

Educated for What?

By E. KENNETH FEAVER

Centuries ago a weatherbeaten teacher wrote to his students an open letter in which he said these words:

Finally, brethren, whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is gracious, if there is any excellence, if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things. (Phillippians 4:8.)

Scarcely anywhere in human literature has a directive for good living been better put. Beyond our particular proficiencies as persons trained to do a job we are under constant compulsion so to live that the fullness of life for ourselves and for our fellowmen can be realized. Our work and the competence we have in it are never to be divorced from the larger human situation to which we belong. We are craftsmen, but not just craftsmen. We are teachers, but not just teachers. We are doctors, but not just doctors. We are research scholars, but not just research scholars. We are first of all human beings in human relationship one with another and are thereby under an imperative to accept obligations and responsibilities broader and longer, higher and deeper, than those involved in our specific business, job, or profession. As that erudite present-day philosopher, Mr. Pogo, has put it: "Animals is animals; but people still make the best type of human beings." The individual in right relations with his fellow on all levels of human experience is the ultimate test of the validity of our living.

With this perspective in the back of our minds, I want to come to the question before us tonight: Educated for what? In making reply to this question, I shall be speaking out of the framework of Western culture, and, more specifically, out of the framework of the Judeo-Christian point of view. Yet, aware of the vantage point, what I shall say, I believe, cannot be confined, at least in general, to any culture; it shall be as appropriate for the cultures of the Orient or of Africa as for the culture of the West. Man is greater than his systems; and, though we cannot with too great accuracy declare what he shares in common with all segments of his species, still we do have pretty clear intimations of that which is basic and common to his

life whatever his color or race, his stage of development, his sophistication, might be. These things we can talk about; these things we must talk about if we are to rescue ourselves from the discarded rubble heaps of time—and, let me add here, I can find no evidence for the thesis that man by nature is of necessity such a creature that he must survive; on the contrary, the only evidence I can see clearly written across the pages of history is that except man does prove himself competent to adjust with facility to his changing environment he may be disposed of with the same regularity and ease with which we abandon a worn-out automobile: to wit, war and our willingness to indulge in it. Man as man has certain responsibilities in regard to himself, to his fellowmen, to the larger world about him, to God. These cannot be ignored or by-passed. Especially are these responsibilities pressing upon the educated man. He, of all men, should be equipped to ask of himself directly: Educated for what?

As we review the contemporary scene, several urgent matters come into clear focus. One is this: the educated man must bring himself to acknowledge and appreciate the demands of justice in all human relations.

It is difficult for any generation to comprehend its situation and to appreciate the forces at work within it. There are those who would have us believe that a demonic force out of the blue catapulted itself into this twentieth century to unsettle our peaceful and well-ordered society; they would tell us that this demonic force entered our century without cause and without reason. This view, more popularly held than we like to think (even in our halls of learning), is naïve. No great upheaval in human affairs comes without long and deeply rooted antecedents. That complacent, comfortable society, which Matthew Arnold somewhere around the middle of the 19th century described as the dawning of an age which lives by "the sweet reasonableness of things," was laying the foundations for the revolution which we today are experiencing throughout the world. Even as late as the first decade of this century many able people in

Europe and America were seeing no ominous clouds upon the eastern horizon; indeed as late as 1910 they were declaring across the continents of Europe and America that war was unthinkable; we had become too intelligent for that. Behold, how great can be the blindness of the competent! Today we are in the position to see this in regard to the era closed by the outbreak of the first World War. But what do we see of the era begun by this war?

The annals of human history are plaintively persistent upon this: justice must be done. Native to the yearnings of the human soul is, however you may wish to describe it, that which I shall call "the indwelling sense of the rightness of things." Mankind has never accomplished it, but mankind has always seen as a prospect and held as a hope what the fiery prophet of Tekoa declared more than 2,500 years ago,

*Let justice roll down like waters,
And righteousness like a perennial stream.*

We stand tonight on a spot where this ancient insight ought to be given modern expression. If from any source in our whole culture we should anticipate the open, frank recognition of the fact that justice will not forever hold its peace, it is from those whose privilege it has been and is to move through our halls of higher learning. Our expectation unfortunately has not been adequately vindicated. One of the brutal facts of our present is that our educated people have aborted their competence; they have turned their learning into an instrument of selfishness and greed; they have exercised their ingenuity to sow the seeds of disorder. As Professor Brunner has said of his people, so it may be said of us: "Even in so sound a democracy as Switzerland, it has happened again and again that the majority of the people has rejected the just law and chosen the unjust law." (*Justice and the Social Order*, p. 201.)

We in America shall not prove ourselves worthy of the democracy which we have inherited unless we demonstrate that we know how to meet the demands of justice in our time. More bluntly, we in America shall not preserve this

Marxistic hate-ideology, always and inevitably at war, and since war is conducted on the principles quoted above, all attempts at reasonable discussion are futile. If the principle of logic is denied, there is no possibility of any mutual understanding. The well is poisoned. You may have the most sincere and reasonable intentions to be fair and to do justice—to the Marxist this is merely a ruse and hypocrisy.

