By Invitation Only: Controlling Interest Group Access to the Oval Office
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2004.25.0.221-240Abstract
Does the exchange model used to explain interest group influence with Congress and the bureaucracy hold leverage over patterns of lobbyist contact with the president? In this paper I argue that there is good reason to believe that it does not. Rather, I argue that the president and his immediate staff often keep interest groups at arm’s length. Instead of being able to acquire face time with senior administration staff to press their own cases, lobbyists are largely granted access only when they are needed to build support for the president’s policy agenda in Congress or with the public. Using data drawn in part from the 1996 filings of interest groups under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, I analyze lobbyists’ contact with the White House to learn what types of circumstances appear to drive contact between interest groups and the president. The evidence suggests that the president-interest group connection is largely determined by the White House based on ideological congruence rather than a two-way flow of communication and influence.References
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