the MFDP fight four years earlier and the subsequent work of the Special Equal Rights Committee helped ensure that both McCarthy *and* Humphrey endorsed the 1968 challenge of the Mississippi regulars.[55] The Credentials Committee upheld the Mississippi challenge and meted out partial victories to challengers from Alabama and Georgia.[56] The Alabama regulars were seated, but only on condition of signing a loyalty oath. The Georgia delegation's seats were split evenly between the Maddox regulars and the GLND—prompting the bulk of the Maddox forces to walk out of the convention in protest. The Credentials Committee rejected all of the challenges from non-southern states, but passed a resolution calling for the DNC to establish a new commission to study delegate selection practices and recommend improvements based on participatory principles.[57]

Those principles were connected to a normative view of representation and intraparty democracy that led ultimately to the delegitimization of a contrasting view. This debate was already at work in Georgia's intra-Loyalist conflicts in 1968. During the Macon convention, Al Kehrer applied a trustee view of representation, wanting the attendees to be loyal to the national

[53] Commission on the Democratic Selection of Presidential Nominees, *The Democratic Choice* (New York, 1968).

[54] *The Presidential Nominating Conventions, 1968*, 88, 96–131.

[55] Aaron Henry, letter to John Bailey, July 17, 1968, Box 29, Folder "Democratic Party: Democratic Convention, 1968: Credentials Contest: Mississippi," Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

[56] One other southern state challenge, in Alabama, resembled Georgia in its experience of three-way factionalization. Three full Alabama delegations vied for recognition before the Credentials Committee: so-called regulars, who supported George Wallace; a group of moderate white Wallace critics who actually controlled the formal state party; and a predominantly African-American independent group called the National Democratic Party of Alabama (NDPA). Although endorsed at the Chicago convention by the McCarthy campaign and dismissed by the Alabama regulars and moderates alike as a "McCarthy front group," the NDPA had roots in Black Power-influenced political organizing that predated the 1968 campaign and lasted several years beyond it. The McCarthy campaign appears to have been less directly involved in building the NDPA's challenge delegation than it had been in Georgia, and thus Alabama does not present the same case of candidate- and movement-centered tactics interacting. See Steven F. Lawson, *In Pursuit of Power: Southern Blacks and Electoral Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press), 115-117; and *The Presidential Nominating Conventions*, 120.

[57] *The Presidential Nominating Conventions*, 199–200.

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party and open to the deliberations of the national convention in order to act in the interests of the constituents.[58] Many but not all of the initial GDF members were for Humphrey, who was expected to be nominated. Kehrer saw the actions of the McCarthy campaign at Macon as a hostile "partisan takeover" in part because he believed that delegates should be free to act and vote according to their own political judgment.[59] He thus believed in an interactive model of representation, one that echoes scholarly arguments against direct democracy and emphasizes the time and space allowed by representative systems for officials and constituents to get to know each other and develop shared judgments.[60] Kehrer did not want the representatives to be bound as delegates to a one-time choice of constituents.

Kehrer's fellow GDF founder John Morris held a more delegate or mandate view of representation.[61] In this view, specific people coming to the Macon convention could demand that their preferred candidate be represented. (Morris stayed on the Executive Committee of the delegation as its majority went for McCarthy, and his wife sent a contribution to the local campaign for McCarthy).[62] Morris's logic was echoed by Bond, Hooten, and the other GLND leaders. As a GLND press release put it in the aftermath of Kehrer's and other critics' resignations, "once the grounds for challenge had been fulfilled," participants in the Macon convention had "rightfully proceeded to elect its delegates to the Democratic National Convention, who are to help choose the nominee of the Democratic Party for President of the United States." Given such weighty responsibility, it is "no surprise that there was interest in the political nature of the delegation by those who supported the challenge at Macon."[63] An expression of actual preferences for specific presidential candidates was, in this line of thinking, intrinsic to meaningful participation. That logic exerted a powerful hold on those laying the groundwork in Chicago for long-term procedural reform—unsurprisingly so, since this reform agenda emerged out of the experience of actors working on behalf of specific candidate campaigns.

One last maneuver at the convention to secure a commitment to reforms backed by the full force of party law took place at the Rules Committee, where McCarthy-supporting delegates drafted a minority report resolving that the Call to the 1972 Democratic Convention would include language requiring state parties to make "all feasible efforts" to adopt delegate selection procedures that allow for full and timely public participation.[64] The convention's narrow vote in

[58] Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), Chs. 7-9.

[59] Al Kehrer, memo to Don Slaiman, AFL-CIO, August 19, l968, p. 2, in RG9-003 Box 44, Folder "Democratic National Convention, 1968," George Meany Memorial Archives, International Labor Center, Silver Spring, MD. (Since our research in these archives, the collection has moved to the University of Maryland, College Park.)

[60] Nadia Urbinati, *Representative Democracy. Principles and Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), Intro., Ch. 1.

[61] Pitkin, *Concept of Representation*, Chs. 2-3, 7; Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," *American Political Science Review* 53:3 (September 1959): 742-756.

[62] Patsy Morris, Letter to Judy Besdine, July 30, 1968, in Schwartz, "Georgia Papers."

[63] Georgia Loyal National Democrats press release, August 18, 1968, Paschall Papers.

[64] *The Presidential Nominating Conventions*, 198.

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favor of that resolution proved the only victory for a minority report in 1968. In January of the following year, in the wake of Humphrey's loss to Republican Richard Nixon, the DNC established the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection. The formal drive to inscribe a participatory ethos and delegate vision of representation into the presidential nominating system had commenced.

Party Reform and the Turn to "Mandate" Representation

The reforms that emerged from this process shifted the balance of influence among factions and groups within both parties, while ensuring that debates over the nature of intraparty representation would become a recurring feature of American politics. Following a year of research and public hearings, the McGovern-Fraser Commission published eighteen guidelines for state delegate selection procedures in its 1970 report *Mandate for Reform*. Some required procedures to be transparent, codified, timely, and both logistically and financially accessible to all Democrats wishing to participate. Others prohibited practices that would privilege party officials and public office holders, such as the automatic designation of delegate status to such officials and the use of proxy voting and lax quorum requirements at party meetings. Closely related to such participatory measures would be efforts, like banning the use of the unit rule, to ensure that minority viewpoints on policy and candidate preferences could not be snuffed out by majorities. These measures served effectively to prohibit two systems that as of 1968 were employed, wholly or in part, by twenty-three states and territories: delegate selection by state party committees, and the election of delegates in caucuses and conventions closed to non-officials.[65]

To render participation meaningful in the sense that Bond, Hooten, and other insurgent activists meant, the report included as "Guideline C-1" a requirement that contenders for delegate slots in primary elections list their presidential candidate preference or the word 'uncommitted' by their name on the ballot. As Bob Nelson, the McGovern-Fraser commission's staff director, later recalled, such a direct application of a delegate/mandate concept of representation would have the regrettable effect of "forc[ing] your party leaders out of the process; you were taking flexibility out of the system." But, he continued, within the commission, and particularly among its staff, "that argument was rejected. The purist theory won out."[66] Critics of this theory, warning of the unrepresentative consequences of turning control over both delegate selection and delegate decision-making to engaged activists and the minority of voters who turn out for primaries, made their voices heard during this period. [67] But as within the McGovern-Fraser Commission, so it went in the broader political world of the early 1970s: a participatory vision of party procedures, linked to the idea of presidential nominations centered around the expressed preferences of ordinary voters, won out.