Whoever attacks or ignores reason and philosophy is the loser. His ignorance of philosophy shows up his own philosophy of ignorance. Marxism, by undermining philosophy as an ideological handmaiden of material power-interests, has branded itself as nothing but an ideology; "truth" depends on those in power who reach the tactical decision, what sort of double-talk might be the most opportunistic at the moment. Hence the frightening anxiety of all, living under this terror, to be orthodox and to swing along with the party line at the right moment. Hence also the impoverishment of thinking, whose richness depends on the freedom of individuals to bring to public discussion their own views and abilities. Truth must be replaced by uniform and cominform propaganda.

III.

The third negation is the progressive abolition of progress. When an epidemic makes progress or when you have a progressive tuberculosis you are subject to a progression which you would rather not have. Progress in this naturalistic sense is the Marxist conception of it. It is thought of as an irresistible natural power in which man is a helpless victim. He can do nothing to stem this sort of "progress."

Marx had inherited the term progress from Hegel. But he claims to have reversed its meaning. Hegel says that the meaning of history is a "progression in the consciousness of freedom." If Marx is correct in saying that he has put Hegel's philosophy upside down, the sentence then would read "The meaning of history is progression in the unconsciousness of slavery."

In Hegel's philosophy the idea of progress is inseparable from a widening, deepening, improved understanding of truth. It is a more mature formulation of what the Enlightenment had in mind when reason was said to liberate man from narrow provincialisms, prejudices, and superstitions. We are entitled to speak of progress, if a former world view is seen through its limitations, when its truth becomes a partial aspect of a wider truth. In such a maturing, dialectical progression we preserve the individual differences and former

insights, while at the same time we also cancel them in favor of a revised and more comprehensive knowledge. And Hegel is careful to state that such a progress is tied up with the earnest endeavor in seeking truth, and that it is therefore not a blind or irresponsible change in time. What is later in time is not therefore also more spiritual or true in content: "The logical order in ideas must not be confused with their order in the sequence of time."

Marx's reaction against Hegel and his step "forward" in "the order of time" is at the same time many steps "backward" in the "logical order of ideas." Marxism is truly reactionary.

To distinguish between a natural progression or change and a meaningful progress we need values, norms, standards by which we evaluate a change. A change is a progress in a philosophical sense only if life becomes richer, more meaningful, more valuable to individuals and societies; or, to put it negatively, if suffering, misery, and ignorance are diminished. But since Marx assumes that reality is all physical, natural, material, he has no such spiritual value which could serve as a norm of progress or regress.

And since he further believes that philosophy should be replaced by natural sciences, he is bent on finding progress as a natural or scientific "law." This he proclaims to have found and all Marxists parrot after him that progress is proven scientifically. As Lenin states it: "Science is a copy, a reflex, a photograph of matter in movement." This dogmatic and blind scientism makes scientific progress impossible.

Scientific progress has always rested on logical questions put to nature. Physical phenomena are criticized, not blindly accepted at their face value. Physical science itself is not physical. It is a logical method, by which spatio-temporal changes are measured and predicted. And philosophy of science has shown that this measuring or quantitative description of appearances can never equate its equations with a

knowledge of reality. A philosophical scientist knows the limit of his methods. Only when we know our various limitations have we made true human progress.

Marxism has stifled both the scientific as well as the philosophical progress. The practical technical application of sciences becomes a mysterious progressive process of nonsense—as if the value quality of human life were dependent on a more efficient mechanism and technicism. Man himself, a physical object among other objects, can now be mechanically manipulated. Man is a mass subject to impersonal laws. Scientism in political practice leads to the most revolting dehumanization of life known to history.

IV.

The fourth negation is the negation of freedom and democracy. The term "democracy" has assumed an ideal meaning for us, which the Greek expression itself does not contain. Whether a "people's rule" is desirable or not, depends on what sort of people is going to rule by what sort of rule. The tacit assumption that it will be a good people or that its rule is good speaks well for our confidence in man, but any unexamined optimism is nevertheless a bit naïve. The thoughtless communistic stuttering "people's democracy" shows how empty the term can be—it approaches a vacuum.

What we really mean by the term is not what the term means. What we have in mind is rather freedom. And all freedom is based on the freedom to think and to say what you think. Without thinking, without sharing universal ideas through which we can communicate and form a community, all other freedoms would instantly collapse. The absence of logical thinking is insanity. If we "lose our mind" and with it our freedom, we lose everything.

Thinking is a social process. One does not think in isolation. One thinks in meeting the thoughts of others. If I meet you and you represent a thought differing from my own, we exchange ideas and each of

Continued back cover



About the Author

Gustav Mueller, Ph. D., University of Bern, author and scholar, has written poems, plays, novels, and a number of books in his special field, philosophy. Philosophy of Our Uncertainties (1936) and Education Limited (1949) were published by the University of Oklahoma Press. Professor of Philosophy, Dr. Mueller is also chairman of the committee which directs the Program in Letters in the College of Arts and Sciences.

der the direct demand of the citizens within their borders. I learned long ago out on the farm that the way to get suckers at the top of the tree is to get at the suckers at the bottom.

