Timing an Election: The Impact on the Party in Government

Authors

  • Steven D. Roper
  • Christopher Andrews

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2002.23.0.305-318

Abstract

A commonly found feature in many parliamentary democracies is the power of the government to call elections before the completion of a full term of office. Based on an examination of British and Canadian general elections during the 1940 to 2000 period, we find that it is not a good decision for the governing parties to wait the full term allowable between elections. The general pattern is that the longer the government waits to call an election, the worse its chances for gaining seats. This is a parliamentary effect similar to the honeymoon period commonly associated with presidential regimes.

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Published

2003-01-01

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