[65] This count is derived from the overview of existing state procedures in Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, *Mandate for Reform* (Washington, DC: Democratic National Committee, 1970).

[66] Shafer, *Quiet Revolution*, 183-184.

[67] See, e.g., Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate* (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan Inc., 1970), 142-143; and Penn Kemble and Josh Muravchik, "The New Politics & the Democrats," *Commentary*, December 1, 1972.

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The transformations of both parties' nomination procedures, unleashed by McGovern-Fraser, were profound. Candidates now must woo voters, rather than delegates, in a marathon of state-level primaries and caucuses. Party actors lack formal powers over the selection process, with the partial exception of the Democrats' institution of "unpledged party leader and elected official delegates," discussed below.[68] Meanwhile, insiders (broadly construed) in both party networks have demonstrated an impressive capacity to learn and adapt to the new system and thereby sustain effective *informal* control over the selection of presidential nominees[69]—except for those contests in which, spectacularly, they have failed to do so.[70]

The reforms ushered in new electoral dynamics. The coalitional vision that animated the McCarthy and, later, McGovern supporters' reform efforts involved an alliance of minorities, progressive labor, and educated cultural liberals, supplanting the New Deal coalition as the constituent base of the Democratic party. This approach travelled a four-decade path from electoral catastrophe to viable if fragile majority-making success during the Obama years.[71]

McGovern-Fraser also contributed to change in southern Democratic parties.[72] The longstanding work on the ground of groups like the GDF in Georgia at last met with a receptive national party response. McGovern-Fraser's requirements for openness and participation in state delegate selection procedures provided the leverage for loyalist partisan actors in southern states to consolidate control over their organizations.[73] Georgia illustrates this process. It had delivered a plurality to George Wallace on November 5, 1968, but the Wallacite "regulars" soon lost control of the state Democratic Party while Loyalists healed the internal division that had opened in 1968.[74] When the McGovern-Fraser Commission came to Georgia to hold hearings in l969, a range of Loyalists testified, including Carl Sanders, Ivan Allen, Julian Bond, and Al Kehrer. New state party rules for choosing delegates by district conventions and a state-level meeting were passed in 1971, and Bond and Jimmy Carter worked together on the composition of the 1972 Georgia delegation.[75] The shift toward Loyalist control of the Georgia Democratic Party was mirrored in other states in the 1970s. Across the South, Democratic parties opened up institutionally, integrated racially, and liberalized ideologically, increasingly resembling over time the national Democratic Party.

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[68] DNC Office of Party Affairs and Delegate Selections, "Delegate Selection Materials for the 2016 Democratic National Convention," December 15, 2014, 9, accessed at: https://demrulz.org/wp-content/files/12.15.14_2016_Delegate_Selection_Documents_Mailing_-_Rules_Call_Regs_Model_Plan_Checklist_12.15.14.pdf.

[69] Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller, *The Party Decides*.

[70] Marty Cohen, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller, "Party Versus Faction in the Reformed Presidential Nominating System," *PS* (October 2016): 701-708.

[71] John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira referred to this historical development as "McGovern's revenge" in *The Emerging Democratic Majority* (New York: Scribner, 2002), 37-68.

[72] Robert Mickey, *Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America's Deep South, 1944-1972* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 277-280.

[73] Richard M. Valelly, *The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 173-223.

[74] Boyd, *Georgia Democrats*, 209-244.

[75] Boyd, *Georgia Democrats*, 201, 216-217.

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In the wake of these post-McGovern-Fraser developments, questions of representation and voice have continued to figure in intraparty debate. Although a mandate view of internal party decision-making dominates both party practice and contemporary American political culture, alternative visions live on in specific practices—most notably the Democratic institution of unpledged "superdelegates." Adopted prior to the 1984 election by a successor commission to McGovern-Fraser, appointed superdelegates embody the party as an institution and can claim distinct expertise drawn from their service and experience with the party. The potential of such figures to act deliberatively and autonomously stands as a remnant of Al Kehrer's "trustee" outlook on the proper role of convention delegates. But superdelegates, who have never served as a decisive force in presidential nomination votes at party conventions, have struggled from the beginning to garner legitimacy and respect from other participants. The institution served as a *bête noire* for the Bernie Sanders campaign during the 2016 primaries. In a sign that those critiques have come to prevail in the party writ large, the DNC voted in August 2018 to bar superdelegates from voting on the first ballot in future conventions under most circumstances.[76]

The conflict over superdelegates points to the difficulty of justifying trustee representation in current politics, which is itself a legacy of battles waged in places like Macon in 1968. We thus end by briefly discussing the theoretical and normative case for trustee forms of representation. As a participant observer in Georgia 1968, one of the authors, Schwartz, was excited about McCarthy's victory at Macon. In retrospect, however, it is hard to countenance Joe Rauh's breaking his word to Al Kehrer, since the challenge delegation might have been partially seated anyway. At the time, Schwartz had never met nor heard of Kehrer. But his work—founding the GDF and remaining loyal to the labor and civil rights movements as well as the Democratic Party—has inspired in both authors the following observation: It is hard to justify trustee representation in democratic theory and practice, yet it is necessary.

It is hard because democratic theory values people acting for themselves and not having someone act on their behalf. In a democracy, people may act autonomously, passing laws for the self and others, or they can act on a whim. To be fully democratic, then, decision-makers would have to be chosen by lot, where all are considered equally qualified and only chance or fate singles out some to hold office.[77] Democratic city-states in the classical, and medieval, and early renaissance periods used the lottery for this purpose.[78] The goal was wide citizen rotation in office; citizens would participate in power rather than consent to it.[79]

By contrast, the very idea of representation, of standing and acting for others who are not present, involves a "principle of distinction."[80] The formal act of an individual authorizing someone to be one's agent might be egalitarian. But once a group of people gives an agent the

[76] Adam Levy, "DNC changes superdelegate rules in presidential nomination process," CNN.com, August 25, 2018.

[77] Bernard Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Chs. 1-2.

[78] Nancy L. Schwartz, *The Blue Guitar. Political Representation and Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, l988), Ch. 7.

[79] Manin, *Principles of Representative Government*, 79-93.

[80] Manin, *Principles of Representative Government*, Ch. 3.

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substantive authority to make decisions, a temporary willed inequality enters.[81] An election seeks what is "best" in a candidate. It need not be older aristocratic distinctions, like noble birth or inherited wealth. It could be any trait that sets a candidate apart from some others, such as political ideas, virtues of character, or practical judgment. Thus, the criterion of distinction can be democratically chosen by the voters, but it is still an aristocratic principle. Although even delegate or mandate representation has a small aristocratic element, in choosing who can best carry out our will, trustee representation has it more. Once granted authority as the people's choice, the trustee representative has leeway and obligation to act in their interest. To democratic eyes and ears, this seems paternalistic.