I put this matter before you now. The achievement which these ceremonies take notice of and the congratulations which they invoke can be validated alone by your capacity to produce the fruits of such preparation. Any fool can get through college; he just has to be a little smart. But only a man of integrity who arouses himself to inquire into and to live by the largest moral and spiritual insights and discipline the race has developed can prove himself worthy of his own effort, the expenditure of public funds, the earnest resolve of our society to give him the chance to gain an adequate education. The receiving of an education puts a person under sacred obligation. It equips him with the ability to do a specific job within his society. But if it has done its task well and if the recipient has understood the purpose of that task, then his education expects him to assume the responsibility of life given in service to the common good.

I want to close my remarks with a picture vividly drawn of that which divides us humans:

Then the King will say to those at his right hand. "Come, O blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you clothed me, I was sick and you visited me, I was in prison and you came to me." Then the righteous will answer him, "Lord, when did we see thee hungry and feed thee, or thirsty and give thee drink? And when did we see thee a stranger and welcome thee, or naked and clothe thee: And when did we see thee sick or in prison and visit thee?" And the King will answer them, "Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me." Then he will say to those at his left hand, "Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels; for I was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me no drink, I was a stranger and you did not welcome me, naked and you did not clothe me, sick and in prison and you did not visit me." Then they also will answer, "Lord, when did we see thee hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did not minister to thee?" Then he will answer them, "Truly, I say to you, as you did it not to one of the least of these, you did it not to me." And they will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life. (Matthew 25:34-46.)

The picture makes its point. The ultimate issues of life are human issues. Our education is complete only when we learn that human good supersedes all other good. We are made to live as responsible persons in creative community.

What Is Marxism?

By GUSTAV MUELLER

Marxism is an ideology of hate, expressed in four negations.

I.

The first and foremost negation is the negation of God and of man's believed relation to Him, which is religion. A rabid, militant atheism fired the imagination of the young Marx. In the preface to his doctoral dissertation on the materialistic philosophy of nature in Democritus and Epicurus he says: "Philosophy does not conceal it: In simple words, I hate all the gods; this confession of Prometheus is also her own confession, her dictate against all earthly and heavenly deities, which do not acknowledge man's own consciousness as the absolute and supreme being. There shall be no god above it."

And in his so-called *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, a pretentious political pamphlet, which does not come to grips with Hegel's great ethical work at all—the title is a false claim—he says: "Criticism of religion is the basis of all further criticism. Man has sought in the phantastic realm of heaven only his own reflected image. What he sought there, was the superman. This magnified image of himself is pure illusion; by it man is undoing himself (*Unmensch*) and now he will no longer be inclined to be satisfied with this mirage instead of with his own true reality which he now must seek. . . . The fight against religion is at the same time a fight against that world, whose spiritual aura religion is . . . religion is the opium for the people."

Friedrich Engels, the inseparable friend and companion of Marx, carries this on as follows: "The fight against religion, our emancipation from it, and the emancipation of the world from it is the purpose of our whole work from morning to night (*einzig Tagewerk*). . . . The pretension of man to be anything but natural . . . is the root of all untruth and of all lies. Therefore we have declared war on religion and on all religious conceptions."

Marx makes it perfectly clear how this war is to be conducted. Religion is not an object of knowledge, which is merely to be criticised, it is "our enemy, which we do not want to refute but to annihilate . . .

in such a struggle the question is not, whether the opponent is an equal, a noble or an interesting opponent, the only thing that matters is to strike the mortal blow."

II.

The second negation is the negation of reason. Reason is the center of philosophy. Philosophy is a free and logical reflection on all meanings of human existence. It can not live except in freedom—in the freedom to serve the truth. As Hegel puts it: Philosophy must be open to that which is and it must clearly think and say what it is. Reason in that sense is not a natural thing among other things, let alone a physical process which simply occurs. It is rather an obliging and infinite task, a personal commitment and a spiritual reality. As such it points back or implies a world-ground which makes it possible.

Marx denies this classical and idealistic conception of reason and philosophy. With his own venomous arrogance he declares in the preface to *Das Kapital* that he has reformed philosophy, that he has put Hegel upside down (*umgestülpt*), and that philosophy and reason are nothing but ideology.

The term "ideology" he found as a weapon, wielded by French materialists of the eighteenth century. It means that there is no authentic spiritual reality. The implications of this position are terrific. You can never trust what a man says. There is no truth. There is no obligation in any agreement. All such rational conduct of life is nothing but "bourgeois ideology."

Philosophy degraded into ideology becomes the dogmatism of the party line, dictated by momentary power-interest. It is the Marxist dogma, that "all ideality is nothing but material interests fed back (*umgesetzt*) through a human head." Since the "human head" is also physical and material, the sentence says that all ideality is nothing but physical matter "transposed through other physical matter."

All philosophy is the "superstructure" or ideology of material and physical class-interests. And since those so-called "classes" are, in accordance with the whole