Lifetime Term Limits: The Impact on Four State Legislatures
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2004.25.0.305-320Abstract
This research examines the roll call voting record of state legislators in Arkansas, California, Michigan, and Missouri in order to assess if there are any substantive differences between those legislators who are nearing retirement due to term limits (“last term” legislators) and those legislators who are at an earlier stage of their legislative careers. These are the only four states in the United States that have lifetime term limits in full effect. Binomial logit analysis of key roll call votes suggests that these “last term” legislators stand apart from their other colleagues on certain issues. This characteristic arises from the increased tendency of last-term legislators to defy the party leadership, albeit on a limited number of bills. This “independent streak” of last-term legislators is even more pronounced among Republican legislators, although this effect is not present in the state of California. Therefore, term limits appear to have a modest, but potentially significant effect on the policy preferences of legislators.References
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