Yet the trustee role, alongside mandate representation, is needed in political life. Politics involves "any kind of independent leadership in action," where a person tries to amass power by recruiting a following.[82] Insurgent leaders tend to focus on fewer issues, while an "attentive statesman" listens to all the demands and tries to come up with a generally accepted decision.[83] Politics involves some gifts and skills developed through experience—an ability to size up and interact with people, and judgment about when to compromise one's principles and when not. For some people, "politics [is] a calling" or vocation, and in this sense, the activity can use some professionals, who make it their career.[84]

The trustee role of the statesman is harder to celebrate than that of the activist, because the trustee is less charismatic. Without this figure, however, "the centre cannot hold."[85] It is on this point that the original impetus for the Democrats' adoption of superdelegates in 1984 holds continuing relevance. Worried that the proliferation of direct primaries had "devalue[d] party conventions and caucuses by removing decision-making power from them," the DNC's Commission on Presidential Nominations called for the introduction of unpledged at-large delegates to "increase the representativeness of mainstream Democratic constituencies … [to] help restore peer review to the process, subjecting candidates to scrutiny by those who know them best," and to "return decision-making discretion and flexibility to the Convention."[86] Not all

[81] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "To the Republic of Geneva," dedication to "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men," in *The First and Second Discourses*, ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, l964), 83-88, esp. 85 and 87.

[82] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, l958), 77-78.

[83] Bertrand de Jouvenel, *The Pure Theory of Politics* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, l963), 219; see also 130-31, 134, 138, 140, 219-241.

[84] Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," 80, 83, 84.

[85] William Butler Yeats, "The Second Coming," (1921) in *The Norton Anthology of Modern Poetry*, ed. Richard Ellman and Robert O'Clair (New York: W. W. Norton, l973), p. 131. In his analysis of the Democratic party and its political culture, David Plotke points out that by 1972, there were three, not two, forms of representation at stake in Democratic Party politics: mandate, descriptive, and trustee. The trustee tended, ideologically, to be a moderate centrist. Descriptive representatives, standing for ascriptive or acquired characteristics like race, age, and gender—had a left-wing bent, but later identity politics on the right, as in white ethno-nationalism, was also grounded in descriptive representation. This development is beyond the ken of this article. Plotke, "Party Reform and Democratic Renewal," pp. 269-276, esp. Table 4.

[86] Commission on Presidential Nominations, *The Report of the Commission on Presidential Nominations*, pp. 10, 17, Box 1073, Folder unlabeled, Democratic National Committee Records, National Archives, Washington, DC.

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superdelegates rise to the level of skillful statesmen, of course, and state parties both North and South had compelling reasons to move away from the "smoke-filled rooms" of old. But as new passions and interests mobilize and politicians maneuver to use or defeat them, there is still a role for experienced party people. And because ideas about democracy matter for the development of democratic practice, democratic theory needs to incorporate an aristocratic element. The Georgia 1968 case shows that trustee as well as mandate representatives have moral claims and a political role.

The Georgia delegate challenge of 1968 served as a small battle in a larger process of party development that had even larger consequences for the political system as a whole. It thus holds lessons for party scholarship. In the American system, presidential nomination contests are a key arena in which organized interests, movements, and factions fight and bargain over national party policy. But nomination contests are also about nominees, and nominees are people. The inevitable personalization of such conflicts, given the strategic needs and incentives of office-seekers and their campaigns, means that the process of party development is the product of both candidate- and group-driven dynamics. Those dynamics both shape and in turn are shaped by normative struggles over representation and other democratic values. Half a century after the Chicago convention, this remains both the promise and the burden of party politics.

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Geographic Differences of Individual Views toward the Role of Government

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Introduction

A central tenet of democracy is the interaction between a government and its citizens. The government provides a number of goods and services that benefit Americans every day. From traveling on public roads to receiving mail, government has long been a provider to millions of people across the United States. Consequently, the role of government is not without debate. As a result, political pundits, politicians, and scholars have often evaluated various policies and government actions in regard to the role government should play. To some, government appears too big and too involved in the everyday lives of Americans. To others, government may not be big enough and fails to encompass or provide the necessary services for a sustainable American life.

It is not surprising that politicians often use the role of government as a campaign talking point in order to sway public sentiment towards their preferred points of view. President Ronald Reagan once expressed his disdain for big government when he proclaimed that the most dangerous words in the English language were, "I'm from the government and I'm here to help" (Reagan 1986). On the other side of the aisle, President Bill Clinton once exclaimed that the "era of big government is over" (Clinton 1996). Both presidents were generally popular and this was perhaps due in part to their public appeals that less government means better government.

Consequently, political elites and policy decision-makers are entrenched in this battle for the direction of America with regard to how government should function, and while their opinion certainly matters, perhaps the better question is, what factors affect citizen perceptions of governmental policies? This research seeks to understand how individuals perceive specific policies that are rooted in the scope and overarching role of government in American society. While previous research has focused on the variation of views on public policy across demographics such as income and race as well as political perceptions and characteristics such as ideology and partisanship (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), the focus here is how much variation exists between individuals of different geographies.

More recent work finds that rural Americans hold a distrust towards government generally and therefore do not support government involvement (Walsh 2012; Cramer 2016). This study extends Cramer's logic that place serves as an influencing factor on political perceptions. This study consequently demonstrates that place acts as a moderator of perspectives. Liberals in rural areas compared to those in urban areas are less supportive of increased government spending and are less supportive of a spending increase in welfare programs. Overall, the findings demonstrate that living in rural America, especially for liberals, can have a significant

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influence on perspectives on the role of government and public policy, which is further evidence that an urban-rural divide adds nuance to the ideological divisions in contemporary American politics.

Perceptions of Government Policies and Spending

Much of the literature regarding the role of government has focused on how individuals perceive government spending and the ways in which attitudes toward the role of government are affected by sociological and ideological factors. Additionally, for the purpose of explaining the division between individuals of varying geographies, existing research has promulgated the ideas that individuals' ideas about politics and culture are shaped by their environment and their identity with a particular place or population.

This previous research has attempted to illustrate how Americans develop attitudes regarding government spending or an increased role of government. Such research also examines the relationship between government spending and public opinion in order to gain a better understanding of how Americans feel about the role of government. Jacoby (1994) demonstrates that attitudes on government spending are shaped more by symbolic considerations rather than the substantive content of the policies. Symbolic content activates responses in citizens given their ideological or partisan predispositions. A particular policy may take on a new meaning when presented to individuals from different groups and furthermore, the concept of "spending" may actually be interpreted as "welfare," which presents a symbolic idea on its own. When the concept of "welfare" is activated in the mind of individuals, they perhaps interpret that to be associated with more government involvement.

Other research has discussed issue framing and how "packaging" government programs by political elites to the masses affects perceptions of the role of government. Perceptions of government policy have been shown to be *group-centric* in the sense that people judge particular policy initiatives based on who benefits from the proposed policy. Therefore, group-centrism follows as a particular heuristic that guides individuals on their evaluations of government activity in a more simplistic manner (Nelson and Kinder 1996; Popkin 1994). Still, while individuals may be able to perceive politics through their group-centric lenses, they are still subject to considerable influence by political parties and elites. The idea of group-centrism is predicated on individuals being able to connect members of a particular group with policies. Additionally, it can be inferred that individuals will view particular groups as "winners" and "losers" of government policies and can either increase or decrease support. Furthermore, when negative frames are used, such as the claim that welfare recipients are "freeloaders," a negative stigma enters the minds of certain groups and thus, activates stereotypes that influence their predispositions towards welfare. The way in which government spending is framed to the public is clearly a product of partisan strategies to gain public support and appeals. Issue framing influences people in specific ways dependent on their personal characteristics such as race, age, gender, or income (Jacoby 2000). Most striking among studies of issue framing on government

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spending attitudes are the findings that individuals who were provided with more specific issue frames, where more transparent details about an issue were provided, were more supportive of government spending programs.

Other research has examined similar phenomena specifically with regard to the concept of race, political sophistication, and values. Goren (2003) illustrates that the opinion of white Americans toward government spending is not as much a single issue of racial difference between whites and blacks but is influenced by how well individuals understand the differences between undeserving and deserving poor. Spending programs that target the undeserving poor are significantly likely to be evaluated by sophisticated white individuals through the lenses of racial stereotypes. Racial stereotyping affects beliefs on welfare and government spending but has minimal if any influence on other non-welfare social programs (Goren 2008). It is clear that racial perceptions are significant in determining attitudes toward government welfare spending. Additionally, Americans have ordered hierarchical values that influence their beliefs toward government spending policies as individuals with distinct differences between the values of "liberty" and "equality" have significantly divergent perspectives on government spending, wherein those who favored equality were more likely to support welfare spending and those who valued liberty were less likely (Jacoby 2006).

Unsurprisingly, perceptions of government spending are moderated by political ideology. Previous research has analyzed the role ideology plays in evaluating government spending and politics in general (Conover & Feldman 1981; Huckfeldt et al. 1999; Jacoby 2000; Rudolph & Evans 2005; Pickering & Rockey 2011). Primarily, ideology has been examined in interactions with other factors as political ideology is understood to play such an integral role in political evaluations and perceptions (Ellis & Stimson 2011). In a similar fashion, I build from the growing research agenda that examines the role of place and its influence on attitudes toward government (Walsh 2012; Cramer 2016; Hopkins 2017). In marrying the concepts of political ideology and place, this present study seeks to understand how place moderates the ideological perceptions towards the role of government.

"Place" and its Role in the Study of Political Behavior

Aside from the common determinants of political attitudes and perceptions, a fair amount of research is devoted to the politics of place, where one's geographic location significantly affects one's ideas about politics and government. More specifically, recent research has discussed the idea that an urban-rural divide exists in the United States in terms of how people living in those regions perceive the political world around them. Earlier works posited that "a sense of place" is formed through the personal and emotional attachments that individuals have to a particular region or locale (Agnew 1987). This attachment serves as a similar psychological mechanism as partisanship for the purposes of understanding and perceiving politics (Campbell et al 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).

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While doubts have been raised as to whether an urban-rural divide is actually prevalent in modern society (Misra 2018), previous and contemporary literature have presented significant findings demonstrating that not only does place matter, but it serves as a valuable mechanism for political socialization. For example, people from rural locations have a propensity to consider themselves distinct and living a different way of life from individuals in urban areas (Bell 1992; Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003). As individuals have some sort of "tie" to a particular place, they are also likely to have their identity reinforced through interaction with like-minded individuals in their local residential networks (Blokland and Savage 2001). As a result, individuals may choose to select where they live based on the political leanings, policies, or like-minded partisans in a particular locality (Bishop 2009; McDonald 2011; Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2012). Perhaps self-sorting has contributed to the partisan and geographic divisions that have become prevalent in contemporary American politics (McKee 2008). Rural areas across the country are now politically more conservative, especially in the American South compared to other regions of the country. Urban areas are primarily more liberal, even in the American South (McKee 2008; Hopkins 2017; Scala and Johnson 2017). In consequence, individuals from these distinct regions and geographic localities have unique perspectives on politics and government, people, and public policy.

Socioeconomically, the urban-rural divide is rooted in the idea that rural individuals attribute their economic deprivation to urban elites, who fail to understand "how the other half lives" in rural areas (Walsh 2012). As a consequence, these rural individuals are more likely to favor limited government and believe the appropriate role of government is best when "urban elites" are not making decisions on behalf of rural interests. This "rural resentment" fosters a sense of distrust and thus, leads to rural Americans holding negative predispositions towards government. Furthermore, the urban-rural divide is perhaps fostered through the ideas that individuals from urban and rural areas are significantly different from one another in terms of their values and lifestyles, political decision-makers overlook rural areas, and distributive resources in terms of government spending are disproportionately given to urban areas over rural areas (Cramer 2016).

The social identities that are formed through geography have had significant implications for the study of political behavior. Political geography and the identities formed from living in particular regions have allowed scholars to better understand voting behavior across the United States in terms of how citizens view government, political parties, and policy issues. Campaigns view regions as political battlegrounds, and when the campaign is able to understand the "lay of the land," candidates and strategists may be able to tailor their campaigns to the specific ideologies of the individuals who reside there. As scholars continue to understand political geography and more specifically the urban-rural divide, it is essential to understand how the areas and the people living in those regions perceive the role of government. In turn, this research attempts to demonstrate a clearer picture of the intersection between geographic perceptions and the provision of public policy.

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Theory and Hypotheses

Hypotheses of Place and the Role of Government

Building from the previous research, I seek to test three specific hypotheses on how the role of place affects perspectives on the role of government through individual attitudes on spending towards public services such as health and education, welfare, and Social Security. It is expected that rural Americans will be less favorable of more government spending and welfare due in part to the resentment many rural Americans have demonstrated towards government in general (Cramer 2016). Here, I am not seeking to test Cramer's theory of rural resentment, but rather whether rural Americans have a negative predisposition towards government spending. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:

- *Hypothesis 1: Rural Americans are expected to be less favorable of increases in government spending compared to urban Americans.*

While it is not only expected that "place" will be a significant factor in determining differences in government involvement and public policy, political ideology is also expected to be important in explaining political behavior or perceptions. As mentioned previously (Jacoby 2000), individuals who are conservative are more likely to favor a smaller government with less government involvement. Conversely, liberals are primarily associated with supporting more social welfare policies and therefore are more likely to favor more government involvement. Here, the second hypothesis seeks to test for the influence of ideology on perceptions of the role of government and specific government policies. The second hypothesis is as follows:

- *Hypothesis 2: Americans who are more conservative will be less favorable of government spending compared to those who are more liberal.*

The third hypothesis is most integral to assessing the role an individual citizen's place plays in the minds of American citizens when it comes to perceiving politics. If place matters, then it is expected that people's perceptions of government changes or moderates given their geographic environment. As mentioned previously, liberals are more predisposed to supporting more government spending and involvement, whereas conservatives favor less spending. Like conservatives, rural Americans are less supportive of government involvement and spending compared to urban Americans. Here, the following hypothesis seeks to assess the interaction between ideology and place and whether place has a significant effect on moderating the perceptions of government across political ideology. For example, it is expected that individuals with an ideology that perhaps stands in stark contrast with the rest of their geographic population, those individuals will have moderated perspectives to "match" with their neighbors and friends. Therefore, the third hypothesis is as follows:

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- *Hypothesis 3: Geography conditions perceptions towards government spending and across political ideologies.*

Data and Methodology

The first task in examining the influence of place on perceptions of government and policy is to find data that measure these concepts and also specifically identifies place as a key independent variable for analysis. Previous national surveys have done an adequate job at tapping into the minds of individuals regarding their beliefs about government and how much/little the government should do for American citizens. For the purposes of this research, the ANES (American National Election Survey) includes measures of geographic location at the county-level and also asks questions that tap into the attitudes of Americans on government policies and the role of government.

The American National Election Survey permits scholars to access the geocodes (numeric county identifiers) and zip codes for all respondents to the survey for the years of 1994 through 2008. Using this geographic data allows for an examination over roughly the last twenty years of perceptions towards the role of government and government policy based on where someone lives. Furthermore, all the primary dependent variables of interest were included as questions in each of the years in the ANES dataset. The utilization of time in the study is twofold. First, examining individual perceptions towards particular governmental policies across geography is difficult given the low sample size of rural respondents. Therefore, by aggregating respondents for multiple years, the data is able to examine a greater number of rural respondents and their perceptions of public policies. Second, the analysis utilizes the ANES cross-sectional time-series data to account for population shifts in the respondent's geographic location. For example, a county considered rural in 1994, may become more urban or suburban with a greater population shift over the subsequent years. The shifts are accounted for with the use of the geographic data discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, which are updated every few years. Regarding how time is utilized in the analyses, time acts as a control variable, as the analysis is examining aggregate perceptions on the role of government for each year. By using year as a control variable, the analysis accounts for unmodeled variation in the perceptions towards government spending and policy by each year.

The dataset of the geocodes and zip codes correspond to each respondent's case ID in the original ANES dataset, therefore giving each respondent a particular geographic location; however, simply having geocodes and zip codes is still not adequate to pinpoint whether a respondent lives in a rural, urban, or suburban county in the United States. The National Center for Health Services through the Center for Disease Control has developed Urban-Rural Continuum Codes in order to "study health differences across the urban-rural continuum" (Ingram & Franco 2014). Compared to other measures of geography utilized in political science research, the NCHS codes have a more fine-grained measurement in the identification of geography. Other types of geographic measurement, such as the U.S. Census Bureau or

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geographic coding by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, do not designate areas as "urban" or "rural" based on proximity to a metropolitan population. Furthermore, the NCHS breaks down geography into six specific classifications – (1) large central metro, (2) large fringe metro, (3) medium-sized metro, (4) small metro, (5) micropolitan, and (6) non-core rural. Whereas the U.S. Census Bureau and USDA account for population rather than distance or "influence" of nearby geographic areas. In large part, the decision to use the NCHS coding scheme was to ensure that "urban" and "rural" areas were *distinct* from one another and there were little to no "spillover" effects from metropolitan areas into rural areas. The approximation of the NCHS urban-rural continuum is appropriate for the analysis as it identifies counties according to their population and separates metro areas from "fringe" metro areas. Areas with significantly smaller populations are considered "non-core" localities or rural areas, located away from other population centers. For the purposes of appropriately assigning these NCHS urban-rural codes, of which there are six, to respondents from the ANES data, the designations are broken into four categories in the dataset, wherein large central metro areas are designated as urban, large fringe metros are designated as suburban, medium metros, small metros, and micropolitan areas are considered "mid-size localities," and "non-core" localities are designated as rural. Most importantly for this paper is the ability to separate out individuals who live in rural areas (non-core in the NCHS data) as the separation from urban locales, regardless of size, may be an important component in explaining attitudes towards the role of government. The NCHS's urban-rural classification scheme has accounted for population changes across each type of geographic area since its inception in 1990. Additionally, the coding scheme has maintained consistency between the last two versions of the data in 2006 and 2013 by accounting for population shifts and changes as well as the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) delineation of geographic areas. The version in 1990 was based on the 1990 census and the OMB's delineation of areas but did not account for population shifts provided by post-census population estimates of the geographic localities. Table 1 shows the geographic breakdown of the respondents in the ANES and NCHS data across urban, suburban, mid-sized, and rural localities who answered any combination of the primary questions of interest.

Table 1. Summary Statistics of Geography		
Location	n	Percent
Urban	1,808	29.34%
Suburban	1,364	22.14%
Mid-Sized Areas	2,564	41.62%
Rural	425	6.90%
Total	6,161	100%

The primary dependent variables are formulated from several questions in the ANES that effectively demonstrate individual preferences towards government intervention and

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specific policies. To test the aforementioned hypotheses, the questions are primarily ordinal wherein respondents rate their responses in accordance with whether government should have a more active role in providing and spending for particular public services or should have a smaller role. For the subsequent analyses, this research analyzes three questions that examine individual attitudes towards government spending, welfare services, and Social Security. Assessing these attitudes towards welfare and Social Security can indicate whether Americans waver in their support for specific policies compared to their overall feelings about broad government spending and involvement. Percentages of the number of respondents across the primary dependent variables are found in Table 2.

Table 2. Percentage of Respondents by Category and Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables

Variables	n	Percent	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Govt. Spending	4,847	100%	0.849	0	2
Less	1,712	35.3%			
Same	1,357	28.0%			
More	1,778	36.7%			
Welfare	5,203	100%	0.745	0	2
Less	2,342	45.0%			
Same	1,930	37.1%			
More	931	17.9%			
Soc. Security	5,199	100%	0.595	0	2
Less	272	5.2%			
Same	2,116	40.7%			
More	2,811	54.1%			

The sample size for each dependent variable accounts for the number of respondents who answered each particular question.

In addition to the primary independent variables measuring "place," the analysis also includes a control variable for the length of time a respondent has lived in a given area. The inclusion of the variable accounts for the possibility that respondents who have lived in a particular geographic area for a prolonged length of time will have similar perceptions to their geographic peers on government spending across the three policy areas as they have perhaps more rigid and defined perceptions given their long-time residency in the same geographic area. Length of residency for respondents ranges from 0 to 90 years. Also, included in the analysis are standard control variables that attempt to capture additional factors that can potentially influence perceptions on government spending and policy attitudes. The analysis includes variables for political ideology, gender, race, age, income, and level of education. Political ideology is coded from 0 to 2, where liberal is coded as 0, moderate is coded as 1, and conservative is coded as 2.

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Gender is coded as a dichotomous variable, where male is coded as 0 and female is coded as 1. Race is coded from 0 to 3, where white/Caucasian is coded as 0, black/African American is coded as 1, Hispanic is coded as 2, and other ethnicities are coded as 3. Ages of the respondents range from 18 to 93. Income is coded from 0 to 4, where the respondents who fall in the 0-16th percentile are coded as 0, respondents who fall in the 17th-33rd percentile are coded as 1, respondents who fall in the 34th-67th percentile are coded as 2, respondents who fall in the 68th-95th percentile are coded as 3, and respondents who fall in the 96th-100th percentile are coded as 4. Education is coded from 0 to 4, where respondents who did not completed high school are coded as 0, respondents who received a high school diploma are coded as 1, respondents who have some college education are coded as 2, respondents who have a college degree are coded as 3, and respondents who have an advanced degree are coded as 4. The analysis also controls for geographic region (South vs. Non-South) in order to ensure that people's place-based perceptions are rooted in their geographic locality while considering the effect of geographic region. South is coded as 1 and Non-South is coded as 0.[1] Time is utilized as a control using year fixed effects, with the omitted category being the first year of data (1994). Utilizing year fixed effects accounts for shifts in opinion on government spending from year to year. For example, respondents who answered questions regarding welfare spending may have a more favorable opinion in the aggregate towards such spending in 2004 compared to 2000. Descriptive and summary statistics are found in the Appendix.[2]

Analysis

This study conducts three separate analyses of perceptions of government spending across geography and political ideology. Each separate analysis has two models. The first model is an ordered logistic regression. The second model in each analysis is another ordered logistic regression with an interaction between political ideology and geography. The first analysis examines people's perceptions towards spending on public services (Table 3). The second analysis examines people's perceptions towards spending on welfare programs (Table 4). The third analysis examines people's perceptions towards spending on Social Security (Table 5). For substantive interpretation of the results of the analyses, the marginal effects and predicted probabilities are displayed in Figures 1-3.

Geographic Perspectives on Government Spending and Services

First, in order to assess the general dispositions of individuals regarding the role of government, the first analysis utilizes an ordered logistic regression on how much the government

[1] South is defined as the states that were members of the Confederate States of America: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

[2] In total, the dataset used here had a total of 6,161 respondents for the years 1994-2008. For the purposes of the analysis, 6,161 respondents were featured in any of the three models, wherein most of those respondents answered all of the questions pertaining to the dependent variables and the independent variables.

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should spend to provide services to the public. This regression will test whether people of different geographic areas want a "big" government or one that is smaller, expressing a desire for lower levels of spending and fewer government services. The dependent variable is coded from 0-2 with 0 representing the response that government should provide fewer services and spend less, 1 representing the response that government should keep spending the same, and 2 representing the response that government should provide more services and spend more. It is also worth examining whether ideology plays a role in the perception of the role and size of government. Having a particular political ideology, whether liberal or conservative, brings to mind notions and ideas about how government should function. In that, the analysis also interacts ideology and geography to examine how individuals of different ideologies from different geographic places (urban, suburban, mid-sized, and rural) perceive their government and whether they are drastically different from their co-residents or become more like-minded based on their place of residence. In the analysis, urban is the omitted category for the ordinal geography variable and liberal is the omitted category for the ordinal ideology variable. The results of the ordered logistic regression analysis are found in Table 3.

Table 3: Geographic Perspectives on Government Spending and Services

Variables	Model 1 Views on the Provision of Government Services/Spending	Model 2 Interaction of Ideology and Geography
Suburban	0.0394	0.0234
	(0.0792)	(0.153)
Mid-Sized Area	-0.0177	-0.0477
	(0.0722)	(0.142)
Rural	0.0255	-0.789**
	(0.114)	(0.326)
Length of Residency	0.00125	0.00139
	(0.00118)	(0.00118)
Moderate	-0.809***	-0.947***
	(0.0776)	(0.135)
Conservative	-1.577***	-1.580***
	(0.0779)	(0.130)
Black	0.814***	0.818***
	(0.113)	(0.114)
Hispanic	0.405***	0.401***
	(0.102)	(0.103)
Other Race	0.257	0.255
	(0.162)	(0.163)
Gender	0.362***	0.369***

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	(0.0565)	(0.0566)
Education	-0.0697**	-0.0716**
	(0.0283)	(0.0283)
Age	-0.00689***	-0.00702***
	(0.00179)	(0.00179)
Income	-0.191***	-0.190***
	(0.0281)	(0.0281)
South	-0.0579	-0.0539
	(0.0656)	(0.0658)
Suburban x Moderate	-	0.0710
		(0.200)
Suburban x Conservative	-	-0.0151
		(0.198)
Mid-Size x Moderate	-	0.199
		(0.180)
Mid-Size x Conservative	-	-0.0985
		(0.177)
Rural x Moderate	-	0.884**
		(0.360)
Rural x Conservative	-	0.963***
		(0.366)
Year: 1996	0.226***	0.234***
	(0.0802)	(0.0804)
Year: 1998	0.604***	0.607***
	(0.0873)	(0.0875)
Year: 2000	0.759***	0.755***
	(0.117)	(0.118)
Year: 2004	0.958***	0.962***
	(0.0931)	(0.0932)
Year: 2008	0.911***	0.914***
	(0.101)	(0.102)
Constant (Cut 1)	-1.883***	-1.930***
	(0.161)	(0.177)
Constant (Cut 2)	-0.507***	-0.551***
	(0.159)	(0.175)
Observations	4,847	4,847
Pseudo R^2	0.098	0.100
Ordered Logistic Regression/Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

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Based on the results in Table 3, the analyses bear mixed results for the hypotheses. In the non-interactive model (Model 1), the results support the hypothesis that conservatives are less favorable of government spending compared to liberals; however, the models do not provide support for the first hypothesis that rural Americans are less supportive of spending than urban Americans. The analysis demonstrates that control variables move in their expected direction. Minorities were more likely to support government services compared to white respondents. As expected, the older and wealthier respondents were less supportive of government services and spending, further demonstrating that wealthier and older Americans hold more conservative positions on the role of government involvement. More government programs and spending would also require more tax revenue from citizens, thereby placing a higher tax burden onto wealthier Americans.

As it appears that perceptions on government spending are slightly different across political ideologies especially between liberals and conservatives, it is worth asking how much geography impacts the perceptions of government across the two ideologies. Such a question could better illustrate the link between how place and if the surrounding environment can alter perceptions of government on individuals of varying political ideologies. The second model in Table 3 includes an interaction between geography and ideology. Here, it is expected that an individual's place will either exacerbate their ideological feelings towards government or will moderate such beliefs (Hypothesis 3). As previous literature has indicated (Walsh 2012; Cramer 2016), rural Americans are more prone to supporting less government involvement. Therefore, the outcome of interest in the marginal effects analysis is the propensity of Americans of different ideologies across geography to desire *less* government involvement through government spending. The results of the interaction are demonstrated by a marginal effects analysis and the results are depicted in Figure 1.

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Figure 1. Interaction between Geography and Ideology on Support for Less Government Spending on Public Services



According to the results displayed in Figure 1, it becomes clear that liberals from urban, suburban, and mid-sized areas are less likely to believe government should provide fewer services to the public. As expected, conservatives were always less supportive of government spending across all geographic areas. Still, the significant finding here is that liberals and moderates in rural areas are roughly similar in their perspectives on government spending and the provision of services as rural liberals are nearly 0.15 higher in their desire for less government spending than liberals from other areas.[3] This finding supports the third hypothesis and theory that individuals' opinions and perceptions are moderated by their geographic surroundings and thereby, by living in a particular place may inherently condition or alter one's political perspectives.

Geographic Perspectives on Welfare Spending

The second analysis moves beyond an examination of the role of government and government spending by evaluating individual opinions of the provision of welfare. The

[3] Using a pairwise comparison test between each interaction of ideology and geography, the difference between rural liberals and liberals from the other three geographic areas is statistically significant at $p<.05$.

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provision of welfare has often been a hot-button political issue as it deals with the idea that government can play a large role in assisting the poor with increased spending and the creation of social programs. The dependent variable in this analysis asks respondents whether government spending for welfare programs should be decreased, kept the same, or increased. The variable is coded as 0 for decreased spending, 1 for keeping the amount the same, and 2 for an increase in welfare spending. Similar to the analysis for government spending and the provision of services, this analysis will also incorporate an interaction between ideology and geography to evaluate whether opinions regarding welfare are conditioned or moderated by geography across different political ideologies. The results of the ordered logistic regression analysis are found in Table 4.

Table 4: Geographic Perspectives on Welfare Spending

Variables	Model 1 Views on the Provision of Government Welfare	Model 2 (Interaction of Ideology and Geography)
Suburban	0.0620	0.108
	(0.0774)	(0.140)
Mid-Sized Areas	0.0906	0.0343
	(0.0691)	(0.123)
Rural	-0.179	-0.274
	(0.119)	(0.272)
Length of Residency	-0.000212	-0.000234
	(0.00119)	(0.00119)
Moderate	-0.657***	-0.556***
	(0.0723)	(0.122)
Conservative	-1.172***	-1.305***
	(0.0712)	(0.126)
Black	0.785***	0.775***
	(0.0963)	(0.0964)
Hispanic	0.378***	0.370***
	(0.0923)	(0.0925)
Other	0.194	0.192
	(0.162)	(0.163)
Gender	0.174***	0.180***
	(0.0551)	(0.0553)
Education	0.0275	0.0281
	(0.0274)	(0.0275)
Age	0.00178	0.00176
	(0.00175)	(0.00175)
Income	-0.261***	-0.262***

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	(0.0281)	(0.0281)
South	-0.000123	0.00250
	(0.0612)	(0.0613)
Suburban x Moderate	-	-0.314
		(0.191)
Suburban x Conservative	-	0.146
		(0.187)
Mid-Size x Moderate	-	-0.0430
		(0.167)
Mid-Size x Conservative	-	0.188
		(0.165)
Rural x Moderate	-	-0.0993
		(0.332)
Rural x Conservative	-	0.294
		(0.319)
Year: 1996	-0.227***	-0.227***
	(0.0840)	(0.0841)
Year: 2000	0.450***	0.453***
	(0.0986)	(0.0988)
Year: 2004	0.934***	0.936***
	(0.0913)	(0.0918)
Year: 2008	0.959***	0.955***
	(0.0810)	(0.0812)
Cut 1	-0.919***	-0.936***
	(0.156)	(0.166)
Cut 2	1.096***	1.082***
	(0.158)	(0.168)
Observations	5,203	5,203
Pseudo R^2	0.097	0.097
Ordered Logistic Regression/Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

According to the results displayed in Table 4, the analyses bear mixed results for the three hypotheses. In both Models 1 and 2, there were no significant differences between urban and rural Americans in supporting an increase in welfare spending, therefore demonstrating a lack of support for the first hypothesis. In Models 1 and 2, consistent with the results from the first analysis, conservatives were significantly less supportive of spending on welfare compared to liberals, supporting the second hypothesis. As in the first analysis, wealthier Americans were less likely to be supportive of increased welfare spending and programs. To test the third hypothesis, this analysis also incorporates ideology with geography to determine whether a person's place moderates opinions towards welfare spending across ideology. The marginal effects analysis

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demonstrates a similar pattern for rural liberals with the first analysis although with a smaller substantive effect and not statistically significant. As with the first marginal effects analysis, the outcome of interest is the extent to which individuals from the different regions desire *less* welfare spending for the general public. The results of the marginal effects analysis and interaction between ideology and geography are found in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Interaction between Geography and Ideology on Welfare Spending



Geographic Perspectives on Social Security Spending

The third analysis focuses on a specific government policy that in some way benefits all Americans: Social Security. By evaluating a specific government policy such as Social Security, this analysis demonstrates how Americans will perceive a policy that has been a consistent form of government exhibiting a larger role in American society. Given that Social Security has been an active government welfare policy for more than 80 years, it can be expected that individuals will view this policy favorably or at least consistently across geographic areas and across political ideologies. Further supporting this logic, a March 2018 poll of 1,945 respondents from the National Opinion Research Center and the Associated Press revealed that 51% of those surveyed claimed that they rely on or will rely on Social Security either "completely" or "quite a bit" as they get older (NORC Long-Term Care Poll 2018). In the ANES survey, Americans were asked whether Social Security spending should be decreased or cut out entirely, kept the same, or

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increased. The dependent variable measuring opinions on Social Security spending is coded from 0-2 with 0 representing the opinion that Social Security spending should be decreased or cut out entirely, 1 representing the opinion that Social Security spending should be kept the same, and 2 representing the opinion that Social Security spending should be increased. In similar fashion to the first two analyses, this analysis also incorporates an interaction between ideology and geography to examine whether place moderates or shifts opinions regarding Social Security across geography and ideology. The results of the ordered logistic regression are found in Table 5.

Table 5: Geographic Perspectives on Social Security Spending

Variables	Model 1 Views on Government Spending for Social Security	Model 2 (Interaction of Ideology and Geography
Suburban	0.0383	-0.00267
	(0.0826)	(0.153)
Mid-Size	0.0523	-0.0723
	(0.0755)	(0.134)
Rural	0.278**	0.682**
	(0.119)	(0.329)
Length of Residency	0.000713	0.000736
	(0.00122)	(0.00122)
Moderate	-0.109	-0.260*
	(0.0796)	(0.147)
Conservative	-0.514***	-0.518***
	(0.0732)	(0.131)
Black	1.050***	1.060***
	(0.118)	(0.118)
Hispanic	0.496***	0.506***
	(0.102)	(0.102)
Other	0.104	0.107
	(0.164)	(0.164)
Gender	0.508***	0.503***
	(0.0582)	(0.0583)
Education	-0.305***	-0.303***
	(0.0282)	(0.0282)
Age	-0.00317*	-0.00304
	(0.00185)	(0.00185)
Income	-0.125***	-0.126***
	(0.0293)	(0.0293)
South	0.0375	0.0314

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	(0.0658)	(0.0660)
Suburban x Moderate	-	0.270
		(0.216)
Suburban x Conservative	-	-0.0745
		(0.196)
Mid-Size x Moderate	-	0.263
		(0.190)
Mid-Size x Conservative	-	0.109
		(0.172)
Rural x Moderate	-	-0.424
		(0.387)
Rural x Conservative	-	-0.448
		(0.365)
Year: 1996	-0.229***	-0.227***
	(0.0794)	(0.0796)
Year: 2000	0.697***	0.696***
	(0.105)	(0.105)
Year: 2004	0.623***	0.624***
	(0.0951)	(0.0953)
Year: 2008	0.646***	0.646***
	(0.0865)	(0.0867)
Cut 1	-3.763***	-3.802***
	(0.184)	(0.197)
Cut 2	-0.750***	-0.787***
	(0.165)	(0.180)
Observations	5,199	5,199
Pseudo R^2	.092	.092
Ordered Logistic Regression/Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

According to the results in Table 5, the results are mixed. From the analysis, it appears that support for Social Security spending is fairly constant and similar across geographic areas; however, in both Models 1 and 2, rural Americans are slightly more supportive of increased spending on Social Security and expansion, compared to urban Americans running counter to the logic of the first hypothesis. Still, as evidenced in the first two analyses, ideology still plays a pivotal role in determining attitudes towards Social Security spending with conservatives being less favorable compared to liberals in both models, supporting the second hypothesis. Furthermore, as in the first two analyses, wealthier Americans were less supportive of increased Social Security spending. To determine whether opinions toward Social Security are different across geography and ideology, a marginal effects analysis of the interaction between the two will

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illustrate any differences. As the outcomes of interest in the first two analyses focused on the propensity for Americans to desire *less* government spending or involvement, here the outcome of interest is the desired *increase* in government spending of Social Security. The results of the marginal effects analysis of the interaction are found in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Interaction between Ideology and Geography on Social Security Spending



According to the marginal effects analysis, rural liberals are significantly more favorable towards spending on Social Security compared to liberals from urban areas. Additionally, rural conservatives appear to be more supportive of Social Security than their ideological compatriots from other geographic areas, although the difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, while there is evidence that rural Americans desire less government spending in general and increases in welfare spending, Social Security, which has benefited Americans across the country for quite some time, is viewed favorably by that group. Perhaps the most important finding here is that across ideologies, rural Americans were slightly more favorable towards increases in Social Security spending, especially rural liberals.[4] It is possible that rural liberals may look to Social Security not only as a positive government benefit due to their ideological predispositions, but

[4] Using a pairwise comparison test between each interaction of ideology and geography, the difference between rural liberals and liberals from the other three geographic areas is statistically significant at $p<.05$.

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one that helps their friends, neighbors, and their community with whom they share a geographic identity.

Limitations and Considerations

While the findings demonstrate the role of place influences perceptions of politics and public policy, this research has some limitations. First, the sample of rural respondents is significantly smaller compared to the other geographic areas. Therefore, the low sample size of rural respondents is leading to larger confidence intervals in regard to the predicted probabilities when comparing ideology across geography. When coding for a respondent's geography using the NCHS coding scheme, I wanted to capture respondents who were the *most* distinctly rural and therefore were not living in micropolitan or scattered suburban areas around a major metro area. In only utilizing one specific classification for rural, I was able to identify those who lived in rural areas that were furthest away from other localities. In order to further understand how politics is viewed, discussed, or different between urban and rural areas, future research will require an emphasis or oversampling of rural areas due to the small sample sizes of rural respondents in existing survey research.

Additionally, the data, while appropriate, is only limited to a specific set of years from 1994-2008. Examining a longer period of time would be beneficial to track the development and trends of perceptions on government and public policy across different geographic areas. In doing so, researchers will be able to better understand how the urban-rural division in America has formed across time. Overall, the data did not provide a perfect picture that mirrors the national demographics of geography (where 14% of Americans live in rural areas); however, the data along with the analyses further confirm that the place in which someone lives can influence perceptions of the role of government.

Conclusion

As seen from previous literature, partisanship, ideology, and race have been significant factors in the development of political attitudes and opinions. This study incorporates the analysis of political geography in order to explain whether the location in which someone lives is just as much of a factor on an individual's perceptions of government and the provision of government services. The research presented here further buttresses the idea that geography can matter in explaining political attitudes in some situations. The rationale behind this research was not only to demonstrate the value of geography in the study of public opinion, but also to empirically examine the idea that America is divided into two distinct geographic "camps:" urban and rural. The findings in the empirical analyses suggest geography can be an influential factor in affecting individual perceptions towards government or specific government policies, especially among a specific group: rural liberals. Individuals in rural areas, especially those who considered themselves liberal and to a lesser degree moderates, demonstrated significant differences in perceptions on the role of government compared to those respondents with the same ideologies in urban and suburban and mid-size areas. Therefore, the findings suggest that

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the perspectives of liberal Americans from rural areas regarding government spending are more nuanced than liberals from other regions. Conservatives, unsurprisingly, were consistently in favor of reducing the amount of spending for public services and programs, compared to liberals across geographic areas.

Based on the results of the study, liberals who lived in rural areas were more likely to support decreases in general spending for public services and welfare, thereby demonstrating that geography has a significant influence upon one's political perspectives and can affect their attitudes regarding the role of government. These results indicate that liberals who live in rural areas have their opinions moderated in perhaps an attempt to "blend in" or become more like those within their rural environment. As liberals are in large part "outnumbered" by conservatives in rural America, rural liberals' perceptions of politics may be more "liberal" than their fellow community members, yet they still hold onto the belief that increased government spending and welfare benefits are not benefiting their communities. Still, rural liberals demonstrated a greater level of support for Social Security, a policy that has been popular among Americans since its inception.

In short, this study illustrates that political perceptions of individuals between urban and rural America are nuanced and the study of rural Americans who consider themselves liberal merits further consideration as this group perhaps holds its own perspective of the political world. The findings of this study also demonstrate that public opinion among liberals and conservative is conditional upon where they live; therefore, such individuals who identify themselves as either liberal or conservative cannot be assumed to hold more liberal or more conservative attitudes on issues of public policy. For political candidates, liberal Democratic candidates should not discount rural Americans as they appear to be generally supportive of social programs such as Social Security, yet they must be wary of promoting large-scale government programs in rural areas as those voters are perhaps more skeptical or at least more moderate when it comes to spending more on public policies. Given the ideological breakdown of rural areas, Republicans attract a great deal of support from these communities, therefore the Republican message of reducing "big-government" spending continues to resonate with rural Americans.

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Appendix

Summary Statistics of Independent Control Variables					
Variables	n	Percent	Std Dev	Min	Max
Age	6161	100%	16.63	18	93
Income	6161	100%	1.13	1	5
0 – 16 Percentile	846	13.7%			
17 – 33 Percentile	994	16.1%			
34 – 67 Percentile	2210	35.9%			
68 – 95 Percentile	1662	27%			
96 – 100 Percentile	449	7.3%			
Length of Res.	6161	100%	26.03	0	90
Race	6161	100%	0.82	0	3
White	4575	74.3%			
Black	675	10.9%			
Hispanic	710	11.5%			
Other	201	3.3%			
Ideology	6161	100%	0.81	0	2
Liberal	1586	25.7%			
Moderate	1993	32.4%			
Conservative	2582	41.9%			
Education	6161	100%	1.14	0	4
Not Completed HS	521	8.5%			
High School Diploma	1713	27.8%			
Some College	1905	30.9%			
College Degree	1299	21.1%			
Advanced Degree	723	11.7%			
Gender	6161	100%	0.5	0	1
Male	2964	48.1%			
Female	3197	51.9%			
Geographic Region	6161	100.0%	0.47	0	1
Non-South	4086	66.3%			
South	2075	33.7%			

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ANES Question Wording

Government Services

- "Some people think the government should provide fewer services in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Where would you place yourself on this scale?"

Welfare Spending

- "If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which of the following programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending decreased: Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?"

Social Security Spending

- "If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which of the following programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending decreased: Should federal spending on Social Security be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?"

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